Procedural change is a recurrent feature of federal budgeting, although the scope and impact of changes may vary from year to year. To advance their budgetary, economic, or political objectives, both Congress and the President regularly propose and make changes to the federal budget process. This report briefly discusses the context in which federal budget process changes are made and identifies selected reform proposals by major category. The identification of reform proposals in this report is not intended to be comprehensive; other Congressional Research Service reports discuss different aspects of budget process reform in more detail. A variety of sources give rise to the interest in budget process reform, including Congress, the President, state and local government officials, and special commissions, among others. Congress initiated a thorough overhaul of its internal budget process and ameliorated ongoing conflicts with President Richard Nixon over the withholding of appropriated funds through enactment of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. President Bill Clinton, like many Presidents before him, requested line-item veto authority, which Congress granted in 1996 in the Line Item Veto Act (but which was invalidated by court action in 1998). State and local government officials were instrumental in securing passage of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995. Finally, special commissions, such as the President's National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the "9/11 Commission"), have recommended changes in budget structure and procedure that have been adopted. (Citations to laws identified in this report are provided in the Appendix .) Outside of Congress itself, the President probably has been the most important source of budget process reform proposals over the years. The President's annual budget submission to Congress typically includes at least several proposed changes in budget procedure. In his final budget submission, for example, President George W. Bush advocated proposals involving such matters as enhanced controls over mandatory and discretionary spending, stricter standards for emergency spending designations, changes in how baseline calculations are made, earmark reform, line-item veto, biennial budgeting, a joint budget resolution, and an automatic continuing resolution. In late November 2008, President-elect Barack Obama signaled his interest in pursing budget process reform during the 111 th Congress when he announced that he intended to nominate Peter Orszag to the position of director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and Rob Nabors to the position of OMB deputy director. In making the announcement, President-elect Obama stated: "In these challenging times, when we are facing both rising deficits and a sinking economy, budget reform is not an option. It is an imperative." Perhaps more than any other factor over the years, concern about the size and persistence of the federal deficit has animated calls for budget process reform. The federal deficit, which amounted to $162 billion for FY2007 and $455 billion for FY2008, jumped to $1.414 trillion (9.9% of Gross Domestic Product) for FY2009 in the face of a significant economic downturn. In its January 2010 report presenting baseline budget projections, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated the baseline deficit at $1.3 trillion for FY2010 and $1.0 trillion for FY2011, and continuing at historically high levels through FY2020. The dramatic increase in the deficit, its likely persistence at high levels in the short term, and its unsustainable path in the long run, already has fueled strong interest in procedural reform. On January 14, 2009, several private organizations, including the Peter G. Peterson Foundation, the Pew Charitable Trusts, and the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, announced a joint enterprise (the Peterson-Pew Commission on Budget Reform) to foster changes in the budget process. The next day, President-elect Obama stated in an interview with the Washington Post that he would convene a "fiscal responsibility summit" prior to submitting the FY2010 budget to Congress, focusing on control of long-term obligations for entitlement programs. The summit was held on February 23, 2009, and included a session on budget process reform in which, among other issues, the notion of different types of commissions to formulate long-term budget solutions was addressed. (The following year, President Obama created the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform by executive order, as discussed later in this report.) In his budget submission for FY2010, President Obama pledged to cut the deficit in half by the end of his first term and asked Congress to act on various changes in the budget process that would, in part, contribute to this goal. The proposed changes included, among other things, restoration of the statutory "pay-as-you-go" requirement (with significant modifications), expedited legislative procedures for the consideration of certain presidential rescission proposals, and a limit on advance appropriations; similar proposals were included in his FY2011 budget. The federal budget process is rooted in constitutional mandates, statutory requirements, House and Senate rules and practices, and administrative directives. Thus, there are several avenues through which budget process changes can occur. Either chamber may focus on changes in its rules, thereby minimizing the time needed to effect the change and the scale of potential conflict needed to be resolved, but at the same time possibly minimizing the impact of the changes. Broader and potentially more consequential changes, involving statutes or constitutional amendments, may entail a larger set of participants in the decision-making (i.e., the other chamber, the President, state legislatures), likely escalating the effort required to reach agreement and lengthening the time period before the changes take effect. Legislative changes in the budget process may take the form of freestanding bills or joint resolutions (e.g., the Line Item Veto Act), or may be incorporated into other budgetary legislation, such as acts raising the debt limit (e.g., the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, also referred to as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act), implementing reconciliation instructions (e.g., the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990), or providing annual appropriations (e.g., revisions in the Senate's cap on discretionary appropriations). Budget process changes also may be included in the annual budget resolution (a concurrent resolution), or in simple House or Senate resolutions. In some years, changes made in the budget process were comprehensive. The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 established the executive budget process, the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 created the congressional budget process, and the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 and the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 imposed additional budget controls on a temporary basis. In other years, such as 1987, 1993, and 1997, existing budget process statutes were modified in a less comprehensive fashion and extended for limited periods. At other times, Congress and the President enacted statutes changing only selected aspects of the budget process; the Line Item Veto Act (of 1996) is one example. Finally, in every Congress, the House and Senate have modified existing rules and practices affecting the budget process and sometimes instituted new ones. Like other types of legislation, statutes making changes in the budget process are subject to review by the judiciary. In several major instances, the Supreme Court has declared procedures established by Congress and the President to be invalid on constitutional grounds. The one-House legislative veto (found in many acts, including the Impoundment Control Act of 1974), for example, was invalidated by I.N.S. v. Chadha in 1983, 103 S.Ct. 715 (1983); the triggering of a sequester by the Comptroller General under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act was invalidated by Bowsher v. Synar in 1986, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); and the Line Item Veto Act was invalidated by Clinton v. City of New York in 1998, 118 S.Ct. 2091 (1998). In the wake of court decisions, Congress and the President may successfully modify legislation (e.g., 1987 legislation modifying the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, vesting the authority to trigger a sequester in the OMB director), but sometimes persistent efforts to enact corrective legislation do not succeed (e.g., line-item veto proposals). Given that nearly every committee of the House and Senate has jurisdiction over legislation with a budgetary impact, interest in the budget process and proposals to change it radiate throughout both chambers. Although jurisdiction over executive and congressional budget procedures generally resides with the Budget, Oversight and Government Reform, and Rules Committees in the House, and with the Budget, Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Rules and Administration Committees in the Senate, other House and Senate committees, particularly the appropriations and tax committees, may exert influence over budget process changes affecting their legislative interests. The first opportunity in a new Congress to change budget procedures usually occurs on the first or second day of session. The House, which unlike the Senate is not a continuous body, must adopt its rules anew at the beginning of each Congress. Traditionally, the House adopts its rules from the previous Congress, with modifications (that may include changes in the budget process), in the form of a simple resolution. On January 6, 2009, the House adopted the opening-day rules package for the 111 th Congress, H.Res. 5 , by a vote of 242-181. The measure included several changes in the budget process, including modifications to the "pay-as-you-go" rule and earmarking rules that had been adopted at the beginning of the 110 th Congress. Some of the specific changes made by H.Res. 5 are discussed below under the applicable areas of reform. A second opportunity for budget process changes typically comes in March and April, when the two chambers consider the annual budget resolution for the fiscal year beginning on October 1.