The U.S. nuclear weapons complex (the Complex) consists of eight government-owned,contractor-operated sites (see Appendix) that study, maintain, and disassemble U.S. nuclearweapons. The National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA), a semiautonomous part of theDepartment of Energy (DOE), manages it. Some in Congress have expressed concern that the U.S.nuclear stockpile and the Complex are becoming increasingly difficult and costly to maintain, thatsecurity costs are rising sharply, and that the Complex is not sufficiently responsive to the needs ofits "customer," the Department of Defense (DOD). Further, they maintain, it is difficult for Congressto judge the merits of various large expenditures for the Complex, such as for major researchfacilities, without a long-term road map. (In this report, "site" refers to an entire laboratory or plant,or the Nevada Test Site, while "facility" refers to a structure within a site, such as for production ofa specific item or for experiments or computation.) To address these concerns, the House Energy and Water Development AppropriationsSubcommittee asked the Secretary of Energy to conduct a study of the Complex looking out 25years, and to make recommendations on restructuring the Complex. The committee's report stated: During the fiscal year 2005 budget hearings, theCommittee pressed the Secretary on the need for a systematic review of requirements for theweapons complex over the next twenty-five years, and the Secretary committed to conducting sucha review. The Secretary's report should assess the implications of the President's decisions on the sizeand composition of the stockpile, the cost and operational impacts of the new Design Basis Threat,and the personnel, facilities, and budgetary resources required to support the smaller stockpile. Thereport should evaluate opportunities for the consolidation of special nuclear materials, facilities, andoperations across the complex to minimize security requirements and the environmental impact ofcontinuing operations. The Secretary should assemble a team of outside expertsto assist with this review. Prior reviews have largely been conducted by insiders from the weaponscomplex, who produce the predictable but not very credible recommendation that the Departmentshould preserve the status quo and maintain all existing facilities and capabilities. As part of thefive-year integrated budget plan for the entire Department that is directed elsewhere in this report,the Secretary will have to balance NNSA requirements against competing needs for other DOEprograms. This will require an objective review that is only possible with the help of independentexperts who are not, and have not been, part of the NNSA weapons complex. The Committee directs the Secretary to submit a writtenreport on his findings and recommendations on the NNSA complex to the House and SenateCommittees on Appropriations and Armed Services not later than April 30, 2005. (1) In response, the Secretary of Energy in January 2005 had the Secretary of Energy AdvisoryBoard (SEAB) form the Nuclear Weapons Complex Infrastructure Task Force (hereinafter referredto as the "Task Force" or "TF"). It issued a "draft final report" in July 2005. (2) After receiving comments,it transmitted the final report to SEAB on October 4 with no changes from the July version. A letterfrom David Overskei, Chairman of the Task Force, included clarifications on nuclear weapon storageand on production of a key component. Also on October 4, SEAB transmitted the report to theSecretary of Energy. (3) The TF reported that there was no master plan guiding the Complex. Instead, it stated thatthere were redundant facilities within the Complex; excessive competition between the weaponslabs; an imbalance between the labs, with state-of-the-art experimental facilities, and the productionplants, with archaic equipment; and special nuclear material (SNM; see Appendix) at six of the eightComplex sites, increasing vulnerability to terrorist attack and raising security costs. The TF alsofound current warheads to have undesirable characteristics, such as designs offering less safety andless control over unauthorized use than DOD and DOE wanted, designs that approached too closelythe point at which they would fail, components that were difficult to manufacture, excessive use ofexotic or hazardous materials, and maintenance that would probably become ever more costly. These problems resulted in high costs. As a result, the Task Force concluded, "the status quo isneither technically credible, nor financially sustainable." (ix) (Throughout this report, numbers inparentheses refer to pages in the Task Force's report.) The TF had a vision of a different Complex. "The Complex of 2030 should be an integrated,interdependent enterprise. The technical acuity and scientific innovation to meet unforeseenchallenges and threats to the nation's security are sustained by a Complex operating interactively andcontinuously conducting research, nonnuclear testing and weapon modernization, production, anddismantlement." (4) It would be responsive to the needs of its customer, DOD. As a measure of responsiveness, the Complex will bedesigned to respond to any needed design change in less than 18 months, field a prototype [nuclearweapon] in less than 36 months, and go into full production in less than 48 months, and perform anunderground test at the [Nevada Test Site] within 18 months. By 2030 the Complex would be inequilibrium, producing and dismantling at a rate of 125 devices per year. (4) The TF would restructure the Complex, closing some sites, building another, relocating someexperimental facilities, and making other such facilities available for use by Complex personnel. It would dismantle all Cold War-era weapons (the current stockpile) by 2030. The replacementwarheads and restructured Complex would, according to the TF, be safer, more secure, and lesscostly. The TF recommended proceeding briskly to implement this vision. "The Task Force visionis best achieved at the lowest risk to the nation's nuclear deterrent through an aggressive schedulefor achieving the 2030 vision, with near-term budget increases resulting in substantially largeraccumulated long-term budget reductions." (5) To remedy the perceived problems and implement its vision, the TF made two main, relatedrecommendations. First, it created a master plan that would restructure the entire Complex. Theplan has several key elements. A Consolidated Nuclear Production Center (CNPC) would produce allcomponents in the "nuclear explosive package," or NEP (see Appendix), including those made fromuranium, plutonium, and high explosives, and would assemble complete nuclear weapons. WhilePantex would dismantle current warheads by 2030, CNPC would dismantle the next generation ofwarheads. (vii, 4) CNPC would include a facility for fabrication of plutonium components; aseparate facility for fabrication of uranium components; a materials research laboratory; a facilityfor machining and testing all the insensitive high explosive for the Complex, though the explosiveitself might be procured from outside vendors or DOD; a building for weapons assembly anddisassembly; areas to store plutonium and pits; another building to store uranium and secondaries; and several other facilities. (14-16) CNPC would not store deployed warheads. (4) The Y-12 Plant fabricates and stores uranium components, and assembles andstores secondaries. These functions would move to CNPC. It thus appears likely that Y-12 wouldclose. Pantex could close. The TF states, "Upon dismantlement of the last of the Coldwar weapons, Pantex, if not the site of the CNPC, could be decommissioned." (19) While"dismantlement of the last Cold war weapon [is] envisioned to occur by 2030," (4) the TF alsoemphasizes accelerating dismantlement. (E2) Kansas City Plant would not be part of CNPC. It would continue to producenonnuclear components (batteries, fuzes, bomb casings, etc. ), but "as many components as practical[would] be procured from commercial vendors." (22) The labs would become smaller. The TF states: Technical staffing levels at the design laboratories can be significantlyreduced as the Complex leverages the years of investment in new,automated test and computational capabilities at the design laboratories.Perhaps greater impact on Complex staffing levels will be the efficiencyrealized by personnel moving into continuous design, plus weaponproduction and manufacturing cycles, which evolve into a family ofmodular nuclear weapons. (23) Some large experimental and scientific facilities mightmove to CNPC or NTS, and duplicative facilities at more than one lab might be closed and theremaining facility of each type made into a user facility, i.e., available to staff of all labs. (viii, J1-J3) The TF raises the prospect that one of the two nuclear weapon physics labs -- Los Alamos NationalLaboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) -- might close: "thelong-term requirement for two physics design laboratories will be determined through overallComplex performance and needs." (4) Some lab facilities under consideration would move toCNPC. For example, the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) building atLANL for R&D on uranium and plutonium, for which construction began in January 2006, wouldinstead be built at CNPC on grounds that other facilities to be placed in CNPC would have a similarcapability. LANL would instead have a "'CMRR lite,' designed for only laboratory sample levelsof material and amenable to commercial security." (21) One lab would house high-end computing for the entire Complex, andComplex staff at other sites could use that site's resources by remote connection(20). The Nevada Test Site might gain several experimental facilities (J1-J3), andis a possible site for CNPC.