فورد بينتو
مراجع

↑  Mays, James C. "Ford and Canada: 100 Years Together" (Montréal: Syam Publishing, 2003). p.116.
↑  Smith، Charles (25 مارس 2006). "Lofty ambition / Developer revs up former Ford factory in Richmond for real live-work spaces". The San Francisco Chronicle. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2019-11-16.
↑  Sherefkin، Robert (17 يونيو 2003). "Ford 100: Defective Pinto almost took Ford's reputation with it". Autoweek. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2020-09-01. اطلع عليه بتاريخ 2017-10-26.
↑  "Why Ford keeps using horse names for cars". Jennings Ford Direct. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2019-11-16. اطلع عليه بتاريخ 2017-10-26.
1 2 3 4 5 6  Lewis 2003.
↑  Danley 2005: Initial planning on the Pinto, a second-generation subcompact, began in 1967 ... In January 1969, in a victory for Iaccoca, Ford's Board approved the recommendation of the Product Planning Committee (December 1968) to produce the Pinto.
↑  Gioia 1992: The Pinto was brought from inception to production in the record time of approximately 25 months (compared to the industry average of 43 months), a time frame that suggested the necessity for doing things expediently. In addition to the time pressure, the engineering and development teams were required to adhere to the production "limits of 2000" for the diminutive car: it was not to exceed either $2000 in cost or 2000 pounds in weight. Any decisions that threatened these targets or the timing of the car's introduction were discouraged. Under normal conditions design, styling, product planning, engineering, etc., were completed prior to production tooling. Because of the foreshortened time frame, however, some of these usually sequential processes were executed in parallel. As a consequence, tooling was already well under way (thus "freezing" the basic design) ...
↑  Helms، Marilyn M.؛ Hutchins، Betty A. (1992). "Poor quality products: Is their production unethical?". Management Decision. ج. 30 ع. 5: 35. DOI:10.1108/00251749210015661. When a decision was made to produce the Pinto, it was given the shortest production planning schedule in history. Tooling went on at the same time as product development so, when testing revealed a serious defect with the gas tank, the $200 million Pinto tooling machines were almost completely built. The directive came from the top, President Lee Iacocca, who emphasized that the Pinto was not to weigh an ounce over 2,000lb and not cost a cent over $2,000 and that safety was not a priority, because "safety doesn't sell".
↑  Wojdyla 2011: The genesis of the Ford Pinto came sometime in 1968, when Ford's then-president Lee Iaccoca decided that his company would not sit idly by as new Japanese competitors dominated the small-car segment. He pushed the board to greenlight the Pinto program, and by August 1968 the program was underway. It would have aggressive targets: no more than 2000 pounds, not a penny over $2000 and a delivery deadline of just 25 months, a record at the time and still impressive today.
↑  Wojdyla 2011: But at the time, management's attitude was to get the product out the door as fast as possible.
↑  Sherefkin 2003: Iacocca ordered a rush program to build the Pinto ... The Pinto quickly became known as "Lee's car." He demanded that it weigh no more than 2,000 pounds and sell for $2,000 ... Iacocca was in a hurry. He wanted the car in showrooms for the 1971 model year. That meant one of the shortest production planning periods in modern automotive history: just 25 months, when the normal time span was 43 months. That also meant that the Pinto's tooling was developed at the same time as product development.
1 2  "Pinto 2000 Coupe". Super Stock Magazine. ديسمبر 1970. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2019-11-16. اطلع عليه بتاريخ 2016-04-29.
↑  "Meet Ford's new Pinto. The little carefree car. (advertisement)". Spokane Daily Chronicle. (Washington). 10 سبتمبر 1970. ص. 12. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2021-01-24. اطلع عليه بتاريخ 2020-12-31.
↑  Kirkl، Giles (11 يونيو 2019). "Ford Pinto: A Little Carefree Car Gone Very Very Wrong". Great Cars. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2020-11-25. اطلع عليه بتاريخ 2020-12-31.
1 2 3 4 5  "1971–1980 Ford Pinto". HowStuffWorks.com. 9 أغسطس 2007. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2021-01-25. اطلع عليه بتاريخ 2020-12-31.
↑  "Quart in a Pinto". The Motor. ج. 3558. 26 أغسطس 1970. ص. 26–27.
1 2  Gunnell، John (2008). Standard Catalog of Ford (ط. Fourth). Krause Publications. ISBN:9780896896154.
↑  "1980 Ford Pinto brochure". مؤرشف من الأصل في 2018-10-17.
↑  Jones 1978: Soon after the Pinto was introduced, 26,000 were recalled because accelerators were sticking.
↑  "Ford Recalls 26,000 Pinto Cars". Chicago Tribune. 31 أكتوبر 1970. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2019-11-16. اطلع عليه بتاريخ 2016-03-06. Ford Motor Co. announced today it is recalling 26,000 early production models of its 1971 Pinto equipped with the 1600 cubic centimeter engine because of an accelerator problem ... The company found that when the throttle is opened more than half way, it is possible that it may not always return to the closed position when pressure on the accelerator pedal is removed
↑  Associated Press 1971: For many of the motorists, it's the second time around ... Last October Ford recalled some 26,000 Pintos because of complaints about accelerator pedals sticking when the throttle was opened more than halfway.
↑  Jones 1978: 220,000 Pintos were recalled for modifications to prevent possible engine compartment fires.
↑  Mateja، James (30 مارس 1971). "Ford Recalls 204,000 Pintos to Prevent Fuel Vapor Fires". Chicago Tribune. Ford Motor Co. will recall about 204,000 subcompact 1971 Pintos for modification to prevent possible ignition of fuel vapors in the engine air cleaner, it announced yesterday. A Ford Spokesman declined to give the cost of the recall, but all Pintos produced thru March 19, including 204,000 in the United States, 13,000 in Canada and 2,500 overseas, are involved in the program ... Ford said its investigation of complaints revealed that the possibility of a fire existed because the vapors in the air cleaner could be ignited by a backfire thru the carburetor.
↑  Associated Press 1971: About 165,000 American owners of Ford's new Pinto are affected by the automaker's announcement that virtually all the mini-cars are being recalled for an engine defect.
↑   https://web.archive.org/web/20191116233751/http://oldcarbrochures.org/index.php/New-Brochures---May/1972-Ford-Pinto-Brochure-Rev/1972-Ford-Pinto-Rev--08-09. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2019-11-16. {{استشهاد ويب}}: الوسيط |title= غير موجود أو فارغ (مساعدة)
↑  Pawel Zal (المحرر). "1972 Ford (USA) Pinto Station Wagon". automobile-catalog.com. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2022-05-04. اطلع عليه بتاريخ 2017-10-26.
↑   https://web.archive.org/web/20191116233749/http://oldcarbrochures.org/index.php/New-Brochures---March/1974-Ford-Pinto-Brochure-Rev/1974-Ford-Pinto-Rev--10-11. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2019-11-16. {{استشهاد ويب}}: الوسيط |title= غير موجود أو فارغ (مساعدة)
↑  "1976 Ford Pinto Brochure". Paintref.com. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2021-01-24.
↑  Lamm، Michael (أغسطس 1974). "PM Owners Report: Ford Pinto". Popular Mechanics. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2021-01-24.
↑  "The Ford Pinto". مؤرشف من الأصل في 2019-11-16.
1 2  Gunnell، John A.؛ Lenzke، James T. (1995). Standard Catalog of Ford Cars, 1903–1990. Krause Publications. ISBN:0-87341-140-4.
↑  "1974 Mercury Bobcat Brochure Canada". مؤرشف من الأصل في 2018-10-21.
↑  Flory، J. Kelly, Jr (2013). American Cars, 1973–1980: Every Model, Year by Year. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company. ISBN:978-0-7864-4352-9.{{استشهاد بكتاب}}:  صيانة الاستشهاد: أسماء متعددة: قائمة المؤلفين (link)
↑  "Chevrolet Vega vs Ford Pinto". Car and Driver Magazine. نوفمبر 1971. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2017-08-21. اطلع عليه بتاريخ 2016-04-12.
↑  "Ford Pinto Runabout: The secret to small-car success cannot be found in an options list". Car and Driver Magazine. يونيو 1974. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2019-11-16.
↑  Lienert، Dan (27 يناير 2004). "The worst cars of all time". مؤرشف من الأصل في 2019-11-16. اطلع عليه بتاريخ 2016-03-06. "You don't want to talk about the Pinto," said a Ford official. "Leave that one in the cemetery." Apparently, Ford has not forgotten the lawsuits and the public relations disasters forged by its Pinto hatchback and sedan. The Pinto's famous safety flaw, of course, was that it was prone to blowing up if rear-ended. When people talk about how bad American small cars created an opportunity for the Japanese to come in and clean house in the 1970s and '80s, they are referring to vehicles like this (and see Chevrolet Vega, second slide).
1 2  Neil، Dan (7 سبتمبر 2007). "1971 Ford Pinto – The 50 Worst Cars of All Time". Time. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2020-11-12.
↑  "Top 10 Product Recalls". Time. 2 يوليو 2009. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2020-01-29. اطلع عليه بتاريخ 2016-03-05.
↑  Huffman، John Pearley (12 فبراير 2010). "5 Most Notorious Recalls of All Time". Popular Mechanics. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2019-11-16. اطلع عليه بتاريخ 2016-03-05.
↑  Spear، Gillian (18 يونيو 2013). "Take that back: Famous recalls, from Tylenol to Toyota". NBC News. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2019-11-16. اطلع عليه بتاريخ 2016-03-05.
↑  Lee & Ermann 1999: The Pinto story has become a landmark narrative" (Nichols 1997:324), a definitive story used to support the construction of amoral corporate behavior as a pervasive social problem. This narrative was first stated publicly by investigative journalist Mark Dowie (1977) in a scathing Pulitzer Prize-winning exposé, "Pinto Madness," published in "Mother Jones" magazine.
↑  Bazerman، Max H.؛ Tenbrunsel، Ann E. (أبريل 2011). "Ethical Breakdowns". هارفارد بزنس ريفيو. ج. 89 ع. 4: 58–65, 137. PMID:21510519. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2020-11-30. اطلع عليه بتاريخ 2015-02-28.
↑  Birsch، Douglas (25 أكتوبر 1994). The Ford Pinto Case.
↑  Woodyard، Chris (28 مارس 2011). "Case: Lee Iacocca's Pinto: A fiery failure". يو إس إيه توداي.
↑  Kitman، Jamie (24 مارس 2011). "Don't Like Government Regulation? How'd You Like Another Pinto?". Cartalk.com.
↑  Lee & Ermann 1999: Conventional wisdom holds that Ford Motor Company decided to rush the Pinto into production in 1970 to compete with compact foreign imports, despite internal pre-production tests that showed gas tank ruptures in low-speed rear-end collisions would produce deadly fires. This decision purportedly derived from an infamous seven-page cost-benefit analysis (the "Grush/Saunby Report" [1973]) that valued human lives at $200,000. Settling burn victims' lawsuits would have cost $49.5 million, far less than the $137 million needed to make minor corrections. According to this account, the company made an informed, cynical, and impressively coordinated decision that "payouts" (Kelman and Hamilton 1989:311) to families of burn victims were more cost-effective than improving fuel tank integrity. This description provides the unambiguous foundation on which the media and academics have built a Pinto gas tank decision-making narrative.
↑  Rossow 2015:'Fixed-barrier' meant that the vehicle was moving (towed backwards) into a stationary barrier ... The 20-mph fixed barrier standard was greeted with uniform opposition from the auto industry because it was a much more severe test than the moving-barrier standard.
↑  Lee & Ermann 1999: pg 36, 43
↑  Schwartz 1991: In August 1970, 1971 model-year Pintos began coming off the assembly line. Just a few days later, NHTSA-which had never acted on its earlier proposal-advanced a more demanding set of proposed regulations. Three months later, Ford officials decided that for purposes of the 1973 model year, Ford would adopt, as its own internal objective, the regulations that NHTSA had suggested in 1969. In order to respond to NHTSA's more recent proposal, Ford engineers, with actual Pintos now available, stepped up the crash-testing process, and identified a number of design modifications that might improve the Pinto's performance. In October 1971, Ford officials decided against incorporating any of these modifications into current Pintos; rather, it would wait until NHTSA clarified its position. In 1973, NHTSA promulgated its fuel-tank standard but ruled that this standard would apply only to 1977 models. Ford adopted a 20 mph moving-barrier standard for all 1973 cars.
↑  Strobel 1979: Ford then joined other automakers in an aggressive lobbying campaign that was successful in delaying and softening proposed federal standards on how strong fuel systems must be to resist rupture and potential explosion.
↑  Gioia 1992: The tank was positioned between the rear bumper and the rear axle (a standard industry practice for the time).
↑  Schwartz 1991: Page 1015 and Footnote 9, "The court of appeal opinion referred to the Pinto's bumper as the flimsiest of any American car. Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 774, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 360. Mark Robinson, Jr., co-counsel for the plaintiffs, is emphatic that this reference is correct. Telephone interview with Mark Robinson, Jr. (Sept. 12, 1990) [hereinafter Robinson Interview). In the later criminal case, however, Byron Bloch, a prosecution witness, stated in cross-examination that the Pinto's bumper was about the same as those of the Gremlin, Vega, and Dodge Colt. See L. Strobel, supra note 5, at 157 ("I would say they were all bad.")."
↑  Danley 2005: A few months later Ford began crash-testing modified Mavericks In part to prepare a response to NHTSA'S proposed regulations. The results demonstrated the vulnerability of fuel-integrity At fairly low speeds and some modifications were made. In August of 1970, the first model year Pinto, the 1971, went into production. Post-production testing revealed similar results. Still, there were No federal performance standards At the time and the proposed regulations addressed only front-end collisions.
↑  Lee & Ermann 1999: engineers In the design stage were still trying "to find out how to conduct crash tests" (Feaheny 1997; see also Lacey 1986:613). For example, an internal Pinto test report dated November, 1970 listed As its objective "To develop a test procedure to Be used to provide baseline data on vehicle fuel system integrity" (NHTSA C7−38-Al.5, Final Test Report #T-0738). In this test, a Pinto sedan exhibited "excessive fuel tank leakage" when towed rearward into a fixed barrier At 21.5 miles per hour, considered roughly equivalent to a car-to-car impact At 35 miles per hour. Nothing In this, or any other, Ford test report indicates that participants felt cause for concern or organizational action. Although some Ford engineers were not especially pleased, they felt that the data were inconclusive or the risks acceptable (Feaheny 1997; Strobel 1980), or they kept their concerns to themselves (Camps 1997). Some felt that cars would rarely Be subjected to the extreme forces generated In a fixed-barrier test In real-world collisions (Feaheny 1997; Devine 1996). NHTSA apparently agreed and ultimately replaced the proposed fixed barrier test with a less-stringent moving-barrier test In its final standard (U.S. Department of Transportation 1988)
↑  Gioia 1992: Ford had in fact crash-tested 11 vehicles; 8 of these cars suffered potentially catastrophic gas tank ruptures. The only 3 cars that survived intact had each been modified in some way to protect the tank.
↑  Lee & Ermann 1999: Occupational caution encouraged engineers to view many design adjustments that improved test performance as "unproven" in real-world accidents (Devine 1996; Feaheny 1997; Schwartz 1991; Strickland 1996; Strobel 1980). Engineers, who typically value "uncertainty avoidance" (Allison 1971:72), chose to stick with an existing design rather than face uncertainties associated with novel ones (Devine 1996; Strobel 1980). One series of tests, for instance, showed that Pintos equipped with pliable foam-like gas tanks would not leak in 30 mile-per-hour crashes. But some engineers feared that such a tank might melt and disagreed with others who felt it was safer than the existing metal design (Devine 1996, see also Strobel 1980). Other engineers believed that rubber bladders improved performance in tests, but anticipated problems under real-world conditions (Strobel 1980).
↑  Schwartz 1991: As for additional design proposals brought forward by the plaintiffs, several of them-for example, a bladder within the gas tank, and a "tank within the tank"-concerned somewhat innovative technology that had never been utilized in actual auto production. At trial, there was testimony that a bladder would have been feasible in the early 1970s, but also rebuttal testimony that a bladder was at this time beyond the bounds of feasibility.
↑  Lee & Ermann 1999: Ford whistle-blower Harley Copp's argument-that the Pinto would have been safer had its gas tank been placed above the axle rather than behind it-is often cited in Pinto narratives as an example of safety being sacrificed to profits, or at least trunk space, in the design stage (Cullen, Maakestad and Cavender 1987; Dowie 1977; Strobel1994). Yet Copp did not reach this conclusion until 1977 (Strobel1980). And other engineers were considerably less certain about it, even though the above-the-axle design did perform better in one set of crash tests. The engineer overseeing the Pinto's design, Harold MacDonald (whose father died in a fuel tank fire when his Model A Ford exploded after a frontal collision with a tree), felt that the above-the axle placement was less safe under real-world conditions because the tank was closer to the passenger compartment and more likely to be punctured by items in the trunk (Strobel1980).
↑  Gioia 1992: I began to construct my own files of incoming safety problems. One of these new files concerned reports of Pintos "lighting up" (in the words of a field representative) in rear-end accidents. There were actually very few reports, perhaps because component failure was not initially assumed. These cars simply were consumed by fire after apparently very low-speed accidents.
↑  Lee & Ermann 1999: When Gioia became Recall Coordinator, he inherited about 100 active recall campaigns, half of them safety-related. As with most jobs, the enormous workload required him to use standard operating procedures" (SOPs) to organize and manage information for decision making (d. Kriesberg 1976:1102). SOPs increase organizational efficiency by operating as cognitive scripts that transform decision-making opportunities into largely predetermined action patterns. Existing SOPs required that, to be "recallable," problems needed either high frequency or a directly traceable causal link to a design defect. When reports began to trickle into Gioia that Pintos were "lighting up" in relatively low-speed accidents, and after viewing the burned wreckage of a Pinto, he initiated a meeting to determine if this represented a recallable problem. His work group voted unanimously not to recall the Pinto because the weak data did not meet SOP criteria (Gioia 1996). The work group was unaware of any cost-benefit analyses or Pinto crash test results. Reports of Pinto fires continued to trickle in, and eventually, Gioia did become aware of, and concerned about, the crash test results. Again he wondered if the Pinto had a recallable problem, so he initiated a second meeting to convince his co-workers that crash tests showed a possible design flaw. But others again saw no design flaws—after all, the Pinto met internal company standards, and no contradictory external standard existed. The work group conceived the tank leak "problem" not as a defect, but as a fundamental and unalterable design feature: the car's small size, the use of light metals, and unibody construction produced a tendency for Pintos (and others in its class) to "crush up like an accordion" in rear-end collisions (Gioia 1996).
1 2  Danley 2005
↑  Rossow 2015
↑  Gioia 1992: The National Highway Traffic Safety Association (NHTSA, a federal agency) had approved the use of cost-benefit analysis as an appropriate means for establishing automotive safety design standards.
↑  Danley 2005: In calculating the benefits, the analysis used a figure of $200,000 per life. NHTSA had developed this figure in 1972.
↑  Frank، Ted. "Rollover Economics: Arbitrary and Capricious Product Liability Regimes". American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.
↑  Lee & Ermann 1999: Based on information given to it by lawyers preparing cases against Ford, the Center for Auto Safety petitioned NHTSA in the mid-1970s to investigate the Pinto's rear-end design. According to material presented on the Center's website, Dowie's article is based on that information, made available to him by the Center (www.autosafety.org). "Pinto Madness" is still available on the "Mother Jones" website along with a video clip showing a Pinto catching fire after being rear-ended. In an interview with Gary T. Schwartz of the "مراجعة قانون روتجرز", Copp asserted that he was also a major source of the information for the "Mother Jones" story, Schwartz, "The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case," 1027, n.53
↑  Schwartz 1991:The Mother Jones article is suffused with an outrage at companies that apply a pernicious cost-benefit analysis in order to achieve "corporate profits".
↑  Schwartz 1991: According to the Mother Jones article, as of 1977, somewhere between 500 and 900 persons had been killed in fires attributed to the Pinto's unique design features
↑  Schwartz 1991:To sum up, the Ford document has been assigned an operational significance that it never possessed, and has been condemned as unethical on account of characterizations of the document that are in significant part unwarranted. Of course, the condemnation of Ford's report is linked to the condemnation imposed by the public on the Pinto itself. The common belief is that the Pinto, on account of its fuel-tank design, was a "firetrap." The Mother Jones article derived emotional power from its presentation of the Pinto as a "firetrap," a "death trap," and a "lethal car."47 The combination of that article, the verdict in the Ford Pinto case, the NHTSA initial determination, and the Pinto recall clearly conveyed this sense of the Pinto-as-firetrap to the general public."
↑  Lee & Ermann 1999: Dowie (1977) accurately explains in part of his Mother Jones article that Ford employees wrote this document as part of an ongoing lobbying effort to influence NHTSA (24, 28). But his readers have relied exclusively on his other claim, that it was the "internal" (20, 24) memo on which Ford based its decision to market the dangerous Pinto and settle the few inevitable lawsuits (31).
↑  Graham، John D. (1991). Huber، Peter W.؛ Litan، Robert E. (المحررون). "Does liability promote the safety of motor vehicles?". Brookings Institution. Washington DC: 132.
↑  Weiss، Joseph W. (2014). Business Ethics: A Stakeholder and Issues Management Approach. Berrett-Koehler Publishers. ISBN:978-1-62656-141-0.
↑  Lee & Ermann 1999:pg 41
↑  Dowie 1977: Ford knows the Pinto is a firetrap, yet it has paid out millions to settle damage suits out of court, and it is prepared to spend millions more lobbying against safety standards ... Ford waited eight years because its internal "cost-benefit analysis," which places a dollar value on human life, said it wasn't profitable to make the changes sooner.
↑  Dardis & Zent 1982: On August 10, 1977, Ralph Nader and Mark Dowie held a press conference to notify the public that unnecessary deaths and injuries were being suffered as a result of the faulty design of the pre-1977 model year Pinto.
↑  Center for Auto Safety 2009
↑  Schwartz 1991: Pg 1019, Schwartz noted, "The Mother Jones article had encouraged consumers to write to NHTSA and demand a recall of earlier Pintos. Responding to the wave of consumer complaints it received, NHTSA began a recall proceeding relating to 1971–1976 Pintos." Also see footnote 15.
↑  Dardis & Zent 1982: On August 11, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) began an investigation of the claims.
↑  Jones 1978: But NHTSA, a Department of Transportation agency, informed Ford on May 8 about results of the new investigation, which concluded that Pintos had a safety defect.
↑  Dardis & Zent 1982: In May 1978, NHTSA determined that pre-1977 model year Ford Pintos were subject to "fuel tank damage, Fuel leakage and fire occurrences which had resulted in fatalities and non-fatal burn injuries" when impacted at "moderate speeds," and that the "fire threshold" in those vehicles was reached at closing speeds of 30–35 MPH.
↑  Jones 1978: A spokesman for NHTSA said that his agency and Ford began a "process of negotiation" after May 8 that led to Ford's announcement in Detroit yesterday.
↑  Lee & Ermann 1999: NHTSA engineer Lee Strickland was assigned to determine if Pinto (and Chevrolet Vega) tank problems warranted a mandatory recall. Strickland's work group held the Pinto and Vega to a higher standard than other cars (Strickland 1996). It dispensed with the usual moving barrier. Instead, it intentionally selected a large and particularly rigid "bullet car" to hit the Pinto's rear end. It weighed down the bullet car's nose to slide under the Pinto and maximize gas tank contact. It also turned on the bullet car's headlights to provide a ready source of ignition. And it completely filled gas tanks in both cars with gasoline rather than the non-flammable Stoddard fluid normally used. Strickland justified these actions as approximating real-world worst-case circumstances (Davidson 1983; NHTSA C7-38; Strickland 1996). For NHTSA, the tests seemed an unqualified success: two 1972 Pintos burst into flame upon impact. In the summer of 1978, NHTSA announced that the Pinto gas tank represented a safety defect, leading to the largest recall campaign in automobile history at that time (NHTSA C7-38; Strickland 1996). Ford agreed to "voluntarily" recall 1971–1976 Pintos. Other small cars sold during the 19 70s were not recalled, even though most were comparable, or in the case of the AMC Gremlin probably less safe (Schwartz 1991; NHTSA C7-38; Swigert and Farrell 198081:180). Their manufacturers successfully defended them as acceptable risks (see Wallace 1978). When we asked why NHTSA forced a Pinto recall for failing the 35 mile-per-hour test, although most small cars could not withstand such a test, Strickland (1996) analogized that, "Just because your friends get away with shoplifting, doesn't mean you should get away with it too."
↑  Lee، Matthew T (1998). "The Ford Pinto Case and the Development of Auto Safety Regulations, 1893—1978". Business and Economic History. ج. 27 ع. 2: 390–401.
↑  Schwartz 1991: Relying on a variety of external sources (including Ford), NHTSA indicated that it was aware of thirty-eight instances in which rear-end impact on Pintos had resulted in fuel-tank leakage or fire; these instances, in turn, resulted in twenty-seven deaths and twenty-four nonfatal burn injuries.66 The NHTSA report also incorporated the data internally provided by NHTSA's own Fatal Accident Reporting System ("FARS"), which had begun operation in 1975. FARS data showed that from January 1975 through the middle of 1977, seventeen people had died in accidents in which Pinto rear-end collisions resulted in fires. 67 In comparing NHTSA's figure of twenty-seven deaths for 1971–77 with the FARS figure of seventeen for 1975–77,68 one should keep in mind that the number of Pintos on the road was increasing every year in a cumulative way. The NHTSA figure of twenty-seven fatalities hence seems roughly in the ballpark by way of suggesting the number of people who had died in Pinto rear-end fires. In setting forth this number, however, NHTSA made no effort to estimate how many of these deaths were caused by the Pinto's specific design features. Many fire deaths undeniably result from high-speed collisions that would induce leakage even in state-of-the-art fuel systems;69 moreover, cars in the subcompact class generally entail a relatively high fatality risk.70 Yet the NHTSA report did not compare the performance results of the Pinto to the results of other cars then on the road, including other subcompacts.
↑  Lee & Ermann 1999: Beginning in the late 1970s, claims consistent with "Pinto Madness" readily gained public acceptance, but credible contradictory claims did not (e.g., Davidson 1983; Epstein 1980). For instance, Dowie's "conservative" estimate of 500 deaths (1977:18) was accepted, while NHTSA's report that it could document only 27 Pinto fire-related deaths (NHTSA C7-38; Frank 1985) was ignored. A transmission problem that also caused 27 Pinto deaths (and 180 on other Ford products [Clarke 1988]) never became a social problem. Similarly, publics accepted claims of safety errors leveled by Harley Copp, a Ford engineer who was apparently overseas when early crucial decisions were made (Camps 1997; Strobel 1980), but ignored other safety-conscious Pinto engineers who believed windshield retention was a more important safety problem (Camps 1997), and lack of safety glass caused more deaths (Feaheny 1997).
↑  Lee & Ermann 1999: By the time of its Pinto investigation, NHTSA had essentially abandoned its original mission of forcing industry-wide safety improvements, in favor of investigating and recalling specific cars (Mashaw and Harfst 1990). NHTSA had two primary incentives in reinforcing the extant Nfocal organization" imagery of the Pinto narrative. First, NHTSA was pressured by specific organizations in its network (e.g., the Center for Auto Safety) and members of the public (see NHTSA C7-38) to take action on the Pinto's gas tank. Second, other network actors (e.g., courts, the Nixon administration, the auto industry) had increasingly limited NHTSA's ability to address systemic auto safety issues.
↑  Danley 2005: Ford could have refused to recall and have chosen instead to defend the Pinto's design in the formal recall hearings at NHTSA." While this tactic could easily have delayed any forced recall for months, if not for more than a year, the cost of the publicized hearings to Ford's reputation could have been substantial, even if Ford had been successful in the end. Ford agreed to "voluntarily recall" the Pinto in June 1978.
↑  Lee & Ermann 1999: the Pinto was the subject of the largest recall in automobile history at the time.
↑  Jones 1978: In a prepared statement, Ford vice President Herbert L. Misch said: "Ford informed NHTSA that it does not agree with the agency's initial determination of May 8 that an unreasonable risk of safety is involved in the design of these cars ..." Misch said Ford decided to offer the modifications "so as to end public concern that has resulted from criticism of the fuel systems in these vehicles".
↑  "1975 FORD PINTO". NHTSA. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2019-11-16.
↑  Sherefkin 2003: Ford customers filed 117 lawsuits, according to Peter Wyden in The Unknown Iacocca.
↑  Danley 2005: Two important legal cases were central. One was a civil trial that began in August 1977 in Orange County California, Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Company. The other was a case involving criminal reckless homicide in Indiana.