F ederal campaign finance law is composed of a complex set of limits, restrictions, and requirements on money and other things of value that are spent or contributed in the context of federal elections. While the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA, or Act) sets forth the statutory provisions governing this area of law, several Supreme Court and lower court rulings also have had a significant impact on the Act's regulatory scope. This report begins with a brief history of FECA and an overview of the constitutional framework for evaluating campaign finance law. Next, organized by regulatory context, and integrating governing court precedent, this report analyzes three primary areas of FECA regulation: contribution limits; source restrictions; and disclaimer and disclosure requirements. In so doing, the report examines topics of recent interest to Congress, including the permissible uses of campaign funds; the scope of what constitutes a campaign contribution; the ban on foreign nationals making contributions and expenditures in connection with U.S. elections; and the restrictions on foreign nationals participating in campaigns. The report also outlines the criminal penalties that may be imposed under the Act for violations of its provisions. As the Supreme Court's campaign finance jurisprudence informs the manner in which campaign financing may be constitutionally regulated, the report assesses pivotal rulings that may be instructive should Congress consider legislation in this area. In addition, the report examines significant lower court rulings, including an appellate court decision that provides the legal underpinning for the establishment of super PACs. Finally, the report analyzes two cases that were recently appealed to the Supreme Court. Should the Court decide to review either case, depending on its contours, the decision could potentially affect the constitutional bounds of future campaign finance regulation. In 1971, Congress first enacted FECA, requiring, among other things, campaign finance reporting by candidates and political committees. In response to the Watergate scandal, in 1974, Congress substantially amended the Act, generally implementing limits on contributions and expenditures, and creating the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to administer and provide civil enforcement of FECA. As a result of a challenge to the constitutionality of the 1974 Amendments, the Supreme Court issued its seminal Supreme Court ruling in Buckley v. Valeo , holding, among other things, mandatory spending limits unconstitutional, and invalidating the original appointment structure of the FEC. Responding to the Court's ruling, in 1976, Congress amended FECA in order to, among other things, restructure the FEC and establish revised contribution limits, and again in 1979, in order to revise certain reporting requirements. In 2002, Congress enacted the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), which contains the most recent, comprehensive amendments to FECA. Among other provisions, BCRA prohibited corporate and labor union spending on certain advertisements run prior to elections, and restricted the raising and spending of unregulated or "soft money" in federal elections. Since 2003, a series of Supreme Court decisions has invalidated several BCRA provisions. In addition, in 2010, the Court invalidated a long-standing prohibition on independent expenditures funded from the treasuries of corporations and labor unions. Generally, the Court has overturned such provisions as unconstitutional violations of First Amendment guarantees of free speech. Accordingly, the body of federal campaign finance law that remains was not originally enacted by Congress as a comprehensive regulatory policy. In Buckley , the Supreme Court established the framework for evaluating the constitutionality of campaign finance regulation. According to the Court, limits on campaign contributions—which involve giving money to an entity—and expenditures—which involve spending money directly for electoral advocacy—implicate rights of political expression and association under the First Amendment. The Court, however, afforded different degrees of First Amendment protection and levels of scrutiny to contributions and expenditures. Contribution limits are subject to a more lenient standard of review than expenditures, the Court held, because they impose only a marginal restriction on speech, and will be upheld if the government can demonstrate that they are a "closely drawn" means of achieving a "sufficiently important" governmental interest. Unlike expenditure limits, which reduce the amount of expression, the Court opined, contribution limits involve "little direct restraint" on the speech of a contributor. Although the Court acknowledged that a contribution limit restricts an aspect of a contributor's freedom of association, that is, his or her ability to support a candidate, nonetheless, the Court determined that a contribution limit still permits symbolic expressions of support, and does not infringe on a contributor's freedom to speak about candidates and issues. Reasonable contribution limits, the Court announced, still permit people to engage in independent political expression, associate by volunteering on campaigns, and assist candidates by making limited contributions. Regarding whether a contribution limit is closely drawn, the Court reasoned that it was relevant to examine the amount of the limit. Limits that are too low could significantly impede a candidate or political committee from amassing the necessary resources for effective communication. The Court concluded, however, that the FECA contribution limit at issue in Buckley would not negatively affect campaign funding. On the other hand, the Buckley Court determined that because they impose a substantial restraint on speech and association, expenditure limits are subject to strict scrutiny, requiring that they be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. Specifically, under the First Amendment, the Court determined, expenditure limits impose a restriction on the amount of money that a candidate can spend on communications, thereby reducing the number and depth of issues discussed and the size of the audience reached. Such restrictions, the Court determined, are not justified by an overriding governmental interest. That is, because expenditures do not involve money flowing directly to the benefit of a candidate's campaign fund, the risk of quid pro quo corruption does not exist. Essentially, quid pro quo corruption captures the notion of "a direct exchange of an official act for money." Further, the Court in Buckley rejected the government's asserted interest in equalizing the relative resources of candidates, and in reducing the overall costs of campaigns. Upon a similar premise, the Court rejected the government's interest in limiting a wealthy candidate's ability to draw upon personal wealth to finance his or her campaign, and struck down a law limiting expenditures from personal funds. When a candidate self-finances, the Court pointed out, his or her dependence on outside contributions is reduced, thereby lessening the risk of corruption. Importantly, the Court's most recent major campaign finance decision, McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission , announced that only quid pro quo corruption or its appearance constitute a sufficiently important governmental interest to justify limits on contributions, as well as expenditures. In McCutcheon , the Court reasoned it has consistently rejected campaign finance regulation based on other governmental objectives, such as goals to "level the playing field," "level electoral opportunities," or "equaliz[e] the financial resources of candidates." While acknowledging that the Court's campaign finance jurisprudence has not always discussed the concept of corruption clearly and consistently, and that the line between quid pro quo corruption and general influence may sometimes seem vague, the Court in McCutcheon said that efforts to ameliorate "influence over or access to" elected officials or political parties do not constitute a permissible governmental interest. Although the Supreme Court's campaign finance jurisprudence has shifted over the years, as this report illustrates, reviewing courts have applied the basic Buckley framework when evaluating whether a campaign finance regulation violates the First Amendment. Therefore, in Buckley and its progeny, with some exceptions, courts have generally upheld limits on contributions, concluding that they serve the governmental interest of protecting elections from corruption, while invalidating limits on independent expenditures, concluding that they do not pose a risk of corruption. As discussed, FECA sets forth limits and restrictions on campaign contributions in federal elections. FECA broadly defines a "contribution" to include money or anything of value given for the purpose of influencing an election for federal office. Specifically, FECA defines contributions to include "any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of value" that is made "for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office" or a payment that is made for compensation of personal services that are rendered to a political committee free of charge. As outlined above, FECA expressly defines contributions to include loans made to campaign committees; however, the Act exempts from such definition loans that are made from banks, so long as they are made in compliance with applicable law and "in the ordinary course of business." Further, the Act specifies that a bank loan to a campaign committee must be evidenced by a written instrument, ensuring repayment on a date certain or in accordance with an amortization schedule, and subject to the lending institution's "usual and customary interest rate." However, in the case of other loans made to a campaign—for example, personal loans—the outstanding balance is considered a campaign contribution. Therefore, the amount of an unpaid loan, coupled with other contributions made by an individual to a given candidate or committee, cannot exceed the applicable contribution limit. Once a loan is repaid in full, the amount of the loan is no longer considered a contribution. The following sections of the report provide an overview of FECA's limits and restrictions on contributions, including a discussion of key constitutional rulings. FECA provides specific limits on how much individuals can contribute to a candidate, and these limits are periodically adjusted for inflation in odd-numbered years. For example, in the 2017-2018 federal election cycle, an individual can contribute up to $2,700, per election, to a candidate. Table 1 , below, outlines the major federal campaign contribution limits applicable to the 2017-2018 cycle. In Buckley , the Court upheld the constitutionality of FECA base limits, which limit the amounts of money an individual can contribute to a candidate, party, or political committee. In the years since, the Court has applied the principles articulated in Buckley to uphold what it considers reasonable contribution limits, while invalidating limits it determines are too low to allow a candidate to amass necessary resources for effective campaigning.