Congress enacted the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) provisions as part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. In spite of its name and origin, RICO is not limited to "mobsters" or members of "organized crime," as those terms are popularly understood. Rather, it covers those activities which Congress felt characterized the conduct of organized crime, no matter who actually engages in them. RICO proscribes no conduct that is not otherwise prohibited. Instead it enlarges the civil and criminal consequences, under some circumstances, of a list of state and federal crimes. In simple terms, RICO condemns (1) any person (2) who (a) invests in, or (b) acquires or maintains an interest in, or (c) conducts or participates in the affairs of, or (d) conspires to invest in, acquire, or conduct the affairs of (3) an enterprise (4) which (a) engages in, or (b) whose activities affect, interstate or foreign commerce (5) through (a) the collection of an unlawful debt, or (b) the patterned commission of various state and federal crimes. Violations are punishable by (a) forfeiture of any property acquired through a RICO violation and of any property interest in the enterprise involved in the violation, and (b) imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or life if one of the predicate offenses carries such a penalty, and/or a fine of not more than the greater of twice of amount of gain or loss associated with the offense or $250,000 for individuals and $500,000 for organizations. RICO violations also subject the offender to civil liability. The courts may award anyone injured by a RICO violation treble damages, costs and attorneys' fees, and may enjoin RICO violations, order divestiture, dissolution or reorganization, or restrict an offender's future professional or investment activities. RICO also makes provision (1) for venue and service of process in RICO criminal and civil cases; (2) for expedited judicial action in certain RICO civil cases brought by the United States; (3) for in camera proceedings in RICO civil cases initiated by the United States; and (4) for the Department of Justice's use of RICO civil investigative demands. RICO cases have been attacked on a host constitutional grounds and generally survived. Any person may violate RICO. The "person" need not be a mobster or even a human being; "any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property" will do. Although the "person" and the "enterprise" must be distinct in the case of a subsection 1962(c) violation (conducting an enterprise's activities through racketeering activity), a corporate entity and its sole shareholder are sufficiently distinct to satisfy the enterprise and person elements of a subsection (c) violation. The "person" and "enterprise" need not be distinct for purposes of subsection 1962(a) (investing the racketeering activity proceeds in an enterprise) or subsection 1962(b) (acquiring or maintaining an enterprise through racketeering activity) violations. Even though governmental entities may constitute a corrupted RICO enterprise or in some instances the victims of a RICO offense, they are not considered "persons" capable of a RICO violation. RICO addresses four forms of illicit activity reflected in the four subsections of section 1962: (a) acquiring or operating an enterprise using racketeering proceeds; (b) controlling an enterprise using racketeering activities; (c) conducting the affairs of an enterprise using racketeering activities; and (d) conspiring to so acquire, control, or conduct. The first, 18 U.S.C. 1962(a), was designed as something of a money laundering provision. "The essence of a violation of §1962(a) is not commission of predicate acts but investment of racketeering income." It introduces several features of its own and has been described as the most difficult to prove. Under its provisions, it is unlawful for (1) any person (2) who is liable as a principal (a) in the collection of an unlawful debt or (b) in a pattern of predicate offenses (3) to use or invest (4) the income from such misconduct (5) to acquire, establish or operate (6) an enterprise in or affecting commerce. The "person," the pattern of predicate offenses, and the enterprise elements are common to all of the subsections. For purposes of 1962(a), however, a legal entity that benefits from the offense may be both the "person" and the "enterprise." The person must have committed usury or a pattern of predicate offenses or aided and abetted in their commission, have received income that would not otherwise have been received as a result, and used those proceeds to acquire or operate an enterprise in or whose activities have an impact on interstate or foreign commerce. The second proscription, 18 U.S.C. 1962(b), is much the same, except that it forbids acquisition or control of an enterprise through the predicates themselves rather than through the income derived from the predicates. It makes it unlawful for (1) any person (2) to acquire or maintain an interest in or control of (3) a commercial enterprise (4) through (a) the collection of an unlawful debt or (b) a pattern of predicate offenses. As in the case of subsection 1962(a), the "person" and the "enterprise" may be one and the same. There must be a nexus between the predicate offenses and the acquisition of control. Exactly what constitutes "interest" or "control" is a case-by-case determination. The defendant must be shown to have played some significant role in the management of the enterprise, but a showing of complete control is unnecessary. Subsection 1962(c) makes it unlawful for (1) any person, (2) employed by or associated with, (3) a commercial enterprise (4) to conduct or participate in the conduct of the enterprise's affairs (5) through (a) the collection of an unlawful debt or (b) a pattern of predicate offenses. Subsection 1962(c) is the most common substantive basis for RICO prosecution or civil action. Although on its face subsection 1962(c) might appear to be less demanding than subsections 1962(a) and (b), the courts have not always read it broadly. Thus, in any charge of a breach of its provisions, the "person" and the "enterprise" must ordinarily be distinct. The requirement cannot be avoided by charging a corporate entity as the "person" and the officers and employees through whom it must act as an "association in fact" enterprise. A corporate entity and its sole shareholder, however, are sufficiently distinct for purposes of subsection 1962(c). The Supreme Court has identified an entrepreneurial stripe in the "conduct or participate in the conduct" element of subsection 1962(c) under which only those who direct the operation or management of the enterprise itself satisfy the "conduct" element. Liability, however, is not limited to the "upper management" of an enterprise, but extends as well to those within the enterprise who exercise broad discretion in carrying out the instructions of upper management. Moreover, conviction requires neither an economic predicate offense nor a predicate offense committed with an economic motive. The heart of most RICO violations is a pattern of racketeering activities, that is, the patterned commission of two or more designated state or federal crimes. The list of state and federal crimes upon which a RICO violation may be predicated includes the following: (A) any act or threat involving— dealing in obscene material, or dealing in controlled substances or listed chemicals chargeable under state law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) violation of— 18 U.S.C. 201 (bribery of federal officials) 18 U.S.C. 224 (bribery in sporting contests) 18 U.S.C. 471, 472, 473 (counterfeiting) 18 U.S.C. 659 (theft from interstate shipments)(if felonious) 18 U.S.C. 664 (theft from employee benefit plan) 18 U.S.C. 891-894 (loansharking) 18 U.S.C. 1028 (fraudulent identification documents)(if for profit) 18 U.S.C. 1029 (computer fraud) 18 U.S.C. 1084 (transmission of gambling information) 18 U.S.C. 1341 (mail fraud) 18 U.S.C. 1343 (wire fraud) 18 U.S.C. 1344 (bank fraud) 18 U.S.C. 1351 (fraud in foreign labor contracting), 18 U.S.C. 1425 (procuring nationalization unlawfully) 18 U.S.C. 1426 (reproduction of naturalization papers) 18 U.S.C. 1427 (sale of naturalization papers) 18 U.S.C. 1461-1465 (obscene matter) 18 U.S.C. 1503 (obstruction of justice) 18 U.S.C. 1510 (obstruction of criminal investigation) 18 U.S.C. 1511 (obstruction of state law enforcement) 18 U.S.C. 1512 (witness tampering) 18 U.S.C. 1513 (witness retaliation) 18 U.S.C. 1542, 1543, 1544, 1546 (passport or similar document fraud) 18 U.S.C. 1581-1592 (peonage & slavery) 18 U.S.C.