DOD space systems support and provide a wide range of capabilities to a large number of users, including the military services, the intelligence community, civil agencies, and others. These capabilities include positioning, navigation, and timing; meteorology; missile warning; and secure communications, among others. Space systems can take a long time to develop and often consist of multiple components, including satellites, ground control stations, terminals, and user equipment. DOD satellite systems are also expensive to acquire. Unit costs for current DOD satellites can range from $500 million to over $3 billion, and ground systems can cost as much as $3.5 billion. The cost to launch just one satellite can climb to well over $100 million. Most major space programs have experienced significant cost and schedule increases. For instance, program costs for the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite program, a protected satellite communications system, had grown 116 percent as of our latest review, and its first satellite was launched over 3.5 years late. For the Space Based Infrared System High (SBIRS High), a missile warning satellite program, costs grew nearly 300 percent and the launch of the first satellite was delayed roughly 9 years. Last year, we reported that contract costs for the Global Positioning System (GPS) ground system, designed to control on-orbit GPS satellites, had more than doubled and the program had experienced a 4-year delay. The delivery of that ground system is now estimated to be delayed another 2 years, for a cumulative 6-year delay. Some DOD officials say even that is an optimistic timeline. Table 1 below provides more details on the current status of DOD’s major space programs. Cost and schedule growth in DOD’s space programs is sometimes driven by the inherent risks associated with developing complex space technology; however, for at least the past 7 years we have identified a number of other management and oversight problems that can worsen the situation. These include overly optimistic cost and schedule estimating, pushing programs forward without sufficient knowledge about technology and design, and problems in overseeing and managing contractors, among others. Some of DOD’s programs in operation were also exceedingly ambitious, which in turn increased technology, design, and engineering risks. While satellite programs have provided users with important and useful capabilities, their cost growth has significantly limited DOD’s buying power—at a time when more resources may be needed to protect space systems and to recapitalize the space portfolio. Since 2013, I have testified that DOD has implemented actions to address space acquisition problems, and most of its major space programs have transitioned into the production phase where fewer problems tend to occur. These range from improvements to cost estimating practices and development testing to improvements in oversight and leadership, such as the addition of the Defense Space Council, designed to bring together senior leaders on important issues facing space. DOD has also started fewer new programs and even those are less ambitious than prior efforts, which helps to reduce the risk of cost and schedule growth. Given the problems we have identified in the GPS program, however, it is clear that more needs to be done to improve the management of space acquisitions. Our past work has recommended numerous actions that can be taken to address the problems we typically see in space programs. Generally, we have recommended that DOD separate the process of technology discovery from acquisition, follow an incremental path toward meeting user needs, match resources and requirements at program start, and use quantifiable data and demonstrable knowledge to move programs forward to next phases. We also have identified practices related to cost estimating, program manager tenure, quality assurance, technology transition, and an array of other aspects of acquisition program management that could benefit space programs. Right now, DOD is at a crossroads for space. Fiscal constraints and increasing threats—both environmental and adversarial—to space systems have led DOD to consider alternatives for acquiring and launching space-based capabilities. For satellites, our reports since 2013 have described efforts such as: disaggregating large satellites into multiple, smaller satellites or payloads; relying on commercial satellites to host government payloads; and procuring certain capabilities, such as bandwidth and ground control, as services instead of developing and deploying government-owned networks or spacecraft. For space launch this includes continuing to introduce competition into acquisitions as well as eliminating reliance on Russian-built rocket engines. In some cases, such as space launch, changes are being implemented. For example, as we reported in April 2015, DOD has introduced competition into acquisitions. In other areas, such as space-based environmental (or weather) monitoring, decisions have just recently been made. In still others, such as protected satellite communications and overhead persistent infrared sensing, decisions on the way forward, including satellite architectures, have not yet been made though alternatives have been assessed. Figure 1 describes some changes DOD is considering in some areas for space. In multiple reports since our last testimony on this subject in April 2015, our work has touched on these and other potential changes. Our reports have specifically covered issues associated with protecting space assets, transforming launch acquisitions, and improving purchases of commercial satellite bandwidth, as well as the development of the GPS ground control system and user equipment. We are also currently examining the analysis used to support decisions on future weather system acquisitions as well as space leadership. All of this work is summarized below. Together, these reports highlight several major challenges facing DOD as it undertakes efforts to change its approaches to space acquisitions. First, though DOD is conducting analyses of alternatives to support decisions about the future of various programs, our preliminary work suggests there are gaps in cost and other data needed to weigh the pros and cons of changes to space systems. Second, most changes being considered today will impact ground systems and user equipment, but these systems continue to be very troubled by cost and schedule overruns. Third, leadership for space acquisitions is still fragmented, which may hamper the implementation of changes, especially those that stretch across satellites, ground systems and user equipment. Space Situational Awareness Costs. According to Air Force Space Command, U.S. space systems face intentional and unintentional threats, which have increased rapidly over the past 20 years. These include radio frequency interference (including jamming), laser dazzling and blinding, kinetic intercept vehicles, and ground system attacks. Additionally, the hazards of the already-harsh space environment (for example, extreme temperature fluctuations and radiation) have increased, including numbers of active and inactive satellites, spent rocket bodies, and other fragments and debris. In response, recent government-wide and DOD-specific strategic and policy guidance have stressed the need for U.S. space systems to be survivable or resilient against such threats. The government relies primarily on DOD and the intelligence community to provide Space Situational Awareness (SSA)—the current and predictive knowledge and characterization of space objects and the operational environment upon which space operations depend—to provide critical data for planning, operating, and protecting space assets and to inform government and military operations. In October 2015, as mandated by the Senate Armed Services Committee, we reported on estimated costs of SSA efforts over the next 5 years. Specifically, we reported that the government’s planned unclassified budget for SSA core efforts—DOD, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) operations of sensors, upgrades, and new developments—averages about $1 billion per year for fiscal years 2015 through 2020. Operations and payroll accounts for about 63 percent of the core budget during fiscal years 2015 through 2020, while investments for new sensors and systems, as well as upgrades for existing ones, account for the rest. Moreover, we could not report total costs since SSA is not the primary mission for many of the sensors that perform this mission. This is partly because DOD leverages systems that perform other missions to conduct SSA. This is a good practice since it reduces duplication and overlap but it makes accounting for SSA costs difficult. For example, missile defense sensors also perform SSA missions. The Missile Defense Agency has not determined what percentage of its budget for operating its missile defense sensors, which averages about $538 million per year over the next several years, would be allocated to the SSA mission. Moreover, these sensors would be procured by the Missile Defense Agency even if they were not involved in the SSA mission. Responsive Launch. In light of DOD’s dramatically increased demand and dependence on space capabilities and that operationally responsive low cost launch could assist in addressing such needs, DOD was required to report to the Congress on “responsive launch,” which generally means the ability to launch space assets to their intended orbits as the need arises, possibly to augment or reconstitute existing space capabilities. In October 2015, we reported that DOD did not yet have a consolidated plan for developing a responsive launch capability since there were no formal requirements for such a capability. DOD and contractor officials we spoke with also highlighted several potential challenges DOD faces as it pursues operationally responsive launch capabilities. For example, DOD officials told us that existing national security space program architectures (including payloads, ground systems, user equipment, and launch systems) may need to be modified to improve responsiveness, which could present challenges. That is, modifying one program could have repercussions for another, including changes to infrastructure and command and control elements. Further, while smaller, simpler satellites may require less time and effort to develop, build, and launch, a larger number of satellites may be needed to provide the same level of capability, and the transition from existing system designs could increase costs. DOD plans to validate future responsive launch requirements as it gains knowledge about emerging threats. Once this is done, having a single focal point for prioritizing and developing its responsive launch capabilities will be important, especially since different components of DOD already have ongoing efforts in place to develop responsive launch capabilities. Competitive Launch Acquisition.