太空發射系統
參考

↑  Europa Lander Mission Concept Overview （页面存档备份，存于） Grace Tan-Wang, Steve Sell, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, NASA, AbSciCon2019, Bellevue, Washington. 26 June 2019  本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。
↑  Clark, Stephen. . Spaceflightnow. 2020-07-14  [2021-10-13]. （原始内容存档于2021-10-06）.
↑  Siegel, Ethan. . Forbes. 2017-09-19  [2021-10-13]. （原始内容存档于2021-07-05）.
↑   (PDF). NASA.   [2021-10-13]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2021-04-16）.
↑  Billings, Lee. . Scientific American. 2019-11-12  [2021-10-13]. （原始内容存档于2021-07-25）.
↑  .   [2021-01-17]. （原始内容存档于2021-02-09）.
↑  https://twitter.com/NASA/status/1590116388403785729 （页面存档备份，存于） SLS Launch delayed to 16th Nov
↑  https://twitter.com/NASA_SLS/status/1592773054312038400 （页面存档备份，存于） SLS-1 Launch
↑  https://twitter.com/NASA_Orion/status/1592803012245917697 （页面存档备份，存于） Orion seperated from ICPS
↑  Bergin, Chris. . nasaspaceflight.com. 2011-07-27  [2011-07-28]. （原始内容存档于2011-08-12）.
1 2  Ferris Valyn. . Space Frontier Foundation. 2011-09-15  [2011-09-16]. （原始内容存档于2011-10-06）.
↑  . moonandback.com. 2011-10-04  [2011-10-20]. （原始内容存档于2011-10-03）.
1 2 3  . Competitive Space Task Force. 2011-10-04  [2011-10-20]. （原始内容存档于2011-10-27）.
1 2 3  Henry Vanderbilt. . moonandback.com. 2011-09-15  [2012-01-26]. （原始内容存档于2012-03-31）.
↑
1 2  Rick Tumlinson. . Huffington Post. 2011-09-15  [2014-09-09]. （原始内容存档于2014-09-10）.  参数|newspaper=与模板{{cite web}}不匹配（建议改用{{cite news}}或|website=） (帮助)
↑  Davenport, Christian. . Washington Post. 2021-02-25  [2021-02-26]. （原始内容存档于2021-10-03）.
↑  . Space News. January 2014  [2015-08-25]. （原始内容存档于2021-10-03）.
↑  . 2015  [2015-08-25]. （原始内容存档于2015-08-24）.
↑  . ArsTechnica. 2019-06-19  [2019-08-01]. （原始内容存档于2019-08-14）.
↑  . Space News. 2019-06-19  [2019-08-01]. （原始内容存档于2021-10-03）.
1 2 3 4   (PDF). NASA – Office of Inspector General – Office of Audits. 2020-03-10  [2020-09-14]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2020-08-28）. Based on our review of SLS Program cost reporting, we found that the Program exceeded its Agency Baseline Commitment (ABC) by at least 33 percent at the end of FY 2019, a figure that could reach 43 percent or higher if additional delays push the launch date for Artemis I beyond November 2020. This is due to cost increases tied to Artemis I and a December 2017 replan that removed almost $1 billion of costs from the ABC without lowering the baseline, thereby masking the impact of Artemis I’s projected 19-month schedule delay from November 2018 to a June 2020 launch date. Since the replan, the SLS Program now projects the Artemis I launch will be delayed to at least spring 2021 or later. Further, we found NASA’s ABC cost reporting only tracks Artemis I-related activities and not additional expenditures of almost $6 billion through FY 2020 that are not being reported or tracked through the official congressional cost commitment or the ABC. [...] as a result of delaying Artemis I up to 19 months to June 2020, NASA conducted a replan of the SLS Program in 2017 and removed $889 million in Booster and RS-25 Engine-related development costs because SLS Program officials determined those activities were not directly tied to Artemis I. [...] In our judgement, the removal of these costs should have reduced the SLS Program’s ABC development costs from $7.02 billion to $6.13 billion. [...] SLS Program and HEOMD officials disagreed with our assessment and stated the SLS Program’s change in cost estimates for the Booster and Engines element offices were not a removal of costs but rather a reallocation of those activities to appropriately account for them as non-Artemis I costs. [...] Federal law requires that any time Agency program managers have reasonable knowledge that development costs are likely to exceed the ABC by more than 30 percent, they must notify the NASA Administrator. Once the Administrator determines the SLS Program will exceed the development cost baseline by 30 percent or more, NASA is required to notify Congress and rebaseline program costs and schedule commitments.  If the Administrator notifies Congress of the need to rebaseline, NASA is required to stop funding program activities within 18 months unless Congress provides approval and additional appropriations. In our judgement, using NASA’s cost estimates from October 2019 and accounting for the removed costs from the replan, the SLS Program was required to rebaseline when the program exceeded its ABC by 33 percent at the end of FY 2019, an increase that could reach 43 percent or higher by the Artemis I launch date.   本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。
↑   (PDF). GAO.   [2020-09-15]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2021-10-03）. NASA’s current approach for reporting cost growth misrepresents the cost performance of the program and thus undermines the usefulness of a baseline as an oversight tool. NASA’s space flight program and project management requirements state that the agency baseline commitment for a program is the basis for the agency’s commitment to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Congress based on program requirements, cost, schedule, technical content, and an agreed-to joint cost and schedule confidence level. Removing effort that amounts to more than a tenth of a program’s development cost baseline is a change in the commitment to OMB and the Congress and results in a baseline that does not reflect actual effort. [...] Further, the baseline is a key tool against which to measure the cost and schedule performance of a program. A program must be rebaselined and reauthorized by the Congress if the Administrator determines that development costs will increase by more than 30 percent. Accounting for shifted costs, our analysis indicates that NASA has reached 29.0 percent development cost growth for the SLS program. [...] In addition, as we previously reported in May 2014, NASA does not have a cost and schedule baseline for SLS beyond the first flight. As a result, NASA cannot monitor or track costs shifted beyond EM-1 against a baseline. We recommended that NASA establish cost and schedule baselines that address the life cycle of each SLS increment, as well as for any evolved Orion or ground systems capability. NASA partially concurred with the recommendation, but has not taken any action to date. [...] By not adjusting the SLS baseline to account for the reduced scope, NASA will continue to report costs against an inflated baseline, hence underreporting the extent of cost growth. NASA’s Associate Administrator and Chief Financial Officer stated that they understood our rationale for removing these costs from the EM-1 baseline and agreed that not doing so could result in underreporting of cost growth. Further, the Associate Administrator told us that the agency will be relooking at the SLS program’s schedule, baseline, and calculation of cost growth.   本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。
1 2   (新闻稿). NASA. 2020-05-01  [2020-05-04]. （原始内容存档于2020-05-01）.   本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。
↑  Berger, Eric. . Ars Technica. 2020-05-01  [2020-05-04]. （原始内容存档于2020-05-04）.
↑  . Politico. 2020  [2020-09-11]. （原始内容存档于2020-09-11）.
↑  Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee; Augustine, Austin; Chyba, Kennel; Bejmuk, Crawley; Lyles, Chiao; Greason, Ride.  (PDF). NASA. October 2009  [2010-04-15]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2019-02-16）.   本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。
↑   (PDF). The Planetary Society. 2011-07-12  [2012-01-26]. （原始内容 (PDF)存档于2012-03-29）.
↑  Rohrabacher, Dana. . 2011-09-14  [2011-09-14]. （原始内容存档于2011-09-24）.   本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。
↑  . parabolicarc.com. 2011-08-24  [2011-09-15]. （原始内容存档于2014-11-26）.
↑  Jeff Foust. . The Space Review. 2011-09-15  [2011-10-20]. （原始内容存档于2011-10-17）.
↑  Jeff Foust. . The Space Review. 2011-11-01  [2011-10-20]. （原始内容存档于2011-10-15）.
↑  Mohney, Doug. . Satellite Spotlight. 2011-10-21  [2011-11-10]. （原始内容存档于2016-03-03）.
↑   (PDF). HAT Technical Interchange Meeting. 2011-07-21  [2012-05-25]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2021-10-01）.
↑  Cowing, Keith. . SpaceRef. 2011-10-12  [2011-11-10]. （原始内容存档于2021-10-03）.
↑   (PDF). Georgia Institute of Technology / National Institute of Aerospace. 2010-09-02  [2012-03-07]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2016-02-04）.
↑   (PDF). United Launch Alliance. 2009. （原始内容 (PDF)存档于2012-10-21）.
↑  Grant Bonin. . The Space Review. 2011-06-06  [2011-09-20]. （原始内容存档于2012-11-23）.
↑  Robert Zubrin. . Mars Society. 2011-05-14. （原始内容存档于2012-03-19）.
↑  Andrew Gasser. . The Space Review. 2011-10-24  [2011-10-31]. （原始内容存档于2011-10-27）.
↑  Berger, Eric. . 2019-08-01  [2019-08-05]. （原始内容存档于2019-08-05）.
↑  Boyle, Alan. . MSNBC. 2011-12-07. （原始内容存档于2012-01-07）.
↑  Strickland, John K. Jr. . National Space Society.   [2012-01-04]. （原始内容存档于2015-07-08）.
↑  . Aviation Week. 2010-12-02. （原始内容存档于2012-07-27）.
. NASA.   [2016-06-23]. （原始内容存档于2021-09-30）.   本文含有此來源中屬於公有领域的内容。