Between 1948 and 1951, the United States undertook what many consider to be one of its more successful foreign policy initiatives and most effective foreign aid programs. The Marshall Plan (the Plan) and the European Recovery Program (ERP) that it generated involved an ambitious effort to stimulate economic growth in a despondent and nearly bankrupt post-World War II Europe, to prevent the spread of communism beyond the "iron curtain," and to encourage development of a healthy and stable world economy. It was designed to accomplish these goals by achieving three objectives: the expansion of European agricultural and industrial production; the restoration of sound currencies, budgets, and finances in individual European countries; and the stimulation of international trade among European countries and between Europe and the rest of the world. It is a measure of the positive impression enduring from the Economic Recovery Program that, ever since, in response to a critical situation faced by some regions of the world or some problem to be solved, there are periodic calls for a new Marshall Plan. In the 1990s, some Members of Congress recommended "Marshall Plans" for Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and the environment. Meanwhile, international statesmen suggested Marshall Plans for the Middle East and South Africa. In the 21 st century, there continue to be recommendations for Marshall Plan-like assistance programs—for refugees, urban infrastructure, Iraq, countries affected by the Ebola epidemic, the U.S.-Mexican border, Greece, and so on. Generally, these references to the memory of the Marshall Plan are summonses to replicate its success or its scale, rather than every, or any, detail of the original Plan. The replicability of the Marshall Plan in these diverse situations or in the future is subject to question. To understand the potential relevance to the present of an event that took place decades ago, it is necessary to understand what the Plan sought to achieve, how it was implemented, and its resulting success or failure. This report looks at each of these factors. The Marshall Plan was proposed in a speech by Secretary of State George Marshall at Harvard University on June 5, 1947, in response to the critical political, social, and economic conditions in which Europe found itself at that time. Recognizing the necessity of congressional participation in development of a significant assistance package, Marshall's speech did not present a detailed and concrete program. He merely suggested that the United States would be willing to help draft a program and would provide assistance "so far as it may be practical for us to do so." In addition, Marshall called for this assistance to be a joint effort, "initiated" and agreed by European nations. The formulation of the Marshall Plan, therefore, was, from the beginning, a work of collaboration between the Truman Administration and Congress, and between the U.S. Government and European governments. The crisis that generated the Plan and the legislative and diplomatic outcome of Marshall's proposal are discussed below. European conditions in 1947, as described by Secretary of State Marshall and other U.S. officials at the time, were dire. Although industrial production had, in many cases, returned to prewar levels (the exceptions were Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands), the economic situation overall appeared to be deteriorating. The recovery had been financed by drawing down on domestic stocks and foreign assets. Capital was increasingly unavailable for investment. Agricultural supplies remained below 1938 levels, and food imports were consuming a growing share of the limited foreign exchange. European nations were building up a growing dollar deficit. As a result, prospects for any future growth were low. Trade between European nations was stagnant. Having already endured years of food shortages, unemployment, and other hardships associated with the war and recovery, the European public was now faced with further suffering. To many observers, the declining economic conditions were generating a pessimism regarding Europe's future that fed class divisions and political instability. Communist parties, already large in major countries such as Italy and France, threatened to come to power. The potential impact on the United States was severalfold. For one, an end to European growth would block the prospect of any trade with the continent. One of the symptoms of Europe's malaise, in fact, was the massive dollar deficit that signaled its inability to pay for its imports from the United States. Perhaps the chief concern of the United States, however, was the growing threat of communism. Although the Cold War was still in its infancy, Soviet entrenchment in Eastern Europe was well under way. Already, early in 1947, the economic strain affecting Britain had driven it to announce its withdrawal of commitments in Greece and Turkey, forcing the United States to assume greater obligations to defend their security. The Truman Doctrine, enunciated in March 1947, stated that it was U.S. policy to provide support to nations threatened by communism. In brief, the specter of an economic collapse of Europe and a communist takeover of its political institutions threatened to uproot everything the United States claimed to strive for since its entry into World War II: a free Europe in an open-world economic system. U.S. leaders felt compelled to respond. Three main hurdles had to be overcome on the way to developing a useful response to Europe's problems. For one, as Secretary of State Marshall's invitation indicated, European nations, acting jointly, had to come to some agreement on a plan. Second, the Administration and Congress had to reach their own concordance on a legislative program. Finally, the resulting plan had to be one that, in Marshall's words, would "provide a cure rather than a mere palliative." Most European nations responded favorably to the initial Marshall proposal. Insisting on a role in designing the program, 16 nations attended a conference in Paris (July 12, 1947) at which they established the Committee of European Economic Cooperation (CEEC). The committee was directed to gather information on European requirements and existing resources to meet those needs. Its final report (September 1947) called for a four-year program to encourage production, create internal financial stability, develop economic cooperation among participating countries, and solve the deficit problem then existing with the American dollar zone. Although Europe's net balance of payments deficit with the dollar zone for the 1948-1951 period was originally estimated at roughly $29 billion, the report requested $19 billion in U.S. assistance (an additional $3 billion was expected to come from the World Bank and other sources). Cautious not to appear to isolate the Soviet Union at this stage in the still-developing Cold War, Marshall's invitation did not specifically exclude any European nation. Britain and France made sure to include the Soviets in an early three-power discussion of the proposal. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union and, under pressure, its satellites, refused to participate in a common recovery program on the grounds that the necessity to reveal national economic plans would infringe on national sovereignty and that the U.S. interest was only to increase its exports. CEEC formulation of its proposal was not without U.S. input. Its draft proposal had reflected the wide differences existing between individual nations in their approach to trade liberalization, the role of Germany, and state controls over national economies. As a result of these differences, the United States was afraid that the CEEC proposal would be little more than a shopping list of needs without any coherent program to generate long-term growth. To avoid such a situation, the State Department conditioned its acceptance of the European program on participants' agreement to 1. make specific commitments to fulfill production programs, 2. take immediate steps to create internal monetary and financial stability, 3. express greater determination to reduce trade barriers, 4. consider alternative sources of dollar credits, such as the World Bank, 5. give formal recognition to their common objectives and assume common responsibility for attaining them, and 6. establish an international organization to act as coordinating agency to implement the program. The final report of the CEEC contained these obligations. After the European countries had taken the required initiative and presented a formal plan, both the Administration and Congress responded. Formulation of that response had already begun soon after the Marshall speech. As a Democratic President facing a Republican-majority Congress with many Members highly skeptical of the need for further foreign assistance, Truman took a two-pronged approach that greatly facilitated development of a program: he opened his foreign policy initiative to perhaps the most thorough examination prior to launching of any program and, secondly, provided a perhaps equally rare process of close consultation between the executive and Congress. From the first, the Truman Administration made Congress a player in the development of the new foreign aid program, consulting with it throughout the process (see text box ). A meeting on June 22, 1947, between key congressional leaders and the President led to creation of the Harriman, Krug, and Nourse committees. Secretary of Commerce Averell Harriman's committee, composed of consultants from private industry, labor, economists, etc., looked at Europe's needs. Secretary of Interior Julius A. Krug's committee examined those U.S. physical resources available to support such a program. The group led by Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers Edwin G. Nourse studied the effect an enlarged export burden would have on U.S. domestic production and prices. The House of Representatives itself formed the Select Committee on Foreign Aid, led by Representative Christian A. Herter, to take a broad look at these issues. Before the Administration proposal could be submitted for consideration, the situation in some countries deteriorated so seriously that the President called for a special interim aid package to hold them over through the winter with food and fuel, until the more elaborate system anticipated by the Marshall Plan could be authorized. Congress approved interim aid to France, Italy, and Austria amounting to $522 million in an authorization signed by President Truman on December 17, 1947. West Germany, also in need, was still being assisted through the Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) program.