تاريخ الجيش الإسرائيلي
مراجع

↑  Benny Morris, Righteous Victims, Alfred A. Knopf, 1999, p. 219.
↑  A.J. Barker, The Arab Israeli Wars, Hippocrene Books, 1981.
↑  Peri, Yoram. Between battles and ballots – Israeli military in politics. CUP, 1983.
↑  De Gaury, Gerald, The New State of Israel. Derek Verschoyle Ltd, London. 1952. p. 183. General Amnesty Ordinance, 1949; Kosher Food for Soldiers Ordinance, 1949; Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, 1948; Jerusalem Military Government (Confirmation) Ordinance, 1949 and the Firearms Ordinance, 1949. De Gaury suggests that the legal authority held by the High Commissioner under the Defences (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, was transferred to the Minister of Defence.
↑  Moshe Shemesh; Selwyn Illan Troen (5 October 2005). The Suez-Sinai Crisis: A Retrospective and Reappraisal. Routledge. p. 5. ISBN 978-1-135-77863-7. The aims were to be threefold: to remove the threat, wholly or partially, of the Egyptian rmy in the Sinai, to destroy the framework of the fedaiyyun, and to secure the freedom of navigation through the straits of Tiran. نسخة محفوظة 24 أبريل 2016 على موقع واي باك مشين.
↑  Isaac Alteras (1993). Eisenhower and Israel: U.S.-Israeli Relations, 1953-1960. University Press of Florida. pp. 192–. ISBN 978-0-8130-1205-6. the removal of the Egyptian blockade of the Straits of Tiran at the entrance of the Gulf of Aqaba. The blockade closed Israel’s sea lane to East Africa and the Far East, hindering the development of Israel’s southern port of Eilat and its hinterland, the Nege. Another important objective of the Israeli war plan was the elimination of the terrorist bases in the Gaza Strip, from which daily fedayeen incursions into Israel made life unbearable for its southern population. And last but not least, the concentration of the Egyptian forces in the Sinai Peninsula, armed with the newly acquired weapons from the Soviet bloc, prepared for an attack on Israel. Here, Ben-Gurion believed, was a time bomb that had to be defused before it was too late. Reaching the Suez Canal did not figure at all in Israel’s war objectives.  نسخة محفوظة 30 ديسمبر 2016 على موقع واي باك مشين.
↑  Dominic Joseph Caraccilo (January 2011). Beyond Guns and Steel: A War Termination Strategy. ABC-CLIO. pp. 113–. ISBN 978-0-313-39149-1. The escalation continued with the Egyptian blockade of the Straits of Tiran, and Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956. On October 14, Nasser made clear his intent:"I am not solely fighting against Israel itself. My task is to deliver the Arab world from destruction through Israel's intrigue, which has its roots abroad. Our hatred is very strong. There is no sense in talking about peace with Israel. There is not even the smallest place for negotiations." Less than two weeks later, on October 25, Egypt signed a tripartite agreement with Syria and Jordan placing Nasser in command of all three armies. The continued blockade of the Suez Canal and Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping, combined with the increased fedayeen attacks and the bellicosity of recent Arab statements, prompted Israel, with the backing of Britain and France, to attack Egypt on October 29, 1956. نسخة محفوظة 30 ديسمبر 2016 على موقع واي باك مشين.
↑  "The Jewish Virtual Library, The Sinai-Suez Campaign: Background & Overview". In 1955, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser began to import arms from the Soviet Bloc to build his arsenal for the confrontation with Israel. In the short-term, however, he employed a new tactic to prosecute Egypt's war with Israel. He announced it on August 31, 1955: Egypt has decided to dispatch her heroes, the disciples of Pharaoh and the sons of Islam and they will cleanse the land of Palestine....There will be no peace on Israel's border because we demand vengeance, and vengeance is Israel's death. These “heroes” were Arab terrorists, or fedayeen, trained and equipped by Egyptian Intelligence to engage in hostile action on the border and infiltrate Israel to commit acts of sabotage and murder. نسخة محفوظة 8 ديسمبر 2016 على موقع واي باك مشين.
↑  Alan Dowty (20 June 2005). Israel/Palestine. Polity. pp. 102–. ISBN 978-0-7456-3202-5. Gamal Abdel Nasser, who declared in one speech that "Egypt has decided to dispatch her heroes, the disciples of Pharaoh and the sons of Islam and they will cleanse the land of Palestine....There will be no peace on Israel's border because we demand vengeance, and vengeance is Israel's death."...The level of violence against Israelis, soldiers and civilians alike, seemed to be rising inexorably. نسخة محفوظة 30 ديسمبر 2016 على موقع واي باك مشين.
↑  Ian J. Bickerton (15 September 2009). The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History. Reaktion Books. p. 101. ISBN 978-1-86189-527-1. (p. 101) To them the murderous fedayeen raids and constant harassment were just another form of Arab warfare against Israel...(p. 102) Israel's aims were to capture the Sinai peninsula in order to open the straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, and to seize the Gaza strip to end fedayeen attacks. نسخة محفوظة 13 يناير 2020 على موقع واي باك مشين.
1 2  Segev 2007
↑  Gawrych، Dr. George W. (1996). The 1973 Arab–Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory. Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. ص. 97. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2022-10-18. Available online نسخة محفوظة 30 يونيو 2007 على موقع واي باك مشين.
Moshe Shemesh؛ Selwyn Illan Troen (5 أكتوبر 2005). The Suez-Sinai Crisis: A Retrospective and Reappraisal. Routledge. ص. 5. ISBN:978-1-135-77863-7. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2020-01-13. The aims were to be threefold: to remove the threat, wholly or partially, of the Egyptian rmy in the Sinai, to destroy the framework of the fedaiyyun, and to secure the freedom of navigation through the straits of Tiran.
Isaac Alteras (1993). Eisenhower and Israel: U.S.-Israeli Relations, 1953-1960. University Press of Florida. ص. 192–. ISBN:978-0-8130-1205-6. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2016-06-03. the removal of the Egyptian blockade of the Straits of Tiran at the   entrance of the Gulf of Aqaba. The blockade closed Israel's sea lane to East Africa and the Far East, hindering the development of Israel's southern port of Eilat and its hinterland, the Nege. Another important objective of the Israeli war plan was the elimination of the terrorist bases in the Gaza Strip, from which daily fedayeen incursions into Israel made life unbearable for its southern population. And last but not least, the concentration of the Egyptian forces in the Sinai Peninsula, armed with the newly acquired weapons from the Soviet bloc, prepared for an attack on Israel. Here, Ben-Gurion believed, was a time bomb that had to be defused before it was too late.  Reaching the Suez Canal did not figure at all in Israel's war objectives.
Alan Dowty (20 يونيو 2005). Israel/Palestine. Polity. ص. 102–. ISBN:978-0-7456-3202-5. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2020-01-24. Gamal Abdel Nasser, who declared in one speech that "Egypt has decided to dispatch her heroes, the disciples of Pharaoh and the sons of Islam and they will cleanse the land of Palestine....There will be no peace on Israel's border because we demand vengeance, and vengeance is Israel's death."...The level of violence against Israelis, soldiers and civilians alike, seemed to be rising inexorably.
"The Jewish Virtual Library, The Sinai-Suez Campaign: Background & Overview". مؤرشف من الأصل في 2016-12-08. In 1955, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser began to import arms from the Soviet Bloc to build his arsenal for the confrontation with Israel. In the short-term, however, he employed a new tactic to prosecute Egypt's war with Israel. He announced it on August 31, 1955: Egypt has decided to dispatch her heroes, the disciples of Pharaoh and the sons of Islam and they will cleanse the land of Palestine....There will be no peace on Israel's border because we demand vengeance, and vengeance is Israel's death. These "heroes" were Arab terrorists, or fedayeen, trained and equipped by Egyptian Intelligence to engage in hostile action on the border and infiltrate Israel to commit acts of sabotage and murder.
Dominic Joseph Caraccilo (يناير 2011). Beyond Guns and Steel: A War Termination Strategy. ABC-CLIO. ص. 113–. ISBN:978-0-313-39149-1. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2020-01-13. The escalation continued with the Egyptian blockade of the Straits of Tiran, and Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956. On October 14, Nasser made clear his intent:"I am not solely fighting against Israel itself. My task is to deliver the Arab world from destruction through Israel's intrigue, which has its roots abroad. Our hatred is very strong. There is no sense in talking about peace with Israel. There is not even the smallest place for negotiations." Less than two weeks later, on October 25, Egypt signed a tripartite agreement with Syria and Jordan placing Nasser in command of all three armies. The continued blockade of the Suez Canal and Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping, combined with the increased fedayeen attacks and the bellicosity of recent Arab statements, prompted Israel, with the backing of Britain and France, to attack Egypt on October 29, 1956.
Ian J. Bickerton (15 سبتمبر 2009). The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History. Reaktion Books. ص. 101. ISBN:978-1-86189-527-1. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2019-12-21. (p. 101) To them the murderous fedayeen raids and constant harassment were just another form of Arab warfare against Israel...(p. 102) Israel's aims were to capture the Sinai peninsula in order to open the straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, and to seize the Gaza strip to end fedayeen  attacks.
في كومنز مواد ذات صلة بـ تاريخ الجيش الإسرائيلي.
بوابة إسرائيل
بوابة التاريخ
بوابة الحرب
ديفيد بن غوريون، أول رئيس وزراء ووزير دفاع لإسرائيل، يعلن دولة إسرائيل في 14 مايو 1948.
أعضاء من لواء يفتاح في حفل بمناسبة تأسيس الجيش الإسرائيلي. صرفند 1948
شمعون بيريز، رئيس وزراء إسرائيل (سابقًا) ووزير الدفاع: تفاوضت حول المساعدات العسكرية والنووية التي قدمتها فرنسا إلى إسرائيل.
خريطة توضح المناطق الإسرائيلية التي هاجمتها الصواريخ التي أطلقت من الأراضي اللبنانية اعتبارًا من يوم الأحد 16 يوليو.
الطيار ورائد الفضاء إيلان رامون