نادي السفاري
مراجع

↑   https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=VEYsi7ZmtywC&pg=PT85&redir_esc=y. {{استشهاد ويب}}: |url= بحاجة لعنوان (مساعدة) والوسيط |title= غير موجود أو فارغ (من ويكي بيانات) (مساعدة)
1 2 3  Heikal, Iran: The Untold Story (1982), p. 114.
1 2 3 4  Cooley, Unholy Wars, p. 17.
↑  محيي الدين عميمور (13 مارس 2014). "من أرشيف التاريخ : حكاية نادي السافاري". صحيفة رأي اليوم. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2016-01-03.
1 2  Scott, The Road to 9/11 (2008), pp. 62–63. "The Safari Club met at an exclusive resort of the same name in Kenya, which in the same year, 1976, was visited and eventually bought by Adham's friend Adnan Kashoggi.
↑  Heikal, Iran: The Untold Story (1982), p. 113.
↑  Cooley, Unholy Wars, p. 15.
↑  محمد حسنين هيكل، مدافع آية الله:قصة إيران والثورة (القاهرة:دار الشروق، ط،3 1983)، ص 154.
↑  Robert Lacey, Inside the Kingdom: Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia, London: Penguin, 2009; ISBN 9781101140734; p. Google Books preview. نسخة محفوظة 04 ديسمبر 2016 على موقع واي باك مشين.
↑  Robert Lacey, Inside the Kingdom: Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia, London: Penguin, 2009; (ردمك 9781101140734); p. Google Books preview. نسخة محفوظة 2021-10-15 على موقع واي باك مشين.
↑  Miglietta, American Alliance Policy (2002), p. 20. "The Shah provided covert assistance to groups seeking to destabilize the governments of Soviet allies in the region such as Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as providing assistance to pro-Western governments such as Oman and South Vietnam. In an effort to further advance these goals, the Shah associated Iran with a group of conservative Middle Eastern and African states in an informal organization known as the Safari Club. This group was dedicated to blocking the spread of Soviet influence in the third world."
↑  محمد حسنين هيكل، مدافع آية الله:قصة إيران والثورة، ص151.
↑  Trento, Prelude to Terror (2005), p. 105.
↑  Trento, Prelude to Terror (2005), p. 104. The Safari Club needed a network of banks to finance its intelligence operations. With the official blessing of George Bush as the head of the CIA, Adham transformed a small Pakistani merchant bank, the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), into a worldwide money-laundering machine, buying banks around the world in order to create the biggest clandestine money network in history.
↑  Trento, Prelude to Terror (2005), p. 105. "They contrived, with Bush and other intelligence-service heads, a plan that seemed too good to be true. The bank would solicit the business of every major terrorist, rebel, and underground organization in the world. The invaluable intelligence thus gained would be discreetly distributed to 'friends' of the BCCI."
↑  Cooley, Unholy Wars, p. 15. "The جيمي كارتر team adopted a method of avoiding the stigma of direct CIA involvement in covert operations which could go wrong and backfire on the United States. It was a method which Henry Kissinger, first as President ريتشارد نيكسون's national security advisor, then as Secretary of State, had refined and applied with skill: get others to do what you want done, while avoiding the onus or blame if the operation fails."
↑  Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim (2004), pp. 80–84.
1 2 3  بيتر ديل سكوت, "Launching the U.S. Terror War: the CIA, 9/11, Afghanistan, and Central Asia", Asia–Pacific Journal 10(12), 16 March 2012.
↑  تركي الفيصل بن عبد العزيز آل سعود, February 2002, quoted in Trento, Prelude to Terror (2005), p. 102.
↑  Trento, Prelude to Terror (2005), p. 113–114. "Shackley, who still had ambitions to become DCI, believed that without his many sources and operatives like Wilson, the Safari Club — operating with Helms in charge in Tehran — would be ineffective. Shackley was well aware that Helms was under criminal investigation for lying to Congress about the CIA in Chile. Shackley had testified before the same grand jury. Unless Shackley took direct action to complete the privatization of intelligence operations soon, the Safari Club would not have a conduit to DO resources. The solution: create a totally private intelligence network using CIA assets until President Carter could be replaced."
↑  Trento, Prelude to Terror (2005), p. 314. "The Safari Club was run by the Saudis. It was a club to serve their purposes through the CIA. Shackley and Wilson were not members; only nations could belong. Shackley and Wilson were men who served the club in exchange for power, influence, and money."
↑  Bronson, Thicker than Oil (2006), p. 132. "Each Safari Club member brought unique capabilities. France supplied technical equipment for communications and security. Egypt and Morocco provided weapons and manpower. Saudi Arabia financed the group's efforts. The club worked because it reinforced preexisting arrangements. The Saudis were already buying French Mirages for Egypt's arsenal and providing Morocco with financial aid, which by 1980 amounted to around $1 billion a year."
↑  Issandr el Amrani, "Security Policy and Democratic Reform in Morocco: Between Public Discourse and Reality"; in Arab State and Neo-Liberal Globalization : The Restructuring of State Power in the Middle East, ed. Laura Guazzone and Daniela Pioppi; Ithaca Press, 2009; (ردمك 9780863723391); p. 307. "[Morocco] took part in an informal intelligence-gathering and military operations network known as the 'Safari Club', a late 1970s US-led effort at destabilization of pro-Soviet Sub-Saharan African countries involving France, Egypt, (pre-revolutionary) Iran and Saudi Arabia, created to some extent to enable parts of the American intelligence community to conduct undercover operations without congressional oversight. Morocco's role in that particular initiative was to provide 'muscle' for counter-insurgency operations, as it did in 1978 in Kowelzi, a mining city in southern Zaire that had been overtaken by rebels."
↑  Ibrahim Warde, The Price of Fear: Al-Qaeda and the Truth Behind the Financial War on Terror, London: I.B.Taurus, 2007; (ردمك 9781850434245); p. 133.
"The various members of that group contributed in different ways. Saudi Arabia's contribution was by and large limited to providing money. Under such 'checkbook diplomacy,' the Saudi government would finance, with no questions asked, covert operations in countries such as Angola and Nicaragua."
↑  Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim (2004), p. 85. "The club's first success was in the Congo. Faced with a rebellion in mineral-rich Katanga (now Shaba) province in April 1977 and a plea for help from French and Belgian mining interests conveyed through their close ally Mobutu, the club combined French air transport with logistical support from diverse sources to bring Moroccan and Egyptian troops to fight the rebellion."
↑  Elaine Windrich, "The laboratory of hate: The role of clandestine radio in the Angolan War", International Journal of Cultural Studies 3(2), 2000; accessed via Sage, DOI: 10.1177/136787790000300209.
↑  Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim (2004), p. 85. "The club registered an even greater success when it helped bring about the historic rapprochement between two strategic American allies, Egypt and Israel, laying the ground for Anwar al-Sadat's pathbreaking November 1977 visit to Jerusalem."
↑  Heikal, Iran: The Untold Story (1982), p. 116. "In a way, however, the Club could claim responsibility for President Sadat's initiative which took him to Jerusalem in November 1977. The first letter suggesting a meeting came from Rabin when he was still Israeli Prime Minister and was carried to Sadat by Ahmed Duleimi, the Moroccan representative in the Club, and it was under the auspices of King Hassan that an initial meeting took place in Morocco between Moshe Dayan and an Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister."
↑  Cooley, Unholy Wars, pp. 17–18.
↑  Xavier Cornut, "The Moroccan connection", Jerusalem Post, 22 June 2009. نسخة محفوظة 2013-02-04 على موقع واي باك مشين.
↑  Trento, Prelude to Terror (2005), p. 110. "According to Crowley, Shackley 'went out, dropped a quarter in the telephone, and contacted Mossad. He went around Turner and contacted Mossad and said he would be their man in the Agency. Shackley moved quickly to fill the Angleton void."
↑  Lefebvre, Arms for the Horn (1992), pp. 179.
↑  Gebru Tareke, "The Ethiopia-Somalia War of 1977 Revisited", The International Journal of African Historical Studies, 33(3), 2000; accessed via JStor.  نسخة محفوظة 27 مارس 2020 على موقع واي باك مشين.
↑  Bronson, Thicker than Oil (2006), p. 134. "Encouraged by Saudi Arabia, Safari Club members approached Somali president Siad Barre and offered to provide the arms he needed if he stopped taking Russian aid. Barre agreed. Egypt then sold Somalia $75 million worth of its unwanted Soviet arms, with Saudi Arabia footing the bill."
↑  Miglietta, American Alliance Policy (2002), p. 78. "American military goods were provided by Egypt and Iran, which transferred excess arms from their inventories. وقيل أن الدبابات إم-48 الأمريكية المباعة لإيران شُحنت إلى الصومال عبر عُمان."
↑  Lefebvre, Arms for the Horn (1992), p. 188. "Washington had done little to control, and seemingly ahd encouraged, Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia to take advantage of the more liberal policies of other Western states and make third-party arms transfers to Somalia. Reports surfaced that U.S.-made M-48 tanks,originally sold to Iran, had reached Somalia عن طريق عُمان."
↑  Ofira Seliktar, Failing the Crystal Ball Test: The Carter Administration and the Fundamentalist Revolution in Iran, Westport CT: Praeger, 2000; ISBN 9780275968724; p. 53. "Iran became a crucial player in the Red Sea Entente—known as the Safari Club—which also included Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Egypt. In the early seventies the shah put down a leftist rebellion in Dhofar and helped Morocco fight Polissario guerrillas in Sahara. However, when the shah moved to help Somalia in its struggle with Marxist Ethiopia, the Carter administration rebuffed his effort, signalling that the Entente was dead."
1 2  Ioannis Mantzikos, "U. S. foreign policymaking toward Ethiopia and Somalia (1974 - 1980)", African Journal of Political Science and International Relations 4(6), June 2010. نسخة محفوظة 03 يونيو 2013 على موقع واي باك مشين.
↑  Lefebvre, Arms for the Horn (1992), pp. 176–177.
↑  Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim (2004), p. 86.
↑  Miglietta, American Alliance Policy (2002), p. 78. "This led the Red Sea Entente countries of Saudia Arabia and Iran, as well as Somalia, to view Washington as having let them down and backing away from its commitments at the last moment."
↑  Roy Pateman, "Intelligence Operations in the Horn of Africa"; in Disaster and Development in the Horn of Africa, ed. John Sorenson; Houndmills & London: Macmillan, 1995; ISBN 0-333-60799-6; p. 61. "كان لفرنسا بعض النفوذ في الصومال، من خلال وجودها في جيبوتي المجاورة ومن خلال عضويتها في نادي سفاري، فلعبت دوراً محورياً في إقناع سياد بري بطرد السوفيت في 1978 مقابل تسليحه (Faligot and Krop 1989:257). ولبرهة من الوقت، بعد طرد السوفيت، طوّرت الولايات المتحدة الصومال كقاعدة إقليمية. وحسب القائم بأعمال السفارة الأمريكية في مقديشيو، آنذاك، ففي عشر سنوات أنفقت الولايات المتحدة 50 مليون دولار على الصومال؛ 17 مليون خـُصّصت لبناء مركز اتصالات هائل في السفارة، ومعظم الباقي على إعادة تأهيل مجمع رادار سوفيتي الصنع (Rawson:1992)."
↑  Scott, The Road to 9/11 (2008), p. 64. "A key example would soon be the 1980s CIA support of the resistance in Afghanistan, where CIA's disastrous favoring of drug traffickers had grown directly out of the Safari Club arrangement and was partly handled through BCCI. This loss of control will emerge as a major factor in our nation's slouching toward the tragedy of 9/11".
↑  Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, New York: Penguin, 2004; (ردمك 9781594200076); pp. 81–82.
↑  Robert Lacey, Inside the Kingdom: Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia, London: Penguin, 2009; (ردمك 9781101140734)ISBN 9781101140734; p. Google Books preview. نسخة محفوظة 2021-10-15 على موقع واي باك مشين.
↑  Scott, American War Machine (2010), p. 172. "It is certain that, with the blessing of Casey—who had his own direct contacts with Rappaport, BCCI, and the global drug connection—Shackley, Khashoggi, and their contacts led to Iran–Contra. At least one member of Shackley's group, Richard Secord, then created an airline that brought Islamist mujahideen to Afghanistan. Another, neoconservative مايكل ليدين, contributed not only to Iran–Contra but also, with دونالد رامسفيلد and ديك تشيني, to the creation of the مشروع القرن الأمريكي الجديد."
↑  Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim (2004), p. 87. "The Safari Club vindicated the essence of the Kissinger perspective: the constraints of democracy at home required that the United States work through proxies in the international arena. In the search for proxies, South Africa continued to have a special place.
↑  Scott, The Road to 9/11 (2008), p. 63. "These offshore events in 1976 were mirrored by a similar arrangement for off-loading former CIA agents and operations in Latin America. This was the Confederación Anticomunista Latinoamaericana (CAL) and its death-squad collaboration Operation Condor. Operation Condor was a coalition of intelligence agencies of CAL countries, chiefly Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Paraguay. The CAL was funded through the World Anti-Communist League by the governments of South Korea and Taiwan and—once again—the إعادة تدوير البترودولار of Saudi Arabia."
بوابة إسرائيل
بوابة إيران
بوابة الحرب الباردة
بوابة السعودية
بوابة المغرب
بوابة الولايات المتحدة
بوابة جنوب إفريقيا
بوابة فرنسا
بوابة مصر
نادي سفاري في جبل كنيا، الذي أخذ منه التحالف المناهض للشيوعية اسمه.
كان ثيودور "تيد" شاكلي (إلى اليسار) أحد كبار مسؤولي وكالة المخابرات المركزية في نادي سفاري
الملكيت من كولويزي في محافظة شبعا، تمت إعادة تسمية المقاطعة من قبل موبوتو في عام 1972 وهي غنية بالنحاس والكوبالت والراديوم واليورانيوم (شينكولوبوي).
خريطة تبين إقليم أوجادين الذي تحتله إثيوبيا من الصومال
الرئيس جيمي كارتر وشاه إيران في البيت الأبيض، 15 نوفمبر 1977.