The United States Constitution, as amended, is a complex legal document which sets out the structure of the federal government, the legal authorities of that government (and, to a lesser extent, state governments), and, finally, a series of legal disabilities on the exercise of those authorities (such as a law that would infringe on individual rights). The document also addresses the complex legal relationship between the federal government, state governments, and the persons subject to their respective jurisdictions. Judicial interpretation of some of the Constitution's provisions, however, has varied over the last two centuries, leading to concerns regarding the ultimate validity of these decisions. Theories of constitutional interpretation generally address how the meaning of the Constitution should be discerned, thus allowing the application of substantive constitutional law to a particular set of facts or issues. Whether it is necessary to have a unified theory of constitutional interpretation to analyze all aspects of the Constitution is itself a matter of debate. For instance, there would appear to be some constitutional questions, such as whether a President may run for three full terms of office (he may not), that, because of the clear meaning of the text, do not require the application of a sophisticated theory of constitutional interpretation in order to reach a conclusion. On the other hand, there are provisions of the Constitution where the text itself is so abstract or ambiguous, such as the Fourteenth Amendment clause requiring "due process" or "equal protection," that analysis of information from outside of the constitutional text, such as an examination of the history, structure, purpose, and intent of the relevant provision, is necessary. Based on this argument, methods of constitutional analysis that would be appropriate for some provisions of the Constitution may not be necessary or sufficient for others. In fact, some scholars have argued that the formulation of a unified constitutional interpretive theory would obscure external considerations, such as social or political pressures, that might be influential on a court's decision making. While constitutional theory has attracted significant levels of judicial and academic attention, there appears to be no definitive list of constitutional theories, nor is there agreement on how such theories should be applied. Further, judges or justices do not generally limit themselves to one mode of analysis, but, rather, select tools of interpretation based on the nature of the issue at hand. Finally, even where the same method of constitutional theory is being applied by different judges or Supreme Court justices, the end result of such analysis may differ dramatically. For purposes of this report, it is presumed that all judges, justices, and commentators would be comfortable allowing the plain meaning of the text to govern when analyzing certain constitutional provisions. It is further presumed that all judges, justices, and academic commentators would be comfortable utilizing historical documents contemporaneous with the drafting and ratification of the Constitution to help inform constitutional doctrine. While reference to such documents is most often associated with the doctrine known as "originalism," there does not seem to be any theory of constitutional interpretation that rejects the use of such documents. Similarly, while the use of other contemporaneous historical sources to ascertain the meaning of provisions of particular constitutional provisions (such as dictionaries) is also associated with originalism, there appear to be no theories of constitutional interpretation that would suggest that these sources can never be relevant to constitutional interpretation. Various theories of constitutional interpretation seem to diverge from originalism when reference is made to documents or sources outside of these "original" documents. For instance, one of the more controversial references to sources outside of the Constitution is the use of foreign law to help elucidate the meaning of constitutional terms, such as the term "cruel and unusual punishment" under the Eighth Amendment. While it does not appear that such references have served as a primary interpretative tool in particular cases, the fact that any reference is made to such documents has been characterized by some as moving beyond legitimate sources for constitutional interpretation. In essence, the separation between "originalist" and other theories of constitutional interpretation appears to arise in those cases where, at least according to some commentators, the reference sources cited by originalists do not provide sufficient clarity as to the contemporaneous meaning of a particular constitutional provision, or even whether such terms were intended to be decided based on contemporaneous sources. These situations most often occur where the constitutional provision in question (e.g., the Equal Protection Clause) is, by its nature, subject to varying levels of generality. For this reason, the problem of setting the level of generality may have significant impact on constitutional interpretation. For instance, the Supreme Court has held in a variety of cases that an individual's decisions regarding procreation and child-rearing are "fundamental rights" that receive a high level of protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, in the case of Michael H. v. Gerald D. , the biological father of a girl whose mother was married to another man was denied visitation rights under a California law that presumed conclusively that a child born into a marriage was the offspring of both parents of that marriage. In a plurality opinion, Justice Scalia rejected the assertion that the plaintiff had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in his relationship with the child, finding that providing such a right to an adulterous father was not "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." In dissent, Justice Brennan noted that when deciding cases regarding family relationships arising under the Due Process Clause, the Court had traditionally used a more generalized articulation of a liberty interest, such as "family relationships." Justice Scalia explicitly advocated that the Court, when confronted with a claimed liberty interest, should "refer to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified." The separation between orginalism and other forms of constitutional theory can also increase when the nature of the judicial process is taken into consideration. The Anglo-American system of law places a high value on prior judicial precedent, generally using it as the starting point for analyzing the application of legal doctrine. For this reason, the concept of stare decisis often plays an extremely important role in constitutional analysis. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has found that the value of legal precedent, including the Court's own, may be outweighed by other considerations, necessitating the overturning of long-held decisions. When to overturn precedent, however, is itself the object of considerable debate. Finally, constitutional theorists must contend with a large body of federal court cases that seem not to be linked to originalist doctrine, but appear most closely related to theories that find constitutional significance in historically based moral values. These "fundamental rights" theories are most often concerned with explaining why certain due process rights, not textually specified, are to be considered under a higher level of scrutiny than other less-valued rights. For instance, rights such as free speech and freedom of religion are not textually applicable to states, but have been applied to the states by "incorporation" through the Fourteenth Amendment. Or, liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment, such as the right to terminate a pregnancy, are also not specified in the Constitution. Thus the protection of these rights must be justified on theories other than originalism. As there are many commentators who have proposed various refinements of theories of constitutional interpretation, this report will limit itself to selected originalist theories and some major theories that have arisen to address perceived problems with originalism. The report will first examine the historical bases for theories of constitutional interpretation, and will consider two schools of originalism—original intent and original meaning—and criticism of those schools. The report will then consider the role of judicial precedent and pragmatism in constitutional interpretation. Finally, the report will consider theories relating to the identification and justification of heightened constitutional protections for fundamental rights. An initial concern with constitutional interpretation is discerning whether the drafters and ratifiers of the Constitution intended a particular mode of interpretation. There is no express provision in the Constitution mandating the principles on which it is to be interpreted, nor is there a strong indication that one method of constitutional interpretation was universally agreed on or favored by the Founding Fathers. One problem with determining the preference of the drafters and ratifiers regarding methods of constitutional interpretation was that interpretation of a singular, written national Constitution was a relatively unique endeavor, and the prevailing doctrines of legal analysis offered varying templates for interpretation. It appears that at least two methods of doctrinal interpretation were prominent at the time of the passage of the Constitution, differentiated principally by how much reliance was to be placed on precedence. The first was the Protestant tradition of biblical interpretation, which emphasized the importance of textual interpretation, as opposed to reliance on previous interpretations. This tradition of strict textual interpretation is likely to have influenced the Founding Fathers, resulting in a natural hostility to the idea that interpretations of a written text should be given more credence than the text itself. However, the second method of doctrinal interpretation, with which the Founders would have been most familiar, was based on the traditions of English common law, which to an extent stand in opposition to strict textual interpretation. Under this interpretive tradition, the most common principle to be used in analyzing text would be to discern the intent underlying a particular text. However, because of the complex history of the ratification of the Constitution, this principle does not always have a ready application. For instance, there could well be variations between the intent of the drafters of the Constitution and the intent of the attendees of the state ratification convention. Even more difficult to discern (and perhaps less justifiably relied upon) would be the intent of the states which would be included in this new federal structure. And, finally, one might even consider the intent of the "People" of the United States, who, under the terms of the preamble to the Constitution, would arguably be the most relevant source from which to discern intent.