סעיף 48 (חוקת רפובליקת ויימאר)
הערות שוליים

↑  Singular, Notverordnung.
↑  The German term Land translates into English most appropriately as "state", as Weimar Germany, like Germany under the monarchy until 1918 and the modern Federal Republic, was a federation consisting of several Länder with some degree of autonomy.
↑  Reich translates literally as "empire" or "realm". The term persisted even after the end of the monarchy in 1918. The German state's official name was therefore Deutsches Reich through the Weimar Republic and to the end of World War II.
↑  No such law was ever enacted: Olechowski, Thomas (2020). Hans Kelsen: Biographie einer Rechtswissenschaftler. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. p. 510. doi:10.1628/978-3-16-159293-5. ISBN 978-3-16-159293-5.
1 2  Evans, Richard J. (2004). The Coming of the Third Reich. Penguin. pp. 80–84. ISBN 1-59420-004-1.
↑  He was appointed Chancellor on 30 March 1930 after considerable political intrigue
↑  On 16 July, the Chancellor presented his wide-ranging financial bill to the Reichstag; it sought, among other things, to reform government finances through both higher taxes and decreases in government spending (an obviously deflationary policy). The government bill was rejected by the Reichstag, by a vote of 256 to 193,
↑  This was, in fact, the first time that a bill which had been legislatively rejected was later promulgated by way of executive decree, and the constitutionality of such "second bite at the apple" tactics has been questioned (Kershaw, pp. 320–325).
↑  The Social Democrats cooperated with the Nazis to reject the decree, as did Alfred Hugenberg's Nationalists and the Communists. See Maehl, The German Socialist Party, p. 168. The decree was voted down, by a vote of 236 to 221.
↑  Under the constitution, new elections had to be held within 60 days of the dissolution
↑  Historians have not been kind to Brüning. According to Maehl (p 168), the Chancellor "foolishly" dissolved the Reichstag as a result of the financial imbroglio. The decision to dissolve parliament was, in Kershaw's phrase, one of "breathtaking irresponsibility." Brüning had stunningly misjudged the discontent and anger within the country. It is difficult to avoid the conclusions that (a) the democratic processes–namely, parliamentary negotiation to achieve a working majority, either on a single piece of legislation or on a legislative program–were just too difficult for this cast of characters and (b) the parties were too parochial and self-interested to cooperate in the greater interests of the whole (Kershaw, Vol 1, pp. 324–325; Hubris, pp. 73–75; Collier, p. 167). Collier maintains that this single act–the dissolution in the face of a legitimate exercise by the Parliamentary body of its constitutional authority–was one of them most crucial steps in the Nazi rise to power, as it demonstrated the contempt in which the President and his advisers held the concept of democracy and the function of the Reichstag. "It ... marks the shift from parliamentary ... to presidential government ... [which] gave the Nazis a 'legal' route to success that Hitler so needed" (Collier and Pedley, p. 167).
↑  See Election Results. The Nazis increased their seats from a pitiful 12 to a respectable 107, out of a total of 577, becoming the second largest party in the Reichstag as a result; only the Social Democrats were larger at 143 seats.
↑  Skach, C., 2005. Borrowing Constitutional Designs. Princeton University Press, p.104.
1 2  Mommsen, Hans (1998). The Rise and Fall of Weimar Democracy. UNC Press. pp. 57–58. ISBN 0-8078-4721-6. ("Mommsen")(confirming that only a simple majority of Reichstag was necessary to overturn an emergency decree)
הוגו פרויס מנסחה של חוקת רפובליקת ויימאר
היטלר נואם בפני הרייכסטאג, 23 במרץ 1933