Interest in the Eastern Mediterranean as a natural gas resource base has been growing since Israel made its first large-scale natural gas discovery in 2009. (See Figure 1 .) The Tamar Field off the Israeli coast was the first of a series of large-scale natural gas discoveries in the region. Significant subsequent discoveries have been made in Israel (Leviathan), Cyprus (Aphrodite), and Egypt (Zohr), while Lebanon has been actively trying to assess its resources. In 2010, the United States Geological Survey (USGS) estimated that there could be up to an additional 122 trillion cubic feet of undiscovered natural gas resources in the Levant Basin, which underlays a large portion of the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. The USGS report also indicated that there could be up to 1.7 billion barrels of recoverable oil in the Levant Basin, making future oil discovery possible. However, the downturn in global oil and natural gas prices, starting in mid-2014, has constrained the development of resources and made markets more competitive. Projects that are deemed costly, difficult, or problematic have been put on hold in many circumstances. Many companies no longer have the financial resources or motivation to develop resources in challenging environments. For the Eastern Mediterranean, this has meant a slowdown in developing some of the natural gas that has been discovered, delaying the exploration for new discoveries, and requiring greater effort to find markets for the region's natural gas. Europe, given its proximity to the Eastern Mediterranean, is the most logical market for Eastern Mediterranean natural gas production. In the aggregate, though, European natural gas consumption has generally been in decline since 2010, offsetting some of the decline in European production. Imports to Europe rose by more than 10% in 2015, negating the drop in imports from 2011 to 2014. Should Eastern Mediterranean natural gas enter the European natural gas market, it will face strong competition from Europe's traditional suppliers—Russia, Norway, and Algeria—as well as from U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports, which started in 2016. For the most part, the Eastern Mediterranean countries either do not use natural gas as a fuel (i.e., Cyprus and Lebanon ) or are essentially self-sufficient in natural gas (i.e., Israel and Syria) (see Figure 2 and Table 1 ), except for Greece and Turkey, which are heavily dependent upon imports. Egypt, which has large natural gas resources, started importing natural gas in 2015 to meet its subsidized demand ( Table 1 data is from 2014 and shows Egypt as a net exporter of natural gas). Egypt's situation may change in the medium term if it can curb its subsidies for natural gas or change its policies to promote more natural gas development. Development of the region's natural gas resources could meet the potential growing needs of most of the countries in Table 1 , and add some diversification of supply for Turkey. For this to occur, many geopolitical hurdles would need to be overcome and new infrastructure would have to be built. Although the relatively recent discoveries are large for the region, they represent only a small amount globally. The natural gas reserves of the countries represented in Table 1 are less than 1.5% of the world's reserves. Regional production in 2014 was under 2% of global production, while consumption was over 3%. Cyprus is politically and territorially divided between the Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus and Turkish Cypriot administered area of northern Cyprus. Efforts by the Republic of Cyprus and other Eastern Mediterranean countries—most notably Israel—to agree on a division of offshore energy drilling rights without a plan for unification of the island have been opposed by Turkey and Turkish Cypriots. The Republic of Cyprus appears to anticipate considerable future export revenue from drilling in the Aphrodite Field, a natural gas field off Cyprus's southern coast. However, contention on this issue appears to have been deemphasized in negotiations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, which have resumed via U.N. mediation following the election of Mustafa Akinci as Turkish Cypriot leader in April 2015. Cyprus is heavily dependent on foreign oil imports to meet its energy needs (see Figure 3 ). Most electricity in Cyprus is generated by oil-fired power plants. Domestically using gas from the Aphrodite Field could help relieve some of this dependence and natural gas could supplant oil as the primary fuel for power generation. However, using natural gas for power generation would require new infrastructure to be built, especially natural gas-fired fueled power plants. Relieving dependence on oil imports for power generation could help Cyprus reduce carbon emissions. Noble Energy discovered the Aphrodite Field offshore of Cyprus in 2011. The field was estimated to hold between 5 and 8 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas reserves. Cyprus has announced its intention to develop the field and begin exporting gas by 2019. Cyprus currently has no natural gas infrastructure. The lack of natural gas infrastructure on the island makes it difficult and potentially costly for Cyprus to utilize gas from the Aphrodite Field domestically. Doing so would require the construction of both overland pipelines in Cyprus to deliver the gas and power plants or industrial facilities that could use the gas. Cyprus could either build an LNG export terminal to send gas to Europe or route the gas through LNG terminals in neighboring countries. Constructing a pipeline connecting Aphrodite to Egyptian LNG export terminals would be far less expensive than constructing an LNG facility in Cyprus. Exporting gas from Aphrodite through Egypt would take advantage of Egypt's underutilized Idku terminal, which is currently operating at 10% of its 2013 capacity because of subsidized domestic demand. Cyprus concluded its third licensing round for offshore exploration in July 2016. This latest round includes blocks adjacent to the Egyptian Zohr supergiant field and has attracted the interest of a small number of international companies. Exploration rights for this round of licensing are expected to be awarded in early 2017. The Republic of Cyprus is globally recognized as the legitimate government of Cyprus and is a member of the European Union. Turkey refuses to recognize the Republic of Cyprus and instead recognizes the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Turkey maintains up to 40,000 troops in Northern Cyprus. Negotiations to unify the island under one equally administered federation between Turkish Cyprus and the Republic of Cyprus accelerated in 2015. While some commenters are optimistic about potential agreements, no resolution has yet been reached. Although Turkey has not specifically contested ownership of the Aphrodite Field, Turkey strongly opposes the development of Cypriot natural gas resources unless the Turkish Cypriots will share in the financial benefits or until a resolution of the "Cyprus problem" is found. Since its recent reconciliation with Israel, Turkey has stepped up interest in importing Israeli natural gas via a pipeline that would run through the Cypriot economic zone. Cyprus has maintained, and again stated in early July, that it would not allow any gas pipeline connecting Israel and Turkey to be constructed in its exclusive economic zone until a Cyprus solution is found. A Cyprus government spokesperson characterized Cyprus as "a state under occupation" and reiterated the belief of the Greek Cypriot government that it would be unreasonable to approve a pipeline going to "an occupying power." This development has stalled further progress on a potential pipeline connecting Israel and Turkey. The Egyptian government's attempt to spark economic growth in order to stave off public unrest has had mixed results. In 2015, Egypt's economy grew at its fastest rate (4.2%) since 2010. On the other hand, Egypt's government is facing a shortage of dollar-denominated currency, which is affecting its ability to import food and fuel. Additionally, tourism receipts in 2015 have declined because of terrorism fears, as have revenues from transit fees from the Suez Canal, a major source of foreign exchange. Although Egypt is a large producer of natural gas, it became a net importer in 2015, primarily because of government policies subsidizing domestic consumption. The country's budget outlays have benefitted by the drop in prices for its imports of natural gas and oil. Natural gas is the largest source of energy in Egypt, accounting for just under half of primary energy consumption (see Figure 4 ). In addition, natural gas fueled 77% of Egypt's electricity generation in 2013. Oil is also a major component of Egypt's domestic energy mix. Egypt is a major producer of both natural gas and oil, and has yet to begin utilizing large quantities of renewable energy. Formerly a net exporter of natural gas, Egypt is currently facing a natural gas shortage. This is primarily caused by the government subsidizing the cost of fuel consumption and creating more demand. Additionally, domestic policies that force natural gas producers to sell a percentage of their production domestically at lower than international prices have, in the past, curbed interest in developing new natural gas resources. Egyptian natural gas production peaked at 6.1 bcf/d in 2009 and dropped 27% to 4.4 bcf/d between 2009 and 2015. Decreases in production have been largely due to decreasing offshore resources, political unrest, and domestic policies. The political uprising against then-President Hosni Mubarak in 2011 also decreased investment in discovering new sources of gas. The resulting shortage caused disruptions to industrial production and power outages. Demand for gas from the industrial and power sectors, which account for 85% of gas use in Egypt, is set to rise 22% by 2021. Egypt stopped regular LNG exports in 2014 and is actively seeking new sources of natural gas. Egypt currently imports between 1.0 and 1.1 bcf/d of natural gas, but is projected to increase to 2.0 bcf/d. In the spring of 2016, Egypt exported two cargoes of LNG from the Idku LNG facility.