On October 25, 1995, Americans were reminded of the dangers that drivers/passengers often face when they travel over railroad crossings in the United States. On that day, in Fox River Grove, Illinois, seven high school students were killed when a commuter train hit a school bus. The potential for tragedies like the one at Fox River Grove is significant—the United States has over 168,000 public highway-railroad intersections. The types of warning for motorists at these crossings range from no visible devices to active devices, such as lights and gates. About 60 percent of all public crossings in the United States have only passive warning devices—typically, highway signs known as crossbucks. In 1994, this exposure resulted in motor vehicle accidents at crossings that killed 501 people and injured 1,764 others. Many of these deaths should have been avoided, since nearly one-half occurred at crossings where flashing lights and descended gates had warned motorists of the approaching danger. In August 1995, we issued a comprehensive report on safety at railroad crossings. We reported that the federal investment in improving railroad crossing safety had noticeably reduced the number of deaths and injuries. Since the Rail-Highway Crossing Program—also known as the section 130 program—was established in 1974, the federal government has distributed about $5.5 billion (in 1996 constant dollars) to the states for railroad crossing improvements. This two-decade investment, combined with a reduction in the total number of crossings since 1974, has significantly lowered the accident and fatality rates—by 61 percent and 34 percent, respectively. However, most of this progress occurred during the first decade, and since 1985, the number of deaths has fluctuated between 466 and 682 each year (see app. 1). Since 1977, the federal funding for railroad crossing improvements has also declined in real terms. Consequently, the question for future railroad crossing safety initiatives will be how best to target available resources to the most cost-effective approaches. Our report discussed several strategies for targeting limited resources to address railroad crossing safety problems. The first strategy is to review DOT’s current method of apportioning section 130 funds to the states. Our analysis of the 1995 section 130 apportionments found anomalies among the states in terms of how much funding they received in proportion to three key risk factors: accidents, fatalities, and total crossings. For example, California received 6.9 percent of the section 130 funds in 1995, but it had only 4.8 percent of the nation’s railroad crossings, 5.3 percent of the fatalities, and 3.9 percent of the accidents. Senators Lugar and Coats have proposed legislation to change the formula for allocating section 130 funds by linking the amounts of funding directly to the numbers of railroad crossings, fatalities, and accidents. Currently, section 130 funds are apportioned to each state as a 10-percent set-aside of its Surface Transportation Program funds. The second means of targeting railroad crossing safety resources is to focus the available dollars on the strategies that have proved most effective in preventing accidents. These strategies include closing more crossings, using innovative technologies at dangerous crossings, and emphasizing education and enforcement. Clearly, the most effective way to improve railroad crossing safety is to close more crossings. The Secretary of Transportation has restated FRA’s goal of closing 25 percent of the nation’s railroad crossings, since many are unnecessary or redundant. For example, in 1994, the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials found that the nation had two railroad crossings for every mile of track and that in heavily congested areas, the average approached 10 crossings for every mile. However, local opposition and localities’ unwillingness to provide a required 10-percent match in funds have made it difficult for the states to close as many crossings as they would like. When closing is not possible, the next alternative is to install traditional lights and gates. However, lights and gates provide only a warning, not positive protection at a crossing. Hence, new technologies such as four-quadrant gates with vehicle detectors, although costing about $1 million per crossing, may be justified when accidents persist at signalled crossings. The Congress has funded research to develop innovative technologies for improving railroad crossing safety. Although installing lights and gates can help to prevent accidents and fatalities, it will not preclude motorists from disregarding warning signals and driving around descended gates. Many states, particularly those with many railroad crossings, face a dilemma. While 35 percent of the railroad crossings in the United States have active warning devices, 50 percent of all crossing fatalities occurred at these locations. To modify drivers’ behavior, DOT and the states are developing education and enforcement strategies. For example, Ohio—a state with an active education and enforcement program—cut the number of accidents at crossings with active warning devices from 377 in 1978 to 93 in 1993—a 75-percent reduction. Ohio has used mock train crashes as educational tools and has aggressively issued tickets to motorists going around descended crossing gates. In addition, DOT has inaugurated a safety campaign entitled “Always Expect a Train,” while Operation Lifesaver, Inc., provides support and referral services for state safety programs. DOT’s educational initiatives are part of a larger plan to improve railroad crossing safety. In June 1994, DOT issued a Grade Crossing Action Plan, and in October 1995, it established a Grade Crossing Safety Task Force. The action plan set a national goal of reducing the number of accidents and fatalities by 50 percent from 1994 to 2004. As we noted in our report, whether DOT attains the plan’s goal will depend, in large part, on how well it coordinates the efforts of the states and railroads, whose contributions to implementing many of the proposals are critical. DOT does not have the authority to direct the states to implement many of the plan’s proposals, regardless of how important they are to achieving DOT’s goal. Therefore, DOT must rely on either persuading the states that implementation is in their best interests or providing them with incentives for implementation. In addition, the success of five of the plan’s proposals depends on whether DOT can obtain the required congressional approval to use existing funds in ways that are not allowable under current law. The five proposals would (1) change the method used to apportion section 130 funds to the states, (2) use Surface Transportation Program funds to pay local governments a bonus to close crossings, (3) eliminate the requirement for localities to match a portion of the costs associated with closing crossings, (4) establish a $15 million program to encourage the states to improve rail corridors, and (5) use Surface Transportation Program funds to increase federal funding for Operation Lifesaver. Finally, the action plan’s proposals will cost more money. Secretary Pena has announced a long-term goal of eliminating 2,250 crossings where the National Highway System intersects Principal Rail Lines. Both systems are vital to the nation’s interstate commerce, and closing these crossings is generally not feasible. The alternative is to construct a grade separation—an overpass or underpass. This initiative alone could cost between $4.5 billion and $11.3 billion—a major infrastructure investment. DOT established the Grade Crossing Safety Task Force in the aftermath of the Fox River Grove accident, intending to conduct a comprehensive national review of highway-railroad crossing design and construction measures. On March 1, 1996, the task force reported to the Secretary that “improved highway-rail grade crossing safety depends upon better cooperation, communication, and education among responsible parties if accidents and fatalities are to be reduced significantly.” The report provided 24 proposals for five problem areas it reviewed: (1) highway traffic signals that are supposed to be triggered by oncoming trains; (2) roadways where insufficient space is allotted for vehicles to stop between a road intersection and nearby railroad tracks; (3) junctions where railroad tracks are elevated above the surface of the roadway, exposing vehicles to the risk of getting hung on the tracks; (4) light rail transit crossings without standards for their design, warning devices, or traffic control measures; and (5) intersections where slowly moving vehicles, such as farm equipment, frequently cross the tracks. Under the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, as amended, FRA is responsible for regulating all aspects of railroad safety. FRA’s safety mission includes 1) establishing federal rail safety rules and standards; 2) inspecting railroads’ track, signals, equipment, and operating practices; and 3) enforcing federal safety rules and standards. The railroads are primarily responsible for inspecting their own equipment and facilities to ensure compliance with federal safety regulations, while FRA monitors the railroads’ actions. We have issued many reports identifying weaknesses in FRA’s railroad safety inspection and enforcement programs. For example, in July 1990, we reported on FRA’s progress in meeting the requirements, set forth in the Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1980, that FRA submit to the Congress a system safety plan to carry out railroad safety laws. The act directed FRA to (1) develop an inspection methodology that considered carriers’ safety records, the location of population centers, and the volume and type of traffic using the track and (2) give priority to inspections of track and equipment used to transport passengers and hazardous materials. The House report accompanying the 1980 act stated that FRA should target safety inspections to high-risk track—track with a high incidence of accidents and injuries, located in populous urban areas, carrying passengers, or transporting hazardous materials. In our 1990 report, we found that the inspection plan that FRA had developed did not include data on passenger and hazardous materials routes—two important risk factors. In an earlier report, issued in April 1989, we noted problems with another risk factor—accidents and injuries. We found that the railroads had substantially underreported and inaccurately reported the number of accidents and injuries and their associated costs.