This report provides Congress with official, unclassified, background data from U.S. government sources on transfers of conventional arms to developing nations by major suppliers for the period 2003 through 2010. It also includes some data on worldwide supplier transactions. It updates and revises CRS Report R41403, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2002-2009 , by [author name scrubbed]. Data in this report provide a means for Congress to identify existing supplier-purchaser relationships in conventional weapons acquisitions. Use of these data can assist Congress in its oversight role of assessing whether the current nature of the international weapons trade affects U.S. national interests. For most of recent American history, maintaining regional stability and ensuring the security of U.S. allies and friendly nations throughout the world have been important elements of U.S. foreign policy. Knowing the extent to which individual arms suppliers are transferring arms to individual nations or regions provides Congress with a context for evaluating policy questions it may confront. Such policy questions may include, for example, whether or not to support specific U.S. arms sales to given countries or regions or to support or oppose such arms transfers by other nations. The data in this report may also assist Congress in evaluating whether multilateral arms control arrangements or other U.S. foreign policy initiatives are being supported or undermined by the actions of arms suppliers. The principal focus of this report is the level of arms transfers by major weapons suppliers to nations in the developing world—where most of the potential for the outbreak of regional military conflicts currently exists, and where the greatest proportion of the conventional arms trade is conducted. For decades, during the height of the Cold War, providing conventional weapons to friendly states was an instrument of foreign policy utilized by the United States and its allies. This was equally true for the Soviet Union and its allies. The underlying rationale for U.S. arms transfer policy then was to help ensure that friendly states were not placed at risk through a military disadvantage created by arms transfers by the Soviet Union or its allies. Following the Cold War's end, U.S. arms transfer policy has been based on assisting friendly and allied nations in maintaining their ability to deal with regional security threats and concerns. Data in this report illustrate how global patterns of conventional arms transfers have changed in the post-Cold War and post-Persian Gulf War years. Relationships between arms suppliers and recipients continue to evolve in the 21 st century in response to changing political, military, and economic circumstances. Whereas the principal motivation for arms sales by key foreign suppliers in earlier years might have been to support a foreign policy objective, today that motivation may be based as much, if not more, on economic considerations as those of foreign or national security policy. Nations in the developing world continue to be the primary focus of foreign arms sales activity by conventional weapons suppliers. During the period of this report, 2003-2010, conventional arms transfer agreements (which represent orders for future delivery) to developing nations comprised 69.6% of the value of all international arms transfer agreements . The portion of agreements with developing countries constituted 78.9% of all agreements globally from 2007-2010. In 2010 arms transfer agreements with developing countries accounted for 76.2% of the value of all such agreements globally. Deliveries of conventional arms to developing nations, from 2007 to 2010 constituted 55.9% of all international arms deliveries. In 2010, arms deliveries to developing nations constituted 62.6% of the value of all such arms deliveries worldwide. The data in this new report supersede all data published in previous editions. Since these new data for 2003-2010 reflect potentially significant updates to and revisions of the underlying databases utilized for this report, only the data in this most recent edition should be used. The data are expressed in U.S. dollars for the calendar years indicated, and adjusted for inflation (see box note on page 3). U.S. commercially licensed arms export delivery values are excluded (see box note on page 18). Also excluded are arms transfers by any supplier to subnational groups. The definition of developing nations, as used in this report, and the specific classes of items included in its values totals are found in box notes below on page 2. The report's table of contents provides a detailed listing and description of the various data tables to guide the reader to specific items of interest. The value of all arms transfer agreements worldwide (to both developed and developing nations) in 2010 was $40.4 billion. This was a substantial decrease in arms agreements values over 2009 of 38.1%, and the lowest worldwide arms agreements total since 2003 ( Figure 1 ) ( Table 31 ). In 2010, the United States led in arms transfer agreements worldwide, making agreements valued at $21.3 billion (52.7% of all such agreements), a decline from $22.6 billion in 2009. Russia ranked second with $7.8 billion in agreements (19.3% of these agreements globally), down from $12.8 billion in 2009. The United States and Russia collectively made agreements in 2010 valued at over $29 billion, 72% of all international arms transfer agreements made by all suppliers ( Figure 1 ) ( Table 31 , Table 32 , and Table 34 ). For the period 2007-2010, the total value of all international arms transfer agreements ($239.7 billion) was higher than the worldwide value during 2003-2006 ($203.2 billion), an increase of 15.2%. During the period 2003-2006, developing world nations accounted for 63.4% of the value of all arms transfer agreements made worldwide. During 2007-2010, developing world nations accounted for 78.9% of all arms transfer agreements made globally. In 2010, developing nations accounted for 76.2% of all arms transfer agreements made worldwide ( Figure 1 ) ( Table 31 ). In 2010, the United States ranked first in the value of all arms deliveries worldwide, making nearly $12.2 billion in such deliveries or 34.8%. This is the eighth year in a row that the United States has led in global arms deliveries. Russia ranked second in worldwide arms deliveries in 2010, making $5.2 billion in such deliveries. Germany ranked third in 2010, making $2.6 billion in such deliveries. These top three suppliers of arms in 2010 collectively delivered nearly $20 billion, 57.1% of all arms delivered worldwide by all suppliers in that year ( Table 2 ) ( Table 36 , Table 37 , and Table 39 ). The value of all international arms deliveries in 2010 was nearly $35 billion. This is a decrease in the total value of arms deliveries from the previous year (a decline from $38 billion). The total value of such arms deliveries worldwide in 2007-2010 (about $148 billion) was lower than the deliveries worldwide from 2003 to 2006 (about $156.6 billion, a decline of $8.6 billion) ( Table 2 ) ( Table 36 and Table 37 ) ( Figure 7 and Figure 8 ). Developing nations from 2007 to 2010 accounted for 55.9% of the value of all international arms deliveries. In the earlier period, 2003-2006, developing nations accounted for 66.2% of the value of all arms deliveries worldwide. In 2010, developing nations collectively accounted for 62.6% of the value of all international arms deliveries ( Table 2 ) ( Table 15 , Table 36 , and Table 37 ). Worldwide weapons orders fell in 2010. The total of $40.4 billion was a significant decline from $65.2 billion in 2009, or 38.1%. While the United States' worldwide weapons agreements values decreased slightly in value from $22.6 billion in 2009 to $21.3 billion in 2010, its market share nonetheless increased significantly, from 34.7% in 2009 to 52.7% in 2010. Thus, while the demand for new weapons orders decreased substantially from 2009 to 2010, the United States retained its position as the leading arms supplying nation in the world. Meanwhile, Russia posted a significant decline in its global arms agreements values, falling from $12.8 billion in 2009 to $7.8 billion in 2010. But Russia experienced only a nominal decline in its market share of worldwide agreements, falling from 19.6% in 2009 to 19.3% in 2010. The collective market share of worldwide arms agreements for the four major West European suppliers—France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy—fell significantly from 26.2% in 2009 to 11.4% in 2010. Worldwide weapons sales declined generally in 2010 in response to the constraints created by the tenuous state of the global economy. In view of budget difficulties faced by many purchasing nations, they chose to defer or limit the purchase of new major weapons systems. Some nations chose to limit their buying to upgrades of existing systems or to training and support services. Others decided to emphasize the integration into their force structures of the major weapons systems they had previously purchased. That said, orders for weapons upgrades and support services can still be rather lucrative, and such sales can provide weapons suppliers with continued revenue, despite the reduction in demand for major weapons systems. Nonetheless, the international recession has clearly had a negative effect on the arms marketplace. As new arms sales have become more difficult to conclude since the global recession began, competition among sellers has become increasingly intense. A number of weapons-exporting nations are focusing not only on the clients with whom they have held historic competitive advantages, due to well-established military-support relationships, but also on potential new clients in countries and regions where they have not been traditional arms suppliers. With the market for weapons declining, at least in the short term, arms suppliers face the challenge of providing weapons in type and price that can provide them with a competitive edge. A key obstacle arms suppliers face in selling to developing countries is the limited budgets several of these nations have for defense procurement. As a result, arms suppliers have increasingly utilized flexible financing options, and guarantees of counter-trade, co-production, and co-assembly elements in their contracts to secure new orders.