The federal bureaucracy of the present day is the product of more than two centuries of legislative and administrative actions by successive generations of elected and appointed officials. As such, the diverse organizations and processes of the federal government are a consequence of the influence and decisions of thousands of officials with differing viewpoints about the role of government and diverse policy preferences. The federal bureaucracy's organizational arrangements are also reflective of ongoing competition between Congress and the President to influence the behavior of agencies. With its size, complexity, and idiosyncratic history, the federal bureaucracy is sometimes perceived as immutable. Notwithstanding this perception, federal organizational structures and processes are under continual congressional and administrative study and alteration in response to changing contexts and priorities. Most changes in organizational arrangements occur deep within departments and agencies, affecting a small number of subunits and not attracting wide notice. Occasionally, broader, more widely known changes, such as a structural reorganization establishing a new department or a redelegation of responsibilities among agencies, are undertaken. These activities are expected developments in a government that is evolving and adapting in response to changing needs, policy priorities, political contexts, and technology, among other factors. Government reorganization is a process that may be undertaken in pursuit of administrative and political goals. Such activities have been associated with both potential benefits and potential drawbacks, some of which are discussed in a text box near the end of this report. As used in this report, the term reorganization is used to encompass the "purposeful (intended) changes in purpose, functions, procedures, assignments, and relationships in organizations." It involves more than just structural rearrangement of organizational units and personnel, and it can occur within agencies as well as among two or more agencies. Government reorganizations can also entail changes in interagency processes or the distribution of resources and functions among agencies. The government organizations that are the focus of this report are those that exercise significant federal legal authority. Primary constitutional responsibility for the structural organization of the executive branch of the federal government, as well as the creation of the principal components of that branch, rests with Congress. Moreover, Congress has long sought to promote efficiency, transparency, accountability, public participation, and economy in the operations of the executive departments, agencies, and other governmental entities through specifications of both government-wide and agency-specific processes. Key tools that Congress uses to shape the contours of the federal government include authorizing legislation, appropriations legislation, and oversight. The President has often played a leadership role in reorganization of the executive branch by transmitting proposals and advocating legislative action in public statements and private negotiations. Presidents and their appointed agency heads also have a variety of administrative tools at their disposal for making smaller-scale structural and procedural organizational changes. Each of these governing actors has tried to bridge divides between entities with shared missions, similar functions, or overlapping jurisdiction by establishing interagency coordinative mechanisms of one kind or another. Such mechanisms may be considered tools of reorganization in that they often lead to changes in procedures, assignments, and relationships within and between organizations. This report begins with discussions of some tools available to Congress, the President, and agency leaders for initiation and implementation of executive branch reorganization. It then discusses interagency coordinative mechanisms that are sometimes used by each of these actors to bridge interorganizational gaps. The report concludes with general observations regarding federal reorganization efforts. Reorganizations that exceed the boundaries of one department or agency, or that are inconsistent with existing law, generally are accomplished through the legislative process. Consequently, Congress has a fundamental role in shaping and reshaping the federal agency landscape. It creates, structures, and locates or relocates offices; delegates to them specific or general missions, powers, duties, and functions; defines the parameters of personnel systems; confirms an agency's leadership; provides funding; and ultimately evaluates whether or not an agency shall continue in existence. At times, Congress has also specified, in statute, organizational process requirements, such as those that shape decisionmaking and coordination. Reorganization legislation may be initiated by Members, congressional committees, or the President, with proposals by the latter transmitted to Congress and introduced as a courtesy. Once introduced in the House or Senate, such legislation is routinely referred to each chamber's government operations committee: the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. In the House, reorganization legislation may also be referred concurrently or sequentially to other committees with jurisdiction over the affected agencies and programs. The President may attempt to influence the development of reorganization legislation, including by threatening its veto. Efforts carried out through the statutory process can be narrowly targeted or far-reaching. Many reorganization proposals that have become law have been developed through hearings and antecedent legislative initiatives over the course of several Congresses. In addition, galvanizing events have sometimes created political climates favorable to structural reorganizations. For example, this was the case during the 2003 establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in 2001. In some cases, Congress has changed organizational arrangements within a department or agency by shifting funding and functions between offices. In 1987, for example, such an effort was undertaken in the House, with regard to the Agriculture Department appropriations act for FY1988. In this case, a Member sought to defund an assistant secretary office completely; in a compromise, funding for the assistant secretary position was maintained, but most of the funds and functions were shifted to the Office of the Secretary. According to the 1987 CQ Almanac, At the urging of Jamie L. Whitten, ... chairman of the House Appropriations Committee and its subcommittee on Agriculture, the House provided no administrative funds for the assistant secretary [for natural resources], who had authority over the Forest Service and the Soil Conservation Service. Whitten had long complained that the administration was trying to do away with traditional agricultural conservation programs in favor of a new Conservation Reserve Program that paid farmers to take erodible land out of production. He expressed his wrath by "z eroing out" the pay and office expenses of Assistant Secretary George S. Dunlop, although Whitten insisted he had "nothing personal" against him. Dunlop was staff director of the Senate Agriculture Committee under its previous chairman, Jesse Helms.... Whitten ultimately agreed to a compromise creating a new office of assistant secretary for unspecified "special purposes," funded at $416,000—the level earmarked by the Senate for the natural resources position. But the new office was given no authority over the Soil Conservation Service or the Forest Service. The directors of those agencies were required to report directly to the agriculture secretary. The provision regarding the Office of the Secretary in the resulting statute reflects this change. It begins, For necessary expenses of the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture, including the direct supervision of the Soil Conservation Service and the Forest Service. As noted below, under " Congressional Responses to Particular Agency Head Actions ," Congress has also used the appropriations process as a means of blocking or shaping administrative reorganizations initiated by the President or agency heads. As noted above, the President has often played a leadership role in reorganization of the executive branch by transmitting proposals and advocating legislative action in public statements and private negotiations. The President may also direct members of his Administration to conduct reorganizations using the authorities discussed below (" Agency Tools "). In some instances, Presidents have used executive orders to direct the establishment of offices. In addition, the President can redelegate functions that have been vested in him by Congress, as discussed below. Finally, Congress has sometimes delegated to the President circumscribed authority to conduct time- and agency-specific reorganization activities. During the middle of the 20 th century, Congress sometimes enacted so-called "presidential reorganization authority," which provided for a fast-track legislative process, led by the President, for certain reorganization activities. This authority is no longer operative, but it is discussed below nonetheless because it was an important mechanism for reorganization during the period in which it was in effect, and many reorganization plans from that era underpin current organizational arrangements in the executive branch. Where functions are statutorily vested in the President, they may be delegated and redelegated under authority provided in Section 301 of Title 3 of the U.S. Code . This provision states, The President of the United States is authorized to designate and empower the head of any department or agency in the executive branch, or any official thereof who is required to be appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to perform without approval, ratification, or other action by the President (1) any function which is vested in the President by law, or (2) any function which such officer is required or authorized by law to perform only with or subject to the approval, ratification, or other action of the President: Provided, That nothing contained herein shall relieve the President of his responsibility in office for the acts of any such head or other official designated by him to perform such functions. Such designation and authorization shall be in writing, shall be published in the Federal Register, shall be subject to such terms, conditions, and limitations as the President may deem advisable, and shall be revocable at any time by the President in whole or in part. By redelegating such functions, the President can effect a reorganization of authorities among executive branch agencies. The Administration cannot move the funds and other resources that might be necessary to carry out such functions among budget accounts, however, unless Congress provides transfer authority to do so. Through statute, Congress has sometimes provided the President with circumscribed authority to plan and implement a specified reorganization. Statutes providing such authority have specified, for example, the entity or entities within the executive branch that may be affected, the duration of the authority, and the means by which the President's plan may be modified. Congress has used this tool at least twice to empower the President to make organizational refinements during a statutory reorganization involving several agencies. Congress provided authority of this type in the Foreign Affairs Agencies Consolidation Act of 1998, for example.