Afghanistan is a very poor and underdeveloped country that has suffered from instability and war for three decades. The United States and its allies removed the ruling Taliban regime following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. The new Afghan government inherited a country with limited capacity to govern and a poorly developed infrastructure. About 70 percent of the population is illiterate. According to Transparency International, Afghanistan is the world’s fifth most corrupt country. Its police do not respect human rights, according to the Fund for Peace. The MOI and ANP have a history of corruption, and much of Afghanistan lacks a functioning judicial sector. The United States and other international partners agreed in 2006 to establish a professional Afghan police service committed to the rule of law, shortly after the United States assumed the lead in reforming the MOI and ANP. U.S. goals for the MOI include ensuring that it is competent and efficient, provides strong and effective leadership, and has the organizational structures needed to reform, manage, and sustain the police. U.S. goals for the ANP include ensuring that it is fully constituted, professional, and functional; trained and equipped to uphold the rule of law; and able to effectively meet Afghan security needs, including controlling movement across Afghanistan’s borders. In 2006, the United States, Afghanistan, and other international partners outlined goals for the ANP in the Afghanistan Compact. The stated goals of the compact include the establishment of, by the end of 2010, a professional and functional ANP that can meet the security needs of the country effectively and be increasingly fiscally sustainable. The United States views an effective Afghan police force as critical to extending rule of law in Afghanistan and improving Afghan security. U.S. efforts to help Afghanistan reform the MOI and ANP are directed by Defense through CSTC-A, which is also charged with training the Afghan National Army. State provides policy guidance for CSTC-A’s police program and oversees civilian contractors to implement police training. To date, the United States has provided about $6.2 billion to train and equip the ANP. To achieve U.S. goals, CSTC-A has set objectives for institutional, organizational, and individual reform: Institutional reform is intended to ensure that MOI is run by a professional and adequately trained staff that can manage and sustain a national police force. Organizational reform is aimed at ensuring ANP units have sufficient capacity to maintain domestic order and are responsive to the local population’s needs. Individual reform seeks to ensure that the MOI and ANP consist of trained, competent, and credible individuals dedicated to public service who are accountable and transparent in their actions. The United States works with several international partners in supporting reform, including the following organizations: The European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) is intended to bring together European national efforts to support police reform in Afghanistan. LOTFA was established by the United Nations Development Program in May 2002 and provides funds for ANP salaries. As of November 2008, LOTFA had received about $653.4 million from 20 international donors, including the United States. UNAMA assists in leading international efforts to rebuild the country. The MOI and ANP have a total authorized force level of about 82,000. The ANP consists of six components. As shown in figure 2, the largest of these is the Afghan Uniformed Police, which serve as local police and perform routine policing duties in Afghanistan’s 365 police districts. These districts are organized into five regional zones (North, East, West, South, and Central) and a sixth zone for the capital city of Kabul. According to State and Defense, the zone commanders report to the Chief of the Afghan Uniformed Police, who reports to the Deputy Minister of Interior for Security. (See apps. II and III for further information on the structure of the MOI and ANP.) Ministry of Interior Headquarters (5,943) Afghan Border Police (17,676) Afghan Uniformed Police (44,801) Afghan police and other security forces are facing increasing attacks by insurgent forces. As shown in figure 3, attacks on Afghan security forces (including the ANP and the Afghan National Army) increased sixfold from October 2003 to October 2008, according to DOD. The number of attacks rose nearly threefold in 1 year, from 97 attacks in October 2007 to 289 in October 2008. The ANP has suffered significant casualties in recent years. According to Defense, at least 3,400 police have been wounded or killed in action since January 2007. In June 2008, a Defense official testified that ANP combat losses during 2007 were roughly three times more than those of the Afghan National Army. Defense data indicate that the ANP suffered between 19 and 101 fatalities per month over a recent 23-month period (see fig. 4)—an average of 56 police killed in action per month. U.S. agencies have helped Afghanistan restructure the MOI and ANP officer corps, modify ANP pay rates, and plan a reorganization of MOI headquarters. CSTC-A has also acted to better coordinate international mentoring of MOI officials. These efforts were intended to help ensure that the MOI and ANP are directed by professional staff that can successfully manage and sustain a national police force in Afghanistan. The officer corps reform program reduced the oversized MOI-ANP officer corps from about 17,800 to about 9,000 personnel, reformed the ANP’s top-heavy rank structure, and increased police pay. In a separate effort, CSTC-A and MOI worked together to develop a plan for increasing MOI’s efficiency by restructuring the ministry and reducing its staff. In addition, CSTC-A and other international partners have adopted a plan to address problems affecting their efforts to build MOI staff capacity through mentoring. U.S.-supported efforts to restructure the MOI and ANP are intended to promote institutional and organizational reform and to help ensure that the MOI and ANP are directed by professional staff that can successfully manage and sustain a national police force in Afghanistan. The programs have been aimed at addressing problems concerning the size and pay structure of the MOI and ANP officer corps, MOI’s organization and capacity, and mentoring of MOI officials. According to U.S. officials, the MOI-ANP officer corps was top heavy. It consisted of nearly 18,000 individuals, including more than 3,000 generals and colonels. ANP personnel were also paid less than Afghan National Army personnel, creating recruitment and retention challenges for the ANP. MOI headquarters suffers from numerous organizational deficiencies, according to U.S. officials. The U.S. Embassy concluded in 2007 that MOI suffered from corruption, limited control over provincial police structures, and low institutional capacity at all levels. CSTC-A reported in 2008 that MOI lacked a clear organizational structure, basic management functions, and an overall strategy for policing. CSTC-A also reported that MOI’s departments did not have clearly defined missions and did not communicate and coordinate with one another. State has reported that MOI lacks a culture of accountability and transparency. According to State police contactors, MOI’s organization has contributed to pervasive violations of its chain of command and to a lack of accountability in ANP districts and provincial commands. MOI’s lack of clearly defined lines of authority and areas of responsibility weakens its ability to combat fraud through effective internal controls. To help address MOI’s weak institutional capacity, the United States and other international partners initiated efforts to mentor individual MOI officials but did not coordinate these efforts. CSTC-A reported in 2008 that international partners provided more than one mentor to some officials— despite a limited number of available mentors—while providing none to others. For example, one MOI commander had four mentors from two different countries at a time when four senior-level MOI officials had none. CSTC-A also found that donors had not always aligned mentor skills with the needs of MOI officials and had not established a single communication chain to share information and coordinate mentor activities. The United States and MOI have restructured and reduced the rank structure of the MOI and ANP officer corps while increasing police pay scales. The rank reform program cut the total number of officer positions from about 17,800 to about 9,000 and reduced the number of the highest ranking officers (generals and colonels) by nearly 85 percent. A board of MOI officials selected officers for retention with help from CSTC-A and U.S. Embassy officials. The rank reform program significantly altered the structure of the officer corps, as shown in figure 5. The reduction in the MOI and ANP officer corps was accompanied by substantial increases in ANP pay, as shown in table 2. The new pay rates are on a par with those of the Afghan National Army. In 2008, CSTC-A, MOI, and international partner officials developed a plan for restructuring MOI headquarters. Their goals in developing the plan included increasing efficiency, streamlining organization, improving coordination, creating conditions to mitigate corruption, and reducing headquarters staff by 25 percent. The plan’s implementation was delayed by political resistance within MOI, according to CSTC-A. MOI was originally to have begun implementing the restructuring plan in September 2008. However, CSTC-A informed us that some MOI departments were concerned that they would lose power and personnel as a result of restructuring. The plan’s implementation was further delayed by the removal of the former Minister of Interior, according to CSTC-A. The plan was approved in late December 2008 by the new Minister of Interior and implementation is scheduled to begin in March 2009.