The United States now has approximately 130,000 troops in Iraq and another 30,000 supporttroops in Kuwait, a force that some senior U.S. military officials believe stretches the country'scombat capabilities , especially in the event of a major crisis in Korea or elsewhere. The BushAdministration wishes NATO countries to send forces to Iraq to reduce the demands on U.S. forces,and to spread the costs of stabilization and reconstruction. Key allies acknowledge the possibilityof a NATO role, but first wish to see a new U.N. mandate and greater sharing of decision-makingwith both the U.N. and the allies. Some other allies appear to reject involvement in a U.S.-led force,as a NATO force would be, and prefer a force with a substantial U.N. role. In a broader context, unresolved issues from earlier disputes among the allies also intrude in the debate over possible NATO involvement. These issues include the causes of the war in Iraq, therole of the U.N. in NATO out-of-area operations, the military capabilities of the allies, and theeffects of Iraq's evolution on the Middle East as a whole. In addition, vestiges of a dispute overallied assistance to Turkey in February 2003 before the war with Iraq remain a cause for frictionbetween the United States and several allies. This section will first briefly review the debate in NATO over the last two years about alliedmissions outside Europe. It will then discuss several related issues, primarily those generated byallied disagreement over the reasons for war with Iraq, that affect any possible decision by Europeangovernments to contribute forces to stabilize Iraq. There follows a discussion of the evolution of theAdministration's position on its objectives for post-war Iraq and the necessary force levels to achievethose objectives. The section closes with an examination of how many European forces might beavailable for Iraq, and the relation of force levels to costs. NATO members agreed in principle in 2002 that allied forces might be sent beyond Europe to combat threats to member states' security. In May 2002, the allies agreed that "to carry out the fullrange of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they areneeded, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives." Several monthsearlier, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, when asked what NATO's area of operations shouldbe, responded, "The only way to deal with the terrorist network that's global is to go after it whereit is." On July 9, 2003, he told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Administrationwould "certainly want assistance from NATO and from NATO countries" in stabilizing Iraq. (1) Thosewho favor a NATO role in Iraq cite the recent precedent of the allied force in Afghanistan. TheInternational Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan has 4,800 troops, including a smallU.S. contingent, that came under NATO command on August 11, 2003. Its commander on theground is a German general. Its objective is to bring stability to Kabul. (An additional 9,000 U.S.forces, not under NATO command, continue combat operations outside Kabul.) In early October2003, NATO agreed in principle to extend the NATO force to the town of Kunduz. Before the conflict in Iraq, some Administration officials made a case for NATO involvement in post-war Iraq. They contended that only NATO had the capability for force generation,intelligence, and planning for a peace operation. NATO has had experience in Bosnia, Kosovo, andAfghanistan in leading stabilization forces. The bombing of U.N. headquarters in Baghdad onAugust 19 may signal a continuation of violent resistance to any outside entity, whether military orcivilian, be it NATO or the U.N. (2) NATO's agreement in principle to send forces outside Europe and the precedent of ISAF mask a range of issues that must be resolved before the European allies might send troops to Iraq. Someallied governments believe that the Bush Administration should have involved NATO more closelyin the conflict in Afghanistan in late 2001 to build an international political base for using militaryforce against terrorism. A more narrow range of allied governments believes that the Administrationoverrode their preference for allowing U.N. WMD inspections to run their course in Iraq in late 2002and 2003, that the Administration pushed aside the U.N. as a centerpiece for building aninternational coalition against the government of Saddam Hussein, and that the Administration wentto war precipitately, without establishing firm evidence of WMD in or Al Qaeda links to Iraq. In February 2003, several allies resisted a U.S. effort to send NATO forces to defend Turkey in the event of an attack by Iraq. They opposed such a move because they viewed it as anAdministration maneuver to imply NATO endorsement of the impending conflict with Iraq. Theseexperiences have led the allies to demand a greater share of decision-making and more authority forthe U.N. in Iraq before committing military forces to that country, issues that will be discussed ina later section of this report. (3) Both President Bush and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld have previously said that U.S. forces in Iraq are adequate to stabilize the country and to accomplish Administration objectives there. InJune 2003, President Bush said that the United States has in Iraq "the force necessary to deal withthe security situation." On August 20, Secretary Rumsfeld said, "At the moment, the conclusion ofthe responsible military officials is that the force levels are where they should be." (4) Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz testified to Congress that the purpose of the U.S. occupation is to build "a free, democratic, peaceful Iraq" that will not threaten friends of the UnitedStates with "illegal weapons. A free Iraq that will not be a training ground for terrorists...[and] willnot destabilize the Middle East. A free Iraq can set a hopeful example to the entire region and leadother nations to choose freedom." He added that by bringing in military forces from other countries,U.S. forces could be drawn down. (5) On September23, 2003, in a speech at the U.N., President Bushsaid that "Iraq as a democracy will have great power to inspire the Middle East. The advance ofdemocratic institutions in Iraq is setting an example that others, including the Palestinian people,would be wise to follow." (6) There are views, some within the United States government, that contend that the force levels in Iraq cannot be maintained without severe stress on U.S. forces. The United States Army has 33active-duty combat brigades, of which only three are available today for new missions. Twenty-oneare overseas, including 16 in Iraq. A CBO study released September 3 found that the U.S. Armycould not maintain170,000-180,000 forces in Iraq and Kuwait past March 2004 without activatingmore National Guard and Reserve units, or calling upon foreign forces. General John Abizaid,CENTCOM commander, placed the figure at a lower level. He said that the United States could notsustain the current level of 130,000 troops without rotating active duty, reserve, and National Guardforces into Iraq by spring 2004, absent international forces to replace them. (7) Other estimates put the level of forces needed in Iraq at a higher figure than that given by the Administration. A Rand Corporation official has given an estimate of 300,000-500,000 troops.Former Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki said that several hundred thousand troops wouldbe needed. Some of these estimates do not cite democracy and influence on regional governmentsto develop representative institutions as goals of the occupation; rather, they generally cite "stability"as the key objective. (8) One defense analyst providesa more sobering perspective, noting that the U.S.political as well as military strategy is deficient to bring stability to Iraq. In his view, the UnitedStates lacks properly trained forces, such as peacekeepers and military police, for the job; the essenceof Iraq's need is for civilian training for administrators and establishment of civil institutions, butIraq is now being administered by the Department of Defense, which is not prepared for such amission, according to this view. (9) NATO is providing a measure of assistance in Iraq to Poland, which has formed a multinational force that became operational in part of its originally assigned sector September 3. NATO's NorthAtlantic Council decided on May 21, 2003, to provide Poland allied assets for force planning,communications, logistics, and establishment of a headquarters. The operation is not technically aNATO operation. Poland leads a contingent of 9,000 troops from a variety of countries, some ofwhich are not NATO members, from north of Basra into the central part of the country. Thebombing of a major mosque in Najaf, which took the life of an important Shi'ite cleric, led the U.S.government to delay Poland's takeover of that city, which is in the Polish sector, for at least severalweeks. Some observers, while crediting Warsaw with a willingness to undertake a dangerousmission, believe that some of the forces are not trained to NATO standards. (10) The United States willpay Poland $250 million to cover primarily logistics and communication costs for its force. On August 26, 2003, NATO SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe) General James Jones floated the idea that the Polish-led force might eventually be expanded and transformed intoa NATO-led force, a step that would require the approval of all allies. (11) Several factors could limit the availability of forces from NATO countries. Several allies -- such as France, Italy, Britain, and Germany -- are already contributing to stability operations inBosnia, Kosovo, the Ivory Coast, and Afghanistan.