The FCS concept is designed to be part of the Army’s Future Force, which is intended to transform the Army into a more rapidly deployable and responsive force that differs substantially from the large division-centric structure of the past. The Future Force is to be offensively oriented and will employ revolutionary concepts of operations, enabled by new technology. The Army envisions a new way of fighting that depends on networking the force, which involves linking people, platforms, weapons, and sensors seamlessly together in a system-of-systems. If successful, the FCS system-of-systems concept would integrate individual capabilities of weapons and platforms, thus facilitating interoperability and open system designs. This concept would represent a significant improvement over the traditional approach of building superior individual weapons that must be retrofitted and netted together after the fact. The Army is reorganizing its current forces into modular brigade combat teams, each of which is expected to be highly survivable and the most lethal brigade-sized unit the Army has ever fielded. The Army expects FCS- equipped brigade combat teams to provide significant warfighting capabilities to DOD’s overall joint military operations. The Army is implementing its transformation plans at a time when current U.S. ground forces continue to play a critical role in ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army has instituted plans to spin out selected FCS technologies and systems to current Army forces throughout the program’s system development and demonstration phase. FCS is to be composed of advanced, networked air and ground-based combat and maneuver sustainment systems, unmanned ground and air vehicles, and unattended sensors and munitions. (See fig. 1.) The soldier is the centerpiece of the system-of-systems architecture and is networked with 14 FCS core systems and numerous other enabling systems referred to as complementary programs. FCS is expected to be networked via a command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance architecture, including networked communications, network operations, sensors, battle command systems, training, and both manned and unmanned reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities that will enable improved situational understanding and operations at a level of synchronization heretofore unachievable. With that, FCS brigade combat teams are expected to be able to execute a new tactical paradigm based on the quality of firsts—the capability to see first, understand first, act first, and finish decisively. Fundamentally, the FCS concept is to replace mass with superior information—allowing the soldier to see and hit the enemy first rather that to rely on heavy armor to withstand a hit. The Army is using a management approach for FCS that centers on an LSI to provide significant management services to help the Army define and develop FCS and reach across traditional Army mission areas. Because of its partner-like relationship with the Army, the LSI’s responsibilities include requirements development, design, and selection of major system and subsystem contractors. The team of Boeing and its subcontractor, Science Applications International Corporation, is the LSI for the FCS system development and demonstration phase of acquisition, which is expected to extend until 2017. The FCS LSI is expected to act on behalf of the Army to optimize the FCS capability, maximize competition, ensure interoperability, and maintain commonality in order to reduce life-cycle costs, and for overall integration of the information network. Boeing also acts as an FCS supplier in that it is responsible for developing two important software subsystems. Army officials have stated they did not believe the Army had the resources or flexibility to use its traditional acquisition process to field a program as complex as FCS under the aggressive timeline established by the then-Army Chief of Staff. The Army will maintain oversight and final approval of the LSI’s subcontracting and competition plans. The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 mandated that the Secretary of Defense carry out a Defense Acquisition Board milestone review of FCS not later than 120 days after the system-of- systems preliminary design review, which is now tentatively scheduled for May 2009. The legislation is consistent with our 2006 report on FCS wherein we recommended that the Secretary of Defense establish a Defense Acquisition Board milestone review following the Army’s design review. Moreover, we recommended that this should be a go/no-go review of the FCS program based on its ability to meet knowledge markers consistent with DOD acquisition policy and best practices and demonstrate the availability of funds necessary to meet program costs. According to the law, DOD’s 2009 milestone review of FCS should include an assessment for each of the following: (1) whether the warfighter’s needs are valid and can be best met with the concept of the program; (2) whether the concept of the program can be developed and produced within existing resources; and (3) whether the program should (a) continue as currently structured; (b) continue in restructured form; or (c) be terminated. Furthermore, the Congress stipulated that the Secretary make specific determinations when making the assessment concerning the future course of the FCS program. The original language contained six criteria the Secretary was to use when answering the three assessment questions. In our 2008 report on the FCS program, we recommended that the Secretary establish objective and quantitative criteria that the FCS program will have to meet in order to justify its continuation and gain approval for the remainder of the acquisition strategy. Subsequently, the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 amended and expanded the existing requirements and added four new criteria. These changes expand the scope of supporting information the Congress mandated to be included with the DOD milestone review report. For example, the 2009 Act requires the Secretary, when making his assessment of the program, to determine whether actual demonstrations, rather than simulations, have shown that the software for the program is on path to achieve threshold requirements on cost and schedule. Appendix III contains the legislative requirements for the 2009 milestone review. For the purposes of our analysis, we aggregated the congressional criteria into four key areas: technology maturity, requirements/design, demonstrations (FCS concept and network), and cost. In 2008, we found that the progress made by FCS, in terms of knowledge gained, was commensurate with a program in early development but was well short of a program halfway through its development schedule and its budget. In view of these findings, we recommended, in part, that the Secretary of Defense establish criteria that the FCS must meet in the 2009 milestone review in order to justify continuation along with identifying viable alternatives to FCS. In response to this recommendation, and to facilitate the Secretary’s assessment of the status of FCS and to decide the program’s future, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology and Logistics issued an acquisition decision memorandum in August 2008 to the Secretary of the Army outlining the information the Army must provide. The Under Secretary established criteria for supporting information in five program areas: program execution, unmanned systems, manned ground vehicles, network, and test/experimentation/demonstration. The Under Secretary has established specific criteria within each of the five areas, as shown in Appendix IV. For example, in the area of program execution, the Army must demonstrate that the FCS, Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), and Warfighter Information Network Tactical (WIN-T) programs’ development, build, and test schedules are aligned and executable. The Under Secretary’s memorandum also instructed the Army to mature its acquisition approach to deliver initial increments of FCS capability to infantry brigade combat teams rather than the originally planned heavy brigades. For the FCS core program, the Under Secretary stated that the Army shall pursue an incremental or block approach to acquiring FCS capability. Along with the mandated 2009 milestone review of FCS, the Congress has required the DOD and the Army to perform analyses and report separately on two core systems of the FCS system-of-systems. Specifically, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration is to report on an analysis of the FCS communications network and software. This report, due not later than September 30, 2009, will include assessments of issues such as network vulnerability to enemy attack, electronic warfare, jamming, and adverse weather. (See app. V.) Compared with the criteria to be used for the milestone review, the FCS program has significant knowledge gaps. Specifically, the program has yet to show that critical technologies are mature, design issues have been resolved, requirements and resources are matched, performance has been demonstrated versus simulated, and costs are affordable. The Army will be challenged to convincingly demonstrate the knowledge necessary to warrant an unqualified commitment to FCS at the 2009 milestone review. Four of the critical technologies have not yet achieved minimally acceptable maturity levels despite being in development for at least 6 years. The schedule to complete the remaining preliminary design reviews is aggressive, and it seems clear from the results of the initial system-level preliminary design reviews that numerous performance trade-offs will be needed to close gaps between FCS requirements and designs. Actual demonstrations (versus modeling and simulation) of the FCS concept, including its critical survivability aspects, have been limited to date; demonstrated network performance is particularly limited with many key questions yet to be answered. Finally, FCS costs appear likely to increase again at a time when available funds may decline. In making the assessment of whether the FCS program should continue, DOD is required by congressional direction to make a determination of whether each critical technology for the program is at least TRL 6. The Army has struggled to attain this level of maturity, despite being a lower standard than preferred by DOD policy and falling short of best practices. At TRL 6, a representative model or prototype exists and is tested in a relevant environment—a maturity level well beyond TRL 5 where the technology demonstrates functionality in a laboratory environment but does not have the physical form or fit of the finished product.