DOD’s ranges are used primarily to test weapon systems and train military forces; some ranges are used for both testing and training purposes, while others are limited to one use or the other. These ranges represent important national assets for the development and sustainment of U.S. military forces. This report focuses primarily on ranges used for training purposes. DOD requires ranges for all levels of training to include airspace for air-to-air, air-to-ground, drop zone, and electronic combat training; live-fire ranges for artillery, armor, small arms, and munitions training; ground maneuver ranges to conduct realistic force-on-force and live-fire training at various unit levels; and sea ranges to conduct surface and sub-surface maneuvers for training. In a February 2004 report to the Congress, DOD identified 70 major active-component training ranges in the continental United States—the Army has 35, the Navy 13, the Marine Corps 12, and the Air Force 10. The report also identified several National Guard, Reserve, and smaller training ranges. The Office of the Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness develops policies, plans, and programs to ensure the readiness of military forces and provides oversight on training issues. The Secretaries of the military departments are responsible for training personnel and for maintaining their respective training ranges and facilities. Until recent years, DOD had no readiness reporting system in place for its defense installations and facilities, including training ranges. In fiscal year 2000, DOD reported to the Congress for the first time on the readiness of its defense infrastructure as an integral element of its overall Defense Readiness Reporting System. At the core of the system is a rating classification, typically referred to as a “C” rating. The C-rating process is intended to provide an overall assessment for each of nine facility classes (e.g., “operations and training” and “community and housing”) on a military installation. Training ranges fall within the operations and training facility class. While the services provide overall assessments by facility class, they may not always provide detailed separate ratings for installation assets, such as training ranges, within a class. With respect to training ranges, the Army and Marine Corps have data that provide C-ratings for their ranges, but the Navy and Air Force do not. The definitions for C-ratings are as follows: C-1—only minor facility deficiencies with negligible impact on capability C-2—some deficiencies with limited impact on capability to perform C-3—significant facility deficiencies that prevent performing some C-4—major facility deficiencies that preclude satisfactory mission accomplishment. Although we have previously reported concerns about the consistency and quality of the services’ approaches to completing these assessments, their assessments nonetheless have shown a large portion of DOD facilities across all classes of facilities, which include training ranges, being rated either C-3 or C-4. To effectively support the needs of combatant commanders in the new strategic environment of the 21st century, DOD has undertaken a transformation initiative to change the way it conducts training by preparing military forces to learn, improvise, and adapt to constantly changing threats as they execute military doctrine. The joint national training capability is one of three capabilities of this initiative and calls for the development of a live-virtual-constructive training environment. To meet this effort, defense planning guidance required OSD, in collaboration with the military services, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Joint Forces Command, to develop a plan to transform military training to, among other things, ensure that training ranges and devices are modernized and sustainable. The Training Transformation Implementation Plan, which identifies DOD’s vision, goals, and milestones, was initially issued in June 2003 and subsequently updated in June 2004. Under the joint national training capability, DOD recognized the need for sustainable and modernized ranges and stated that range capabilities, such as instrumentation for the operating platforms, and modern range infrastructure are necessary to create the training environment, capture realistic ground situations, assess activity and performance, and promptly provide feedback to the training audience and serve as the foundation for the joint national training capability. In recent years, we have reviewed and reported on constraints, particularly those related to encroachment, on military training ranges. A brief summary on those reports follows: In June 2004, we reported that DOD’s training range report to the Congress, which was mandated by section 366 of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, did not provide a comprehensive plan to address training constraints caused by limitations on the use of military lands, marine areas, and air space that are available in the United States and overseas for training. We also reported that DOD’s training report did not fully identify available training resources, specific training capacities and capabilities, and existing training constraints; fully assess current and future training requirements; fully evaluate the adequacy of current resources to meet current and future training range requirements in the United States and overseas; or include a comprehensive plan with quantifiable goals or milestones to measure progress, or projected funding requirements needed to implement the plan. In response to our recommendation calling for a comprehensive plan to fully address training constraints, DOD stated that the services had initiated a comprehensive planning process, which it considered to be evolutionary, and disagreed with our implication that DOD has not executed a comprehensive program to improve the sustainability of its ranges. In September 2003, we reported that through increased cooperation DOD and other federal land managers could share the responsibility for managing endangered species on training ranges. In February 2003, we also reported that while the amount of money spent on facility maintenance has increased, the amounts have not been sufficient to halt the deterioration of facilities, which include training ranges. In addition, we also reported a lack of consistency in the services’ information on facility conditions, making it difficult for the Congress, DOD, and the services to direct funds to facilities where they are most needed and to accurately gauge facility conditions. In April 2002, we reported that troops stationed outside of the continental United States face a variety of training constraints that have increased over the past decade and are likely to increase further. In June 2002, we reported on the impact of encroachment on military training ranges inside the United States with similar findings to those of the April 2002 report. In both reports, we stated that impacts on readiness were not well documented. In addition, we testified before the Congress twice on these issues—in May 2002 and April 2003. See the Related GAO Products section at the end of this report for a more comprehensive list of our products related to the issues discussed in this report. Our visits to eight training ranges, along with DOD’s own assessments, show that military training ranges have been generally deteriorating over time and lack modernized capabilities. These degraded conditions have adversely affected training, placed the services at risk of not meeting DOD’s transformation goals, and jeopardized the safety of military personnel who use the ranges. Without adequately maintained and modernized ranges, the department not only compromises the opportunity to achieve its training transformation goal of sustainable and capable training ranges but also assumes the risk that its forces will be less prepared for its missions and subjected to safety hazards. Table 1 shows the wide variety of identified degraded conditions or lack of upgrades to meet current training needs at the ranges that we visited. The degraded conditions comprise both (1) those physical features of a training range that are subject to maintenance (e.g., tank trails and roads) over time and (2) those capabilities that are desirable for a modernized training range (e.g., automated threat emitters, automated targets, urban training facilities). Following the table is a discussion of degraded conditions that we observed. While the overall C-rating of the Fort Hood ranges in 2004 was C-2, 53 percent of the assessed training areas were identified by installation officials as having significant (C-3) or major (C-4) deficiencies that preclude satisfactory mission accomplishment. According to Army officials, the condition of Fort Hood’s training ranges is understated because the overall C-rating does not include all assessed training areas. In addition, training range officials identified 364 (91 percent) of the 400 miles of their tank trails, which are not rated under training areas, as unusable or hazardous because of deteriorated conditions (see fig. 1). As a result, units typically detoured onto paved, public roads to travel to and from training areas causing road damage and creating safety hazards to the public who use the roads. In addition, the urban training facilities were outdated, having been designed for Cold War scenarios that are not applicable to current military operations. For example, the facilities at Fort Hood resemble European villages with narrow streets. But in current military operations, tanks and other military vehicles patrol Middle Eastern settings and downtown cities. Also, while entrances to these European homes at Fort Hood are immediately off the road and easily accessible, homes in the Middle East are generally protected by tall, gated walls and designed around a courtyard, making soldiers more vulnerable to enemy fire before entering a home. While the overall C-rating of the Fort Stewart ranges in 2004 was C-3, 60 percent of the training areas were identified by installation officials as having major (C-4) deficiencies that preclude satisfactory mission accomplishment. In addition, range officials and units told us that the convoy training area limits soldiers to shoot out of only one side of a vehicle during ambush training exercises, although soldiers stated that in actual military operations they could be attacked from multiple directions. The range also lacks urban training facilities that accurately reflect the needs of current military operations, such as Middle Eastern-style building facades. A range official further stated that most of their ranges lack running water and therefore do not have functioning restrooms or showers, which leads to delays and inefficient use of training time. Similar to Fort Hood, the range also has deteriorated training areas that pose difficulties in maneuvering vehicles during training events (see fig. 2).