The National Strategy for Homeland Security sets out a plan to improve homeland security through the cooperation and partnering of federal, state, local, and private sector organizations on an array of functions. The strategy organizes these functions into six critical mission areas: Intelligence and Warning involves the identification, collection, analysis, and distribution of intelligence information appropriate for preempting or preventing a terrorist attack. Border and Transportation Security emphasizes the efficient and reliable flow of people, goods, and material across borders while deterring terrorist activity. Domestic Counterterrorism focuses on law enforcement efforts to identify, halt, prevent, and prosecute terrorists in the United States. Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets stresses securing the nation’s interconnecting sectors and important facilities, sites, and structures. Defending Against Catastrophic Threats emphasizes the detection, deterrence, and mitigation of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction. Emergency Preparedness and Response highlights damage minimization and recovery from terrorist attacks. Since the strategy was issued in July 2002, the President has also issued 12 HSPDs that provide additional guidance related to these mission areas. For example, HSPD-4 focuses on defending against catastrophic threats and HSPD-7 focuses on protecting critical infrastructure. These HSPDs provided some of the details that were not in the strategy, particularly with respect to agency roles and milestones. See appendix X for a complete list and description of these HSPDs. The strategy also identifies the major initiatives to be addressed within each of these six mission areas. For example, within the Intelligence and Warning mission area, 5 initiatives are indicated: (1) enhancing the analytic capabilities of the FBI; (2) building new capabilities through the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate of DHS; (3) implementing the Homeland Security Advisory System; (4) utilizing dual-use analysis to prevent attacks; and (5) employing “red team” techniques. Within the Border and Transportation Security mission area, 6 initiatives are cited: (1) ensuring accountability in border and transportation security, (2) creating “smart borders”, (3) increasing the security of international shipping containers, (4) implementing the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001, (5) recapitalizing the U.S. Coast Guard, and (6) reforming immigration services. In all, the strategy cites 43 initiatives across the six mission areas. See appendix IX for a complete list of all the initiatives by mission area. The latest available funding data from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for the six mission areas is illustrated in figure 1. The National Strategy for Homeland Security specifies a number of federal departments, as well as nonfederal organizations, that have important roles in implementing the mission areas and related initiatives. In terms of federal departments, DHS is intended to have a prominent role in implementing all of the mission areas. Other key federal departments specified in the strategy include, in alphabetical order, the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Justice, and the Department of State (State). These departments have their own strategic plans, which indicate how they will implement their homeland security programs (as well as other programs unrelated to homeland security). Together, DHS and these other five departments constitute 94 percent of the proposed $47.4 billion budget for homeland security-related activities in fiscal year 2005. OMB did not report funding for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) although it has activities related to the Intelligence and Warning mission area. As explained further in appendix II, we did not include the CIA in our analysis because of the lack of funding data and because the strategy provides little discussion of the agency. Figure 2 shows the proposed fiscal year 2005 funding for these departments as well as the proposed homeland security funding for all other agencies. The National Strategy for Homeland Security and the related HSPDs typically identify a specific federal department as being a “lead” agency for specific initiatives. However, the language varies in precision. In some cases, the documents use clear language to identify which department will lead efforts across the government. In other cases, the lead is more implied than stated. Sometimes, more than one department is identified as a lead agency—which can occur because some of the initiatives in the strategy are large in scope, and different departments lead different parts of the initiatives. The identification of lead agency is important in order to specify which agencies are accountable for the implementation of the initiatives, particularly if implementation requires the efforts of several different agencies exercising different statutory authorities. By clearly identifying the lead agency, the strategies and the HSPDs enable the federal, state, local, and private stakeholders to determine who is responsible and accountable for the implementation, and thus more effectively direct their inquiries and integrate their own actions, particularly where multiagency coordination is required. See appendix IX for a complete list of the initiatives and the departments identified as lead agencies. Congress, because of concerns about terrorism in recent years, chartered four commissions to examine terrorist threats and the government’s response to such threats, as well as to make recommendations to federal, state, local, and private organizations. These national commissions included the following: The Bremer Commission: the National Commission on Terrorism, chaired by Ambassador Paul Bremer, which issued its report in June 2000. The Gilmore Commission: the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, chaired by Governor James S. Gilmore, III, which issued its final report in December 2003. The Hart-Rudman Commission: the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, chaired by Senators Gary Hart and Warren B. Rudman, which issued its final report in February 2001. The 9/11 Commission: the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, chaired by Governor Thomas H. Kean, which issued its final report in July 2004. To determine whether the key federal departments addressed strategy initiatives in their planning and implementation activity, we identified the 43 major initiatives and the six key federal departments for review. We evaluated each department’s high-level strategic planning documents related to homeland security to determine if they had planning or implementation activities related to each initiative. To satisfy the planning and implementation criteria, we generally required departments to provide documentary support for one such activity, per initiative. Where classified or undocumented activities were involved, we worked with department officials to verify the activity. We provided the results of our analyses to planning officials from the various departments for their verification. Additionally, we reviewed the language in the strategy and HSPDs to determine which departments had been identified as lead agencies in implementing the initiatives. In some cases, the leadership language was clear; in other cases, it was less precise or implied. We were then able to determine whether departments demonstrated planning or implementation activities in both lead and nonlead initiatives. Our analysis is necessarily a snapshot of activity as of particular points in time. The agencies reviewed provided us with information as to their planning and implementation as of various dates, including fiscal year 2004. We recognize that the agencies continue to plan and implement their strategies and programs and have and may continue to progress beyond the status portrayed in this analysis. Finally, our work did not assess the status or quality of the work being planned or implemented. To determine homeland security challenges facing the nation, we reviewed our reports issued since September 11. This included over 250 products cutting across the gamut of homeland security activities. We summarized and categorized the challenges by critical mission area and subtopic where appropriate (e.g., the Border and Transportation Security mission area was subdivided into border security and transportation security). While our summary is limited to challenges we identified, we have noted in the text where the congressionally chartered commissions have raised similar issues. We recognize that these commissions, Congress, the executive branch, and other organizations have identified additional challenges in each of the mission areas. We conducted our work between February and November 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. For more details on our objectives, scope, and methodology, see appendix I. The following sections provide summaries of each mission area, as well as issues that cut across all six mission areas. These summaries include an analysis of federal departments’ strategic planning and implementation activities and the challenges faced by these departments and the nation as a whole. The strategy identifies five initiatives under the Intelligence and Warning mission area. All of the initiatives are covered by at least two departments planning or implementation activities (see table 1). Examples include DOJ and DOE activities to enhance the analytic capabilities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); DHS, State, and DOE activities to utilize dual-use analysis to prevent attacks; and DHS, DOD, and DOE activities to employ red-team techniques. Four of the five initiatives have a department identified as a lead agency. Neither the strategy nor the HSPDs identified a lead agency on the fifth initiative, which relates to the employment of red-team techniques. According to DHS strategic planning officials, it is important that a number of agencies conduct red-team techniques to test their own specific programs, so no agency would necessarily have the overall lead. See appendix II for a more detailed discussion on the implications of not having an overall lead agency identified for red-team techniques. For this mission area, the lead agency specifications are clear (rather than implied), and there are no multiple leads on any of the initiatives. All five initiatives were being implemented in fiscal year 2004 as reported by two or more departments (see table 7). DHS and DOJ cited 2004 implementation activity for each of the initiatives for which they were identified as lead agencies. Refer to appendix II for more specific details regarding department planning and implementation activities, including a discussion of fiscal year 2004 implementation. As explained further in appendix II, we did not include CIA in our analysis because of the lack of funding data and because the strategy provides little discussion of the agency. Our work in the Intelligence and Warning mission area since 2001 has highlighted a number of challenges that need to be addressed.