DHS’s interest in better integrating its legacy agencies has been long- standing, and on several occasions since 2004 the department has identified an approach or vision for establishing a more unified field structure to enhance mission coordination among its component agencies but has not implemented such a structure. As we reported in September 2012, according to senior DHS officials, the fragmentation associated with each operational component having different boundaries for its area of responsibility prompted some in DHS and other stakeholders to promote the idea of a single unified DHS field structure, sometimes referred to as regionalization. Proponents believed that a more unified structure of DHS regional offices could foster better collaboration and integration of multiple components’ operations, making DHS as a whole more responsive and better prepared to counter man-made or natural threats. In addition to improving operational effectiveness, proponents of a single DHS field structure envisioned opportunities for long-term cost savings through the sharing of assets, including office space. For example, in 2005 and 2006, DHS considered implementing an overarching plan to unify its components under a single unified field structure, but then opted not to pursue this vision because of component resistance to the concept and significant up-front costs associated with colocating components. Again, in 2010, DHS chose not to realign its component regional configurations into a single DHS regional structure, as recommended in its BUR. In 2012, DHS and component officials stated that transforming the existing structure into a single unified DHS system would be a huge undertaking, and those not in favor of large- scale regionalization cited numerous challenges, including budgetary constraints, and other drawbacks to such a plan. As we reported in September 2012, while DHS’s intention of improving collaboration among its agencies is a sound goal—whether through regionalization or other means—its approach has lacked the systematic analyses and documentation needed to support its proposals for change. The department agreed with our findings and acknowledged that its efforts could have been better documented. In lieu of a single unified field structure, DHS has proposed other alternatives for enhancing collaboration among its components in the field, but has not implemented these proposals. For example, the department reported plans to harmonize operations and intelligence— utilizing concepts and structures modeled after JIATF-South. In 2012, DHS identified a new approach for enhancing regional collaboration among its components through virtual integration—that is, by improving component agencies’ coordination of mission activities and communication through the use of technology. According to a senior DHS official, virtual integration would allow for coordination of component functions without actually consolidating or merging the functions. DHS’s intention toward virtual integration was communicated in its fiscal years 2012-2016 strategic plan and reported to us in September 2012. However, in 2013, DHS officials stated that the department was not specifically pursuing virtual approaches to regional coordination. DHS officials also reported that although DHS no longer planned to pursue virtual collaboration on a larger scale, it was occurring on a more limited scale, within the department and components, for certain efforts. In the absence of a unified field structure, DHS’s operational components have established and utilized collaborative mechanisms, including virtual approaches, to better integrate their field operations. Specifically, DHS field components have employed collaborative mechanisms to coordinate their missions and share information among multiple stakeholders in order to increase their mission effectiveness and efficiencies. These mechanisms have both similarities and differences in how they are structured, which missions or threats they focus on, and which agencies participate in them, among other things. All of the mechanisms identified in this report involve multiple DHS components, as well as other federal, state, and local agency participants, and their purpose is to improve operational integration, coordination, and efficiency among DHS components. These mechanisms focus on a range of missions and are located throughout the United States. Figure 2 shows the states and territories that contain 1 or more of the 13 collaborative field mechanism types (including the 4 mechanism types we selected for further study) involving DHS’s key operational components that we identified in conjunction with the department and these components. All 4 mechanism types we selected for a more in-depth review (ReCoM, BEST, JTT, and RISC) had been established through formal organizing documents (e.g., a charter or memorandum of understanding); involve stakeholders from various federal, state, and local agencies; and have an established lead agency to provide oversight and guidance to participants. In addition, all 4 of these mechanism types are funded by the participating agencies—no funding has been allocated or budgeted specifically for these collaborative mechanisms. ReCoMs were officially established in 2011 through the Maritime Operations Coordination Plan, which was signed by their Executive Team of the Senior Guidance Team, composed of the Director of ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), the Commissioner of CBP, and the Commandant of the Coast Guard. The Maritime Operations Coordination Plan directs these agencies to utilize the fusion of intelligence, planning, and operations to target the threat of transnational terrorist and criminal acts along the coastal border. USCG serves as the lead agency responsible for planning and coordinating among components, and as of June 2013, 32 ReCoMs had been established aligning with the USCG sectors’ geographic areas of responsibility. In 2005, the first BEST unit was organized and led by ICE HSI, in partnership with CBP, in Laredo, Texas, and as of June 2013, 35 BESTs had been established throughout the United States. The BESTs have a mission to identify, disrupt, and dismantle existing and emerging threats at U.S. land, sea, and air borders. The first JTT was organized in November 2011 as a CBP-led partnership among the U.S. Border Patrol, CBP Office of Field Operations, ICE HSI, and the government of Mexico to support the South Texas Campaign (STC). The purpose of the STC is to integrate intelligence, pursue enhanced coordination with the government of Mexico, and conduct targeted operations to disrupt and dismantle transnational criminal organizations. As of June 2013, JTTs had been established across four geographic boundary areas in Del Rio, Laredo, McAllen, and Houston, Texas. The first RISC was organized in 2003 to provide a forum for senior DHS officials to enhance emergency management and homeland security for all hazards through a collaborative, regional approach involving federal, state, local, tribal, nongovernmental organization and private sector partners. As of June 2013, a RISC had been established in each of the 10 FEMA regions. The purpose of all of these selected mechanisms includes increasing operational effectiveness through greater collaboration and leveraging of resources and expertise. Our review identified commonalities within the same type of mechanism across multiple locations, as well as commonalities across the 4 types of mechanisms that we focused on for our review. Table 1 provides a summary description of the 4 selected collaborative field mechanism types that we reviewed and the locations we visited for each of them. DHS, at the departmental level, has limited awareness of the universe of component field collaborative mechanisms and of the types and quality of collaborative practices they employ to better coordinate and integrate mission operations. As a result of its limited visibility over these mechanisms, DHS headquarters is not well positioned to routinely identify valuable information obtained from the mechanisms that could inform decisions about DHS field structures or further enhance collaboration across components. According to senior DHS Office of Operations Coordination and Planning (OPS) officials, DHS headquarters does not actively catalog or routinely monitor the universe of collaborative field mechanisms because they are organized and monitored by their respective lead operational components or participants. However, although the collaborative mechanisms may be monitored by individual components, the components do not have the same high-level perspective—or accountability—as the department as a whole, to look across all components and assess the state of collaboration occurring in the field. Moreover, according to senior OPS officials, their departmental-level office is focused on the specific outcomes of operational activities and not whether the activities are carried out by a certain collaborative mechanism, as the collaborative mechanisms employed to accomplish tasks are not as important as the end results. Therefore, these DHS headquarters officials believe they have visibility—primarily through the components—over activities carried out by collaborative mechanisms, but stated that they have little or no visibility over the nature of the collaboration itself, since they do not collect this type of information. OPS officials also noted that the Program Analysis & Evaluation Division (PA&E), within the Office of the Chief Financial Officer, which is involved with performance measurement, monitors whether the operational components are meeting their performance requirements or goals, but does not track performance or other information on cross-component field mechanisms. PA&E officials stated that their division is responsible for strategic-level management and oversight, not operational-level, and per various laws and policy frameworks, their division measures performance of higher-level DHS programs. DHS’s limited visibility at the departmental level of the number and type of existing collaborative field mechanisms was demonstrated in part by the challenges DHS headquarters experienced in providing us with a list of mechanisms. Specifically, when we asked for a list of formalized mechanisms that DHS headquarters considered to be successful examples of field collaboration, this information was not readily available at the departmental level, according to senior DHS officials. After consulting with operational component officials, DHS headquarters provided 6 of the 13 examples that constituted our final list of mechanisms. We acknowledge that identifying a universe of successful collaborative field mechanisms can be difficult, in part because of the relatively large size of DHS and the breadth of activities involving component agencies. However, systematically collecting information (e.g., related to operational mission, capabilities, performance, etc.) about the mechanisms from the component agencies that sponsor them would yield important information about which mechanisms are effective. Senior DHS headquarters officials stated that although they have limited visibility over the universe of collaborative mechanisms and the specific collaborative practices utilized by the groups, the department does obtain regular knowledge of component operational activities and results. For example, senior OPS officials said that they receive situation reports about daily operational actions broken out by lead component, regardless of whether the operation is affiliated with a particular collaborative mechanism.