The recent trend in state laws requiring voters to present identification when casting their ballots has raised questions about the burdens imposed on individuals who do not have photo identification, including those who object to photographs based on religious beliefs. Proposed legislation in the 112 th Congress addresses state efforts to implement these requirements, including one bill that would prohibit states from requiring voter identification in federal elections. Photo identification has been a recurring issue in a number of contexts, and Congress recently has considered questions regarding whether photo ID can or should be required under the REAL ID Act of 2005. Intended to improve security for driver's licenses and personal identification cards, the REAL ID Act also requires, without exemption, that a digital photograph appear on each document. A number of religious beliefs may interfere with requirements for photo identification, leading to questions about whether a religious exemption to photograph requirements may be required to comport with the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). This report will analyze the legal issues associated with religious exemptions to photo identification laws. Although no lawsuits appear to have challenged federal laws with photo requirements, state photo identification laws have been challenged for several decades. After discussing the legal requirements of the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA, the report will explain the elements of analysis necessary for legal challenges involving religious objections to photo requirements. The report will also analyze lawsuits that have challenged state photo requirements, including significant factors of consideration in such cases. Finally, the report will analyze what factors may be relevant in future decisions that may arise related to federal photo identification requirements as well as U.S. Supreme Court opinions related to religious objections to voter identification requirements. The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...." These clauses are known respectively as the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. Under the Free Exercise Clause, individuals are guaranteed the right to practice their religious beliefs without government interference. Historically, the U.S. Supreme Court applied a heightened standard of review to government actions that allegedly interfered with a person's free exercise of religion. Under that heightened standard, the government could not interfere with a person's religious exercise if it did not have a compelling governmental interest. In 1990, the Court reinterpreted that standard in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith , holding that the compelling interest was not necessary for governmental interference with religious exercise in all circumstances. Since then, the Court has held that the Free Exercise Clause never "relieve[s] an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability." Under this interpretation, the constitutional baseline of protection was lowered, meaning that laws that do not specifically target religion or do not allow for individualized assessments are not subject to heightened review under the Constitution. Rather, these laws of general applicability are required only to be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose, and this baseline of constitutional protection analysis is often referred to as rational basis review. Congress responded to the Court's holding in Smith by enacting RFRA, which statutorily reinstated the standard of protection of heightened scrutiny for government actions interfering with a person's free exercise of religion. When RFRA was originally enacted, it applied to federal, state, and local government actions, but the Supreme Court later ruled that its application to state and local governments was unconstitutional under principles of federalism. Therefore, RFRA now applies only to federal actions. RFRA provides that a statute or regulation of general applicability may lawfully burden a person's exercise of religion only if it (1) furthers a compelling governmental interest and (2) uses the least restrictive means to further that interest. This standard reflects the pre- Smith compelling interest requirement and is sometimes referred to as strict scrutiny analysis. In 2006, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether religious exemptions were required from generally applicable laws under RFRA. In Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal , the Court held that the government must demonstrate a compelling interest to prohibit any exceptions for generally applicable laws to accommodate religious exercise. Specifically, the Court stated that the government must "demonstrate a compelling interest in uniform application of a particular program by offering evidence that granting the requested religious accommodations would seriously compromise its ability to administer the program." As a statutory enactment, rather than a constitutional standard, RFRA is not necessarily absolutely binding against all post-RFRA legislation. Rather, it is possible that future statutes may not be required to comply with RFRA. In other words, RFRA may be preempted by another federal law. Congress may amend RFRA's scope of application generally or may provide specific exemptions from RFRA in future legislation. Members of some religious groups may object to having their photograph taken as many identification laws require. The teachings of several religious groups may prohibit their members from being photographed in general or from revealing some parts of their body. For instance, some Christians, including some Amish, believe photographs violate the Ten Commandments. Members of other religious groups may believe that members must wear head coverings or veils for religious reasons. Identification laws that require individuals to be photographed or require individuals to be photographed without religious head covering may infringe upon these individuals' First Amendment right to exercise their religious beliefs freely, leading to potential legal challenges to determine whether the individuals' First Amendment right must be accommodated. The most common type of identification law to be challenged are state driver's license laws, but the legal issues may also apply in other cases with photograph requirements. In challenges to legal requirements that may infringe on an individual's religious exercise, courts generally consider three questions: (1) Is the individual's religious belief sincerely held? ; (2) Would the legal requirement impose a substantial burden on the individual's religious exercise? ; and (3) Is the burden sufficient to overcome the government's interest in applying the requirement without an exemption? In order for an individual's religious beliefs to be protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the beliefs must be sincerely held. An individual's beliefs are not required to conform with the beliefs of other members of his or her religious group, nor is the individual required to be a member of a religious group at all. Furthermore, the accuracy of an individual's religious belief need not be verified by factual findings. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that courts are not to judge the truth or falsity of religious beliefs. Instead, courts generally examine whether the individual applies the belief consistently in his or her own practices. Even if an individual's belief is sincerely held, the government action that allegedly infringes on that belief must impose a substantial burden on the individual's religious exercise. A substantial burden on religious exercise is one that puts "substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs." The Supreme Court has required evidence that the legal requirement in question violates the individual's sincerely held belief. That is, if the legal requirement that the individual opposes does not actually interfere with the religious practice, the government may still require the individual to comply with the requirement. For example, a religious organization challenged the imposition of a sales tax on religious products that it sold, claiming the tax burdened the organization's religious exercise. The organization's religious doctrine did not include a belief that payment of taxes was forbidden, but rather claimed that the government was taking part of the money it raised as a part of its religious practice. The Supreme Court held that a sales tax applied generally to products distributed by religious and non-religious entities did not constitute a significant burden on religious exercise because the tax itself did not violate the religious entity's sincerely held beliefs. Therefore, in the case of a religious organization's objections to paying sales tax on products it sells, the organization would be substantially burdened by the tax if its sincerely held beliefs prohibited the payment of taxes, because the tax requirement forces the organization to act in violation of its beliefs. However, because the action being regulated by the government was not one that directly affected the organization's sincerely held beliefs, the Court held that the burden did not implicate the organization's religious exercise. Once a court has determined that a substantial burden has been imposed on a sincerely held belief, it must balance that burden on the individual's religious exercise with the governmental interest associated with it. That is, the right to religious exercise is not absolute. Burdens on religious exercise may be constitutionally permissible if the appropriate legal standard is met. The standard that this balance must meet is determined by the applicable law protecting religious exercise. For cases brought under the Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the governmental interest generally may be deemed to outweigh the burden on religious exercise if the governmental action is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose—the minimum constitutional standard of review sometimes referred to as rational basis review. For cases brought under the heightened statutory standard provided by RFRA, the governmental interest outweighs the burden on religious exercise if the government has a compelling interest that is achieved by the least restrictive means to meet that end—the strict scrutiny standard of review. Cases may also be brought under state constitutional or statutory provisions relating to free exercise, which may impose either of these standards. Over the past several decades, lawsuits challenging state photo identification laws, particularly driver's license photo requirements, have been filed in federal and state courts. The U.S. Supreme Court has never ruled on the issue of religious exemptions to photo identification requirements. One driver's license photo case, Jensen v. Quaring, made its way to the Court, but because one Justice did not participate in the case and the other Justices split evenly in the decision, the Court issued no opinion, resulting in the automatic affirmance of the decision of the Court of Appeals for the 8 th Circuit. The 8 th Circuit's decision required state officials to issue a driver's license without a photograph. A review of the decisions concerning whether exemptions are required for individuals with religious objections to photograph requirements for driver's licenses indicates a few common considerations by courts in such cases.