The authority of Congress to regulate the jurisdiction, procedures and remedies available infederal courts is principally found in Article III of the United States Constitution. Article III providesthat "[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in suchinferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." (6) Article III identifiesthe cases covered by this judicial power by two separate criteria -- the subject matter of particularcases or the identity of the litigants or persons affected. The subject matter of the federal judicialpower is quite broad, as it includes the power to consider "all" cases arising under either theConstitution, federal law or treaty, or arising from the admiralty or maritime jurisdiction. As noted,Article III also extends the federal judicial power to cases based on the types of parties affected orinvolved. These latter cases can be divided into two different groups. The first group includes "all" cases which affect an Ambassador or other public Ministers or Consuls, or which involve a controversy between two or more States. The second group includescases involving disputes between the United States and another party; a state and citizens of anotherState; citizens of different States; citizens of the same state claiming land under grants of differentstates; and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects. (7) Thecases in the first group, and any other cases where a State is a party, are to be heard directly by theSupreme Court under the Court's original jurisdiction. (8) The remaining cases in the second group,along with the Court's previously noted substantive authority, are heard under the Court's appellatejurisdiction. (9) It is important to note that the Court's appellate jurisdiction (unlike its original jurisdiction) is subject to "Exceptions, and under such Regulations" as Congress shall make. (10) It should also benoted, however, that the Constitution provides for jurisdiction in "all" cases under its substantivejurisdiction or under the first group of cases based on parties. As will be discussed later, this has ledsome commentators to suggest that while Congress has the power to limit the Supreme Court'sappellate jurisdiction, that at least some cases must be considered by some federal court, whether itbe the Supreme Court or an inferior court. The Supremacy Clause, found in Article VI, provides that the judges in every State are bound to follow the United States Constitution and applicable federal law. (11) The Congress does not appearto have the authority to establish state courts of competent jurisdiction. (12) However, once such statecourts exist, the Congress can endow them with concurrent power to consider certain casesconcerning federal law. When a state court has rendered a decision on an issue of federal law, anda final determination has been made by the highest court in that state, then that case may generallybe appealed to the Supreme Court. (13) Thus, statecourt cases can also fall under the Supreme Court'sappellate jurisdiction. The question arises, however, precisely how the "judicial power" should be allocated between the various courts, and what sort of limitations can be implemented on the combined court systemsby Congress. While there have been many proposals to vary federal court jurisdiction in order toaffect a particular judicial result, few have passed, and even fewer have been subjected to scrutinyby the courts. Further, those laws that did pass varied from modern proposals. Thus, the answer tothese complex questions must be ascertained by reference to constitutional text, historical practice,a limited set of case law, and scholarly commentary. Federal district courts and courts of appeal (the inferior federal courts) are authorized to consider most questions of federal statutory and constitutional law, with appeal to the SupremeCourt. In general, most modern "court-stripping" proposals appear to be intended to increase statecourt involvement in constitutional cases by decreasing federal court involvement. There are at leastthree possible variations to these proposals. (14) First, there are proposals which, by limiting inferiorfederal court jurisdiction, would, in effect, cause a particular class of constitutional decisions to beheard in state courts, with appeal to the Supreme Court. (15) Second, there are proposals to vest theexclusive jurisdiction to hear such constitutional cases in the state courts without appeal to theSupreme Court. (16) Third, the Congress might actto exclude any judicial review over a particular classof constitutional cases from any court, whether state or federal. It should be noted that there are also proposals, not examined in depth here, that would limit the methods available to the various courts to remedy constitutional injury. (17) To the extent that theseremedy limitations actually prevent the vindication of established constitutional injury, they wouldappear to fall under the same category as proposals that limit the jurisdiction of particular courts.Thus, for instance, the amendment noted above which would prohibit the use of funds forenforcement of a particular district court decision, (18) would seem likely to be analyzed similarly toan amendment limiting lower court jurisdiction over constitutional cases. However, in situationswhere other sufficient remedies are left unchanged, a court might determine that the constitutionalright could be effectuated despite limits on a particular remedy. (19) As noted previously, the Congress considers and passes many laws that are exercises of itscontrol over judicial power under Article III. There appears, however, to be no direct legislativeprecedent for the types of "court-stripping" proposals noted above. While federal court jurisdictionor remedies have occasionally been varied by Congress to affect a particular judicial result, theassociated case law is of only limited applicability to the modern proposals. Thus, an analysis ofthese proposals will principally concern a textual analysis of the extent and limit of Congress'spower under Article III, a scholarly discussion on that subject, and related case law. It should be noted, however, that various commentators have suggested that the constitutional problems with "court-stripping" provisions are more fundamental than an analysis of Congress'Article III powers. (20) The most significant issueis whether Congress, by attempting to changeconstitutional law by statute rather than constitutional amendment, is in violation of the doctrine ofseparation of powers. Further, when specific constitutional rights are singled out for disparatetreatment, a question arises as to whether that class of litigants is being treated in a mannerinconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause. Ultimately, an evaluation of a particular piece of"court-stripping" legislation may vary depending on what jurisdiction, remedies or procedures areaffected, and what ultimate impact this is likely to have on the specified constitutional rights. The argument has been made that because the Congress has the authority to decide whether or not to create inferior federal courts, it also has authority to determine which issues these courts mayconsider. There appears to be significant historical support for this position. While the establishmentof a federal Supreme Court was agreed upon early in the Constitutional Convention, theestablishment of inferior federal courts was not a foregone conclusion. At one point, it was proposedthat the Convention eliminate a provision establishing such inferior courts. This proposal wouldhave had state tribunals consider most federal cases, while providing Supreme Court review in orderto enforce national rights and ensure uniformity of judgments. (21) James Madison opposed the motion to eliminate lower federal courts, arguing that such a decentralized system would result in an oppressive number of appeals, and would subject federal lawto the local biases of state judges. A compromise resolution, proposed by Madison and others, wasagreed to, whereby the Congress would be allowed, but not compelled, to create courts inferior tothe Supreme Court. The new plan, referred to as the "Madisonian Compromise," was ultimatelyadopted. Thus, Article III provides that Congress has the power to create courts inferior to theSupreme Court, but that it need not exercise it. Once the Congress has agreed to the creation of inferior courts, however, the question then arises as to whether the Congress must grant these courts the full extent of the jurisdictioncontemplated by Article III. Some commentators have argued that the very nature of the MadisonianCompromise described above plainly allowed the establishment of federal courts with something lessthan the full judicial power available under Article III. (22) An 1816 decision by Justice Story, Martinv. Hunter's Lessee, (23) however, suggestedthat the Constitution requires that if inferior courts areestablished, there are some aspects of the judicial power which the Congress may not abrogate. Forinstance, Justice Story argued that the Congress would need to vest inferior courts with jurisdictionto hear cases that are not amenable to state court jurisdiction. (24) Thus, arguably, a constitutional issuewhich arose under a law within the exclusive federal jurisdiction (25) would need to be decided by afederal court. There is significant historical precedent, however, for the proposition that there is no requirement that all jurisdiction that could be vested in the federal courts should be so vested. Forinstance, the First Judiciary Act implemented under the Constitution, the Judiciary Act of 1789, isconsidered to be an indicator of the original understanding of the Article III powers. That act,however, falls short of having implemented all of the "judicial powers" which were specified underArticle III. For instance, the act did not provide jurisdiction for the inferior federal courts to considercases arising under federal law or the Constitution. Although the Supreme Court's appellatejurisdiction did extend to such cases when they originated in state courts, its review was limited towhere a claimed statutory or constitutional right had been denied by the court below. (26) There is also Supreme Court precedent that holds that the Congress need not vest the lower courts with all jurisdiction authorized by Article III. In Sheldon v. Sill , (27) the Court was asked toevaluate whether the Congress need grant a federal circuit court jurisdiction in a case where diversity(jurisdiction based on parties being from different states) had been manufactured by assignment ofa mortgage to a person in another state.