ראיה מדעית
הערות שוליים

↑  Taper, Mark L.; Lele, Subhash (2004). "The nature of scientific evidence: a forward-looking synthesis".  In Taper, Mark L.; Lele, Subhash (eds.). The nature of scientific evidence: statistical, philosophical, and empirical considerations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp. 527–551 (547). doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226789583.003.0016. ISBN 0226789551. OCLC 54461920. Scientific evidence is generally taken to be anything tending to refute or confirm a hypothesis.
1 2  Longino, Helen (במרץ 1979). Philosophy of Science, Vol. 46. pp. 37–42. {{cite book}}:  (עזרה)
↑  Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolution, 2nd Ed. (1970).
↑  William Talbott "Bayesian Epistemology" Accessed May 13, 2007.
↑  Thomas Kelly "Evidence". Accessed May 13, 2007.
↑  George Kenneth Stone, "Evidence in Science"(1966)
↑  Karl R. Popper,"The Logic of Scientific Discovery" (1959).
↑  Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, 2nd Ed. (2000), p. 71. Accessed Feb 21, 2020. see: the 3rd edition of Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence
↑  Carnap, Rudolf (1962). Logical foundations of probability (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. p. 462. ISBN 978-0226093437. OCLC 372957.
↑  Achinstein, Peter, ed. (1983). The concept of evidence. Oxford readings in philosophy. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0198750625.
↑  Bechtel, William (1990). "Scientific evidence: creating and evaluating experimental instruments and research techniques". PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. 1990 (1): 559–572 (561). doi:10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1990.1.192732. JSTOR 192732.
1 2  McArthur, Dan (באוגוסט 2003). "Book review: Peter Achinstein, The book of evidence". Philosophy in Review. 23 (4): 235–237. {{cite journal}}:  (עזרה) Achinstein's four concepts are also summarized in: Achinstein, Peter (2014). "Evidence".  In Curd, Martin; Psillos, Stathis (eds.). The Routledge companion to philosophy of science. Routledge philosophy companions (2nd ed.). London; New York: Routledge. pp. 381–392. doi:10.4324/9780203744857. ISBN 9780415518741. OCLC 824535995.
1 2  Vitányi, Paul M. B.; Li, Ming (במרץ 2000). "Minimum description length induction, Bayesianism, and Kolmogorov complexity" (PDF). IEEE Transactions on Information Theory. 46 (2): 446–464. arXiv:cs/9901014. doi:10.1109/18.825807. {{cite journal}}:  (עזרה) See also Chapter 5 in: Li, Ming; Vitányi, Paul (2019). An introduction to Kolmogorov complexity and its applications. Texts in computer science (4th ed.). Cham: Springer-Verlag. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-11298-1. ISBN 978-3030112974. OCLC 1106165074.
↑  For example: Schindler, Samuel (2018). "Testability and non–ad hocness". Theoretical virtues in science: uncovering reality through theory. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 6–7. doi:10.1017/9781108381352. ISBN 978-1108422260. No other criterion of a good scientific theory is as widely recognized as the falsifiability or testability of a theory—not only within the philosophy of science, but also way beyond it. And: "Understanding Science 101: Testing scientific ideas". undsci.berkeley.edu. University of California Museum of Paleontology. Testing hypotheses and theories is at the core of the process of science.
1 2  Thagard, Paul; Toombs, Ethan (2005). "Atoms, categorization and conceptual change" (PDF).  In Cohen, Henri; Lefebvre, Claire (eds.). Handbook of categorization in cognitive science. Amsterdam: Elsevier. pp. 243–254 (253). doi:10.1016/B978-008044612-7/50065-2. ISBN 0080446124. OCLC 60667797. The features of abductive prototypes are hypothesized in order to explain observations, as when Rutherford inferred that the mass of an atom is concentrated in a very small region in order to explain why alpha particles pass through gold foil. Abductive prototypes can change dramatically when new data require revision of hypotheses concerning explanatory features. This is just what happened to the concept of an atom when the experiments of Thompson and Rutherford revealed the divisibility of atoms. Rutherford's interpretation of the Geiger–Marsden experiment is also mentioned as an example of abduction in: Faye, Jan (2014). "On interpretation". The nature of scientific thinking: on interpretation, explanation, and understanding. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 60–84. doi:10.1057/9781137389831_3. ISBN 978-1137389824. OCLC 870285649.
↑  Campbell, Donald T. (1984) "Foreword". In Yin, Robert K. (2018). Case study research: design and methods (6th ed.). Los Angeles: SAGE Publications. pp. xiii–xiv. ISBN 978-1506336169. OCLC 983826254. More and more I have come to the conclusion that the core of the scientific method is not experimentation per se but rather the strategy connoted by the phrase 'plausible rival hypotheses'. This strategy may start its puzzle solving with evidence, or it may start with hypothesis. Rather than presenting this hypothesis or evidence in the context-independent manner of positivistic confirmation (or even of postpositivistic corroboration), it is presented instead in extended networks of implications that (although never complete) are nonetheless crucial to its scientific evaluation. This strategy includes making explicit other implications of the hypothesis for other available data and reporting how these fit. It also includes seeking out rival explanations of the focal evidence and examining their plausibility. The plausibility of these rivals is usually reduced by ramification extinction, that is, by looking at their other implications on other data sets and seeing how well these fit. This idea is further discussed in several chapters in: Bickman, Leonard, ed. (2000). Donald Campbell's legacy. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications. OCLC 42603382.
↑  For example: "Thematic issue: Scientific method as a problem-solving and question-answering technique: Vol. 47, No. 1 of Synthese". באפריל 1981. {{cite web}}:  (עזרה) One article from the issue is: Nickles, Thomas (באפריל 1981). "What is a problem that we may solve it?". Synthese. 47 (1): 85–118. doi:10.1007/BF01064267. JSTOR 20115620. Data sometimes do not constitute the problem (or the primary problem) but serve chiefly as evidence that a problem (or at least a deeper problem) exists. {{cite journal}}:  (עזרה) See also: Nickles, Thomas (1988). "Questioning and problems in philosophy of science: problem-solving versus directly truth-seeking epistemologies".  In Meyer, Michel (ed.). Questions and questioning. Grundlagen der Kommunikation = Foundations of communication. Berlin; New York: De Gruyter. pp. 43–67. doi:10.1515/9783110864205.43. ISBN 3110106809. And from a scientist's perspective: Krauss, Lawrence M. (14 במאי 2015). "The big unanswered questions". The Huffington Post. נבדק ב-15 במאי 2015. {{cite web}}:  (עזרה)
↑  See, for example, "Greenpeace co-founder: No scientific proof humans are dominant cause of warming climate". Fox News Channel. 28 בפברואר 2014. נבדק ב-19 במרץ 2014. {{cite web}}:  (עזרה)
↑  Popper, Karl (2011). The Open Society and Its Enemies (5th ed.). Routledge. pp. 229–230. ISBN 978-1136700323.
↑  Theobald, Douglas (1999–2012). "29+ Evidences for Macroevolution". TalkOrigins Archive. נבדק ב-19 במרץ 2014. {{cite web}}:  (עזרה)
↑  Gaither, Carl (2009). Gaither's Dictionary of Scientific Quotations. New York: Springer. p. 1602. ISBN 978-0-387-49575-0.
1 2  Walton, Douglas N.; Zhang, Nanning (במאי 2013). "The epistemology of scientific evidence". Artificial Intelligence and Law. 21 (2): 173–219 (214). doi:10.1007/s10506-012-9132-9. Traditional epistemology established knowledge on the basis of a false concept—true belief. On our theory, scientific evidence should be based on a process of justifying the agent's reasonable acceptance of a hypothesis in an inquiry that ends in proof. We have shown in section V how this procedure can be modeled using the Carneades Argumentation System. Any proposition that cannot be proved in an inquiry to an appropriate standard of proof following this kind of epistemological procedure is not acceptable as knowledge. {{cite journal}}:  (עזרה)
1 2  Walton, Douglas N. (2016). Argument evaluation and evidence. Law, governance and technology series. Vol. 23. Cham; New York: Springer-Verlag. p. 224. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-19626-8. ISBN 9783319196268. OCLC 919080389. To say that something is knowledge, it is important that the proposition claimed as knowledge be based on evidence of a kind that reaches a level where the proposition passes beyond the level of being accepted as true because it is based on evidence. Only when it is proved by a certain kind of evidence, that is sufficient for the discipline, or more generally the context in which the proposition was claimed, can something be properly said to be knowledge. The standard has to be high enough in a scientific inquiry to minimize the possibility that the proposition accepted as true will later have to be retracted.
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בקרת זהויות :  NKC: ph280626