新春攻勢
註腳

↑  Smedberg, p. 188
↑  . History.   [2014-12-22]. （原始内容存档于2013-10-29）.
↑  Hoang, p. 8.
↑  The South Vietnamese regime estimated North Vietnamese forces at 323,000, including 130,000 regulars and 160,000 guerrillas. Hoang, p. 10. MACV estimated that strength at 330,000. The CIA and the U.S. State Department concluded that the North Vietnamese force level lay somewhere between 435,000 and 595,000. Dougan and Weiss, p. 184.
↑  Tổng công kích, Tổng nổi dậy Tết mậu thân 1968 (Tet Offensive 1968) – ARVN's Đại Nam publishing in 1969, p. 35
↑  Does not include ARVN or U.S. casualties incurred during the "Border Battles"; ARVN killed, wounded, or missing from Phase III; U.S. wounded from Phase III; or U.S. missing during Phases II and III.
↑  Steel and Blood: South Vietnamese Armor and the War for Southeast Asia. Naval Institute Press, 2008. P 33
↑  Includes casualties incurred during the "Border Battles", Tet Mau Than, and the second and third phases of the offensive. General Tran Van Tra claimed that from January through August 1968 the offensive had cost North Vietnam more than 75.000 dead and wounded. This is probably a low estimate. Tran Van Tra, Tet, in Jayne S. Warner and Luu Doan Huynh, eds., The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and American Perspectives. Armonk NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1993, pgs. 49 & 50.
↑  PAVN's Department of warfare,  124th/TGi, document 1.103 (11-2-1969)
↑  Ang, p. 351. Two interpretations of North Vietnamese goals have continued to dominate Western historical debate. The first maintained that the political consequences of the winter-spring offensive were an intended rather than an unintended consequence. This view was supported by William Westmoreland and his friend Jamie Salt in A Soldier Reports, Garden City NY: Doubleday, 1976, p. 322; Harry G. Summers in On Strategy, Novato CA: Presidio Press, 1982, p. 133; Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts, The Irony of Vietnam, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1979, pp. 333–334; and Schmitz p. 90. This thesis appeared logical in hindsight, but it "fails to account for any realistic North Vietnamese military objectives, the logical prerequisite for an effort to influence American opinion." James J. Wirtz in The Tet Offensive, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1991, p. 18. The second thesis (which was also supported by the majority of contemporary captured Vietcong documents) was that the goal of the offensive was the immediate toppling of the Saigon government or, at the very least, the destruction of the government apparatus, the installation of a coalition government, or the occupation of large tracts of South Vietnamese territory. Historians supporting this view are Stanley Karnow in Vietnam, New York: Viking, 1983, p. 537; U.S. Grant Sharp in Strategy for Defeat, San Rafael CA: Presidio Press, 1978, p. 214; Patrick McGarvey in Visions of Victory, Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1969; and Wirtz, p. 60.
1 2 3 4 5  James H. Willbanks. . Columbia University Press. 2008年  [2013-10-07]. ISBN 978-0-231-12841-4. （原始内容存档于2014-04-09）. （英文）
↑  Schulimson, p. 213. A PAVN document allegedly captured by the ARVN stated that 1,042 troops had been killed in the city proper and that several times that number had been wounded. Hoang, p. 84.
1 2  Schulimson, Jack; Blaisol, Leonard; Smith, Charles R.; Dawson, David.  (PDF). Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, United States Marine Corps. 1997年  [2015-01-30]. ISBN 0-16-049125-8. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2019-06-12）. （英文）
↑  Dougan and Weiss, p. 35. This was the version given in Douglas Pike's The Viet Cong Strategy of Terror, published by the U.S. Mission in 1970.
↑  Lewy, Gunther. . New York: Oxford University Press. 1980: 274. ISBN 0-19-502732-9. （英文）
↑  Oberdorfer, p.11.
↑  . The Virtual Wall.   [2020-05-11]. （原始内容存档于2011-07-17）.
↑  . The Virtual Wall.   [2020-05-11]. （原始内容存档于2011-07-17）.
↑  Oberdorfer, p.11-12.
↑  Oberdorfer, p.13.
↑  . The Virtual Wall.   [2020-05-11]. （原始内容存档于2011-07-17）.
↑  . The Virtual Wall.   [2020-05-11]. （原始内容存档于2011-07-17）.
↑  Oberdorfer, p.12-13.
↑  Oberdorfer, p.23-24.
↑  Oberdorfer, p.14.
↑  Oberdorfer, p.22-23.
↑  Oberdorfer, p.9-10.
1 2  Oberdorfer, p.23.
↑  Oberdorfer, p.24.
↑  . The Virtual Wall.   [2020-05-11]. （原始内容存档于2011-07-17）.
↑  Oberdorfer, p.25-26.
↑  Oberdorfer, p.29-30.
溪生基地（英语：），1968
美國海軍陸戰隊隊員持M14步槍在Hamo村莊作戰（攝於1968年1月）
越共進攻西貢市區期間，黑煙覆蓋
南越陸軍於西貢近郊持M16步槍作戰
進攻新山一空軍基地時陣亡的越共及北越正規軍屍體
越共進攻期間，美國空軍第377憲兵中隊（377th Security Police Squadron）在新山一空軍基地作戰
美國空軍第3戰術戰鬥機聯隊（英语：）部署在邊和空軍基地（英语：）的一架F-100超級軍刀戰鬥機被越共摧毀（攝於1968年2月1日）
美國陸軍機械化步兵向隆平地區進攻（攝於1968年1月31日）
在對隆平發動進攻後，陣亡的越共（攝於1968年2月1日）
越共士兵在統一大道側的大使館圍牆上所炸出的凹洞，藉此進入使館院子展開攻擊。
大使館辦公樓外牆被槍砲擊中的痕跡
1月31日上午事件平息後，美軍憲兵站在統一大道入口對面的越共射擊位置
美軍憲兵押送被俘的越共到使館外