النموذج الاستنتاجي الطبيعي
مراجع

↑  Kenneth F Schaffner, "Explanation and causation in biomedical sciences", pp 79–125, in Laudan, ed, Mind and Medicine (U California P, 1983), p 81. نسخة محفوظة 2020-07-31 على موقع واي باك مشين.
1 2  G Montalenti, ch 2 "From Aristotle to Democritus via Darwin", in Ayala & Dobzhansky, eds, Studies in the Philosophy of Biology (U California P, 1974). نسخة محفوظة 2020-07-31 على موقع واي باك مشين.
↑  In the 17th century, Descartes as well as إسحاق نيوتن firmly believed in God as nature's designer and thereby firmly believed in natural purposiveness, yet found غائية to be مشكلة التمييز فلسفة طبيعية's inquiry (Bolotin, Approach to Aristotle's Physics, pp 31–33). By 1650, formalizing مركزية الشمس and launching فلسفة آلية، التفسيرات الميكانيكية للجاذبية overthrew geocentrism as well as Aristotelian physics. In the 1660s, روبرت بويل sought to lift chemistry as a new discipline from alchemy. Newton more especially sought the laws of nature—simply the regularities of phenomena—whereby ميكانيكا كلاسيكية, reducing celestial science to terrestrial science, ejected from physics the vestige of Aristotelian metaphysics, thus disconnecting physics and alchemy/chemistry, which then followed its own course, yielding chemistry around 1800. نسخة محفوظة 2020-07-31 على موقع واي باك مشين.
↑  Nicknames for principles attributed to Hume—Hume's fork، مشكلة الاستقراء، مشكلة هل - يجب—were not created by Hume but by later philosophers labeling them for ease of reference.
↑  Not privy to the world's either necessities or impossibilities, but by force of habit or mental nature, humans experience sequence of sensory events, find seeming constant conjunction, make the unrestricted generalization of an استقراء, and justify it by presuming وتيرة واحدة. Humans thus attempt to justify a minor induction by adding a major induction, both logically invalid and unverified by experience—the مشكلة الاستقراء—how humans irrationally presume discovery of causality. (Chakraborti, Logic, p 381; Flew, Dictionary, "Hume", p 156. نسخة محفوظة 2020-07-31 على موقع واي باك مشين.
↑  By Hume's fork, the truths of mathematics and logic as علوم شكلية are universal through "relations of ideas"—simply abstract truths—thus knowable بداهة واستدلال. On the other hand, the claimed truths of تجريبية are إمكان on "fact and real existence", knowable only بداهة واستدلال. By Hume's fork, the two categories never cross. Any treatises containing neither can contain only "sophistry and illusion". (Flew, Dictionary, "Hume's fork", p 156). نسخة محفوظة 2020-07-31 على موقع واي باك مشين.
↑  For more discursive discussions of types of causality—necessary, sufficient, necessary and sufficient, component, sufficient component, counterfactual—see Rothman & Greenland, Parascandola & Weed, as well as Kundi. Following is more direct elucidation:

A necessary cause is a causal condition required for an event to occur. A sufficient cause is a causal condition complete to produce an event. Necessary is not always sufficient, however, since other casual factors—that is, other component causes—might be required to produce the event. Conversely, a sufficient cause is not always a necessary cause, since differing sufficient causes might likewise produce the event. Strictly speaking, a sufficient cause cannot be a single factor, as any causal factor must act casually through many other factors. And although a necessary cause might exist, humans cannot verify one, since humans cannot check every possible state of affairs. (Language can state necessary causality as a طوطولوجيا—a statement whose terms' علم النحو and meanings render it is logically true by mere definition—which, as an تمييز تحليلي اصطناعي, is uninformative about the actual world. A statement referring to and contingent on the world's actualities is a تمييز تحليلي اصطناعي, rather.)

Sufficient causality is more actually sufficient component causality—a complete set of component causes interacting within a causal constellation—which, however, is beyond humans' capacity to fully discover. Yet humans tend intuitively to conceive of causality as necessary and sufficient—a single factor both required and complete—the one and only cause, the cause. One may so view flipping a light switch. The switch's flip was not sufficient cause, however, but contingent on countless factors—intact bulb, intact wiring, circuit box, bill payment, utility company, neighborhood infrastructure, engineering of technology by توماس إديسون and نيكولا تسلا, explanation of electricity by جيمس كليرك ماكسويل, harnessing of electricity by بنجامين فرانكلين, metal refining, metal mining, and on and on—while, whatever the tally of events, nature's causal mechanical structure remains a mystery.

From a ديفيد هيوم perspective, the light's putative inability to come on without the switch's flip is neither a logical necessity nor an empirical finding, since no experience ever reveals that the world either is or will remain universally uniform as to the aspects appearing to bind the switch's flip as the necessary event for the light's coming on. If the light comes on without switch flip, surprise will affect one's mind, but one's mind cannot know that the event violated nature. As just a mundane possibility, an activity within the wall could have connected the wires and completed the circuit without the switch's flip.

Though apparently enjoying the scandals that trailed his own explanations, Hume was very practical and his skepticism was quite uneven (Flew p 156). Although Hume rejected orthodox theism and sought to reject ما وراء الطبيعة, Hume supposedly extended Newtonian method to the human mind, which Hume, in a sort of antiCopernican move, placed as the pivot of human knowledge (Flew p 154). Hume thus placed his own theory of knowledge on par with قانون الجذب العام لنيوتن (Buckle pp 70–71, Redman pp 182–83, Schliesser § abstract). Hume found استقراء an unavoidable custom required for one to live (Gattei pp 28–29). Hume found constant conjunction to reveal a modest causality type: counterfactual causality. Silent as to causal role—whether necessity, sufficiency, component strength, or mechanism—counterfactual causality is simply that alteration of a factor prevents or produces the event of interest. "نسخة مؤرشفة". مؤرشف من الأصل في 2020-07-31. اطلع عليه بتاريخ 2021-02-11.{{استشهاد ويب}}:  صيانة الاستشهاد: BOT: original URL status unknown (link)
↑  Kundi M (2006). "Causality and the interpretation of epidemiologic evidence". Environmental Health Perspectives. ج. 114 ع. 7: 969–974. DOI:10.1289/ehp.8297. PMC:1513293. PMID:16835045.
↑  Hume noted that authors ubiquitously continue for some time stating facts and then suddenly switch to stating معياري—supposedly what should be—with barely explanation. Yet such values, as in أخلاقيات or فلسفة الجمال or فلسفة سياسية, are not found true merely by stating facts: is does not itself reveal ought. Hume's law is the principle that the fact/value gap is unbridgeable—that no statements of facts can ever justify norms—although Hume himself did not state that. Rather, some later philosophers found Hume to merely stop short of stating it, but to have communicated it. Anyway, Hume found that humans acquired morality through experience by تعزيز مجتمعي. (Flew, Dictionary, "Hume's law", p 157 & "Naturalistic fallacy", pp 240–41; Wootton, Modern Political Thought, p 306.) نسخة محفوظة 2020-07-31 على موقع واي باك مشين.
↑  Kant inferred that the المقولة عند كانت arrange space holding هندسة إقليدية—like Newton's زمان ومكان مطلق—while objects interact temporally as modeled in قانون الجذب العام لنيوتن, whose قانون الجذب العام لنيوتن is a truth تمييز تحليلي اصطناعي, that is, contingent on experience, indeed, but known universally true without universal experience. Thus, the المقولة عند كانت cross the tongs of Hume's fork and lay Newton's قانون الجذب العام لنيوتن as بداهة واستدلال truth.
1 2  Chakravartty, "Scientific realism", §1.2 "The three dimensions of realist commitment", in SEP, 2013: "Semantically, realism is committed to a literal interpretation of scientific claims about the world. In common parlance, realists take theoretical statements at 'face value'. According to realism, claims about scientific entities, processes, properties, and relations, whether they be observable or unobservable, should be construed literally as having truth values, whether true or false. This semantic commitment contrasts primarily with those of so-called instrumentalist epistemologies of science, which interpret descriptions of unobservables simply as instruments for the prediction of observable phenomena, or for systematizing observation reports. Traditionally, instrumentalism holds that claims about unobservable things have no literal meaning at all (though the term is often used more liberally in connection with some antirealist positions today). Some antirealists contend that claims involving unobservables should not be interpreted literally, but as elliptical for corresponding claims about observables". نسخة محفوظة 2020-11-09 على موقع واي باك مشين.
↑  Challenges to الواقعية العلمية are captured succinctly by Bolotin, Approach to Aristotle's Physics (SUNY P, 1998), pp 33–34, commenting about modern science, "But it has not succeeded, of course, in encompassing all phenomena, at least not yet. For it laws are mathematical idealizations, idealizations, moreover, with no immediate basis in experience and with no evident connection to the ultimate causes of the natural world. For instance, قوانين نيوتن للحركة (the law of inertia) requires us to imagine a body that is always at rest or else moving aimlessly in a straight line at a constant speed, even though we never see such a body, and even though according to his own theory of universal gravitation, it is impossible that there can be one. This fundamental law, then, which begins with a claim about what would happen in a situation that never exists, carries no conviction except insofar as it helps to predict observable events. Thus, despite the amazing success of Newton's laws in predicting the observed positions of the planets and other bodies, Einstein and Infeld are correct to say, in تطور الأفكار في الفيزياء, that 'we can well imagine another system, based on different assumptions, might work just as well'. Einstein and Infeld go on to assert that 'physical concepts are free creations of the human mind, and are not, however it may seem, uniquely determined by the external world'. To illustrate what they mean by this assertion, they compare the modern scientist to a man trying to understand the mechanism of a closed watch. If he is ingenious, they acknowledge, this man 'may form some picture of a mechanism which would be responsible for all the things he observes'. But they add that he 'may never quite be sure his picture is the only one which could explain his observations. He will never be able to compare his picture with the real mechanism and he cannot even imagine the possibility or the meaning of such a comparison'. In other words, modern science cannot claim, and it will never be able to claim, that it has the definite understanding of any natural phenomenon". نسخة محفوظة 2020-07-31 على موقع واي باك مشين.
↑  Whereas a hypothetical imperative is practical, simply what one ought to do if one seeks a particular outcome, the categorical imperative is morally universal, what everyone always ought to do.
1 2  Bourdeau, "Auguste Comte", §§ "Abstract" & "Introduction", in Zalta, ed, SEP, 2013. نسخة محفوظة 2021-02-05 على موقع واي باك مشين.
↑  Comte, A General View of Positivism (Trübner, 1865), pp 49–50, including the following passage: "As long as men persist in attempting to answer the insoluble questions which occupied the attention of the childhood of our race, by far the more rational plan is to do as was done then, that is, simply to give free play to the imagination. These spontaneous beliefs have gradually fallen into disuse, not because they have been disproved, but because humankind has become more enlightened as to its wants and the scope of its powers, and has gradually given an entirely new direction to its speculative efforts". نسخة محفوظة 2020-07-31 على موقع واي باك مشين.
↑  Flew, Dictionary (St Martin's, 1984), "Positivism", p 283. نسخة محفوظة 2020-07-31 على موقع واي باك مشين.
1 2 3  Woodward, "Scientific explanation", §1 "Background and introduction", in SEP, 2011. نسخة محفوظة 2020-08-13 على موقع واي باك مشين.
1 2  Friedman, Reconsidering Logical Positivism (Cambridge U P, 1999), p xii. نسخة محفوظة 2021-02-05 على موقع واي باك مشين.
↑  Any positivism placed in the 20th century is generally neo, although there was إرنست ماخ's positivism nearing 1900, and a general positivistic approach to science—traceable to the inductivist trend from فرانسيس بيكون at 1620, the إسحاق نيوتن برنامج بحثي at 1687, and أوغست كونت positivism at 1830—that continues in a vague but usually disavowed sense within popular culture and some sciences.
↑  Neopositivists are sometimes called "verificationists".
↑
Chakravartty, "Scientific realism", §4 "Antirealism: Foils for scientific realism", §4.1 "Empiricism", in SEP, 2013: "Traditionally, ذرائعية maintain that terms for unobservables, by themselves, have no meaning; construed literally, statements involving them are not even candidates for truth or falsity. The most influential advocates of ذرائعية were the الوضعانية المنطقية (or logical positivists), including رودولف كارناب and كارل هيمبل, famously associated with the تجريبيو فيينا group of philosophers and scientists as well as important contributors elsewhere. In order to rationalize the ubiquitous use of terms which might otherwise be taken to refer to unobservables in scientific discourse, they adopted a non-literal علم دلالة الألفاظ according to which these terms acquire meaning by being associated with terms for observables (for example, 'إلكترون' might mean 'white streak in a غرفة سحابية'), or with demonstrable laboratory procedures (a view called 'إجرائية'). Insuperable difficulties with this semantics led ultimately (in large measure) to the demise of الوضعانية المنطقية and the growth of الواقعية العلمية. The contrast here is not merely in علم دلالة الألفاظ and نظرية المعرفة: a number of logical empiricists also held the كانطية جديدة view that علم الوجود questions 'external' to the frameworks for knowledge represented by theories are also meaningless (the choice of a framework is made solely on براغماتية grounds), thereby rejecting the ما وراء الطبيعة dimension of الواقعية العلمية (as in Carnap 1950)".
Okasha, Philosophy of Science (Oxford U P, 2002), p 62: "Strictly we should distinguish two sorts of anti-realism. According to the first sort, talk of unobservable entities is not to be understood literally at all. So when a scientist puts forward a theory about electrons, for example, we should not take him to be asserting the existence of entities called 'electrons'. Rather, his talk of electrons is metaphorical. This form of anti-realism was popular in the first half of the 20th century, but few people advocate it today. It was motivated largely by a doctrine in the philosophy of language, according to which it is not possible to make meaningful assertions about things that cannot in principle be observed, a doctrine that few contemporary philosophers accept. The second sort of anti-realism accepts that talk of unobservable entities should be taken at face value: if a theory says that electrons are negatively charged, it is true if electrons do exist and are negatively charged, but false otherwise. But we will never know which, says the anti-realist. So the correct attitude towards the claims that scientists make about unobservable reality is one of total agnosticism. They are either true or false, but we are incapable of finding out which. Most modern anti-realism is of this second sort". "نسخة مؤرشفة". مؤرشف من الأصل في 2020-11-09. اطلع عليه بتاريخ 2021-02-11.{{استشهاد ويب}}:  صيانة الاستشهاد: BOT: original URL status unknown (link)
↑  Woodward, "Scientific explanation", in Zalta, ed, SEP, 2011, abstract. نسخة محفوظة 2020-08-13 على موقع واي باك مشين.
↑  Hempel، Carl G؛ Oppenheim، Paul (أبريل 1948). "Studies in the logic of explanation". Philosophy of Science. ج. 15 ع. 2: 135–175. DOI:10.1086/286983. JSTOR:185169.
↑  Bechtel, Discovering Cell Mechanisms (Cambridge U P, 2006), esp pp 24–25. نسخة محفوظة 2020-09-14 على موقع واي باك مشين.
1 2  Suppe, "Afterword—1977", "Introduction", §1 "Swan song for positivism", §1A "Explanation and intertheoretical reduction", pp 619–24, in Suppe, ed, Structure of Scientific Theories, 2nd edn (U Illinois P, 1977). نسخة محفوظة 2020-07-31 على موقع واي باك مشين.
↑  Woodward, "Scientific explanation", §2 "The DN model", §2.3 "Inductive statistical explanation", in Zalta, ed, SEP, 2011. نسخة محفوظة 2020-08-13 على موقع واي باك مشين.
↑  von Wright, Explanation and Understanding (Cornell U P, 1971), p 11. نسخة محفوظة 2020-07-31 على موقع واي باك مشين.
↑  Manfred Riedel, "Causal and historical explanation", in Manninen & Tuomela, eds, Essays on Explanation and Understanding (D Reidel, 1976), pp 3–4. نسخة محفوظة 2020-07-31 على موقع واي باك مشين.
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