Security-related implications are of concern in the lead-up to a Presidential election. These concerns are present when it is known there will be a change of Administration or in cases where the sitting president is running for reelection against an opponent vying for the office. A prospective presidential transition period—ranging from candidate's campaign-related activities through placement of new Administration personnel—is a unique time in American politics and holds the promise of opportunity as well as a real or perceived vulnerability to the nation's security interests. On a given day the outgoing Administration has the ability to change the policies of a nation and possibly affect the international security environment, yet the following day the President and the national security leadership team may be replaced by a new set of leaders who could have very different strategy and policy goals. This political dynamic, coupled with the inherent uncertainty accompanying a presidential transfer of power, may provide an opportunity for those who wish to harm U.S. security interests. Unlike other man-made incidents that may occur with little warning, the presidential election period offers a broadly defined time frame in which an enemy of the United States may decide to undertake an incident of national security significance to manipulate the electoral process or change the nation's foreign and domestic policies. Presidential transitions during times of global uncertainty, U.S. involvement in military operations, and risks to national security-related activities are not unique to the 2012-2013 presidential election period (see Appendix A ). History shows that some state enemies purposefully select periods of government transition to undertake significant acts of violence with a desire to disrupt a peaceful transfer of power (see Appendix B ). While the mere occasion of presidential transition does not ensure an incident of national security significance will occur, security experts argue that this window of potential opportunity is not lost on the enemies of the United States. For example, according to a 2008 presidential transition-related report provided to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) by the Homeland Security Advisory Committee (HSAC), "briefings, research, and recent history have provided an appreciation of the potential vulnerabilities during transition periods. Not only are we [United States] aware that vulnerabilities exist, but our enemies are as well." While no claims of attempting to influence the United States presidential election have been offered as a factor in the September 11, 2012, terrorist attacks on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya, incidences such as this could have policy implications during the transition period. The executive branch is not alone in attempting to ensure the country passes power from one Administration to the next in a safe and thoughtful manner. However, the outgoing and incoming Administrations are viewed as primarily responsible for addressing risks to the nation and taking actions to prevent and respond to any incident that may affect the electoral process. Whether the enemies of the United States choose to undertake action that may harm national security interests during this prospective period of transition or the new President experiences a relative peaceful period shortly after entering office, many national security issues will be awaiting a new Administration. How a newly elected president recognizes and responds to these challenges will "depend heavily upon the planning and learning that takes place during the transition from one Administration to another." During recent presidential transitions, the current and incoming Administrations and Congress have traditionally undertaken numerous activities to facilitate a smooth transfer of executive branch power. Some of the actions taken during a presidential transition period include consulting with government and private sector experts who have presidential transition expertise, providing information to the President-elect after the election and prior to the inauguration, offering operational briefings on ongoing national security matters to prospective presidential nominees and their staff, preparing briefings books and policy memos detailing the issues of most concern to the current Administration, and expediting security clearances for president-elect transition team members. Other activities that the current and incoming Administrations and Congress may wish to consider undertaking during the presidential transition period include pursuing public outreach efforts to discuss possible risks to the nation, involving the national security representatives of presidential candidates in all transition-related discussions, establishing joint advisory councils responsible for addressing all transition-related risks, requiring the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to undertake efforts to support the nation's awareness of risks, reflecting the national security priorities of the newly elected Administration in the upcoming budget, passing fiscal year appropriations without undue delay, quickly assigning newly elected and existing Members of Congress to committees focused on national security, holding hearings comprised of national security experts to gather ideas on prospective U.S. national security policies and goals, and holding hearings soon after the inauguration of the new President to determine the Administration's national security-related priorities. From a national security perspective, the presidential election period runs from the formal announcement of candidates for the office of the presidency to long past the inauguration, members of the current Administration and potential incoming Administration may wish to initiate substantive transition activities as soon as possible. Specifically, some scholars state that "enhanced cooperation and communication between the two Administrations is demanded by national security and foreign policy concerns." It is further observed that, "as the world becomes more dangerous and the risks to harm more immediate, the need for effective and seamless transitions becomes correspondingly greater." Thus, with respect to national security issues in particular, the need for outgoing and incoming Presidents to work together is no longer an option, but an unavoidable demand of the contemporary world. Throughout the entire presidential election period, a number of national security-related concerns and opportunities may be presented to the incoming and outgoing Administrations. However, many observers argue that the national security-related collaborative efforts of the current Administration and members of the potential new Administration, coupled with oversight activities throughout the transition period, offer the nation the best hope of being prepared to recognize and respond to acts taken to disrupt the transfer of power or change U.S. policies. In order to assess the federal governments actions related to the following issues, Congress may wish to hold classified and unclassified hearings and request reports regarding the Administration's knowledge of risks during the Presidential election period and ascertain information about the efforts by departments and agencies to ensure all applicable security and election officials are informed of potential concerns. Threats during a presidential election period may be numerous with "dangers associated with the transition emanating both from within the homeland and internationally." It is argued that enemies of the United States may see the nation as physically and politically vulnerable and that disseminating threatening propaganda or undertaking an incident of national security significance during the election period could potentially result in a change in the election results or future policies. Statements or incidents may be undertaken with the desire to demonstrate a group's ability to reestablish its status as an entity to be feared, intimidate the voting public, suggest perceived weaknesses in a candidate's national security experience, change the results of the election, or change future U.S. policies. Many national security observers speculate that, if an incident of national security significance is to occur, enemies of the United States may prefer to take action just prior to the presidential election date. However, such acts at anytime during the presidential transition period could have desired and unintended effects on the presidential election and resulting policies. Conversely, while many national security experts speculate that extremist groups and some foreign powers may see the presidential election period as a desirable time to undertake action against U.S. interests, the timing of such acts may be solely based on the convergence of an entity attaining a desired capability with a perceived best opportunity to successfully complete its objective. During previous presidential elections, some officials in the federal government have seen the need to develop options that might be pursued should the presidential election be delayed. While noting federal election dates are set by law requiring congressional action to change the current schedule, DeForest Soaries, former Chair of the United States Election Assistance Commission, wrote to then-Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Tom Ridge on June 25, 2004, that the process and procedures for changing election dates vary significantly across the nation's 8,000 voting jurisdictions. Chair Soaries suggested that the DHS and the federal interagency structure collaborate with state and local governments on a plan to address voting options, should a terrorist attack occur around the time of the election. Many security experts argue that federal, state, and local election-contingency planning and coordination should occur during the early phases of the election period. It is further suggested that, in the absence of such discussions, the issuance of general guidelines, or a genuine effort toward collaboration, the prospects for electoral chaos are more likely to occur if an incident of national security significance takes place just before or on the date of election. During all phases of the presidential transition process, many security experts suspect the federal government will receive information of concern to U.S. national security interests. Should such a heightened risk environment occur, observers suggest that one of the best ways to meet this challenge is by a showing of national unity among the outgoing Administration and individuals vying for the presidency. To support a collaborative environment, the 2008 Homeland Security Advisory Council report suggested the nominees issue a joint statement addressing potential threats to the nation or in response to an incident of national significance. Some foreign policy experts suggest joint statements and activities by the current President and the prospective President-elect take place with regularity to put forth a common voice to both the American public and the enemies of the United States that security issues will be addressed in a unified and coordinated manner. Throughout the presidential transition period the federal government may wish to undertake outreach and education efforts directed at the American public. A public awareness campaign discussing a need for citizens to be more-vigilant during the election period and providing insight into what the federal government will do in the event of an incident prior to election day may provide confidence to a concerned voting public. Activities such as this may prove useful in preparing the public for the possibility of an incident of national security significance occurring during the presidential transition period. With respect to security-related issues in the homeland, many observers argue that public awareness offers the best opportunity to provide indicators of anomalies that might be indicative of a group's preparation to undertake criminal activity to affect the presidential election process.