Federal excess and underutilized property is an ongoing challenge facing the government due in part to unreliable data. In June 2012, we found that the FRPC did not ensure that key data elements—including buildings’ utilization, condition, annual operating costs, mission dependency, and value—were defined and reported consistently and accurately. For example, the FRPP data did not accurately describe the properties at 23 of the 26 locations we visited, often overstating the condition and annual operating costs of buildings. The types of inconsistencies and inaccuracies we identified in these five key data elements suggest that the FRPP database is not a useful decision-making tool for managing federal real property. Our review focused on five civilian federal real property-holding agencies—GSA and the departments of Energy (DOE), the Interior (Interior), Veterans Affairs (VA), and Agriculture (USDA). We reviewed key agency-reported FRPP data elements including utilization, condition index, annual operating costs, and value, and we found inconsistencies and inaccuracies for each of these data elements. For example, several buildings that received high scores for condition were actually in poor condition, with problems including: asbestos, mold, health concerns, radioactivity, and flooding (see fig. 1). In addition to the various problems we found and documented with real property data, we have also found that the federal government continues to face other challenges when managing excess and underutilized properties. Such challenges include (1) the high cost of property disposal, (2) legal requirements prior to disposal such as those related to preserving historical properties and the environment, (3) stakeholder resistance to property disposal or reuse plans, and (4) remote property locations that make selling or disposal difficult. Given the complexities of issues related to excess and underutilized federal real property management, unsuccessful implementation of cost savings efforts across administrations, and the issues that remain with data reporting, we concluded that a national strategy could provide a clear path forward to help federal agencies manage excess and underutilized property in the long term. A national strategy can guide federal agencies and other stakeholders to systematically identify risks, resources needed to address those risks, and investment priorities when managing federal portfolios. Without a national strategy, the federal government may be ill-equipped to sustain efforts to better manage excess and underutilized property. In our June 2012 report, we recommended that OMB, in consultation with the FRPC, develop a national strategy for managing federal excess and underutilized real property. OMB did not directly state whether it agreed or disagreed with our recommendation. Up to now, no comprehensive national strategy has been issued. We view such a strategy as a key step needed to improve the federal government’s management of its real property portfolio. Additionally, FRPP is not yet a useful tool for describing the nature, use, and extent of excess and underutilized federal real property. We concluded in June 2012 that FRPP data must be consistent and reliable to help decision makers overcome these long-standing problems. Accordingly, in the same report, we recommended that GSA and FRPC take action to improve the FRPP. GSA stated that they intend to improve the agency’s management of FRPP data by: making enhancements to clearly define data collection requirements, performing data quality tests and assessments to ensure data developing new performance measures to support government-wide goals, and improving collaboration with agencies. GSA developed an action plan for implementing GAO’s recommendations and was scheduled to complete these changes by June 2013. We are in the process of determining whether these actions improve FRPP consistency and reliability. We plan to report our results as part of our 2015 high risk update. The federal government manages a wide variety of structures that represent over half of the federal government’s real property assets, including roads and parking structures, utility systems, monuments, and radio towers. In January 2014, we found that incorrect and inconsistent data on structures limit the value of the government-wide FRPP data the government collects. First, at the most basic level, some of the data agencies submit on their structures are incorrect, undermining agencies’ ability to manage their structures and the reliability of the data in FRPP. Second, even if agencies effectively apply the OMB guidance, the government-wide data will continue to face reliability problems because of the flexibility built into FRPP guidance on how agencies track key elements, such as defining and counting structures. For example, agencies we reviewed—including the Department of Transportation (DOT), DOE, VA, USDA, and Interior—defined structures differently leading to inconsistencies in what assets are included in the FRPP. Figure 2 provides examples of some facilities we visited that were classified as structures, even though they were similar to buildings (having features such as walls, roofs, doors, windows, and air- conditioning systems in some cases). We concluded that agencies must improve their data quality in order to document performance and support decision making. Additionally, the agencies we reviewed submitted incorrect information for key data elements for structures, such as replacement value, annual operating costs, and condition. GSA officials who manage the FRPP said that FRPC chose to provide flexibility in the reporting guidance for data on structures to account for the wide diversity in federal structures, but it also aggregates the data as if they were comparable. We found that, even if this data were useful, FRPC reports very little information on structures. Officials at GSA told us that there is low interest in and demand for this information, creating few incentives to improve data reliability. We recommended that OMB, in coordination with the FRPC, develop guidance to improve agencies’ internal controls to produce consistent, accurate and reliable information on their structures. We also recommended that GSA, in coordination with the FRPC, clarify the definition of structures and assess the feasibility of limiting the data collected on structures submitted to the FRPP. OMB and GSA agreed with the recommendations, and GSA provided an action plan in December 2013 to implement them, but no timeframe was provided for when the proposed actions would be completed. In a 2014 report, we found that civilian agencies followed most leading practices in managing their facility maintenance and repair backlogs, except for transparent reporting about the funding amounts agencies are spending to maintain their assets and manage their backlogs. However, the deferred maintenance and repair of federal real property contributes to deteriorating assets in the federal inventory, and we found that the eventual need to address deferred maintenance and repair could significantly affect future budget resources. The five federal agencies we reviewed for our 2014 report— GSA, DOE, VA, Interior, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) — reported fiscal year 2012 deferred maintenance and repair backlog estimates that ranged from nearly $1 billion to $20 billion. However, agencies do not share a common definition of deferred maintenance, resulting in dissimilar backlog estimates. In addition, financial reporting requirements as well as FRPP reporting guidance do not require a specific process for determining deferred maintenance and repair backlogs, and agencies can use their existing processes to do so. For example, Interior excludes, while DHS includes, costs for some assets scheduled for disposal. As a result, when agencies report information in their financial reports and to FRPP, data include dissimilar backlog estimates and makes estimates across agencies not comparable. As such, an opportunity exists to better conform to leading practices and increase transparency. We recommended that OMB, in collaboration with agencies, collect and report information on agencies’ costs for annual maintenance and repair performed and funding spent to manage their existing backlogs. OMB agreed with our recommendation, and along with FRPC, has taken actions to improve management of deferred maintenance, including working to refine FRPP data and develop performance measures that reflect current federal real-property management priorities, but OMB has not yet fully implemented our recommendation. Thus, as OMB and FRPC agencies work to improve FRPP data and develop new performance metrics, the opportunity exists to revise requirements for agencies to collect and report costs of annual maintenance and repair and to address deferred maintenance and repair backlogs as we recommended earlier this year. In June 2010, the President issued a memorandum directing federal agencies to achieve $3 billion in real property cost savings by the end of fiscal year 2012 through a number of methods, including disposal of excess property, energy efficiency improvements, and other space consolidation efforts. Agencies reported real property cost savings of $3.8 billion across the OMB categories of disposal, space management, sustainability, and innovation in response to the June 2010 presidential memorandum. Space management savings, defined by OMB as those savings resulting from, among other things, consolidations or the elimination of lease arrangements that were not cost effective, accounted for the largest portion of savings reported by all agencies. In October 2013, we found that space management savings accounted for about 70 percent of the savings reported by the six agencies we reviewed— GSA, USDA, DOE, DHS, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Department of State (State). The requirements of the memorandum, as well as agencies’ individual savings targets and the time frame for reporting savings, led the selected agencies to primarily report savings from activities that were planned or under way at the time the memorandum was issued. GAO’s October 2013 review of the six selected agencies found several problems that affected the reliability and transparency of the cost savings data that the government reported in response to the June 2010 memorandum. For example, OMB did not require agencies to provide detailed documentation of their reported savings or include specific information about agencies’ reported savings on Performance.gov, limiting transparency. Furthermore the memorandum and subsequent guidance issued by OMB were not clear on the types of savings that could be reported, particularly because the term “cost savings” was not clearly defined. For instance, officials from several agencies we reviewed said the guidance was unclear about whether savings from cost avoidance measures could be reported. In addition some agencies made different assumptions in reporting disposal savings. Some agencies did not deduct costs associated with disposals, and some reported savings outside the time frame of the memorandum.