According to DOE, 603 metric tons of highly enriched uranium and plutonium are at risk of nuclear material theft in Russia. This material, located at civilian research centers, naval fuel storage sites, and Russia’s nuclear weapons laboratories, can be used directly in a nuclear weapon without further enrichment or reprocessing. The material is considered to be highly attractive to theft because it (1) is not very radioactive and therefore relatively safe to handle and (2) can easily be carried by one or two people in portable containers or as components from dismantled weapons. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the subsequent social, political, and economic changes in Russia weakened the existing Soviet-era nuclear security systems. These systems placed a heavy emphasis on internal surveillance of nuclear workers and citizens and severe penalties for violations of nuclear security. The decline in economic conditions, late payment of wages to nuclear workers, and the rise of a strong criminal element increased the risk that employees or criminal elements in Russia would attempt to steal nuclear material for economic gain. Furthermore, Russian nuclear facilities lacked modern equipment that could quickly detect, delay, and respond to attempted thefts of nuclear material. Over the last 7 years, DOE has worked cooperatively with Russia to install modern nuclear security systems consisting of three components: Physical protection systems, such as fences around the buildings that contain nuclear material; metal doors protecting the rooms where material is stored; and video surveillance systems that monitor the storage rooms. Material control systems, such as seals attached to nuclear material containers that indicate whether material may have been stolen from the containers and badge systems that only allow authorized personnel into areas containing nuclear material. Material accounting systems, such as inventories of nuclear material and computerized databases that enable sites to track the amount and type of nuclear material contained in specific buildings. DOE’s Guidelines for Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Upgrades at Russian Facilities provide U.S. project teams with criteria for designing and installing security systems. The criteria were designed to achieve the greatest reduction to the risk of nuclear material theft within the program’s projected budget. While the guidelines are based on DOE’s physical security and material control and accounting requirements, and the International Atomic Energy Agency’s recommendations for physical protection, they are not as stringent as U.S. and international standards used to protect material at similar kinds of sites. According to the guidelines, installing security systems that use multiple components reduces the risk of theft by minimizing the reliance on any one component to detect and delay attempted thefts. Locating the components close to the material, such as around storage vaults and work areas, rather than at a site’s perimeter also reduces risk by minimizing the chance that a thief can bypass security systems and steal material. The guidelines also establish priorities for installing security systems on the basis of how easily the nuclear material being protected could be converted to nuclear weapons. Material that is more readily converted to nuclear weapons receives more extensive security systems than material that poses less of a proliferation risk. DOE is also placing a priority on countering lower-level threats of theft from nonviolent individual employees or a small group of criminals rather than from higher-level threats such as those from violent employees or terrorists equipped with explosives to maximize the amount of material that can be protected within the program’s budget. DOE’s Technical Survey Team reviews project documentation and meets with project team members to ensure that the installed systems meet DOE’s guidelines for reducing the risk of nuclear material theft in Russia. The Team comprises eight national laboratory personnel with expertise in physical protection systems and material control and accounting for nuclear materials. The Technical Survey Team’s reviews include (1) an estimate of the original risk of theft at the site and how the installed security systems will reduce it; (2) the extent to which project activities have reduced the risk of theft at the site, on the basis of completed systems or other risk-reduction activities; and (3) the extent to which the security systems are balanced with appropriate physical security and material control and accounting equipment and procedures. The Team also reviews the project work plans for each site at the beginning of the fiscal year to ensure that project teams are installing systems that are effective and are of the least cost. DOE installed completed and partially completed security systems in 115 buildings with about 32 percent of the 603 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear material. We found that the systems that were installed are reducing the risk of nuclear material theft in Russia. DOE is not installing security systems in 104 buildings because Russia’s Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) has restricted access to buildings containing several hundred metric tons of nuclear material because of Russian national security concerns. DOE currently does not have a system in place to periodically measure the effectiveness of the systems to ensure that they continue to detect, delay, and respond to attempts to steal nuclear material. As of February 2001, DOE had installed completed and partially completed security systems in 115 buildings with about 192 metric tons, or about 32 percent, of the 603 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear material. DOE installed completed systems in 81 buildings protecting about 86 metric tons, or about 14 percent, of the nuclear material. DOE has also installed partially completed security systems known as rapid upgrades in 34 additional buildings protecting about 106 metric tons, or about 18 percent of the nuclear material. According to DOE, rapid upgrades consist of such things as bricking up windows in storage buildings; installing strengthened doors, locks, and nuclear container seals; establishing controlled access areas around nuclear material; and implementing procedures requiring two people be present when nuclear material is handled. By installing rapid upgrades, DOE helps Russian sites establish basic control over nuclear material while U.S. project teams finish installing the security system. DOE officials consider a system to be completed when it includes such components as electronic sensors, motion detectors, and closed circuit television systems to detect intruders; central alarm stations, where guards can monitor cameras and alarms; and computerized material accounting systems. According to DOE, the program also has work under way on an additional 130 metric tons of nuclear material. Table 1 shows the number of buildings and types of sites where completed nuclear security systems have been installed, where rapid upgrades have been installed, where work has started but rapid upgrades have not been completed, and where work has not yet started. Our assessment that the installed systems are reducing the risk of nuclear material theft is based on the Technical Survey Team’s reviews of the security improvements at Russian sites, our visits to nine sites, and our discussions with DOE and Russian officials responsible for installing the systems. From January 1999 through September 2000, the Technical Survey Team reviewed projects at 30 of the 40 sites with nuclear material in Russia. Of the 30 sites reviewed, the Team found that the security systems installed or being installed for 22 sites are reducing the risk of theft. Specifically, the systems increased the site’s ability to detect, delay, and respond to an attempted theft or otherwise strengthened control over their nuclear materials at all times. To evaluate the projects, the Team used DOE’s criteria and determined (1) whether the project teams installed security systems on the basis of how easily the nuclear material being protected could be converted to nuclear weapons, (2) whether the systems were installed close to the nuclear material rather than at the sites’ perimeter, and (3) whether multiple components were installed to minimize reliance on any one component to prevent theft. The following are examples where the Technical Survey Team found that the systems as installed are reducing the risk of nuclear material theft: At the Mayak Production Association, a major producer of plutonium for Russia’s nuclear weapons program, DOE installed 1-ton interlocking concrete blocks over trenches containing over 5,000 containers of plutonium. (See fig. 1.) As of February 2001, the blocks were protecting over 15 metric tons of plutonium. Each container has a computerized bar code and tamper-resistant seal to help the site track its location and to show if any attempts have been made to open the container. Each block provides a barrier to delay a thief from gaining access to the material before being detected. In addition, the site’s ability to detect and respond to an attempted theft is reinforced with additional sensors, surveillance cameras, alarms, and communications systems. According to the Technical Survey Team, the blocks are effective against an adversary using sophisticated methods. At Navy Fuel Storage Sites 49 and 34 (located in Murmansk and Vladivostok, respectively), DOE helped the Russian Navy construct storage complexes to consolidate tens of tons of nuclear reactor fuel that were located in poorly protected sites in the Northern and Pacific Fleets. (Navy Site 49 is shown in fig. 2.) DOE, working with the Russian Navy, strengthened the walls and ceilings of the nuclear storage buildings and installed portal monitors for nuclear material, which scan people and vehicles entering and leaving facilities to ensure that they have not taken nuclear material from storage locations, video surveillance systems, alarms, and fences to increase the ability to detect a theft. In addition, DOE improved the guard forces’ ability to respond to an attempted theft by providing them with helmets, bulletproof vests, strengthened barriers that protect against gunfire, and a radio communication system. According to the Technical Survey Team, the systems have significantly reduced the risk of nuclear material theft at these sites. At the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering at Obninsk, DOE bricked up windows at several buildings that contain several tons of nuclear material and installed high-security vault doors and locks and access control systems. According to the Technical Survey Team, these measures reduce the risk of theft. The project team also developed an inventory strategy that reduced the time it takes to inventory items and encouraged the facility to place nuclear material that it seldom uses in sealed containers. According to the Team, these security improvements are consistent with the guidelines issued by the program.