השטן הגדול
הערות שוליים

↑  Risen, James (16 באפריל 2000). "SECRETS OF HISTORY: The C.I.A. in Iran -- A special report.; How a Plot Convulsed Iran in '53 (and in '79)". The New York Times. נבדק ב-21 במאי 2016. {{cite news}}:  (עזרה)
↑  Staff writer(s) (c. 1975). "The Battle for Iran (excerpt)". Central Intelligence Agency. נבדק ב-20 במאי 2016. Complete secrecy about the operation that was known under the cryptonym of TPAJAX has been impossible to enforce...[T]he military coup that overthrew Mosadeq and his National Front cabinet was carried out under CIA direction as an act of U.S. foreign policy, conceived and approved at the highest levels of government. {{cite web}}:  (עזרה)
↑  Wilber, Donald (במרץ 1954). "CIA Clandestine Service History, "Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952-August 1953," March 1954, by Dr. Donald Wilber" (PDF). נבדק ב-20 במאי 2016. In early summer of 1953 Carroll was assigned the task of planning military aspects of TPAJAX. Several assumptions first had to be taken into account: A. Operation would be joint operation with SIS. {{cite web}}:  (עזרה)
↑  Wilber, Donald (במרץ 1954). "CIA Clandestine Service History, 'Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952-August 1953,' March 1954, by Dr. Donald Wilber" (PDF). p. iv. נבדק ב-20 במאי 2016. An estimate entitled 'Factors Involved in the Overthrow of Mossadeq' was completed on 16 April 1953... In April it was determined that the CIA should conduct the envisioned operation jointly with the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). By the end of April, it was decided that CIA and SIS officers would draw up a plan… which would be submitted to CIA and SIS Headquarters, and to the Department of State and the Foreign Office for final approval. {{cite web}}:  (עזרה)
↑  David M. Watry (10 בדצמבר 2014). Diplomacy at the Brink: Eisenhower, Churchill, and Eden in the Cold War. LSU Press. p. 93. ISBN 978-0-8071-5719-0. {{cite book}}:  (עזרה)
↑  Acheson, Dean (7 בפברואר 1952). "Telegram from The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran. (Memo of conversation 1 February 1952 between U.S. Department of State and British representatives regarding the Iranian political situation)". Office of the Historian of the United States Department of State. נבדק ב-20 במאי 2016. Although Mosadeq [will] not likely turn toward Russia it is highly improbable that he will do anything [to] check communism in Iran since his ideas of polit[ical] tolerance, neutrality, and fear of offending [the] USSR w[ou]ld prevent his taking action vs Tudeh regardless [of the] outcome [of] the oil question and request[s for] US financial assistance. {{cite web}}:  (עזרה)
↑  Henderson, Loy (28 ביולי 1952). "The Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State, repeated to London". Office of the Historian of the United States Department of State. נבדק ב-20 במאי 2016. ...I could not but be discouraged at [the] thought that [a] person [Mosadeq] so lacking in stability and clearly dominated by emotions and prejudices sh[ou]ld represent [the] only bulwark left between Iran and communism... at one point I almost decided to abandon our conv[ersation] when he r[e]p[ea]t[e]d again and again in monotone that 'Iran w[ou]ld never, never want UK and US to have any differences over it. Iran w[ou]ld prefer [to] go Communist than cause any trouble between US and UK.' {{cite web}}:  (עזרה)
↑  Henderson, Loy (28 ביולי 1952). "The Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State, repeated to London". Office of the Historian of the United States Department of State. נבדק ב-20 במאי 2016. At this point Mosadeq began to chant that Iran w[ou]ld prefer to go communist than for US and UN [UK] to have differences of opinion with regard to it. Eventually I was able to tell him that US choice was not merely between US-UK friction and Iran going Communist. I stressed that if serious misunderstandings sh[ou]ld develop in present world situation between US and UK, Iran would go Communist anyway. {{cite web}}:  (עזרה)
↑  Staff writer(s) (28 ביולי 1953). "FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1952–1954. IRAN, 1951–1954: VOLUME X No. 339 Editorial Note regarding Department of State Bulletin 10 August 1953, page 178". Office of the Historian of the United States Department of State. נבדק ב-20 במאי 2016. Secretary Dulles held a press conference on July 28. In response to a reporter's question about the growing strength of the Tudeh Party in Iran, the Secretary replied as follows: 'Recent developments in Iran, especially the growing activity of the illegal Communist party, which appears to be tolerated by the Iranian Government have caused us concern. These developments make it more difficult for the United States to give assistance to Iran so long as its government tolerates this sort of activity.' {{cite web}}:  (עזרה)
↑  Gleason, Sarell (17 בספטמבר 1953). "No. 358 Memorandum of Discussion at the 160th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, August 27, 1953". Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file. נבדק ב-20 במאי 2016. Secretary [of State John Foster] Dulles commented that while what happened in Iran was spontaneous, he did feel obliged to say that a number of people in Iran had kept their heads and maintained their courage when the situation looked very tough... As a result of what had happened, Secretary Dulles informed the Council, the United States now had a 'second chance' in Iran when all hope of avoiding a Communist Iran appeared to have vanished. {{cite web}}:  (עזרה)
↑  Risen, James (16 באפריל 2000). "Key Events in the 1953 Coup". The New York Times. נבדק ב-21 במאי 2016. Aug. 16, 1953…The shah flees to Baghdad. {{cite web}}:  (עזרה)
↑  Berry, Burton Y. (17 באוגוסט 1953). "Telegram No. 343 The Ambassador in Iraq (Berry) to the Department of State". Office of the Historian of the U.S. Department of State. נבדק ב-21 במאי 2016. On the third day Mosadeq by some means had been alerted and had had the time to take successful countermeasures so that when the Colonel arrived at Mosadeq's house he was himself arrested...This morning the Shah left his Caspian Palace in a Beechcraft with a pilot, one Palace official and his Queen and landed in Baghdad at 10:15. He said that he thought that he should not stay here more than a few days, but would then go to Europe and he hoped eventually to America. He added he would be looking for work shortly as he has a large family and very small means outside of Iran. I tried to boost his morale by saying that I hoped that soon he would return to reign over his people for whom he had done so much, but he replied that Mosadeq was absolutely mad and insanely jealous, like a tiger who springs upon any living thing that it sees moving above him. Shah believes Mosadeq thinks he can form a partnership with the [Communist] Tudeh Party and then outwit it, but in so doing Mosadeq will become the Dr. [Edvard] Bene[š] of Iran. {{cite web}}:  (עזרה)
↑  Carsten Stahn; Jennifer S. Easterday; Jens Iverson (13 בפברואר 2014). Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Normative Foundations. OUP Oxford. p. 468. ISBN 978-0-19-150938-4. It is not uncommon for status questions to act as a lightning rod for…grievances of the local population…A vivid example is offered by Ayatollah Khomeini's speech of 26 October 1964 (Speech 16) denouncing the extension of diplomatic immunities to American military personnel in Iran. {{cite book}}:  (עזרה)
↑  Hughes, Thomas L. (28 בינואר 1965). "67. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk; SUBJECT: The Significance of the Assassination of Prime Minister Hasan Ali Mansur". Johnson Library, National Security File, Robert W. Komer Files, Iran, 1965–March 1966. נבדק ב-21 במאי 2016. There is considerable discontent in Iran because of continued repression of opposition groups, exile of Ayatollah Khomeini, unpopular measures passed by the government such as the recent Status of Forces Bill, and the increase in the cost of basic fuels. {{cite web}}:  (עזרה)
↑  Staff writer(s) (2014). "Chronology: U.S.–Iran relations 1906-2002". PBS News\Frontline. נבדק ב-21 במאי 2016. 1964... Khomeini is exiled to Turkey for his outspoken denunciation of the shah's Status of Forces bill, which grants U.S. military personnel diplomatic immunity for crimes committed on Iranian soil. {{cite web}}:  (עזרה)
↑  Staff writer(s) (במאי 1972). "Central Intelligence Agency\Directorate of Intelligence\Intelligence Report\Centers of Power in Iran". Source: Central Intelligence Agency, OCI Files, Job 79T00832A, Box 9, 46. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated within CIA. נבדק ב-21 במאי 2016. [P]laying an essentially negative role at present... are the clergy, whose strength lies in the emotions of the Iranian masses and whose opposition to the Shah's government is nearly total...Detailed information on the clergy is not available. There are perhaps 100,000 clergymen ranging from the mullah, the lowest clerical post, to the mojtahed. {{cite web}}:  (עזרה)
↑  Staff writer(s) (7 בדצמבר 2009). "How Iran's opposition inverts old slogans". BBC. אורכב מ-המקור ב-2 בינואר 2010. נבדק ב-21 במאי 2016. One of the big anti-Shah chants ended with the slogan "Death to Shah!"...A main revolutionary cry was: "Estaghlal, Azadi, Jomhuriye Eslami" (Eng: Independence, Freedom, Islamic Republic). {{cite news}}:  (עזרה)
↑  Staff writer(s) (6 בנובמבר 1979). "IRAN LEADERS BACK U.S. EMBASSY SEIZURE; Khomeini's Son Tells Students All American Ties Should Be Cut". The New York Times. Teheran. Reuters. pp. A1, A12. Students Shout "Death to America!"…Tens of thousands of students surrounded the American Embassy compound today shouting anti-American slogans such as "Death to America!"... {{cite news}}:  (עזרה)
↑  Christopher Buck, Religious myths and visions of America: how minority faiths redefined America's world role, page 136
↑  Iran & the Great Satan
↑  "America's foreign policy: Manifest Destiny or Great Satan?". Contemporary Politics.
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