United States-China relations, since 196 9, when the process of normalization began under President Richard M. Nixon, have advanced to a point that relatively few restrictions affecting trade remain. This report summarizes the United States' economic sanctions on China, including limits on U.S. foreign assistance and State Department programs; limits on U.S. support for China's requests for funding in the international financial institutions; prohibitions on the exportation of defense articles and defense services to China; prohibitions on the importation of munitions and ammunition from China; limits on exports to China of goods and services controlled for national security or foreign policy reasons, including a prohibition on exports to specific Chinese entities of goods that have a military end-use; limits on import/export and procurement contracts for specific Chinese entities found to be engaged in weapons proliferation activities; and restrictions on access to U.S.-based assets and ability to enter into transactions with U.S. persons, imposed on specific Chinese persons for reasons ranging from weapons proliferation, illicit narcotics trafficking, international terrorism, and engagement with others against which the United States imposes sanctions (i.e., entities in Iran, Russia, North Korea, Belarus). Economic sanctions may be defined as coercive economic measures taken against a target to bring about a change in policies. They typically include measures such as: trade embargoes, restrictions on particular exports or imports, denial of foreign assistance, loans, and investments, or control of foreign assets and economic transactions that involve U.S. citizens or businesses. The decision to apply economic trade and aid sanctions can be based, to some extent, on a country's record with respect to human rights, religious freedom, international terrorism, terrorist financing, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of regional stability, treaty violations, international narcotics trafficking, trafficking in persons, trafficking in protected natural resources and endangered species, child abduction, interference with democratic processes, war crimes, corruption, cyber espionage, and money laundering. The Departments of State, the Treasury, and Commerce are primarily responsible for administering the use of economic sanctions in U.S. foreign policy and national security policy, though the entire interagency has a role. In the immediate wake of the government of China's crackdown against pro-democracy protesters on June 4, 1989 in and around Tiananmen Square, President George H.W. Bush suspended U.S. foreign aid, government-to-government arms sales and military exchanges, commercial arms sales, high-level government exchanges, export licenses, and support in international financial institutions for loans and grants to China. Congress followed up by enacting three bills that continued the President's initial steps and added a few other restrictions (in order of enactment): The Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1990, prohibited funds from being "used to reinstate, or approve any export license applications for the launch of United States-built satellites on ... Chinese-built launch vehicles.... " The International Development and Finance Act of 1989 prohibited the U.S. Export-Import Bank from financing trade, making loans, credits, credit guarantees, or issuing insurance or reinsurance to China. The Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, continued the President's suspension of Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) financing for China and export licenses for defense articles and defense services and satellites with an end-use in China, and required the President to suspend U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) funding and export licenses for crime control equipment for China. The President could terminate any of the restrictions, those extending his initial actions and those creating new restrictions, if he reported to Congress: (1) that the Government of the People's Republic of China has made progress on a program of political reform throughout the country, including Tibet, which includes— (A) lifting of martial law; (B) halting of executions and other reprisals against individuals for the nonviolent expression of their political beliefs; (C) release of political prisoners; (D) increased respect for internationally recognized human rights, including freedom of expression, the press, assembly, and association; and (E) permitting a freer flow of information, including an end to the jamming of Voice of America and greater access for foreign journalists;.... Alternatively, the President could find it in the U.S. national interest to resume financial programs, export licensing, and nuclear cooperation. Incrementally, all but two of the Tiananmen Square sanctions have been waived, either on a case-by-case basis or more broadly removed, or have been made obsolete by other circumstances. The remaining sanctions—a suspension of OPIC funding and restrictions on export licenses for U.S. Munitions List (USML) items and crime control equipment—are incorporated in the paragraphs addressing foreign aid and trade, below. The United States provides foreign assistance to China, in the form of programs that assist Tibetan communities, provides HIV/AIDS and other infectious disease intervention, and funds a Resident Legal Advisor who operates out of the U.S. Embassy in Beijing to "provide expertise on criminal law and procedure to Chinese officials, jurists, and academics.... " Since 1993, the U.S. Peace Corps has deployed volunteers to China, mostly to serve as English teachers in China's secondary schools and universities. Foreign operations and State Department appropriations for FY2016 provide that: None of the funds provided for the State Department's Diplomatic and Consular Programs may be used to process licenses for the export of satellites of U.S. origin to China (including commercial satellites and satellite components) without prior notification to the Committees on Appropriations. The President, already required by foreign aid authorities to "adopt regulations and establish procedures to insure that United States foreign aid is not used in a manner which, contrary to the best interests of the United States, promotes or assists the foreign aid projects of any country that is a Communist country," is further required to apply such conditionality to projects or activities "by any entity that is owned or controlled by" China's People's Liberation Army (PLA). The Secretary of State, furthermore, is required to prohibit the use of funds appropriated or otherwise made available in the FY2016 foreign operations and State Department appropriations to "finance any grant, contract, or cooperative agreement with the PLA, or any entity that the Secretary of State has reason to believe is owned or controlled by, or an affiliate of, the PLA." Funds appropriated for public diplomacy are to be used "to counter the influence of" China. Any foreign aid made available for a "business and human rights program" must be matched by sources other than the U.S. government. U.S. funds to the U.N. Population Fund (UNFPA) are prohibited for use in China. The UNFPA must keep U.S. contributions separate from its other funds, and must document its expenditures in China. The United States reduces its contribution to UNFPA by the amount the organization budgets for China. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation's China program was suspended in days following the Tiananmen crackdown and remains suspended. The purpose of OPIC is to "facilitate the participation of United States private capital and skills in the economic and social development of less developed countries and areas, and countries in transition from nonmarket to market economies" by providing political risk insurance, project and investment funds financing, and other services. China's economic development in the 25 years since Tiananmen Square nearly, but not quite, graduates the country out of the qualifying range for OPIC investment. The United States generally continues to abstain from or vote "No" in the international financial institutions when loans for projects in China are considered. In May 2016, the month on which the U.S. Department of the Treasury has most recently reported, the World Bank's International Finance Corporation and General Environmental Facility, and the Asian Development Bank considered eight requests for various projects in China (including one regional project and one no-cost project), totaling some $209.4 million. Of these, the United States abstained from voting in six instances. The U.S. executive directors to the banks are required by law to vote "No" or abstain on human rights grounds, unless the project supports basic human needs. The United States also takes into account a range of other factors, including potential environmental degradation, worker rights, trade distortion, and conditions in Tibet. Once a project is brought up for a vote, however, no one country holds singular power to block a loan or grant. In addition to the restrictions on appropriations related to foreign assistance and State Department programs, Section 1673, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 ( P.L. 114-92 ; 129 Stat. 1130), prohibits the use of defense appropriations "to integrate a missile defense system of the People's Republic of China into any missile defense system of the United States." Section 515, Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2016 (division B, P.L. 114-113 ; 129 Stat. 2326), prohibits the use of appropriations for the Departments of Commerce and Justice, NASA, or the National Science Foundation to acquire a "high-impact or moderate-impact information system" unless that system meets a number of assessments related to supply chain risk, risk of cyber-espionage, or sabotage, "including any risk associated with such system being produced, manufactured, or assembled by one or more entities identified by the United States Government as posing a cyber threat, including but not limited to, those that may be owned, directed, or subsidized by the People's Republic of China." Section 531, Science Appropriations Act, 2016 (division B, title III, P.L. 114-113 ; 129 Stat.