As part of its constitutional authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations, Congress has long delegated to the President authority to proclaim reciprocal tariff reductions with U.S. trading partners and has encouraged the President to enter into certain trade agreements that meet congressionally mandated objectives. Congress established the trade advisory committee system in Section 135 of the Trade Act of 1974 as a way to institutionalize domestic input into such U.S. trade negotiations from interested parties outside the federal government. This system was considered necessary because of complaints from some in the business community about their limited and ad hoc role in previous negotiations. The 1974 law created a system of committees through which such advice, along with advice from labor and consumer groups, was to be sought. In practice, USTR has primary responsibility within the executive branch for developing U.S. trade policy, and the President has delegated to USTR the role of leading the trade advisory committee process. Additional players in developing U.S. trade policy include other executive branch agencies, particularly the departments of Commerce and Agriculture; the private sector, including business and nonbusiness groups; and state and local governments. USTR also maintains close consultation with Congress. The advisory committee system is one of several ways that USTR obtains input from the private sector (see fig. 1). In fact, Section 135 of the Trade Act also requires USTR to provide an opportunity to private organizations or groups outside the advisory committee system to present their views on trade issues. The system, created in 1974, was originally intended to provide private sector input to global trade negotiations occurring at that time (the Tokyo Round). Since then, the original legislation has been amended to expand the scope of topics on which the President is required to seek information and advice from “negotiating objectives and bargaining positions before entering into a trade agreement” to the “operation of any trade agreement, once entered into,” and on other matters regarding administration of U.S. trade policy. The legislation has also been amended to include additional interests within the advisory committee structure, such as those represented by the services sector and state and local governments. Finally, the amended legislation requires the executive branch to inform the committees of “significant departures” from their advice. The trade advisory committees are subject to the requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), with limited exceptions pertaining to holding public meetings and public availability of documents. One of FACA’s requirements is that advisory committees be fairly balanced in terms of points of view represented and the functions the committees perform. FACA covers most federal advisory committees and includes a number of administrative requirements, such as requiring rechartering of committees if they are to continue for more than 2 years. The structure of the trade advisory committee system consists of three tiers, with the top tier directed by law to provide “overall policy advice,” the second tier to provide “general policy advice,” and the third tier to provide “technical advice and information.” However, Section 135 of the Trade Act does not establish any formal relationship among these tiers, nor does it authorize the first tier to exercise any control over the other two. USTR, working jointly with the other relevant executive departments, has the discretion to create, change, and terminate committees in the second and third tiers. The system comprises about 735 advisers spread across 34 committees, with the bulk of the advisers and committees in the third, technical tier. This tier consists of 17 industry sector advisory committees (ISACs), 4 industry functional advisory committees (IFACs), a committee of ISAC and IFAC chairpersons, and 5 agricultural technical advisory committees (ATACs). The second tier currently consists of five policy advisory committees. The first tier consists of just one committee, the Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations (ACTPN), whose members are appointed by the President. Figure 2 illustrates the committee structure. The advisory committees are administered by USTR, which assumes a leadership role, along with the departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor. USTR is responsible for administering ACTPN and three of the tier-2 Policy Advisory Committees, and shares responsibility with the other agencies for administering the rest of the committees. The Department of Commerce co-administers the majority of these committees—the ISACs, IFACs, and the Committee of Chairs. The Department of Agriculture (Agriculture) coadministers six others—the ATACs and the tier-2 Agricultural Policy Advisory Committee. The Department of Labor (Labor) is responsible for coadministering a tier-2 Policy Advisory Committee. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) plays a supportive role in the activities of the tier-2 Trade and Environment Policy Committee (TEPAC) but does not administer it directly. The advisory committee system’s unique features give it an important role in U.S. trade policy. Many negotiators use the system and report that the committees have made important contributions to successful U.S. trade agreements. Our analysis of documents indicates that committees have been given numerous opportunities to provide formal advice at committee meetings and through informal channels. The advisory committee system is unique in U.S. trade policy because it provides a forum in which business and other interested groups can consult confidentially with and provide advice to the executive branch on trade negotiations, U.S. trade policy, and implementation of trade agreements. The formal nature of advisory meetings helps ensure that representatives of the private sector and other groups have regular access to officials engaged in U.S. trade policy. Further, the system provides government officials with a body of private sector experts with whom they can develop an ongoing dialogue. Since USTR’s administrative procedures for the advisory committees require advisers to obtain security clearances before participating, the committees offer an environment conducive to discussing sensitive negotiating information. Many participants said the advisory committee system serves an important role in U.S. trade policy. A former USTR official and current committee member termed the advisory committee system “one of the great strengths of U.S. trade policy.” Among the comments made by negotiators whom we interviewed and members responding to our survey were that the formal advisory committee system is often preferable to more ad hoc means of obtaining input because it is institutionalized and seeks to be representative. Moreover, they said, the system provides assurance to Congress that domestic interests with a stake in trade matters have a voice when trade policy is formulated and will support the final agreements. It thus helps make the executive branch accountable to Congress and, ultimately, to the American public. According to multiple responses, the system strengthens the U.S. bargaining position by bringing to bear on-the- ground perspective and information from the private sector that the U.S. government lacks; establishing a clear set of U.S. priorities and fuller appreciation of various American interests; and enabling the United States to present a unified front when it faces foreign nations at the negotiating table. Without the system, some participants commented, U.S. negotiators would be operating in a vacuum and businesses would be unable to effectively resolve with foreign governments issues that only the U.S. government can pursue. The bottom line, negotiators and members agree, is that when it works properly, the system results in better trade agreements. Not only does it help the United States achieve commercial benefits, it can help keep the trading system vital and responsive to actual needs. Agency officials also cited the system’s value and contributions to U.S. trade policy. According to USTR, the advisory committee process was extremely successful during negotiations (1) on China’s accession to the WTO; (2) multilateral agreements on information technology, financial services, and basic telecommunications; (3) the Uruguay Round of negotiations that led to establishment of the WTO; (4) as well as regional initiatives such as the North American Free Trade Agreement, the Summit of the Americas, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. Of the 27 USTR trade negotiators whom we interviewed, 18 indicated that they had obtained useful advice from the system, as did most of the 12 Commerce officials we interviewed. They cited numerous specific situations where advisory committee input had been helpful to negotiations. For example, an Assistant U.S. Trade Representative indicated that the advisory committees are playing a vital role in identifying market-opening priorities for the more than 140 nations currently involved in WTO negotiations. A Department of Commerce official described a committee as instrumental in helping monitor implementation of China’s accession commitments to the WTO. A USDA negotiator said a committee was helpful in setting the tone regarding the language on tariff reductions in the comprehensive U.S. agriculture proposal to the WTO. A USTR negotiator reported that a committee helped develop a position on defining “international standards” in the WTO’s Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement and helped gain the international community’s support for the U.S. proposal, expediting acceptance of U.S. goods in foreign markets. Committee members also value the advisory committee system and devote considerable resources to participating in it on a voluntary basis. Just over one-half of committee members live outside of Washington, D.C., and pay their own travel expenses to attend committee meetings. Further, when the Department of Commerce renewed the charter for the ISACs and IFACs in March 2002, more than 80 percent of those members continued. Members whom we surveyed highlighted numerous benefits of committee membership, including access to USTR and other agency officials, insights into other members’ views, and face-to-face dialogue with all members. Parties outside the system, such as U.S. subsidiaries of foreign-owned businesses and nongovernmental organizations (NGO), have sought representation on the committees, arguing that they should not be excluded from such an influential system. Our analysis of committee documents found ample evidence that USTR and other executive branch agencies are consulting committees on a wide range of trade initiatives at formal committee meetings.