Since the inception of SBInet, we have reported on a range of issues regarding program design and implementation. For example, in October 2007, we testified that DHS had made some progress in implementing Project 28—the first segment of SBInet technology across the southwest border—but had fallen behind its planned schedule. In our February 2008 testimony, we noted that although DHS accepted Project 28 and was gathering lessons learned from the project, CBP officials responsible for the program said it did not fully meet their expectations and would not be replicated. We also reported issues with the system that remained unresolved. For example, the Border Patrol, a CBP component, reported that as of February 2008, problems remained with the resolution of cameras at distances over 5 kilometers, while expectations had been that the cameras would work at twice that distance. In our September 2008 testimony, we reported that CBP had initially planned to deploy SBInet technology along the southwest border by the end of 2008, but as of February 2008, this date had slipped to 2011 and that SBInet would have fewer capabilities than originally planned. In September 2009, we reported that SBInet technology capabilities had not yet been deployed and delays required the Border Patrol to rely on existing technology for securing the border, rather than using the newer SBInet technology planned to overcome the existing technology’s limitations. As of April 2010, SBInet’s promised technology capabilities are still not operational and delays continue to require Border Patrol to rely on existing technology for securing the border, rather than using the newer SBInet technology planned to overcome the existing technology’s limitations. When CBP initiated SBInet in 2006, it planned to complete SBInet deployment along the entire southwest border in fiscal year 2009, but by February 2009, the completion date had slipped to 2016. The first deployments of SBInet technology projects are to take place along 53 miles in the Tucson border sector, designated as Tus-1 and Ajo-1. As of April 7, 2010, the schedule for Tus-1 and Ajo-1 had slipped from the end of calendar year 2008 as planned in February 2008, and government acceptance of Tus-1 was expected in September 2010 and Ajo-1 in the fourth quarter of calendar year 2010. Limitations in the system’s ability to function as intended as well as concerns about the impact of placing towers and access roads in environmentally sensitive locations have contributed to these delays. Examples of these system limitations include continued instability of the cameras and mechanical problems with the radar at the tower, and issues with the sensitivity of the radar. As of January 2010, program officials stated that the program was working to address system limitations, such as modifications to the radar. As a result of the delays, Border Patrol agents continue to use existing technology that has limitations, such as performance shortfalls and maintenance issues. For example, on the southwest border, Border Patrol relies on existing equipment such as cameras mounted on towers that have intermittent problems, including signal loss. Border Patrol has procured and delivered some new technology to fill gaps or augment existing equipment. We have also been mandated to review CBP’s SBI expenditure plans, beginning with fiscal year 2007. In doing so, in February 2007, we reported that CBP’s initial expenditure plan lacked specificity on such things as planned activities and milestones, anticipated costs, staffing levels, and expected mission outcomes. We noted that this, coupled with the large cost and ambitious time frames, added risk to the program. At that time, we made several recommendations to address these deficiencies. These recommendations included one regarding the need for future expenditure plans to include explicit and measurable commitments relative to the capabilities, schedule, costs, and benefits associated with individual SBI program activities. Although DHS agreed with this recommendation, to date, it has not been fully implemented. In our June 2008 report on the fiscal year 2008 expenditure plan, we recommended that CBP ensure that future expenditure plans include an explicit description of how activities will further the objectives of SBI, as defined in the DHS Secure Border Strategic Plan, and how the plan allocates funding to the highest priority border security needs. DHS concurred with this recommendation and implemented it as part of the fiscal year 2009 expenditure plan. In reviewing the fiscal year 2008 and 2009 expenditure plans, we have reported that, although the plans improved from year to year, providing more detail and higher quality information than the year before; the plans did not fully satisfy all the conditions set out by law. In addition to monitoring program implementation and reviewing expenditure plans, we have also examined acquisition weaknesses that increased the risk that the system would not perform as intended, take longer to deliver than necessary, and cost more than it should. In particular, we reported in September 2008 that important aspects of SBInet were ambiguous and in a continued state of flux, making it unclear and uncertain what technological capabilities were to be delivered and when. Further, we reported at that time that SBInet requirements had not been effectively developed and managed and that testing was not being effectively managed. Accordingly, we concluded that the program was a risky endeavor, and we made a number of recommendations for strengthening the program’s chances of success. DHS largely agreed with these recommendations and we have ongoing work that will report on the status of DHS’s efforts to implement them. We reported in January 2010 that key aspects of ongoing qualification testing had not been properly planned and executed. For example, while DHS’s testing approach appropriately consisted of a series of test events, many of the test plans and procedures were not defined in accordance with relevant guidance, and over 70 percent of the approved test procedures had to be rewritten during execution because the procedures were not adequate. Among these changes were ones that appeared to have been made to pass the test rather than to qualify the system. We also reported at this time that the number of new system defects identified over a 17 month period while testing was underway was generally increasing faster than the number of defects being fixed—a trend that is not indicative of a maturing system that is ready for acceptance and deployment. Compounding this trend was the fact that the full magnitude of this issue was unclear because these defects were not all being assigned priorities based on severity. Accordingly, we made additional recommendations and DHS largely agreed with them and has efforts underway to address them. Most recently, we concluded a review of SBInet that addresses the extent to which DHS has defined the scope of its proposed SBInet solution, demonstrated the cost effectiveness of this solution, developed a reliable schedule for implementing the solution, employed acquisition management disciplines, and addressed the recommendations in our September 2008 report. Although we plan to report on the results of this review later this month, we briefed DHS on our findings in December 2009, and provided DHS with a draft of this report, including conclusions and recommendations in March 2010. Among other things, these recommendations provide a framework for how the program should proceed. In light of program shortcomings, continued delays, questions surrounding SBInet’s viability, and the program’s high cost vis-à-vis other alternatives, in January 2010, the Secretary of Homeland Security ordered a department assessment of the SBI program. In addition, on March 16, 2010, the Secretary froze fiscal year 2010 funding for any work on SBInet beyond Tus-1 and Ajo-1 until the assessment is completed and the Secretary reallocated $50 million of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act funds allocated to SBInet to procure alternative tested and commercially available technologies, such as mobile radios, to be used along the border. In March 2010, the SBI Executive Director stated that the department’s assessment ordered in January 2010, would consist of a comprehensive and science-based assessment of alternatives intended to determine if there are alternatives to SBInet that may more efficiently, effectively and economically meet U.S. border security needs. According to the SBI Executive Director, if the assessment suggests that the SBInet capabilities are worth the cost, DHS will extend its deployment to sites beyond Tus-1 and Ajo-1. However, if the assessment suggests that alternative technology options represent the best balance of capability and cost-effectiveness, DHS intends to immediately begin redirecting resources currently allocated for border security efforts to these stronger options. As part of our continuing support to the Congress in overseeing the SBI program, we are currently reviewing DHS’s expenditure plan for the fiscal year 2010 Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure, and Technology appropriation, which provides funding for the SBI program. Additionally, we are completing a review of the internal control procedures in place to ensure that payments to SBInet’s prime contractor were proper and in compliance with selected key contract terms and conditions. Finally, we are reviewing controls for managing and overseeing the SBInet prime contractor, including efforts to monitor the prime contractor’s progress in meeting cost and schedule expectations. We expect to report on the results of these reviews later this year. In addition to monitoring SBInet implementation, we also reported on the tactical infrastructure component of the SBI program. For example, in October 2007, we reported that tactical infrastructure deployment along the southwest border was on schedule, but meeting CBP’s fencing goal by December 31, 2008, might be challenging and more costly than planned. In September 2008, we also reported that the deployment of fencing was ongoing, but costs were increasing, the life-cycle cost for fencing was not yet known, and finishing the planned number of miles by December 31, 2008 would be challenging. We also reported on continuing cost increases and delays with respect to deploying tactical infrastructure. In September 2009, we reported, among other things, that delays co ntinued in completing planned tactical infrastructure primarily because of challenges in acquiring the necessary property rights from landowners. GAO, Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed. GAO-09-896. (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2009).