WHTI implements Section 7209 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, as amended, which requires DHS, in consultation with State, to develop and implement a plan to require U.S. citizens and other individuals for whom documentation had previously been waived to show a passport or other document, or combination of documents sufficient to denote identity and citizenship when entering the United States. DHS implemented WHTI documentation requirements at air ports of entry on January 23, 2007, and at land and sea ports of entry on June 1, 2009. The final land and sea rule provides that: U.S. citizens entering at sea or land POEs must present a valid U.S. passport, U.S. passport card, trusted traveler card, Merchant Mariner Document when traveling on official maritime business, or U.S. military ID when traveling on official orders; and Mexican nationals applying for admission as a temporary visitor for business or pleasure may present a BCC in lieu of a passport to enter the United States when arriving from Mexico at land POEs or when arriving by pleasure vessel or ferry. State, in cooperation with DHS, is responsible for the development of passport cards and BCCs. The Bureau of Consular Affairs is responsible for the issuance of passport cards and BCCs, and CBP inspects the documents at ports of entry to the United States. On December 31, 2007, State issued a final rule establishing the passport card as a lower-cost alternative to passport books —$45 for a passport card versus $100 for a passport book—for departure from and entry to the United States through land and sea ports of entry between the United States and Mexico, Canada, the Caribbean, and Bermuda. The passport card cannot be used for international air travel. In February 2008, State began accepting applications for passport cards, and in March 2008, it awarded a contract to L-1 Identity Solutions (L-1) for passport card stock, personalization equipment, and related technical services. State began issuing the first generation passport card on July 14, 2008 and the updated second generation passport card in mid-April 2010. The passport card is valid for up to 10 years and only issued to U.S. nationals, using the same application form and evidence of citizenship or nationality as required for passport books. On October 1, 2008, State assumed responsibility for the production of BCCs, issuing a redesigned, second-generation BCC. All first-generation BCCs will expire before October 2018. The design of the second generation BCC is based on the construction and security features of the passport card. State uses the same contract to procure BCC cardstock and the personalization equipment can be used to personalize both types of cards. The BCC is valid for up to 10 years and is only issued to Mexican citizens. The passport card and second generation BCC use vicinity radio frequency (RF) technology to store and transmit a unique number that can be used by CBP to retrieve information about the cardholder. As amended, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 required DHS and State to certify that they have met certain criteria prior to implementing WHTI documentation requirements at sea and land borders, including: NIST certification that the passport card architecture meets or exceeds International Organization for Standardization (ISO) security standards and best practices for protection of personal information; making the passport card available to U.S. citizens; and installing the infrastructure to process the passport cards and training employees to use the new technology at ports of entry. State and DHS certified that they met these conditions on February 24, 2009. The security of passport cards and BCCs and the ability to prevent and detect their fraudulent use are dependent upon a combination of well- designed security features and inspection procedures that utilize the available security features of the document. A well-designed document has limited utility if inspectors do not inspect the security features to verify the authenticity of the document. In 2007, we reported on the security of passports and visas, including first generation BCCs. In our report, we made several recommendations to State and DHS regarding the planning and design process for its travel documents, ensuring that needed technology is available at ports of entry, and better training for CBP officers at the ports of entry. Threats to the security of travel documents include counterfeiting of a complete travel document, construction of a fraudulent document, photo substitution, deletion or alteration of text, removal and substitution of pages, theft of genuine blank documents, and assumed identity by imposters. Features of travel documents are assessed by their capacity to secure a travel document against the following: Counterfeiting—unauthorized construction or reproduction of a travel document. Forgery—fraudulent alteration of a travel document, including attacks such as photo substitution, and deletion or alteration of text. Imposters—use of a legitimate travel document by people falsely representing themselves as legitimate document holders. Most reported passport card and BCC fraud is imposter fraud. In fiscal year 2009, CBP detected 13,530 passport cards and BCCs presented by travelers attempting to enter the United States through all U.S. POEs that were either fraudulent or were valid documents used by imposters (see table 1). Over 90 percent of these documents were genuine documents presented by imposters. The most frequent fraudulent attempts were by imposters attempting to use a legitimate BCC. Fraudulent use of passport cards and second generation BCCs is much lower than that of first generation BCCs mainly because there are many fewer issued, with over 8 million valid first generation BCCs in circulation but only about 2.3 million passport cards and 435,000 second generation BCCs issued by the end of November 2009. To combat document fraud, security features are used in a wide variety of documents, including currency, identification documents, and bank checks. Security features are used to prevent or deter fraudulent alteration or counterfeiting of such documents. In some cases, an altered or counterfeit document can be detected because it does not have the look and feel of a genuine document. For instance, in U.S. passport cards and second generation BCCs, detailed designs and figures with specific fonts and colors can often be used by inspectors to identify nongenuine documents. While security features can be assessed by their individual ability to help prevent the fraudulent use of the document, it is more useful to consider the entire document design and how all of the security features combine to help secure the document. Layered security features tend to provide better security by minimizing the risk that the compromise of any individual feature of the document will allow for unfettered fraudulent use of the document. An individual security feature may provide protection against more than one type of threat, but no feature can protect against them all and no single feature is 100 percent effective at eliminating a type of threat. Designing secure documents requires the use of a range of security features combined in an appropriate way within the document. The best protection is obtained from a balanced set of features and techniques providing multiple layers of security in the document that combine to deter or defeat fraudulent attack. The application and issuance process for the passport card is the same as for passports, using the same application form. After an application is successfully adjudicated by passport examiners at State Department passport agencies, the passport card will be produced. State personalizes each passport card by printing the photo, biographical data, and other needed information on the card. The card is then mailed to the traveler. In general, passport cards are personalized at State’s Arkansas Passport Center, but the Tucson Passport Center also has the capacity for high volume personalization of the cards and most passport agencies have the capability of personalizing limited volumes of cards. The application and issuance process for the BCC is unchanged for the second generation BCC and is managed through the U.S. consulates in Mexico. After visa officers in Mexico approve an application for a BCC, the BCCs will typically be produced at the Tucson Passport Center. Using blank BCC cardstock, State personalizes each BCC by printing the photo, biographical data, and other needed information on the card. The card is then delivered to the appropriate consulate in Mexico for issuance to the traveler. In each case, the cardstock is produced by one of L-1’s subcontractors and it incorporates the background art and some of the security features already incorporated. As will be explained later in this report, some security features are added to the card during the personalization process. In general, travelers seeking admission to the United States must present themselves and a valid travel document for inspection to a CBP officer. The inspection process requires officers to determine the admissibility of the traveler by questioning the individual and inspecting the presented travel documents. In the first part of the inspection process—primary inspection—CBP officers inspect travelers and their travel documents. The officer can then compare the information on the travel documents with information retrieved from CBP border inspection systems to determine if they may be admitted or should be referred to secondary inspection for further questioning and document examination. If additional review is necessary, the traveler is referred to secondary inspection—an area away from the primary inspection area—where another officer makes a final determination to admit the traveler or deny admission for reasons such as the presentation of a fraudulent or counterfeit travel document. State’s designs for the first and second generation passport card and the second generation BCC generally meet standards and guidance for international travel documents and DHS policies for travel credentials and, in general, the recommended security features that are not included are compensated for by other security features or would not greatly increase the security of the cards. However, while including all security features recommended by guidance and standards for international travel cards can help ensure the security of passport cards and BCCs, security assessments and testing of the cards are necessary to identify any vulnerabilities and to modify the security features to address these vulnerabilities.