Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Congress has not only focused considerable attention on how intelligence is collected, analyzed, and disseminated in order to protect the homeland against terrorism, but also what should such intelligence encompass. A discussion of what constitutes "homeland security intelligence" and how it nests within the broader intelligence discipline may be useful background as Congress continues to examine a broad range of homeland security issues. Prior to 9/11, it was possible to make a distinction between "domestic intelligence"—primarily law enforcement information collected within the United States—and "foreign intelligence"—primarily military, political, and economic intelligence collected outside the country. Today, this distinction is blurred. Threats to the homeland posed by terrorist groups are national security threats, and intelligence collected outside the United States is often very relevant to the threat environment inside the United States and vice versa. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (hereafter the 9/11 Commission) stated that one of the challenges in preventing terrorist attacks is bridging the "foreign-domestic divide." The 9/11 Commission used this term for the divide that it found not only within the Intelligence Community (IC), but also between the agencies of the IC dedicated to the traditional foreign intelligence mission, and those agencies responsible for the homeland security intelligence (HSINT) and law enforcement missions. Some might categorize security intelligence and law enforcement (criminal) intelligence as "non-traditional" intelligence. Yet, the scope and composition of this non-traditional or homeland security intelligence remains somewhat nebulous. At the broadest level, there is a plethora of definitions for intelligence. Most explain the various types of clandestine intelligence, the methods of intelligence collection (the "-Ints"), intelligence consumers, the purposes for which intelligence is collected, and the intelligence cycle. Traditional intelligence collection done clandestinely and overtly, largely at the federal level, to inform national-level policymakers is often differentiated from criminal intelligence gathered by a broader set of federal, state, and local actors generally for law enforcement purposes. Some argue that given that the end result in a criminal case is successful prosecution, that criminal intelligence gathering is largely reactive—a crime takes place, and "intelligence" or evidence is collected to support a prosecution. However, intelligence gathering can also be used to advance the causes of national security, as state and local law enforcement agencies can be viewed as the nation's counterterrorism "eyes and ears." Arguably, not all criminal intelligence gathering is reactive, as some law enforcement organizations and intelligence fusion centers use proactive intelligence gathering techniques, such as the recruitment of human assets, to prevent terrorist attacks. The terms domestic intelligence and homeland security intelligence are often used colloquially and interchangeably by some observers. Depending on how one defines "homeland security," this may be understandable. If, however, one bounds the activities associated with intelligence geographically, a systemic malady which was at least a proximate cause of the intelligence failure resulting in the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the two terms are inherently distinct. That is, domestic intelligence could be defined as that which is collected, analyzed, and disseminated within the United States; yet, homeland security intelligence may be much more broadly defined without regard to the geographic origin of the intelligence collected. The rationale for the integration of what is traditionally defined as foreign intelligence with that which is thought of as domestic intelligence is concisely stated by former Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Ambassador John Negroponte: "What happens abroad can kill us at home." One of the broadest definitions of intelligence is that "intelligence is knowledge, organization, and activity." Arguably, one of the most meaningful purposes of intelligence is "to establish where the danger lies." Some would argue based on this definition that "intelligence is intelligence"—that is, differentiating traditional from non-traditional intelligence is a theoretical matter which may have little relation to the end result—protecting national security. This argument might continue that threats to U.S. national security by and large originate overseas and, since its formal and statutory inception in 1947, the U.S. Intelligence Community has always been the first line of defense in identifying and understanding these threats. Although compelling, this argument could lead some observers to conclude that the state, local, and private sector intelligence players are simply "bolt on" modules to the existing federal community. Such a status quo plus model could be interpreted by some to mean that state, local, and private sector entities are new and passive consumers of federally gathered and analyzed intelligence products, yet not necessarily full intelligence cycle partners. This may not necessarily be the case, as state, local, and private sector organizations have taken on a more activist and proactive role in protecting their populations and infrastructure, a role that includes collecting their own intelligence while working with federal law enforcement and IC partners stationed in Washington, DC, and within their respective districts. The "intelligence is intelligence" position might beg the question of what is the most appropriate strategy for homeland security intelligence—a "top-down" federally driven model where the traditional "Ints" are dominant, a "bottom-up" state, local, and private sector model where the thousands of state and local law enforcement intelligence collectors are dominant, or some unique partnership that strikes a balance between these two extreme models? To some extent, HSINT may be perceived by some as a federally led "top-down" model through which the federal government's intelligence entities provide raw intelligence and/or finished terrorism threat assessments to state, local, and tribal law enforcement entities which may make independent determinations of whether the intelligence is actionable. Another alternative is a "bottom up" model through which criminal intelligence, of the type collected long before the events of September 11, 2001, provides an assessment of the local environments in which a national security and/or a criminal threat might become a reality. A third model, among others, might envision a less hierarchical or a more decentralized structure in which roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and local players are more clearly delineated, information shared more widely, and coordination between law enforcement and traditional intelligence actors closer. These models will be highlighted below. Some perceptions of HSINT among leaders in the IC and observers of the intelligence process are illustrative. Leaders within the Intelligence and Homeland Security communities often speak openly about the responsibilities, priorities, accomplishments, and challenges their agencies face. The nation's first DNI, Ambassador John Negroponte, stated that the Intelligence Community has tasked itself with "bolstering intelligence support for homeland security as enterprise objective number one." He spoke of this priority within the context of the DNI's mandate resulting from the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) to "integrate the foreign, military and domestic dimensions of the United States intelligence into a unified enterprise" and "connecting the dots across the foreign-domestic divide." At the aggregate level, even if it is assumed that there is one unified intelligence discipline, according to Ambassador Negroponte, there are three different dimensions of intelligence—foreign, military, and domestic. Under this school of thought, HSINT could become another dimension of intelligence that is distinct in some manners, yet overlaps with the aforementioned dimensions. At a relatively simplistic level, the relationships among the dimensions of intelligence could be depicted according to Figure 1 below. Although each of the dimensions of intelligence (referred to above) could be further subdivided, the domestic intelligence dimension, under a broad understanding of the term, would include the role state, local, tribal, and private sector entities play in collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information and intelligence within their respective areas of jurisdiction or industries. DNI Negroponte has defined the domestic agenda as "institution building and information sharing without damaging the fabric and values of our political culture." With respect to institution building, the approach remains federal-centric. Ambassador Negroponte referred specifically to the refinement of the FBI's National Security Branch, the further development of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), as well as the development of the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis. State governments, local law enforcement, the private sector, and tribal entities were mentioned at a procedural level—that is, in the sense of "facilitating these multidirectional flow of information." Former Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff provided his insights into and thoughts about defining the scope of HSINT. Using the metaphor of intelligence as the "radar of the 21 st century" to provide early warning of terrorist attacks, he stated, Intelligence, as you know, is not only about spies and satellites. Intelligence is about the thousands and thousands of routine, everyday observations and activities. Surveillance, interactions—each of which may be taken in isolation as not a particularly meaningful piece of information, but when fused together, gives us a sense of the patterns and the flow that really is at the core of what intelligence analysis is all about ... . We (DHS) actually generate a lot of intelligence ... we have many interactions every day, every hour at the border, on airplanes, and with the Coast Guard. Some observers have characterized domestic intelligence in the following manner: Domestic intelligence entails the range of activities focused on protecting the United States from threats mostly of foreign origin. Focused narrowly, it includes the FBI's counterterrorism work with local law enforcement. On a much broader scale, however, it also involves a broader set of intelligence activities overseen by the Director of National Intelligence, the secretary of defense, the attorney general, and the secretary of homeland security. The goal is to integrate federal, state and local governments, and, when appropriate, the private sector on a secure collaborative network to stop our enemies before they act. Those enemies include individuals and groups attempting to transport weapons of mass destruction, international terrorists, organized criminals, narcotics traffickers, and countries that are working alone or in combination against U.S. interests.