For decades Cubans have fled Cuba, often by raft, seeking freedom in the United States. For example, during the first 6 months of 1993, the U.S. Coast Guard picked up about 1,300 rafters and brought them to the United States. This number increased to about 4,700 during the same period in 1994. At that time, Cuba was maintaining its strict policy of forbidding its citizens from illegally exiting the country. In June 1994, violence by both the Cuban authorities and would-be asylum seekers escalated when, for example, Cuban authorities shot and killed a Cuban who was attempting to escape the island. From July 13 through August 8, 1994, at least 37 asylum seekers and 2 Cuban officials were killed in a series of boat hijackings. In addition, a riot erupted in Havana on August 5 when police attempted to disperse a crowd that had gathered when a false rumor circulated that a flotilla of boats was on its way to pick up people seeking to leave. On August 13, Fidel Castro gave a televised speech blaming the United States for the riots and violence and threatened to remove restrictions on Cubans exiting the country if the United States did not take steps to deter boat departures and return those hijackers who had reached the United States. Not receiving the response he anticipated from the United States, Castro indicated he would not prevent Cubans from leaving. Over the next week, Cubans flocked to the beaches, where they constructed make-shift vessels and set out to sea. As the flow of rafters increased, President Clinton announced on August 19, 1994, that the Coast Guard would no longer bring interdicted Cubans to the United States but would hold them at Guantanamo Bay. The President and the Attorney General indicated at that time that those Cubans taken to Guantanamo Bay would have no opportunity for eventual entry into the United States. This announcement reversed a 3-decade policy of welcoming Cubans seeking refuge into the United States. Many Cubans did not believe that the United States would actually enforce the new policy and consequently continued to leave Cuba. About 33,000 Cubans were picked up at sea and taken to Guantanamo Bay. Concerned about the continuing exodus, on September 9, 1994, the United States and Cuba signed an accord under which the United States agreed to admit at least 20,000 Cubans per year directly from Cuba through legal channels. The U.S. Interests Section in Havana estimated that this number would comprise approximately 7,000 refugees and family members, 8,000 immigrant visa recipients and their families, and 5,000 paroled through the Special Cuban Migration Program—a special lottery. The Cuban government agreed “to prevent unsafe departures using mainly persuasive methods.” Within days the Cuban police again were patrolling the roads leading to the beaches, under orders to arrest persons carrying rafts or the materials to build them, and Cubans stopped departing by raft. The United States later began granting parole to certain categories of Cubans in the safe haven camps at Guantanamo Bay. On October 14, 1994, President Clinton announced that parole would be granted to those over age 70, unaccompanied minors, or those with serious medical conditions and their caregivers. On December 2, 1994, the Attorney General announced that parole would be considered on a case-by-case basis for children and their immediate families who would be adversely affected by long-term presence in safe havens. These four categories became known as the “four protocols.” On May 2, 1995, the White House Press Secretary announced that Cubans interdicted at sea would no longer be taken to safe haven at Guantanamo Bay but would be returned to Cuba where they could apply for entry into the United States through legal channels at the U.S. Interests Section. In discussing this announcement, the Attorney General stated that measures would be taken to ensure that persons who claimed a genuine need for protection, which they believed could not be satisfied by applying at the U.S. Interests Section, would be examined before their return to Cuba. She also announced at that time that remaining Cubans at Guantanamo Bay—about 18,500 as of June 7, 1995—would be considered for parole into the United States, excluding those found to be ineligible for parole due to criminal activity in Cuba, in the United States, or while in safe haven and those with certain serious medical conditions. Within the executive branch, an interagency working group is responsible for developing strategies for implementing the Cuban migration policy. The working group is chaired by the National Security Council and includes representatives from the State Department’s Bureaus for Inter-American Affairs and Population, Refugees, and Migration and the Legal Advisor’s Office; the Department of Justice’s INS and CRS; the Defense Department’s Offices of the Secretary of Defense (Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs) and Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Coast Guard. The U.S. Interests Section in Havana is responsible for processing the more than 20,000 expected Cuban applicants for U.S. entry, annually. As of August 1995, the Interests Section had increased its processing staff to 6 full-time consular officers and about 3 temporary-duty consular officers, 4 INS officers, about 40 local nationals, and 4 U.S. and third country contract hires. Consular officers at the Interests Section process immigrant visa applications and prescreen parole applicants; the Refugee Coordinator prescreens refugee applicants. INS adjudicates refugee and parole applications in Havana and parole applications at Guantanamo Bay. The Defense Department is responsible for carrying out the safe haven program at Guantanamo Bay. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff oversee safe haven operations, and the U.S. Atlantic Command has operational responsibility. Joint Task Force (JTF)-160 executes the safe haven mission at Guantanamo—caring for the inhabitants, providing for their security and protection, and preparing them for travel to the United States. JTF-160 is also charged with the safety and security of U.S. personnel at Guantanamo Bay and the security of the station itself. The U.S. Coast Guard interdicts rafters at sea and, until May 2, 1995, it took them to safe haven at Guantanamo Bay. Since May 2, 1995, most Cubans interdicted at sea have been returned by the Coast Guard to Cuba. Civilian agencies implement various components of the safe haven program. The Department of State’s Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration provides assistance to the safe haven population at Guantanamo Bay through a grant to the World Relief Corporation. At Guantanamo Bay, CRS assists in parole processing and provides human resource services, such as family reunification, conciliation and mediation assistance and training, and recreation and education. CRS also provides resettlement assistance to parolees when they arrive in the United States. The State Department also maintains an officer in Guantanamo Bay as a liaison with the military and civilian agencies. Other organizations are also involved in Cuban migration operations at Guantanamo Bay. The World Relief Corporation, a nongovernmental organization, provides public health and social services, vocational training, mail services, and coordination of private donations. The International Organization for Migration (IOM), an intergovernmental organization based in Geneva, Switzerland, arranges resettlement for Cubans wishing to migrate to countries other than the United States. Pursuant to an agreement with the Cuban government to allow some voluntary repatriation over land rather than flying to Havana, IOM also arranges voluntary repatriation through the station’s Northeast Gate. IOM was also working with the remaining Haitians in camps at Guantanamo Bay. Considerable military and civilian personnel resources are at Guantanamo Bay to support the safe haven operation. As shown in table 1, more than 5,000 personnel were providing security and services to Cubans in the safe haven camp at the time of our visit in June 1995. INS planned to increase its personnel to at least 18 by the end of summer to augment parole eligibility determination. IOM, on the other hand, expects to decrease its presence to six as the remaining Haitians are repatriated or allowed entry into the United States. We estimate that the total cost of the U.S. response to the Cuban exodus from August 1994 through fiscal year 1995 will exceed $497 million (see table 2). This represents incremental costs, which are costs that agencies would not have incurred had there been no Cuban migration crisis. Defense costs include procuring construction materials, food, medical supplies, and miscellaneous items for camps at Guantanamo Bay and in Panama; shipping food and supplies; transporting military personnel to the camps and about 500 to 550 parolees to Homestead Air Force Base, Florida, each week; and moving 8,763 Cubans from Guantanamo Bay to Panama in September 1994 and 7,291 back again in February 1995. Defense does not budget for such migrant operations, and it requested a $370-million supplemental appropriation for fiscal year 1995 to minimize the impact of these activities on military operations. Coast Guard expenses cover the costs of patrolling the waters between Cuba and Florida and bringing people to Guantanamo Bay and Cuba. CRS’ costs primarily cover resettlement assistance to parolees arriving in the United States (about $31.3 million). State Department costs include expanding consular processing in Havana and providing a liaison officer at Guantanamo Bay and a grant to the World Relief Corporation to provide services at the safe haven camps.