Seaports are critical gateways for the movement of commerce through the international supply chain. The facilities, vessels, and infrastructure within seaports, and the cargo passing through them, all have vulnerabilities that terrorists could exploit. The containers carrying goods that are shipped in oceangoing vessels are of particular concern because they can be filled overseas at many different locations and are transported through complex logistics networks before reaching U.S. seaports. In addition, transporting a shipping container from its international point of origin to its final destination involves many different participants and many points of transfer. The material in a container can be affected not only by the manufacturer or supplier of the material being shipped but also by carriers who are responsible for getting the material to a seaport and by personnel who load containers onto the ships. Others who interact with the cargo or have access to the records of the goods being shipped include exporters who make arrangements for shipping and loading, freight consolidators who package disparate cargo into containers, and forwarders who manage and process the information about what is being loaded onto the ship. Figure 1 illustrates many of the key participants and points of transfer involved from the time that a container is loaded for shipping to its arrival at the destination seaport and ultimately the importer. Several studies of maritime security conducted by federal, academic, nonprofit, and business organizations have concluded that the movement of oceangoing cargo in containers is vulnerable to some form of terrorist action. Every time responsibility for cargo in containers changes hands along the supply chain there is the potential for a security breach; thus, vulnerabilities exist that terrorists could take advantage of by, for example, placing a WMD into a container for shipment to the United States or elsewhere. While there have been no known incidents of containers being used to transport WMDs, criminals have exploited containers for other illegal purposes, such as smuggling weapons, people, and illicit substances. Finally, while CBP has noted that the likelihood of terrorists smuggling WMDs into the United States in cargo containers is low, the nation’s vulnerability to this activity and the consequences of such an attack are potentially high. For example, in 2002, Booz Allen Hamilton sponsored a simulated scenario in which the detonation of weapons smuggled in cargo containers shut down all U.S. seaports for 12 days. The results of the simulation estimated that the seaport closures could result in a loss of $58 billion in revenue to the U.S. economy along with significant disruptions to the movement of trade. The federal government has taken many steps to secure the supply chain, including the cargo in oceangoing containers destined for the United States. While CBP officials at domestic seaports continue efforts to identify and examine high-risk imports arriving in containers, CBP’s post- 9/11 strategy also involves focusing security efforts beyond U.S. borders to target and examine high-risk cargo before it enters U.S. seaports. As discussed earlier in this report, CBP’s strategy is based on a layered approach of related initiatives that attempt to focus resources on potentially risky cargo shipped in containers while allowing other containers carrying cargo to proceed without unduly disrupting commerce into the United States. While the Department of Energy (DOE) has led U.S. efforts to detect radiation in cargo containers originating at foreign seaports, CBP has initiated five initiatives addressing container security. A brief description of each is shown in table 1. One of CBP’s major efforts to address container security is CSI—a 6-year- old program that aims to identify and examine U.S.-bound cargo that is considered to pose a high risk of concealing WMDs or other terrorist contraband by reviewing advanced cargo information sent by ocean cargo carriers. As part of the program, CBP officers, usually stationed at foreign seaports throughout Europe, Asia, the Middle East, the Americas, or elsewhere, seek to identify high-risk U.S.-bound container cargo. CBP and host government officials share the role of assessing the risk of U.S.-bound container cargo leaving the seaports of the countries participating in CSI. Among other tasks, CBP officers at the 58 CSI seaports are responsible for identifying high-risk cargo shipped in containers, whereas host government customs officials examine the high-risk cargo—when requested by CBP—by scanning containers that hold the cargo using various types of nonintrusive inspection equipment, such as large-scale X-ray machines, or by physically searching the containers’ contents before departure to the United States. Figure 2 describes the activities carried out by CBP officers and host government customs officials to target and examine high-risk container cargo at CSI seaports. Another of CBP’s major efforts to address container security is through the C-TPAT program. Initiated in November 2001, C-TPAT aims to secure the flow of goods bound for the United States by developing a voluntary antiterrorism partnership with stakeholders of the international trade community, which is comprised of importers; customs brokers; forwarders; air, sea, and land carriers; and contract logistic providers. C-TPAT members commit to improving the security of the supply chain, which may include, for example, the use of employee identification systems for access control purposes. The members also agree to provide CBP with information on their specific security measures and allow CBP to validate or verify, among other things, that their security measures meet or exceed the agency’s minimum security requirements. The purpose of this latter step, referred to as validation, is to help CBP ensure that the security measures outlined in a member’s security profile are actually in place and are effective. In return, C-TPAT members are entitled to various benefits—chief among them, a reduced likelihood of having their cargo inspected. As part of its mission and strategic plan, CBP also seeks to promote the security of oceangoing containers by having its officers work closely with other stakeholders, including international customs trade organizations and host governments (where seaports participating in the CSI program are located). CBP’s former Commissioner has stated that a key goal of this outreach effort is to promote an international framework of customs security standards that multiple countries can agree upon. Such a framework is intended by the United States and other parties to help institute consistent, reliable customs security standards and practices. Figure 3 shows a timeline for the various U.S. security initiatives addressing container cargo security. Working through the WCO and in cooperation with the international customs community, CBP has taken a lead role in the development of international standards in customs security practices and in customs-to- business partnership programs. This effort led to the adoption of the WCO SAFE Framework, which establishes standards for collaboration between the customs administrations of different countries as well as between customs administrations and businesses. CBP has also assisted in the implementation of the SAFE Framework to promote international customs security standards, such as through capacity-building efforts that provide technical assistance and training to developing countries wanting to implement the SAFE Framework. CBP has taken a lead role in working with foreign customs administrations on approaches to standardizing supply chain security worldwide. In 2004, CBP, along with 11 other member customs administrations of the WCO, formed the High Level Strategic Group to develop international standards for customs security practices. The group developed the WCO Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade (commonly referred to as the SAFE Framework), the core concepts of which are based on components in CBP’s CSI and C-TPAT programs. Further, CBP’s CSI and C-TPAT programs have provided a model for developing global customs security standards, as countries adopt a framework that embodies the core principles of these programs. The CSI and C-TPAT strategic plans call for promoting an international framework of customs security standards using the core elements of the U.S. cargo security strategy. As CBP has recognized in security matters the United States is not self-contained, either in its problems or its solutions. The growing interdependence of countries requires policy makers to recognize the need to work in partnerships across international boundaries to achieve vital national goals. Further, the WCO has acknowledged that customs security enforcement, particularly with the threat of terrorism, cannot be done in isolation and requires international cooperation. To that end, CBP has taken a lead role in working with foreign customs administrations, through the WCO, to establish the framework of international standards designed to enhance the security of the global supply chain while facilitating international trade. In June 2005, the 173 member customs administrations of the WCO adopted the SAFE Framework. Further, as of June 2008, 154 WCO member countries, including the United States, had signed letters of intent for implementing the SAFE Framework (see fig. 4). The SAFE Framework establishes the standards for collaboration between the customs administrations of different countries (known as the customs- to-customs pillar) as well as between customs administrations and the businesses participating in commercial trade activities through various supply chains (known as the customs-to-business pillar). These standards provide guidance on what WCO member customs administrations must do at a minimum to both secure the international supply chain and facilitate trade. As seen in figure 5, the twin pillars of the customs-to-customs standards and the customs-to-business standards are based upon four core principles and underpin the SAFE Framework. The standards and principles of the SAFE Framework are similar to those of the CSI and C-TPAT programs. For example, just as in the CSI program, the standards in the customs-to-customs pillar state that members should use a risk-management system to target and identify potentially high-risk cargo. Under these standards, members should also require advanced electronic information on container shipments to determine the risk posed by cargo.