The Framework Agreement is the latest achievement in the Doha Development Agenda(DDA) round of trade negotiations at the WTO. This round of trade negotiations was launched atthe 4th Ministerial of the WTO at Doha, Qatar in November 2001. Trade ministers set an ambitiousagenda to negotiate an accord by January 1, 2005. The 5th Ministerial Conference, to take place in2003, would serve as a mid-term review for the negotiations. The work program devised at Doha folded in continuing talks (the built-in agenda) onagriculture and services and launched negotiations on the reduction or elimination of non-agricultural(industrial) tariffs, clarification and improvement of disciplines for existing WTO agreements onantidumping and subsidies, and topics relating to special and differential (S&D) treatment fordeveloping countries and assistance to developing countries with the implementation of existingWTO commitments. Trade ministers at Doha agreed to continue discussions on the "Singaporeissues" (government procurement, trade facilitation, investment, and competition policy) and tolaunch negotiations if an "explicit consensus" was reached on these issues at the 5th MinisterialConference in 2003. The Doha Ministerial Declaration also directed negotiators to resolve a disputerelated to the ability of least developing countries to access generic medicines for HIV/AIDS andother epidemics. The Doha Ministerial documents paid special attention to the concerns of developingcountries, and the round was formally entitled the Doha Development Agenda. This emphasis waspartly in order to get the developing countries -- a majority of the WTO's membership -- to agree tothe commencement of the round. However, some developing countries had difficulty inimplementing their Uruguay Round commitments, and many developing countries have expressedconcern about undertaking new obligations. At Doha, negotiators agreed to resolve issues related totheir implementation of the Uruguay Round agreements, to negotiate special and differentialtreatment for developing countries in the new round, and to provide technical assistance in thenegotiations and implementation of the agreements. Negotiations proceeded at a slow pace. Several deadlines for agreement on negotiatingmodalities -- i.e. methodologies by which negotiations are conducted -- were missed in theagriculture, industrial market access, and other negotiating groups. In addition, deadlines forsubmitting requests and offers in the services negotiations were also missed by many participants. Negotiators looked toward the 5th Ministerial -- which took place September 10-14, 2003 in CancÃºn,Mexico -- to resolve the modalities. In the weeks before CancÃºn, negotiating documents to achievethis resolution were criticized by all sides, and expectations for the Ministerial were reduced fromagreeing on modalities to achieving an agreement on the framework for negotiating the modalitiesto be used in future negotiations. From CancÃºn to Geneva. The CancÃºnMinisterial, however, failed to achieve even these expectations. Trade ministers at CancÃºn becameembroiled in disputes over agriculture and the Singapore issues. The G-20, an informal group ofdeveloping countries led by Brazil, India, China, and South Africa, demanded substantialconcessions from developed countries in the agriculture negotiations in response to perceived UnitedStates-European Union (EU) collaboration. Some developing countries also refused to support thebeginning of negotiations over the Singapore issues, which had been pushed by the EU, because ofsovereignty issues or capacity constraints. In the end, deadlock over the Singapore issues broke upthe talks before agriculture issues were even formally discussed. Subsequent to the collapse of the talks, U.S. and EU negotiators criticized both the substanceand tactics of the G-20 group. Developing countries defended their actions as representing theirparamount interest in breaking down the agricultural barriers and subsidies in the United States andthe EU. Initially, U.S. reaction in the aftermath of the Ministerial was to give increased emphasisto the negotiation of bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTA). The European Unionundertook a review of its policy towards the WTO and multilateral trade negotiations. However, signs of movement in the negotiations could be detected by the beginning of 2004. In January, U.S. Trade Representative Robert B. Zoellick sent a letter to the 147 WTO tradeministers expressing the hope that 2004 would not be "a lost year for the WTO negotiations." Whileeschewing concrete proposals, the letter signaled U.S. reengagement with the process. The EU'sacceptance, meanwhile, of the elimination of agricultural export subsidies "by date certain" alsomoved the negotiations along. Compromise was also achieved over the negotiation of the Singaporeissues as the EU and others decided that the inclusion of competition policy, investment, andgovernment procurement in the round had to be abandoned if the negotiations were to move forwardin the face of developing- country resistance. Developing countries too played an active part innegotiations this year, first by India and Brazil negotiating directly with the developed countries (asthe so-called "non-party of five") on agriculture, and second by working toward acceptance of tradefacilitation as a subject for negotiation. After intense negotiations in late July 2004, WTO members reached what has become knownas the Framework Agreement (or the July package) which provides broad guidelines for completingthe Doha round negotiations. The agreement contains a 4-page declaration, with four annexes (A-D)covering agriculture, non-agricultural market access, services, and trade facilitation, respectively. In addition, the agreement acknowledges the activities of other negotiating groups (such as those onrules, dispute settlement, and intellectual property) and exhorts them to fulfill their Doha roundnegotiating objectives. The agreement also abandons the January 1, 2005 deadline for thenegotiations, but instead sets December 2005 as the date for the 6th Ministerial to be held in HongKong. U.S. Priorities. Throughout the Doha Round,increased market access for U.S. agriculture, industrial goods, and services has been the primary goalfor U.S. negotiators. In the agricultural negotiations, the United States has sought improved marketaccess, especially from developing countries, and the end of all export subsidies. The United Stateshas also sought expansive tariff liberalization in the non-agricultural market access talks, includingsupport for an early proposal for a "tariff-free world" by the year 2015 and for sectoral tariffelimination. The United States has also made cross-border trade in services a priority, reportedlyseeking to have services make up one of the pillars of the Framework Agreement. (1) The United States has beenless concerned with the disposition of the Singapore issues, with USTR Zoellick at one pointreportedly referring to them as a "distraction." (2) The United States has also sought to limit the scope of negotiationson disciplines to WTO rules, especially in light of Congressional support for maintaining currentU.S. trade remedy practices. Previous rounds of trade liberalization were successful in reducing tariffs in the manufacturedgoods sector. That negotiated liberalization has proceeded further in this area perhaps is reflectedin the distribution of world trade. Of the $7.6 trillion exchanged in world trade in 2002, industrialgoods comprised 71.9%, agriculture 7.6%, and services 20.5%. Trade in services was only broughtunder world trade rules by the Uruguay Round's General Agreement on Trade in Services in 1995.Agriculture, though previously negotiated, remains a thorny issue for both producer and consumer,and developed and developing countries. The liberalization of these sectors potentially offers thegreatest boost to world trade, but also potentially the most wrenching changes to the societies thatundertake them. Introduction. The agreement on a framework forcompleting the agriculture negotiations in the DDA is contained in Annex A of the "July package." The Framework Agreement addresses the three "pillars" of agricultural trade liberalization identifiedin the 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration: substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support;the phase-out, with a view to total elimination, of all export subsidies; and substantial improvementsin market access. (4) Failureto agree on a framework for the agriculture negotiations would have contributed to uncertainty aboutprospects for concluding the DDA and about the viability of the WTO as a global forum fornegotiating further farm trade liberalization. The Framework now becomes the basis forestablishing specific formulas, schedules, end dates and other parameters (referred to as"modalities") for achieving DDA objectives for agriculture during the next phase of negotiationswhich seem likely to continue into 2006. U.S. aims for the DDA negotiations include substantial market opening for agriculturalproducts by all WTO members, especially, the developing countries. The United States wants allagricultural export subsidies eliminated. The United States has consistently maintained thattrade-distorting domestic support should be reduced substantially, but also wants to preserve"safety-net" farm income programs enacted in the 2002 farm bill. (5) The European Union (EU),while willing to eliminate export subsidies over time, wants an end to export credit guarantees andsome food aid programs that it claims are export subsidies. The EU also wants to maintain directdecoupled payments to farmers (along with payments linked to production) established underrecently enacted reforms of its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The developing countries, alarge and diverse group that constitutes a majority of WTO members, want special and differentialtreatment with respect to tariff or subsidy reduction. The poorest or least developed countries(LDCs) among them want to maintain the trade preferences they currently enjoy.