In 1994, six Members of Congress expressed concern about a White House official’s use of a military helicopter to visit Camp David and a golf course on May 24, 1994. Accordingly, we were asked to determine (1) the frequency of helicopter flights by White House staff from January 21, 1993, to May 24, 1994, and (2) whether applicable White House procedures were followed in requesting and approving the May 24 trip to Camp David and the golf course. Since 1976, the Marine Corps HMX-1 Squadron in Quantico, Virginia, has been responsible for providing helicopter support to the White House. The squadron is specifically tasked to fly the President, Vice President, First Lady, wife of the Vice President, and visiting Heads of State. White House staff may be authorized to use HMX-1 helicopters when they are directly supporting the President, Vice President, First Lady, and wife of the Vice President or conducting immediate White House activities. Manual records of flights taken by, or in support of, the President, Vice President, First Lady, wife of the Vice President, or Heads of State, are maintained at the squadron’s Quantico facilities. According to HMX-1 manual records, approximately 1,200 flights were flown in support of the President, Vice President, First Lady, wife of the Vice President, and Heads of State during the 16 months before May 24, 1994. These records indicated that, as previously disclosed by the White House, staff members flew in military helicopters 14 times without the President, Vice President, First Lady, wife of the Vice President, or Heads of State during this period. We performed several tests, which I will discuss, to verify the completeness and accuracy of the HMX-1 manual records. Our work did not identify any additional White House staff flights. We reviewed approximately 1,200 manual records (HMX-1 after-action reports) of flights by or in support of the President, Vice President, First Lady, wife of the Vice President, and Heads of State. The after-action report, which is filed by the pilot, identifies the passengers, an itinerary, and the flight crew and is retained by the HMX-1 White House Liaison Office in Quantico. Among the after-action reports we examined were the 14 flights previously reported by the White House as the only flights taken by White House staff when the President, Vice President, First Lady, wife of the Vice President, or Heads of State were not on board. According to officials from the White House Military Office and the HMX-1 Squadron and an associate counsel to the President, the after-action reports we reviewed covered all White House-related flights between January 21, 1993, and May 24, 1994. We performed four tests to independently verify the completeness and accuracy of the manual records maintained by the HMX-1 Squadron. As our first test, we compared the President’s itinerary, as reported in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, with HMX-1 after-action reports. We then listed instances in which the President had traveled, but no after-action reports existed. A White House official then provided us documents from the Presidential Diarist and the Secret Service. These documents verified that the President had used other forms of transportation on the days in question. Next, we compared the records maintained at HMX-1 with the flight records in the Navy’s automated Naval Flight Record Subsystem. This database is part of a larger automated flight record system used to track and manage all naval aircraft flights. The database is maintained by the Navy and the Marine Corps and contains flight information provided by pilots after each flight. The automated data we obtained covered 6,120 flights of HMX-1 aircraft from January 21, 1993, to May 24, 1994. We found the records maintained at HMX-1 to be more complete than those maintained in the database. Third, during our review of the previously reported 14 White House staff flights, we found that 10 had a squadron-specific mission purpose code. According to a Marine Corps official, pilots are to assign this HMX-1 squadron-specific mission purpose code to all flights for logistical support of an executive aircraft, as well as any flight by White House staff that is not directly associated with a flight taken by the President, Vice President, First Lady, wife of the Vice President, or Heads of State. We searched the automated database for all flights with this specific code and found 72 more flights. Of the 72 flights, 34 were included in the records we had reviewed at HMX-1. The remaining 38 flights had no after-action reports. Because it was unclear whether after-action reports should have been completed for the 38 flights, we asked for clarification. We ultimately confirmed why the 38 flights had not been included in the flight records we reviewed at the HMX-1 Squadron. Some flights with no after-action reports included flights to and from contractors for maintenance, flights to test facilities, and support for presidential travel. As one last check that the squadron had not inadvertently omitted a flight from the after-action reports we had reviewed, we interviewed 52 pilots still assigned to the squadron who had flown a White House mission during the 16-month period of our review. In the presence of officials from the White House and the HMX-1 Squadron, we asked the pilots if they had ever flown a White House mission without filing an after-action report. All the pilots said that they always filed after-action reports when they flew missions in support of the White House. At the time of the May 24 trip to Camp David and a golf course, White House policy required that White House Military Office officials approve all HMX-1 helicopter travel by White House staff. The former Deputy Director of the White House Military Office stated that he had approved the use of an HMX-1 helicopter for the May 24 trip. However, no written procedures detailed how such flights were requested or approved. White House Military Office officials told us that the infrequency of helicopter use by the White House staff made written policies and procedures unnecessary; each request had to be considered on an individual basis. The former Deputy Director also told us that the request and approval for helicopter service for the May 24 trip, like most requests for helicopter service, were made orally. Shortly after the May 24 trip, the White House changed the approval authority for staff’s use of military aircraft. According to a May 31, 1994, memorandum, the approval authority was elevated from the level of the Deputy Director of the White House Military Office to the White House Chief of Staff or the Deputy Chief of Staff. For trips that involve the Chief of Staff, the approving authority is now either the White House Counsel or the Deputy White House Counsel. Now let me turn to the issue of senior-level officials traveling on government aircraft. Approximately 500 fixed-wing airplanes and 100 helicopters are used for DOD’s OSA mission, which includes transporting senior-level officials in support of command, installation, or management functions. The Secretary of Defense has designated some DOD senior-level travelers as required use travelers (1) because of their continuous requirement for secure communications, (2) for security, or (3) for responsive transportation to satisfy exceptional scheduling requirements. However, the military department secretaries may apply more stringent restrictions in determining which four-star officers within their respective departments must use these aircraft. DOD policy excludes some aircraft, such as those assigned to the Air Force 89th Military Airlift Wing, from the OSA mission. The 89th Wing provides worldwide airlift support for the President, Vice President, and other high-level officials in the U.S. and foreign governments. The Office of Management and Budget has made the General Services Administration (GSA) responsible for managing civilian agencies’ aircraft programs. DOD, like the civilian agencies, is required to report data to GSA semiannually on senior-level, civilian officials’ travel. DOD’s policy states that the OSA inventory of fixed-wing aircraft should be based solely on wartime requirements. During our review, however, we found that each service had established its own wartime requirements based on differing definitions and methodologies. As of April 1995, the services reported 520 fixed-wing aircraft in DOD’s OSA inventory. Our review showed that only 48 OSA aircraft were used in theater during the Persian Gulf War, which is less than 10 percent of the April 1995 OSA inventory. In 1994, the Air Force determined that its OSA inventory exceeded its wartime requirements, whereas the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps determined that their OSA inventories were slightly less than wartime requirements. However, a February 1993 report on Roles, Missions, and Functions issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the May 1995 report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces indicated that the existing number of aircraft dedicated to OSA missions had been and continued to be excessive. To correct this problem, we recommended in our June report that the Secretary of Defense (1) provide uniform guidance to the services concerning how to compute OSA wartime requirements, (2) develop the appropriate mechanisms to ensure the availability of each service’s aircraft to help fulfill the OSA needs of the other services, and (3) reassign or otherwise dispose of excess OSA aircraft. Additionally, in our September report on the 1996 DOD operation and maintenance budget, we recommended that Congress direct the Air Force to reduce its OSA inventory to its wartime requirements, which would save $18.1 million in operation and maintenance costs. To address the recommendations in our June report, the Joint Chiefs of Staff studied OSA wartime requirements across DOD, including how the availability of each service’s aircraft could help fill the needs of the other services. The resulting October 1995 report established a joint requirement for 391 OSA aircraft and developed a common methodology for determining OSA requirements.