“Oversight of a contract”—which can refer to contract administration functions, quality assurance surveillance, corrective action, property administration, and past performance evaluation—ultimately rests with the contracting officer who has the responsibility for ensuring that contractors meet the requirements set forth in the contract. However, contracting officers are frequently not located in the area or at the installation where the services are being provided. For that reason, contracting officers designate CORs via an appointment letter to assist with the technical monitoring or administration of a contract on their behalf. CORs serve as the eyes and ears for the contracting officer and act as the liaisons between the contractor, the contracting officer, and the unit receiving support or services. CORs are responsible for tasks identified in the contracting officer’s appointment letter that may include (1) providing daily contract oversight, (2) performing quality assurance reviews, (3) monitoring contract performance, and (4) assessing technical performance. CORs cannot direct the contractor by making commitments or changes that affect price, quality, quantity, delivery, or other terms and conditions of the contract. have also been tasked with other contract-related duties such as preparing statements of work, which provide the requirements or specifications of the contract, developing requirements approval paperwork, and preparing funding documents. Although CORs are non- acquisition personnel, they can have acquisition-related responsibilities— particularly those related to contract oversight. CORs are not usually contracting specialists and often perform contract management and oversight duties on a part-time basis in addition to performing their primary military duties, such as those performed by an infantryman or a quartermaster specialist. DOD defines the term “contingency contract” as a legally binding agreement for supplies, services, and construction let by government contracting officers in the operational area, as well as other contracts that have a prescribed area of performance within a designated operational area. These contracts include theater support, external support, and systems support contracts. Theater Support Contracting Command contracting officers assisted by CORs. When DCMA is not designated responsibility for administrative oversight of a contract, the contracting officer who awarded the contract is responsible for the administration, management, and oversight of the contract. These contracting officers, such as those from the CENTCOM Joint Theater Support Contracting Command often appoint CORs to monitor contractor performance. CORs appointed by the CENTCOM Joint Theater Support Contracting Command are typically drawn from units receiving contractor-provided services. In Afghanistan, CORs that have been appointed to contracts administered by DCMA report oversight results to DCMA personnel. For contracts not administered by DCMA, CORs provide oversight information to the contracting officer. In Afghanistan, the CENTCOM Joint Theater Support Contracting Command directs requiring activities (units receiving contractor-provided goods and services) to nominate CORs for all service contracts valued at more than $2,500 with significant technical requirements that require ongoing advice and surveillance from technical/requirements personnel. The contracting officer may exempt service contracts from this requirement when the following three conditions are all met: (1) The contract will be awarded using simplified acquisition procedures; (2) The requirement is not complex; and (3) The contracting officer documents the file, in writing, as to why the appointment of a COR is unnecessary. Although DOD requires CORs to receive training and took some actions to enhance training programs, CORs we met with in Afghanistan do not always receive adequate training to prepare them for their contract management and oversight duties. DOD requires that CORs be qualified by training and experience commensurate with the responsibilities to be delegated to them. According to DOD officials, the current training might qualify CORs to monitor contractor performance generally, but it does not necessarily make them sufficiently capable for their particular assignments. DOD officials have acknowledged gaps in training. For example, required DOD training taken by CORs did not fully address the unique contracting environment that exists in Afghanistan, which includes large numbers of Afghan contractors with limited experience and qualifications. Further, the instability and security aspects of remote locations throughout Afghanistan coupled with an undeveloped infrastructure impedes the CORs’ ability to communicate with and rely upon acquisition personnel, such as contracting officers, for support and guidance. Additionally, not all of the required training for CORs was conducted, and some other oversight personnel were not being trained. In Afghanistan, much of the daily surveillance of contractors supporting military operations is performed by CORs. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) requires that quality assurance, such as surveillance, be performed at such times and places as may be necessary to determine that the supplies or services conform to contract requirements. DOD guidance requires CORs to be trained and assigned prior to award of a contract. DOD training is intended to familiarize the CORs with the duties and responsibilities of contract management and oversight. Contracting organizations such as the CENTCOM Joint Theater Support Contracting Command require that personnel nominated to be CORs complete specific online training courseswell as locally developed CORs overview training, and contract-specific training provided by contracting officers in theater (the latter referred to as (referred to as Phase I), as Phase II) before they can serve as CORs in Afghanistan. The guidance notes that, at a minimum, Phase II training will consist of contract specific responsibilities, including file documentation; terms and conditions of the contract; specifics of the performance work statement; acceptance of services procedures; invoice procedures; technical requirements; monthly reporting procedures, and contractor evaluation—all specific to their assigned contract. DOD has taken some actions to enhance training programs to prepare CORs to manage and oversee contracts in contingency operations, such as in Afghanistan. For example, DOD developed a new training course for CORs, with a focus on contingency operations and developed a more general certification program for CORs, including the contingency operations course as a training requirement when it is applicable. DOD also took steps to institutionalize operational contract support by including some CORs-related training in professional military education programs and by emphasizing the need for qualified CORs by discussing their responsibilities in joint doctrine and other guidance with the publication of Joint Publication 4-10—Operational Contract Support and the Defense Contingency Contracting Officer’s Representative Handbook and memoranda issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Our analysis of DOD’s CORs training and interviews with over 150 CORs and contracting personnel from over 30 defense organizations like the regional contracting centersKandahar, and Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan, indicated that some gaps and limitations existed in DOD’s training programs leaving CORs not fully prepared to perform their contract management and oversight and the DCMA in Bagram, Kabul, duties. For example, the training for CORs is generally focused on low- risk contract operations in Afghanistan and does not fully address the unique contracting environment that exists there, such as the extent of inexperience of Afghan contractors, the remote and insecure locations of project sites, the underdeveloped infrastructure, and constraints on the movement and deployment of oversight personnel, especially acquisition personnel. More specifically, the required CORs training does not include information about important issue areas like the Afghan First Program, which encourages an increased use of local personnel and vendors for supplies and services as part of the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy, and working with private security contractors. Some CORs in Afghanistan told us they were unaware of the challenges in working with Afghan contractors and thought contracting with them would be similar to contracting with U.S. vendors. However, according to some of the CORs and other contracting personnel we interviewed, providing oversight of Afghan contractors was more challenging than was the case with other vendors because the Afghan contractors often did not meet the timelines specified in the contract, did not provide the quality products and the services the units had anticipated, and did not necessarily have a working knowledge of English. Further, these officials told us that Afghan contractors were not always familiar with the business standards and processes of the U.S. government. For example, one COR told us during our visit in February 2011 that a unit was still waiting for barriers that it had contracted for in May 2010. According to that COR, while some of the barriers had been delivered, the unit had not received all of the barriers it required even though the contract delivery date had passed. Other CORs, contracting officials, and commanders described similar situations in which services were either not provided as anticipated or were not provided at all. Because of gaps in training, CORs did not always understand the full scope of their responsibilities and did not always ensure that the contractor was meeting all contract requirements. As a result, according to contracting officials, items such as portable toilets, gates, water, and other items or services were not available when needed, raising concerns about security, readiness, and morale. Contracting officials from over 30 defense organizations and units in Bagram, Kabul, Kandahar, and Camp Leatherneck whom we spoke with noted similar problems with construction contracts awarded to Afghan contractors. For example, according to another COR, an Afghan contractor was awarded a $70,000 contract to build a latrine, shower, and sink unit. The COR told us that the contractor was unable to satisfactorily complete the project and so another contract was awarded for approximately $130,000 to bring the latrine, shower, and sink unit to a usable condition. Because of inadequacies in training, CORs did not always understand that they had the responsibility to ensure that the terms of the contract were met and therefore did not bring contractors’ performance issues to the contracting officer’s attention for resolution. Similarly, DOD contracting officials provided us with documentation of other construction problems, including a shower/toilet facility built without holes in the walls or floors for plumbing and drain (fig. 1), and facilities that were constructed with poor-quality materials such as crumbling cement blocks (fig. 2). The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction has also reported significant construction deficiencies related to contracting in Afghanistan, including poorly formed and crumbling cement structures attributable to the lack of CORs training and oversight.