In 1986, the President signed a joint resolution of Congress that directed the Secretary of Defense to establish a unified combatant command for special operations forces. In April 1987, the Secretary of Defense established USSOCOM with the mission to provide trained and combat- ready special operations forces to DOD’s geographic combatant commands. Since 2003, DOD has further expanded the role of USSOCOM to include greater responsibility for planning and leading the department’s efforts in the war on terrorism. In addition to training, organizing, equipping, and deploying combat-ready special operations forces to the geographic combatant commands, USSOCOM has the mission to lead, plan, synchronize, and, as directed, execute global operations against terrorist networks. DOD doctrine describes the characteristics of special operations forces, and provides joint force commanders with the guidance and information necessary to identify, nominate, and select missions appropriate for special operations forces. According to doctrine, special operations forces perform two types of activities: special operations forces perform tasks that no other forces in DOD conduct, and they perform tasks that other DOD forces conduct but do so according to a unique set of conditions and standards. In particular, special operations forces are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to accomplish nine core tasks, which represent the collective capabilities of all special operations forces rather than those of any one unit. Table 1 defines these core tasks. Since 1987, the Marine Corps and USSOCOM have taken several steps to expand the relationship between the two organizations. For example, beginning in 1993, the Marine Corps and USSOCOM established a working group to discuss efforts to improve communication, cooperation, and interoperability. These efforts received a renewed emphasis with the onset of the war on terrorism. In 2002, the Secretary of Defense requested the military services to increase their support to USSOCOM. In 2003, the Marine Corps established a specially trained and equipped unit as a concept to demonstrate the Marine Corps’ ability to conduct special operations missions under the operational control of USSOCOM. This unit deployed to Iraq in April 2004 to perform selected special operations missions. The Secretary of Defense approved the establishment of a Marine Corps service component to USSOCOM in October 2005. In February 2006, the Marine Corps activated its special operations command. Since August 2006, the Marine Corps special operations command has deployed its forces to perform special operations missions to support the geographic combatant commanders’ requirements. Figure 1 provides a timeline. The Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command is the Marine Corps service component to USSOCOM. The Command is headquartered on Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. The Marine Corps special operations command has five major subordinate units. These units include two Marine Special Operations Battalions, the Marine Special Operations Advisor Group, the Marine Special Operations Support Group, and the Marine Special Operations School. Table 2 provides a description of each unit. By fiscal year 2011, the Command will be authorized 2,516 personnel— 2,483 military personnel and 33 civilians. With the exception of one Marine Corps reserve position, all of the authorized military personnel will be drawn from the military services’ active components. The Marine Corps special operations component will be the smallest service component under USSOCOM. The other military services’ special operations components include the following. The Army component is the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. Army special operations forces include Special Forces, Rangers, Special Operations Aviation, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations units. The Navy component is the Naval Special Warfare Command. Naval Special Warfare forces include SEAL Teams, SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams, and Special Boat Teams. The Air Force component is the Air Force Special Operations Command. Air Force special operations forces include fixed and rotary wing aviation squadrons, a combat aviation advisory squadron, special tactics squadrons, and an unmanned aerial vehicle squadron. Figure 2 shows the number of military personnel positions in fiscal year 2007 authorized for DOD’s special operations forces in the active component and reserve component. The authorizations include positions in special operations forces warfighter units, support units, and headquarters units such as USSOCOM and its service component commands. Since fiscal year 2006, the Marine Corps and USSOCOM have requested baseline and supplemental funding for the Marine Corps special operations command. In fiscal year 2006, the Marine Corps and USSOCOM received $109.3 million in supplemental funds to establish the Marine Corps special operations command. In fiscal year 2007, the Marine Corps and USSOCOM received an additional $368.2 million in baseline funds for the Command, and $32 million in supplemental funding. As shown in table 3, the Marine Corps and USSOCOM have projected military construction, operation and maintenance, and procurement funding for the Command for fiscal years 2008 through 2013. Although the Marine Corps has made progress in establishing its special operations command, the Command has not fully identified the force structure needed to enable it to perform its assigned missions. The Marine Corps has taken several steps to establish its special operations command, such as activating the Command’s headquarters, establishing Marine Corps special operations forces units, and deploying these units to conduct special operations missions; however, DOD did not use critical practices of effective strategic planning when developing the initial force structure plans for the Command. As a result of limitations in the strategic planning process, the Marine Corps special operations command has identified several force structure challenges that will likely affect the Command’s ability to perform its full range of responsibilities, and is working to revise its force structure to address these challenges. The Marine Corps has taken several steps to establish the Marine Corps special operations command. For example, the Marine Corps has activated the headquarters of its special operations command, established some of its special operations forces units—including 4 special operations companies and 12 foreign military training teams to date—and deployed these units to conduct special operations missions. However, the initial force structure plans for the Command were not developed using critical practices of effective strategic planning. According to officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, USSOCOM, and the Marine Corps, the Secretary of Defense directed that the Marine Corps establish a special operations command to meet the growing demand for special operations forces in the war on terrorism. The Secretary of Defense, with input from the Marine Corps, determined that 2,516 personnel was an appropriate size for the Command based on the assumptions that the Command was to be staffed within the existing Marine Corps end-strength, and the establishment of the Command could not significantly affect the Marine Corps budget. Marine Corps planners then based the composition and number of Marine Corps special operations forces units on existing units within the service that had trained to perform similar missions in the past. For example, Marine Corps officials told us that the force structure plans for its special operations companies were modeled after a Maritime Special Purpose Force, which had previously trained to conduct some special operations missions for conventional Marine Corps units. Additionally, Marine Corps officials told us the initial force structure plan to establish nine special operations companies was based on the need to accommodate the deployment schedule of its Marine Expeditionary Units. The initial force structure plan also included the transfer of the Foreign Military Training Unit from the conventional force to its special operations command. Using this existing force structure, the Marine Corps planned to establish 24 foreign military training teams under its special operations command. DOD did not fully incorporate critical practices of effective strategic planning when it developed these initial force structure plans for the Marine Corps special operations command. We have previously reported that strategic planning is important to ensure that an organization’s activities support its strategic goals. Effective planning principles, such as those embodied in the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 and used by leading organizations, require federal agencies to set strategic goals and develop strategic plans to accomplish those goals. Our prior work has identified several critical practices for effective strategic planning, including the alignment of activities and resources to meet organizational missions and stakeholder involvement. Our prior work has shown that leading organizations recognize that an organization’s activities, core processes, and resources must be aligned to support its mission and help it achieve its goals. Organizations should assess the extent to which their programs and activities contribute to meeting their mission and desired outcomes. In addition, successful organizations base their strategic planning, to a large extent, on the interests and expectations of their stakeholders. Stakeholder involvement is important to help agencies ensure that their efforts and resources are targeted at the highest priorities. Just as important, involving stakeholders in strategic planning efforts can help create a basic understanding among the stakeholders of the competing demands that confront most agencies, the limited resources available to them, and how those demands and resources require careful and continuous balancing. However, in our review of the planning process that preceded the establishment of the Marine Corps special operations command, we found the Command’s activities and resources were not fully aligned with the organization’s mission. For example, although the alignment of activities and resources to meet organizational missions, a critical practice of effective strategic planning, should include an analysis of the number of personnel required for an organization to accomplish its missions, Marine Corps officials stated that the size of the Marine Corps special operations command (2,516 personnel) was not determined through an analysis of the Command’s assigned missions. Specifically, neither the Office of the Secretary of Defense nor the Marine Corps conducted a comprehensive, data-driven analysis to determine the number of personnel needed to meet the Marine Corps special operations command’s mission requirements that directly tied the number of personnel authorized for the Command with its assigned missions. USSOCOM did not provide official mission guidance to the Marine Corps until October 2006, almost 1 year after the Command’s personnel authorizations had been determined. In the absence of specific guidance, Marine Corps planners did not conduct a comprehensive, data- driven analysis to determine the number of personnel needed to meet the Marine Corps special operations command’s full range of mission requirements. Our prior work has shown that valid and reliable data on the number of employees required to meet an agency’s needs are critical because human capital shortfalls can threaten an agency’s ability to perform its missions efficiently and effectively.