Congress recently completed action on the Bush Administration's FY2004 supplemental budgetrequest to fund continuing military operations and reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan. (1) A majorissue in the congressional debate on this, and other such supplementals of the past, is whethermilitary and peacekeeping operations should be funded with supplemental requests or via the regulardefense appropriations process. Some Members of Congress have urged the President to include thecosts of current and future operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in the Department of Defense's(DOD's) regular appropriations, arguing that these are now ongoing operations that should beplanned for and funded in the annual defense budget. Others prefer supplementals due to theunpredictability of military and peacekeeping circumstances in Iraq and Afghanistan. Thisunpredictability, they argue, makes it extremely difficult to estimate the costs of either type ofoperation in advance. This report examines 46 cases since FY1990 in which Congress approved funding for combat or peacekeeping operations using regular appropriations, supplemental appropriations, or acombination of the two. Table 1 shows that since 1990, Congress generally has funded combatoperations with supplemental appropriations. In initial post-combat peacekeeping operations,however, Congress has tended to rely on a combination of supplemental and regular appropriations. As peacekeeping operations have become ongoing, Congress has switched to using regularappropriations. Examining the funding patterns for combat operations in the First Gulf War, Somalia, Haiti,Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Operation Iraqi Freedom shows they were all funded initially withsupplemental appropriations. In each case, the President requested supplemental funding shortlyafter operations were underway, and Congress approved the requests within months. The only exception to this pattern is Bosnia, where United States' involvement began in 1993 with a humanitarian airlift. DOD funded this airlift using resources previously appropriated byCongress in FY1993 regular appropriations. (2) InFY1995, when the United States first launchedairstrikes in support of U.N. peacekeepers, DOD used a combination of supplemental appropriationsand FY1995 regular appropriations to fund combat operations. Thus, although supplementalappropriations were not used to fund the United States' initial involvement in Bosnia, Congress didturn to supplemental appropriations to fund combat and later peacekeeping operations after the initialhumanitarian airlift. Table 1 suggests that in the past decade, Congress generally has funded combat operations withsupplemental appropriations and ongoing peacekeeping operations with regular appropriations. Eachoperation, however, has gone through an interim period of initial post-combat peacekeeping in whichCongress has used different combinations of supplemental and regular appropriations. Congress funded combat operations in Haiti and Kosovo with supplemental appropriations in FY1994 and FY1999, respectively. In both cases, Congress also used supplemental appropriationsto fund initial post-combat peacekeeping. In Haiti, Congress funded peacekeeping through theremainder of FY1994 and all of FY1995 with supplemental appropriations, and switched to regularappropriations in FY1996. Similarly, Congress funded FY1999 post-combat peacekeeping inKosovo with supplemental appropriations, and continued to fund peacekeeping in Kosovo withsupplemental appropriations in FY2000. In FY2001, however, Congress switched to using regularappropriations to fund operations in Kosovo. Regular appropriations have also been used in FY2002and FY2003 as peacekeeping has remained ongoing. FY1995 combat operations in Bosnia were funded mostly with supplemental appropriations, and since FY1999 ongoing peacekeeping operations have been funded with regular appropriations. From FY1995 to FY1998, however, a mixture of supplemental and regular appropriations was usedto fund peacekeeping operations. In FY1995 and FY1996, this mixture consisted of supplementalfunding and the use of previously appropriated funds. In FY1997 and FY1998, both supplementaland regular appropriations were used. Funding for the First Gulf War and the "No-Fly" zones established in Southwest Asia after the war underwent a transition from supplemental to regular appropriations, but it was over the courseof 11 years. The long duration of the operations and the use of some regular appropriations to fundcombat during the First Gulf War distinguish these operations from Bosnia, Kosovo, and Haiti. Operation Desert Shield for the First Gulf War was initially funded with supplemental appropriations that were included in the FY1991 continuing resolution. The next funding forOperation Desert Shield, consisting of $1 billion, was included in the FY1991 regular DefenseAppropriations Act from amounts contributed by allies. This use of regular appropriations early inthe Gulf War was contrary to the use of supplemental appropriations to fund combat operations inBosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, Afghanistan, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. However, it may reflectcongressional use of the funding vehicle that was immediately available to cover the initial costs ofthe operation. The next and largest appropriations for the First Gulf War were included in theFY1991 Desert Shield/Desert Storm supplemental, which was signed into law on March 22, 1991. The size of this supplemental appropriation ($42.6 billion) suggests that the $1 billion included inFY1991 regular appropriations was indeed an exception, rather than a significant change, to thepractice of funding combat operations with supplemental appropriations. The "No-Fly" zones (Southwest Asia operations) following the First Gulf War were funded at least partially with supplemental appropriations for 7 years, the longest use of supplementalappropriations in any of the cases examined. Unlike Kosovo and Haiti, the "No-Fly" zones did notprogress directly from supplemental to regular appropriations as they became ongoing operations. Instead, they were funded partially with supplemental appropriations in FY1992 and FY1993 andfully with supplemental appropriations in FY1994 and FY1995. In FY1996, Congress used regularappropriations to fund the "No-Fly" zones. At this point, rather than continuing to use regularappropriations, Congress returned to a combination of regular and supplemental appropriations fromFY1997 through FY1999. In FY2000 and FY2001, regular appropriations were used again. Thus, although Desert Shield/Desert Storm and the "No-Fly" zones began with supplemental appropriations and ended with regular appropriations, the 7-year interim between those pointsdiffered from the interim between combat operations and ongoing peacekeeping operations inBosnia, Kosovo, and Haiti. Not only was this interim longer in the case of the "No-Fly" zones, butit also provided two instances where Congress returned to either partial or full supplemental fundingafter having used only regular appropriations during the prior fiscal year. According to the President, the United States concluded major military operations inAfghanistan in December, 2001 and in Iraq on May 1, 2003. (3) Except for funds appropriated forAfghanistan in the FY2003 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, both operations have beenfunded to date using supplemental appropriations, including the recently enacted FY2004supplemental. Although the President has declared the end of major combat in both operations, lowintensity conflict is still prevalent, making it unclear whether Iraq and Afghanistan can yet bereferred to as ongoing peacekeeping operations. Going forward, Congress might designate a pointat which an operation becomes ongoing, and thus merits funding in the regular appropriationsprocess. Table 1: Methods of Funding for Wars and Contingency Operations, First Persian Gulf War to Operation Iraqi Freedom Notes: Please note that certain operations,such as Operation Desert Shield, were funded more thanonce in the same fiscal year. An asterisk indicates that DOD covered some of the cost by using existing resources thatwere originally programmed for other purposes. Sources: This table was conceived of and partially assembled by [author name scrubbed] and Nina Serafino of CRS, using the cited public laws and corresponding congressional reports. Formore specific cost information on Bosnia and Southwest Asia, see CRS Report 98-823(pdf) F, Military Contingency Funding for Bosnia, Southwest Asia, and Other Operations: Questionsand Answers by Nina Serafino. For more specific information on funding for Kosovo, see CRS Report RS20161(pdf) , Kosovo Military Operations: Costs and Congressional Action on Funding ,by [author name scrubbed]. Specific information on Persian Gulf War funding can be found in CRS Issue Brief IB91019, Persian Gulf War: U.S. Costs and Allied Financial Contributions , by[author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].