This report is designed to provide Congress with a perspective on the contemporary political system of China, the world's second-largest economic power, one of five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, and the only Communist Party-led state in the G-20 grouping of major economies. By introducing some of the distinct features and governance challenges of China's political culture, the report aims to help Congress understand the ways in which political actors in China interact, or in some cases, fail to interact, with implications for China's relationship with its neighbors and the world. By introducing some of the leading political institutions and political actors in China, the report aims to help Congress understand where Chinese interlocutors sit within the Chinese political system, gauge their relative influence, and judge the authoritativeness of their statements with respect to official policy. Where appropriate, the report also seeks to highlight ways in which China's political culture affects official Chinese interactions with the U.S. government. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP or Party) has been in power in China for 63 years, a record of longevity that rivals and could in six years surpass that of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The CCP assumed power in 1949 by means of a civil war victory over the forces of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists, who moved the seat of their Republic of China government to the island of Taiwan. The Communists named their new regime the People's Republic of China (PRC). Although the CCP has been continually in power since, China's political institutions and political culture have evolved significantly over those decades, with the CCP's willingness to adapt helping to explain why it has, so far at least, avoided the fate of its sister parties in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Today, although the Party is committed to maintaining a permanent monopoly on power and is intolerant of those who question its right to rule, analysts consider the political system to be neither monolithic nor rigidly hierarchical. Jockeying among leaders and institutions representing different sets of interests is common at every level of the system. Sometimes fierce competition exists among the members of the Communist Party's seven-man Politburo Standing Committee and 25-member Politburo, China's highest decision-making bodies. It also exists among ministries; between ministries and provincial governments, which are equals in bureaucratic rank; among provinces; and among the headquarters departments and service branches of the military. The military and the Foreign Ministry are often on different pages. Deputies to the National People's Congress, China's weak legislature, sometimes attempt to push back against the government, the courts, and the public prosecutor's office. As part of a trend of very modest political pluralization, moreover, other political actors are increasingly able to influence policy debates. Such actors, who may join forces to advance particular causes, include an increasingly diverse media, micro-bloggers, state-owned and private corporations, official and quasi-official research institutes, university academics, officially sponsored associations and societies, and grassroots non-governmental organizations. One test of a political system is its ability to manage political transitions. In the run-up to a once-in a decade change in the Communist Party's leadership in November 2012, Communist Party Politburo member and Chongqing Municipality Party Secretary Bo Xilai fell from grace, exposing at least one serious rift in the leadership, raising questions about the unity and probity of China's remaining leaders, and, because of Bo's ties to senior military figures, raising questions about the loyalty of parts of the military to the central Party authorities. (See text box on p. 19.) In the same period, the leadership was also shaken by revelations in the foreign media about the vast personal fortunes amassed by relatives of the outgoing premier, Wen Jiabao, and the incoming Party General Secretary, Xi Jinping. Despite the turmoil in its top ranks, the Party convened its 18 th National Congress in November 2012 without public displays of discord, and immediately afterwards appointed a new leadership. Xi Jinping was named both General Secretary of the Communist Party and Chairman of the body that oversees the military, the Party's Central Military Commission. He added the title of State President at the first session of the 12 th National People's Congress in March 2013. The NPC meeting also produced a new Premier of the State Council, Li Keqiang, and other new top state officials. Many analysts, both in China and abroad, have questioned the long-term viability of China's current political system, in which the Party remains above the law, leadership politics is a black box, and civil society and the right to free speech and association are severely constrained. While he was in office, China's recently retired Premier, Wen Jiabao, called for political reform, including reform of "the leadership system of the party and the state," warning that, "Without the success of political structural reform, it is impossible for us to fully institute economic structural reform. The gains we have made in reform and development may be lost, new problems that have cropped up in China's society cannot be fundamentally resolved and such historical tragedy as the Cultural Revolution may happen again." Wen never elaborated, though, on precisely what sort of political reform he hoped to see. China's new Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping raised hopes for a change in the Communist Party's relationship to the law when he called in December 2012 for full implementation of China's state constitution and declared that, "No organization or individual has the special right to overstep the Constitution and law, and any violation of the Constitution and the law must be investigated." Xi has also repeatedly mentioned the need for the Party to police itself, rather than allowing any outside body to do so, however. Perhaps tellingly, in a January 2013 speech, he urged Party organizations and members to abide not by the state constitution, but rather by the Party's constitution, a separate document. The apparent contradictions among Xi's statements make his attitude toward political reform unclear. True to its Leninist roots, the Chinese Communist Party dominates state and society in China. Its power rests on four pillars: its control of China's approximately 2.25 million person-strong military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) , its 1.5 million person-strong paramilitary force, the People's Armed Police , and its 800,000 other internal security forces; its control of personnel appointments across all political institutions, the military, state-owned corporations, and public institutions; its control of the media; and its control of the judiciary and the internal security apparatus. (For discussion of the Party organs in charge of these functions, see " The Party Bureaucracy .") The Party's leadership role is referenced five times in the preamble to the PRC's 1982 constitution, but is not mentioned in any of the articles of the constitution, creating ambiguity about the legal basis for the Party's vast powers. The Party entrusts implementation of its policies and day-to-day administration of the country to the institution of the State , headed by the State Council and including the State's ministries and commissions and layers of "people's governments" below the national level. The top State officials at every level of administration usually concurrently hold senior Party posts, to ensure Party control. According to China's state constitution, the National People's Congress (NPC) oversees the State Council, as well as four other institutions: the Presidency, the Supreme People's Court, the public prosecutors' office, and the military. In practice, the NPC, like People's Congresses at every level of administration, is controlled by the Communist Party and is able to exercise little oversight over any of the institutions officially under its supervision. NPC deputies are expected to approve all budgets, agency reports, and personnel appointments put before them. The NPC's most significant power is its ability to initiate and shape legislation. The formal political system also includes two other categories of institutions, although they have little substantive power. The first is People's Political Consultative Conferences (PPCCs), the most senior level of which is known as the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) National Committee. The Party and State ostensibly "consult" with PPCCs on policy issues. The second set of institutions is China's eight minor political parties , known as the "democratic parties." All the parties were established before the Communists came to power, pledge loyalty to the Communist Party, and accept its leadership. The existence of the PPCCs and the minor parties allows the Communist Party to describe China's political system as one of "multi-party cooperation and political consultation led by the Communist Party of China." The formal Chinese political system has a number of distinct features. Awareness of these features can be helpful for congressional interactions with Chinese officials and institutions, and can inform Congress's understanding of official Chinese behavior. China has had no supreme leader since the death of Deng Xiaoping in 1997. The seven men who sit on the country's most senior decision-making body, the Communist Party's Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), form a collective leadership in which each man has a rank, from one to seven, and shoulders primary responsibility for a specific portfolio. (See Table 1 for the names and offices of all seven members.) Party General Secretary Xi Jinping is ranked first among the seven and has responsibility for convening PSC and larger Politburo meetings. He also controls some of the most consequential portfolios, including military and foreign affairs. Unlike his predecessor, who had to wait two years after becoming head of Party to be named head of the military, Xi was awarded the top military post immediately upon taking over leadership of the Party, a development that has enhanced his authority. Like all his colleagues, however, Xi must still win consensus from the rest of the group for major decisions.