Although the IED was not a new threat when first encountered during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, according to DOD officials, U.S. forces were not initially concerned with the IED as a “weapon of choice” until IED attacks began to increase in Iraq at the end of major combat operations. Terrorist and insurgent groups facing overwhelming conventional forces had previously used IEDs in a variety of scenarios, including the 1983 Marine barracks bombing in Beirut, the ship-borne attack against the USS Cole in 1999, and the airborne attacks of September 11th, 2001. In a 2006 report examining the requirements for truck armor, we stated that the Army had previously identified the IED as a threat to U.S. forces prior to the beginning of operations in Iraq. Following the end of major combat in 2003 in Iraq, insurgents began to rapidly adjust their tactics due to the overwhelming firepower and accuracy of U.S. and coalition military forces in conventional warfare. As U.S. forces began to respond to this asymmetric threat, a new tactic emerged as the preferred enemy form of fire, the IED. Beginning in June 2003, IED incidents targeting coalition forces began to escalate from 22 per month to over 600 per month in June 2004. In June 2006, these incidents reached more than 2,000 per month. At one point in 2006, coalition forces in Iraq were experiencing almost 100 IEDs per day. The initial IED attacks in Iraq used nonconventional tactics, techniques, and procedures with a magnitude U.S. forces had not seen before. This threat involved an enemy that takes advantage of and adapts to the environment and is not restricted by conventional rules of engagement. For example, insurgents began using tactics such as buried or camouflaged roadside bombs, vehicle-borne IEDs (car bombs), and suicide bombers to attack coalition forces. Not only was the enemy flexible, but these insurgents also had the ability to rapidly respond to countermeasures. Due to the magnitude and previously mentioned changes made by the enemy in its tactics, techniques, and procedures, several counter-IED gaps related to the IED threat were identified by DOD: technology gaps—shortage of jammers, robots, and other technology, almost none of which were geared towards homemade roadside bombs, personnel gaps—lack of qualified personnel to analyze the threat and collect and distribute information on intelligence, forensic evidence, latest tactics, techniques, procedures, and other data, training gaps—training on latest tactics, techniques, and procedures not available, equipment often supplied without training or instructions, and jammers interfered with communications equipment, funding gaps—little to no dedicated funding for counter-IED efforts, and DOD acquisition process gaps—no process for rapidly developing and fielding new equipment. DOD’s efforts to address counter-IED gaps culminated in the creation of JIEDDO. Initially, many different DOD entities began focusing on counter- IED issues in an effort to address capability gaps. JIEDDO emerged through a series of attempts to focus counter-IED efforts, but its development did not follow a formal process. In recognition of the lack of official guidance for planning joint activities, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is developing a formal process for establishing future joint organizations. Despite steps taken to focus DOD’s counter-IED efforts, most of the organizations engaged in the IED defeat effort prior to JIEDDO continue to develop, maintain, and in many cases expand their own IED defeat capabilities. As IED attacks in Iraq reached nearly 300 per month by October 2003 and over 400 per month by May 2004, many different DOD entities at the service and joint levels began focusing on addressing capability gaps in the areas of counter-IED technologies, qualified personnel with expertise in counter-IED tactics, training, dedicated funding, and expedited acquisition processes. Many of these efforts were carried out by the Army and Marine Corps, in addition to a number of joint and interagency efforts. Army officials stated that within the Army, individual units throughout Iraq began to focus on counter-IED efforts as IED incidents increased in Iraq. Army units developed their own counter-IED tactics, techniques, and procedures as insurgent tactics evolved, and soldiers began using an increasingly wide range of electronic jammers in varying configurations to counter remote-detonated IEDs. According to Army officials, the Army also employed Explosive Ordnance Disposal technicians to disable and dispose of suspected IEDs. Army officials stated that these personnel began relying on remote-controlled robots as the number of IED incidents and the level of complexity of the devices increased, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal technicians were initially among the few personnel with counterexplosives training in-theater. To support these initial efforts, according to Army officials, the Army relied on the Rapid Equipping Force to quickly acquire counter-IED technology such as jammers and robots. This organization was established in 2002 to identify and pursue off-the- shelf or near-term materiel solutions that could be acquired and fielded quickly without having to rely on the Army’s normally lengthy acquisition processes, Army officials stated. The Operational Needs Statement, a process that enables commanders to request a materiel solution for an urgent need, was another method of rapidly acquiring technology solutions. Marine Corps officials stated that initial Marine Corps counter-IED efforts were centered on the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, which was responsible for managing materiel requests, known as Universal Needs Statements, from deployed personnel. This organization began to receive a larger number of counter-IED-related requests as the IED threat escalated, according to Marine Corps officials, increasing from 2 in 2002 to 8 in 2003, and 26 in 2004. Overall, 13 percent of all requests during this 3-year period were counter-IED-related. According to Marine Corps officials, in response, the organization established a counter-IED cell in 2004 to focus exclusively on counter-IED-related requests. The cell was later transferred to the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, and expanded to include personnel with more specialized technical expertise. Marine Corps officials stated that the Urgent Universal Needs Statement was developed during this period as a means of providing commanders with an expedited process for requesting critically needed capabilities, including counter-IED solutions. Through this process, Marine Corps officials stated that they have been able to develop and field equipment in a significantly shorter time frame than the normal acquisition processes, sometimes within several weeks. At the joint and interagency level, a variety of organizations were engaged in intelligence support and counter-IED technology acquisition. Early joint efforts included the Combined Explosives Exploitation Cell, which was established by the Army in 2003 to perform physical, biometric, and tactical exploitation of evidence from IED attack scenes. Staffed by a combination of Army, law enforcement, and intelligence personnel, the organization provided Army, Marines, and Special Forces units with in- theater analyses of IED construction techniques and enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures, and also collected biometric data, such as fingerprints, in an effort to identify specific bomb makers. While the organization often collected evidence from IED attack scenes itself, it also collaborated with Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams and drew on data provided by these teams in their analyses. Since 2004, the Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division has served as the administrative sponsor and primary source of technical and engineering support for the organization. According to an Army official, the Technical Support Working Group was involved in developing counter-IED technology solutions as part of the Combating Terrorism Directorate of the Joint Staff Operations Center, which in turn was responsible for counter-terrorism force protection efforts, including counter-IED efforts. The Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center was established in 2003 to leverage law enforcement, the intelligence community, and military capabilities to perform technical and forensic analyses on recovered IED components in the United States and provide actionable intelligence to field personnel. Army officials told us that, in contrast to the Combined Explosives Exploitation Cell, it focused on higher-level strategic issues rather than tactical ones, and included personnel from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, DOD, and the intelligence community. Army and Marine Corps officials stated that communication and cooperation among these various efforts lacked overall coordination, with multiple entities independently engaged in attempts to address various facets of the larger IED problem. Although the Army had direct experience with IEDs due to its presence in Iraq, according to an Army official, it had no single coordinator for even its own IED defeat efforts. For example, Army officials stated that coordination of counter-IED efforts between Army units occurred in-theater at the working level as personnel facing similar enemy tactics exchanged successful tactics, techniques, and procedures, but little synchronization of Army-wide efforts was occurring. Army and Marine Corps officials stated that some coordination between the Army and the Marine Corps took place, for example, on the use of the different electronic jamming systems used by each service, but communication was carried out on an ad hoc basis and generally occurred only in Iraq as commanders from both services attempted to overcome IED-related threats. At the interagency level, counterterrorism force protection efforts, including the Technical Support Working Group, were coordinated by the Combating Terrorism Directorate of the Joint Staff Operations Center. However, an Army official stated that this organization was left with limited capabilities by 2003 as many of its resources had been reallocated to the Department of Homeland Security after the attacks of September 11, 2001. As IED attacks increased following the invasion of Iraq, JIEDDO evolved through a series of attempts to focus counter-IED efforts. Figure 1 illustrates JIEDDO’s evolution as the IED threat increased from 2003 to 2007.