The Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA; P.L. 103-465 ) in Section 101 (19 U.S.C.3511) authorized the acceptance, by the President, of United States membership in the World TradeOrganization (WTO) and, thereby, of the rights and obligations of the Agreement Establishing theWorld Trade Organization (WTO Agreement) with its annexed specialized multilateral andplurilateral trade agreements. (1) The URAA, on the other hand, also contains provisions spellingout the legislative procedure whereby the statutory approval of the WTO Agreement -- and, thereby-- of the United States' membership in the WTO can be withdrawn. This legislation functionally ties the withdrawal of the U.S. legislative approval of the WTOagreement to the requirement of periodic reports by the Executive to the Congress on the operationof the WTO and its effects on the United States. Section 124 of the URAA (19 U.S.C. 3534) requires the U.S. Trade Representative to submitto the Congress, by March 1 of each year, beginning in 1996, a report on a wide range of WTOactivities and administrative aspects of WTO operations during the preceding WTO fiscal year(which is the calendar year). Moreover, as required by Section 125 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C.2535), beginning with March 1, 2000, and every fifth year thereafter, such report, transmitted by thePresident, must "include an analysis of the effects of the WTO Agreement on the interests of theUnited States, the costs and benefits to the United States of its participation in the WTO, and thevalue of the continued participation of the United States in the WTO." As pointed out in the section on Disapproval Resolutions contained in the Statement ofAdministrative Action, a part of the documentation which is required to be transmitted by thePresident to the Congress together with the draft of the implementing bill for the Uruguay RoundAgreements Act, [t]he provision creates a mechanism that will permitperiodic Congressional review of U.S. participation in the WTO. (2) Following the submission of such quinquennial report and its review by Congress, Congresscan withdraw its approval of the WTO Agreement, leading to the termination of the United States'participation in the WTO, through the enactment of a joint resolution disapproving the originalapproval of the WTO Agreement. The reasons for the disapproval provision are explained by the House Ways and MeansCommittee as follows: The purpose of this provision is to provide anopportunity for the Congress to evaluate the transition of the GATT to the WTO and to assessperiodically whether continued membership in this organization is in the best interest of the UnitedStates. It is the desire of the Committee not to leave this decision totally in the hands of theExecutive Branch but to be active in determining whether the WTO is an effective organization forachieving common trade goals and principles and for settling trade disputes among sovereignnations. In the course of the five-year review, individualmembers of Congress can evaluate whether the WTO remains on course as a trade-orientedorganization and has not expanded its activities to non-trade related areas. Congress wants to ensurethat the United States can continue to exercise substantial influence within the WTO andsuccessfully promote goals that benefit American producers, workers and consumers... Congress may vote on a joint resolution disapprovingthe continued participation of the U.S. in the WTO. (3) The Senate report on the provision similarly states regarding United States continuedmembership in the WTO that Section 125 establishes a mechanism through which theCongress may withdraw the approval of U.S. participation in the WTO granted under section 102(a)of the bill. ... Congress may consider and adopt a joint resolution providing for withdrawal of U.S.approval of the WTO Agreement, the effect of which would be to end U.S. participation in theWTO. (4) The withdrawal issue came into legislative focus for the first time after the President'squinquennial report of March 2, 2000, but congressional disapproval action initiated in response tothat report was unsuccessful (see p. 9-10). The legislation lays out a specific, expedited (fast-track) procedure to be followed by theCongress in the consideration of the withdrawal measure. To the extent that it differs from theregular procedure (5) , thisprocedure follows, in the main, the special abbreviated fast-track procedure for the consideration of"resolutions disapproving certain actions" (Section 152 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended; 19U.S.C. 2192) (6) , which hasbeen modified with respect to the timetable for certain legislative steps by the provisions of Section125 itself. The provisions of both Section 152 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Section 125 of theURAA are specifically defined as exercises of the rulemaking power of either House and deemeda part of the rules of either House. They can be changed by either House, with respect to its ownprocedure, at any time in the same manner and to the same extent as any other rule of that House(Section 151(a) of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, applied to the procedure by Section 152 ofthe same Act; and Section 125(d) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act; 19 U.S.C. 2191(a), 2192,and 3535(d)). In the presentation that follows, consequently, statutory references to Section 125 refer tothat section of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3535), while those to Section 152refer to that section of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2192). Functionally, the timetable for legislative consideration of the joint resolution of disapprovalencompasses the following steps: (1) Introduction of a joint resolution of withdrawal . A joint resolution of withdrawal may be introduced in either House by any member of thatHouse (Sec. 125(c)(2)(A); 19 U.S.C. 3535(c)(2)(A)) within 90 days (7) of the date on which theCongress receives the quinquennial report transmitted by the President on the operation of the WTO(Sec. 125(b)(2)(B); 19 U.S.C. 3535(b)(2)(B)). (The resolution is privileged -- hence, it must be considered -- and is nonamendable. (8) ) (2) Language of the withdrawal resolution . The language of the joint resolution is prescribed by law (Sec. 125(c)(1); 19 U.S.C.3535(c)(1)) to read, after the resolving clause, only as follows: That the Congress withdraws its approval, providedunder section 101(a) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, of the WTO Agreement as defined insection 2(9) of that Act. (This provision by its very nature makes the withdrawal resolution nonamendable.) (3) Committee referral . The resolution is referred, in the House, to the Committee on Ways and Means and, in theSenate, to the Committee on Finance (Sec. 152(b); 19 U.S.C. 2192(b)). (4) Committee consideration. If the committee of either House to which the resolution has been referred has not reportedit within 45 days (9) afterits introduction, the committee is automatically discharged from further consideration of theresolution, and the resolution is placed on the appropriate calendar for floor consideration (Sec.125(c)(2)(C); 19 U.S.C. 3535(c)(2)(C)). (Also placed on the appropriate calendar under regular legislative procedure are measuresthat have been reported, whether favorably or adversely.) (5) Restriction on consideration in either House . It is not in order in either House to consider a joint resolution of withdrawal (other than aresolution received from the other House) if that House has previously adopted a joint resolution ofwithdrawal (Sec. 125(c)(3); 19 U.S.C. 3535(c)(3)). (10) (6) Floor consideration in the House. (a) It is not in order to consider the joint resolution unless it has been reported by theWays and Means Committee or that committee has been discharged (Sec. 125(c)(2)(D)(ii); 19 U.S.C.3535(c)(2)(D)(ii)). (b) A motion to proceed to the consideration of the resolution may only be made onthe second legislative day after the calendar day on which the sponsor of the motion announces tothe House his intention to do so (Sec. 125(c)(2)(E); 19 U.S.C. 3535(c)(2)(E)). The motion is highlyprivileged and nondebatable; no amendment to the motion, nor a motion to reconsider the vote bywhich it has been agreed or disagreed to, is in order (Sec. 152(d)(1); 19 U.S.C. 2192(d)(1)). (c) Debate is limited to 20 hours, divided equally between those favoring and thoseopposing the resolution; a motion further to limit debate is nondebatable; no amendment to theresolution, nor a motion to recommit it or to reconsider the vote by which it has been agreed ordisagreed to, is in order (Sec. 152(d)(2); 19 U.S.C. 2192(d)(2)). (d) Motions to postpone the consideration of the resolution and motions to proceed to the consideration of other business are decided without debate (Sec.