Colombia is the source of 90 percent of the cocaine and 40 percent of the heroin entering the United States. To assist the Colombian government in its efforts to implement Plan Colombia and reduce the cultivation and trafficking of illegal drugs, the United States has pursued a strategy emphasizing interdiction, aerial eradication, and alternative development. The strategy has resulted in a 33 percent reduction in the amount of coca cultivated in Colombia over the last 2 years—from 169,800 hectares in 2001 to 113,850 hectares in 2003; similarly, opium poppy cultivated also declined by 33 percent—from 6,540 hectares in 2001 to 4,400 hectares in 2003. Nevertheless, according to the Drug Enforcement Administration, cocaine prices nationwide have remained relatively stable—indicating that cocaine is still readily available—and Colombia dominates the market for heroin in the northeastern United States. Despite improvements in Colombia’s security situation in 2003—for example, according to statistics compiled by the Colombian government, the murder rate declined 20 percent that year—insurgent and paramilitary groups still control large parts of the countryside. According to State, the insurgents exercise some degree of control over 40 percent of Colombia’s territory east and south of the Andes. As illustrated in figure 1, this area includes the primary coca-growing regions of Colombia. These groups— the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the National Liberation Army, and paramilitary forces such as the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia—are involved in every facet of narcotics trafficking and are on State’s list of terrorist organizations. State has supported foreign governments throughout the world to locate and eradicate illicit drug crops. In recent years, State’s efforts have focused on the aerial eradication program of the Colombian National Police, although it provides logistical support to Bolivia and Peru and may be called upon to support drug eradication efforts in Afghanistan. NAS at the U.S. Embassy/Bogotá oversees and manages the Colombian program. The Office of Aviation, which has a main operating base at Patrick Air Force Base, Florida, implements the program with contractor assistance from DynCorp. DynCorp personnel at Patrick provide administrative support, perform major maintenance on aircraft, and give initial pilot training. In Colombia, the Office of Aviation and DynCorp maintain a headquarters office at El Dorado International Airport in Bogotá and up to three operational sites at various Colombian police or military bases around the country. From these sites, three types of spray aircraft— the OV-10, the T-65, and the AT-802—fly missions to fumigate the coca and poppy fields in Colombia. DynCorp provides pilots, mechanics, and other operations and maintenance personnel. The aerial eradication program operates in an often-hostile environment that requires helicopter gunships and a search and rescue helicopter to accompany each aerial eradication mission. Eradication spray planes and the supporting helicopters are often shot at from the ground. Missions have been canceled or redirected because NAS, Office of Aviation, or government of Colombia officials considered the targeted locations too dangerous. U.S. officials have had long-standing concerns about the threat posed to aerial eradication activities and, in particular, the safety of operations in Colombia. In August 2000, the Office of Aviation requested an independent evaluation of its aviation operations and safety by the Inter-Agency Committee for Aviation Policy. Based on its review of operations at two forward operating locations in Colombia and the offices in Bogotá and at Patrick Air Force Base, the committee concluded that the Office of Aviation program was safe but made numerous suggestions and recommendations to enhance safety and security. In September 2001, we reported that the Office of Aviation had taken action on or implemented most of the committee’s suggestions and recommendations. We also made recommendations for improvement, which State acted on. Nevertheless, in March 2002, the U.S. Embassy/Bogotá reported that in spite of all of the embassy’s precautions, a contractor, possibly an American, will inevitably be hurt or killed. In June 2003, the Director of the Office of Aviation noted that the Office of Aviation was performing a very difficult mission in an increasingly hostile environment. In September 2003, a spray aircraft crashed because of ground fire and, for the first time, the pilot was killed. In total during 2003, one helicopter and four spray aircraft either crashed or were severely damaged because of ground fire. In an October 2003 report, DynCorp noted that the threat to the program’s aircraft and pilots was causing increasing concern about pilot safety and personnel morale. Another key component of the Colombian-U.S. counternarcotics strategy was forming a Colombian Army Counternarcotics Brigade. Although the brigade’s primary mission is to plan and conduct interdiction operations against cocaine producers and traffickers, the brigade also is supposed to provide security for the eradication program in some of the insurgent- controlled areas of the country. As part of its contract, DynCorp trains pilots and mechanics and helps maintain and operate the U.S.-provided helicopters for the Colombian Army Aviation Brigade, which supplies the airlift capability for the counternarcotics brigade. Although the Office of Aviation has reported ground fire on its aerial eradication aircraft for years, the number of ground-fire hits began to increase in late 2002. In 2001 and most of 2002, the number of ground-fire hits on spray aircraft averaged fewer than 10 per month. But the number of ground-fire hits reported from October 2002 through 2003 increased significantly to an average of more than 26 per month. The number of hits peaked at 73 in January 2003, and 46 hits were reported in March 2003. Although the number of monthly ground-fire hits generally declined after March 2003, the total number for 2003 was more than the previous 2 years combined—313 versus 288 in 2001 and 2002. During the first 5 months of 2004, the total number of hits declined considerably to 48 compared with 168 during the same period in 2003. Figure 2 shows the number of ground- fire hits on spray aircraft from January 2001 through May 2004. In addition, during the period 2001-03, the operational tempo of the aerial eradication program more than doubled in terms of flying hours for the spray aircraft. In general, this meant the spray aircraft and accompanying helicopters were exposed more frequently to the threat of ground fire; although other factors also came into play, such as the proximity of eradication areas to insurgent locations. According to the Office of Aviation, spray aircraft flew about 5,450 hours in 2001, nearly 9,400 hours in 2002, and more than 11,300 in 2003. The increase in flying hours in 2002 and 2003 largely occurred as the Colombian government, headed by President Uribe, took a more aggressive approach to aerial eradication. In the 19 months prior to President Uribe’s inauguration in August 2002, spray aircraft flew about 9,700 hours or 510 hours per month. From August 2002 through May 2004, the eradication program’s spray aircraft flew more than 18,450 hours, or about 839 hours a month—during 2003 alone, the program averaged more than 940 flying hours a month. During the first 5 months of 2004, the pace slowed—spray aircraft flew about 2,000 hours compared with about 4,900 hours during the same period in 2003. Nevertheless, Office of Aviation officials report that the number of hectares of coca sprayed in 2004 remains high—62,000 through mid-June—because the spray aircraft are based close to large coca fields and the AT-802 spray planes, which are capable of carrying more herbicide than the OV-10, have flown more frequently than during the first 5 months of 2003. Figure 3 illustrates the spray aircraft’s monthly flying hours for January 2001 through May 2004. According to U.S. Embassy/Bogotá and Colombian officials, the primary reason for the increase in ground-fire hits in late 2002 was the aerial eradication program’s success in reducing the illicit drug producers’ ability to cultivate coca and opium poppy. To combat this success, U.S. Embassy/Bogotá officials reported that the insurgents began organizing and massing ground fire in front of the spray aircraft’s flight path to force the planes to fly though a barrage of bullets and using a greater variety of weapons against aerial eradication aircraft, including some larger caliber weapons capable of penetrating armor and hitting the aircraft at higher altitudes. State/INL and NAS have taken several actions to reduce the risk to the aircraft on aerial eradication missions. Since January 2003, these actions have primarily focused on improving the processes and procedures for collecting and analyzing intelligence information that the U.S. Embassy collects on insurgent locations and capabilities. Other actions include coordinating spray operations more closely with the Colombian Army and the Colombian National Police and ensuring that eradication aircraft are protected to the extent possible from ground fire. In response to the increased number of ground-fire hits on aerial eradication aircraft in late 2002 and early 2003, the Colombian National Police began providing two or three helicopter gunships for each eradication mission; this was in addition to the two Office of Aviation gunships that already accompanied every mission, and the NAS Director directed spray operations away from areas where the hits were occurring. In addition, throughout 2003 and early 2004, State/INL and NAS took several actions to make greater use of intelligence information regarding the ground threats to the eradication aircraft. In January 2003, State/INL approved a NAS request to hire two personnel as intelligence/security advisors. Their duties include collecting and sharing threat information with U.S. Embassy, DynCorp, and appropriate Colombian National Police and military officials to plan aerial eradication operations. These two individuals began work in August 2003. However, they did not have all the necessary security clearances to handle certain U.S. Embassy intelligence information.