The U.S. Constitution establishes two methods by which Presidents may appoint officers of the United States: either with the advice and consent of the Senate, or unilaterally "during the Recess of the Senate." These two constitutional provisions have long served as sources of political tension between Presidents and Congresses, and the same has held true since President Obama took office. This tension is illuminated by President Obama's difficulty in obtaining Senate confirmation of nominations for the Directorship of the newly-established Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB or Bureau) and Members of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board). President Obama formally nominated Richard Cordray to be the first Director of the CFPB on July 18, 2011. In May 2011, 44 Senators signed a letter to the President stating that they would oppose the confirmation of any nominee to serve as CFPB Director until substantive changes to the structure of the Bureau were enacted into law. On October 6, 2011, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (Senate Banking Committee) approved Cordray's nomination for a full vote of the Senate. However, on December 8, 2011, the Senate fell seven votes shy of the 60-vote threshold necessary to reach cloture and move to a vote on the nomination. The NLRB, an agency with certain powers to investigate and adjudicate unfair labor practices, consists of up to five officials who are to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. However, there have been periods during the presidencies of both George W. Bush and Obama in which the board has had vacancies, including a period of more than two years in which the NLRB operated with only two members. In a 2010 decision, New Process Steel, L.P. v. National Labor Relations Board , the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the National Labor Relations Act prevents the NLRB from exercising rulemaking powers without having three or more acting members. In 2010, the NLRB had operated with a quorum of three or more members; however, by August 2011, there were only three members remaining, the minimum number of members required to establish a quorum. The NLRB was slated to lose one member by the end of the first session of the 112 th Congress. Therefore, in an effort to prevent board membership from dropping below the minimum quorum required for the NLRB to fully conduct business, President Obama nominated Terrence F. Flynn, Sharon Block, and Richard F. Griffin Jr. to be Board members. However, the Senate did not confirm any of the nominees before the third member's term expired. Following Senate inaction, the President reportedly considered making recess appointments should the Senate go into recess. However, the Senate, at various times during the 112 th Congress, has held "pro forma" sessions, which are intended, at least in part, to prevent the existence of a Senate recess sufficient to permit the President to exercise his constitutional authority to unilaterally appoint officers. These pro forma sessions typically are governed by unanimous consent agreements of the Senate that prohibit the chamber from conducting any formal business. The pro forma sessions generally have been held every three or four days, and typically consist of a single Senator gaveling in the session and, shortly thereafter, gaveling the session out. On December 17, 2011, the Senate adopted a unanimous consent agreement that scheduled a series of pro forma sessions to occur from December 20, 2011, until January 23, 2012, with brief recesses in between. The unanimous consent agreement established that "no business" would be conducted during the pro forma sessions and that the second session would begin at 12:00 p.m., January 3, 2012. On January 4, 2012, despite the periodic pro forma sessions of the Senate, the President, asserting his authority under the Recess Appointments Clause, announced his intent to appoint Cordray to serve as the first CFPB Director and Block, Griffin Jr., and Terrence F. Flynn, to be members of the NLRB. The appointments occurred in the time between pro forma sessions on January 3 and January 6, 2012. The President's actions have proven to be contentious. In addition to their impact on relations between the executive and legislative branches, these appointments also raise a number of significant legal questions regarding the scope of the President's authority under the Recess Appointments Clause and the statutory authorities these individuals may exercise—questions that may spark litigation. This report analyzes the legal issues associated with the President's exercise of his Recess Appointments Clause power on January 4, 2012. To set the framework of our discussion, the report begins with a general legal overview of the Recess Appointments Clause. This is followed by an analysis of two legal principles, standing and the political question doctrine, which may impede a reviewing court from reaching the merits of a potential legal challenge to the appointments. The examination of these justiciability issues is followed by an analysis of the constitutional validity of the appointments; potential statutory restrictions on a recess appointee's authority to exercise the powers of the CFPB; and how actions taken by the recess appointees may be impacted by a court ruling that the appointments are unlawful. The U.S. Constitution explicitly provides the President with two methods of appointing officers of the United States. First, the Appointments Clause establishes that the President "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for and which shall be established by Law." Second, the Recess Appointments Clause authorizes the President to "fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session." During the meetings of the Constitutional Convention, there was no debate on the Recess Appointments Clause. However, in light of the constitutional text and historical pronouncements, it is generally accepted that the Recess Appointments Clause was designed to foster administrative continuity by enabling the President to ensure unfettered operation of the government during periods when the Senate was not in session and, therefore, unable to perform its advice and consent function. The inherent ambiguities of the Recess Appointments Clause, such as the interpretation of the phrases "Vacancies that may happen" and "Recess of the Senate," have primarily received formal consideration from the executive branch in the form of Attorneys General opinions, with only periodic attention from the courts and Congress. Some interpretive questions surrounding the Clause are generally regarded as settled. For example, through interpretation and practice, a "Recess" for purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause encompasses both the inter- and intrasession recesses of the Congress. While there have been varying opinions about the duration of an intrasession recess sufficient for the President to make a recess appointment, the shortest duration in the modern era for an intrasession recess appointment has been 10 days. In addition, it is generally understood that the commission of a recess appointee expires at the sine die adjournment of the Senate's "next Session." In practice, an individual receiving an intersession appointment would serve until the end of the following session. However, an individual receiving an intrasession appointment—for example, during the traditional August recess of a first session of Congress—would serve until the end of the following session, that is, the end of the second session. As an intrasession recess appointment during the second session of the 112 th Congress, President Obama's January 4 appointments could serve until the end of the first session of the 113 th Congress. Furthermore, as a constitutional matter, a recess appointee possesses the same legal authority as a confirmed appointee. In upholding the President's authority to make a recess appointment of an Article III judge, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (11 th Circuit) stated: The Constitution, on its face, neither distinguishes nor limits the powers that a recess appointee may exercise while in office. That is, during the limited term in which a recess appointee serves, the appointee is afforded the full extent of authority commensurate with that office. Similarly, a federal district court explained: There is nothing to suggest that the Recess Appointments Clause was designed as some sort of extraordinary and lesser method of appointment.… In the absence of persuasive evidence to the contrary, it is therefore not appropriate to assume that this Clause has a species of subordinate standing in the constitutional scheme…. There is no justification for implying additional restrictions not supported by the constitutional language. Congress has, however, attempted to dissuade the President from making recess appointments through legislation. For example, Congress has passed legislation that restricts certain recess appointees from receiving salaries. Given the historical interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause and the historical use of its authority, the President's appointments of Cordray, Flynn, Block, and Griffin Jr. during a three-day recess between pro forma sessions raises a number of significant legal questions that may lead to judicial challenge. However, prior to assessing the merits of any challenge, a reviewing court would first consider a number of preliminary questions of justiciability—including whether the plaintiffs who have brought the claim have standing and whether the asserted claims present matters appropriately resolved by a court. An extended preliminary discussion of these justiciability questions is necessary because they may have relevance to many of the underlying legal questions posed by the Recess Appointments Clause, the President's recent actions thereunder, and the operation of the statutory authorities exercised by the recess appointees in this case.