More than 2.4 million miles of hazardous liquid and natural gas pipeline— primarily buried underground in the continental United States—run under remote and open terrain as well as densely populated areas. These pipelines are comprised of three main types: Hazardous liquid: About 170,000 miles of hazardous liquid pipeline transport crude oil, diesel fuel, gasoline, jet fuel, anhydrous ammonia, and carbon dioxide. Natural gas transmission and storage: Over 320,000 miles of pipeline—mostly interstate—transport natural gas from sources to communities. Natural gas distribution: About 1.9 million miles of pipeline—mostly intrastate—transport natural gas from transmission pipelines to residential, commercial, and industrial customers. The network of hazardous liquid and natural gas transmission pipelines in the United States can be seen in figure 1. More than 3,000 pipeline companies operate the nation’s pipeline systems. Pipeline systems are comprised of the pipelines themselves, which can traverse multiple states and U.S. borders with Canada and Mexico, as well as a variety of facilities, such as storage tanks, compressor stations, and control centers. Some of these facilities are considered critical and merit particular attention to security if, for example, they are important to the nation’s energy infrastructure; serve installations critical to national defense; or, if attacked, have the potential for mass casualties or significant impact on public drinking water affecting a major population center. A significant disruption of pipeline service has the potential to inflict economic havoc on a region or the nation at large. Notwithstanding the potential damage or harm that could result from an attack, the inherent design and operation of U.S. pipeline systems might reduce some of the potential impacts regarding loss of service. For one thing, the pipeline sector is generally considered to be resilient. Historically, pipeline operators have been able to quickly respond to the adverse consequences of an incident—whether it is damage from a major hurricane or a backhoe—and quickly restore pipeline service. In addition, pipeline infrastructure is versatile and includes such redundancies as parallel pipelines or looping capabilities that enable operators to mitigate potential disruptions by rerouting energy through the network. Protecting the nation’s pipeline systems is a responsibility shared primarily by the federal government and private industry. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the role of federal agencies in securing the nation’s transportation systems has continued to evolve. In response to those attacks, the federal government enacted the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001, which created and conferred upon TSA broad responsibility for securing all modes of transportation, including pipeline. In November 2002, the federal government enacted the Homeland Security Act, which established DHS, transferred TSA from DOT to DHS, and assigned DHS responsibility for protecting the nation from terrorism, including securing the nation’s transportations systems. Within TSA, the Office of Transportation Sector Network Management (TSNM) manages all surface transportation security issues with divisions dedicated to each surface mode of transportation, including pipeline. Within TSNM, the Pipeline Security Division (PSD)—the smallest of TSNM’s surface transportation divisions—has lead responsibility for the security of the nation’s pipeline systems. For fiscal year 2010, PSD has an authorized staffing level of 13 and a budget of about $4 million. TSA’s Office of Intelligence is responsible for collecting and analyzing threat information related to the transportation network; it shares with PSD any information related to pipeline threats or suspicious incidents. While TSA, within DHS, was given primary responsibility for pipeline security, DOT’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) retained responsibility and authority for regulating the transportation of hazardous materials via pipeline and pipeline safety. In 2004, DHS and DOT entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) delineating the agencies’ roles and responsibilities with respect to transportation security and recognizing DHS as having primary responsibility for security in all modes of transportation, including pipeline. In 2006, TSA and PHMSA completed an annex to the MOU further clarifying both agencies’ roles. The annex identifies TSA as the lead federal entity for transportation security, including hazardous materials and pipeline security, and PHMSA as responsible for administering a national program of safety in natural gas and hazardous liquid pipeline transportation, including identifying pipeline safety concerns and developing uniform safety standards. However, pipeline security and safety are intertwined, and PSD and PHMSA coordinate on matters relating to pipeline security and protection. TSA and DOE also work together on matters where pipeline safety and security overlap and PSD and DOE worked closely on pipeline security issues, programs, and activities, such as efforts to enhance reliability and resiliency. Although PSD has primary federal responsibility for pipeline security, implementation of asset-specific protective security measures remains the responsibility of pipeline operators in the private sector. Particularly since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, operators’ attention to security has increased and they have sought to incorporate security practices and programs into their overall business operations. Pipeline operators’ interests and concerns are represented by five major trade associations with ties to the pipeline industry—the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA), American Gas Association (AGA), American Public Gas Association (APGA), American Petroleum Institute (API), and Association of Oil Pipe Lines (AOPL). These associations have worked closely with the federal government on a variety of pipeline security- related issues. In March 2002, API developed Security Guidelines for the Petroleum Industry and in September 2002, INGAA and AGA developed Security Guidelines for the Natural Gas Industry, which were adopted by APGA. Both sets of guidelines emphasize security planning and strategies that, to varying degrees, include identifying, analyzing, and reducing vulnerabilities. Both reference some of the physical security measures that operators can take to protect their critical facilities, but provide caveats explaining the general nature of the described security practices and the importance of each operator determining the security measures that are appropriate for each facility. Figure 2 illustrates some of the physical security measures that operators may choose to employ at a critical facility. In September 2002, prior to the establishment of DHS, DOT issued voluntary guidance for pipeline operators in the form of the Pipeline Security Information Circular (the 2002 circular), which TSA later adopted. The 2002 circular, developed in collaboration with pipeline industry associations, recommended pipeline operators identify their critical facilities, develop security plans consistent with prior industry association guidance, and begin implementing appropriate security measures at critical facilities. It also outlined steps the federal government planned to take, including conducting onsite reviews of pipeline operators’ security plans to determine whether the plans are consistent with security guidance published by their industry. In collaboration with industry associations, PSD developed new, draft pipeline security guidance to replace the 2002 circular. As of May 2010, PSD had not yet issued the new guidance, but it anticipates doing so sometime during 2010. Pipeline Security Contingency Planning Guidance, also developed by DOT in 2002 and considered part of the 2002 circular, provides criteria for pipeline operators to use to identify critical facilities and establishes guidelines for protective measures for critical facilities under each threat condition corresponding to the Homeland Security Advisory System. For example, during periods of elevated threat conditions (yellow), operators should ensure, among many other things, that employees are educated on security standards and procedures; fencing, locks, camera surveillance, intruder alarms, and lighting are in place and functioning; gates and barriers are closed and locked except those needed for immediate entry and exit at critical facilities; and visitation is limited and it is confirmed that every visitor is expected and has a need to be at a critical facility. However, similar to industry guidelines, the Pipeline Security Contingency Planning Guidance also states that pipeline operators are expected to use good judgment in incorporating measures into their security plans as not all security measures are appropriate for all types of facilities. In August 2007, Congress passed the 9/11 Commission Act, which identifies the following pipeline security requirements that the Secretary of Homeland Security must implement. Some of these requirements are shared responsibilities with the Secretary of Transportation; others are to be carried out in consultation with the Secretary of Transportation. Within DHS, PSD has responsibility for carrying out the following pipeline security requirements of the 9/11 Commission Act: Establish a program for reviewing pipeline operators’ adoption of the 2002 circular, including the review of pipeline security plans and critical facility inspections. Develop and implement a plan for reviewing the pipeline security plans of the 100 most critical pipeline operators covered by the 2002 circular. Develop and implement a plan for inspecting the critical facilities of the 100 most critical pipeline operators covered by the 2002 circular. In conducting these reviews and inspections, use risk assessment methodologies to prioritize risks and target inspections. Develop security recommendations for natural gas and hazardous liquid pipelines and pipeline facilities and transmit to pipeline operators. If the Secretary of Homeland Security determines that regulations are appropriate, promulgate regulations and carry out necessary inspection and enforcement actions. Develop a pipeline security and incident recovery protocols plan and submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees. The report is to include the plan and an estimate of the private and public sector costs to implement any recommendations. In recent years, we, along with Congress, the executive branch, and the 9/11 Commission, have recommended that federal agencies with homeland security responsibilities utilize a risk management approach to help ensure that finite national resources are dedicated to assets or activities considered to have the highest security priority. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish uniform policies, approaches, guidelines, and methodologies for integrating federal infrastructure protection and risk management activities. It also called for the Secretary to produce a comprehensive, integrated national plan for critical infrastructure and key resources protection to outline national goals, objectives, milestones, and key initiatives. In response to HSPD-7, DHS released the NIPP in June 2006, and updated it in 2009. The NIPP created a risk-based framework for the development of sector-specific agency strategic plans.