The Department of Defense defines intelligence as "information and knowledge obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding." (4) Surveillance and reconnaissancerefer to the means by which the information is observed. Surveillance is "systematic" observationto collect whatever data is available, while reconnaissance is a specific mission performed to obtainspecific data. For the purposes of this paper, the distinctions between intelligence, surveillance, andreconnaissance are not important unless specified-ISR is used as a shorthand to refer to the systemof collection assets and analysts which brings information about the enemy or potential enemy to thedecision-maker, whether that decision-maker is a top general in Washington, DC or a soldier on theground facing an armed attacker. Another shorthand commonly used by the military services and the intelligence community refers to the source of any given piece of intelligence. Intelligence which comes from a personobserving it is called Human Intelligence, or HUMINT. Intelligence derived from photographs andother imagery is called Imagery Intelligence, or IMINT. Intelligence obtained from electronic signalssuch as communications is called Signals Intelligence, or SIGINT. Finally, intelligence derived fromother technically measurable aspects of the target, such as vibrations or hyper-spectral emissions, isnamed Measurement and Signatures Intelligence, or MASINT. (5) These terms are important, as theyhelp characterize the basic structure of the intelligence community. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), State Department, Department of Energy, Department of Justice, and Department of Treasury all contribute to the intelligence picture available to themilitary. (6) However, most intelligence used by themilitary comes from the Defense IntelligenceAgency (DIA), which produces some HUMINT, MASINT and a large portion of the DefenseDepartment's strategic, or long-term, analysis; the National Security Agency (NSA), which producesmost SIGINT; and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), which produces mostIMINT. The services themselves also produce all types of intelligence for the community. Today's security environment appears to be quite different from the environment of only tenyears ago. Major shifts in both the threat to our national security, and the technologies available tous and our potential adversaries, seem to have occurred. In response, the military services have plansto change their ISR capabilities to meet the new environment effectively. Most of today's military equipment and organization was originally designed to fight the Soviet Union. A common scenario was that the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies would attempt tooccupy all of Western Europe, using large numbers of tanks and aircraft to sweep through Germanyon their way to the rest of the continent. Defense against such an assault was perceived to requireheavy weapons such as tanks, fighter and bomber aircraft, and aircraft carriers. However, theWarsaw Pact has collapsed and a similar threat has not emerged. Instead, the security environmentlooks significantly different compared to 1989. DOD's 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)points out that we "cannot predict with a high degree of confidence the identity of the countries orthe actors that may threaten (our) interests and security." The QDR explains DOD's perception ofthe changed threat by stating that the U.S. is no longer physically protected by distance from itsadversaries. It sees a "broad arc of instability" from the Middle East to Northeast Asia, wherenon-state entities whose activities are damaging to U.S. interests (drug traffickers, terrorists, etc. )are growing in strength and finding safe-haven in weak and failing states. In addition, newtechnologies (especially information technologies and those related to chemical, biological,radiological, nuclear, or enhanced high-explosive weapons) are increasingly within the reach ofpotential adversaries, and warfare may extend to space and cyber space. (7) Outside observers, including other members of the national intelligence community, generally agree with DOD's characterization of the threat. Concern over surprise, deception, increasinglydiverse threats, weapons of mass destruction, the Middle East, and Asia, appears consistent. Someadd that non-state actors with new technology may undermine nation-state control in manycountries. This could exacerbate the effects of environmental deterioration and disaster, increasingthe probability that the U.S. would feel compelled to deploy its military forces to stem a resultinghumanitarian crisis. (8) In sum, many analysts believe the U.S. is now faced with "asymmetric warfare," in which means such as drug-trafficking, terrorism, and biological warfare would be used to attack ourinterests. The events of September 11 appear to confirm the judgement that the threats of the futureare unlikely to look like the threats of the past. Because these are means that the United States wouldnot choose to employ itself and which bear no resemblance to the old Warsaw Pact tank assaultscenario, some believe the U.S. military is currently ill-prepared to deal with them. In addition to the changed threat, the U.S. military along with the rest of society also has experienced major changes in the technologies available. The huge increases in both informationprocessing technology, including data collection and storage, and communications technologies suchas increased bandwidth and networking, appear to be able to completely change the way militaryforces are equipped, organized and employed. (9) Based on these changes in both the threat and in available technology, DOD states it must "transform." Transformation in the context of large organizations such as the Defense Departmentis generally recognized as a process of radical change involving technology, organization, andconcepts of employment. Another term used in military theory which also expresses the idea oftransformation is "revolution in military affairs." However, even within DOD there are at least twocompeting perspectives on what constitutes "transformation." Some personnel define transformationas a discontinuous or leap-ahead change. (10) Thisview supports those who believe it is necessary tomove money, manpower, and particularly patterns of thinking ("doctrine") away from currentweapon systems and methods to entirely new technologies and procedures. They perceive thatresources are being wasted on the older systems, and the only way to accomplish change is to do soin a radical way. The Navy's shift in the 1920s and 30s from the battleship to the aircraft carrier asits centerpiece weapon system could be considered an example of a leap-ahead change, even as thebattleship remained in service until the 1980s. The Army's plan to replace its tank force in favor ofmuch lighter vehicles and other technologies may be seen as an attempt to achieve similar change. (11) Others tend to define transformation as incremental change using current or modernizing technologies in new ways, with an end result of radical improvement over time. They expressconcern that the future is unknown; if DOD cuts out proven capabilities for new ones, those newcapabilities may not match the currently unforeseen threat any better than today's technology. Aproven technology, however, may be able to be adjusted to meet that unknown situation. Theseofficials point to examples such as the change in the military's ability to attack targets from the air,comparing Operation Desert Storm against Iraq in 1991 to Operation Enduring Freedom againstAfghanistan in 2001. Nearly every weapon system which was used in Afghanistan had also beenused in Iraq in 1991. However, improved communications, procedures and the Joint Direct AttackMunition (a standard 2000 lb bomb which can be guided using Global Positioning Systemtechnology) allowed B-52 bombers to attack targets which were very close to friendly militarypersonnel with little risk of hitting the friendly soldiers. This would not have even been consideredin 1991. (12) Regardless of how transformation may be defined, retired Vice Admiral (USN) Arthur Cebrowski, the chief of the Defense Department's Office of Force Transformation, has identifiedsome criteria by which military programs may be judged for their transformational qualities. His topcriterion is that the weapon system or operating procedure be interoperable . Interoperabilitymeansthat the system can function easily with a variety of other systems, including those from otherservices. (13) Other criteria Cebrowski has namedare judgements as to whether the system helps theuser to change warfighting methods , as opposed to merely improving existing methods; andwhether the system can deal with a wide range of threats . (14) Observers generally agree with Cebrowski's criteria. For example, Andrew Krepinevich, Executive Director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, also notes therequirement for interoperability and support to new warfighting methods, and discounts any hard andfast rule that a program must employ new technology to be considered transformational. At the sametime, Krepinevich, along with some other observers, advocates the leap-ahead definition oftransformation, and therefore would likely want to see larger changes in interoperability andwarfighting methods than might Cebrowski. (15) In addition to assessing the military services' ISR programs based on Cebrowski's informal criteria for transformation, it may be helpful to look at what ISR they will really need. Somecommonly recognized characteristics include a world-wide perspective, fusion, detail, andpersistent surveillance . (16) The transformed force, much more than the Cold War force, needs a truly world-wide perspective derived from world-wide collection capabilities and in-depth analysis. During the ColdWar, the threat from the Warsaw Pact was considered so great that military activity in other placesoften was considered inconsequential, or a "lesser included threat." (17) The intelligence communitytherefore put greater effort toward monitoring the Warsaw Pact than the rest of the world. Today,however, the threat may in fact come from within a country which appears quite non-threatening.