الاتحاد الأمريكي للحريات المدنية ضد وكالة الأمن القومي
محكمة الاستئناف بالدائرة السادسة

وفي 4 تشرين الأول / أكتوبر 2006، أوقفت هيئة مؤلفة من ثلاثة قضاة بالإجماع من محكمة الاستئناف بالدائرة السادسة حكم محكمة المقاطعة ريثما يتم تقييم استئناف الحكومة. في الحكم المكون من ثلاث فقرات، أوضحت المحكمة أنها قررت منح اقتراح الحكومة بالبقاء بعد موازنة احتمال نجاح الاستئناف، والأضرار المحتملة لكلا الجانبين، ومصلحة الجمهور في المرسوم القضائي النهائي
استمعت محكمة الاستئناف الأمريكية 6th ومقرها سينسيناتي إلى مرافعات شفوية حول استئناف الحكومة في 31 يناير 2007..
في قرار 6 يوليو 2007، ألغت محكمة الدائرة حكم القاضي تايلور في تصويت 2-1. ورفضت الأغلبية الحكم على شرعية البرنامج، وخلصت إلى أن المدعين افتقروا إلى الوقوف لرفع الدعوى.
فيما يلي بعض المقتطفات من قرار المحكمة:
«The plaintiffs do not contend — nor could they — that the mere practice of wiretapping (i.e., eavesdropping) is, by itself, unconstitutional, illegal, or even improper.  Rather, the plaintiffs object to the NSA’s eavesdropping without warrants, specifically FISA warrants with their associated limitations and minimization requirements.»
«But the plaintiffs do not — and because of the State Secrets Doctrine cannot — produce any evidence that any of their own communications have ever been intercepted by the NSA, under the TSP, or without warrants. Instead, they assert a mere belief, which they contend is reasonable and which they label a "well founded belief,"...»
«Notably, the plaintiffs do not allege as injury that they personally, either as individuals or associations, anticipate or fear any form of direct reprisal by the government (e.g., the NSA, the Justice Department, the Department of Homeland Security, etc.), such as criminal prosecution, deportation, administrative inquiry, civil litigation, or even public exposure.  The injuries that these plaintiffs allege are not so direct; they are more amorphous...»
«Implicit in each of the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries is the underlying  — which the plaintiffs label a "well founded belief" and seek to treat as a probability or even a certainty — that the NSA is presently intercepting, or will eventually intercept, communications to or from one or more of these particular plaintiffs, and that such interception would be detrimental to the plaintiffs’ clients, sources, or overseas contacts.  This is the premise upon which the plaintiffs’ entire theory is built.  But even though the plaintiffs’ beliefs — based on their superior knowledge of their contacts’ activities — may be reasonable, the alternative possibility remains that the NSA might  be intercepting, and might never actually intercept, any communication by any of the plaintiffs named in this lawsuit.»
«By claiming six causes of action, the plaintiffs have actually engaged in a thinly veiled, though perfectly acceptable, ruse.  To call a spade a spade, the plaintiffs have only one claim, namely, breach of privacy, based on a purported violation of the Fourth Amendment or FISA — i.e., the plaintiffs do not want the NSA listening to their phone calls or reading their emails.  That is really all there is to it.  On a straightforward reading, this claim does not implicate the First Amendment. The problem with asserting only a breach-of-privacy claim is that, because the plaintiffs cannot show that they have been or will be subjected to surveillance personally, they clearly cannot establish standing under the Fourth Amendment or FISA. The plaintiffs concede as much. In an attempt to avoid this problem, the plaintiffs have recast their injuries as a matter of free speech and association, characterized their claim as a violation of the First Amendment, and engaged the First Amendment's relaxed rules on standing. This argument is not novel, but neither is it frivolous; it warrants consideration, analysis, and a full explanation by this court.»
«Both FISA and Title III expressly prohibit electronic surveillance outside of their statutory frameworks, as set forth in Part I.B.4.b. above. The language used is unequivocal. In enacting FISA, Congress directed that electronic surveillance conducted inside the United States for foreign intelligence purposes was to be undertaken only as authorized by specific federal statutory authority. See 50 U.S.C. § 1809. Title III criminalizes the interception and disclosure of wire, oral, and electronic communications except under certain specified exceptions. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f). The statute clearly states that chapter 119 and FISA "shall be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance . . . and the interception of domestic wire, oral, and electronic communications may be conducted.»
«Congress has thus unequivocally declared that FISA and Title III are the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance is permitted. No other authorization can comply with the law. Congress further emphasized this point by criminalizing the undertaking of electronic surveillance not authorized by statute in two separate places in the U.S. Code. See 50 U.S.C. § 1809; 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) & (2)(e).»