The close integration and coordination of ground combat forces and bombing operations is essential to the exercise of lethal combat power on the modern battlefield. As depicted in figure 1, military doctrine describes targeting in terms of a cyclical process composed of six basic phases. During this process, the joint force commander identifies the objectives for military operations in support of the national objectives for the conflict and any key limitations on operations—such as procedures for limiting civilian collateral damage. The commander’s guidance then drives the subsequent phases of the targeting cycle to include identifying and analyzing potential targets and resources available to attack them, obtaining formal permission for the strike, executing the strike, and then assessing strike effectiveness and any need to reattack. The success of this process is highly dependent on the speed and quality of interaction among the people and systems conducting the various activities at each phase. Trained ground control personnel must interact quickly and covertly with manned and unmanned aircraft, electronic sensors and space-based satellite imagery systems, or other intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance mechanisms to spot the target and accurately mark its location. Accuracy depends upon the ability of the ground personnel to locate themselves, the target, and any friendly forces nearby and accurately judge the distance between each. These elements must be able to communicate the targeting information to command and control centers that coordinate the actions of a variety of analysts and others who assess the situation, plan the strike, communicate the information back to the ground personnel, and analyze the effectiveness of the attack. DOD is working to improve the interaction of these elements by using network-centric operating concepts. The term “network-centric” is used to describe a broad class of approaches to military operations that are enabled by networking the force. DOD’s approach involves developing the sensors and other technologies to provide pervasive oversight of the battlefield, and then linking them to all elements of the war-fighting force through communications and other technologies. This allows the various elements of the force to develop a shared situation awareness, a shared knowledge and understanding of commanders’ intent, and the ability to rapidly process and analyze information. The belief is that these capabilities will increase combat power by better synchronization of weapons effects in the battle space and greater speed in command decision making. This strategic change is being accompanied by an array of changes to doctrine, tactics, organization, and training to integrate the network-centric concept into DOD’s culture. Advances in networking the force are being complemented by advances in precision weapons. Precision-guided weapons provide precise control of bombs through the use of electrical equipment that help guide the weapon in flight. These capabilities provide an advantage in accuracy over conventional weapons that do not have the ability to adjust their trajectory while in flight. The transition from unguided to guided weapons has accelerated rapidly since Operation Desert Storm in 1991 where unguided weapons were the norm. For example, as shown in figure 2, only about 8 percent of the weapons used during Operation Desert Storm were guided, while this number increased to about 68 percent in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq provided a variety of conditions for the development of these network-centric approaches. For example, operations in Kosovo were conducted primarily by air over rugged and undeveloped mountainous terrain. There were no direct attacks by large massed ground forces, and the cover of forests and villages allowed enemy forces to easily conceal their location. Similarly, Afghanistan’s rugged and mountainous terrain and large number of caves and bunkers also provided numerous opportunities to conceal Taliban and al Qaeda forces. Light infantry and special operations forces were the primary U.S. forces on the ground, with aircraft as their sole means of fire support. In contrast, the terrain in Iraq is characterized by mostly broad plains with mountainous regions along the borders and a largely desert climate posing threats from dust and sand storms. Initial operations pitted large massed forces against one another in more traditional ways of fighting. However, the conduct of U.S. operations also relied heavily on small, dispersed groups of special operations forces operating on battlefields with no clear front and rear lines, as enemy forces blended in and out of urban populations. With the exception of Kosovo, these conflicts were also characterized largely by pronounced U.S. air superiority, with little threat from enemy air defenses. During Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, enemy air defenses were so limited that U.S. forces were able to win near total air supremacy early in the war. Similarly, air superiority was not a concern during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Prior to the conflict, military forces had been working to set the conditions for air dominance through more than 3 years of bombing. During Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, however, there were significant concerns about enemy air defense systems, causing bombing operations to be carried out at high altitudes to avoid the threat. Moreover, access to overseas bases was problematic in all three of these operations, straining logistical support systems and complicating military operations. For example, this lack of forward air basing infrastructure within effective fighter range of land-locked Afghanistan required U.S. forces to rely primarily on carrier-based aircraft to provide strike power during the operations. These operations were also conducted in an environment of pronounced concerns about limiting collateral damage to civilian populations and infrastructure. Adversaries attempted to exploit collateral damage in an effort to gain public sympathy for their cause and cast a negative light on U.S. operations. U.S. forces adjusted the target selection and approval process to minimize collateral damages, calling on senior leaders to approve target selection in some cases. However, attempts to minimize collateral damages can also create tension with military objectives and complicate bombing operations. DOD officials cite improvements in networking the force and in the use of precision weapons as primary reasons for the overwhelming combat power demonstrated in recent operations. Network-centric operating concepts, particularly in surveillance and command and control systems, have created unprecedented battlefield situation awareness for commanders and their forces, yet the full extent to which operations have been affected is unclear. Technologies enhancing the use of precision- guided weapons have also provided military commanders with increased flexibility and accuracy in bombing operations. Network-centric operating concepts have improved battlefield situation awareness for commanders and their forces. DOD has indicated that technological improvements in information-gathering systems allow commanders an unprecedented view of the battlefield. Such improvements provide for greater shared situation awareness, which, in turn, speeds command and control. However, while it appears that enhanced networking has speeded operations, the full impact on operations is unclear because of the absence of detailed measures of their effects. DOD officials and reports cite a variety of technological and other improvements in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance mechanisms as basic to the unprecedented ability of commanders and forces to observe and monitor the battlefield. For example, surveillance aircraft orbiting the battlefield—such as the E-3 Sentry airborne warning and control system (for detecting enemy air and naval activities and directing friendly fighters), the RC-135 and EP-3 aircraft (for locating enemy radar and other electronic emissions), the E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (for detecting enemy ground activity), and the U-2 (for high altitude, wide-area surveillance)—have been outfitted with smaller, lower cost, and higher quality sensors and radars, improving their ability to detect the enemy and provide high resolution imagery of the battlefield. Another key is the development of unmanned aerial vehicles, such as the Predator and the Global Hawk used extensively in Afghanistan and Iraq. These aircraft carry cameras, sensors, or even weapons and are used to constantly circle over the battlefield and provide continuous live surveillance of the enemy without risk to human pilots. The Predator is remotely piloted by operators on the ground, while the Global Hawk is self-piloted, controlled by a preprogrammed onboard computer that controls the aircraft from takeoff to landing. These systems interact with ground personnel, such as special operations forces or specially trained combat controllers, to locate and precisely mark targets and assess bombing results. Technological advances now enable these controllers to identify a target and determine its precise location by using laser designators, which may be connected to a hand- held Global Positioning System receiver. Reports have cited the use of these technologies interacting with aircraft flying at high altitudes to avoid enemy air defenses, combined with new tactics for integrating special operations forces with conventional units, as a breakthrough capability. During Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, special forces teams used these technologies linked to piloted aircraft or unmanned Predator drones—providing live battlefield video directly to nearby AC-130 gun ships—to attack small groups of al Qaeda and Taliban fighters and other fleeting targets. The Joint Forces Command report on missions conducted during Operation Iraqi Freedom also cited the capabilities provided by these advances. DOD officials indicate that the improved ability to share a broad view of the battlefield and communicate quickly with all elements of the force has compressed the time required for analysis and decision making in bombing operations, increasing lethality significantly. Before an actual strike may begin, information on potential targets generally must be routed through command and control centers where the target information is analyzed; information is exchanged between a myriad of commanders, analysts, and other elements of the force; and final approval for the strike is granted. The ability to network these elements and rapidly exchange information during this process—central to combat effectiveness—-is enabled by improvements in computing power, digital communications, and satellite data links in recent years. For example, increases in computing power have enabled the networking of computers from a multitude of personnel and locations, with near instantaneous exchange of information through techniques such as file sharing, video conferencing, and e-mailing. These capabilities are enhanced by digital communications, which can be faster and more accurate than voice communication. For example, digital systems allow a ground controller to input the coordinates and other information needed for an attack into a computer and transmit this information instantly to computers on board an aircraft or at command and control centers. The ability to rapidly exchange information generated by these networks has some limitations.