DHS has made significant progress in deploying both radiation detectio equipment and developing procedures to scan cargo and conveyances entering the United States through fixed land and sea ports of entry for nuclear and radiological materials. Specifically, DHS has deployed nearly two-thirds of the more than 2,100 radiation portal monitors identified in its re to deployment plan—over 1,400—but needs to deploy more than 700 mo complete the plan. According to DHS officials, the department scans nearly 100 percent of the cargo and conveyances entering the United States through land borders and major seaports. However, DHS has ma less progress scanning for radiation (1) in railcars entering the United States from Canada and Mexico; (2) in international air cargo; and ( international commercial aviation aircraft, passengers, or baggage. According to DHS officials, since November 2009 almost all non-rail lan ports of entry have been equipped with one or more PVTs. Of the over 1,400 radiation portal monitors deployed, 885 PVTs have been deployed along the northern and southern borders of the lower 48 states to all but a few non-rail ports of entry. At present, 100 percent of all cargo, conveyances, drivers, and passengers driving into the United States through commercial lanes at land borders are scanned for radiation, as are more than 99 percent of all personally operated vehicles (non-commercial passenger cars and light trucks), drivers, and passengers. According to DHS officials, the department now scans nearly all containerized cargo entering the U.S. seaports for nuclear and radiologica materials. Specifically, in addition to the PVTs deployed for land ports of entry, DHS has deployed 444 PVTs to major American seaports––including the largest seaports accounting for the majority of cargo. However, some DHS smaller seaports that receive cargo may not be equipped with PVTs. officials stated that current deployment plans have been in place to l address all the remaining gaps in the deployment of PVTs to seaports but that current and future budget realities require a complete re-planning of the deployment schedule. At present there is limited systematic radiation scanning of the roughly 4,800 loaded railcars in approximately 120 trains entering the United States each day from Canada and Mexico through 31 rail ports of entry. Much of what scanning for radioactive materials takes place at these ports of entry is conducted with portable, hand-held radioactive isotope identification devices (RIID). Such scans are triggered when, for example, anomalous readings are detected from imaging scans of rail car contents. According to DHS officials, international rail traffic represents one of the most difficult challenges for radiation detection systems due to the nature of trains and the need to develop close cooperation with officials in Mexico and Canada. In addition, there are unique operational challe this environment due to the length of the trains (up to 2 miles), the distance required to stop moving trains, and the difficulties in separating alarming cars for further examination. Furthermore, DHS officials told us that rail companies resist doing things that might slow down rail traffic and typically own the land where DHS would need to establish stations primary and secondary screening. Moreover, DHS officials said that it takes time to develop the necessary close cooperation with officials in Mexico and Canada and that an effective solution would require scanning of at least some rail traffic on Mexican or Canadian soil, before a train enters the United States. As a result, DHS is only in the early stages of developing the procedures and technology to feasibly scan international rail traffic. DHS is currently undertaking an International Rail Threat and Gap Study to determine the most promising radiation detection approach. DHS officials also told us that implementing the results of this study is subject to the availability of adequate funding. DHS is in the early stages of addressing the challenges of scanning for radioactive materials presented by air cargo and commercial aviatio present DHS is scanning for radioactive materials at certain major international airports in the United States, and has deployed some o PVTs in its plans. It plans to deploy more PVTs by the end of 2011. United States has helped them develop scanning procedures and info current and future deployment strategies for both fixed and mobile radiation detection equipment. However, these officials told us that scanning air cargo planes is a challenge because of the lack of natur choke points in airports where fixed detection equipment could be deployed. They believe that further operational experience and research is necessary before they can develop practicable mobile scanning strategiesand procedures. Until solutions to these challenges can be found, DHS’s goal of scanning 99 percent of air cargo at 33 international airports by 20 is currently on hold. According to DHS officials, whatever scanning for radioactive materials occu rs at these 33 airports is currently conducted with hand-held detectors. International Commercial Aviation. As part of a pilot program, DH ation aircraft, developing plans to effectively scan commercial avi passengers, and baggage for radioactive materials. DHS efforts to prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materi into the United States through the critical gaps DNDO identified––land border areas between ports of entry, international general aviation, and small maritime craft––remain largely developmental. These pathway important because dangerous quantities of nuclear and radiological material can be small and portable enough to be carried across land borders by vehicles or pedestrians, on most private aircraft, or by small maritime craft. In addition, these pathways are challenging because of their size, volume of traffic, and the difficulty of deploying available radiological and nucle detection capabilities and technologies. For example, the United States has more than 6,000 miles of land border with many locations outside of established ports of entry where people and vehicles can enter the Un States. In the maritime environment, a Coast Guard risk assessment revealed that small boats pose a greater threat for nuclear smuggling t shipping containers. There are at least 13 million registered domestic pleasure craft in the United States and 110,000 commercial fishing ves These small boats have traditionally been used to smuggle drugs and people but could be used to smuggle nuclear or radiological material. sels. DHS’s actions to address these gaps consist primarily of efforts to develop, test, and deploy current generation or newly developed radiation detectionequipment; conduct studies or analyses to identify and address particular threats or gaps; develop new procedures to guide scanning for radiation in pathways where no scanning had occurred before; and develop and learn from pilot programs. DHS is taking a number of steps it believes will improve its odds of deterring or detecting attempts to smuggle nuclear or radiological materials across the more than 6,000 miles of land border susceptible to illegal crossings by people and vehicles into the United States. Specifically, according to DHS officials, the department is procuring more current generation mobile radiation detection technology, seeking new technology, and further studying gaps in the detection architecture and the threat they pose. These efforts are, however, not yet complete and in some cases are behind schedule. For example, DHS is currently working to equip Border Patrol officers responsible for patrolling the U.S. borders with Canada and Mexico between ports of entry with current generation portable radiological and nuclear detection equipment—specifically, personal radiation detectors (PRD) and RIIDs. Portability is critical to strengthening radiation detection efforts, according to DHS officials, because it expands border patrol agents’ ability to detect a potential radiological threat beyond fixed ports of entry. According to its deployment plan, DHS planned to buy a certain number of PRDs and RIIDs each fiscal year from 2008 through 2011 to complete acquisition by 2012. However, the department has fallen short of these targets, citing a lack of funds. According to officials, DHS has undertaken some initiatives to scan private aircraft entering the United States as international general aviation. Since December 2007, DHS has been scanning 100 percent of arriving international general aviation aircraft (approximately 400 flights per day) with a standard hand-held RIID for nuclear and radiological material. DHS depends on the aircraft operators to obey the law by either arriving in the United States only at an international airport—which are all equipped with scanning capability—or departing for the United States from one of four overseas airports where such aircraft can be scanned before departure. Accordingly, DHS has already initiated studies to help it address this challenge and plans, according to officials, to initiate further studies in 2011. Specifically, among other things, DHS plans to update its analysis of pre-clearance scanning capabilities at airports overseas and evaluate the feasibility of expanding the number of overseas airports with scanning capabilities. It also plans to study the characteristics of aircraft that do not comply with U.S. scanning requirements and develop interim surveillance options to enhance DHS capabilities and mitigation strategies to detect and interdict these aircraft. A Coast Guard analysis revealed that small boats pose a greater threat than shipping containers for nuclear smuggling. These small boats, which include maritime craft less than 300 gross tons, number in the millions. DHS has developed and tested equipment for detecting nuclear material on small maritime vessels. However, efforts to use this equipment in a port area have been limited to pilot programs. Whereas initiatives to combat smuggling at land border areas between established ports of entry and through aviation routes are being integrated into already existing CBP screening operations, initiatives in the maritime environment require DHS to acquire and test new equipment and procedures with the Coast Guard and local law enforcement agencies. DHS is currently conducting 3-year pilot programs in Puget Sound, Washington, and San Diego, California, to design, field test, and evaluate equipment and is working with CBP, the Coast Guard, state, local, tribal officials, and others as they develop procedures for screening. These pilot programs are scheduled to end in 2010, when DHS will decide the future path of screening of small vessels for nuclear and radiological materials. According to DHS officials, initial feedback from federal, state, and local officials involved in the pilot programs has been positive. DHS hopes to sustain the capabilities created through the pilot programs via federal grants to state and local authorities through the port security grant program.