جذور حرب 1967
حواشي

↑  الجمعية العامة للأمم المتحدة  Special Reportand Add.1/3  Report of the Secretary-General on the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force   A/6730 and Add.1/3  26 June 1967.  Retrieved 2 March 2015.
↑  Maoz, Zeev. Defending the Holy Land: A Critical Analysis of Israel's Security & Foreign Policy, p. 111 (University of Michigan Press, 2009): "It is most important to reiterate the conclusion of most scholarly accounts of the crisis: this was a process of unwanted escalation, which everybody wanted to prevent, but all were responsible for making this escalation unavoidable." نسخة محفوظة 2022-04-07 على موقع واي باك مشين.
1 2  Ian J. Bickerton (15 سبتمبر 2009). The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History. Reaktion Books. ص. 111. ISBN:978-1-86189-527-1. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2020-11-25. (P. 111) It is generally assumed that the June war was fought because in May Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. (P. 113) on 23 May 1967, knowing that it might very likely provide Israel with the trigger it needed to launch a war, Nasser made the fateful step of closing the Straits of Tiran.
↑  Jesse Ferris (23 ديسمبر 2012). Nasser's Gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Caused the Six-Day War and the Decline of Egyptian Power. Princeton University Press. ص. 286. ISBN:978-1-4008-4523-1. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2020-11-25. Both the decision to demand the removal of UNEF from Sinai and the decision to close the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping- commonly accepted as the point where war became inevitable-
↑  Kinga Tibori Szabó (22 أغسطس 2011). Anticipatory Action in Self-Defence: Essence and Limits under International Law. Springer Science & Business Media. ص. 147, 148. ISBN:978-90-6704-796-8. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2023-04-08. (p. 147) The sequence of events that led to the Israeli pre-emptive strike did indeed create a situation where an armed attack seemed unavoidable. (p. 148 ) Many commentators treat it (the six day war) as the locus classicus of anticipatory action in self defence
↑  John Quigley (17 ديسمبر 2012). The Six-Day War and Israeli Self-Defense: Questioning the Legal Basis for Preventive War. Cambridge University Press. ص. 135–. ISBN:978-1-139-62049-9. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2021-03-08. Terence Taylor…wrote in 2004…that "many scholars" considered Israel to have "conducted the (1967) action in anticipatory of self-defense
↑  John Quigley (17 ديسمبر 2012). The Six-Day War and Israeli Self-Defense: Questioning the Legal Basis for Preventive War. Cambridge University Press. ص. 134–. ISBN:978-1-139-62049-9. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2021-03-08. Analysts in fields other than law began to question the original Israeli view of the 1967 war as declassified documentation from the major powers began to be released. (...) Mary Ellen O'Connell (...) said, "we now know that Israel acted on less than convincing evidence. Thus, the 1967 war does not provide an actual example of lawful anticipatory self-defence" (...) Richard Falk asserted in 2012 that the view Israel acted in self-defence was by then "increasingly contested by diplomatic historians"
↑  Rauschning؛ Wiesbrock؛ Lailach (1997)، ص. 30 {{استشهاد}}: الوسيط |title= غير موجود أو فارغ (مساعدة).
↑  Sachar 2007, pp. 504, 507–8.
↑  First United Nations Emergency Force (Unef I) — Background (Full text)، UN، مؤرشف من الأصل في 2018-03-08
↑  "Operations Database Details/Information". 9 نوفمبر 2004. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2020-11-25.
↑  Some sources date the agreement to November 4, others to November 7. Most sources simply say "November". Gawrych (2000) p. 5.
↑  Schiff, Zeev, History of the Israeli Army, Straight Arrow Books (1974) p. 145.
↑  Churchill & Churchill, The Six Day War, Houghton Mifflin Company (1967) p. 21.
↑  Pollack, Kenneth, Arabs at war: military effectiveness 1948-1991, University of Nebraska Press (2002), p. 290.
↑  Segev, 2007, pp. 149–52.
↑  Hart, 1989 p. 226.
↑  Oren 2002/2003, p. 312.
↑  Burrowes & Douglas 1972, pp. 224–25.
↑  "The Montreal Gazette - Google News Archive Search". مؤرشف من الأصل في 2020-11-25.
↑  Gluska, Ami. "The Israeli Military and the 1967 War", Routledge, 2007, pp. 98–99.
↑  Govrin, Yosef. Israeli-Soviet relations, 1953-67 : from confrontation to disruption /. 1st ed. Portland: Frank Cass, 1998. Pages 3-58, 221-324
↑  Shlaim (2007) p. 238.
↑  Mutawi (2007) p. 93.
↑  Cohen, Raymond. (1988), p. 12.
↑  Meir، Golda (1 مارس 1957)، Statement to the General Assembly by Foreign Minister Meir، The State of Israel: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs، مؤرشف من الأصل في 2020-11-25، Interference, by armed force, with ships of Israeli flag exercising free and innocent passage in the Gulf of Aqaba and through the تيران (مضيق) will be regarded by Israel as an attack entitling it to exercise its inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter and to take all such measures as are necessary to ensure the free and innocent passage of its ships in the Gulf and in the Straits
↑  Churchill pp. 52, 77.
Yaacov Ro'i؛ Boris Morozov (2008). The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day War. Stanford University Press. ص. 13. ISBN:978-0-8047-5880-2. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2020-11-25. According to the KGB's deputy resident in Washington at that time, no one in Moscow had any doubt that Israel would be quickly defeated
Talal Nizameddin (يناير 1999). Russia and the Middle East: Towards a New Foreign Policy. C. Hurst & Co. Publishers. ص. 26–. ISBN:978-1-85065-380-6. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2020-11-25. Moscow's assumption that Israel was too weak to launch a pre emptive strike was proven wrong"
Galia Golan (22 نوفمبر 1990). Soviet Policies in the Middle East: From World War Two to Gorbachev. CUP Archive. ص. 66. ISBN:978-0-521-35859-0. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2020-11-25. there reportedly were Soviet estimates that the Arab armies could pursue a protracted war
Uri Bar-Noi (7 يوليو 2011). "The Soviet Union And The Six-Day War: Revelations From The Polish Archives". Wilson Center. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2023-03-18. The Kremlin estimated mistakenly, as if turned out – that Israel was militarily weak... Moscow did its utmost to tone down the belligerent rhetoric of Egyptian and Syrian leaders...Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, Soviet leadership operated under the illusion that Arab armed forces could easily repel any Israeli offensive and defeat the IDF on the battlefield. In retrospect, Brezhnev assured his audience that the armed forces of Egypt, Syria, Algeria and Iraq were superior to the IDF in number of troops and amount of tanks, planes, ships and armaments. They had been equipped with the most modern weapons, and had received high-level training from Soviet ...the Soviet leader held Nasser solely responsible for this catastrophe. He claimed that the reckless closing of the Tiran Straits to the passage of Israeli ships provoked Israel to conduct a wider military campaign against its Arab neighbors.
Sherman Kent for the Central Intelligence Agency's Board of National Estimates (26 مايو 1967). "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968 Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, Document 79 79. Memorandum From the Central Intelligence Agency's Board of National Estimates to Director of Central Intelligence Helms". Washington. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2023-03-18. The most likely course seems to be for Nasser to hold to his present winnings as long as he can, and in as full measure as he can. As of the moment he has vastly enhanced his own prestige in Egypt and throughout the Arab world, diminished the standing of Israel and, at least for the moment, administered a serious setback to the US. Moreover, by simply standing where he is he places the Israelis in an extremely difficult position. He keeps the crisis at high pitch, and as long as this continues the Israelis must remain mobilized. This they cannot do for long without adverse effects upon their economy.  5. The Israelis face dismaying choices. Surprised and shaken by Nasser's action, they failed to take the instant military counteraction which might have been most effective. If they attack now they will face far more formidable opposition than in the rapid campaign of 1956. We believe that they would still be able to drive the Egyptians away from the entrance to the Strait of Tiran, but it would certainly cost them heavy losses of men and materiel. We are not sure that they have sufficient stockpiles of ammunition and equipment for a war lasting more than three or four weeks, and it is possible that they would not embark upon a major campaign without prior assurances from the US of adequate resupply.
Avi Shlaim؛ William Roger Louis (13 فبراير 2012). The 1967 Arab-Israeli War: Origins and Consequences. Cambridge University Press. ص. 64. ISBN:978-1-107-00236-4. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2020-11-25. sami sharaf...the decision (the closure of the Tiran straits) was known (to Nasser) to make war inevitable
Dayton Mak (10 يوليو 1991). "Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, ASSISTANT SECRETARY LUCIUS D. BATTLE Interview". The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2020-11-25. Nasser was in real trouble, economically and politically. ...I predicted that Nasser was about to do something dramatic....(optionally) to heat up the Israeli situation, ... The Egyptians soon thereafter began to make unfortunate comments about the Israeli situation. The rest is history. The war came and Nasser never recovered from his decline which started before the war and accelerated after it.
Greg Cashman؛ Leonard C. Robinson (1 مارس 2007). An Introduction to the Causes of War: Patterns of Interstate Conflict from World War I to Iraq. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. ص. 181. ISBN:978-1-4616-3654-0. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2020-11-25. In April 1967, after meeting with Nasser,... Lucius Battle,  reported back to Washington... that the Egyptian leader was anxious to create a foreign policy crisis in order to deflect mounting internal pressure against his regime
"General Abdal Muhsin Murtaji book review" (PDF). FAO Journal, VOLUME VIII, NUMBER 3. سبتمبر 2004. ص. 14. مؤرشف من الأصل (PDF) في 2023-03-18. In 1976, General Abdal Muhsin Murtaji, an officer since 1937 and the commander of the Sinai front in 1967, wrote a bold, scathing indictment of the Egyptian military in his book Al-Fariq Murtaji Yarwi Al-Haqiqa (General Murtaji Narrates the Truth)... The failed union with Syria and the debacle in Yemen forced Nasser to find an outlet for his failures, which he found through the 1967 war
Michael K. Carroll (1 يناير 2010). Pearson's Peacekeepers: Canada and the United Nations Emergency Force, 1956-67. UBC Press. ص. 164–. ISBN:978-0-7748-5886-1. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2020-11-25. it was imperative that UAR forces occupied the strategic positions of Sharm el Seikh
Michael B. Oren (2002). Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East. Oxford University Press. ص. 69–. ISBN:978-0-19-515174-9. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2020-11-25. to evacuate...Sharm el Sheikh that very night
Andrzej Sitkowski (1 يناير 2006). UN Peacekeeping: Myth and Reality. Greenwood Publishing Group. ص. 51–. ISBN:978-0-275-99214-9. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2020-11-25. Brigadier Mokhtar verbally requested the immediate withdrawal of the U.N units from El-Sabha and Sharm El Sheikh
Moshe Gat (2003). Britain and the Conflict in the Middle East, 1964–1967: The Coming of the Six-Day War. Greenwood Publishing Group. ص. 101. ISBN:978-0-275-97514-2. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2023-04-08. اطلع عليه بتاريخ 2013-09-07. [on 1965]Nasser too, assured the American under Secretary of state, Philip Talbot, that the Arabs would not exceed the water quotas prescribed by the Johnston plan
Avi Shlaim (2000). The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World. Penguin Books. ص. 229, 230. ISBN:978-0-14-028870-4. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2023-04-05. In January 1964 an Arab League summit meeting convened in Cairo. The main item on the agenda was the threat posed by Israel's diversion of water … The preamble to its decision stated: "The establishment of Israel is the basic threat that the Arab nation in its entirety has agreed to forestall. And Since the existence of Israel is a danger that threatens the Arab nation, the diversion of the Jordan waters by it multiplies the dangers to Arab existence. Accordingly, the Arab states have to prepare the plans necessary for dealing with the political, economic and social aspects, so that if necessary results are not achieved, collective Arab military preparations, when they are not completed, will constitute the ultimate practical means for the final liquidation of Israel
Masahiro Murakami (1995). Managing Water for Peace in the Middle East; Alternative Strategies. United Nations University Press. ص. 287–297. ISBN:978-92-808-0858-2. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2023-04-07. اطلع عليه بتاريخ 2013-07-15. The book appears in: http://archive.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/80858e/80858E0m.htm . The initial diversion capacity of the National Water Carrier without supplementary booster pumps was 320 million m3, well within the limits of the Johnston Plan. ......Shortly before completion of the Israeli Water Carrier in 1964, an Arab summit conference decided to try to thwart it. Discarding direct military attack, the Arab states chose to divert the Jordan headwater......he Arab states chose to divert the Jordan headwaters.......diversion of both the Hasbani and the Banias to the Yarmouk.....According to neutral assessments, the scheme was only marginally feasible; it was technically difficult and expensive......Political considerations cited by the Arabs in rejecting the 1955 Johnston Plan were revived to justify the diversion scheme. Particular emphasis was placed on the Carrier's capability to enhance Israel's capacity to absorb immigrants to the detriment of Palestinian refugees. In response, Israel stressed that the National Water Carrier was within the limits of the Johnston Plan......the Arabs started work on the Headwater Diversion project in 1965. Israel declared that it would regard such diversion as an infringement of its sovereign rights. According to estimates, completion of the project would have deprived Israel of 35% of its contemplated withdrawal from the upper Jordan, constituting one-ninth of Israel's annual water budget.......In a series of military strikes, Israel hit the diversion works. The attacks culminated in April 1967 in air strikes deep inside Syria. The increase in water-related Arab-Israeli hostility was a major factor leading to the June 1967 war. {{استشهاد بكتاب}}: روابط خارجية في |اقتباس= (مساعدة)