After the New York Times reported that the National Security Agency (NSA) was conducting a secret Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP), a national debate emerged about whether the program was subject to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), whether the Administration needed additional authority to continue the program, and how and whether Congress should oversee the program. The TSP involved surveillance without a warrant or court order under the FISA of international communications of persons within the United States, where one party to the communication is believed to be a member of al Qaeda, affiliated with al Qaeda, a member of an organization affiliated with al Qaeda, or working in support of al Qaeda. The Bush Administration asserted constitutional and statutory support for its program. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, P.L. 95-511 , Title I, October 25, 1978, 92 Stat. 1796, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. , as amended, provides a statutory framework for the use of electronic surveillance, physical searches, pen registers and trap and trace devices to acquire foreign intelligence information. It also provides statutory authority for the production of tangible things for an investigation to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities. While describing electronic surveillance under FISA as a valuable tool in combating terrorism, the Bush Administration argued that it lacked the speed and agility to deal with such terrorists or terrorist groups. In a January 17, 2007, letter to Chairman Leahy and Senator Specter of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Attorney General Gonzales advised them that, on January 10, 2007, a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) judge "issued orders authorizing the Government to target for collection international communications into or out of the United States where there is probable cause to believe that one of the communicants is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an associated terrorist organization." The Attorney General stated that, in light of these orders, which "will allow the necessary speed and agility," all surveillance previously occurring under the TSP will now be conducted subject to the approval of the FISC. He indicated further that, under these circumstances, the President has determined not to reauthorize the TSP when the current authorization expires. The Attorney General also noted that the Intelligence Committees had been briefed on the highly classified details of the FISC orders and advised Chairman Leahy and Senator Specter that he had directed the Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel and the Assistant Attorney General for National Security to provide them a classified briefing on the details of the orders. The NSA program has been challenged on legal and constitutional grounds. On August 17, 2006, in one such lawsuit, American Civil Liberties Union v. National Security Agency , Case No. 06-CV-10204 (E.D. Mich. August 17, 2006), U.S. District Court Judge Anna Diggs Taylor held the program unconstitutional on the ground that it violated the Administrative Procedures Act, the Separation of Powers doctrine, the First and Fourth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), and Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (Title III), and permanently enjoined the Terrorist Surveillance Program. The decision has been appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. On October 4, 2006, the Sixth Circuit stayed Judge Taylor's August 17, 2006, judgment and permanent injunction pending appeal, American Civil Liberties Union v. National Security Agency , Docket Nos. 06-2140 and 06-2095 (6 th Cir. Oct. 4, 2006). The docket sheets for both Docket Nos. 06-2140 and 06-2095 indicate that a letter from the attorneys for the appellants was filed on January 18, 2007, notifying the court "concerning a letter from the Attorney General's Office regarding orders issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court." Several bills were introduced in the 109 th Congress to amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and to address concerns raised with respect to the Terrorist Surveillance Program. One of these bills, the Electronic Surveillance Modernization Act, H.R. 5825 , 109 th Congress, was introduced on July 18, 2006, and passed the House on September 28, 2006. The measure was designed to provide increased flexibility in authorizing electronic surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence information, while requiring increased reporting and affording Congress additional oversight over such activities. The 110 th Congress may choose to explore similar or different approaches to the issues related to the TSP, or may choose to forego legislative action in light of the new FISC orders and the anticipated termination of the TSP at the conclusion of its current authorization, while continuing congressional oversight of these issues. This report summarizes the provisions of H.R. 5825 , as passed by the House of Representatives in the 109 th Congress, and discusses the impact of its provisions, were similar legislation to be enacted, on current law. The sections of the bill are addressed in the order in which they appear in the bill. Sec. 2 of the bill amends several of the current definitions in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Sec. 2(a) amends definition of "agent of a foreign power" in subsection 101(b)(1), 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1), to add a new category covering any person, other than a United States person, who "(D) is reasonably expected to possess, control, transmit, or receive foreign intelligence information while such person is in the United States, provided that the official making the certification required by section 104(a)(7) deems such foreign intelligence information to be significant." Unlike the definitions of "agent of a foreign power" in subsections 101(b)(1)(A) and 101(b)(1)(B) of FISA, but like the so-called "lone wolf" provision in subsection 101(b)(1)(C) of FISA, the definition of an "agent of a foreign power" under proposed subsection 101(b)(1)(D) does not require that the non-U.S. person covered by this new definition have any connection with a foreign power. However, it differs from the latter provision in that under proposed subsection 101(b)(1)(D), a reasonable expectation that a non-U.S. person will possess foreign intelligence information, without more, appears sufficient for that person to be categorized as an "agent of a foreign power." In addition, under the proposed new definition, a non-U.S. person who is "reasonably expected to control, transmit, or receive foreign intelligence information while in the United States" would also be considered an "agent of a foreign power." The proposed definition does not appear to require an action or intent to act for the benefit of a foreign power or against the interests of the United States, nor does it require any ill intent. This would seem to significantly broaden the reach of the term so defined. Sec. 2(b) amends the definition of "electronic surveillance" in subsection 101(f) of FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f), to mean: (1) the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device [as defined in subsection (2)(d) of the bill, new subsection 101( l ) of FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1801( l ) ] for acquiring information by intentionally directing surveillance at a particular known person who is reasonably believed to be in the United States, under circumstances in which that person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes; or (2) the intentional acquisition of the contents of any communication under circumstances in which a person has reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes, if both the sender and all intended recipients are reasonably believed to be located within the United States. Although this is a broader, shorter, and more general definition than that contained in current law, there are some similarities in language. Proposed subsection 101(f)(1) blends some of the elements of current subsections 101(f)(1) and (f)(4) with new elements, while eliminating other aspects of those provisions. Current subsection 101(f)(1) deals with the use of a surveillance device to intercept the contents of wire or radio communications sent by or intended to be received by a particular, known, intentionally targeted U.S. person, who is in the United States, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes. Current subsection 101(f)(4) deals with the installation or use of a surveillance device in the United States "for monitoring to acquire information, other than from a wire or radio communication, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes." However, unlike current subsection 101(f)(1), the new definition does not explicitly distinguish between interception of the communications of U.S. persons and those of non-U.S. persons, nor is it restricted to acquisition of the contents of communications. The current subsection 101(f)(1) requires the person intentionally targeted to be in the United States, while the proposed provision requires a reasonable belief that the person at whom surveillance is intentionally directed be in the United States. Both proposed subsection 101(f)(1) and current subsection 101(f)(4) deal with the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device to acquire information, but unlike current subsection 101(f)(4), the proposed definition contains no express requirement that the surveillance device be installed or used in the United States, and no restriction on acquisition of that information from wire or radio communications.