فورد بينتو
مراجع

↑  Schwartz 1991: The Pinto was then struck by a car, which had originally been traveling at about fifty miles per hour but which had braked down to a speed of perhaps thirty miles per hour at the point of impact.9 ... [footnote 9] For reasons quite beyond the court's control, its opinion must be treated cautiously as a source of actual facts. Because the defendant was appealing a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, the court was under an obligation to view all the evidence in a way most favorable to the plaintiffs and essentially to ignore evidence in the record that might be favorable to the defendant. See id. at 773, 820, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 359, 388. In fact, Ford's basic position at trial-which the court's opinion at no point mentions was that the approaching car (a Ford Galaxie) had not slowed down at all, and had struck the Gray car at a speed in excess of 50 miles per hour. There was an enormous amount of evidence at trial supporting each of the parties' factual claims as to the Galaxie's closing speed. Had the jury accepted Ford's speed estimate, there would not have been much of an issue of crashworthiness: for the plaintiffs' position throughout the trial was that even a state-of-the-art fuel system could not maintain integrity in a 50 mile-per hour collision.
↑  Danley 2005: pg 208
↑  Schwartz 1991:pg 1016
↑  Lee & Ermann 1999: Based on information given to it by lawyers preparing cases against Ford, the Center for Auto Safety petitioned NHTSA in the mid-1970s to investigate the Pinto's rear-end design. According to material presented on the Center's website, Dowie's article is based on that information, made available to him by the Center (www.autosafety.org). "Pinto Madness" is still available on the Mother Jones website along with a video clip showing a Pinto catching fire after being rear-ended. In an interview with Schwartz, Copp asserted that he was also a major source of the information for the Mother Jones story, Schwartz, "The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case," 1027, n.53
↑  Schwartz 1991: after deliberating for eight hours-awarded the Gray family wrongful death damages of $560,000; Grimshaw was awarded over $2.5 million in compensatory damages and $125 million in punitive damages as well. The trial judge reduced the punitive damage award to $3.5 million as a condition for denying a new trial. Two years later the court of appeal affirmed these results in all respects; the state supreme court then denied a hearing.
↑  Christian، Nichole M؛ Henderson، Angelo B؛ Nomani، Asra Q (9 أكتوبر 1997). "Chrysler is Told to Pay $262.5 Million by Jurors in Minivan-Accident Trial". وول ستريت جورنال. ص. 1. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2019-11-16. اطلع عليه بتاريخ 2016-03-04.
↑  McLellan، Dennis (19 أبريل 2008). "Retired O.C. judge handled major cases". لوس أنجلوس تايمز. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2018-10-12. اطلع عليه بتاريخ 2016-03-04.
↑  Danley 2005: pg 209
↑  Williams، Carol J. (14 مارس 2010). "Toyota is just the latest automaker to face auto safety litigation". لوس أنجلوس تايمز. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2018-01-15. اطلع عليه بتاريخ 2016-03-04.
↑  Viscusi، W. Kip (فبراير 2000). "Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?" (PDF). Stanford Law Review. ج. 52 ع. 3: 569. DOI:10.2307/1229473. JSTOR:1229473. مؤرشف من الأصل (PDF) في 2021-01-24. The basic problem is that jurors do not undertake a comprehensive risk analysis approach, regardless of its character. Jurors have a tendency to compare the often very small per-unit safety cost with the costs borne by the injured victim. Rather than examine the entire market and the associated benefits and costs, jurors will be offended by, or will not fully understand, a comprehensive risk-analysis approach and will focus their assessment more narrowly on the identified victim and the costs of preventing that injury. The fact that these costs would also have been incurred for thousands of consumers who were not injured will not loom as large, as Judge Easterbrook emphasized. Thus, there is a tendency to exhibit "hindsight bias" rather than to consider the expected costs and expected benefits at the time of the safety decision.
↑  Viscusi، W. Kip (فبراير 2000). "Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?" (PDF). Stanford Law Review. ج. 52 ع. 3: 569. DOI:10.2307/1229473. JSTOR:1229473. مؤرشف من الأصل (PDF) في 2019-11-16.
↑  Schwartz، Gary T. (1982–1983). "Deterrence and Punishment in the Common Law of Punitive Damages: A Comment". Southern California Law Review: 134. The Court of Appeal's opinion thus suggested that the Court would have been equally willing to have affirmed the trial judge's decision had he either accepted the jury's $125 million award or reduced the award to $1 million. From a deterrence standpoint, it confounds understanding to permit such vast uncertainty as to the level of the expected penalty.
↑  Schwartz 1991: Hence, there was nothing clearly wrong in subjecting Ford to liability for harms resulting from that latter category of fires. The punitive damage award in the Ford Pinto case is, however, much more difficult to justify. To a large extent, it rested on the premise that Ford had behaved reprehensibly when it balanced safety against cost in designing the Pinto. However, the process by which manufacturers render such trade-off design decisions seems not only to be anticipated but endorsed by the prevailing risk-benefit standard for design liability. Accordingly, the Pinto jury's decision that punitive damages were appropriate-a decision that was affirmed by the trial judge and the court of appeal-raises serious questions about the operational viability of the risk-benefit standard itself.
↑  Epstein 1980
↑  Becker, Jipson & Bruce 2002: There is little doubt about the importance of State of Indiana v. Ford Motor Company from a legal standpoint. This case was the first time criminal charges were bought against an American corporation for faulty product design. According to attorney Malcolm Wheeler (1981, p. 250), "[n]ewspapers referred to it as the most important economic case of the century ..." The notion that a corporation could be held accountable for its criminal actions was a novel legal concept at the time. Wheeler was not alone in his estimation of the case as influential. Because of the application of criminal law to corporate behavior, others have referred to this litigation as "unprecedented" (Welty, 1982) and as a "landmark case" (Clinard, 1990; Frank & Lynch, 1992; Hills, 1987; Maakestad, 1987). Maakestad (1987, p. 7) stated that the case "[r]eestablished an important precedent: In certain cases involving human health and safety, corporations and their executives could be required to submit not only to the scrutiny and sanctions of traditional federal regulatory agencies, but to state criminal courts as well."
↑  Dole، Charles E. (14 مارس 1980). "Pinto verdict lets US industry off hook". كريستشن ساينس مونيتور. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2020-11-11. اطلع عليه بتاريخ 2016-03-03. An Indiana farm country jury in the 10-week landmark trial found Ford "not guilty" in the deaths of three teen-age girls whose 1973-model Pinto exploded when a speeding van struck it in the rear Aug. 10, 1978.
↑  Schwartz 1991: In August 1978-half a year after the verdict in the tort case-a 1973 Pinto was involved in a fatal crash in Ulrich, Indiana. Indiana public officials decided to prosecute Ford for the crime of reckless homicide. Because the reckless homicide statute had been enacted only in 1977, Ford could not be prosecuted for the reckless design of the Pinto; rather, the prosecution needed to show a reckless post-1977 failure by Ford to repair or warn. Largely because of the narrowness of the resulting issue, at trial the prosecution was not able to secure the admission of internal Ford documents on which it had hoped to build its case. Ford's defense effort in this criminal case was vastly more ambitious than the effort the company had previously mounted in defending itself against Grimshaw's tort claim. In March 1980 the Indiana jury found Ford not guilty. The jury seemed ambivalent about the Pinto, but concluded that Ford had avoided recklessness in the conduct of its recall program.
↑  Leviton، Joyce (4 فبراير 1980). "A Local D.A. Charges the Pinto with Murder—and Watergate's James Neal Comes to Its Defense". بيبول. ج. 13 رقم  5. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2017-12-25. اطلع عليه بتاريخ 2016-03-03.
↑  Gladwell 2015: A former head of the N.H.T.S.A. testified on Ford's behalf, stating that in his opinion the Pinto's design was no more or less safe than that of any other car in its class, like the Chevrolet Vega or the A.M.C. Gremlin.
↑  Becker, Jipson & Bruce 2002
↑  Sherefkin 2003: The low point for Ford came in 1979 when Indiana authorities charged the automaker with reckless homicide in a criminal trial.
↑  Becker, Jipson & Bruce 2002: Two main perspectives emerged after the Pinto trial as to how the case outcome would affect future uses of criminal law against corporations for product liability issues. One viewpoint was stated by the then president of the National District Attorneys Association, Robert Johnson, Sr. He is quoted as saying "We'll see more prosecutions like this ... A psychological barrier has been broken, and the big corporations are now vulnerable" (Bodine, 1980, p. 3). The popular idea was that corporate malfeasance would be curtailed if corporations were held accountable for their actions. Thus, the feeling among some legal commentators was that the Pinto case represented a fundamental shift in how the criminal courts would perceive corporations. ... Another perspective was that the case was completely frivolous. Commenting on civil litigation, Harry Philo, then president-elect of the Association of American Trial Lawyers of America, commented that "In my opinion, the Pinto case was a completely irrelevant prosecution" (Stuart, 1980, p.4). However, he also stated that "[t]he verdict won't deter civil lawsuits" (Mleczko, 1980, llA).
↑  Epstein 1980: The important point here is that neither the drama of the case nor its outcome should be allowed to obscure the essential legal and institutional issues. On the record, this criminal prosecution should never have been brought at all.
↑  Becker, Jipson & Bruce 2002: The very fact that there has not been another product liability criminal prosecution since that case tells you one major impact of the case was ... [that] it said the criminal law is a very, very poor tool to use for product litigation. It's just not appropriate
↑  Becker, Jipson & Bruce 2002: Paul Weaver worked for the Ford Motor Company from 1978 to 1980 in the corporation's public affairs staff preparing company positions on public policy issues. He criticized Ford for how it dealt with the controversy surrounding the Pinto. According to Weaver (1988, p.94), "[t]he design of its [Pinto's] fuel system was essentially the same as that of other cars of its size and generation" and "Pintos had about the same rate of death from fire due to rear-end collision as other small cars." His assertion is that the Pinto was not unusual compared to similar models. Weaver admits that "[w]e should simply have told the truth about the car" and "[w]e did not fight to vindicate ourselves." Thus, by refusing to mount a major publicity campaign, Ford gave the impression that it was guilty. ... These remarks add an interesting dimension to the Pinto case in that one of the clear lessons was to confront issues raised about defective products. This concern illustrates that after the Pinto case, corporations became much more willing and adept at handling images stemming from poor design. In other words, the Pinto case made corporations much more willing to wage public relations battles over design and production flaws.
↑  Schwartz 1991 Footnote pg 1029
↑  Schwartz 1991 pg 1031
↑  Schwartz 1991 pg 1033
في كومنز مواد ذات صلة بـ فورد بينتو.
بوابة الولايات المتحدة
بوابة سيارات
الجيل الأول من المركبات الثانوية الأمريكية، من اليسار إلى اليمين: AMC Gremlin، وFord Pinto، وChevrolet Vega
مقترح تصميم فورد بينتو 1970
فورد بينتو 1971-1972 سيدان مع صندوق مغلق
بينتو رانابوت 1973
فورد بينتو سيدان 1979-1980
فورد بينتو رانابوت 1979-1980
ميركوري بوبكات واجن 1977