The September 11 attacks illustrated the vulnerabilities in the visa process when it became known that all 19 of the terrorist hijackers had been issued visas to enter the United States. Before the attacks, the State Department’s visa operations focused primarily on screening applicants to determine whether they intended to work or reside illegally in the United States. In deciding on who should receive a visa, consular officers relied on the State Department’s consular “lookout” system, a name check system that incorporates information from many agencies, as the primary basis for identifying potential terrorists. Consular officers were encouraged to facilitate legitimate travel and, at some posts we visited, faced pressure to issue visas. The State Department gave overseas consular sections substantial discretion in determining the level of scrutiny applied to visa applications and encouraged streamlined procedures to provide customer service and deal with a large workload. As a result, according to State Department officials and documents, consular sections worldwide adopted practices that reduced the review time for visa applications. For example, some posts decided not to interview applicants who appeared likely to return to their country at the end of their allotted time in the United States. Since the terrorist attacks, the U.S. government has introduced some changes to strengthen the visa process. For example, the State Department has, with the help of other agencies, almost doubled the number of names and the amount of information in the lookout system. Further, the Department began seeking new or additional interagency clearances on selected applicants to screen out terrorists, although these checks were not always completed by other U.S. agencies in a thorough or timely manner. We also observed that consular officers at some of the posts we visited were spending more time reviewing visa applications and interviewing applicants; they were able to do so, at least temporarily, because the number of visa applications decreased dramatically after September 11. While these actions have strengthened the visa process, our work in 2002 showed that there were widely divergent practices and procedures among and within overseas posts regarding (1) the authority of consular officers to deny questionable applicants a visa, (2) the role of the visa process in ensuring national security, and (3) the types of changes in posts’ visa policies and procedures that are appropriate given the need for heightened border security. Also, the Departments of State and Justice disagreed on the evidence needed to deny a visa on terrorism grounds. Most consular officers at the posts we visited stated that more comprehensive guidance and training would help them use the visa process as an antiterrorism tool to detect questionable applicants. In July 2002, the Secretary of State acknowledged that the visa process needed to be strengthened and indicated that the State Department is working to identify areas for improvement. In addition, the State Department has stressed that it must have the best interagency information available on persons who are potential security risks in order to make good visa decisions. The additional data received from the intelligence and law enforcement community has increased State’s access to information for use in the visa adjudication process. In addition, State indicated that it will work with Homeland Security to establish the systems and procedures that will ensure seamless sharing of information in the future. We also found that human capital limitations are a concern, as some consular sections may need more staff if the number of visa applicants returns to pre-September 11 levels or if State continues to institute new security checks for visa applicants. At some posts the demand for visas combined with increased workload per visa applicant still exceeded available staff, as evidenced by the waiting time for a visa appointment and in overtime of consular staff. Moreover, several posts we visited reported that they could manage their existing workload with current staffing but would need more staff if they faced an increase in either security clearance procedures or visa applications. In our October 2002 report, we concluded that the visa process could be an important tool to keep potential terrorists from entering the United States but that weaknesses limited its effectiveness as an antiterrorism tool. The State Department needed to improve implementation of the visa process to increase its effectiveness and consistency among posts. To strengthen the visa process as an antiterrorism tool, we recommended that the Secretary of State, in consultation with appropriate agencies, establish clear policy on addressing national security concerns through the visa process that is balanced with the desire to facilitate legitimate travel, provide timely customer service, and manage workloads; develop comprehensive, risk-based guidelines and standards on how consular affairs should use the visa process as a screen against potential terrorists; reassess staffing for visa operations in light of the current and anticipated number of visa applications and, if appropriate, request additional human resources to ensure that consular sections have adequate staff with necessary skills; and provide consular training courses to improve interview techniques, recognize fraudulent documents, understand terrorism trends, and better use the name check system. To address visa issues requiring coordination and actions across several agencies, we recommended that the Department of Homeland Security coordinate with appropriate agencies to establish governmentwide guidelines on the level of evidence needed to deny a visa on terrorism grounds under provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act; reassess interagency headquarters’ security checks on visa applicants to verify that all the checks are necessary and promptly conducted, and provide clear guidance to overseas posts and headquarters agencies on their roles in conducting these checks; consider reassessing, on an interagency basis, visas issued before the implementation of the new security checks; reexamine visa operations on a regular basis to ensure that the operations effectively contribute to the overall national strategy for ensure that law enforcement and intelligence agencies promptly provide information to the State Department on persons who may pose a security risk and, therefore, should not receive visas. In its response to our recommendations, the Department of State noted that it has acted on or is currently acting on some of the issues we reported and continues to reexamine its visa process. Moreover, in January 2003, the Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs reported that State plans to use our recommendations as a roadmap for improvements within the Bureau of Consular Affairs and in consular sections around the world. State has also indicated that it is currently undertaking a number of initiatives to review visa policies, staffing, and training needs. Furthermore, State said it is looking at refining various screening programs and will coordinate with other agencies to reassess interagency headquarters’ security checks. In our recent work on visa revocations, we again found weaknesses caused by the lack of comprehensive policies and coordination between agencies. The visa revocation process can be an important tool to prevent potential terrorists from entering the United States. Ideally, information on suspected terrorists would reach the Department of State before it decides to issue a visa; however, there will always be some cases in which the information arrives after the visa has been issued. Revoking a visa can mitigate this problem, but only if State notifies the appropriate agencies and if those agencies take appropriate actions to deny entry or investigate persons with a revoked visa. In our June 2003 report, we identified the policies and procedures of several agencies that govern the visa revocation process and determined the effectiveness of the process. We focused on all 240 visas that State revoked for terrorism concerns from September 11, 2001, to December 31, 2002. Our analysis indicated that the U.S. government has no specific written policy on the use of visa revocations as an antiterrorism tool and no written procedures to guide State in notifying relevant agencies of visas that have been revoked on terrorism grounds. State and INS have written procedures that guide some types of visa revocations; however, neither they nor the FBI has written internal procedures for notifying appropriate personnel to take action on visas revoked by the State Department. State and INS officials could articulate their informal policies and procedures for how and what purpose their agencies have used the process to keep terrorists out of the United States, but neither they nor FBI officials had specific policies or procedures that covered investigating, locating, or taking appropriate action in cases where the visa holder had already entered the country. The lack of formal, written policies and procedures may have contributed to systemic weaknesses in the visa revocation process that increase the probability of a suspected terrorist entering or remaining in the United States. At the time of visa revocation, State should notify its consular officers at overseas posts, the Department of Homeland Security, and the FBI. State would have to provide notice of revocation, along with supporting evidence to the appropriate units within Homeland Security and the FBI, which would allow them to take appropriate action. In our review of the 240 visa revocations, we found that (1) appropriate units within INS and the FBI did not always receive timely notification of the revocations; (2) lookouts were not consistently posted to the agencies’ watch lists; (3) 30 individuals whose visas were revoked on terrorism grounds entered the United States and may still remain in the country; (4) INS investigators were not usually notified of individuals with revoked visas who had entered the United States and therefore did not open investigations on them; and (5) the FBI did not investigate individuals with revoked visas unless these individuals were also in TIPOFF. For instance: In a number of cases, notification between State and the appropriate units within INS did not take place or was not completed in a timely manner. For example, INS officials said they did not receive any notice of the revocations from State in 43 of the 240 cases. In another 47 cases, the INS Lookout Unit received the revocation notice only via a cable, which took, on average, 12 days to reach the Unit. In cases in which the INS Lookout Unit had received notification, it generally posted information on these revocations in its lookout database within 1 day of receiving the notice. In cases where it was not notified, it could not post information on these individuals in its lookout database, which precluded INS inspectors at ports of entry from knowing that these individuals had had their visas revoked. Moreover, the State Department neglected to enter the revocation action for 64 of the 240 cases into its own watch list. GAO’s analysis of INS arrival and departure data indicates that 29 individuals entered the United States before their visas were revoked and may still remain in the country.