انقلاب هندوراس 1963
مراجع

↑  Leonard, History of Honduras (2011), p. 141. "Despite the limited gains, the 1954 strike marked a major turning point in the growing strength of the Honduran labor movement and the decline of the fruit companies over state affairs. Coupled with the 1949 labor law, the settlement of the 1954 labor strike paved the way for the full unionization of Honduran labor in 1955, when the state legalized 50 unions, including the North Coast banana workers."
↑  Mylene Bruneau, "Ramón Villeda Morales: The “Little Bird” Who Brought Big Changes and Honor to Honduras”, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 8 May 2009. نسخة محفوظة 5 أغسطس 2020 على موقع واي باك مشين.
↑  Bowman, "Public Battles over Militarisation and Democracy in Honduras" (2001), p. 551.
↑  Leonard, History of Honduras (2011), p. 144.
↑  Bowman, Militarization, Democratization, and Development (2002), pp. 166–167.
↑  Schulz & Schulz, The United States, Honduras, and the Crisis in Central America (1994), pp. 28–29. "In contrast, the big cotton plantations and cattle ranches tended to expand outward, absorbing neighboring land by evicting tenants and squatters and fencing in their new acquisitions with barbed wire. In southern Honduras, between 1952 and 1966, two haciendas alone acquired some 54,000 acres through such 'competitive exclusion.' Moreover, as land grew more scarce, the purchase and rental price of property rose, driving even more people into landlessness. These developments could not but produce a reaction. As peasant desperation grew, agrarian conflict increased. Campesinos began to resist the encroachments of the big commercial farms. Land invasions and violence became more frequent. Peasant militancy and organization increased."
↑  Schulz & Schulz, The United States, Honduras, and the Crisis in Central America (1994), p. 29. "In response, the government set up a colonization program. Between 1958 and 1960, some 75,000 acres of land were distributed. In 1961 a National Agrarian Institute (Instituto Nacional Agrario—INA) was established to oversee the process. A year later Villeda sponsored a new peasant union, the National Association of Honduran Peasants (Asociación Nacional de Campesinos de Honduras—ANACH), to counteract a more radical organization."
↑  Schulz & Schulz, The United States, Honduras, and the Crisis in Central America (1994), p. 29.
1 2  LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions (1993), pp. 179–180. "But Villeda Morales became too acute about the Alliance's objectives. At the 1961 Punta del Este meeting, he took the Kennedy administration's rhetoric so seriously that he drafted an agrarian reform law which threatened the massive uncultivated lands owned by United Fruit and Standard Fruit."
↑  Euraque, Reinterpreting the Banana Republic (1996), p. 113. "Charles F. Burrows, the U.S. Ambassador, had long been reviewing the projected law with Villeda Morales so that, according to State Department official Edwin M. Martin, Villeda Morales and other Honduran officials 'would be aware of our interest in ensuring that the law was both constructive in its effects on agricultural productivity and incomes and would not adversely affect the legitimate interests of the present property owners, including United States corporations.' Despite Burrow's early discussions with Villeda Morales, the liberal leader apparently still felt that he could demonstrate some independence from Washington and the banana companies. For example, he 'failed' to show United Fruit Company officials copies of agrarian legislation prior to debate in the Honduran Congress."
↑  Bowman, Militarization, Democratization, and Development (2002), p. 172.
↑  Schulz & Schulz, The United States, Honduras, and the Crisis in Central America (1994), p. 30.
↑  Bowman, Militarization, Democratization, and Development (2002), p. 172. "Two months after signing the Agrarian Reform Law, Villeda was summoned to Washington to meet with Kennedy at the White House. After this meeting, Villeda removed the progressive director of the National Agrarian Institute (INA) and 'agrarian reform shifted drastically from expropriation of private property to colonization or resettlement projects upon state-owned land' (MacCameron 1983, 113; also see Brocket 1991). Villeda had seen what happened to Arbenz when the CIA and the UFCO decided he was a threat. Land reform continued in a watered-down version and country headed into the 1963 election."
↑  Euraque, Reinterpreting the Banana Republic (1996), p. 113.
↑  Euraque, Reinterpreting the Banana Republic (1996), p. 114. "Starting in 1961, the president's enemies had viciously red-baited his regime, despite Ambassador Burrows's reassurances to Villeda Morales and despite Villeda Morales public denunciations of communism in general and its Cuban variety in particular. Villeda Morales suspended diplomatic relations with Cuba in April 1961—before he signed the alliance charter in August. Even right-wing opponents recognized his constant recriminations against 'Castro-Communism.' Nonetheless, by the time López Arellano ousted Villeda Morales, it was a foregone conclusion that the new regime would justify the coup at least partly because of 'the communist menace' to local civilization, property, and so forth."
↑  Euraque, Reinterpreting the Banana Republic (1996), p. 108. "Berle's confidence in Villeda Morales's regime actually belied, at least by 1962, a suspicion that liberals like Villeda Morales and others in the region were often still too soft on communists and 'crypto-Communists.'”
↑  Bowman, Militarization, Democratization, and Development (2002), p. 156.
↑  MacCameron, Bananas, Labor, and Politics (1983), p. 113. "More realistically, Villeda Morales appeared to have followed explicit policy directives of the United States embassy in Honduras. Throughout Latin America, the CIA and the State Department were working assiduously to precipitate ruptures in diplomatic relations with Castro (Agee 1975:138–316, passim). The perpetration of a classic CIA ploy became evident in Honduras a month prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion, when Roberto Dominguez Argucia, supposedly a leading intellectual of the Honduran Communist Party and a member of the Committee of Friends of the Cuban Revolution, surfaced to publicly assail the 'tyranical ambitions' of Fidel Castro. Such statements of political disavowal more than faintly resembled the actions of such CIA agents as the Guatemalan Manuel Pellcer."
↑  LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions (1993), p. 182. "In an underdeveloped country, the military had become the most developed political institution. The United States played a vital role in fashioning that army. In the 1954 agreement that established the military relationship, the United States promised military aid and in return Honduras promised to open for U.S. Exploitation any 'raw and semi-processed materials required by the United States of America as a result of deficiencies or potential deficiencies in its own resources.' (That provision and other parts of the treaty resembled clauses in the 1903 pact in which the United States made a virtual colony out of Panama.)”
↑  Bowman, Militarization, Democratization, and Development (2002), p. 154.
↑  MacCameron, Bananas, Labor, and Politics (1983), pp. 114–115. "Even as Villeda Morales offered near-total cooperation with CIA front organizations in Honduras, the autonomous nature of the Honduran military served as a constant reminder of his government's very real fragility. The constitutional leverage which the military exerted on the presidency probably determined to some extent the final forms of the labor and agrarian laws. In view of Ropp's thesis (see chapter three) that the Honduran military owed its institutional strength exclusively to United States military aid and assistance, and indeed relied for its continued strength upon the same source, there was every reason to believe that the army would not allow national legislation to undermine the strength of United States economic interests in Honduras. Villeda Morales certainly recognized and understood this political fact of life, and carefully heeded it in governing the country."
| ع ن الانقلابات العسكرية ومحاولات الانقلاب في أمريكا اللاتينية منذ سنة 1930 | ع ن الانقلابات العسكرية ومحاولات الانقلاب في أمريكا اللاتينية منذ سنة 1930 |
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عقد 1930:  بوليفيا (1936) 
عقد 1940:  الأرجنتين (1943)*  البرازيل (1945)*  فنزويلا (1945)*  فنزويلا (1948)* 
عقد 1950:  الأرجنتين (1951)  كوبا (1952)*  كولومبيا (1953)*  باراغواي (1954)*  غواتيمالا (1954)*  الأرجنتين (1955)*  هندوراس (1956)*  كولومبيا (1957)*  فنزويلا (1958)*  البرازيل (1959) 
عقد 1960:  إكوادور (1961)*  الأرجنتين (1962)*  غواتيمالا (1963)*  إكوادور (1963)*  هندوراس (1963)*  بوليفيا (1964)*  البرازيل (1964)*  الأرجنتين (1966)*  بنما (1968)*  بيرو (1968)*  تشيلي (1969)  البرازيل (1969)* 
عقد 1970:  بوليفيا (1970)*  هندوراس (1972)*  أوروغواي (1973)‡*  تشيلي (يونيو 1973)  تشيلي (سبتمبر 1973)*  بيرو (1975)*  هندوراس (1975)*  إكوادور (1975)  الأرجنتين (1976)*  إكوادور (1976)*  هندوراس (1978)*  السلفادور (1979)* 
عقد 1980:  بوليفيا (1980)*  غواتيمالا (1982)  غواتيمالا (1983)  هايتي (يونيو 1988)*  هايتي (سبتمبر 1988)*  هايتي (1989)×  بنما (1989)  باراغواي (1989)* 
عقد 1990:  هايتي (1991)*  فنزويلا (1992)  بيرو (1992)‡*  غواتيمالا (1993)‡ 
عقد 2000:  إكوادور (2000)  فنزويلا (2002)  هايتي (2004)*  هندوراس (2009)* 
عقد 2010:  إكوادور (2010)*  فنزويلا (2017)‡ 
عقد 2020:  السلفادور (2020)‡  الولايات المتحدة (2021)‡ 
 * انقلاب عسكري  ‡ انقلاب ذاتي  الانقلابات ضد أنظمة ديمقراطية مميزة بالخط الغليظ :  * انقلاب عسكري  ‡ انقلاب ذاتي  الانقلابات ضد أنظمة ديمقراطية مميزة بالخط الغليظ 
بوابة التاريخ
بوابة هندوراس
مزارعين هندوراسيين.