The purpose of this report is to examine three labor issues and arguments related to the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement (CFTA): violence against trade unionists; impunity (accountability for or punishment of the perpetrators); and worker rights protections for Colombians. For general issues relating to the CFTA, see CRS Report RL34470, The U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Background and Issues , by [author name scrubbed]. For background on Colombia and its political situation and context for the agreement, see CRS Report RL32250, Colombia: Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed]. Labor provisions in the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement result from a May 10, 2007, agreement between the Administration and Congress. Under those provisions in the Colombia Free Trade Agreement, (Article 17.2.1), each Party to the agreement shall "adopt and maintain in its statutes and regulations, and practices thereunder," five rights as stated in the International Labor Organization (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and R ights at Work and its Follow-Up (1998) : (a) freedom of association; (b) the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; (c) the elimination of all forms of compulsory or forced labor; (d) the effective abolition of child labor and for purposes of this Agreement, a prohibition on the worst forms of child labor; and (e) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. Opponents of the U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement argued against it on three points: (1) the high rate of violence (homicides, arbitrary detentions/kidnappings, and death threats) against trade unionists in Colombia; (2) the lack of adequate punishment for the perpetrators of that violence; and (3) weak Colombian enforcement of International Labor Organization (ILO) core labor principles, the Conventions behind them, and their own labor laws. Proponents of the agreement primarily argued for the Colombia FTA on the basis of economic and national security benefits. Trade typically benefits all parties to a trade agreement, as each country tends to specialize in exporting those goods which it can produce relatively more efficiently, and to import those which it produces relatively less efficiently than its trading partners. Accordingly, proponents argued, the CFTA will support increased exports, expand economic growth, create U.S. jobs, offer consumers a greater variety of goods and services at lower prices, and encourage economic development by attracting foreign investment and expanding output. They also argued that it will reinforce the rule of law, spread values of capitalism in Colombia, and anchor hemispheric stability. Proponents specifically respond to the above labor complaints that (1) homicides and kidnappings against trade unionists have declined dramatically since former President Álvaro Uribe took office in 2002; (2) substantial progress is being made on the impunity issue as the government has undertaken great efforts to find perpetrators and bring them to justice; and (3) the Colombian government is taking steps to improve conditions for workers. On April 7, 2011, the White House and the Government of Colombia, after weeks of negotiations released an "Action Plan Related to Labor Rights" as part of the Colombian government's "ongoing commitment" to prevent violence against labor leaders, prosecute the perpetrators of such violence, and protect internationally recognized worker rights. For details on this Action Plan, see CRS Report RL34470, The U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Background and Issues , by [author name scrubbed]. Colombia is one of the oldest democracies in Latin America, and has a bicameral legislature. Yet it has been plagued by an ongoing armed conflict for over 40 years. This violence has been aggravated by a lack of state control over much of Colombian territory—rugged terrain that has been hard to govern. In addition, a long history of poverty and inequality has left Colombia open to other influences, among them drug trafficking. Leftist guerrilla groups inspired by the Cuban Revolution formed in the 1960s as a response to state neglect and poverty. Right-wing paramilitaries formed in the 1980s to defend landowners, many of whom were drug traffickers, against guerrillas. The shift of coca production from Peru and Bolivia to Colombia in the 1980s increased drug violence and provided a new source of revenue for both guerrillas and paramilitaries. In 2002 Colombians elected an independent, Álvaro Uribe, as president (2002-2010), largely because of his aggressive plan to reduce violence in Colombia. He was succeeded by Jan Manuel Santos on August 7, 2010. Colombia is the United States' fourth-largest trading partner in Latin America (after Mexico, Brazil, and Venezuela). In 2010, it was the United States' 25 th largest import source ($16 billion in U.S. imports from Colombia) and its 20 th largest export destination worldwide ($12 billion in U.S. exports to Colombia). Machinery parts, oil, electrical machinery and organic chemicals constituted more than half (56%) of total U.S. exports to Colombia, and mineral fuels (primarily crude oil) accounted for 67% of all imports from Colombia. Given the relatively small level of trade between the United States and Colombia, (0.9% of all U.S. trade in 2010) the CFTA would, according to a U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC), likely have minimal to no effect on output or employment for most sectors of the U.S. economy, because, until recently, most Colombian products already entered the U.S. market free of duty under the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA). However, new U.S. investment in Colombia as a result of the agreement could support increased economic growth and employment and additional exports to the United States. U.S. proponents argued that the proposed CFTA would provide a number of economic benefits, including market access for U.S. consumer and industrial products; cooperation in the production of textiles and apparel; and new opportunities for U.S. farmers and ranchers. With regard to the projected small potential effect on U.S. jobs, the largest changes in U.S. output are projected for the cereal grains production sector (0.3%) and the sugar sector (-0.3%), with similar effects on employment. The largest changes in U.S. employment are projected to be in cereal grains (0.3%), sugar cane (-0.3%), and textiles (-0.3%). Opponents argued that new U.S. investment in Colombia as a result of the agreement could support increased economic growth and employment in Colombia and additional exports to the United States, given the relative wage difference. U.S. total monthly compensation costs in manufacturing for 2008 (most recent data) expressed in U.S. dollars, were roughly five times the level of such costs in Colombia—$5,060 for the United States and $984 for Colombia. Colombian proponents argued that the only Western Hemisphere "Pacific Rim" countries with which the United States did not have a free trade agreement were Colombia, Ecuador, and Panama. Now only Ecuador remains. The United States has FTAs with all others: besides Colombia and Panama, these are Canada, Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Peru, and Chile. U.S. proponents concerned that U.S. trade with Colombia could get diverted to other countries if the agreement were not approved, pointed out that Colombia's current regional trade agreement partners include the Andean Community, Chile, Mexico, Latin American countries, Canada, and four European countries (Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland). Colombia's official labor force is about 18.4 million, as compared with 154 million for the United States. Roughly 23% of Colombia's labor force is involved in the agricultural sector, 19% is involved in the manufacturing/industry sector, and 58% is employed in the service sector. Almost 60% of the workforce in Colombia is employed in the (largely unregulated, undocumented) informal sector. The unemployment rate in Colombia was roughly 12% in 2010. During most of the more than 40 years that Colombia has experienced internal armed conflict, membership and participation in labor unions has waned. Between 1959 and 1965, the unionization rate grew from 5.5% to 13.5%. Since 1966, the unionization rate has declined to 4.4% or 815,000 of the 18.4 million workforce. In 1999, roughly 1.36% of the labor force was covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Roughly 75 percent of the workforce in Colombia's ports is employed under flexible non-labor contracts and consequently not allowed to join unions or bargain collectively. A key issue in the debate on the CFTA is the long-term trend in homicides of Colombia's trade unionists as they try to express rights that are in concept protected in Colombia's laws. Three organizations track data on the number of trade unionists murdered each year: the Colombian government; the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), successor to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU); and the Escuela Nacional Sindical (ENS) or National Labor School, a non-governmental organization founded in 1982 in Colombia to provide "non-partisan and independent" information on human rights, labor, and the dynamics of association and collective bargaining. Figure 1 below tracks each of their data on the number of homicides of trade unionists in Colombia and worldwide between 1997 and 2009. It shows a wide year-to-year variation in the number of trade unionists murdered, but a primarily downward trend since 2001.