The legislation authorizing the 2005 BRAC round, enacted as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, required DOD to give priority to selection criteria dealing with military value and added elements of specificity to criteria previously used by DOD in prior BRAC rounds. In large measure, the final criteria closely followed the criteria DOD employed in previous rounds, with greater specificity added in some areas, as required by Congress. To ensure that the selection criteria were consistently applied, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) established a common analytical framework to be used by the three military departments and the seven joint cross-service groups. Each service and group adapted this framework, in varying degrees, to its individual activities and functions in evaluating facilities and functions and identifying closure and realignment options. Despite the diversity of bases and cross-service functions analyzed, each of the groups was expected to first analyze capacity and military value of its respective facilities or functions, and then to identify and evaluate various closure and realignment scenarios and provide specific recommendations. The analysis relied on data calls to obtain certified data to assess such factors as maximum potential capacity, current capacity, current usage, excess capacity, and capacity needed to meet surge requirements. The military value analysis consisted of assessments of operational and physical characteristics of each installation, or specific functions on an installation related to a specific joint cross-service group’s area of responsibility. These would include an installation’s or function’s current and future mission capabilities, physical condition, ability to accommodate future needs, and cost of operations. This analysis also relied on data calls to obtain certified data on the various attributes and metrics used to assess each of the four military value criteria and permit meaningful comparisons between like installations or facilities with reference to the collective military value selection criteria. The scenario development and analysis phase focused on identifying various realignment and closure scenarios for further analysis. These scenarios were to be derived from consideration of the department’s 20- year force structure plan, capacity analysis, military value analysis, and, as appropriate, the exercise of military judgment through consideration of transformational options, applicable guiding principles, objectives, or policy imperatives identified by individual military services or joint cross- service groups. The BRAC 2005 round is different from previous base closure rounds in terms of number of actions, projected implementation costs, and estimated annual recurring savings. While the number of major closures and realignments is just a little greater than those in individual previous rounds, the number of minor closures and realignments, as shown in table 1, is significantly greater than those in all previous rounds combined. DOD data indicate that over 200,000 military and civilian personnel jobs, exclusive of personnel returning from overseas locations, will be affected by the implementation of the DOD’s BRAC recommended actions, if they are approved. Further, it is likely that thousands of contractor personnel will be similarly affected. The large increase in minor closures and realignments is attributable partly to actions involving the Army National Guard, Army Reserve, and Air National Guard and vacating leased space. DOD’s projected cost to implement the proposed actions is $24.4 billion compared to a $22 billion total from the four previous rounds through 2001, the end of the 6-year implementation period for the 1995 BRAC round. The increase in costs is due partly to significant military construction and moving costs associated with Army recommendations to realign its force structure, and to recommendations to move activities from leased space onto military installations. For example, the Army projects that it will need about $2.3 billion in military construction funds to build facilities for the troops returning from overseas. Likewise, DOD projects that it will need an additional $1.3 billion to build facilities for recommendations that include activities being moved from leased space. DOD’s decision-making process for evaluating its facilities and studying potential recommendations was generally logical, well documented, and reasoned, although there were delays in making the supporting data available to the Commission and to the public after the Secretary announced his proposed recommendations on May 13, 2005. In establishing the framework for the 2005 BRAC round, DOD provided overall policy guidance for the BRAC process, including a requirement that its components develop and implement internal control plans to ensure the accuracy and consistency of their data collection and analyses. These plans also helped to ensure the overall integrity of the process and the information upon which OSD considered each group’s recommendations. OSD also established a common analytical framework used by each military department to analyze its service-unique functions and by each of the seven joint cross-service groups to analyze its common business- oriented functions. The military departments and each joint cross-service group adapted this framework, in varying degrees, to its individual activities and functions in evaluating facilities and functions that shaped its analysis. The process began with a set of sequential steps by assessing capacity and military value, developing and analyzing scenarios, then identifying candidate recommendations, which led to the final list of recommendations. Military judgment also played a role throughout the process. Figure 1 illustrates the overall sequential analytical process generally employed to develop BRAC recommendations. It must be noted, however, that while the process largely followed the sequential process, initial difficulties associated with obtaining complete and accurate data in a timely manner added to overlap and varying degrees of concurrency between data collection efforts and other steps in the process. To assist in the process for analyzing and developing recommendations, the military services and joint cross-service groups used various analytical tools that helped to ensure a more consistent approach to BRAC analysis and decision making. For example, all of the groups used the DOD-approved Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) model to calculate costs, savings, and return on investment for BRAC scenarios and, ultimately, for the final 222 BRAC recommendations. DOD has used the COBRA model in each of the previous BRAC rounds and, over time, has improved upon its design to provide better estimating capability. In our past and current reviews of the COBRA model, we found it to be a generally reasonable estimator for comparing potential costs and savings among various BRAC options. The BRAC process follows a historical analytical framework with many elements of the process being carried forward or building upon lessons learned from previous rounds. For example, the selection process essentially followed a framework similar to that employed in previous BRAC rounds, with more specificity in selected military value areas like surge and homeland defense as required by Congress. At the same time, DOD incorporated into its analytical process other legal considerations for formulating its realignment and closure recommendations. As required by BRAC legislation, DOD certified the data used in the selection process and based its recommendations on the congressional specified selection criteria, its 20-year force structure plan, and gave priority consideration to the military value criteria. DOD collected capacity and military value data that were certified as to their accuracy by hundreds of persons in senior leadership positions across the country. These certified data were obtained from corporate databases and from hundreds of defense installations. In total, DOD projects that it collected over 25 million pieces of data as part of the BRAC process. Given the extensive volume of requested data from the 10 separate groups (3 military departments and 7 joint cross-service groups), we noted that the data collection process was quite lengthy and required significant efforts to help ensure data accuracy. In some cases, coordinating data requests, clarifying questions and answers, controlling database entries, and other issues led to delays in the data-driven analysis DOD originally envisioned. As such, some groups had to develop strategy- based proposals. As time progressed, however, these groups reported that they obtained the needed data, for the most part, to inform and support their scenarios. At the same time, because of data limitations, a few of the joint cross-service groups relied on some data from commercially available databases to support their decision making. While it was difficult for these data to be validated in a fashion similar to most other DOD collected-data, the data came from widely used databases and were approved by the chairs of the relevant joint cross-service groups. Each of the military services and the seven joint cross-service groups considered DOD’s 20-year force structure plan in its analysis. DOD based its force structure plan for BRAC purposes on an assessment of probable threats to national security during a 20-year period beginning with fiscal year 2005. DOD provided this plan to Congress in March 2004, and as authorized by the statute, it subsequently updated it 1 year later in March 2005. Based on our analysis, updates to the force structure affected some ongoing BRAC analyses. For example, the Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group reassessed its data pertaining to overhauling and repairing ships based on the updated force structure and decided that one of its two smaller shipyards—Naval Shipyard Pearl Harbor or Naval Shipyard Portsmouth—could close. However, as you know, much debate continues over the size of the Navy’s future force structure. DOD gave primary consideration to its military value selection criteria in its process. Specifically, military value refers to the first four selection criteria: an installation’s current and future mission capabilities, condition, ability to accommodate future needs, and cost of operations. The manner in which each military service or joint cross-service group approached its analysis of military value varied according to the unique aspects of the individual service or cross-service function. These groups typically assessed military value by identifying multiple attributes or characteristics related to each military value criterion, then identifying qualitative metrics and measures and associated questions to collect data to support the overall military value analysis. For example, figure 2 illustrates how the Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross-Service Group linked several of its military value attributes, metrics, and data questions to the mandated military value criteria. Based on congressional direction, there was enhanced emphasis on two aspects of military value—an installation’s ability to serve as a staging area for homeland defense missions and its ability to meet unanticipated surge.