Plan Colombia was developed by former President Pastrana (1998-2002) as a six-year planto end the country's 40-year old armed conflict, eliminate drug trafficking, and promote economicand social development. President Uribe (2002-present) has continued the work of Plan Colombia,but with an increased emphasis on security concerns. It was envisioned that a significant portion ofthe costs of Plan Colombia would be provided by the international community, although to date, theUnited States has been the most significant contributor. (1) The Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) is the primary U.S. program that supports PlanColombia, as well as assistance to other nations in the Andean region. In addition to ACI funding,Colombia also benefits from the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program, and the Departmentof Defense's central counternarcotics account. U.S. support for Plan Colombia began in 2000, whenCongress passed legislation ( P.L. 106-246 ) providing $1.3 billion for the region in interdiction anddevelopment assistance. ACI funding for Plan Colombia from FY2000 through FY2005 totalsapproximately $2.8 billion. When FMF and DOD assistance is included, the total level of U.S.support to Colombia is $4.5 billion. The Administration requested Congress to continue support for Plan Colombia beyondFY2005 with an additional $463 million in ACI funds, and $90 million in FMF for FY2006. TheFY2006 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act ( P.L. 109-102 ), enacted in November 2005,provided $469.5 million in assistance to Colombia. The conference report did not earmark FMFfunds to Colombia, but the Senate version approved the Administration's $90 million request. U.S.resources support the eradication of coca and opium poppy crops, the interdiction of narcoticstrafficking, and the protection of infrastructure, through the training and material support forColombia's security forces. U.S. programs also support alternative crop development andinfrastructure development to give coca and opium poppy farmers alternative sources of income, andinstitution building programs to strengthen democracy. Components of U.S. assistance includehuman rights training. Because Plan Colombia is a six-year plan that expired at the end of 2005, Congress has beenand will likely continue assessing its progress in light of the Administration request to continue ACIfunding, the latter having no statutory end-date. The House-passed FY2005 Foreign OperationsAppropriations Act ( H.R. 4818 ) expressed concern that the FY2005 budget requestincreased ACI levels for Colombia, despite its scheduled conclusion. The language noted theCommittee's expectation that the FY2006 request for Colombia would be less. However, theFY2006 request essentially maintained the same level of funding for Colombia, $463 million. TheHouse version of the FY2006 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act ( H.R. 3057 / H.Rept. 109-152 ), while essentially approving the Administration's request, directed theSecretary of State to report to the Committee on a "future, multiyear strategy" for Colombia. The House bill, as well as some individual Members of Congress, expressed the opinion thatthe ratio between alternative development and interdiction should be more balanced. The FY2006request maintained the same balance as in FY2005: $124.8 million for alternative development andinstitution building; $27.4 million for rule of law programs; and $310.9 million for interdiction. However, the FY2006 appropriation increased the amount for alternative development to $131.2million. Other Members have suggested the need for an exit strategy that would have Colombiadevelop the capabilities to take over the types of operations for which the United States is nowproviding support. The House appropriation bill included report language that expressed concernwith the Colombian government's ability to assume more operational and maintenance functions ofPlan Colombia. The objectives of Colombia and the United States for Plan Colombia differ in some aspects,although there is a significant overlap of goals. The primary U.S. objective is to prevent the flowof illegal drugs into the United States, as well as to help Colombia promote peace and economicdevelopment because it contributes to regional security in the Andes. (2) The primary objectives ofColombia are to promote peace and economic development, and increase security. Addressing drugtrafficking is considered a key aspect of those objectives. (3) The objectives of each country have evolved over time. This evolution became evident whenPresident Uribe was elected on a platform of taking a tougher approach to the illegally armed groups(IAG) that operate in the country and benefit from participation in drug trafficking. He vowed notto negotiate with any of the armed groups until they declared a cease-fire and disarmed. In addition,Uribe implemented new laws giving the security forces increased powers, and instituted a one-timetax to be used to increase the troop strength and capabilities of the Colombian military. Heincreasingly equated the guerrillas with drug traffickers and terrorists, and initiated a militarycampaign, called Plan Patriota , to recapture guerrilla-controlled territory. U.S. policy has also evolved from a strictly counternarcotics focus to support for Colombia'sfight against IAGs. In 2002, the Administration requested, and Congress approved, expandedauthority to use U.S. counternarcotics funds for a unified campaign to fight both drug trafficking andterrorist organizations in Colombia. (4) The three main armed organizations in Colombia -- the leftistRevolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the National Liberation Army (ELN), andthe rightist United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) -- have been designated foreign terroristorganizations (FTOs) by the State Department [pursuant to Section 219 of the Immigration andNationality Act, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ( P.L.104-132 )]. (5) In 2003 theFARC and AUC were designated Significant Foreign Narcotics Traffickers under the ForeignNarcotics Kingpin Designation Act ( P.L. 106-120 ). After many years of stable prices, purity, and availability of cocaine and heroin in the UnitedStates, prices for both drugs have increased in 2005, whereas purity and availability have decreased. This represents the first statistics that may indicate that Plan Colombia is having a favorable effecton drug flows to the United States, according to government agencies responsible for tracking drugtrends. Colombia produces most (6) of the world supply, with 90% of the cocaine entering the UnitedStates originating in or transiting through Colombia. The country also produces significantquantities of high quality heroin. The supply of drugs is often judged by changes in price, with higher prices signifyingdecreased supply. In November 2005, the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP)announced that from February to September 2005, prices for cocaine increased 19% while puritydecreased 15%. This follows a long trend line, beginning in the early 1980s, of falling cocaineprices. Earlier in the year, ONDCP reported that the availability of South American heroin had alsofallen, with heroin prices increasing 30% and purity decreasing 22%. (7) Heroin purity had beensteadily increasing since the 1980s. Despite increasing prices, the National Institute on Drug Abuse(NIDA) reported that drug use among young people has declined by 11% from 2001 to 2003, andagain by 6% from 2003 to 2004. (8) While these surveys report a declining trend in overall drug use,they also report that the use of cocaine and heroin has remained stable. In fact, the National Surveyon Drug Use and Health reported that "There was no change in the overall rate of illicit drug usebetween 2002 and 2003." (9) The same report showed that cocaine and heroin use has remained stable over the same time periodat 2.3 million persons (not limited to young Americans) and 119,000 users respectively. Someobservers criticize the value of these types of surveys because they rely on self-reporting. (10) Some observers have expressed caution in interpreting the ONDCP figures on price, purity,and availability. They maintain that short-term fluctuations are not uncommon and may not besustainable. (11) Thereare several reasons why prices and supply remained stable for such a long period. In testimonybefore Congress in June 2004, John P. Walters of ONDCP argued that interdiction efforts take timeto show their impact on price and availability, and that the effect would begin to show in the next12 months. (12) Someargue that an increase in the street price of cocaine and heroin is unlikely to appear in the near termbecause of the large profit margin. Even if the availability of coca leaf and opium poppies isdecreasing, and consequently the price for the raw materials is increasing, they constitute a verysmall fraction of the U.S. retail price. Traffickers are easily able to absorb this increased cost. (13) The interdiction of the final product, rather than the raw ingredients, imposes greater costson traffickers. In June 2004, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) reported that domestic seizuresof heroin had steadily increased from 1,152 kilograms in 1999 to 2,351 kilograms in 2003. Seizuresof cocaine, both domestic and maritime, have increased from 106,623 kilograms in 2000 to 115,725kilograms in 2003. Much of this gain is from maritime seizures in the South Atlantic and Caribbean,and southwest Pacific regions.