This report is designed to help the 110 th Congress better understand the characteristics and importance of measurement of counter-terrorism activities, the dynamics of the phenomenon to be measured, i.e. terrorism, and what would generally be required from any entities—government or otherwise—tasked with establishing and evaluating measures of effectiveness. It is not intended to define counter-terrorism activities, nor to create a definitive, in-depth methodology for measuring progress against terrorism. Rather, it is designed to provide added tools and insights to support Congress in its efforts to coordinate, fund, and oversee the nation's anti-terrorism activities. The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) requires agencies to set goals and objectives for their performance, and to measure progress against these goals and objectives. Under the law, anti-terror efforts are not exempt from these requirements, without which the objective evaluation of progress to the full satisfaction of Congress might be impeded. Rising costs of anti-terrorism efforts have become an increasing problem. The vast land area of the United States and widespread U.S. interests abroad are impossible to protect entirely. Billions of dollars have been spent to develop anti-terror technologies, establish crisis management training and enhance security staffing throughout the country. Whether these expenditures are cost-effective, or whether the money would be better spent, for instance, building secular schools in Islamic countries or promoting public relations efforts aimed at young Muslims, remains an important policy question. Developing robust measurement criteria might assist government officials in answering such questions. It is unclear just how much the United States spends overseas annually in non-military areas to combat terrorism, but the amounts are in the billions of dollars. For FY2004, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) put the figure at $11 billion. At home, dollar amounts spent on terrorism-related security by the 50 states are elusive as well, but FY2006 appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security topped $30 billion ($30.8 billion). Arguably, existing legislation requires government agencies to be held accountable for the cost-effectiveness of these mammoth expenditures on combating terrorism. Demonstrable, measurable, effective progress against terrorism is the desired goal. Among the various U.S. government agencies involved in anti-terrorism efforts, there is currently no common set of criteria for measuring success. Although over four years have elapsed since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, many agencies are still attempting to establish and define precise criteria and standards, without which they cannot measure organizational performance. Uncertainty with respect to both strategies and measurements makes it difficult to describe progress accurately and to demonstrate progress to the public or U.S. allies. Different types of terrorist threats may carry different risks and potential impacts, and strategies may need to adapt accordingly. For instance, different strategies may be applicable to terrorism rooted in political or economic vs. cultural or theocratic origins. Such differences in threats and our response strategies make measurement of progress more difficult. For the greatest success, the war on terrorism, like the war on drugs, must arguably be conducted and measured in a multi-faceted manner on many fronts, with sufficient resources allocated to each strategic element. It is usually not possible to achieve this approach due to funding limitations, and the result is vulnerabilities in certain areas, where acknowledgment of lack of progress may be politically unpopular. Of concern to some is that efforts to gauge progress may be compromised should measurement criteria selectively target areas of apparent relative progress, such as increased airport security, while other areas, such as port security, may remain under-addressed. Another area of concern is that anti-terrorist actions might be undertaken for a wide range of reasons without being clearly linked to previously defined anti-terror goals; in such circumstances, caution would likely be warranted before characterizing results as progress. A common misconception is that by increasing expenditures the nation is necessarily making good progress. As a practical matter, the nation cannot secure everything, everywhere. Terrorist operations are relatively inexpensive to organize and carry out, especially in comparison to the damage they may inflict, or the cost of trying to prevent them from happening. Consequently, spending more money may not necessarily increase security proportionally. Moreover, some suggest that the United States is bleeding itself dry economically, like the Soviet Union did in its attempts to match western military spending during the cold war. Some contend that the biggest threat to democracy from terrorism is not destruction of property and life, but rather an inexorable erosion of civil liberties worldwide. Other concerns are loss of international unity due to policy differences, loss of opportunities due to budget and policy constraints, and reduction of U.S. stature and public relations image abroad. These and many other factors form a mosaic of measurements that highlight the complexities of analyzing progress. How one perceives and measures progress is central to formulating and implementing anti-terror strategy. The perception of progress has a major impact on establishing priorities and allocating resources. The parameters used to measure progress can also set the framework for measurement of failures. To better define the parameters of success, it is important to determine what both the terrorists, and those who fight them, see as their goals and priorities. Critical to the measurement process is the realization that measurements are inextricably linked to strategies. Positive progress is possible using diverse strategies, which may employ very different tactics. For example, some nations take a hard line against radical Islamists, including targeted assassination, while other nations appear to have a more laissez-faire —if not conciliatory/accommodating—approach. Both strategies can claim progress, using different measurements. An important consideration in formulating measurable strategies is reduction of uncertainty through clear enunciation of policy. In a statement issued by President Bush on September 28, 2005 titled Fighting a Global War on Terror , he emphasized four core elements of America's strategy for victory in the war on terror: (1) fighting the enemy abroad; (2) denying terrorists state support and sanctuary; (3) denying terrorists access to weapons of mass destruction; and (4) spreading democracy. These elements generally echo Administration anti-terror strategy as set forth in its February 14, 2003, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism . In the wake of 9/11, the Administration has pointed to the killing or capture of more than 2/3 of al Qaeda's top leadership and seizure of over $200 million in terrorist financing as examples of progress against terrorism. More recently, progress milestones cited by President Bush in his September 28, 2005 statement included (1) removal of brutal regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq that harbored terrorists; (2) moving forward in the "march" of democracy worldwide, noting Lebanon; (3) shutting down a major weapons of mass destruction [WMD] black market network originating in Pakistan, and Libya's rejoining a community of nations; and (4) capturing a number of key terrorists in Pakistan and Iraq, as well as capturing and killing hundreds of insurgents in Iraq. Disruption of al Qaeda terrorist plots and efforts to infiltrate the United States were subsequently cited as an additional indication of success by the President in his discussion of the war on terror at the National Endowment for Democracy on October 6, 2005. Though some $200 million is said to have been have been confiscated, it is not clear how much damage has been done to the terrorist's ability to raise or transfer additional funds. Moreover, if one terminates 2/3 of the senior leadership of a particular terrorist organization, the ranks of the organization may grow and decentralize, similar to the impact of attacks on drug cartels, evolving into a more resilient adversary. Another key issue is how one measures the impact of unintended consequences—or side effects and by-products—and other results, such as diverting scarce resources from one policy area to another, increasing spending and possibly adding to the budget deficit, or eroding civil liberties. These types of issues were often not addressed in the Patterns of Global Terrorism reports of previous years. However, in contrast, the successor to Patterns , titled Country Reports on Terrorism , now emphasizes in-depth, comprehensive analysis. The phenomenon of terrorism can be seen as comprising human elements (supporters and hard core terrorists) and ideological elements. To the degree that terrorism is viewed as a process, the phenomenon is similar to a pipeline or factory assembly line with key stations along the way. The process includes ideological outreach, acquisition of funding and support, recruitment, organization, indoctrination, training, planning, targeting, attack, exploitation of results, financial rewards and other factors which lead to production of terrorist acts. Any such proposed anti-terrorism model would be adapted for specific terrorist groups, since such groups may operate differently. A challenge facing those who seek to measure progress against terrorism is to identify critical, outcome-determining elements and assess how well they have been mitigated. Disrupting the process of terrorism as early as possible is vital, since it can eventually become an economic engine in its own right, with increasing numbers of individuals and businesses deriving financial benefits and developing vested interests. The terrorists' initial search for ideological or financial supporters and physical recruits comes at the beginning of the process. Important here is the level of state support or opposition to such activities. At a subsequent phase, one might look at the organization or network and seek to measure its effectiveness and resiliency. In addition to measuring the terrorism process itself, structural and environmental factors also require evaluation. Is the dependence on certain factors that terrorists or anti-terrorists can exploit as vulnerabilities increasing or decreasing? How seamlessly do terrorist organizations and networks interact? How seamlessly do new government anti-terrorist organizational structures and networks interact? Is the international operating environment becoming more or less inviting or restrictive for terrorists or for those combating them? Is it easier or harder today for terrorists to inflict the damage they seek to do? Also important is the post-attack/recovery period. Since not all targets can be protected at all times, some will likely be hit.