Since fiscal year 2011, DHS has used changes in the number of apprehensions on the southwest border between POEs as an interim measure for border security, as reported in its annual performance reports. As we reported in December 2012, our data analysis showed that apprehensions across the southwest border decreased 69 percent from fiscal years 2006 through 2011. These data generally mirrored a decrease in estimated known illegal entries in each southwest border sector. As we testified in February 2013, data reported by Border Patrol following the issuance of our December 2012 report showed that total apprehensions across the southwest border increased from over 327,000 in fiscal year 2011 to about 357,000 in fiscal year 2012.assess whether this increase indicates a change in the trend for Border Patrol apprehensions across the southwest border. Through fiscal year 2011, Border Patrol attributed decreases in apprehensions across sectors in part to changes in the U.S. economy, achievement of strategic objectives, and increased resources for border security. It is too early to In addition to collecting data on apprehensions, Border Patrol collects other types of data that are used by sector management to help inform assessment of its efforts to secure the border against the threats of illegal migration and smuggling of drugs and other contraband. These data show changes, for example, in the (1) percentage of estimated known illegal entrants who are apprehended, (2) percentage of estimated known illegal entrants who are apprehended more than once (repeat offenders), (3) number of seizures of drugs and other contraband, and (4) number of apprehensions of persons from countries at an increased risk of sponsoring terrorism. Our analysis of these data show that the percentage of estimated known illegal entrants apprehended from fiscal years 2006 through 2011 varied across southwest border sectors. The percentage of individuals apprehended who repeatedly crossed the border illegally declined by 6 percent from fiscal years 2008 through 2011. Further, the number of seizures of drugs and other contraband across the border increased from 10,321 in fiscal year 2006 to 18,898 in fiscal year 2011. Our analysis of the data also show that apprehensions of persons from countries at an increased risk of sponsoring terrorism— referred to as Aliens from Special Interest Countries—increased each fiscal year from 239 in fiscal year 2006 to 399 in fiscal year 2010, but dropped to 253 in fiscal year 2011. As we reported in December 2012, Border Patrol sectors and stations track changes in their overall effectiveness as a tool to determine if the appropriate mix and placement of personnel and assets are being deployed and used effectively and efficiently, according to officials from Border Patrol headquarters. Border Patrol data showed that the effectiveness rate for eight of the nine sectors on the southwest border improved from fiscal year 2006 through 2011. Border Patrol headquarters officials said that differences in how sectors define, collect, and report turn back data (entrants who illegally crossed the border but were not apprehended because they crossed back into Mexico) and got away data (entrants who illegally crossed the border and continued traveling into the U.S. interior) used to calculate the overall effectiveness rate preclude comparing performance results across sectors. Border Patrol headquarters officials stated that until recently, each Border Patrol sector decided how it would collect and report turn back and got away data, and as a result, practices for collecting and reporting the data varied across sectors and stations based on differences in agent experience and judgment, resources, and terrain. Border Patrol headquarters officials issued guidance in September 2012 to provide a more consistent, standardized approach for the collection and reporting of turn back and got away data by Border Patrol sectors. Each sector is to be individually responsible for monitoring adherence to the guidance. According to Border Patrol officials, it is expected that this guidance will help improve data reliability. Implementation of this new guidance may allow for comparison of sector performance and inform decisions regarding resource deployment for securing the southwest border. Border Patrol is in the process of developing performance goals and measures for assessing the progress of its efforts to secure the border between POEs and for informing the identification and allocation of resources needed to secure the border, but has not yet identified milestones and time frames for developing and implementing them. Since fiscal year 2011, DHS has used the number of apprehensions on the southwest border between POEs as an interim performance goal and measure for border security as reported in its annual performance report. Prior to this, DHS used operational control as its goal and outcome measure for border security and to assess resource needs to accomplish this goal. Operational control—also referred to as effective control—was defined as the number of border miles where Border Patrol had the capability to detect, respond to, and interdict cross-border illegal activity. DHS last reported its progress and status in achieving operational control of the borders in fiscal year 2010. At that time, DHS reported achieving operational control for 1,107 (13 percent) of 8,607 miles across U.S. northern, southwest, and coastal borders. Along the southwest border, DHS reported achieving operational control for 873 (44 percent) of the about 2,000 border miles. At the beginning of fiscal year 2011, DHS transitioned from using operational control as its goal and outcome measure for border security. We testified in February 2013 that the interim goal and measure of number of apprehensions on the southwest border between POEs provides information on activity levels but does not inform program results or resource identification and allocation decisions, and therefore until new goals and measures are developed, DHS and Congress could experience reduced oversight and DHS accountability. Further, studies commissioned by CBP have found that the number of apprehensions bears little relationship to effectiveness because agency officials do not compare these numbers with the amount of cross-border illegal activity. Border Patrol officials stated that the agency is in the process of developing performance goals and measures, but has not identified milestones and time frames for developing and implementing them. According to Border Patrol officials, establishing milestones and time frames for the development of performance goals and measures is contingent on the development of key elements of its new strategic plan, such as a risk assessment tool, and the agency’s time frames for implementing these key elements—targeted for fiscal years 2013 and 2014—are subject to change. We recommended that CBP establish milestones and time frames for developing a performance goal, or goals, for border security between POEs that defines how border security is to be measured, and a performance measure, or measures, for assessing progress made in securing the border between POEs and informing resource identification and allocation efforts. DHS concurred with our recommendations and stated that it plans to set a date for when it will establish such milestones and time frames by November 2013. As part of its homeland security and legacy customs missions, CBP inspects travelers arriving at POEs to counter threats posed by terrorists and others attempting to enter the country with fraudulent or altered travel documents and to prevent inadmissible aliens, criminals, and goods from entering the country. In fiscal year 2012, CBP inspected about 352 million travelers, and over 107 million cars, trucks, buses, trains, vessels, and aircraft at over 329 air, sea, and land POEs. We have previously identified vulnerabilities in the traveler inspection program and made recommendations to DHS for addressing these vulnerabilities, and DHS implemented these recommendations. For example, we reported in January 2008 on weaknesses in CBP’s inbound traveler inspection program, including challenges in attaining budgeted staffing levels because of attrition and lack of officer compliance with screening procedures, such as those used to determine citizenship and admissibility of travelers entering the country as required by law and CBP policy.Factors that contributed to these challenges included lack of focus, complacency, lack of supervisory presence, and lack of training. We recommended that CBP enhance internal controls in the inspection process, implement performance measures for apprehending inadmissible aliens and other violators, and establish measures for training provided to CBP officers and new officer proficiency. DHS concurred with these recommendations and has implemented them. Specifically, in January 2008, CBP reported, among other things, that all land port directors are required to monitor and assess compliance with eight different inspection activities using a self-inspection worksheet that is provided to senior CBP management. At that time, CBP also established performance measures related to the effectiveness of CBP interdiction efforts. Additionally, in June 2011, CBP began conducting additional classroom and on-the-job training, which incorporated ongoing testing and evaluation of officer proficiency. In December 2011, we reported that CBP had revised its training program for newly hired CBP officers in accordance with its own training development standards. Consistent with these standards, CBP convened a team of subject-matter experts to identify and rank the tasks that new CBP officers are expected to perform. As a result, the new curriculum was designed to produce professional law enforcement officers capable of protecting the homeland from terrorist, criminal, biological, and agricultural threats. We also reported that CBP took some steps to identify and address the training needs of its incumbent CBP officers but could do more to ensure that these officers were fully trained. For example, we examined CBP’s results of covert tests of document fraud detection at POEs conducted over more than 2 years and found weaknesses in the CBP inspection process at the POEs that were tested. In response to these tests, CBP developed a “Back to Basics” course in March 2010 for incumbent officers, but had no plans to evaluate the effectiveness of the training. We also reported that CBP had not conducted an analysis of all the possible causes or systemic issues that may have contributed to the covert test results. We recommended in December 2011 that CBP analyze covert tests and evaluate the “Back to Basics” training course, and DHS concurred with these recommendations. In April 2012, CBP officials reported that they had completed an evaluation of the “Back to Basics” training course and implemented an updated, subsequent training course. Further, in November 2012, CBP officials stated that they had analyzed the results of covert tests prior to and since the implementation of the subsequent course.