Recent disclosures of various National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance and data collection programs have prompted increased attention on the government's collection of foreign intelligence. Pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) reviews government applications to conduct electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISA Court of Review) reviews decisions of the FISC. Due to concerns about the size and scope of the foreign intelligence collection programs authorized by orders of the FISC, many have suggested substantive changes to the underlying legal authorities relied on by the government to collect foreign intelligence, while others have proposed altering the practices and procedures of the FISA Courts. After a short overview of the FISA judicial review process, this report will briefly analyze the latter set of proposals. First, this report examines proposals to introduce a public advocate into FISA Court proceedings, a third party who would argue against the government's application to the FISC. Second, the report explores various other proposals that would alter the procedural and operational mechanisms of the FISA Courts, such as appointing an amicus curiae , or friend of the court, to assist the court in addressing novel legal issues. Third, the report will consider measures designed to displace the authority to designate judges to the FISA Court. Finally, the last section discusses the legal implications of proposals that would require the executive branch to release FISA Court opinions. The FISC is an Article III court composed of 11 district court judges selected by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court from at least seven of the regional judicial circuits. While judges of traditional Article III courts are selected via presidential appointment and Senate confirmation, FISC and FISA Court of Review judges are "designated" to the court by the Chief Justice. The FISC's jurisdiction is limited to hearing applications and granting orders for "the collection of foreign intelligence by the federal government." This includes four types of investigative methods: (1) electronic surveillance; (2) physical searches; (3) pen register/trap and trace surveillance; and (4) orders to compel the production of tangible things. The government may appeal a denial of an application to the FISA Court of Review. The FISC is also authorized to review the government's certifications, minimization, and targeting procedures concerning targeting of non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be abroad. The FISA Court of Review has jurisdiction to review FISC decisions to modify or set aside directives and decisions to compel compliance with them. Additionally, the FISC may, on its own initiative, or upon the request of the government in any proceeding, or a party in any proceeding under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act or Section 702 of FISA, hold a hearing or rehearing en banc . An en banc panel consists of all the judges who constitute the FISC. In light of the sensitive national security concerns respecting its docket, the FISA Courts operate largely in secret and in a non-adversarial fashion. Court sessions are conducted in secret, are generally held ex parte with the government as the only party presenting arguments to the court, and the court's opinions are rarely released. As noted by the FISC, whereas "[o]ther courts operate primarily in public, with secrecy the exception[,] the FISC operates primarily in secret, with public access the exception." However, recipients of production orders under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and directives under Section 702 of FISA may challenge the legality of orders by petitioning the court. In the event of a contested hearing, FISA permits in camera review—private review by a court without the challenging party receiving access—of classified information upon motion by the government. The executive branch classifies most filings made to the FISC as Secret or Top Secret before they are sent to the court, and the FISC's opinions and orders in the possession of the executive branch are similarly classified. The executive branch can choose to declassify portions of opinions, or entire opinions and release them to the public. It has done so a number of times since the disclosure of the NSA data collection programs. Some critics of the FISA process have noted the infrequency of FISC rejections of the government's surveillance requests and suggested that the lack of an adversarial process prevents the court from adequately scrutinizing the government's position. Accordingly, a number of legislative proposals seek to allow another attorney to challenge the government's FISA requests in order to protect civil liberty interests. These proposals have varied according to nomenclature, the structural placement of a potential advocate, and the appointing authority. Nonetheless, most proposals embody three unifying themes. First, an advocate would oppose the government's request for FISA orders on behalf of the privacy and civil liberties interests of the public. Second, an advocate would take on a robust role in FISA Court proceedings. While the various proposals differ at the margins, public advocate measures generally envision the advocate having a range of responsibilities, such as being able to intervene in ongoing cases, brief the FISC on relevant matters, conduct some forms of discovery, file motions seeking discrete forms of relief from the court, move the court to reconsider past orders, or even appeal an adverse ruling. Finally, proposals envision giving the advocate a measure of independence from the President so as to enjoy unfettered discretion to oppose the government's applications. Before examining the constitutional implications of the establishment of a public advocate, a threshold matter is whether an advocate is a government actor subject to the constraints of the Constitution. The determination ultimately depends on whether the advocate is a permanently constituted entity. At the onset, Congress's labeling of an entity as non-governmental is not determinative. Instead, courts will examine a number of factors, including whether establishing a public advocate furthers a government objective. A permanently constituted advocate seeking injunctive relief based on a violation of law in the interest of the general public might be viewed as engaging in a government function; while a private party appointed temporarily to litigate on behalf of the public might not be considered an arm of the government. Assuming a public advocate who is permanently constituted is an arm of the government and subject to constitutional constraints, the proposed agency must comply with the Appointments Clause of Article II of the Constitution. Under its terms, principal officers must be appointed by the President subject to Senate confirmation; Congress may vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President, the courts, or in department heads. In contrast, employees are not subject to the Appointments Clause, as they are "lesser functionaries subordinate to the officers of the United States." Accordingly, the first relevant issue is whether a public advocate would be an officer of the United States. The Supreme Court has held that the term officer encompasses "any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States." The Court did not extensively analyze what constitutes significant authority, although the Department of Justice's (DOJ's) Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) has argued that this definition includes (1) the "delegation of a sovereign authority" that includes "a legal power which may be rightfully exercised, and in its effects will bind the rights of others" and (2) a "continuing" position. Accordingly, a permanent public advocate could be viewed as an officer, especially if he has the power to seek judicial relief on behalf of the public. The Supreme Court has found that an entity with "primary responsibility" to conduct "civil litigation in the courts of the United States for vindicating public rights ... may be discharged only by ... 'Officers of the United States' within the language of [the Appointments Clause.]" In contrast, proposals that permit private attorneys to be appointed for a single case or permit amici to offer advisory briefs to the court would likely not require adherence to the requirements of the Appointments Clause. Assuming a public advocate is an officer, the next question would be whether an advocate is a principal or inferior officer, because principal officers must be appointed by the President with the Senate's confirmation. The relevant test for distinguishing an inferior officer is the ability of a principal officer—appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate—to control the officer's conduct. The proposals that create an advocate largely do not establish an advocate who would be "directed and supervised at some level by" another principal officer, and thus appear to create an office headed by a principal officer. Leaving aside Appointments Clause concerns, utilizing a public advocate in FISA proceedings might also raise Article III issues. Federal courts are limited to adjudicating cases and controversies, which requires a live dispute that is "definite and concrete." Some commentators have questioned whether allowing the government—through DOJ and the public advocate—to "literally argue both sides of a legal case" satisfies the requirement that courts adjudicate live cases and controversies. There are two possible answers to this question, which largely depend on (1) a determination of what the FISC's role is in approving FISA applications and (2) what the role of the FISA advocate is. One might argue that the role of the judiciary in FISA proceedings is incidental to the exercise of the judicial function and therefore FISA proceedings need not satisfy the case or controversy requirement. This reasoning derives from Morrison v. Olson and Mistretta v. United States , where the Supreme Court suggested that federal courts may engage in certain non-adjudicatory, non-adversarial activities without violating Article III's restrictions. Specifically, these opinions indicate that Article III courts may perform a variety of non-adversarial tasks, such as approving search warrants and wiretaps, because they are incidental to an adversarial proceeding that does meet Article III requirements. The FISA Court of Review may have adopted this line of reasoning in rejecting an Article III challenge to FISA proceedings. If this line of argumentation is controlling, there is at least some authority for the notion that FISA proceedings are incidental to the judiciary's powers.