The United States government utilizes the services of hundreds of thousands of employees and contractors overseas. In some instances, U.S. agreements with the host nation preclude local prosecution of the crimes they commit. Federal law, as now written, does not always permit federal prosecution. The Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act ( H.R. 2136 and S. 1145 ) would fill some of the perceived gaps. The House bill, introduced by Representative Price, and the Senate bill, introduced by Senator Leahy and approved with minor amendments by the Senate Judiciary Committee, are very similar but not identical. They each address objections voiced concerning comparable proposals passed by the House during the 110 th Congress. The 112 th Congress adjourned without taking further action on either proposal. Criminal law is usually territorial. In some instances, however, a nation's interests and responsibilities permit the extraterritorial application of its law to matters beyond its borders. So it is with the crimes of those associated with the United States government's activities overseas. The Uniform States Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) applies to crimes committed by members of the United States Armed Forces, wherever they may be. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) applies to certain felonies committed by those employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces abroad. The USA PATRIOT Act amended the federal criminal code to make portions of it applicable to crimes committed by Americans within federal facilities and residences overseas. Legislation in 2006 established extraterritorial jurisdiction over Mann Act and human trafficking offenses, when committed by those employed by or accompanying the federal government overseas. Events in Iraq in 2007 raised questions about whether these provisions are sufficient to apply to allegations of misconduct by contractors employed by agencies other than the Department of Defense. The House responded with passage of H.R. 2740 (110 th Congress), which, among other things, would have made MEJA applicable to employees of any contractor for "any department or agency of the United States, where the work under such contract is carried out in an area, or in close proximity to an area (as designated by the Department of Defense), where the Armed Forces is conducting a contingency operation." At the time, the Administration objected that the bill was vague; would afford a sweeping number of offenses extraterritorial application; would impermissibly direct FBI overseas activities; and would burden the Defense Department with implementation responsibilities. The Senate took no action on the House-passed bill in the 110 th Congress. Modified proposals were reintroduced in the 111 th Congress. Witnesses at congressional hearings discussed the matter, but no further legislative activity occurred. "[T]he Federal 'Government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers,' which means that 'every law enacted by Congress must be based on one or more of' those powers." Nevertheless, the Constitution is particularly generous in the powers which it grants the federal government, and consequently the Congress, with regard to matters overseas. It designates the President commander in chief of the armed forces of the United States and empowers Congress to make rules for their government and regulation. It vests in the President the power to receive foreign ambassadors, and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties and appoint ambassadors. It grants Congress an array of enumerated powers that includes the power to define and punish felonies on the high seas and contrary to the law of nations, to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and to pass laws to carry into effect any of the powers which the Constitution vests in it, in the President, in the federal government, or in any federal officer or department. Such limitations as may exist must be found in the scope of the enumerated powers themselves or in constitutional prohibitions—either explicit restrictions, such the ban on ex post facto laws, or implicit restrictions, such as those that follow from the due process clause. Curtiss-Wright provides some support for the proposition that where Congress's enumerated powers are wanting, extraterritorial jurisdiction may be based on sovereignty. Its exercise of that power is limited by law of nations as well as by due process. MEJA has recently withstood constitutional challenges which argued that it exceeded Congress's enumerated powers. In Green , the Sixth Circuit also rejected the argument that expanding the circumstances under which executive branch officials might enforce a criminal statute constituted violation of a separation of powers principles. In the absence of encroachment of one branch upon the powers of another the Court could find no separation of powers infirmity. Green argued in addition that trying him under MEJA while trying his coconspirators under the UCMJ denied him equal protection of the law. Green who had been discharged and his coconspirators who had not were not similarly situated. Green's equal protection argument thus turned upon evidence of purely arbitrary or malicious official conduct, neither of which he had shown, the court found. Nor could the court find that Green's discharge and subsequent prosecution under MEJA so shocked the conscience of the court as to constitute a violation of due process. The district court in Williams greeted the argument that MEJA exceeded Congress's enumerated powers with the assertion that, "there is no constitutional bar to the extraterritorial application of penal laws." The court then declared that, "[b]efore finding the MEJA to be a proper exercise of Congress' extraterritorial power, however, the Court must 'consider whether [giving extraterritorial effect to the penal statute] would violate general principles of international law.'" It is unclear whether the court felt this consideration was necessary (1) to confirm the intent of Congress; (2) to bring the statute within the reach of Congress's power as sovereign or under Article I, Section 8, clause 10, to define and punish offenses under the law of nations; or (3) to a guide a due process analysis. As for confirming congressional intent, the cases which the court cites address the question of whether a statute, silent as to its extraterritorial application, was intended to apply overseas. The overseas application of MEJA, however, is explicit and so reference to international law to discern congressional intent seems unnecessary. The court initially suggested that it might view the principles of international law as indicative of the scope of Congress's sovereign power or its power to define and punish offenses under the law of nations pursuant to Article I, Section 8, clause 10. It described the pertinent principles of international law as the "law of nations," "[t]he law of nations permits the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by a nation under five general principles: (1) the objective territorial, (2) the national, (3) the protective, (4) the universal, and (5) the passive personality." Yet, the court went on to find application of MEJA in the case before it consistent with each of the five principles—other than universal principle—the one principle that it characterized as embodying the law of nations. Were the timing different, the district court might have been mindful of the Eleventh Circuit's observation that, "[i]n determining whether an extraterritorial law comports with due process, appellate courts often consult international law principles." In any event, the court found "that the MEJA is a proper application of Congress's extraterritorial power, ... [b]ecause Congress clearly intended the MEJA to be applied extraterritorially, and because such extraterritorial application of the MEJA would not offend international law." The House Judiciary Committee report on MEJA indicates that constitutional authority to enact its provisions may be found in: Article I, Section 8, clauses 10 ["To define and punish ... Offenses against the Law of Nations"], 14 ["To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces"], 16 ["To provide ... for governing such Part of [the militia] as may be employed in the Service of the United States"], and 18 ["To make all Laws ... necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in [the President] ... "). Congress may rely upon a wider range of its enumerated powers to enact the bills' proposals, based on the legislative authority for (1) the contracts or employment of those covered by the proposals, (2) the offenses covered by the proposals, or (3) the location of the offenses. The Constitutional Authority Statement for H.R. 2136 identifies three constitutional justifications: the power to tax and spend for the common defense and general welfare, the power to define and punish offenses against the law of nations, and the power "to legislate with respect to matters outside U.S. boundaries ... based on national sovereignty in foreign affairs." The House and Senate bills in the 112 th Congress supplement rather than amend MEJA. They would establish a new Section 3272 outlawing conduct outside the United States by anyone "employed by or accompanying any department or agency of the United States other than the Department of Defense," when the conduct would be criminal if committed within the United States or within its special maritime and territorial jurisdiction. The bills identify those "employed by" or "accompanying" as employees, contractors, subcontractors, grantees, subgrantees as well as their dependants, family members, and members of their households. They would exclude nationals and ordinary residents of the host country and encompass only employees, contractors, and their attendants whose presence abroad is attributable to support of a federal, non-Defense Department program, project, or activity. The definitions are comparable to those found in MEJA. MEJA, however, does not specifically mention grantees, family members, or household members. The bills do. The bills would also reach the crimes of a wider range of non-Defense Department employees, contractors, and attendants than MEJA. MEJA reaches the crimes of a few.