The National Guard of the United States, which performs both federal and state missions, represents about 52 percent of the armed services’ selected reserve and consists of approximately 457,000 members: about 350,000 in the Army National Guard and about 107,000 in the Air National Guard. Overall, the Army National Guard makes up more than one-half of the Army’s ground combat forces and one-third of its support forces (e.g., military police or transportation units) and has units in more than 3,000 armories and bases in all 50 states and 4 U.S. territories. Air National Guard personnel make up 20 percent of the total Air Force, with 88 flying units and 579 mission support units at more than 170 installations throughout the United States. The majority of Guard members are employed on a part-time basis, typically training 1 weekend per month and 2 weeks per year. The Guard also employs some full-time personnel who assist unit commanders in administrative, training, and maintenance tasks. The National Guard Bureau is the federal entity responsible for the administration of the National Guard. National Guard personnel may be ordered to perform duty under three different authorities: Title 10 or Title 32 of the United State Code or pursuant to state law in a state active duty status. Personnel in a Title 10 status are federally funded and under federal command and control. Personnel may enter Title 10 status by being ordered to active duty in their status as federal Reserves, either voluntarily or under appropriate circumstances involuntarily (i.e., mobilization). Personnel in Title 32 status are federally funded but under state control. Title 32 is the status in which National Guard personnel typically perform training for their federal mission. Personnel performing state active duty are state-funded and under state command and control. Under state law, the governor may order National Guard soldiers to perform state active duty to respond to emergencies, disasters, civil disturbances, and for other reasons authorized by state law. The Guard is organized, trained, and equipped for its federal missions, which take priority over state missions. As we reported in our April 2004 testimony, the National Guard’s involvement in federal operations has increased substantially since the September 11 terrorist attacks. Three days after the attacks, the President, under Title 10, authorized reservists to be activated for up to 2 years. This authority was subsequently used to activate reservists for overseas warfighting and stabilization missions in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan as well as for domestic missions, such as flying patrols and supporting federal civilian agencies in guarding the nation’s borders. As figure 1 illustrates, as of May 2004, about 102,800 Army and Air National Guard members—the vast majority of whom were Army National Guard members—were on active duty. Although both Army and Air National Guard activations increased in the aftermath of September 11, the Air National Guard activations had declined to pre-September 11 levels by October 2003, while Army National Guard activations continued to rise. When activated under Title 10, the National Guard is subject to the Posse Comitatus Act, which prohibits the military from law enforcement activities unless expressly authorized by the Constitution or law. The Army and the Air Force have different strategies for structuring and providing resources for their Guard components that reflect each service’s planned use and available resources. While the Army National Guard’s structure requires 375,000 personnel to be fully manned, in fiscal year 2004, the Army National Guard was authorized 350,000 soldiers resulting in many units being manned below wartime requirements. Using DOD planning guidance, Army National Guard units are provided varying levels of resources according to the priority assigned to their warfighting missions. Because much of the Army National Guard was expected to be used as a follow-on force in the event of an extended conflict, many of its units were structured with fewer personnel and lesser amounts of equipment than they would need to deploy, with the assumption that there would be time to supply additional personnel, equipment, and training before these units would be needed. For example, Army National Guard divisions, which include over 117,000 soldiers and provide the majority of the combat capability in the Army National Guard, are supplied with 65 to 74 percent of their required personnel and 65 to 79 percent of their required equipment, and are less ready for their missions. This approach to managing limited resources is referred to as “tiered readiness.” In contrast, the Air National Guard was integrated into the Air Force’s operational force and maintained at readiness levels comparable to its active component counterparts. This approach enables the Air National Guard to be ready to deploy on short notice. Since September 11, Guard members have also been activated for missions under the authority of state governors in both Title 32 and state active duty statuses. Title 32 status is generally used to train National Guard units and personnel to perform their federal mission. National Guard personnel also may perform operational (nontraining) missions in Title 32 status when authorized by federal statute. According to DOD, after September 11, the Guard performed other operational (nontraining) duties such as providing airport security in Title 32 status in response to presidential direction. National Guard personnel in Title 32 status have also provided support for events such as the G-8 Summit and the Democratic and Republican National Conventions. Also, National Guard personnel have served in a state active duty status in response to natural disasters. Additionally, the National Guard performs state missions under the command and control of the governor, with costs for these missions borne by the state. Guard missions typically performed in this status include providing assistance in response to natural disasters such as fires and storms that have not been declared federal disasters. Since September 11, governors have increasingly used this authority to activate Guard members to protect key assets in the states. Both at home and overseas, the Army and the Air National Guard have been adapting in several ways to meet the demands of current warfighting requirements, but some of the measures taken may challenge the Army National Guard’s efforts to provide ready forces for future operations. While the Army National Guard has met new warfighting requirements by retraining some units to acquire in-demand skills, tailoring others to provide particular capabilities, changing unit missions in some cases, and transferring personnel and equipment to meet combatant commander needs, these adaptations have reduced the readiness of its nondeployed units, in turn challenging the Army National Guard to prepare for future operations. The Army recognizes the need to restructure its active, Reserve, and Guard forces to respond more effectively to the new global security environment and is in the process of developing plans to make its forces more modular. However, its plans for restructuring Army National Guard forces are not finalized and do not provide detailed information on time frames for restructuring all the Guard’s units, whether the Guard’s equipment will be compatible with that of active units, or the costs of implementing these plans. The Air National Guard has also adapted to meet new warfighting requirements, but its readiness has not been as negatively affected because it has not experienced continued high usage as the Army National Guard has and because its units are more fully equipped and manned for war. The Army National Guard has been adapting to the demands of current warfighting requirements but faces future challenges in providing ready forces for future operations. The recent increased and expanded use of the National Guard illustrates the shift from the post-cold war military planning strategy, in which much of the Guard represented a force to follow the active military in the event of extended conflict, to an operational force similar to the Air National Guard. Using this strategy, the Army has generally maintained most Army National Guard units at lower readiness levels under the assumption that additional personnel and equipment would be provided prior to deployment. While the Army National Guard’s adaptations since September 11 were intended to make deploying units more useful for current operations, these adaptations have caused the overall readiness of nondeployed Guard units to decline, which may hamper the Guard’s ability to meet the requirements of future warfighting operations overseas, particularly in Iraq. To meet the high demand for Army National Guard personnel for recent operations, the Army has alerted or mobilized over one-half of the Army National Guard’s personnel since September 11. In June 2004, Army National Guard activations peaked with almost 81,000 Army National Guard members—more than one-quarter of the Army National Guard’s force—activated for overseas military operations such as in Afghanistan and Iraq. Personnel with certain skills have been in particularly high demand. For example, as of June 2004, 95 percent of military police units had deployed, with 23 percent having deployed more than once, and at least 50 percent of units with specialties such as transportation, aviation, medical, and special operations had been activated. To alleviate the stress on these forces, the Army has retrained personnel in units with less needed skills, such as field artillery, to provide skills in higher demand. For example, the Army recently changed the mission of 27 artillery units and retrained over 7,000 personnel to meet the need for additional military police and security forces. Some of these soldiers have already deployed to Iraq to perform missions such as convoy security. The Army has also adapted Guard units to meet the specific requirements of current overseas missions by tailoring units for particular purposes. In some cases, the Army took personnel with key capabilities from existing units and created new, smaller units whose personnel had skills specifically tailored to provide the capabilities required by the combatant commander. For example, the Army extracted 55 soldiers with military police skills from an armored battalion of about 600 soldiers to perform a security mission at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. More than 35,000 Army National Guard soldiers—almost one-fifth of all soldiers utilized—deployed in these newly created, tailored units to support recent military operations. Over one-half of these tailored units (about 57 percent) were small, containing 10 or fewer soldiers. In addition to extracting key capabilities, tailored units have also been used to address personnel shortages in deploying units.