A particularly interesting facet of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA; P.L.107-71 ) is the security screening opt-out provision (Sec. 108) that allows airports, with the approvalof the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), to implement a system using private screenersin lieu of federal screeners to inspect airline passengers and baggage beginning in November 2004. Specifically, ATSA required the TSA to fully deploy a federal screening workforce within one yearafter enactment, and permits airports to opt out of the federal screening program two years thereafter. Therefore, airports will officially be eligible to opt out of the federal screening program on or afterNovember 19, 2004. What distinguishes the opt-out program is that it delegates the authority ofdeciding whether to pursue private screening to airport operators, but leaves the actual oversight andcontract monitoring responsibilities in the hands of the TSA. The opt-out provision proposes a shared responsibility between the federal government,airport operators, and private screening firms, with specific roles and responsibilities for each to beformally defined in the TSA's implementation of this program. Private screening systems have beenin place at many European airports for some time and are generally regarded as being efficient andeffective. For example, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) reported that airport operatorsare responsible for screening operations at airports in Belgium, France, and the UnitedKingdom. (1) At many ofthese locations, airports contract with screening companies to conduct screening operations, whilesome airports in the United Kingdom directly manage and conduct screening operations. However,successful implementation of the opt-out program in the United States is likely to be highlydependent on the specific policies and guidelines established by TSA to implement and manage theprogram. Consequently, the implementation of the opt-out provision of ATSA is likely to be ofconsiderable interest to Congress as it engages in oversight to assess whether the program achievesits intended objectives, or whether the program or its implementation should be modified throughrecommended policy changes or legislative action. Screening contracts awarded under the opt-out provision would be determined by the TSAand federally managed by the TSA. Therefore, the opt-out program, as defined in ATSA, does noteliminate the federal responsibility for security screening at airports or place airport operators orairlines directly in charge of security screening contract oversight. Thus, the security screeningopt-out program is not a return to the operational structure for aviation security that existed beforethe passage of ATSA, where airlines were directly responsible for screening operations, nor is it aprogram that would place the responsibility for direct oversight of screening contracts in the handsof individual airport operators. Rather, the opt-out program establishes a federally funded andmanaged, contractor-operated framework for security screening at airports. Nonetheless, the opt-outprovision affords each airport operator the opportunity to assume an active role in deciding whetherprivate screening operations are suitable for a given airport and providing recommendations forprivate screening operations. In some cases, airports may elect to take an active role in privatescreening operations by directly employing screeners and managing screening activities. The opt-outprovision as defined in statute offers such flexibility in the implementation of private screeningoperations at each airport, leaving it up to TSA to decide if an airport's proposal for private screeningwill meet the desired objectives without compromising security. On the other hand, while airlinesare clearly major stakeholders in aviation security, their input or involvement in implementingprivate screening operations role is not specifically addressed in the provision, leaving it largely upto TSA to determine how airline input or involvement in the planning, decision-making, andimplementation of private screening operations will be handled. The FAA first implemented domestic passenger security screening at airports in the UnitedStates in 1973, requiring that airlines conduct pre-board screening of passengers and their carry-onitems. The Air Transportation Security Act of 1974 ( P.L. 93-366 , 88 Stat. 409) specifically required the screening of all passengers and their carry-on baggage and required the FAA to submitsemiannual reports to Congress detailing the effectiveness of screening procedures. This policy ofscreening domestic passengers, as well as passengers on international flights, was implemented inresponse to the large number of hijackings on domestic flights in the United States during the 1960sand early 1970s. Between 1961 and 1972, 134 domestic flights had been hijacked in the UnitedStates, most destined for Cuba. (2) By the 1990s, incidents of air piracy were virtually nonexistent inthe United States. Nonetheless, deficiencies in passenger pre-board screening practices had been identified inseveral Department of Transportation (DOT) Inspector General's investigations and GAOexaminations of airport security. (3) However, based on the precipitous decline in domestic acts of airpiracy after the implementation of passenger screening, the FAA and the airline industry generallyviewed pre-board screening as an effective deterrent against hijackings. While the existing policyand airline-operated system for screening passengers and their carry-on items was generally viewedfavorably by both the FAA and industry stakeholders, the growing threat of aircraft bombingsspurred significant policy debate over aviation security practices in the 1990s. Following the 1988bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, and other high-profile bombings of civilianairliners overseas, the threat of aircraft bombings was perceived to be the most significant andgrowing threat to aviation security and was the primary impetus behind efforts to revise aviationsecurity policy in the United States. In response to increasing threat of terrorist acts against aircraft, Congress passed the AviationSecurity Improvement Act of 1990 ( P.L. 101-604 ). This comprehensive measure responded to thenational security risk of threats to aviation by increasing the FAA's role in aviation securityintelligence, and requiring the deployment of federal security managers to oversee airport securityat all Category X airports (4) and other airports where the FAA determined deployment of a federal security manager was neededto meet aviation security needs. The statutory duties of federal security managers included theoversight and enforcement of federal security requirements implemented by air carriers and airportoperators, including screening operations. However, the legislation did not address or alter theexisting system of airline-managed screening operations. The Federal Aviation Authorization Act of 1996 ( P.L. 104-264 , 110 Stat. 3213) required theFAA to study and assess whether and, if so, how to transfer certain responsibilities, such aspassenger screening, from air carriers to either airport operators or the federal government or toprovide for shared responsibilities between air carriers on the one hand and airport operators or thefederal government on the other. During the ensuing debate, proposals to either federalize securityscreening operations or make airport operators responsible for security screening were both evaluatedbut were ultimately dismissed for a variety of reasons. (5) From the perspective of airport operators at the time, placing airports in charge of screeningoperations introduced logistic complexities and diffusion of responsibility that they believed woulderode security and increase the risk of terrorist infiltration of the aviation system. In 1996, RichardMarchi, senior vice president for technical and environmental affairs for the Airports CouncilInternational - North America (ACI-NA), speaking for his organization and the AmericanAssociation of Airport Executives (AAAE), the two primary trade organizations representing airportsin the United States, summarized the airports' collective position on airport involvement in passengerscreening at the time, stating that: By interposing another controlling entity -- an airportor federal employee -- into the midst of the check-in process continuity is lost, and the suspect personand/or their baggage would have the opportunity to evade security measures such as a positivepassenger/baggage match.... [Airline-managed screening] works because a single entity -- in thiscase, the airline -- is responsible for controlling all aspects of that passenger's screening process. Ifairport or federal government employees were to become responsible for effective screening ofsuspect passengers and/or baggage, they would multiply the number of points in the system wherethere must be a hand-off of responsibility and, in turn, multiply the number of opportunities for amiscue. (6) Ultimately, the FAA elected to retain the system of airline-controlled screening operationswhile proposing increased federal involvement in research and acquisition of screening technologiessuch as explosive detection systems (EDS) and regulatory oversight of screening companies. Boththe airlines and the airports supported this evolutionary approach that maintained the status quo withregard to airline responsibility for conducting screening operations while increasing federalinvolvement in the deployment of screening technologies and oversight of screening operations. Under the Federal Aviation Administration Reauthorization Act of 1996 ( P.L. 104-264 ), theFAA was directed to certify screening companies and develop uniform performance standards forscreening operations to increase federal oversight of these activities. However, the FAA was stillengaged in the rulemaking process to implement these certification standards when the terroristattacks of September 11, 2001 occurred. Thus, up until the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,and for about six months thereafter when the TSA assumed control over screening contracts, theairlines were responsible for the pre-board screening of passengers and their property. However,screening operations were typically carried out by private security firms under contracts with theairlines. Under this system, there was a lack of uniform standards for screening operations, therewere frequent incidents of poor job performance, and high turnover rates were commonplace amonglow-paying screener positions. In 1999, there were 66 private screening companies providing airport screening at the nation'scommercial passenger airports. (7) Many of these contracts were on a month-to-month basis. Furthermore, at some larger airports, multiple contracts were in place at a single airport, withmultiple screening companies providing screening at security checkpoints in different parts of thepassenger terminal.