The development of the Internet has revolutionized communications. It has never been easier to speak to wide audiences or to communicate with people who may be located more than half a world away from the speaker. However, like any neutral platform, the Internet can be used for many different ends, including illegal, offensive, or dangerous purposes. Terrorist groups, such as the Islamic State (IS, also referred to as ISIS or ISIL), Al Qaeda, Hamas, and Al Shabaab, use the Internet to disseminate their ideology, recruit new members, and take credit for attacks around the world. In addition, people who are not members of these groups may view such content and could begin to sympathize with or to adhere to the violent philosophies these groups advocate. They might even act on these beliefs. For example, it has been reported that the sermons of Anwar al Awlaki were instrumental in influencing the ideology of certain individuals accused of terrorist activities, including the perpetrators of the San Bernardino shooting and the Boston Marathon bombers. Awlaki was a U.S. citizen who was targeted and killed by a drone strike on foreign soil. Awlaki left behind numerous digital videos on websites like YouTube of himself preaching his interpretation of the Islamic faith. Some of his videos expound upon less controversial topics such as respect for the holy month of Ramadan, the nature of marriage, or the relationship between Islam and Jesus Christ. However, other videos depict Awlaki exhorting his followers never to trust a non-Muslim; that Muslims are at war with the United States; and, in a video entitled "Call to Jihad," that "it is every Muslim's religious duty to kill Americans." It was messages like these, particularly the "Call to Jihad," that reportedly motivated the San Bernardino and Boston Marathon attackers. More broadly, the Islamic State organization has been known to use popular Internet services such as Twitter and YouTube to disseminate videos of its fighters executing prisoners, claim credit for organizing terrorist attacks such as the attack that occurred in Paris in November of 2015, and recruit new members to their cause. IS personnel also disseminate high-quality electronic publications encouraging supporters to conduct violent attacks in their communities. Members of Hamas and Al Shabaab have reportedly used Facebook and Twitter to disseminate their ideology as well. The media arm of Al Shabaab used Twitter to claim credit for the terrorist attack on the Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, and distribute information and pictures of the attack while it remained ongoing. Speech advocating violence and terrorism is prohibited by the terms of service of Twitter, Facebook, and other social media outlets. Sites like Twitter reportedly have increased their efforts to disable accounts that are associated with terrorist groups or the advocacy of terrorist ideologies. However, these efforts have not been wholly successful. When one account is disabled, another might soon appear to replace it. Many policymakers, including some Members of Congress, have expressed concern about the influence the speech of terrorist groups and the speech of others who advocate terrorism can have on those who view or read it. Some policymakers have expressed particular concern regarding the ease by which persons who might otherwise not have been exposed to the ideology or recruitment efforts of terrorist entities may become radicalized. These concerns raise the question of whether it would be permissible for the federal government to restrict or prohibit the publication and distribution of speech that advocates the commission of terrorist acts when that speech appears on the Internet. Significant First Amendment freedom of speech issues are raised by the prospect of government restrictions on the publication and distribution of speech, even speech that advocates terrorism. However, government restrictions on advocacy that is provided to foreign terrorist organizations as material support have been upheld as permissible. This report will discuss relevant precedent that may limit the extent to which advocacy of terrorism may be restricted. The report will also discuss the potential application of the federal ban on the provision of material support to foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) to the advocacy of terrorism and the dissemination of such advocacy by online service providers like Twitter or Facebook. The First Amendment to the Constitution states that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech.... " According to the Supreme Court, "the First Amendment [generally] means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." However, the freedom of speech is not absolute. Some speech, including fighting words, incitements to imminent violence, child pornography, and obscenity can be restricted by the government without constitutional concern. Furthermore, courts do allow the government to place restrictions on protected speech under certain circumstances. When a restriction applies to speech based upon its content or upon the viewpoint expressed, courts generally apply the highest level of scrutiny, known as strict scrutiny. In order to satisfy strict scrutiny, a speech restriction must directly advance a compelling government interest and it must be the least restrictive means for achieving that interest. It is rare that a law will survive this level of scrutiny. Generally, when a restriction is not directed at the content of speech or the viewpoint expressed, courts apply a less-exacting standard of scrutiny, known as intermediate scrutiny. Content-neutral restrictions on protected speech will be upheld if the government can show that the restriction advances a substantial government interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. In this way, the government is permitted to impose reasonable regulations on the time, place, and manner of speech. In Brandenb u rg v. Ohio , the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment can protect the advocacy of lawbreaking and violence. Brandenbu rg overturned a conviction under Ohio's criminal syndicalism statute, invalidating that statute. The statute, like other syndicalism laws, prohibited "advocat[ing] ... the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism." Members of the Ku Klux Klan had been convicted of violating that statute at a rally covered by a Cincinnati television station at the request of one of the Klan members. At the rally, among other incendiary comments, one of the members said "We're not a revengent [sic] organization, but if our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's possible that there might have to be some revengeance [sic] taken." Other statements advocating violence were made, as well. The Supreme Court overturned the convictions at issue because "the mere abstract teaching ... of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence is not the same as preparing a group for violent action" and cannot be punished by the government in a manner consistent with the First Amendment. In order for speech inciting violence or lawlessness to fall outside of the ambit of the Free Speech Clause, the Court held that: 1. the speech must be directed at ... 2. inciting "imminent lawless action" and 3. the speech must also be likely to produce such action. In other words, for punishment of speech advocating violence to be constitutional, the speaker must both intend to incite a violent or lawless action and that action must be likely to imminently occur as a result. In so holding, the Court invalidated Ohio's criminal syndicalism statute, reasoning that the statute failed to draw the distinction between "mere abstract teaching" and "preparing a group for violent action" and, therefore, swept too broadly. Consequently, in order for a statute that restricts the advocacy of violence or lawlessness to be constitutional, the statute must apply only to speech meeting the standard announced by the Court. As indicated by the Court in Brandenburg , speech that is intended to incite violent action and is likely to imminently produce such action is not protected by the First Amendment and may freely be proscribed by the government. However, the Court did not elaborate upon what it might mean for speech to be "likely to imminently produce" unlawful action. Therefore, it is unclear how imminent the violence advocated must be in order for speech to be able to be proscribed. In Hess v. Indiana , the Supreme Court provided some guidance regarding "imminence" pursuant to Brandenburg . The defendant in Hess had been convicted of disorderly conduct. At an anti-war rally, he had been arrested for shouting "[we'll] take the [expletive] street later." The Court overturned his conviction because his statement "amounted to nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time" and his statements were not directed to any person or group of persons. In the Court's words, "there was no evidence, or rational inference from the import of the language that his words were intended to produce and likely to produce imminent disorder." Some argue that the Court's decision in Hess indicated the Court viewed the "imminence" requirement to mean that violence must be likely to occur immediately as a result of the speech at issue. The Hess Court apparently did not think that a threat to "take the street" at some later point was imminent or likely enough to be punished under Brandenburg . However, state and federal courts have not always applied Hess or the imminence requirement of Brandenburg so strictly. For example, in People v. Rubin , a California state court ruling, Rubin was charged with solicitation of murder. During a press conference to protest a planned march by the Nazi Party through Skokie, Illinois, Rubin offered money to anyone who "kills, maims, or seriously injures a member of the American Nazi Party.... The fact of the matter is that we're deadly serious. This is not said in jest, we are deadly serious." The trial court found that his speech was protected by the First Amendment, but the appeals court reversed.