איך זה להיות עטלף?
הערות שוליים

↑  Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (Back Bay Books: 1991), p. 441
1 2 3  Alan Thomas, Thomas Nagel, (Acumen: 2009), p. 63
↑  "fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism - something it for the organism"; Thomas Nagel, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?", The Philosophical Review 83(4) (1974), p. 436
1 2 3  Andrea Eugenio Cavanna and Andrea Nani, "Thomas Nagel", in Consciousness: Theories in Neuroscience and Philosophy of Mind (Springer: 2014), p. 61
1 2  Thomas Nagel, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?", The Philosophical Review 83(4) (1974), p. 449-450
↑  Thomas Nagel, "Physicalism", The Philosophical Review 74(3) (1965), p. 435n.1
↑  Thomas Nagel, "Physicalism", The Philosophical Review 74(3) (1965), p. 339
↑  Thomas Nagel, "Physicalism", The Philosophical Review 74(3) (1965), p. 340
↑  Thomas Nagel, "Physicalism", The Philosophical Review 74(3) (1965), p. 354
↑  Thomas Nagel, "Physicalism", The Philosophical Review 74(3) (1965), pp. 354-356
↑  For Example see Serdal Tümkaya, "A Novel Reading of Thomas Nagel’s 'Challenge' to Physicalism", Organon F (2021), pp. 1-17; Yujin Nagasawa, "Thomas vs. Thomas: A New Approach to Nagel's Bat Argument", Inquiry 46(3) (2003), pp. 377-394
↑  Pär Sundström, "Nagel’s case against Physicalism", - Nordic Journal of Philosophy 3(2) (2010), pp. 91-108
↑  Thomas Nagel, "Armstrong on the Mind", The Philosophical Review 79(3) (1970), pp. 394-403
↑  Thomas Nagel, "Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness", Sythese 22(3/4) (1971), pp. 396-413
תומאס נייגל, "חציית מוח ואחדות התודעה", בתוך שאלות עלמוות (מאגנס: 2010), עמ' 179-200
↑  Ethan B. Rubin, "Implications of the Split Brain: A Consideration of Nagel", Inquiries 2(9) (2010)
↑  B.A. Farrell "Experience", Mind 59(234), p. 183
↑  Timothy L. S. Sprigge and Alan Montefiore, "Final Causes", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 45 (1971), p. 168
↑  Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (Oxford University Press: 1986), p. 13n.2
1 2 3  Thomas Nagel, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?", The Philosophical Review 83(4) (1974), p. 436
↑  Van Gulick, Robert, "Consciousness", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
↑  P.M.S. Hacker, "Is There Anything It Is Like to Be a Bat?", Philosophy 77 (2002), p. 160
↑  Thomas Nagel, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?", The Philosophical Review 83(4) (1974), p. 437-438
1 2  Thomas Nagel, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?", The Philosophical Review 83(4) (1974), pp. 439-440, and 440n.6
↑  Thomas Nagel, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?", The Philosophical Review 83(4) (1974), pp. 449
1 2  Alan Thomas, Thomas Nagel, (Acumen: 2009), p. 64
↑  Thomas Nagel, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?", The Philosophical Review 83(4) (1974), pp. 442 n .8
↑  John R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (MIT Press: 1992), pp. 117-118
↑  See also Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (Oxford University Press: 1986), pp. 13-19
↑  Thomas Nagel, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?", The Philosophical Review 83(4) (1974), pp. 441-442
↑  Andrea Eugenio Cavanna and Andrea Nani, "Thomas Nagel", in Consciousness: Theories in Neuroscience and Philosophy of Mind (Springer: 2014), p. 63
↑  בהקשר זה H.O. Mounce כותב שעבור נייגל ההבדל בין עטלפים לבין בני אדם הוא לא הבדל של מידה, אלא הבדל של איכות או סוג. המשפט "עשירים לא יודעים איך זה לחיות על הקשקש" לא תופס את סוג הבעיה שעליה נייגל מדבר. אדם עשיר יכול בעיקרון להבין איך זה להיות עני, ולפעמים בני אדם עשירים חווים עוני בעצמם. בניגוד לכך, הניסיון להבין "איך זה להיות עטלף" נועד לכישלון, משום שסביר שחווייתם של עטלפים שונה באופן רדיקלי מזו של בני אדם. אנחנו יכולים להשיג יותר מידע על עטלפים, אך המידע הזה רק מדגיש את זרותם ביחס אלינו. ראו: 
H.O. Mounce, "The Aroma of Coffee", Philosophy 64(268) (1989), pp. 163-164
↑  Thomas Nagel, "Dennet Consciousness Explained" in Other Minds (Oxford University Press: 1995), pp. 89
↑  Thomas Nagel, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?", The Philosophical Review 83(4) (1974), pp. 444-445
↑  Donald Davidson, "Mental Events", in Experience and Theory. Ed. by Lawrence Foster and J.W. Swanson (University of Massachusetts Press": 1970)
↑  Thomas Nagel, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?", The Philosophical Review 83(4) (1974), pp. 446-448
↑  Alan Thomas, Thomas Nagel, (Acumen: 2009), pp. 82ff
↑  Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (Oxford University Press: 1986), esp. chapters 1 and 2
↑  Thomas Nagel, "The Psychophysical Nexus", in Concealment and Exposure and Other Essays (Oxford University Press: 2002), pp. 194-236
1 2  Daniel C. Dennett, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat", paper presented  at the New York University Philosophy Department, April 5 1991
↑  David Woodruff Smith, "Phenomenology", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
↑  Ted Honderich, "Introduction to Thomas Nagel's Lecture", in Philosophers of Our Time, ed.  by Ted Honderich, (Oxford University Press: 2015), p. 5
↑  Susan Blackmore, Consciousness: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press: 2005), p. 8
↑  Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (Back Bay Books: 1991), p. 441-448
↑  Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (Back Bay Books: 1991), p. 445
↑  Thomas Nagel, "Dennet Consciousness Explained" in Other Minds (Oxford University Press: 1995), Chapter 8, pp. 86-89
↑  Douglass R. Hofstadter and Daniel C. Dennet, "Reflections on What Is It Like to Be a Bat", in The Mind's I: Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul, (Basic Books: 1981), pp. 403-414
↑  Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker (Norton: 1986), p. 34
↑  Kathleen Akins, "What is it Like to be Boring and Myopic?", in Dennett and His Critics: Demystifying Mind, edited by Bo Dahlbom, (Blackwell: 1993), pp. 127-128
↑  Kathleen Akins, "What is it Like to be Boring and Myopic?", in Dennett and His Critics: Demystifying Mind, edited by Bo Dahlbom, (Blackwell: 1993), p. 147
↑  Kathleen Akins, "What is it Like to be Boring and Myopic?", in Dennett and His Critics: Demystifying Mind, edited by Bo Dahlbom, (Blackwell: 1993), p. 154
↑  Sean Allen-Hermanson, "Strong Neurophilosophy and the Matter of Bat Consciousness: A Case Study", Erkenntnis 80(1) (2015), pp. 57-76
↑  Peter M.S. Hacker, Is there anything it is like to be a bat?, Philosophy 77 (2002), pp. 157-174
↑  Peter M.S. Hacker, The Sad and Sorry History of Consciousness: being among other things a challenge to the “consciousness studies community”, Royal Institute of Philosophy, supplementary volume 70 (2012)