Three Interior bureaus—BLM, BOEM, and BSEE—are responsible for regulating the processes that operators must follow when leasing, drilling, and producing oil and gas from federal lands and waters. BLM manages onshore oil and gas activities, and BOEM and BSEE manage offshore oil and gas activities. Onshore. BLM manages more than 245 million surface acres of federal land for multiple uses, including recreation; range; timber; minerals; watershed; wildlife and fish; natural scenic, scientific, and historical values; and for the sustained yield of renewable resources. BLM oversees onshore oil and gas development on and under BLM-managed federal lands, under other federal agencies’ lands, and under private lands for which the federal government has retained mineral rights— totaling about 700 million subsurface acres. BLM manages these responsibilities through its headquarters office in Washington, D.C.; 12 state offices; 38 district offices; and 127 field offices. BLM’s headquarters office develops guidance and regulations for the bureau, and the state, district, and field offices manage and implement the bureau’s programs. BLM’s oil and gas development oversight efforts are led by 33 field offices located primarily in the Mountain West—the center of much of Interior’s onshore oil and gas development and production—although some BLM offices in other locations have small oil and gas programs that are administered with the assistance of these 33 offices (see fig. 1). Across these offices, BLM employs petroleum engineers, natural resource specialists, geologists, and other scientists to carry out land-use planning efforts and review and approve APDs before operators can begin to drill any new oil or gas wells. Operators that obtain leases for oil and gas development are required to submit to BLM (onshore) or BSEE (offshore) an APD for approval before beginning to drill any new oil or gas wells. The APD contains a detailed set of forms and documents that specify requirements that the operator must follow when drilling. In addition, other specialists, including petroleum engineering technicians, carry out a variety of oil and gas inspections, including drilling inspections, production inspections, and environmental compliance inspections. Offshore. BOEM and BSEE oversee all offshore oil and gas activities on federal leases in the United States. Through its three regional offices— in Alaska, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Pacific––Interior manages more than 1.7 billion offshore acres. The vast majority of Interior’s offshore oil and gas development and production occurs in the Gulf of Mexico; accordingly, the majority of BOEM’s and BSEE’s workforces are located in the Gulf of Mexico Outer Continental Shelf Region. BOEM and BSEE also have offices in the Pacific and Alaska Outer Continental Shelf Regions (see fig. 2). BOEM employs petroleum engineers, geoscientists, and other specialists who are responsible for leasing and resource management, and BSEE employs petroleum and other engineers, inspectors, and other specialists who are responsible for reviewing and approving APDs and conducting drilling and production inspections to ensure that operators comply with all regulatory requirements. Over the last decade, we have reported on Interior’s persistent challenges hiring and retaining sufficient staff to provide efficient and effective oversight of oil and gas activities on federal lands and waters, and we have made a number of recommendations to Interior to address these challenges. In June 2005, we reported that BLM did not have sufficient staff to manage the increasing demand for onshore oil and gas drilling permits while fulfilling its environmental protection responsibilities. We recommended that BLM ensure that its staffing needs are accurately reflected in its workforce plans. In response to this recommendation, BLM analyzed the staffing levels needed to process drilling permits and used this analysis to fill additional inspection and environmental monitoring positions. In March 2010, among other things, we reported that BLM field offices were unable to hire and retain sufficient numbers of staff to complete all required inspections. We reported that, according to BLM officials, low pay when compared with industry salaries and the high housing costs in energy boom towns were major factors affecting their ability to hire sufficient numbers of staff. We recommended that Interior determine what additional policies or incentives were necessary, if any, to attract and retain staff. Interior agreed with our recommendation, and we are evaluating the actions they have taken, including developing a workforce strategy and issuing guidance for the use of recruitment and retention incentives. In June 2012, we reported that salaries for some key oil and gas oversight positions—which are generally set by the federal salary schedule—were significantly lower than salaries offered by industry for candidates with similar skills, and that top applicants are typically hired by the petroleum industry, leaving Interior with less-skilled applicants. To improve Interior’s oversight of oil and gas activities in the Gulf of Mexico, we recommended that Interior assess how the number of inspectors affects the agency’s ability to conduct monthly inspections and whether the monthly inspection goals were appropriate. Interior agreed with our recommendation but has not fully taken action to address it. In August 2013, we reported that BLM also faces challenges in retaining its oil and gas staff and in hiring new employees, including staff responsible for environmental inspections and enforcement. BLM officials told us that some environmental protection positions were unfilled for long periods, and new hires were often inexperienced and required greater supervision, limiting their effectiveness. We did not make any recommendations that directly addressed this concern. In March 2010, we reported that BLM had experienced high turnover rates in key oil and gas inspection and engineering positions from 2004 through 2008, and that this high turnover resulted in a greater reliance on less-trained and less-experienced staff. In July 2012, we reported that Interior continued to face workforce planning challenges following a reorganization effort to improve its oversight of oil and gas activities in the wake of the April 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. In particular, we found that Interior had not developed a strategic workforce plan that outlined specific strategies to help address recruitment and retention challenges. We recommended that BOEM and BSEE develop a strategic workforce plan that would determine the critical skills and competencies needed to achieve current and future programmatic results and develop strategies to address critical skills gaps. In response to this recommendation, BSEE completed its workforce plan in September 2013, and BOEM officials told us that they will complete their plan in fiscal year 2014. In addition to our work, Interior’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) and others have reported on Interior’s challenges related to hiring and retention of key oil and gas oversight staff. With respect to hiring, in September 2010, Interior’s Outer Continental Shelf Safety Oversight Board reported that Interior did not have a formal program for recruiting the best candidates or well-defined career advancement and promotion opportunities for inspectors. A December 2010 report from Interior’s Inspector General echoed that finding and concluded that the Pacific Region faced considerable hiring challenges because of increased hiring by the oil and gas industry, citing the industry’s significant salary advantage over federal service. With respect to retention, the Outer Continental Shelf Safety Board also reported that Interior lacked a formal program for retaining the most-qualified inspectors. Moreover, the report found that in the Pacific Region, 8 out of 10 staff responsible for permitting were eligible for retirement within the next 3 years. In December 2010, Interior’s Inspector General reported that, in spite of the considerable investment in both time and money for inspector training, BLM’s inspection and enforcement program risked losing its inspectors once they were trained because trained inspectors were highly sought by industry. Interior’s Inspector General reported that oil and gas operators commonly recruit petroleum engineering technicians by offering high salaries during successful business periods, and recommended, among other things, that BLM consider developing and implementing a continued service agreement requiring newly certified inspectors to stay with the bureau for a specified period of time following certification. In February 2013, BLM issued guidance that requires the use of a mandatory service agreement for inspectors as a condition of employment. According to the guidance, if an inspector voluntarily separates from BLM within 2 years of certification, the inspector will have to reimburse BLM the full cost of the training, which is estimated at $48,000 per certification. In 2011, we added Interior’s management of federal oil and gas resources to our list of programs at high risk for waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement in part because Interior continued to experience problems hiring and retaining sufficient staff to provide oversight and management of oil gas operations on federal lands and waters. More broadly, in 2001 we added strategic human capital management across the federal government to our high-risk list. At that time, we highlighted various challenges the federal government faces, including strategic human capital planning, succession planning, and acquiring and developing staff sufficient to meet agencies’ needs. We concluded that these challenges may leave agencies unable to effectively, efficiently, and economically perform their missions. In addition, we have issued a series of reports highlighting human capital challenges at individual federal agencies—including the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Department of State—and these reports highlight problems similar to the problems at Interior. The federal government has made substantial progress addressing its human capital challenges over the past 12 years. As we noted in September 2012, both Congress and OPM have taken several actions in this regard. For example, in 2002, Congress created a chief human capital officer position in 24 agencies to advise and assist the head of these agencies and other agency officials in their strategic human capital efforts. In addition, in 2002 and 2004, Congress provided agencies with additional authorities and flexibilities to manage the federal workforce, such as the authority to offer recruitment bonuses. In 2005, and again in 2008, OPM issued guidance on the use of hiring authorities and flexibilities. In 2008, OPM launched an 80-day hiring model to help speed the hiring process.