In recent years, DOD has taken steps to improve its processes for acquiring and sustaining weapon systems. As part of these improvements, program managers are now responsible for the total life-cycle management of a weapon system, to include the sustainment of the system. In addition, DOD has directed weapon system program managers to develop acquisition strategies that maximize competition, innovation, and interoperability and the use of commercial, rather than military-unique, items to reduce costs. Within the area of weapon system sustainment, DOD is pursuing the use of performance-based logistics as the preferred support strategy for its weapon systems. Performance-based logistics, a variation on other contractor logistics support strategies calling for the long-term support of weapon systems, involves defining a level of performance that the weapon system is to achieve over a period of time at a fixed cost to the government. Technical data rights can affect DOD’s plans to sustain weapon systems throughout their life cycle. For example, DOD would need technical data rights if it opts to reduce spare parts costs by developing new sources of supply, to meet wartime surge requirements by contracting with additional equipment suppliers, or to reduce system acquisition costs by recompeting follow-on procurements of the equipment. In addition, DOD may need to develop depot-level maintenance capabilities for its weapon systems at government depots in order to meet legislative requirements. DOD is required under 10 U.S.C. 2464 to identify and maintain within government- owned and government-operated facilities a core logistics capability, including the equipment, personnel, and technical competence identified as necessary for national defense emergencies and contingencies. Under 10 U.S.C. 2466, not more than 50 percent of the funds made available in a fiscal year to a military department or defense agency for depot-level repair and maintenance can be used to contract for performance by nonfederal personnel. These provisions can limit the amount of depot-level maintenance that can be performed by contractors. Finally, DOD would also need technical data rights for a weapon system should a contractor fail to perform, including a contractor working under a performance-based logistics arrangement. DOD has referred to this contingency as an “exit strategy.” The Army and the Air Force have encountered limitations in their sustainment plans for some fielded weapon systems because they lacked needed technical data rights. The lack of technical data rights has limited the services’ flexibility to make changes to sustainment plans that are aimed at achieving cost savings and meeting legislative requirements regarding depot maintenance capabilities. During our review we identified seven weapon system programs where these military services encountered limitations in their sustainment plans. Although the circumstances surrounding each case were unique, earlier decisions made on technical data rights during system acquisition were cited as a primary reason for the limitations subsequently encountered. As a result, the services had to alter their plans for developing maintenance capability at public depots, new sources of supply to increase production, or competitive offers for the acquisition of spare parts and components to reduce sustainment costs. In at least three of the cases, the military service made attempts to obtain needed technical data subsequent to the system acquisition but found that the equipment manufacturer declined to provide the data or that acquiring the data would be too expensive. We did not assess the rationale for the decisions made on technical data rights during the acquisition of these systems. The seven weapon system programs we identified where a lack of technical data rights affected the implementation of sustainment plans are summarized below: C-17 aircraft: When the Air Force began acquisition of the C-17 aircraft, it did not acquire technical data rights needed to support maintenance of the aircraft at public depots. According to a program official, the Air Force did not consider the aircraft’s depot maintenance workload as necessary to support DOD’s depot maintenance core capability. Subsequently, however, the Air Force’s 2001 depot maintenance core assessment identified the C-17 aircraft workload as necessary to support core capability. The Air Force determined that it did not have the technical data rights needed to perform the required maintenance. According to C-17 program officials, the C-17 prime contractor did not acquire data rights for C-17 components provided by sub-vendors and consequently was not able to provide the needed data rights to the Air Force. The prime contractor has encouraged its sub-vendors to cooperate with the Air Force in establishing partnerships to accomplish the needed core depot maintenance. Under these partnerships, Air Force depots would provide the facilities and labor needed to perform the core depot maintenance work, and the sub-vendor would provide the required technical data. According to Air Force officials, there are some instances where the sub-vendor is unwilling to provide the needed technical data. For example, in the case of the C-17’s inertial navigation unit, the sub-vendor maintains that the inertial navigation unit is a commercial derivative item and the technical data needed to repair the item are proprietary. As of April 18, 2006, the sub-vendor was declining to provide the technical data needed to the Air Force. Without the rights to the technical data or a partnership with the sub-vendor, the Air Force cannot develop a core maintenance capability for this equipment item. F-22 aircraft: The acquisition of the Air Force’s F-22 aircraft did not include all of the technical data needed for establishing required core capability workload at Air Force depots. Early in the F-22 aircraft’s acquisition, the Air Force planned to use contractors to provide needed depot-level maintenance and therefore decided not to acquire some technical data rights from sub-vendors in order to reduce the aircraft’s acquisition cost. Subsequently, however, the Air Force determined that portions of the F-22 workload were needed to satisfy core depot maintenance requirements. The Air Force is currently negotiating contracts for the technical data rights needed to develop depot-level maintenance capability. While the Air Force has negotiated contracts to acquire technical data for four F-22 aircraft components, F-22 program officials expressed concern that it may become difficult to successfully negotiate rights to all components. C-130J aircraft: The Air Force purchased the C-130J aircraft as a commercial item and, as such, did not obtain technical data rights needed to competitively purchase C-130J-unique spare parts and components or to perform depot-level maintenance core workload. The C-130J shares many common components with earlier versions of the C-130 for which the government has established DOD and contractor repair sources. In 2004, the DOD Inspector General reported that the Air Force’s use of a commercial item acquisition strategy was unjustified to acquire the C-130J aircraft. In response to the Inspector General’s findings and added congressional interest, the Air Force is converting its C-130J acquisition to traditional defense system acquisition and sustainment contracts. However, because the Air Force did not acquire the necessary technical data during the acquisition process, it has less leverage to negotiate rights to data. In 2005, the Air Force approached the aircraft manufacturer to purchase technical data rights for C-130J-unique components, but the aircraft manufacturer declined to sell the data rights. Because of its lack of the needed technical data, the Air Force is planning to establish partnerships with C-130J sub-vendors that have technical data rights to components of the C-130J. Under these partnerships, Air Force depots would provide the facilities and labor needed to perform the core depot maintenance work, and the sub-vendors would provide the required technical data. C-130J program officials expressed concerns that in some instances sub- vendors may not be willing to partner. The Air Force currently expects to develop approximately 90 partnerships with as many different vendors on approximately 300 C-130J core candidate components. Program officials expressed concern about the proliferation of partnerships and said the Air Force will incur additional costs to develop, manage, and monitor these partnerships, but they had not determined what these costs will be. Up-armored High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles: When the Army first developed the up-armored HMMWV in 1993, it did not purchase the technical data necessary to develop new sources of supply to increase production. Army officials anticipated fielding these vehicles to a limited number of Army units for reconnaissance and peacekeeping purposes. At that time, the Army did not obtain technical data required for the manufacture of up-armor HMMWVs. With the increasing threat of improvised explosive devices during operations in Iraq, demand for up-armored HMMWVs increased substantially, from 1,407 vehicles in August 2003 to 8,105 vehicles by September 2004. According to Army officials, the manufacturer declined to sell the rights to the technical data package. Because of the lack of technical data rights to produce up-armored HMMWVs, program officials explained they were unable to rapidly contract with alternate suppliers to meet the wartime surge requirement. Stryker family of vehicles: When acquiring the Stryker, the Army did not obtain technical data rights needed to develop competitive offers for the acquisition of spare parts and components. Following the initial acquisition, the program office analyzed alternatives to the interim contractor support strategy for the weapon system and attempted to acquire rights to the manufacturer’s technical data package. The technical data package describes the parts and equipment in sufficient technical detail to allow the Army to use competition to lower the cost of parts. The contractor declined to sell the Stryker’s technical data package to the Army. Further, according to an Army Audit Agency report, the project office stated that the cost of the technical data, even if available, would most likely be prohibitively expensive at this point in the Stryker’s fielding and would likely offset any cost savings resulting from competition. Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft: The Air Force lacked technical data for the AWACS needed to develop competitive offers for the purchase of certain spare parts.