On August 29, 2005, and in the ensuing days, Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma devastated the Gulf Coast region of the United States. Hurricane Katrina alone affected more than a half million people located within approximately 90,000 square miles spanning Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, and ultimately resulted in over 1,600 deaths. Hurricane Katrina severely tested disaster management at the federal, state, and local levels and revealed weaknesses in the basic elements of preparing for, responding to, and recovering from a catastrophic disaster. Beginning in February 2006, reports by the House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, the White House Homeland Security Council, the DHS Inspector General, DHS, and FEMA all identified a variety of failures and some strengths in the preparation for, response to, and initial recovery from Hurricane Katrina. Our findings about the response to Hurricane Katrina in a March 2006 testimony and a September 2006 report focused on the need for strengthened leadership, capabilities, and accountability to improve emergency preparedness and response. The Post-Katrina Act was enacted to address various shortcomings identified in the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina. The act enhances FEMA’s responsibilities and its autonomy within DHS. FEMA is to lead and support the nation in a risk-based, comprehensive emergency management system of preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and mitigation. Under the act, the FEMA Administrator reports directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security; FEMA is now a distinct entity within DHS; and the Secretary of Homeland Security can no longer substantially or significantly reduce the authorities, responsibilities, or functions of FEMA or the capability to perform them unless authorized by subsequent legislation. The act further directs the transfer to FEMA of many functions of DHS’s former Preparedness Directorate. The statute also codified FEMA’s existing regional structure, which includes 10 regional offices, and specified their responsibilities. It also contains a provision establishing in FEMA a National Integration Center, which is responsible for the ongoing management and maintenance of the National Incident Management System (NIMS)—which describes how emergency incident response is to be managed and coordinated—and the National Response Plan (NRP)—now revised and known as the National Response Framework (NRF). In addition, the act includes several provisions to strengthen the management and capability of FEMA’s workforce. For example, the statute calls for a strategic human capital plan to shape and improve FEMA’s workforce, authorizes recruitment and retention bonuses, and establishes requirements for a Surge Capacity Force. The Post-Katrina Act extends beyond changes to FEMA’s organizational and management structure and includes legislative reforms in other emergency management areas that were considered shortcomings during Hurricane Katrina. For example, the Post-Katrina Act includes an emergency communications title that requires, among other things, the development of a National Emergency Communications Plan, as well as the establishment of working groups within each FEMA region dedicated to emergency communications coordination. The act also addresses catastrophic planning and preparedness; for example, it charges FEMA’s National Integration Center with revising the NRF’s catastrophic incident annex, and it makes state catastrophic planning a component of one grant program. In addition, the act addresses evacuation plans and exercises and the needs of individuals with disabilities. In November 2008, we reported the actions FEMA and DHS had taken in response to more than 300 distinct provisions of the Post-Katrina Act that we had identified. We also reported on areas where FEMA and DHS still needed to take action and any challenges to implementation that FEMA and DHS officials identified during our discussions with them. In general, we found that FEMA and DHS had made some progress in their efforts to implement the act since it was enacted in October 2006. For most of the provisions we examined, FEMA and DHS had at least preliminary efforts under way to address them. We also identified a number of areas that still required action, and noted that it was clear that FEMA and DHS had work remaining to implement the provisions of the act. Throughout this statement, unless otherwise noted, the actions reported that DHS and FEMA have taken to address provisions of the Post-Katrina Act are drawn from our November 2008 report. Our 2006 report noted that in preparing for, responding to, and recovering from any catastrophic disaster, the legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines of authority at all levels of government must be clearly defined, effectively communicated, and well understood in order to facilitate rapid and effective decision making. We further noted that the experience of Hurricane Katrina showed the need to improve leadership at all levels of government to better respond to a catastrophic disaster. Specifically, we reported that in the response to Hurricane Katrina there was confusion regarding roles and responsibilities under the NRP, including the roles of the Secretary of Homeland Security and two key federal officials with responsibility for disaster response—the Principal Federal Official (PFO), and the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO). The Post-Katrina Act clarified FEMA’s mission within DHS and set forth the role and responsibilities of the FEMA Administrator. These provisions, among other things, required that the FEMA Administrator provide advice on request to the President, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, and that the FEMA Administrator report directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security without having to report through another official. As a result of the limitations in the NRP revealed during the response to Hurricane Katrina and as required by the Post-Katrina Act, DHS and FEMA undertook a comprehensive review of the NRP. The result of this process was the issuance, in January 2008, of the NRF (the name for the revised NRP). The NRF states that it is to be a guide to how the nation conducts an all-hazards response and manages incidents ranging from the serious but purely local to large-scale terrorist attacks or catastrophic natural disasters. The NRF became effective in March 2008. As reflected in the NRF and confirmed by FEMA’s Office of Policy and Program Analysis and FEMA General Counsel, there is a direct reporting relationship between the FEMA Administrator and the Secretary of Homeland Security. According to officials in FEMA’s Office of Policy and Program Analysis, the FEMA Administrator gives emergency management advice as a matter of course at meetings with the President, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Homeland Security Council. The NRF also states that the Secretary of Homeland Security coordinates with other appropriate departments and agencies to activate plans and applicable coordination structures of the NRF, as required. The FEMA Administrator assists the secretary in meeting these responsibilities. FEMA is the lead agency for emergency management under NRF Emergency Support Function #5, which is the coordination Emergency Support Function for all federal departments and agencies across the spectrum of domestic incident management from hazard mitigation and preparedness to response and recovery. We reported in 2006 that in response to Hurricane Katrina, the Secretary of Homeland Security initially designated the head of FEMA as the PFO, who then appointed separate FCOs for Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi. It was not clear, however, who was responsible for coordinating the overall federal effort at a strategic level. Our fieldwork indicated that the lack of clarity in leadership roles and responsibilities resulted in disjointed efforts of federal agencies involved in the response, a myriad of approaches and processes for requesting and providing assistance, and confusion about who should be advised of requests and what resources would be provided within specific time frames. The Post-Katrina Act required that the Secretary of Homeland Security, through the FEMA Administrator, provide a clear chain of command in the NRF that accounts for the roles of the FEMA Administrator, the FCO, and the PFO. According to the NRF, the Secretary of Homeland Security may elect to designate a PFO to serve as his or her primary field representative to ensure consistency of federal support as well as the overall effectiveness of federal incident management. The NRF repeats the Post- Katrina Act’s prohibition that the PFO shall not direct or replace the incident command structure or have directive authority over the FCO or other federal and state officials. Under the NRF, the PFO’s duties include providing situational awareness and a primary point of contact in the field for the secretary, promoting federal interagency collaboration and conflict resolution where possible, presenting to the secretary any policy issues that require resolution, and acting as the primary federal spokesperson for coordinated media and public communications. According to DHS officials, at the time of our 2008 report, no PFO had been operationally deployed for any Stafford Act event since the response to Hurricane Katrina. DHS’s appropriations acts for fiscal years 2008 and 2009 have each included a prohibition that “none of the funds provided by this or previous appropriations acts shall be used to fund any position designated as a Principal Federal Official” for any Stafford Act declared disasters or emergencies. Our Office of General Counsel plans to address the implications of this funding prohibition in future work. According to the NRF, the primary role and responsibilities of the FCO include four major activities: representing the FEMA Administrator in the field and discharging all FEMA responsibilities for the response and recovery efforts under way; administering Stafford Act authorities, including the commitment of FEMA resources and the issuance of mission assignments to other federal departments or agencies; coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing the federal response, within the Unified Coordination Group at the Joint Field Office; and interfacing with the State Coordinating Officer and other state, tribal, and local response officials to determine the most urgent needs and set objectives for an effective response in collaboration with the Unified Coordination Group. The Catastrophic Incident Annex to the NRP (now NRF) was a source of considerable criticism after Hurricane Katrina.