In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, security experts have raised concerns that terrorists may try to smuggle radiological or nuclear materials into the United States to produce either an RDD or IND. These experts have also raised concerns that terrorists could obtain radioactive materials used in medicine, research, agriculture, and industry to construct an RDD, or dirty bomb. This radioactive material is encapsulated, or sealed, in metal, such as stainless steel, titanium, or platinum, to prevent its dispersal and is commonly called a sealed radiological source. Sealed sources are used throughout the United States and other countries in equipment designed to, among other things, diagnose and treat illnesses, preserve food, detect flaws in pipeline welds, and determine the moisture content of soil. Depending on their use, sealed sources contain different types of radioactive material, such as strontium- 90, cobalt-60, cesium-137, plutonium-238, and plutonium-239. While no terrorists have detonated a dirty bomb in a city, Chechen separatists placed a canister containing cesium-137 in a Moscow park in the mid- 1990s. Although the device was not detonated and no radioactive material was dispersed, the incident demonstrated that terrorists have the capability and willingness to use radiological materials as weapons of terrorism. In contrast, detonating an IND would require a terrorist group to obtain nuclear weapons material—which is generally heavily secured— and to have highly sophisticated expertise and equipment to fabricate this material into a weapon. Another form of nuclear terrorism occurred with the dispersal of radioactive materials through a sequence of events in London during November and December 2006. On November 23, 2006, Alexander Litvinenko, a former officer of the Russian Federal Security Service, was poisoned with a milligram of polonium-210—about the size of a grain of salt. The dispersal of the polonium by the perpetrators of the crime and the victim resulted in widespread contamination across London and even abroad. His poisoning was detected only after he was hospitalized for a few weeks and tested for symptoms of radiation exposure because of hair loss. Following the poisoning, forensic investigators examined 47 sites across London for traces of polonium, both resulting from the handling of the polonium by his perpetrators and maybe other attempts to poison him. Of these locations, about 12 showed signs of this radioactive material, including a restaurant, hotel room, soccer stadium, and an eastbound British Airways plane. British investigators also identified over 1,000 people who might have been in various ways exposed to the polonium. Health officials tested 738 of them and found that 137 had reportable levels of this substance, although few of these individuals turned out to have levels that warranted medical attention. The decontamination activities at these sites spanned 19 days, involved a number of methods and technologies, and cost more than $200,000. However, the estimated total cost of managing this incident, including law enforcement investigation, testing individuals, sampling materials, and cleanup, was $4 million. FEMA has not completed planning to help cities and states recover from RDD or IND incidents as evidenced by not (1) developing a national disaster recovery strategy as required by law and (2) issuing specific guidance to coordinate federal, state, and city planning to recover from RDD or IND incidents. Moreover, federal agencies have conducted few exercises to test recovery plans for these incidents. FEMA has not developed a national disaster recovery strategy, as required by law and directed by executive guidance, or issued specific guidance to coordinate federal, state, and local government recovery planning for RDD or IND incidents. The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 requires FEMA to develop, coordinate, and maintain a national disaster recovery strategy. Among other things, the strategy is to clearly define the roles, programs, authorities, and responsibilities of each agency that may provide assistance to the recovery from a major disaster. In addition, the National Strategy for Homeland Security also called on the federal government to prepare a recovery strategy. The federal government has placed a higher priority on developing a strategy to respond to domestic incidents, including RDD and IND incidents, than it has on developing a comparable strategy for recovering from these incidents. For example, the response strategy, captured in the 2008 National Response Framework, does not include guidance on long-term recovery activities. The FEMA coordinator for the development of a national disaster recovery strategy told us that while the previous administration had drafted a “white paper” addressing this strategy, the new administration has decided to rethink the entire approach. The FEMA coordinator also told us that FEMA recognizes its responsibility to prepare a national disaster recovery strategy but could not provide a time frame for its completion. This same official did say that in developing this strategy, FEMA plans to seek out opinions of nonfederal stakeholders. Once completed, the official said that the recovery strategy would provide guidance to federal, state, and local agencies in revising their operational plans for recovery activities, including recovery from RDD and IND incidents. Currently, the limited federal planning guidance related to the recovery from RDD and IND incidents can be found in a number of documents. There are several annexes to the National Response Framework that address, in part, federal agency responsibilities and assets to help state and local governments recover from these incidents. For example, a December 2004 emergency support function annex covering long-term community recovery and mitigation, led by FEMA, provides a framework for federal support to localities to enable community recovery from the long-term consequences of events of national significance. While this annex addresses FEMA’s responsibilities to coordinate the transition from response to recovery in field operations, it does not provide details on recovery planning for RDD and IND incidents. The January 2003 emergency support annex covering hazardous materials, led by EPA, provides the framework for federal support in response to an actual or potential discharge and release of hazardous materials following a major disaster or emergency. EPA officials informed us that this annex will give them a significant federal role in leading cleanup efforts after RDD or IND incidents, in coordination with affected state and local governments. The June 2008 nuclear and radiological incident annex describes federal responsibilities and provides some operational guidance for pertinent response activities and, to a lesser extent, recovery activities in support of state and local governments. DHS is identified as the technical lead for recovery activities, but may request support from other federal agencies— for example, EPA and the United States Army Corps of Engineers—that have cleanup and recovery experience and capabilities. According to this annex, the federal government, upon request of state and local governments, can assist in developing and executing recovery plans, but such plans would not generally be developed until after the incident occurs. The lack of a national disaster recovery strategy that would include RDD and IND incidents is problematic because, according to survey respondents, most localities would count on the federal government being prepared to carry out analysis and environmental cleanup activities following these incidents. Specifically, emergency management officials from almost all 13 cities and most of their 10 states indicated in our survey that they believe they would need to rely heavily on the federal government to conduct and fund all or almost all analysis and environmental cleanup activities associated with recovering from an RDD or IND incidents of the magnitude described in the national planning scenarios. They indicated that their technical and financial resources would be overwhelmed by a large RDD incident—and certainly by an IND incident. Most of these officials reported that they believe they could adequately address a smaller RDD incident, such as one that is confined to a city block or inside a building. Despite this anticipated reliance on the federal government, we obtained mixed responses as to whether these RDD and IND recovery activities should be primarily a federal responsibility. Almost half of the respondents from the cities (6 of 13), but most of those from states (8 of 10), indicated that these activities should be primarily a federal responsibility. The others stressed the need for shared responsibilities with the federal government. However, when respondents were asked in our survey to identify which federal agencies they would turn to for help in the analysis and environmental cleanup of areas contaminated with radioactive materials from RDD or IND incidents, they provided inconsistent responses and frequently listed several federal agencies for the same activity. These responses seem to indicate that there might be some confusion among city and state emergency management officials regarding federal agency responsibilities to provide assistance to them under these circumstances. In our view, this confusion, if not addressed, could hamper the timely recovery from these incidents and demonstrates the need for development and implementation of a national disaster recovery strategy. In commenting on the draft report, EPA indicated that as no single federal department or agency has the sole requisite technical capacity and capabilities to respond to the scope of RDD or IND incidents, it is expected that numerous federal agencies would need to work together in a single mission, such as through FRMAC. Nevertheless, EPA stated that our survey results underscore the importance having clear communication and notification among federal agencies, which if not addressed, could hamper recovery efforts. FEMA has not issued specific guidance describing how federal capabilities would be integrated into and support state and local plans for recovery from RDD or IND incidents, as called for by presidential directive. According to a senior FEMA official, the agency has delayed issuing this guidance pending the reevaluation of its planning approach by the new administration. However, a senior FEMA planning official told us that because FEMA is already aware that its planning system does not fully recognize the involvement of state and local governments, the agency is developing regional support plans—including for RDD and IND incidents—through its regional offices, which will reflect state and local government roles and responsibilities. Moreover, according to FEMA officials, in August 2008, DHS issued stop-gap guidance outside of FEMA’s planning guidance framework to provide some immediate direction to federal, state, and local emergency response officials in developing their own operational plans and response protocols for protection of emergency workers after RDD or IND incidents.