The Inspector General Act, as amended, will reach its 30 th anniversary in 2008, and today there are more than 60 offices of inspectors general (OIGs). This longevity and growth built on the efforts of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (then the Committee on Government Operations) in spearheading their origination, beginning in 1976. Substantial bipartisan and bicameral support was necessary at their creation, given the across-the-board opposition by executive agencies early on, and for their continued development. There are two types of Inspectors General (IGs): (1) federal establishment IGs are appointed by the President with Senate confirmation, and may be removed only by the President except in the case of impeachment; and (2) designated federal entity (DFE) IGs are appointed and removed by the agency head in usually smaller agencies. The establishing mandates and statutory supports for the IGs provide a useful vantage point to view the current proposals to modify the IGs, their statutory powers and political power. In combating waste, fraud, and abuse, IGs have been granted a substantial amount of independence, authority, and resources. In combination, these assets are probably greater than those held by any similar internal auditing-investigating office at any level of government, here or abroad, now or in the past. Some of these purposes and powers of the IGs include their charges to conduct and supervise audits and investigations within an agency; provide leadership and coordination for recommending policies and activities to promote the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of programs and operations; have access to agency information and files and subpoena power for records and documents; receive complaints from agency employees whose identities are to remain confidential (with certain stated exceptions); implement the cash incentive award program for employee disclosures of waste, fraud, and abuse; hold independent law enforcement authority in offices in establishments; receive a separate appropriations account for offices in establishments; be appointed without regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of integrity and demonstrated ability in relevant professions (for establishment IGs and the IG for the U.S. Postal Service); remain in office without term or tenure limits; report suspected violations of federal criminal law immediately and directly to the Attorney General; and operate under only the "general supervision" of the agency head, who is prohibited (with only a few express exceptions ) from preventing or prohibiting an IG from initiating or carrying out an audit or investigation. Along with these, IGs have critical reporting requirements to keep the agency head and Congress "fully and currently informed" through specified reports and otherwise (which includes testifying at hearings and meeting with Members and staff). The reports include semi-annual reports as well as immediate reports regarding "particularly serious or flagrant problems." For both types, the IG reports are submitted to the agency head who transmits them unaltered, but with comments deemed necessary, to Congress within a designated period of time. The resulting connections between the IGs and Congress not only enhance legislative oversight capabilities, but also provide an avenue for potential support for IG findings, conclusions, and recommendations for corrective action. H.R. 928 and S. 1723 attempt to address recent, and in some cases, longstanding, congressional concerns regarding OIGs. Despite their institutional arrangements and authorities, modifications to the IG Act have been seen as useful to enhance the IG's independence and power. Along these lines is the wide range of proposed changes in these two bills. Their overarching theme is to strengthen and clarify the authority, tenure, resources, oversight, and independence of the inspectors general. The bills' specific proposals and considerations set up additional protections for IGs, including "for cause" removal and terms of office; consolidation and codification of two existing councils established by executive order into a single Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency; the reporting of the IG's initial budget and appropriations estimates to the Office of Management and Budget, the agency head, and congressional committees; program evaluation in IG semi-annual reports; and the grant of law enforcement authority to IGs in designated federal entities. Additionally, H.R. 928 , as passed by the House, and S. 1723 would require that DFE IGs, like their establishment IG counterparts, be appointed "without regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or investigations." The Bush Administration has taken exception to several provisions in H.R. 928 âremoval for cause, transmittal of budget requests to Congress, and an independent IG Councilâand, on October 1, 2007, threatened a veto of the legislation. In the face of this threat, the House passed H.R. 928 by a veto-proof margin on October 3, 2007. Under current law, IGs have limited protection with respect to removal from office. Presidentially appointed IGs may be removed from office for any reason by the President. The President is required to communicate the reasons for such removal to Congress; however, the reasons need not be given in writing and no time limit is set. There is no requirement that Congress be given advance notice of an IG's removal. IGs who are appointed by an agency head may be removed or transferred for any reason by the agency head, and the only limitation on such removal is that the agency head must promptly communicate to both Houses of Congress, in writing, the reasons for the IG's removal or transfer. H.R. 928 and S. 1723 propose a change in the removal provision for establishment IGs by requiring that removal by the President must be for cause on specified grounds. H.R. 928 and S. 1723 provide that an establishment Inspector General may be removed from office prior to the expiration of his or her term only on any of the following grounds: (1) Permanent incapacity. (2) Inefficiency. (3) Neglect of duty. (4) Malfeasance. (5) Conviction of a felony or conduct involving moral turpitude. (6) Knowing violation of a law, rule, or regulation. (7) Gross mismanagement. (8) Gross waste of funds. (9) Abuse of authority. Congress has provided these specific grounds for other officials, and an appendix to this report lists other examples of statutory terms used to limit the President's authority to remove officials appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate. S. 1723 would also change the removal provision for DFE IGs by requiring that removal of a DFE IG by the agency head be for cause on any of the first five grounds listed above. S. 1723 would require the agency head of a DFE to notify Congress, in writing, of the reasons for the DFE IG's removal or transfer by that agency head "not later than 15 days before" the agency head takes such action. An amendment to H.R. 928 , while not containing a for cause removal requirement for DFE IGs, would require DFE agency heads to give both Houses of Congress and the DFE IG written notice of "the reasons for any such removal or transfer . . . at least 30 days before such removal or transfer." The President has threatened to veto H.R. 928 , in part, because of the for cause removal provision. The Bush Administration argues that limiting the President's removal authority "does not enhance the function of IGs and raises grave constitutional concerns." However, as explained below, this argument is without merit. The Supreme Court has held as constitutional congressional conditions limiting the President's ability to remove appointed officers. In Humphrey ' s Executor v. United States , the Court determined that appointed officers, other than officers performing "purely executive" functions, could not be removed during their terms of office "except for one or more of the causes named in the applicable statute," such as "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." The Court reasoned that "the fixing of a definite term [of office] subject to removal for cause ... is enough to establish legislative intent that the term not be curtailed in the absence of such cause." Congressional restraints on the President's power of removal fall within the principle of separation of powers, according to the Court, which recognized the "fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the three general departments of government entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of the others." Subsequently, in Morrison v. Olson , the Supreme Court expanded the congressional authority established in Humphrey ' s Executor . The Court removed the limitations with respect to inapplicability to officers performing "purely executive" functions, holding that now Congress has the authority to provide "for cause" removal protection to any advice and consent officer. The Court established a two-step balancing test for such separation of powers situations. First, the President must establish that the congressional action interferes with a core power. If so, Congress must show a necessity for its action to overcome the interference. In Morrison , the Supreme Court held that congressional restrictions on the Attorney General's ability to remove an executive officer did not violate the constitutional principle of separation of powers. In analyzing the issue, the Court reasoned that the "good cause" standard for removal did not impermissibly interfere with the functions of the executive branch because Congress had not tried "to gain a role in the removal of executive officials" beyond its current powers. Additionally, even with its limitations, removal power remained within the executive branch, thus enabling the executive branch to perform its constitutional duty to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed." In the IG context, the executive branch would "retain[] ample authority to assure that the [IG] is competently performing his or her statutory responsibilities" according to the IG Act.