The nation’s economy and security are dependent, in part, on domestic offshore exploration and production of oil and natural gas. OCS facilities play a significant and growing role in domestic production. For example, oil production from offshore sources helped offset declines in land-based production in recent decades. The OCS is in an area of federal jurisdiction that contains an estimated 85 billion barrels of oil, more than all onshore resources and those in shallower state waters combined (see fig. 1 for a photograph of an OCS facility in the Gulf of Mexico). In addition, the LOOP is responsible for transporting to shore about 10 percent of imported oil to the United States. Offshore production of oil and natural gas is critical in supporting businesses, the military, and individuals who rely on a steady supply of these resources. In addition, the leasing of offshore lands and the collection of royalties on the production of oil and natural gas results in billions of dollars in revenue for the federal government. Because of their importance to the economy and national security, OCS facilities and deepwater ports are possible targets for al Qaeda and other groups with malevolent intent. For example, in May 2011, DHS issued a press statement that intelligence information showed that throughout 2010 there was continuing interest by members of al Qaeda in targeting oil tankers and commercial oil infrastructure at sea. In addition, other countries have experienced attacks by terrorists or criminals. For example, in 2006, Nigerian militants attacked energy facilities and abducted foreign oil workers in the oil-rich Niger delta. These attacks have continued in recent years and, in August 2011, the United Nations Security Council expressed concern about the attacks. Potential attack methods identified by the Coast Guard or owners and operators of offshore energy infrastructure include (1) crashing an aircraft into a facility; (2) using a submarine vessel, diver, or other means of attacking a facility underwater; (3) ramming a facility with a vessel; and (4) sabotage by an employee. OCS facilities and deepwater ports may be at risk for an attack because they are located in open waters and generally are many miles away from Coast Guard assets and personnel. For example, owners and operators of OCS facilities expressed concern about recreational and fishing boats and divers operating near or attempting to attach themselves to an OCS facility. Another risk is that many OCS facilities do not have personnel on- board the facility who can detect or report unauthorized incursions. According to Coast Guard officials, OCS facilities and deepwater ports are generally not considered to be high-risk targets. Rather, Coast Guard officials also noted that OCS facilities and deepwater ports are lower risk targets because of their remote location because an attack on them would not likely result in a significant disruption of maritime commerce. However, if an incident occurs, it would be difficult for the Coast Guard to respond quickly because deepwater ports and OCS facilities are generally isolated and located many miles from the closest Coast Guard unit. Of the roughly 3,900 offshore facilities on the OCS, from January 1, 2008, through December 31, 2010, there were 57 facilities which, at some point during that period of time, met the production or personnel thresholds subjecting them to security requirements. OCS facilities generally consist of two different types of facilities: (1) fixed OCS facilities and (2) floating OCS facilities. For example, 41 of the OCS facilities are fixed OCS facilities that are permanently fixed to the sea floor. Of those, 34 are primarily involved in the transportation of large volumes of oil or natural gas and are called “transmission platforms.” These facilities, unlike facilities that produce oil and natural gas, may not be staffed, but instead may have automated operations or could be operated remotely from shore. The remaining 16 facilities are floating OCS facilities, which are buoyant facilities that are securely moored to the seabed. An example of such a facility is a floating offshore installation, which is a floating structure that is moored to the seafloor in a semipermanent manner, to be kept at that location for the primary purpose of producing oil and natural gas from wells drilled into the sea floor. Further, we determined there were four deepwater ports in operation during the time period covered by our review. Deepwater ports can be one of two types: (1) oil deepwater ports and (2) liquefied natural gas (LNG) deepwater ports. The LOOP is an oil deepwater port that has two above the water fixed platforms in addition to buoys that float on the surface, while the remaining three deepwater ports involve an underwater buoy system that tankers use to offload LNG and have no above the water infrastructure. When LNG tankers are not using these ports, the ports are not visible above the water. Figure 2 shows these facilities by type, number of each type from 2008 through 2010, and the applicable security regulation. All OCS facilities, as defined in this report, are located in the Gulf of Mexico. Among the four deepwater ports, the LOOP and one LNG deepwater port are located in the Gulf of Mexico and the other two LNG ports are located offshore in Massachusetts Bay near Boston. During the course of our review, the operator of the LNG deepwater port in the Gulf of Mexico notified the Coast Guard that it intended to decommission the facility. As a result, the rest of this report’s discussion of deepwater ports will focus on the remaining three deepwater ports. As the lead federal agency for maritime security, the Coast Guard has broad responsibilities for ensuring the security of OCS facilities and deepwater ports. For example, staff at Coast Guard headquarters oversee and develop policies and procedures for field staff to follow when conducting security inspections of offshore energy infrastructure and to assist affected owners and operators so that they can comply with maritime security regulations. Such policies and procedures offer guidance for (1) reviewing security plans produced by owners and operators of OCS facilities and (2) ensuring the security of OCS facilities. Among other things, Coast Guard marine inspectors in field units are to conduct security inspections of OCS facilities and deepwater ports by taking helicopter rides to facilities that can range up to 200 miles offshore. Once arriving, inspectors are to conduct on-site interviews with facility security officers and observe operations to verify whether required security measures are in place. As of August 2011, the Coast Guard had about 12 active marine inspectors who were qualified to conduct security inspections of OCS facilities. These inspectors work out of six field units near the Gulf of Mexico. After conducting security inspections of OCS facilities and deepwater ports, and in accordance with the guidance, inspectors are to record the results of these inspections in the MISLE database. Coast Guard marine inspectors are to record information such as any deficiencies that were identified and enforcement actions that were used to ensure compliance by the owners and operators. In addition to recording the results of offshore security inspections in MISLE, Coast Guard staff are to record other actions that are not related to offshore inspections, such as the results of search and rescue missions. Owners and operators of OCS facilities and deepwater ports have a shared responsibility with the Coast Guard to ensure the security of their offshore facilities and ports. For example, owners and operators of OCS facilities must carry out measures intended to improve the security in and around their facilities. These measures include designating a company security officer and a facility security officer for each OCS facility the company operates. Company and facility security officers have responsibilities that include reporting security incidents to the National Response Center, submitting facility security plans to the Coast Guard for approval, and ensuring their facilities comply with the security plans. Among other things, each facility security plan must address any vulnerabilities identified through a facility security assessment. Although not subject to the same security requirements as OCS facilities, owners and operators of deepwater ports must develop security plans comparable to those required for OCS facilities and that address, among other things, risk identification and procedures for detecting and deterring terrorist or subversive activity. The Coast Guard has taken actions to ensure the security of OCS facilities in the Gulf of Mexico, within which all OCS facilities are presently located. For example, within a greater maritime security preparedness program, it established an Area Maritime Security Committee for the Gulf of Mexico in 2004. An Area Maritime Security Committee is responsible for, among other things, identifying critical infrastructure and operations, identifying risks, and providing advice to the Coast Guard for developing the Area Maritime Security Plan. The Gulf of Mexico Area Maritime Security Committee covers a broad area that crosses jurisdictional boundaries of multiple Coast Guard field units. Among other things, the Gulf of Mexico committee has representatives from stakeholders, such as federal law enforcement, state emergency responders, and owners and operators of OCS facilities. The committee has taken actions to enhance information sharing among stakeholders by holding annual meetings and offering training to OCS facility security officers on the command structure for responding to a transportation security incident. One of the functions of the committee is to contribute to the development of an Area Maritime Security Plan, which is discussed in more detail below. The Coast Guard, in consultation with the Gulf of Mexico Area Maritime Security Committee and reliance on information in OCS facility security plans, has also developed an Area Maritime Security Plan specific to the offshore environment in the Gulf of Mexico. One of the primary objectives of the plan is to provide a framework for communication and coordination among stakeholders and law enforcement officials and to identify and reduce vulnerabilities to security threats in and near the marine transportation system in the Gulf of Mexico. For example, the plan specifies security measures to be taken at OCS facilities under certain security conditions. Furthermore, the plan discusses the broader security environment, including security measures at facilities and vessels that are not currently regulated with respect to security under part 106, which includes fixed transmission platforms or MODUs that do not exceed the production or personnel thresholds in part 106, and provides that the Coast Guard may consider requiring additional security measures for such facilities.