Lapses in the Department of Energy's (DOE's) security and counterintelligence programshave plagued DOE since 1977, when the department was established by merging 40 governmentorganizations, including the Energy Research and Development Administration and the FederalEnergy Administration. (1) The purpose in establishing the new agency was to focus the government's research centers onfinding solutions to the energy crisis then confronting the United States. The view, according tosome, is that DOE's establishment represented an unsuccessful attempt to merge more than 40different government agencies and organizations, an event from which DOE arguably has neverrecovered. (2) Congress created the semi-autonomous National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)in 1999 in the wake of a recommendation by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board(PFIAB) that DOE's weapons research and stockpile management functions should be placed whollywithin a new semi-autonomous agency within DOE "that has a clear mission, streamlinedbureaucracy, and drastically simplified lines of authority and accountability." (3) Since then, however, someobservers have questioned whether the current dual counterintelligence (CI) office structureestablished by Congress -- with DOE operating one counterintelligence office and NNSA a second,independent one -- is the most effective structure to combat foreign espionage. Or, as some havewarned, does such a bifurcated structure expose both agencies to the possibility of futurecounterintelligence missteps because it contributes to coordination and communicationsproblems? (4) One of DOE's legacies has been its continuing struggle to strike an acceptable balancebetween open scientific inquiry and the need to protect highly sensitive and classified informationthat comprises many of those inquiries. In the past, this inherent tension led many observers toquestion whether the security of DOE's highly classified weapons-related program, particularly withregard to CI, has received sufficient attention. These and other concerns prompted the ClintonAdministration to issue a Presidential Decision Directive (PDD-61) in which he ordered DOE tofundamentally restructure its counterintelligence program. PDD-61 called for a number of changes,including one that placed the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in charge of DOE'scounterintelligence program. In 1999, Congress went further by establishing the semi-autonomousNational Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and giving it control over DOE's nationalsecurity-related programs, including the department's sensitive weapons laboratories. It alsoestablished a separate counterintelligence office within NNSA -- one separate and independent ofthe DOE's Office of Counterintelligence. This new office was given responsibility for developingand implementing counterintelligence programs within NNSA. Although representing separateorganizations, the two CI offices share resources, funds, and personnel for some programs. (5) This partially bifurcated counterintelligence structure, and its long-term effectiveness,continues to generate concern in some quarters, (6) particularly given that DOE and NNSA facilities are expected toremain major espionage targets of foreign intelligence services. (7) In 1998, President Clinton issued PDD-61 out of concern about intelligence evidenceindicating that the People's Republic of China (PRC) had stolen secrets from DOE's weaponslaboratories. Aimed at strengthening DOE's counterintelligence program, (8) the President's directivemandated the establishment of an independent counterintelligence office -- known as the Office ofCounterintelligence (OCI) -- within the department and placed it under the supervision of a seniorFBI official. (9) Previously,DOE's counterintelligence program had been highly decentralized and, according to some observers,grossly underfunded. (10) The President's directive also mandated that the head of the new office report directly to theEnergy Secretary and that existing DOE lab contracts be amended to take into accountcounterintelligence goals and compliance measures. The directive consolidated under the OCIDirector's control counterintelligence oversight functions previously assigned to DOE operations andfield offices. As part of a follow-on implementation plan issued in 1999, the Director also assumedprogramming, funding, and personnel authority over counterintelligence activities at all DOE fieldoffices and laboratories. Despite these changes, a majority in Congress decided that DOE'scounterintelligence reforms were insufficient. March 1999 marked a turning point in DOE's counterintelligence program. That month LosAlamos National Security Laboratory scientist Wen Ho Lee was fired after allegedly failing apolygraph exam. (11) (Leehad also allegedly failed to notify DOE officials about certain contacts with individuals in the PRC,to properly safeguard classified material, and to cooperate with authorities with regard to certainsecurity matters. He pleaded guilty to one felony count of unlawful retention of national defenseinformation; the government dropped 58 additional counts. (12) ) In May of that same year,a bipartisan House Select Committee charged in a report that was declassified that the PRC hadstolen U.S. nuclear weapons secrets. In June, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board(PFIAB) criticized DOE for the "worst" security record on secrecy that panel members said they hadever encountered. (13) The criticism was contained in a PFIAB report, the first of its kind to be publicly released in thepanel's 38-year history. Although the PFIAB dismissed assertions of wholesale losses of nuclearweapons technology as a result of espionage, the panel did concur, on balance, with the U.S.intelligence community's assessment that the PRC had stolen classified U.S. nuclear weaponsinformation that probably enabled the PRC to accelerate its development of nuclear weapons. (14) Congress and thePresident responded to the panel's report by establishing NNSA (15) and placing it charge ofDOE's national security-related nuclear programs. (16) In restructuring DOE and establishing NNSA, Congress created dual counterintelligenceoffices in DOE and NNSA, respectively. Within DOE, the already-existing Office ofCounterintelligence was codified and made responsible for establishing counterintelligence policyfor both DOE and NNSA. The department further directed that the office be responsible forimplementing CI programs at non-NNSA facilities. Within NNSA, the Office of Defense NuclearCounterintelligence was created by statute to implement DOE counterintelligence policy, but onlyat NNSA facilities. Conferees further stipulated that a presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmedUnder Secretary for Nuclear Security be designated to serve as NNSA Administrator, and that theAdministrator report directly to the Energy Secretary. In approving this reorganization, conferees cited the PFIAB's report, which blamed DOE'scounterintelligence failures on poor organization and a failure of accountability. Conferees alsonoted the PFIAB's criticism of the DOE bureaucracy for being dysfunctional with regard to securitymatters, and incapable of reform. (17) Over time, this partially bifurcated CI structure has produced debate over its effectiveness. Critics warn that there is a lack of communication and coordination between the two offices thatcould undermine delicate counterintelligence investigations. Supporters of the dual office structureargue, however, that a separate, dedicated CI office within NNSA is necessary if counterintelligenceprotection of DOE's national security laboratories is to receive the focus it warrants. In assessing the current debate over DOE counterintelligence policy, observers have generallyfocused on two interrelated questions. First, are DOE and NNSA effectively managing their CIprograms? And second, is the current dual office organizational structure within DOE and NNSAflawed? In a 2002 report, the Commission on Science and Security blamed dysfunctional managementat DOE for deficiencies in DOE's security and counterintelligence programs, including a lack ofclarity, consistency, and broad strategic planning. The commission criticized DOE for failing tosystematically assess the espionage risk to its programs and establish appropriate protectionpriorities. It also said that DOE's investments in counterintelligence technology were inadequate andthat its focus on cybersecurity threats was insufficient. (18) Authors of a second study issued in January 2003 concluded that both agencies were makingprogress in accomplishing their basic CI missions. (19) The Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive(NCIX) reported that DOE and NNSA were working cooperatively, particularly in the areas ofstrategic planning, operating procedures, and creating joint information-sharing systems. Both studies, however, contained expressions of concern about the current CI organizationalstructure. (20) With regard to the current bifurcated structure, two views generally prevail. According tothe first view, articulated by the PFIAB in its 1999 report, real and lasting CI reform is "unworkablewithin DOE's current structure and culture. To achieve the kind of protection that these sensitivelabs (DOE's national security laboratories) must have, they and their functions must have their ownautonomous operations structure free of all the other obligations imposed by DOEmanagement." (21) Accordingly, the PFIAB advocated the establishment within DOE of a semi-autonomous agency,with its own separate and coherent counterintelligence program and structure. (22) The Commission on Science and Security summed up the opposing view in its 2002 report,concluding: Counterintelligence must be an enterprise-widefunction, responsible for counterintelligence issues anywhere within the DOE complex. Furthermore, counterintelligence investigations, analysis, and all other counterintelligenceinformation must be developed within a unified organization and provided to the Secretary and othersenior officials without bureaucratic delays. This vital function necessitates one organization withone chief of counterintelligence reporting to the office of the Secretary. (23) The commission went on to warn that the current bifurcated counterintelligence structure willinevitably cause counterintelligence responsibilities to fragment, thereby preventing theestablishment of a single, strong department-wide counterintelligence program.