At the federal level, interest in performance budgeting has led to numerous initiatives since World War II, including four that were governmentwide in scope: (1) reforms flowing from the first Hoover Commission in its efforts to downsize the post-World War II government, (2) Planning-Programming-Budgeting-System (PPBS) begun in 1965 by President Johnson, (3) Management by Objectives (MBO) initiated in 1973 by President Nixon, and (4) Zero-Base Budgeting (ZBB) initiated in 1977 by President Carter. Each of these efforts established unique procedures for linking resources with results. The following discussion briefly summarizes and relates each of these initiatives; appendixes II through V provide additional background information. First championed in 1949 by the Hoover Commission, a federal “performance budget” was intended to shift the focus away from the inputs of government to its functions, activities, costs, and accomplishments. Rather than emphasizing items of expenditure—for example, salaries, rent, and supplies—a performance budget was to describe the expected outputs resulting from a specific function or activity—for example, weapons, training, insurance claims, construction projects, or research activities. Consistent with the Commission’s recommendations, the Congress enacted the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950 (BAPA), which, among other things, required the President to present in his budget submission to the Congress the “functions and activities” of the government, ultimately institutionalized as a new budget presentation: “obligations by activities.” These presentations were intended to describe the major programs, projects, or activities associated with each federal budget request—in a sense, the “performance budget” of a government which at that time was primarily involved in directly providing specific goods and services. Workload and unit cost information began to appear in the President’s Budget, associated with the “obligations by activities” presentations, providing a means of publicly reporting the outputs of federal spending. The Planning-Programming-Budgeting-System (PPBS), mandated governmentwide by President Johnson in 1965, assumed that different levels and types of performance could be arrayed, quantified and analyzed to make the best budgetary decisions. In essence, PPBS introduced a decision-making framework to the executive branch budget formulation process by presenting and analyzing choices among long-term policy objectives and alternative ways of achieving them. Multiyear planning was to be based on an agency’s “program structure,” which was to provide a coherent statement of a national need, an agency’s directive to fill that need, and the activities planned to meet it. Performance was generally defined as agency outputs, with an agency’s program structure linking outputs to long-term objectives. Systems analysis and other sophisticated analytical tools were an intrinsic part of PPBS, with measurement seen as an essential means to better understand federal outputs, benefits, and costs. Management by Objectives, which was primarily a federal management improvement initiative, ultimately sought to link agencies’ stated objectives to their budget requests. Initiated by President Nixon in 1973, MBO put in place a process to hold agency managers responsible for achieving agreed-upon outputs and outcomes. Agency heads would be accountable for achieving presidential objectives of national importance; managers within an agency would be held accountable for objectives set jointly by supervisors and subordinates. Performance was primarily defined as agency outputs and processes, but efforts were also made to define performance as the results of federal spending—what would today be called “outcomes.” Zero-Base Budgeting (ZBB) was an executive branch budget formulation process introduced into the federal government in 1977 by President Carter. Its main focus was on optimizing accomplishments available at alternative budgetary levels. Under ZBB agencies were expected to set priorities based on the program results that could be achieved at alternative spending levels, one of which was to be below current funding. In developing budget proposals, these alternatives were to be ranked against each other sequentially from the lowest level organizations up through the department and without reference to a past budgetary base. In concept, ZBB sought a clear and precise link between budgetary resources and program results. Past initiatives, although generally perceived as having fallen far short of stated goals, contributed to the evolution of performance-based measurement and budgeting in the federal government. Many concepts first introduced by these initiatives became absorbed in the federal government and persisted long after their origins in PPBS, MBO, or ZBB had been forgotten. Hoover Commission reforms ultimately led to permanent changes in the President’s budget presentations and a greater inclusion of performance information in the narrative summaries associated with each budget account. The “obligations by activities” presentations established in response to the Commission’s performance budgeting recommendations continue today, although they are now referred to as “obligations by program activity” or, more informally, “program activities.” PPBS and MBO fostered exploration of difficult performance measurement issues, ultimately demonstrating the inherent limitations of analysis in a political environment and the often complex and uncertain relationship between federal activities, outputs, and outcomes. ZBB illustrated the usefulness of defining and presenting alternative funding levels and expanded participation of program managers in the budget process. When viewed collectively the past initiatives suggest two common themes. First, any effort to link plans and budgets—that is, to link the responsibility of the executive to define strategies and approaches with the legislative “power of the purse”—must explicitly involve both branches of our government. PPBS and ZBB faltered in large part because they intentionally attempted to develop performance plans and measures in isolation from congressional oversight and resource allocation processes. Since goals, objectives, and activities were not jointly discussed and agreed upon, there was no consensus on what performance should be, how to measure it, or how to integrate performance information with resource decisions. Second, the concept of performance budgeting has and will likely continue to evolve. Past initiatives illustrate a progression from the straight-forward, efficiency notion implicit in the Hoover Commission recommendations, through the increasingly complex and mechanistic processes of PPBS and ZBB. Budgeting is the process of making choices, and all of these initiatives sought to improve the rationality of budget choices by focusing on the results of activities—however those results might be defined. This history suggests that no single definition of performance budgeting encompasses the range of past and present needs and interests of federal decisionmakers. One commentator has summarized this reality as follows. “To a student of politics and of legislative bodies, it means . . . a presentation and review of budget requests in such a manner as to emphasize issues and make possible more effective choices. To a top administrator, it . . . also greater flexibility and discretion in his operations, plus better control and accountability with regard to his subordinates. Down the line of an agency, it may mean a single source for funds, an enlargement of authority, flexibility, and responsibility in the use of funds. . . . To the accountant, it means accrual accounting, cost accounting, segregation of capital from operating accounts, working capital funds, and many other techniques.” In other words, the multiplicity of definitions reflects the differences in the roles various participants play in the budget process. And, given the complexity and enormity of the federal budget process, performance budgeting at the federal level will need to encompass a variety of perspectives in its efforts to link resources with results. As the current federal initiative seeking to link resources to results, GPRA seeks to involve all participants, directly ties plans and measures to budget presentations, and centers attention on outcome performance measurement. GPRA requires all federal agencies to set strategic goals in consultation with the Congress and key stakeholders; develop plans for program activities; measure performance; and annually report to the President and the Congress on the degree to which goals were met. Appendix VI contains additional information on GPRA’s purposes and requirements. GPRA can be seen as melding the best features of its predecessors. Its required connection to budget presentations harkens back to BAPA; its interest in performance measurement and cross-agency comparisons reflects PPBS; and its concern with outcomes and outputs emulates MBO. In performance budgeting terms, GPRA avoids the mechanistic approaches of previous efforts, notably PPBS and ZBB. The Senate committee report on GPRA emphasized that although “this Act contains no provision authorizing or implementing a performance budget,” it was imperative that the “Congress develop a clear understanding of what it is getting in the way of results from each dollar spent.” Recognizing that “it is unclear how best to present information and what the results will be,” GPRA requires pilot projects to develop alternative forms of performance budgets. As one observer has noted, “there is no magic bullet that will replace budget judgement and budget policies with science.” Past initiatives demonstrate that any link between performance information and resource allocation decisions is unlikely to be straightforward. The implicit presumptions of PPBS and ZBB—that systematic analysis of options could substitute for political judgment—ultimately proved unsustainable. GPRA recognizes that decisionmakers, rather than budget systems, must provide judgments needed within a public sector context. That is, in a political process, performance information can be one, but not the only factor in budgetary choice; performance information can change the terms of debate, but not necessarily the ultimate decision. Finally, GPRA should be seen as part of a series of critical managerial and financial reform efforts currently underway in the federal government that share common goals of better management and accountability for results. For example, the Chief Financial Officers Act and efforts by the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board seek to increase public confidence in government through improved financial reporting. These efforts will, among other things, help achieve improved cost accounting and reliability of data, essential steps in accurately matching resources to program performance. In its structure, focus, and approach, GPRA incorporates important lessons from past federal performance budgeting initiatives.