Since 2010, DOD has taken action to address many of DOD updated its strategy and doctrine for civil support. In 2010, and then again in 2012, we found that DOD’s 2005 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support had not been updated to reflect the current environment in which DOD supports civil authorities. For example, while the strategy primarily discusses DOD’s DSCA mission in the context of the department’s response to a weapon of mass destruction—DOD’s primary focus after the 2001 terrorist attacks—it did not address the breadth of DSCA missions that DOD must be prepared to support subsequent to Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Based on our recommendation that DOD should update its strategy, in February 2013 DOD issued an updated Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities. In this update, DOD acknowledged that national security threats, hazards, vulnerabilities, strategic guidance, and political and economic factors had evolved since the 2005 strategy, and recognized that its support to civil authorities included a broader set of missions—to include catastrophic natural or man-made disasters, pre-planned National Special Security Events (like summits and high-profile sports events), cyberattacks, and the southwest border counterdrug efforts. We also reported in 2012 that DOD had not updated its joint publication for DSCA and recommended that the department needed to do so. DOD agreed with our recommendation and in July 2013, DOD updated its joint publication for Defense Support for Civil Authorities. In this update, among other things, DOD described more fully the National Response Framework, which is a framework based on a tiered, graduated response to major disasters and emergencies where incidents are managed at the lowest jurisdictional level and are supported by additional response capabilities, as needed. DOD has reported that it has updated its DSCA plans. In September 2013, we found that DOD did not have a clear command-and-control structure for federal military services during complex catastrophes. We found that DOD had not identified the roles, responsibilities, and relationships among command elements that may be involved in responding to such incidents across multiple states. This issue was illustrated by events such as National Level Exercise 2011 that examined DOD’s response to a complex catastrophe. Similarly, DOD’s after-action reports on Hurricane Sandy in 2012 found that the command-and-control structure for federal military forces was not clearly defined, resulting in the degradation of situational awareness and unity of effort, and the execution of missions without proper approval. Northern Command officials agreed with our findings and stated that they would address this issue and the associated recommendation we made in our report by updating their DSCA plans. As of June 2015, DOD reported that Northern Command and Pacific Command had updated their DSCA plans to address our recommendation. DOD implementation guidance on the use of dual-status commanders is in development. DOD established the dual-status commander structure—active-duty military or National Guard officers who command state and federal responses to civil-support incidents and events—and has used this structure for certain events. For example, DOD used the dual-status commander structure for the 2012 Colorado wildfire response and the Hurricane Sandy response. In October 2012, we reported that DOD had not developed guidance for the use of dual-status commanders for incidents affecting multiple states and territories. For example, DOD had not developed specific criteria and conditions for when and how state governors and the Secretary of Defense would mutually appoint a commander. Consequently, we recommended and DOD concurred that the department develop implementation guidance on the use of dual- status commanders. In June 2015, Northern Command officials reported that an instruction about dual-status commanders was being drafted in coordination with DOD, Northern Command, and the National Guard Bureau. DOD has agreed to take steps to align cyber-support roles and responsibilities. In October 2012, we found that DOD had not updated its DSCA guidance, such as joint doctrine, to ensure that it was consistent with national plans and preparations for domestic cyber incidents. We recommended that DOD align guidance on preparing for and responding to domestic cyber incidents with national-level guidance to include roles and responsibilities. DOD partially concurred with this recommendation. However, the department has not yet taken action that meets the intent of the recommendation. DOD has and continues to take action to address our prior recommendations to strengthen the department’s interagency coordination for support of civil authorities. As numerous events within the homeland in the last decade have pointed out, it is critical that DOD coordinate, integrate, and synchronize its DSCA mission with a broad range of interagency partners that the department may need to support. Such partners can include FEMA, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Customs and Border Protection, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. As we have previously reported, there are three key areas that DOD needs to focus on to enhance and institutionalize its interagency coordination efforts. DOD has since taken action to address these areas: DOD has better defined interagency roles and responsibilities. Previous GAO work, the National Response Framework, and DOD strategic guidance identify the need for clearly defined roles and responsibilities to enhance interagency coordination. In our 2010 review of DOD’s interagency coordination efforts, we found that the key documents used to define roles and responsibilities were outdated, not fully integrated, or were not comprehensive. We found that DOD’s series of civil-support policies and guidance, such as a 1997 DOD directive on military assistance to civil authorities, were outdated and did not reflect changes that occurred subsequent to their issuance. For example, the guidance documents did not refer to DHS, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, Northern Command, or roles and responsibilities under the National Response Framework. Similarly, we found that roles and responsibilities for support to law enforcement—including Joint Task Force-North, which provides defense support of civilian law enforcement agencies along U.S. borders—were unclear as were the roles and responsibilities between the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. Consequently, we recommended and DOD concurred that the department should update key documents that outline roles and responsibilities. Subsequently, DOD has, for the most part, issued new guidance documents or updated older guidance to better define roles and responsibilities within the department for interagency coordination. DOD has issued an interagency partner guide. DOD’s joint doctrine on interagency coordination and support of civil authorities notes that a unified “whole-of-government” approach to national security issues requires federal partner agencies to understand core competencies, roles, and missions and that sharing information is critical for the success of interagency coordination between federal agencies. To support interagency coordination on DSCA, DOD has taken action to communicate with its federal partners through conferences and other forums and multiple documents. In our 2010 review of DOD’s interagency coordination efforts, we found that DOD’s approach to communicating with federal partners could be improved, and the department had not clearly identified the roles and responsibilities and day-to-day coordination processes with its federal partners through a single, readily accessible source. Specifically, DOD, DHS, and the Department of Justice officials told us that the benefits gained through interagency forums, such as Homeland Security Council meetings and annual National Interagency Fire Center conferences, are transient because they depend on personnel who rotate out of their positions frequently. The National Interagency Fire Center had addressed this challenge by creating a partner handbook that identified key information. DOD had not developed a similar vehicle for institutionalizing its information sharing efforts so that federal partners could maintain knowledge and have readily accessible information about key issues, such as the different DOD entities that have DSCA missions. For those cases where DOD internally documented its missions, roles, and responsibilities, we found the information was dispersed among multiple sources; also, the documents may not have always been readily accessible to federal partners, and they may have been written in a manner that led to unclear expectations. Therefore, we recommended that DOD develop and issue a partner guide that identifies the roles and responsibilities of DOD entities, processes, and agreed-upon approaches for interagency coordination for homeland defense and civil-support efforts. DOD concurred with our recommendation and, in November 2011, issued its Defense Support of Civil Authorities Interagency Partner Guide. DOD has taken action to implement key practices for managing some liaisons the department exchanges with its federal partners. Prior GAO reports and DOD guidance recognize that leading organizations employ key practices for effective and efficient workforce planning, such as situational awareness, staffing-needs assessments, position descriptions, training, and performance assessments. However, in our 2010 report, we found that DOD had not implemented such key practices. For example, DOD did not have complete situational awareness of all the liaisons detailed to its interagency partners. According to DOD records, in 2009, there were only 2 DOD personnel at DHS headquarters—yet an informal survey by the representative for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense to DHS found that more than 110 DOD personnel, from a variety of DOD entities, were working at DHS as liaisons, subject-matter experts, or in other capacities.we recommended and DOD agreed that DOD develop and issue additional workforce management policy and guidance regarding DOD liaisons to other federal agencies, as well as other federal agencies’ liaisons to DOD. In October 2013, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Acting Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security Therefore, signed an updated memorandum of agreement that outlines ways in which DOD and DHS will incorporate key practices for managing liaisons in the national capital region. In response to our prior recommendations, DOD has taken action to identify needs and address capability gaps for its DSCA mission.