Congress established the Stockpile Stewardship Program in the FY1994 National Defense Authorization Act ( P.L. 103-160 ). The goal of the program, as amended by the FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act ( P.L. 111-84 , §3111), is to ensure "that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable without the use of underground nuclear weapons testing." The program is operated by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within DOE that Congress established in the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act ( P.L. 106-65 , Title XXXII). NNSA also manages two other programs, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and Naval Reactors. Stockpile stewardship consists of all activities in NNSA's Weapons Activities account. It consists of four programs with funding of over $1 billion each and several smaller programs, all of which are discussed in detail below. Table 1 presents Weapons Activities funding. Most stewardship activities take place at the nuclear weapons complex (the "complex"), which consists of three laboratories (Los Alamos National Laboratory, NM; Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, CA; and Sandia National Laboratories, NM and CA); four production sites (Kansas City Plant, MO; Pantex Plant, TX; Savannah River Site, SC; and Y-12 National Security Complex, TN); and the Nevada National Security Site (formerly Nevada Test Site). NNSA manages and sets policy for the complex; contractors to NNSA operate the eight sites. While the nuclear weapons complex currently consists of eight sites, it had many more personnel and sites during the Cold War. Despite post-Cold War reductions, many in Congress have for years wanted the complex to change further, in various ways: fewer personnel, greater efficiency, smaller footprint at each site, increased security, and the like. After numerous exchanges between DOE and the appropriating and authorizing committees, such issues still remain. According to a White House document of May 2010, the President provided Congress with a classified report (the "1251 report") required by the FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 1251, "on the comprehensive plan to: (1) maintain delivery platforms [that is, bombers, missiles, and submarines that deliver nuclear weapons]; (2) sustain a safe, secure, and reliable U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile; and (3) modernize the nuclear weapons complex." According to that document, "the Administration intends to invest $80 billion in the next decade to sustain and modernize the nuclear weapons complex." The Administration submitted a revised Section 1251 report in November 2010, projecting weapons stockpile and infrastructure costs for FY2011-FY2020 at between $85.4 billion and $86.2 billion. The request for FY2015 was below the 1251 report figure; in contrast, the request for FY2016 is about at the 1251 report's figure for that year, and projections for FY2017-FY2020 are above the figures in the 1251 report, as Table 2 shows. Along with reconfiguring the nuclear weapons complex, there have been concerns for decades about the proper organization of the federal agency responsible for managing it. While the Army managed the nuclear weapons program during World War II, Congress, in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, created the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) as an independent civilian agency to manage that program. In the Energy Research and Development Act of 1974, Congress dissolved the AEC and created the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), which among other functions managed the nuclear weapons program. That program was moved again by the Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, which dissolved ERDA and created DOE. In 2000, as noted above, Congress created NNSA as a separately organized agency within DOE. In part, these reorganizations stem from long-standing concerns about the management of the nuclear weapons complex. Many reports have been written over the past several decades to address this issue. Most recently, in the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 112-239 , Congress established the Congressional Advisory Panel on the Governance of the Nuclear Security Enterprise and directed the panel to make recommendations on "the most appropriate governance structure, mission, and management of the nuclear security enterprise." In its report to Congress, the panel stated: the panel finds that the existing governance structures and many of the practices of the enterprise are inefficient and ineffective, thereby putting the entire enterprise at risk over the long term. These problems have not occurred overnight; they are the result of decades of neglect. This is in spite of the efforts of many capable and dedicated people who must nonetheless function within the confines of a dysfunctional system.… One unmistakable conclusion is that NNSA governance reform, at least as it has been implemented, has failed to provide the effective, mission-focused enterprise that Congress intended. The panel's recommendations included strengthening presidential guidance and oversight of the nuclear enterprise; establishing new congressional mechanisms for leadership and oversight of the enterprise; replacing NNSA with a new Office of Nuclear Security within DOE, renamed to the Department of Energy and Nuclear Security, with the Secretary responsible for the mission; and building a culture of performance, accountability, and credibility. Owing to concerns about cost growth and transparency, P.L. 113-235 contained several sections relating to cost and oversight. Section 304 required construction of high-hazard nuclear facilities to have independent oversight by the Office of Independent Enterprise Assessments "to ensure the project is in compliance with nuclear safety requirements." Section 305 required an independent cost estimate for approving performance baseline and starting construction for projects with total cost over $100 million. Section 308 required the Secretary of Energy to provide an analysis of alternatives for each major warhead refurbishment program reaching the development engineering stage. Similarly, in its FY2016 report on energy and water development appropriations, S.Rept. 114-54 , the Senate Appropriations Committee expressed its concern "with the continued poor cost estimating by the Department, particularly within the NNSA," and directed the Secretary of Energy to "provide a report … that outlines the Department's plan for improving cost estimating for major projects and programs." This program involves work directly on nuclear weapons in the stockpile, such as monitoring their condition; maintaining them through repairs, refurbishment, life extension, and modifications; conducting R&D in support of specific warheads; and dismantlement. The FY2016 request was $3,187.3 million; the enacted amount, on a comparable basis, for FY2015 was $2,797.2 million. The House Appropriations Committee recommended $3,354.3 million for FY2016. The House passed H.R. 2028 , Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2016, by a vote of 240-177, without amendments to the Weapons Activities section of the bill as reported from committee. The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended $3,039.5 million for FY2016. Specific items under DSW include the following: These programs aim to extend the life of existing warheads through design, certification, manufacture, and replacement of components. An LEP for the W76 warhead for the Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) is ongoing, as is an LEP for the B61 mod 12. (A "mod," such as B61 mod 12 or B61-12, is a modification or version of a bomb or warhead type.) For FY2016, the amounts requested by NNSA for LEPs are as follows. H.R. 2028 , as passed by the House, provided the requested amounts; the Senate Appropriations Committee likewise recommended providing the requested amounts. The omnibus appropriations bill also approved these amounts. $244.0 million for the W76-1 LEP. The first production unit (FPU) was completed in FY2008, with production scheduled to be completed by FY2019. $643.3 million for the B61-12 LEP, with the FPU by the second quarter of FY2020. $220.2 million for the W88 Alt [Alteration] 370, to provide an arming-fuzing-firing system among other things, with the FPU in the first quarter of FY2020. The House Appropriations Committee, noting a growth in scope of work planned for the W88, directed NNSA to integrate the cost of certain other work to refurbish this warhead into selected acquisition reports for the W88 LEP. In contrast, the Senate Appropriations Committee, in commenting on the Alt 370, noted that alterations are "much less intensive" than LEPs and stated that the distinction between the two "is important, and should be maintained." The omnibus appropriations bill directed NNSA to "clearly account for all costs of any major multi-year stockpile refurbishment activity with a total cost greater than $1,000,000,000" and to "ensure a formal and comprehensive acquisition management plan is in place to manage such efforts." $195.0 million for the W80-4, a cruise missile warhead LEP. FY2015 was the first year for which NNSA requested funds for this warhead under the LEP heading. The LEP would seek to use common components from other LEPs and to improve warhead safety and security. The FPU is scheduled for FY2025. The House Appropriations Committee expressed its concern "that the NNSA has already settled on two alternatives for the W80-4 that are more expensive than the B61 life extension program … [and] has a history of spending large amounts of funding to develop alternatives that are tabled in order to pursue a more affordable option." Accordingly, the committee directed NNSA to task an independent group "to perform a red team assessment of the NNSA's alternatives selected for the W80-4 life extension program."