ריצ'רד הלמס
הערות שוליים

↑  https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol46no4/article06.html
↑  http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/washington-whispers/2013/01/11/new-book-explains-why-ex-cia-director-richard-helms-lied-to-congress
↑  http://jaxrevenge.blogspot.co.il/2007/12/gates-mcgarrah-banker-grandfather-to.html
↑  Helms (2003) at 14-16.
↑  http://books.google.ca/books?id=0HqhGvQF4CQC&pg=PA545&dq=Marion+Herman+Helms&hl=en#v=onepage&q=Marion%20Herman%20Helms&f=false
↑  Chistopher Marquis, "Richard M. Helms Dies at 89; Dashing Ex-Chief of the C.I.A." in the New York Times, October 23, 2002, obituary.
↑  Helms (2003) at 17-26.
↑  Powers (1979) at 20-22.
↑  Helms (2003) at 29, 31.
↑  Powers (1979) at 22.
↑  Helms (2003) at 29-32.
↑  Helms (2003) at 33-37, Helms' quotes at 33, 33, 37, 36, 36n.
↑  Cf, Powers (1979) at 23.
↑  Cf, Peter Hoffmann, German Resistance to Hitler (Harvard University 1988) at 134-135.
↑  Helms (2003) at 37, 55.
↑  Cf., Lucas Delattre, Fritz Kolbe: Un espion au coeur du IIIieme Reich (Paris: Éditions Denoël 2003), translated as A Spy at the Heart of the Third Reich. The extraordinary story of Fritz Kolbe, America's most important spy in World War II (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press 2005).
↑  Weiner (2007) at 375, 411. As DCI, it went: Turner, Casey (1981-1987), Webster.
↑  Turner (2005) at 24, 39. Beforehand Donovan had held the post of Coordinator of Information (COI) for President Roosevelt from its creation in April 1941 until the position was folded into the newly created OSS about a year later. Thereafter Donovan as OSS chief reported to military in the War Department. Turner (2005) at 15, 24.
↑  Weiner (2007) at 4. Donovan had served in World War I, being awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for heroism. During World War II, he conceived of the OSS as including a kind of special forces brigade. About planning new OSS paramilitary projects, Donovan's "imagination was unlimited," a close associate noted."The bravest of the OSS, the ones who inspired legends, were the men who jumped behind lines, running guns, blowing up bridges, plotting against the Nazis with the French and the Balkan resistance movements.".
↑  Cf., William Stevenson, A Man called Intrepid. The Secret War (London: Macmillan 1976; reprint Ballantine 1977) at Chap. 17, 117-135.
↑  Helms (2003) at 38-44.
↑  Helms (2003) 45-48.
↑  Cf., Weiner (2007) at 4: of 21 two-man teams dropped into Nazi Germany by the OSS during the last year of the war, "only one was ever heard from again".
↑  Powers (1979) at 24. See below, section "Helms' formation".
↑  Helms (2003) at 63, 67-68.
↑  Powers (1979) at 29.
↑  Helms (2003) at 102; 359 (DDP Wisner).
↑  Helms (2003) at 61.
↑  Turner (2005) at 39-40.
↑  Helms (2003) at 70.
↑  Dulles (1963, 1965) at 42. Here Dulles wrote: "The two years between the end of World War II when the OSS was dissolved and the creation of the CIA in the fall of 1947 had been a period of interdepartmental infighting as to what to do with intelligence.".
↑  "The intelligence collection (SI) and counterintelligence (X-2) components" were placed as separate entities in the SSU "commanded by Brigadier General John Magruder". Helms (2003) at 66.
↑  Helms (2003) at 62: "For the moment we had been subsumed into a carryover organization known as the Strategic Services Unit (SSU)".
↑  Powers (1979) at 29, 31.
↑  Weiner (2007) at 10.
↑  Helms (2003) at 79-80.
↑  General Vandenberg was the nephew of the Arthur H. Vandenberg, influential Republican Senator from Michigan (1928-1951). Weiner (2007) at 22.
↑  Helms (2003) at 80, 81.
↑  Cf., John Ranelagh, "Central Intelligence Agency" at 122, in Oxford Companion to Politics of the World (2d ed., 2001), edited by Krieger.
↑  Cf., Helms (2003) at 79-81 (agency); 103 (quote re Helms' role), 100 (analogous quote).
↑  Weiner (2007) at 24-25.
↑  Turner (2005) at 56-57.
↑  Helms at (2003) at 104. The NSCDs were known orally as "nonskids". See also Helms (2003) at 113-115.
↑  Cf., Powers (2004) at 4 [1983].
↑  Marchetti and Marks (1974, 1980) at 20. President Truman by signing NSCD 10/2 created the authority for him then to institute the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) under Wisner to carry out Cold War covert opperations. Originally quasi-independent, in 1951 the OPC was fully absorbed by the CIA under DCI Bedell Smith.
↑  The supporter quoted: "Dewey Short of Missouri, the ranking Republican on the House Armed Services Committee." Weiner (2007) at 40.
↑  Weiner (2007) at 40-41 (quote).
↑  Cf., John Ranelagh, "Central Intelligence Agency" in Krieger, editor, Oxford Companion to Politics of the World (2d ed., 2001) at 122.
↑  Helms (2003) at 282 (quote).
↑  Helms (2003), e.g., Eisenhower's orders re Congo in 1960, at 167-168; Kennedy re Cuba in 1961, at 181; Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson at 349; Nixon's orders re Chile in 1970, at 403-405.
↑  Cf., Powers (1979) at 181 (& n.1 at 401); at 354-355.
↑  Cf., Powers (2004) at 55 [1994].
↑  Marchetti and Marks (1974, 1980), discussion at 35-38 of circular process from President to CIA officials to agents in the field.
↑  Noam Chomsky in Understanding Power (New York: The New Press 2002) at 348-349, criticizes the left's fascination with conspiracy theories, and clearly dismisses the "rogue elephant" theory about the CIA (at 349, 397), although Chomsky does not thereby absolve the Agency.
↑  Cf., Helms (2003) at 282-283.
↑  See section below on Operation CHAOS in "Nixon Presidency".
↑  It is in the nature of a secret service agency, however, to be able to covertly misdirect foreign enemies, especially during wartime. Clearly, in accordance with this understood context, the President as Commander in Chief may direct the CIA to fabricate misinformation intended to fool a foreign enemy. "There is required for the composition of a great commander not only massive common sense and reasoning power, not only imagination, but also an element of legerdemain, an original and sinister touch, which leaves the enemy puzzled as well as beaten." Winston Churchill, The Great War (London: George Newnes 1933) at vol. 5: 514, cited in Bodyguard of Lies (New York: Harper and Row 1975; reprint Wm. Morrow, NY 1991) by Anthony Cave Brown, at 5.
↑  Powers (1979) at 25, 34.
↑  Robarge (2007, 2008).
↑  Powers at 25-27, 41.
↑  Weiner (2007) at 11-12. Weiner later notes that Wisner was a very aggressive cold warrior. In response to the Soviet Berlin blockade (June 1948 to May 1949) he recommended a hot war, that the U. S. Army "should battle its way into Berlin with tanks and artillery". His suggestion was declined. Weiner (2007) at 30.
↑  elms later, from 1952 to 1956, worked directly under Wisner when the latter served as the CIA's DDP.
↑  Robarge (2007, 2008).
↑  Weiner (2007) at 32.
↑  Eisenhower's rollback policy for Europe was crafted by John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower's Secretary of State, and brother of the CIA's then DDP Allen Dulles; the brothers agreed. Weiner (2007) at 69.
↑  Powers (1979) at 50 (J. F. Dulles and "roll-back").
↑  Dulles (1963, 1965) at chapter 14, "The Role of Intelligence in the Cold War" 204-218.
"In applying the rule of force instead of law in international conduct the Communists have left us little choice except to take counteraction of some nature to meet their aggressive moves, whenever our vital interests are involved. Merely to appeal to their better nature and to invoke the rule of international law is of little use. ... Furthermore, we cannot safely take the view that once the Communists have 'liberated' in Soviet style a piece of territory, then it is forever beyond the reach of corrective action." Dulles (1963, 1965r) at 217 (both quotes).
↑  Cf., Powers at 39, 44.
↑  The CIA referred to the Soviet bloc as the "denied areas" because of the "extraordinary tight social control maintained". Powers (2002) at 145-146 [1997].
↑  The Soviets might be said to have 'inherited' the well-developed Czarist security culture. Helms (2003) at 219.
↑  The Soviet secret services "have been adept pupils of their czarist predecessors". Dulles (1963, 1965) at 140.
↑  Cf., Epstein (1989) at 21, 23-28 (Soviet deception and it beginning in 'The Trust' 1921-1929), at 116-117 (the Czarist double agents of Okhrana).
↑  Powers (1979) at 44-45 (efforts fruitless), 45-47 (in Poland, 'WIN' counter-espionage deceives CIA), 49-51 (Dulles closes down fruitless resistance-building in satellites), 52-53 (no quality CIA assets in satellites).
↑  Weiner (2007) at 65 (quote re 'communist intelligence'), at 183 (no quality CIA agents in satellites).
↑  Nonetheless, entirely local, 'spontaneous' anti-Soviet movements arose in Germany (DDR) (1953, [1989]), Poland (1956, [1980]), Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Rumania (1989). Among the earlier movements, the more radical were forceably crushed, while the more moderate politicians were coopted or accommodated by the Soviet block. The persistance of these popular movements, however, resulted in eventual success and liberation. Cf.,Mark Mazower, Dark Continent. Europe's twentieth century (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1998) at 361-386.
↑  Thereafter the anti-Soviet movement spread to Russia, and resulted in the Collapse of the Soviet Union itself. Cf., Conor O'Clery, Moscow, December 25, 1991. The last day of the Soviet Union (New York: Public Affairs 2011), e.g., at 88.
↑  Helms (2003) at 112.
↑  Eric F. Goldman, Crucial Decade-and After. America 1945-1960 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1956, 1960; reprint Vintage 1960) at 62-81.
↑  Weiner (2007) at 28-29: the CIA "siphoned off" money from the Marshall Plan, using it to finance various citizen groups, publishers, politicians, etc., to counter the similar "front" organizations run by communist parties in NATO countries. Such schemes followed the "organized political warfare" advocated by George Kennan.
↑  Weiner (2007) at 10-11, 17, 30-34, 48.
↑  Ranelagh (1986) 133-135: OPC and possible "hot" war.
↑  Karalekas (1976) at 36. OPC paramilitary activities concerned "stay-behind nets" of resistance in case of a Soviet-NATO war.
↑  E.g., during the close 1948 elections in Italy, CIA/OPC secretly provided support to the Democrazia Christiana party and pro-western coalition. Colby (1978) at 109-110.
↑  Helms (2003) at 354-366; cf., 370-371.
↑  Powers (1979) at 43, 91-92.
↑  Helms (2003) at 60.
↑  Weiner (2007) at 10 (black market, scientists), 17 (228 personnel).
↑  Powers (1979) at 29.
↑  Weiner (2007) at 17.
↑  Helms (2003) at 74-75, 76.
↑  Weiner (2007) at 520-521.
↑  Helms (2003) at 156.
↑  Weiner (2007) at 17.
↑  Helms (2003) at 70.
↑  Cf., Dulles (1963, 1965) at 119 (post-war refugees in Europe).
↑  Weiner (2007) at 42. Gehlen had been a leader in the Abwehr, the Nazi Germany's military intelligence service.
↑  Helms (2003) at 85. Yet the German Abwehr had little success in the west, and "the Russians had also been highly effective in deceiving German intelligence on the eastern front".
↑  The Pentagon's code name for their Gehlen operation was Rusty. Helms (2003) at 83.
↑  Powers (1979) at 25.
↑  Helms (2003) at 83-84. The Gehlen group possessed strong assets (at 84-85), and Gehlen was never a Nazi Party member (at 88-89).
↑  Weiner (2007) at 42-43.
↑  Helms (2003) at 88. Fortunately Helms found in Colonel James Critchfield an effective CIA officer to locate in Germany to monitor Gehlen, serving there seven years. Helms (2003) at 89-90.
↑  Weiner (2007) at 14-15, 49.
↑  Helms (2003) at 76. Helms writes that he used caution to avoid an unwarranted negative entering a leftist's file.
↑  Helms heeded the warnings. Yet some other CIA concluded that exigencies of events demanded timely results, thus less than desirable means, i.e., agents. Weiner states that elsewhere CIA directlly employed even probable war criminals. Weiner (2007) at 41.
↑  Weiner (2007) at 42: Soviet and East German "moles".
↑  Cf., Helms (2003) at 91, e.g., Soviet KGB agent Heinz Felfe (at 155, 193). Gehlen's organization expanded to roughly 4,000 (at 87).
↑  Powers (1979) at 44-47, 53.
↑  Wiener (2007) 67-68.
↑  Helms (2003) at 91.
↑  Dulles (1963, 1965) at 199-202 ("intelligence fabricators and swindlers" and "paper mills").
↑  Helms (2003), "fabrication": at 93, 95-96, 97-99; DCI Gen. Smith's instructions at 98-99. Walter Jessel of the CIA made a critical study of the 'invented' information problem that proved decisive. The most maligned fabricators were run by former Hungarian General Andras Zako. His group was put on the CIA's "burn list", i.e., designated untrustworthy.
↑  Cf., Powers (1979) at 46-47.
↑  Helms (2003), "fabrication": at 93, 95-96, 97-99; DCI Gen. Smith's instructions at 98-99. Walter Jessel of the CIA made a critical study of the 'invented' information problem that proved decisive. The most maligned fabricators were run by former Hungarian General Andras Zako. His group was put on the CIA's "burn list", i.e., designated untrustworthy.
↑  Cf., Powers (1979) at 46-47.
↑  Turner (2005) at 61, 62. Intelligence activity at Defense was much larger than at CIA.
↑  Helms (2003) at 233-235.
↑  Weiner (2007) at 68.
↑  Helms (2003) at 101 (quote).
↑  Helms (2003) at 114-116.
↑  Karalekas (1976) at 36-38.
↑  Powers (1979) at 28, 29 (where Helms worked: OSS's SI, to War's SSU to CIG's OSO); at 33-34 (OPC origin and Wisner, and re OSO).
↑  Helms (2003) at 113.
↑  Ranelagh (1986) at 133-138 (OPC).
↑  Karalekas (1976) at 38.
↑  William P. Johnson, "Clandestinity and Current Intelligence" in Studies in Intelligence 20/3: 15-69 (1976), reprinted in Westerfield (1995) 118-184, at 136-140 (elephants and gorillas); 140-143 (merger of OSO and OPC). Johnson later refers to the Foreign Service Officer as a hippopotamus (at 159, 162).
↑  Cf., Powers (1979) at 23 (noisy paramilitary operations vs. silent espionage), at 38-41 ("the spy runners, the analysts, and the political operators"); 53-56 (OSO-OPC rivalry, merger).
↑  Karalekas (1976) at 38.
↑  Turner (2005) at 67; cf., 52-53. DCI Bedell Smith hired Allen Dulles who with Wisner then merged covert operations and information gathering into the new Directorate for Plans. According to Turner, DCI 1977-1981, praise is due Smith's take-over of OPC, but Turner refers to merger of covert operations and espionage as inviting the foxes into the hen house: a merger "against Smith's express wishes". Once in CIA, OPC-style covert action "threatened to dominate the entire organization" (at 67).
↑  Ranelagh (1986) at 198-199, 200.
↑  Karalekas (1976) at 45, note 2.
↑  Cf., the National Clandestine Service.
↑  Helms (2003) at 116.
↑  Ranelagh (1986) at 199-201.
↑  Helms (2003) at 115.
↑  Karalekas (1976) at 36-37 (OSO-OPC rivalry). "The close 'tradecraft' relationship... and the frequent necessity for one to support the other was totally distorted" before the merger. "OPC and OSO agents were often competing for the same agents and, not infrequently, attempting to wrest agents from each other." OSO ran long-term, clandestine spies, silently gathering information; hence OSO "regarded OPC's high risk operations as a threat" to the carefully crafted "cover" of its agents.
↑  Ranelagh (1986) at 200 (quote [bracketed cues added).
↑  Powers (1979) at 238: Helms' "personal history is indistinguishable from the history of the CIA". At DDP Helms quickly replaced the OSO's Lyman Kirkpatrick as chief of operations when the later became seriously ill while in Thailand (at 55-57). "Helms' broad experience with clandestine operations was a result of his unique position under Wisner" (quote at 88; 88-89).
↑  Helms (2003) at 116 (quote).
↑  Ranelagh (1986) at 201-202.
↑  Powers (1979) at 92-94, quotes at 93, 94.
↑  Helms (2003) at 105, where he refers to "my old friend Frank Wisner".
↑  Powers (1979) at 140-141 (quote).
↑  Turner (2005) at 115: "Helms's tendency was against paramilitary-type violence... because it was messy and inefficient.".
↑  Colby (1978) at 310.
↑  E.g., Marchetti and Marks (1974, 1980) at 68, 324.
↑  f., Jeffreys-Jones (1989) at 194-215.
↑  Powers (1979) at 124 (good soldier); 39 (intelligence); 100, 121 (operations).
↑  Cf., Powers (1979) at 38-41, 53.
↑  Cf., Helms (2003) at 124-128.
↑  Turner (2005) at 115: Helms' "heart was in CIA espioncage operations".
↑  Powers (1979) at 20-22. His father was an industry executive and Helms' himself had headed an advertising sales department.
↑  Cf., Helms (2003) at 297-298.
↑  Turner (2005) at 115, 117, regarding Johnson.
↑  Richard Helms, "Foreword" at 8, to J. P. Quirk, The Central Intelligence Agency. A photographic history (Guilford: Foreign Intelligence Press 1986).
↑  Weiner (2007) at 69.
↑  Helms (2003) at 103.
↑  Powers (1979) 66-74, at 67 (liberal quote).
↑  Helms (2003) at 360-361.
↑  Powers (1979) 66.
↑  Weiner (2007) at 105-106.
↑  Cf., Powers (1979) at .
↑  Powers (1979) at 73.
↑  Weiner (2007) at 106.
↑  "CIA drug testing program" in Senate [Church] (1976) at 392-411. In 1952 the Chief of Medical Staff at CIA wrote (quoted at 393) about reports of Communist interrogations "utilizing drugs, physical duress, electric shock, and possibly hypnosis" and concluded that CIA develop these "techniques" but warned of danger if used by the "unscrupulous".
↑  Ranelagh (1986) at 202-216; Moscow trials at 202-203; quote from CIA memorandum per Helms' proposal at 205.
↑  Helms "proposed the establishment of MKULTRA" and "Dulles authorized MKULTRA". Senate [Church] (1976) at 404, 406.
↑  Ranelagh (1986) at 202-216; quote re 23 years at 203; drug project at 203-207; unwitting drug tests and suicide at 208-210.
↑  Senate [Church] (1976) at 401-402.
↑  Karalekas (1976) at 47: quote.
↑  Dulles and Helms both approved waiver of normal procedures for security reasons. Senate [Church] (1976) at 404-405.
↑  Ranelagh (1986) at 204.
↑  Weiner (2007) at 64-66; prison quote and Polgar quote at 64, responsibility at 65, iron curtain quote at 66.
↑  Jeffreys-Jones (1989) at 96. "Supporters and critics alike discerned a tendancy for the CIA to imitate the KGB." A State Department veteran accused it of "slavish imitation".
↑  Ranelagh (1986) at 205: Suspected double agents taken to Panama Canal Zone and used as MKUltra "guinea pigs", rumor of deaths.
↑  Marchetti and Marks (1974, 1980) at 26: quote.
↑  Ranelagh (1986) at 575-576.
↑  Powers (1979) at 341, 434,n1.
↑  Weiner (2007) at 65-66, 324.
↑  Senate [Church] (1976) at 403-404. Here the date given for destruction of MKUltra files is "early 1973" (at 403). Helms left CIA service in February 1973. Helms described the files as an "embarrassment" (at 404) and at first termed a Senate question about the regularity of their destruction as "hard to say" (at 404,n76).
↑  "CIA OKs MK-ULTRA Mind-Control Tests". Wired. April 13, 1953.
↑  Ranelagh (1986) at 571-572 & 575 re December 22, 1974 story by Hersh; at 573 re the "Vail memorandum" and Congress.
↑  Colby (1978) at 389-393 (Hersh article and Colby's candid-response strategy); at 393-395, 398 (Colby's Vail memorandum and prior CIA list of Family jewels); at 399-403 et seq. (Colby's testimony before Congressional committees); at 340 (MKUltra included in list of Family jewels).
↑  Weiner (2007) pp. 81–92. Anglo Iranian Oil Company had been caught "systematically cheat[ing]" Iran, writes Weiner (p. 82). The Aug. 19 coup d'etat (as described by Weiner) was initiated by DCI Dulles and DDP Wisner on Nov. 26 after the 1952 election, although not approved by any President until July 11 (pp. 83, 87). The coup was led by a handsomely bribed retired general Fazlollah Zahedi, whom Mossadeq previously knew as a 'British-backed traitor' (pp. 85–86, 89, 91). The CIA recruited forty other army officers, and hired his twin sister to convince the reluctant Shah (pp. 87–88). Paid-for propaganda and mob action started, but Mosaddeq was prepared and the coup failed on Aug. 16; the Shah fled the country to Baghdad, then Rome (pp. 88–89). By coincidence Dulles on vacation arrived in Rome at a hotel reception desk at the same time as the Shah (at 90). Then in earnest the CIA hired thugs to pose as 'communist goons' who the next day began to loot and burn in Tehran. More army and street agitators were purchased: on Aug. 19 the coup succeeded. 'Kim' Roosevelt was congratulated in person by Winston Churchill; the covert action became widely celebrated (p. 91–92).
↑  Powers (2004) pp. 161–166 [1980].
↑  Cf., Dulles (1963, 1965) pp. 207–208.
↑  Cf., Turner (2005) p. 84.
↑  Wm. Shawcross, The Shah's Last Ride (NY: Simon and Schuster 1988) p. 62: "Royalties paid to Iran were lower than the taxes Anglo-Iranian paid to the British governmnet."
↑  Fakhreddin Azimi, The Quest for Democracy in Iran: A Century of Struggle against Authoritarian Rule (Harvard University 2008) pp. 144, 146–147, 150, 153. Mosaddeq was "committed to the payment of just compensation to the AIOC." Azimi (2008) p. 144.
↑  Cf., Abbas Mílaní, The Shah (London: Palgrave Macmillan 2011) pp. 171–202. Mílaní, however, states that what exactly happened on August 19, 1953, the date of the coup, is unclear. The narrative accounts published are colored by their allegiances; the event has not yet been "historicized". Not available are "the most important documents" from closed archival sources—Mílaní lists a half dozen institutions. The versions that make up his composite picture seem to discount heavily the CIA version, in favor of that given by the Shah's partisans, e.g., Fazlollah Zahedi. Mílaní (2011) p. 172, 173.
↑  "[T]he support of the Ayatollahs Kashani and Behbehani ... was as important as that of the CIA in staging the [1953] return of Mohammad Reza Shah." Said Amir Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown. The Islamic Revolution in Iran (Oxford University 1988) p. 81.
↑  London journalist Christopher de Bellaigue, in his Patriot of Persia: Muhammad Mossadegh and a Tragic Anglo-American Coup (New York: HarperCollins 2012), writes at p. 155: the Majlis legislation provided that "Compensation would be paid to the 'former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company'"; and at p. 158: "What Mossadegh and his supporters considered a victory of right over wrong was for the British a theft and a violation."
↑  Richard W. Cottam, Nationalism in Iran (University of Pittsburgh 1964, 1979), e.g., pp. 226–229, 320–323. The British misunderstood Iran's primary national aim in the oil dispute: to prevent future British political interference in Iran's internal affairs. The British "persisted in their antiquarian conviction that the Iran of 1951 differed little from the Iran of 1901." Cottam, pp. 272–274.
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בקרת זהויות :  NLI: 987007280556105171  BIBSYS: 90146342  BnF: cb11948595h (data)  GND: 124361536  ISNI: 0000 0000 6682 9111  LCCN: n79064778  NARA: 10581172  NKC: mzk2015885765  NTA: 070546673  SNAC: w6gm8tc8  SUDOC: 027446344  VIAF: 52620809   WorldCat (עם VIAF): 52620809 
ויליאמס קולג'
אלן דאלס: שירת במשרד לשירותים אסטרטגיים בשווייץ בזמן מלחמת העולם השנייה וכיהן כראש ה-CIA בשנות החמישים של המאה העשרים
גנרל הויט ונדנברג ראש ה-CIG בשנים 1946–1947
חותם ה-CIA, שקוטרו 5 מטרים, בבניין המטה הראשי
ריינהרד גהלן לאחר המלחמה, 1945 (חיל האותות של צבא ארצות הברית)
גנרל וולטר סמית, ראש ה-CIA בין השנים 1950–1953. התמונה צולמה כשהיה שגריר ארצות הברית בברית המועצות, 1946-1948
וולטר סמית (במרכז) עם ראשי הסוכנות, כולל האדמירל רוסקו הילנקוטר ראש הסוכנות היוצא באותה עת (לשמאלו של סמית, בחליפה הבהירה), 7 באוקטובר 1950
החותם הרשמי של ה-CIA
מוחמד מוסאדק ראש ממשלת איראן בין השנים 1951 ל-1953