On January 22, 2002, the Congressional Research Service sponsored a seminar on the possiblelessons for U.S. policy from the experiences of other countries in handling their own terrorismchallenges. Although other countries generally have not experienced international terrorist incidentsresembling the events of September 11, 2001 in concept and in devastating execution, many haveconfronted very severe and prolonged domestic threats. To discuss whether there are policy lessonsthat the United States might draw from those countries, CRS invited several experts on internationalterrorism, and others with particular experiences in one or more cases to discuss the topic. Although this seminar was held over two and a half years ago, several of the topics of discussion and speakers' points of view are relevant to the recommendations made by the report ofthe 9/11 Commission issued in July 2004. The following four paragraphs in this introductionsummarize pertinent points on the utility reform (which was the major topic of discussion during theseminar), as well as on four subjects highly relevant to Commission recommendations. Thesesubjects were (1) the possible tradeoffs between security and civil liberties; (2) the tradeoffs betweensecurity risks and costs; (3) international cooperation; and (4) terrorist financing. The remainder ofthe text is unchanged from the original publication of July 24, 2002. Several of the Commission's recommendations dealt with a perceived need for reforms within Muslim countries: economic reforms, political reforms, and social reforms, most particularlyeducation. One of the most controversial topics of discussion at the CRS seminar was the utility ofsuch reforms. The debate centered upon the accuracy of the findings of a 1984 study by one of thespeakers that demonstrated that levels of terrorism did not decrease when economic reforms wereundertaken or when selected economic indicators improved, but rather that violence worsened wheneconomic indicators were better. Other speakers and discussants raised several considerations as towhy this finding may have been true: (1) terrorists may have intensified their activities as they foundreforms counterproductive to their objectives; (2) if negotiations were going on they might haveintensified activities to produce more concessions; (3) the government was unable to deliver thedegree of reform needed or had undertaken reforms too late; (4) other government actions, such asstopping people on the streets, may have undermined the positive effects of reform; or simply (5)that the time frame covered by the study (four to eleven years, depending on the case) may have notbeen long enough to demonstrate the true results of reforms. One speaker pointed out that thetimeframe over which one evaluates a situation can affect perceptions of a policy's effectiveness andoutcome. (See pp. 11-14.) There was some discussion as to whether Islamist terrorism was better addressed through long-term programs, such as secularized education, and whether changed circumstances could modify thesocial and psychological context which feeds terrorism. Speakers could not recall a precedent wherethe United States sought to change an educational system abroad to prevent the emergence ofterrorism, but thought perhaps a domestic example, the influence of education in diminishing overtime the power of the Ku Klux Klan, might provide insight into the possible utility of such anapproach. One speaker said that he found the educational system to be one of the most significantfactors in predicting the occurrence of terrorism. He attributed a large difference in the degree ofterrorism in Quebec, Canada, and Northern Ireland, both of which have separatist movements withinBritish cultures, to the deliberate nationalist indoctrination in Northern Ireland's schools. He alsopointed to an example regarding Northern Ireland where a long term cultural shift in perception hasbeen undermining the pro-terrorism culture there. (See pp. 13-14.) Speakers debated the degree towhich the United States could affect Islamist terrorism by a change in its policies in the Middle East,particularly its policy towards Israel. (See pp. 15-16.) The speakers also addressed two sets of tradeoffs that were raised by the 9/11 Commission. Noting that many of its recommendations called for the government to "increase its presence in ourlives," the Commission advanced several recommendations designed to protect civil liberties whilecautioning that security must be reconciled with liberty "since the success of one helps protect theother." One speaker opined that whether Europe's "severe" anti-terrorism laws grantingextraordinary police powers in the 1970s and 1980s were effectively implemented depended uponthe collection of good intelligence that could minimize the use of intrusive, repressive tactics. TheCommission's recommendations also pointed to the dilemmas raised by evaluating risks within thecontext of limited resources, but concluded, in the case of transportation assets, that "terroristsshould perceive that potential targets are defended." Discussion at the CRS seminar suggested thatdecisions setting priorities in terms of risk may be a difficult -- if not futile -- task, as even thehighest degree of preparedness is not going to prevent terrorist incidents as terrorists turn to secondlevel targets when more desirable targets are well guarded. The net result, according to one of thespeakers, is that the United States will have to decide what degree of risk it is willing to bear, muchas the United States decides to tolerate the risk of deaths on its highways and from smoking. (Seepp. 15-17.) The Commission Report also indicated through several recommendations the need for international cooperation, with one recommendation calling for the development of a comprehensivecoalition strategy against Islamist terrorism. CRS speakers pointed to international cooperation ashelpful in controlling sources of support for terrorist acts, in particular financing and arms. (See pp.8-9.) There were three speakers. The first was Martha Crenshaw , now the Colin and Nancy Campbell Professor in Global Issues and Democratic Thought at Wesleyan University, who gave anintroduction discussing the complexities involved in developing a viable policy towards terrorism. As one of the first scholars to devote herself to the study of terrorism who continues to devote amajor portion of her time to the subject, she has studied the phenomenon for over 30 years. Thesecond speaker was Christopher Hewitt , a Professor of Sociology at the University of Maryland,Baltimore County, who has written a multi-case comparative study of the effectiveness ofgovernment policies towards terrorism, and a book published in the spring of 2002 on Americanterrorism. His comparative study, completed in 1984, looked at five cases, all modern democracies. Three were cases of ethnic or separatist terrorism: the IRA in Northern Ireland (1968-1973); theBasque ETA in Spain (1975-1981); and the EOKA in Cyprus (1955-1958). The other two werecases of revolutionary terrorism: the Red Brigades in Italy (1977-1981), and the Tupamaros inUruguay (1968-1973). [Of these, the first two conflicts are still active to some extent.] The finalspeaker was Peter Probst , an independent consultant with nearly 30 years of experience with theCentral Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense. His formal remarks concentrated onperceived deficiencies in current U.S. policy. Three additional people were invited to participate in the subsequent discussion with members of the audience. They were Imad-ad-dean Ahmad of the Minaret of Freedom, MarcGopin , avisiting professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and specialist in conflict resolution,and Ulrich Seidt of the German Embassy in Washington, D.C. (For further biographicalinformation on the speakers and commentators, see Appendix A.) The three major issues that the speakers were asked to address were: Methods of dealing with terrorist organizations: whether targeting leadership (for arrest or assassination), and targeting flows of money, can curb or eliminate terroristactivity; Utility of policy reforms and accommodation: whether an accommodation of U.S. policy and/or reform of Middle East governments would help end radical Islamist terrorism; Debate over civil liberties: whether the strengthening of police enforcement powers and strict immigration controls have significantly enhanced public security in othercountries. The speakers were also asked to weigh whether there are particular policies that might be useful, and to suggest policies which may not have yet been tried. There were three areas, discussedimmediately below, on which there seemed to be broad agreement. There were many points of livelydiscussion and debate, the most salient of which are present in the section on Issues in Dealing withTerrorist Organizations. This report concludes with some considerations for U.S. policy that wereraised throughout the program. (One hour, edited versions of the seminar are available in audio(AB50397) and video (VB60057) tapes. Online audio and video excerpts from the seminar areposted at http://www.crs.gov/products/multimedia/sem-020122.shtml .) Nature of Terrorism. An area on which the three speakers agreed was on the nature of terrorism, and the seriousness of the current threat to the UnitedStates. All of them saw it as a tactic used in many different contexts by people willing to inflictviolence on military and civilian targets in order to obtain a variety of ends. In response to a questionas to what was a terrorist organization, both Crenshaw and Hewitt thought it best to avoid labelingorganizations as such, arguing that applying a "terrorist" label to acts, and not the actors, wouldfacilitate clearer analysis and policymaking. Ahmad offered a definition: "deliberate targeting ofcivilians to create an atmosphere of terror with the intention of advancing one's particular cause." Long-term Prospect of Violence. All also agreed that the United States may be dealing with international terrorism as a domestic problem for a verylong time. "The United States is in a situation that is likely to last for generations," according toProbst. While others did not speculate on the time frame, there was general agreement that terrorismtends to become a long term, self-perpetuating problem, because it engenders a cycle of violence.