This report addresses Congress's oversight authority over individual federal judges or Supreme Court Justices. Congressional oversight authority, although broad, is limited to subjects related to the exercise of legitimate congressional power. While Congress has the power to regulate the structure, administration and jurisdiction of the courts, its power over the judicial acts of individual judges or Justices is more restricted. For instance, Congress has limited authority to remove or discipline a judge for decisions made on the bench. Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution provides that judges have "good behavior" tenure, which effectively has come to mean lifetime tenure for Article III judges subject to removal only through conviction on impeachment. However, impeachment of a judge or justice requires a finding that such judge or Justice has engaged in a "High Crime or Misdemeanor." Thus, an investigation into decisions or other acts by a particular judge pursuant to an impeachment would appear to require some connection between an alleged "High Crime or Misdemeanor" and a particular case or cases. Of course, review and consideration of particular court decisions or other judicial acts are well within the purview of Congress's legislative authority. For instance, Congress has the legislative authority to amend statutes that it believes were misinterpreted by court cases, or to propose amendments to the Constitution that it believes would rectify erroneous constitutional decisions. However, investigating the judge or Justices behind such decisions may require something more. This report reviews a number of circumstances in which Congress may be authorized to either pursue or otherwise influence an investigation of individual federal judges or Supreme Court Justices. The report first addresses the general powers and limitations on Congress's oversight authority. Second, the report examines the Senate approval process for the nominations of individual judges or Justices, and the Senate's ability to obtain information on judicial acts by individual judges or Justices during that process. The report also considers the limits of existing statutory authority for judicial discipline within the Judicial Branch, and how Congress has influenced such procedures. It discusses the issue of how far congressional investigatory powers can be exercised regarding possible judicial impeachments. Finally, it treats investigations regarding the individual actions of a judge outside of the above contexts, such as how a judge imposes sentences under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Throughout its history, Congress has engaged in oversight—the review, monitoring and supervision of the implementation of public policy. These oversight powers are based on Congress's authority to engage in effective inquiries and investigations to assure itself and the public that the laws are being "faithfully executed." The first several Congresses inaugurated such important oversight techniques as special investigations, reporting requirements, resolutions of inquiry, and use of the appropriations process to review executive activity. Contemporary developments, moreover, have increased the legislature's capacity and capabilities to oversee and check the Judiciary and the Executive. For instance, public laws and congressional rules have measurably enhanced Congress's implied power under the Constitution to conduct oversight. Although oversight may occur regarding any matter within the legislative purview of the Congress, such oversight can become particularly complicated as regards the other branches of government. These congressional investigatory powers derive from Congress's various legislative authorities over those branches, whether it be the power of the purse, the power to organize the Executive and Judicial Branches, or the power to make all laws necessary for "carrying into Execution" Congress's own enumerated powers as well as those of the Executive. Such legislative and oversight powers can even extend to individual assessments of the performance of judges or Justices, such as might occur during a judicial nomination process or during an impeachment proceeding. For instance, as is discussed below, any number of oversight methods would be available to obtain information regarding a particular judge or Justice during a nomination process. These might include informal Member contacts with the judge or Justice; congressional staff studies; studies prepared by congressional support agencies or noncongressional entities; and formal committee hearings. To the extent that the cooperation of the Executive or Judicial Branches is required to facilitate these processes, these methods would generally be sufficient. Even if there were a dispute between the branches as to access to information, the threat of withholding consent to the nomination would be likely to lead to some accommodation of congressional requests. However, the question arises as to whether the Congress has the authority to compel the Judicial or Executive Branch to provide information on individual judges or their judicial acts. One possibility is for the Congress to establish statutory reporting requirements. As is discussed below, Congress has, by statute, provided that the Department of Justice must provide information to Congress on downward departures under the United States Sentencing Guidelines by individual federal judges. As is discussed below, Justice Rehnquist, however, has suggested that this provision, know as the Feeney Amendment, is a violation of separation of powers. Further, a district court considering this provision has struck it down. A more controversial option would be to attempt to compel judges and Justices to respond to congressional oversight through the subpoena and contempt process. For instance, committees have the authority to issue subpoenas for testimony or documents. Refusal to comply with such a subpoena is punishable as a contempt of Congress, which could result in imprisonment for up to one year and/or a fine of up to $100,000. Most often, however, the threat of contempt, or the actual vote of a committee or of the House itself, has resulted in compliance before the referral for prosecution. However, outside the impeachment context, the efficacy of such an oversight method with respect to federal judges or Justices seems unclear. A successful use of the criminal contempt mechanism by a committee needs to overcome two formidable legal and practical obstacles. First, although the Speaker (or in the case of the Senate, the President of the Senate) may certify a statement of facts of such contempt "to the appropriate United States attorney, whose duty it shall be to bring the matter before the grand jury for its action," the Department of Justice has taken the position that Congress cannot constitutionally direct that the Executive initiate a contempt prosecution. In the instance of a prosecution of a judge for failure to comply with a congressional subpoena, for instance, the Department of Justice may weigh pragmatic and legal factors, e.g., a likely unfriendly forum and the availability of the impeachment process, as reasons to decline to prosecute. A second option might be for the full Judiciary Committee to seek a House resolution authorizing it to bring a civil action to compel compliance with the subpoena. Such an action, if successful, serves to either force the witness to testify or produce the documents sought, or subjects the subpoenaed person to a contempt of court for failure to comply with court's order. The down side to this course, as with the first option, is that it takes place in a forum likely to be sympathetic to a claim of congressional intrusion on judicial independence. It does not appear that the House has ever enforced a subpoena against a sitting federal judge. A third option is utilization of the statutory judicial discipline process. Currently, federal judges are subject to internal discipline proceedings within the Judiciary. These judicial discipline procedures are available to anyone, including a Member of Congress, who deems it appropriate to file a complaint against a federal district court judge, judge of a U.S. circuit court of appeals, bankruptcy judge, or magistrate judge. While this oversight option is not directly controlled by Congress, information derived from this process may ultimately serve as the basis for impeachment proceedings. Finally, the Committee might seek a resolution of the House authorizing the Judiciary Committee to investigate the conduct of a judge to ascertain whether formal impeachment proceedings might be appropriate. Congress's oversight authority is based on obtaining information that will assist it in the legislative process with respect to matters within its constitutional purview. These powers are acknowledged to extend to the Judiciary and the operations of the courts, but only up to a point. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in the context of recent congressional actions with respect to downward departures in sentencing by federal judges, attempted to define that line of demarcation as follows: ... We can all recognize that Congress has a legitimate interest in obtaining information which will assist in the legislative process. But the efforts to obtain information may not threaten judicial independence or the established principle that a judge's judicial acts cannot serve as a basis for his removal from office. It is well settled that not only the definition of what acts shall be criminal, but the prescription of what sentence or range of sentences shall be imposed on those found guilty of such acts, is a legislative function—in the federal system, it is for Congress. Congress has recently indicated rather strongly, by the Feeney Amendment, that it believes there have been too many downward departures from the Sentencing Guidelines. It has taken steps to reduce that number. Such a decision is for Congress, just as the enactment of the Sentencing Guidelines nearly twenty years ago was. The new law also provides for the collection of information about sentencing practices employed by federal judges throughout the country. This, too, is a legitimate sphere of congressional inquiry, in aid of its legislative authority. But one portion of the law provides for the collection of such information on an individualized judge-by-judge basis. This, it seems to me, is more troubling. For side-by-side with the broad authority of Congress to legislate and gather information in this area is the principle that federal judges may not be removed from office for their judicial acts. The Chief Justice acknowledged that this principle is not set forth in the Constitution but was established in the impeachment trial of Judge Samuel Chase in 1805 when the Senate failed to convict Chase. The Chief Justice states that the acquittal "represented a judgment that impeachment should not be used to remove a judge for conduct in the exercise of his judicial duties." The Chief Justice reiterated his reliance on this principle in his most recent report to Congress on the state of the Judiciary. The Chief Justice does not define what he means by "conduct in the exercise of his judicial duties."