Many media reports in Israel, the United States, and elsewhere since late March 2012—and especially since August—have focused closely on apparent differences between the Netanyahu government in Israel and the Obama Administration on potential "red lines" for possible military action. After seemingly unsuccessful attempts by Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to persuade President Barack Obama to present Iran with a time-specific ultimatum (see " U.S. Concerns and Possible Responses: Possible Impact on Israeli Decisionmaking " below), prospects for future Israeli military action remain unclear. The complex array of information and views set forth in this section may help U.S. policymakers address relevant questions on this issue within the context of various regional and global economic, political, and security concerns. As with other parts of the report, this section has many elements that are the subject of vigorous debate and remain fully or partially outside public knowledge. CRS does not claim that it has confirmed independently any sources cited within this report that attribute specific positions or views to Israeli, U.S., or other officials. Israeli and international media reports have continued speculating that Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu may order an Israeli military attack on Iranian nuclear facilities in the coming months. The rationale for a possible strike is set forth in detail below (see " Possible "Zone of Immunity" and Israel's Ability to Act Independently "). This has enlivened an already vigorous public debate in Israel (as discussed below). A wide array of current and former leaders in Israel's political, military, and security establishments have either publicly expressed opposition or are reportedly opposed, not to an attack in principle, but to an attack without U.S. support given possible operational and political fallout. Seemingly heated private and public exchanges between the Obama Administration and Netanyahu government (discussed below) have occurred within the context of frequent consultations—including summer 2012 visits to Israel by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, and National Security Advisor Tom Donilon. In a September 27 speech before the United Nations General Assembly in which he stressed that the hour was getting "very late," Netanyahu said, "I believe that faced with a clear red line, Iran will back down. This will give more time for sanctions and diplomacy to convince Iran to dismantle its nuclear weapons program altogether." He asserted that otherwise, at current rates of uranium enrichment, Iran could reach the final stage of enrichment by the spring or summer of 2013. Netanyahu's remarks appear to have convinced several former Israeli officials and other international commentators that the timeline for a possible Israeli attack has been pushed back at least to early 2013. However, one Israeli journalist reportedly wrote, "If one takes his statements seriously, within a short time, months at most, if Iran is not deterred and if the US does not attack, Israel will launch an attack on its own." Speculation persists regarding a possible Israeli strike, even though—as discussed below (see " Effect on Iran's Nuclear Program ")—most Israeli officials and analysts agree that military action might only delay, not destroy, Iran's nuclear program. Other efforts—diplomacy, sanctions, reported covert action, even implied threats of military action by Israel or the United States—have not led Iran's regime either to stop expanding its uranium enrichment activities or to take steps toward assuring the international community that its nuclear program is confined to purely peaceful purposes. Israel is not a direct party to the P5+1 (see " Military Action Versus Alternative Courses of Action " below for a definition of this term) negotiations over Iran's nuclear program, where technical discussions that continued in the spring and summer of 2012 made no apparent progress. In August 2012, Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon called upon the international community to acknowledge that diplomacy had failed. In August 2012, Congress and the President enacted the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-158 ), an additional sanctions law aimed at Iran's oil exports. Most analysts agree that these sanctions, combined with preexisting U.S. and international sanctions (see " Military Action Versus Alternative Courses of Action " below), are significantly affecting Iran's economy, and reports indicate that Israeli officials may seek additional sanctions. The August 2012 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report on Iran's nuclear program reiterated concern over continued enrichment and evidence of possible military dimensions to the program. For more information on U.S. and international sanctions, diplomatic efforts, and their collective impact, as well as the August IAEA report, see CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses , by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions , by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report R40094, Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations , by [author name scrubbed]. Israeli concerns regarding a potential Iranian nuclear weapons capability may be exacerbated by reports that Iran has deliberately provided faulty information about its nuclear program to international monitors. This may further heighten Israeli and international concerns about the reliability and comprehensiveness of current information regarding the program and its progress. Media attention to deliberations among Netanyahu and the other members of the 14-member Israeli security cabinet (see " Decisionmakers: Views and Interactions " below) has intensified. A vote of approval from the security cabinet is necessary before ordering military action. A late August New York Times report indicated that of those within the security cabinet whose views are thought to be known, approximately six members are in favor of a strike, with three or four opposed. The implications for Israeli decisionmaking of press articles pointing to Israeli emphasis on home front safety and streamlined cabinet procedures reportedly giving Netanyahu greater control over the decisionmaking process are unclear. In August 2012, Netanyahu appointed Avi Dichter, a former head of the Israel Security Agency (also known as the Shin Bet), as Home Front Defense Minister after his predecessor was named ambassador to China. Reports indicate that Dichter—though not a member of the security cabinet—has joined the group of eight other ministers (previously known as the "octet," now known as the "group of nine") that has particularly significant influence over the national security decisionmaking process. Netanyahu disbanded security cabinet meetings earlier than planned during the first week of September, reportedly due to leaks of disagreements over when Iran would reach a "zone of immunity" (the term is described below—see " Possible "Zone of Immunity" and Israel's Ability to Act Independently "). If, when, and how Netanyahu might call a vote in the security cabinet and/or the full 29-member cabinet remains unclear. Another possible consideration for Netanyahu is that he will face national elections sometime in 2013; he has faced a drop in approval ratings in 2012—from over 50% in March to 31% in August. This drop may not fundamentally undermine Netanyahu's chances for another prime ministerial term in Israel's coalition-based parliamentary system. However, changing electoral prospects might affect his and other actors' decisionmaking on Iran. Polls continue to indicate that a majority of Israelis opposes a unilateral Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear facilities at this time, but that a slight majority would support a joint U.S.-Israel strike. Ehud Olmert, Israel's previous prime minister, who reportedly ordered Israel's 2007 strike on a presumed Syrian nuclear reactor, and whose political comeback prospects have been the subject of Israeli domestic speculation, was quoted as saying in September: Worse comes to worst, and all options have been tried, then, naturally it may force Israel to act to defend its existence. But it must be clear that we tried with the international community, and particularly with the United States, to act together before we resort to the last option of an Israeli military operation. Public debate in Israel continues to reflect disagreement over both the likelihood and the advisability of an attack. At least one analyst has asserted that Israeli leaders appear to be preparing the "Israeli home front, and international public opinion, for the inevitably messy aftermath of any such action." Other commentators—who note that Israeli leaders did not provide prior warning before military attacks in 1981 and 2007, respectively, against presumed Iraqi and Syrian nuclear reactors—have said that "all the loose talk of a brewing strike is a signal the warnings are little more than posturing." One journalist argued that Israel might strike Iran "just to prove that they're serious" to a largely skeptical world. Another journalist wrote that the key question "is whether Netanyahu sees the threat of Iran building a nuclear bomb as so severe that he is willing to risk severe friction with the United States, a severe blow to the Israeli economy, the possibility of a bloody regional war, and a hail of missiles from Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, and perhaps Syria hitting Israel." Israeli censorship rules reportedly limit public discussion of operational details of a possible Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. Nevertheless, sources that discuss potential military capabilities, options, and outcomes, such as a 2012 book by an Israeli military correspondent and an Israeli military historian, could shed some light on Israeli decisionmakers' calculations. U.S. and international sources have provided some additional information on this subject since late March 2012. A September report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) concluded that although an Israeli strike was possible, "it would be complex and high risk in the operational level and would lack any assurances of a high mission success rate." Furthermore, the report stated that Iranian retaliation will have "devastating regional consequences." Some other commentators have presented what they claim to be leaked information from U.S. or Israeli sources pertaining to possible operational details of potential Israeli military action.