In 1998, Al Qaeda (AQ) conducted its first U.S.-documented terrorist attacks against U.S. interests, killing 224 people, including 12 Americans, and injuring over 4,500 in the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Al Qaeda and related groups have executed subsequent terrorist attacks in East Africa, including the first known attack by an American suicide bomber in Somalia in October 2008. On July 11, 2010, 76 people, including one American, were killed in near simultaneous bombings in Kampala, Uganda. Al Shabaab, a Somali Islamist insurgent group with ties to Al Qaeda, claimed responsibility, marking the group's first successful attack outside Somali territory. Al Shabaab has threatened attacks in Uganda and Burundi, which have deployed troops to the African Union (AU) peacekeeping mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and has threatened other countries and Western targets in East Africa. Al Shabaab's threats mirror those issued by Al Qaeda. In an audio message addressed to Somalis released in April 2009, Al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden stated, "the war which has been taking place on your soil for these years is a war between Islam and the International Crusade," and called on Somalis "to continue their steps on the path of Jihad." According to the U.S. State Department, the continued presence of Al Qaeda operatives in the region and Islamist militants in Somalia poses the greatest threat to U.S. and allied government interests in the region, where porous borders remain vulnerable to the movement of terrorists and illicit materials. The reported recruitment efforts of Al Shabaab in the United States have also raised concern regarding threats to the homeland and the involvement of U.S. citizens in terrorism activities overseas. East African countries have faced threats from a variety of groups that employ terrorist tactics. U.S. counterterrorism policy is focused on transnational AQ operatives in the region and on those local groups, like Al Shabaab, that share a common extremist ideology with Al Qaeda and whose success may benefit Al Qaeda's aims. The United States implements a range of overt, covert, and clandestine programs to counter the transnational terrorist threat in this region. These efforts are part of what the Bush Administration referred to as the "Global War on Terror," and what the Obama Administration calls "a global campaign … to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qa'ida and its affiliates." Debate over their focus, guiding strategy, tactics, and effectiveness continues. This report explores U.S. measures to prevent, deter, and preempt terrorism in East Africa, focusing on the response to threats posed by violent Islamist extremist groups such as Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab. It briefly examines the evolving threat posed by these groups in the region, and discusses the evolution of policies guiding the U.S. response. The report describes both regional and bilateral programs designed to counter the influence and activities of violent extremist organizations. These include not only security assistance and efforts to build regional capacity to counter terrorist financing and transit, but also efforts to address the root causes of extremism. As Congress continues to monitor these programs, questions for potential oversight may include the following: What is the context, focus , and scope of U.S. co unterterrorism programs in East Africa? How serious is the threat posed by violent extremist organizations in East Africa to U.S. interests? In what countries are U.S. and host nation targets most vulnerable to terrorist attack? How are U.S. resources matched against the threat? Given finite U.S. resources, how much should be devoted to countering terrorist threats in East Africa compared to those elsewhere in the world? What are the drivers of violent extremism in East Africa? How might they differ from those in other regions that have experienced increased terrorist activity? To what extent are U.S. counterterrorism programs in East Africa designed to address the specific context of the countries in which they are implemented? How are counterterrorism programs coordinated? Which agencies currently implement counterterrorism programs? Are they best placed to do so? How has interagency coordination of these programs evolved? What challenges remain? To what extent are counterterrorism programs accompanied by effective communications and public affairs strategies to explain their aims? How are U.S. counterterrorism efforts perceived by host country populations? Is there a comprehensive counter-radicalization strategy guiding counterterrorism- related development and civil affairs interventions? How are counterterrorism programs balanced between military and law enforcement or judicial assistance, and between security assistance and "development" programs, such as efforts to counter extremist ideologies? Are these programs effective in countering or preventing extremism? Could they be improved? What metrics are used to evaluate these programs? How effective are partner nations' efforts in disrupting or reducing the terrorist threat posed by Al Qaeda and its affiliates in East Africa? To what extent have partner governments conducted operations that demonstrate enhanced counterterrorism capabilities attributable to U.S. training or assistance? To what extent, if at all, should efforts to counter violent extremism in the region incorporate initiatives to reach out to non-violent Islamists to marginalize violent extremists? What are the potential costs or dangers of such a strategy? To what extent do counterterrorism programs potentially conflict with other U.S. regional policy goals, such as the promotion of human rights and democracy? In November 2001, the chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa declared in a hearing on Africa and the War on Global Terrorism, "It is clear that in the fight against terrorism, no region can be ignored, especially not Africa." In that hearing, former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Susan Rice, who is now the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, testified that Africa was "the world's soft underbelly for global terrorism." Congress has maintained an active interest in terrorist threats over the past decade, and has focused increasingly on the growing capabilities of AQ affiliates. During the past year, multiple committees held hearings on the evolving threat of Al Qaeda and its global network, and witnesses have drawn attention to the activities of Al Shabaab and its relationship with Al Qaeda (hearings are listed in Appendix C ). Congress has also focused on Al Shabaab's recruitment efforts in the United States. In January 2009, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee produced a majority staff report on Al Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia, which warned, "the potential threats from Yemen and Somalia pose new challenges for the United States and other countries fighting extremism worldwide." Political instability and terrorist activities in and emanating from Somalia have been the subject of increasing focus. Members have expressed concern with the ongoing humanitarian crisis and security situation, and in 2010 the chairman of the Senate Africa Subcommittee voiced his concern that "we still do not have an overarching strategy for Somalia that ties our programs and policies together. As a result, we appear to be grasping at straws to 'do something' while our national security increasingly hangs in the balance." He introduced S.Res. 573 , calling for the development of a comprehensive strategy to address Somalia's multiple crises. Several bills were introduced in the aftermath of the 2010 Kampala bombings: H.Con.Res. 303 , which calls upon the Administration to formulate a comprehensive strategy and work with African partners to address the terrorist threat in the region; H.Res. 1538 , which condemns the bombings and calls for the Administration to work with partners to address the security threat emanating from Somalia; and H.Res. 1596 , which condemns Al Shabaab for its conscription of child soldiers. Related legislation, H.Res. 1708 , introduced in September 2010, calls for Eritrea to be designated a state sponsor of terrorism for its alleged ties to Al Shabaab. Congress has explored the U.S. response to terrorist threats, including those in East Africa, through a range of hearings and oversight activities. The Armed Services Committees have examined the various strategies and programs to counter violent extremism, and the Senate has scrutinized U.S. outreach to Muslim communities overseas. In its most recent defense authorization, H.R. 5136 , the House Armed Services Committee expressed concern that the Department of Defense (DOD) had not focused sufficient effort on messaging programs aimed at delegitimizing violent extremism, and that despite a number of programs focused on the mission, they were not well coordinated or supported. The committee found that "the Department must first understand the ideological environment, including how these groups leverage digital media," and recommended increased funding. The committee has also sought to expand or enhance several counterterrorism authorities, including the "Section 1208" program, which allows DOD to provide assistance to foreign forces facilitating U.S. Special Operations Forces operations to counter terrorism; various counter-ideology initiatives, including efforts to facilitate DOD understanding of the cultural and ideological contexts of radicalization; and the "Section 1206" train and equip program, which has been used to build capabilities in East Africa. Members of Congress have also expressed concern that the U.S. government may not be adequately assessing long-term risks associated with providing training and military equipment for counterterrorism purposes to countries with poor records of human rights, rule of law, and accountability. U.S. military and security assistance efforts in East Africa have drawn the attention of the 111 th Congress. The House Oversight and Government Reform Committee has investigated the activities of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and its sub-regional presence in Djibouti, the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). Senate committees have expressed support for the task force's regional engagement activities, but have requested clarification on CJTF-HOA's future role in Africa (see " Regional Programs "). The House of Representatives, in its FY2011 Defense Authorization Act ( H.R.