1993年俄罗斯宪政危机
注释与参考文献

↑  俄羅斯民主向何處去- 鄭易平、聶聖平、王洋
↑  Celestine Bohlen, "Yeltsin Deputy Calls Reforms 'Economic Genocide,'" 纽约时报, February 9 1992.
↑  The Central Bank's efforts got in the way of pro-Yeltsin, Western-oriented leaders were seeking to carry out a decisive neoliberal economic transformation of Russia. They undermined the regime of fiscal austerity that the Yeltsin government was attempting to pursue. See, e.g., Thomas F. Remington, Politics in Russia (New York: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 2002), p. 50.
↑  When majorities fail: the Russian Parliament, 1990-1993. By Josephine T. Andrews. p 61[]
↑  .   [2009-07-16]. （原始内容存档于2008-10-07）.
↑  （俄文）Text of the ruling (Russian) （页面存档备份，存于）. Accessed 2009-04-12. 2009-05-11.
↑  on March 24, 1993. - Белкин А.А. Дело о Президентском обращении к народу 20 марта 1993 года - "Правоведение", № 3 1994. Available at .   [2009-07-16]. （原始内容存档于2011-07-23）.  accessed on July 16, 2009
↑  .   [2009-07-13]. （原始内容存档于2009-07-22）.
↑  .   [2009-07-13]. （原始内容存档于2009-07-22）.
↑  .   [2009-07-13]. （原始内容存档于2009-07-22）.
1 2  .   [2009-04-12]. （原始内容存档于2009-05-12）.
↑  .   [2010-07-22]. （原始内容存档于2011-08-27）.
↑  .   [2010-07-22]. （原始内容存档于2011-08-27）.
↑  Executive decree authority By John M. Carey, Matthew Soberg. p. 76 的存檔，存档日期2013-06-22.
↑  the Congress enabled this formerly-suspended amendment after it had failed to impeach Yeltsin after his declaration of a 'Special Rule' in March, 1993
↑  Changing channels
By Ellen Propper Mickiewicz p. 126 的存檔，存档日期2013-06-17..
↑  A Guide to the Economies in Transition
By Ian Jeffries p. 113
↑  For further details see Margaret Shapiro, "Yeltsin Dissolves Parliament, Orders New Vote," Washington Post, September 22, 1993. （页面存档备份，存于）
↑  It is still hotly debated among Western economists, social scientists, and policymakers as to whether or not the IMF-, World Bank-, and U.S. Treasury Department-backed reform policies adopted in Russia, often called "shock therapy," were responsible for Russia's poor record of economic performance in the 1990s. Under the Western-backed economic program adopted by Yeltsin, the Russian government took several radical measures at once that were supposed to stabilize the economy by bringing state spending and revenues into balance and by letting market demand determine the prices and supply of goods. Under the reforms, the government let most prices float, raised taxes, and cut back sharply on spending in industry and construction. These policies caused widespread hardship as many state enterprises found themselves without orders or financing. The rationale of the program was to squeeze the built-in inflationary pressure out of the economy so that producers would begin making sensible decisions about production, pricing and investment instead of chronically overusing resources, as in the Soviet era. By letting the market rather than central planers determine prices, product mixes, output levels, and the like, the reformers intended to create an incentive structure in the economy where efficiency and risk would be rewarded and waste and carelessness were punished. Removing the causes of chronic inflation, the reform's architects argued, was a precondition for all other reforms: Hyperinflation would wreck both democracy and economic progress, they argued; only by stabilizing the state budget could the government proceed to restructure the economy. A similar reform program had been adopted in Poland in January 1990, with generally favorable results. However, Western critics of Yeltsin's reform, most notably Joseph Stiglitz and Marshall Goldman (who would have favored a more "gradual" transition to market capitalism), consider policies adopted in Poland ill-suited for Russia, given that the impact of communism on the Polish economy and political culture was far less indelible. .   [2009-07-12]. （原始内容存档于2009-06-03）. . - Criticism on Stiglitz's perspective is found in 'Whence Reform? A Critique of the Stiglitz Perspective 的存檔，存档日期2011-06-07.' by M. Dabrowski, S. Gomulka, J. Rostowski. Accessed 2009-07-13. Archived 2009-07-21.
↑   的存檔，存档日期2013-06-17.
↑  .   [2010-09-19]. （原始内容存档于2010-12-20）.
↑  .   [2010-09-19]. （原始内容存档于2011-06-29）.
↑  . Cambridge University Press. 2003  [2011-04-10]. ISBN 9780521016940. （原始内容存档于2013-06-17）.
↑  Decree of the President of RF of 3 October 1993 № 1575 (original text) （页面存档备份，存于）
1 2  .   [2009-07-12]. （原始内容存档于2008-01-21）.
↑  Yeltsin's Russia and the West
By Andrew Felkay. p. 79 （页面存档备份，存于）
↑  The whole text of the declaration in Russian （页面存档备份，存于）, part of the video broadcast （页面存档备份，存于）
↑  For further details see Rusnet.nl, "Pavel Grachev" .   [2009-07-12]. （原始内容存档于2008-10-13）.  Updated March 12, 2003
↑  Since the release of Argentine political scientist Juan Linz's 1985 influential essay "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does it Make a Difference?" the argument that presidentialism is less likely to sustain stable democratic regimes has gained widespread currency in Western comparative politics literature. According to Linz, conflict is always latent between the president and the legislature due to competing claims to legitimacy derived from the same source: electoral mandates from the very same body of citizens. Thus, a conflict can escalate dramatically since it cannot be resolved through rules, procedures, negotiations, or compromise.
↑  See, e.g., Stephen White, "Russia: Presidential Leadership under Yeltsin," in Ray Taras, ed., Postcommunist Presidents (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 57–61.
↑  . 纽约时报. 1993-10-16  [2014-07-30]. （原始内容存档于2014-08-11）.
俄罗斯第2近卫塔曼摩托化步兵师的T-80U主力戰車正在炮擊白宫，攝於1993年10月4日