Penyebaran Salafi dan Wahabi internasional
Rujukan > Kutipan

1 2 3 4 5  Wagemakers, Joas (2021). "Part 3: Fundamentalisms and Extremists – The Citadel of Salafism".  Dalam Cusack, Carole M.; Upal, M. Afzal. Handbook of Islamic Sects and Movements. Brill Handbooks on Contemporary Religion. 21. Leiden and Boston: Brill Publishers. hlm. 333–347. doi:10.1163/9789004435544_019 . ISBN 978-90-04-43554-4. ISSN 1874-6691.
1 2 3  Kepel, Gilles (2006). Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. I.B. Tauris. hlm. 51. ISBN 9781845112578. Well before the full emergence of Islamism in the 1970s, a growing constituency nicknamed `petro-Islam` included Wahhabi ulemas and Islamist intellectuals and promoted strict implementation of the sharia in the political, moral and cultural spheres; this proto-movement had few social concerns and even fewer revolutionary ones.
1 2  JASSER, ZUHDI. "STATEMENT OF ZUHDI JASSER, M.D., PRESIDENT, AMERICAN ISLAMIC FORUM FOR DEMOCRACY. 2013 ANTI–SEMITISM: A GROWING THREAT TO ALL FAITHS. HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES" (PDF). 27 Februari 2013. U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. hlm. 27. Diakses tanggal 31 Maret 2014. Lastly, the Saudis spent tens of billions of dollars throughout the world to pump Wahhabism or petro-Islam, a particularly virulent and militant version of supremacist Islamism.
1 2  DAOUD, KAMEL (16 November 2017). "If Saudi Arabia Reforms, What Happens to Islamists Elsewhere?". The New York Times. New York Times. Diakses tanggal 16 November 2017.
↑  Musa, Mohd Faizal (2018). "The Riyal and Ringgit of Petro-Islam: Investing Salafism in Education".  Dalam Saat, Norshahril. Islam in Southeast Asia: Negotiating Modernity. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing. hlm. 63–88. doi:10.1355/9789814818001-006. ISBN 9789814818001.  Parameter |s2cid= yang tidak diketahui akan diabaikan (bantuan)
↑  Hasan, Noorhaidi (2010). "The Failure of the Wahhabi Campaign: Transnational Islam and the Salafi madrasa in post-9/11 Indonesia". South East Asia Research. Taylor & Francis on behalf of the SOAS University of London. 18 (4): 675–705. doi:10.5367/sear.2010.0015. ISSN 2043-6874. JSTOR 23750964.  Parameter |s2cid= yang tidak diketahui akan diabaikan (bantuan)
↑  "6 common misconceptions about Salafi Muslims in the West". OUPblog (dalam bahasa Inggris). 2016-10-05. Diakses tanggal 2021-08-20.
↑  Kepel, Gilles (2003). Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. I.B. Tauris. hlm. 61–2. ISBN 9781845112578.
1 2 3  Roy, Olivier (1994). The Failure of Political Islam. Harvard University Press. hlm. 117. ISBN 9780674291416. Diakses tanggal 2 April 2015. The Muslim Brothers agreed not to operate in Saudi Arabia itself, but served as a relay for contacts with foreign Islamist movements. The MBs also used as a relay in South Asia movements long established on an indigenous basis (Jamaat-i Islami). Thus the MB played an essential role in the choice of organisations and individuals likely to receive Saudi subsidies. On a doctrinal level, the differences are certainly significant between the MBs and the Wahhabis, but their common references to Hanbalism ... their rejection of the division into juridical schools, and their virulent opposition to Shiism and popular religious practices (the cult of 'saints') furnished them with the common themes of a reformist and puritanical preaching. This alliance carried in its wake older fundamentalist movements, non-Wahhabi but with strong local roots, such as the Pakistani Ahl-i Hadith or the Ikhwan of continental China
1 2  Gold, Dore (2003). Hatred's Kingdom : How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism. Regnery. hlm. 237. ISBN 9781596988194.
1 2 3 4  Kepel, Gilles (2004). The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West. Harvard University Press. hlm. 156. ISBN 9780674015753. Diakses tanggal 4 April 2015. In the melting pot of Arabia during the 1960s, local clerics trained in the Wahhabite tradition joined with activists and militants affiliated with the Muslims Brothers who had been exiled from the neighboring countries of Egypt, Syria and Iraq .... The phenomenon of Osama bin Laden and his associates cannot be understood outside this hybrid tradition.
1 2  Gaffney, Jr., Frank (8 Desember 2003). "Waging the 'War of Ideas'". Center for Security Policy. Diakses tanggal 8 Juli 2017.
↑  Mandaville, Peter; Hammond, Andrew (2022). "1: Wahhabism and the World: The Historical Evolution, Structure, and Future of Saudi Religious Transnationalism". Wahhabism and the World: Understanding Saudi Arabia's Global Influence on Islam. New York: Oxford University Press. hlm. 6–10. ISBN 978-0197532577.
↑  
Ibrahim, Youssef Michel (11 Agustus 2002). "The Mideast Threat That's Hard to Define". cfr.org. The Washington Post. Diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 4 September 2014. Diakses tanggal 21 Agustus 2014. ... money that brought Wahabis power throughout the Arab world and financed networks of fundamentalist schools from Sudan to northern Pakistan.  Parameter |url-status= yang tidak diketahui akan diabaikan (bantuan)
↑  According to author Dore Gold this funding was for non-Muslim countries alone. Gold, Dore (2003). Hatred's Kingdom : How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism. Regnery. hlm. 126.
↑  Ibrahim, Youssef Michel (11 Agustus 2002). "The Mideast Threat That's Hard to Define". Council on foreign relations. Washington Post. Diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 4 September 2014. Diakses tanggal 25 Oktober 2014.  Parameter |url-status= yang tidak diketahui akan diabaikan (bantuan)
↑  Kepel, Gilles (2006). Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. I.B. Tauris. hlm. 72. ISBN 9781845112578. founded in 1962 as a counterweight to Nasser's propaganda, opened new offices in every area of the world where Muslims lived. The league played a pioneering role in supporting Islamic associations, mosques, and investment plans for the future. In addition, the Saudi ministry for religious affairs printed and distributed millions of Korans free of charge, along with Wahhabite doctrinal texts, among the world's mosques, from the African plains to the rice paddies of Indonesia and the Muslim immigrant high-rise housing projects of European cities. For the first time in fourteen centuries, the same books ... could be found from one end of the Umma to the other... hewed to the same doctrinal line and excluded other currents of thought that had formerly been part of a more pluralistic Islam.
↑  House, Karen Elliott (2012). On Saudi Arabia : Its People, Past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future. Knopf. hlm. 234. A former US Treasury Department official is quoted by Washington Post reporter David Ottaway in a 2004 article [Ottaway, David The King's Messenger New York: Walker, 2008, p.185] as estimating that the late king [Fadh] spent `north of $75 billion` in his efforts to spread Wahhabi Islam. According to Ottaway, the king boasted on his personal Web site that he established 200 Islamic colleges, 210 Islamic centers, 1500 mosques, and 2000 schools for Muslim children in non-Islamic nations. The late king also launched a publishing center in Medina that by 2000 had distributed 138 million copies of the Koran worldwide.
↑  Lacey, Robert (2009). Inside the Kingdom : Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia. Viking. hlm. 95. The Kingdom's 70 or so embassies around the world already featured cultural, educational, and military attaches, along with consular officers who organized visas for the hajj. Now they were joined by religious attaches, whose job was to get new mosques built in their countries and to persuade existing mosques to propagate the dawah wahhabiya.
1 2  House, Karen Elliott (2012). On Saudi Arabia : Its People, Past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future. Knopf. hlm. 234. To this day, the regime funds numerous international organizations to spread fundamentalist Islam, including the Muslim World League, the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, the International Islamic Relief Organization, and various royal charities such as the Popular Committee for Assisting the Palestinian Muhahedeen, led by Prince Salman bin Abdul Aziz, now minister of defense, who often is touted as a potential future king. Supporting da'wah, which literally means `making an invitation` to Islam, is a religious requirement that Saudi rulers feel they cannot abandon without losing their domestic legitimacy as protectors and propagators of Islam. Yet in the wake of 9/11, American anger at the kingdom led the U.S. government to demand controls on Saudi largesse to Islamic groups that funded terrorism.
1 2  Shane, Scott (25-8-2016). "Saudis and Extremism: 'Both the Arsonists and the Firefighters'". The New York Times (dalam bahasa Inggris). ISSN 0362-4331. Diakses tanggal 22-6-2017.  Periksa nilai tanggal di: |access-date=, |date= (bantuan)
↑  Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia (PDF). I.B.Tauris. hlm. 141.
↑  Kepel, Gilles (2002). Jihad: On the Trail of Political Islam. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. hlm. 220. ISBN 9781845112578. Diakses tanggal 6 Juli 2015. Hostile as they were to the `sheikists`, the jihadist-salafists were even angrier with the Muslim Brothers, whose excessive moderation they denounced ...
↑  Armstrong, Karen (27 November 2014). "Wahhabism to ISIS: how Saudi Arabia exported the main source of global terrorism". New Statesman. London. Diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 27 November 2014. Diakses tanggal 8 September 2020. A whole generation of Muslims, therefore, has grown up with a maverick form of Islam [i.e. Wahhabism] that has given them a negative view of other faiths and an intolerantly sectarian understanding of their own. While not extremist per se, this is an outlook in which radicalism can develop.
↑  Pabst, Adrian. "Pakistan must confront Wahhabism". Guardian. in the 1980s ... during the Afghan resistance against the Soviet invasion, elements in Saudi Arabia poured in money, arms and extremist ideology. Through a network of madrasas, Saudi-sponsored Wahhabi Islam indoctrinated young Muslims with fundamentalist Puritanism, denouncing Sufi music and poetry as decadent and immoral.
↑  Pabst, Adrian. "Pakistan must confront Wahhabism". Guardian. Unlike many Sunnis in Iraq, most Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan have embraced the puritanical and fundamentalist Islam of the Wahhabi mullahs from Saudi Arabia who wage a ruthless war not just against western "infidels" but also against fellow Muslims they consider to be apostates, in particular the Sufis. ... in the 1980s ... during the Afghan resistance against the Soviet invasion, elements in Saudi Arabia poured in money, arms and extremist ideology. Through a network of madrasas, Saudi-sponsored Wahhabi Islam indoctrinated young Muslims with fundamentalist Puritanism, denouncing Sufi music and poetry as decadent and immoral.
↑  "King Salman's Return to Brunei Two Decades Later". 20 Maret 2017.
↑  von der Mehden, Fred R. (1 Desember 2014). "Saudi Religious Influence in Indonesia". Middle East Institute (dalam bahasa Inggris). Diakses tanggal 24-7-2017.  Periksa nilai tanggal di: |access-date= (bantuan)
↑  "Nurturing Sala manhaj: A study of Sala pesantren in contemporary Indonesia". 27 Januari 2014.
↑  "Saudi Arabia Is Redefining Islam for the World's Largest Muslim Nation". 2 Maret 2017.
↑  "In Indonesia, Madrassas of Moderation". 10 Februari 2015.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  Scott, Margaret (27 Oktober 2016). "Indonesia: The Saudis Are Coming [complete article behind paywall]". New York Review of Books. Diakses tanggal 17 Oktober 2016.
1 2 3 4 5 6  PERLEZ, JANE (5 Juli 2003). "Saudis Quietly Promote Strict Islam in Indonesia". New York Times. Diakses tanggal 21 Agustus 2014.
1 2  von der Mehden, Fred R. (1 Desember 2014). "Saudi Religious Influence in Indonesia". Middle East Institute. Diakses tanggal 17 Oktober 2016.
1 2  Varagur, Krithika (16 April 2020). "How Saudi Arabia's religious project transformed Indonesia". The Guardian. Diakses tanggal 16 April 2020.
↑  Pipes, Daniel (2009) [1980]. In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power (edisi ke-5th). Transaction Publishers. hlm. 314. ISBN 9781412826167. Diakses tanggal 30 Maret 2015. When Prince Muhammad al-Faysal of Saudi Arabia visited Malaysia in December 1980, he offered $100 million for an interest-free finance corporation. Not surprisingly, the Malaysian finance minister responded by announcing that the government would study the possibility of establishing an `Islamic economic system.` Two years later, the Saudis helped finance the government-sponsored Bank Islam Malaysia. These actions led some cynics to argue `that the expanded interest in Islam among Malaysian politicians reflects a desire to obtain economic aid from the Arabs or to guarantee continued oil during future embargoes.`
↑  "Wahabism spreading among Malaysia's elite". 14 Januari 2017.
↑  "The radicalisation of Islam in Malaysia". 28 Agustus 2016.