In November 2005, DHS announced the launch of the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a multiyear, multibillion-dollar program aimed at securing U.S. borders and reducing illegal immigration. CBP is the lead agency within DHS responsible for the development and deployment of SBI technology (e.g., cameras, sensors, radars, and tactical communications) and tactical infrastructure (e.g., pedestrian and vehicle fences, roads, and lighting). In July 2010, CBP announced the formation of OTIA, which was created to ensure all of CBP’s technology efforts are properly focused on the mission and are well integrated, and to strengthen CBP’s expertise and effectiveness in program management and acquisition. OTIA assumed the responsibilities of the former SBI program office that previously managed SBInet. SBInet was intended to cover the entire southwest border with an integrated set of fixed sensor towers. These towers were to transmit radar and camera information into a centralized location that integrated information to create a Common Operating Picture (COP) at work stations manned at all times by Border Patrol Agents. SBInet’s initial deployment, known as Block 1, was deployed to 53 miles of the Arizona border where it continues to be used by the Border Patrol. Since its inception, SBInet had continued and repeated technical problems, cost overruns, and schedule delays, which raised serious questions about SBInet’s ability to meet Border Patrol’s needs for surveillance technology along the border. We have issued 26 reports and testimonies identifying operational and program management weaknesses that contributed to SBInet’s performance shortfalls, including cost overruns and schedule slippages. For example, in September 2008 and May 2010, we reported on deficiencies in CBP’s timely preparation and completion of key acquisition documents essential to setting operational requirements, identifying and mitigating risks, and establishing the cost, schedule, and performance of the project and the technology to be delivered. We also reported that key acquisition documents, such as a risk management plan, were not prepared and approved for SBInet prior to the start of the acquisition process, a lack that precluded a fully informed design for the system that would meet CBP’s needs within the expected time frame. In May 2010, we made a number of recommendations to enhance CBP’s acquisition of SBInet systems. DHS agreed with 10 of our recommendations and partially agreed with two of them and detailed actions planned to address each. This included a recommendation to respond to a departmentwide reassessment of the program. In January 2010, the Secretary of Homeland Security ordered a departmentwide reassessment of the SBInet program to consider options that may more efficiently, effectively, and economically meet the nation’s border security needs. The assessment focused on two key questions:  whether the SBInet program was viable and could be made to work effectively and fulfill the intent of the program and  whether SBInet was cost-effective. After receiving the results of the assessment, in January 2011, the Secretary of Homeland Security announced that the department had concluded that SBInet systems were not appropriate for the entire southwest border and did not meet current standards for viability and cost-effectiveness. While the department would continue to use those elements of SBInet that were useful, the Secretary announced that the department was canceling further deployments of SBInet systems using the current contract. In its place, DHS is implementing a new approach for acquiring and deploying border security technology called Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology. As the approach’s first step, CBP’s Plan is to deploy a mix of technologies to complete coverage of the Arizona border including integrated fixed-tower (IFT) systems, Remote Video Surveillance Systems (RVSS), Mobile Surveillance Systems (MSS), hand-held equipment, and unattended ground sensors. CBP plans to deploy five IFT systems each comprising about 10 radar-and-camera- equipped towers and integrate their signals into a system command center. According to CBP officials, though similar, the IFT systems’ equipment will be simpler when compared with the equipment for the tower systems deployed under SBInet. Thus, CBP’s plans include the currently deployed SBInet system for 53 miles in Arizona along with the new Plan to acquire and deploy additional towers, mobile surveillance equipment, unattended ground sensors, and hand-held devices to secure the rest of the Arizona border. CBP estimates that the total life-cycle cost of the new Plan will be about $1.5 billion for Arizona. In fiscal year 2011, CBP allocated $185 million to procure border surveillance technologies contained in the Plan except for the new IFT systems. The agency has requested $242 million in fiscal year 2012 appropriations to procure the first three IFT systems also included in the Plan. CBP does not have the information needed to fully support and implement its Plan in accordance with DHS and OMB guidance. To develop this Plan, CBP conducted an analysis of alternatives (AOA) and outreach to potential vendors, and took other steps to test the viability of the current system. However, CBP has not  documented the analysis justifying the specific types, quantities, and deployment locations of border surveillance technologies proposed in the Plan;  defined the mission benefits or developed performance metrics to assess its implementation of the Plan; or  developed a plan to assess and address operational issues with the continuing use of SBInet systems along the highest risk section of the border that could affect the new Plan’s implementation across the remainder of Arizona. For these reasons, CBP’s newly proposed approach is at an increased risk of not accomplishing its goal in support of Arizona border security. At the Secretary of Homeland Security’s direction, CBP has adopted a new approach for developing a technology plan for surveillance at the border that includes development of a business case to justify the way forward. CBP officials told us their business case consists of the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan and a phased independent analysis of alternatives (AOA). According to CBP officials, the development of the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan consisted of a two-step process. First, the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute (HSI) was enlisted to conduct a multipart AOA beginning with Arizona. Second, using the AOA, the Border Patrol conducted an operational assessment of border surveillance technologies to identify the appropriate mix of technologies required to gain situational awareness and manage the Arizona border area. HSI’s AOA considered four technology alternatives: (1) agent- centric hand-held devices, (2) integrated fixed-tower systems, (3) mobile surveillance equipment, and (4) unmanned aerial vehicles. These technology alternatives were analyzed in four representative geographic areas of Arizona. The AOA for Arizona found that integrated fixed-tower systems, like the other technology alternatives, represent the most effective choice only in certain circumstances and that there is no one technology alternative that is appropriate for the entire Arizona border. A summary of the conclusions reached for each of the four alternatives examined is presented in table 3. Unattended ground sensors were not included in the analysis because they were considered part of the existing baseline of technology and would co-exist with all of the alternatives in the AOA. In the AOA, HSI noted that its analysis did not, among other things, identify the optimal combination of specific equipment and systems, measure the contribution of situational awareness to achieving control of the border, or quantify the number of apprehensions that may result from the deployment of any technology solution. Upon completion of the AOA, in July 2010, the Secretary of Homeland Security directed the AOA study team to seek independent validation of its work. In response, HSI assembled an independent review team composed of senior subject matter experts with expertise in border security, operational testing, acquisition, performance measurement, and the management and execution of AOAs to evaluate the AOA for Arizona. In the results of the final report in March 2011, the review team concluded that the AOA for Arizona appeared to have successfully answered the questions asked and drew appropriate conclusions and insights that should be useful to DHS and CBP. CBP officials said they planned to conduct additional analysis of alternatives to incorporate additional technologies and Border Patrol Sectors. Following the completion of the AOA, the Border Patrol conducted its operational assessment, which included a comparison of alternative border surveillance technologies and an analysis of operational judgments to consider both effectiveness and cost. According to CBP officials, they started with the results of the AOA for Arizona, noting that the AOA considered the technologies in terms of the trade offs between capability and cost—but did not document the quantities of each technology needed, the appropriate mix of the technologies, or how a proposed mix of technologies would be applied to specific border areas. CBP officials stated that a team of Border Patrol agents familiar with the Arizona terrain determined the appropriate quantity and mix of technologies by considering the terrain in each area under consideration and which mix of technologies appeared to work for that area and terrain. These officials also stated that they used an iterative process involving dialogue between trained engineers and Border Patrol agents based on the team’s understanding of topography and technology, considering the lowest dollar cost mix of technologies as a starting point to see if situational awareness provided by the mix sufficiently met the threat. As a result, according to CBP officials, if the least expensive technology, such as hand-held portable equipment, met the threat, then that technology would be chosen. If the threat was not addressed by the hand-held technologies, then officials said the team considered the next higher cost technology. The officials added that the IFT systems were the most expensive. CBP has taken a number of steps to develop the Plan; however, program officials developed and proposed the new Plan without documenting the analysis justifying the specific types, quantities, and deployment locations of border surveillance technologies CBP proposed.