On March 25, 2008, the Supreme Court issued a decision in the case of MedellÃ­n v. Texas. In an opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by Justices Alito, Kennedy, Thomas, and Scalia, the Court held that neither the judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States) ( Avena ) nor the President's Memorandum requiring state courts to give effect to the Avena decision constituted enforceable federal law preempting state procedural default rules. Justice Stevens wrote an opinion concurring with the Court's judgment, and Justice Breyer issued a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justices Ginsburg and Souter. The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR), ratified by the United States in 1969, is a multilateral agreement codifying consular practices originally governed by customary practice and bilateral agreements between States (i.e., countries). When the United States became a party to the VCCR, it also chose to become a party to the VCCR's Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes (Optional Protocol). Parties to the Optional Protocol agree to accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ to resolve disputes arising between nations with respect to the VCCR. The ICJ is the "principle judicial organ of the United Nations," and the ICJ Statute, establishing the organization and procedures of the court, is annexed to the U.N. Charter. Pursuant to Article 94(1) of the U.N. Charter, each U.N. Member "undertakes to comply" with decisions of the ICJ "in any case to which it is a party." Article 94(2) of the Charter provides that if a party fails to perform obligations required of it pursuant to an ICJ judgment, the other party may present the matter to the U.N. Security Council, "which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment." On March 7, 2005, the United States withdrew from the Optional Protocol, meaning that the ICJ's jurisdiction over VCCR claims is no longer recognized by the United States. Pursuant to Article 36 of the VCCR, when a national of a signatory State is arrested or otherwise detained in another signatory State, appropriate authorities within the receiving State must inform him "without delay" of his right to have his consulate notified. This requirement is potentially beneficial to a detained national. For instance, a consulate might arrange for legal representation of the detained national, or help the national obtain evidence or witnesses to bolster the national's defense in any subsequent criminal case. Nevertheless, foreign nationals detained by U.S. state and local authorities are not always provided with requisite consular information, and some have been convicted of criminal charges carrying serious penalties without ever having their consulate notified of their detention. Further, under U.S. state and federal law, procedural default rules might prevent foreign nationals from obtaining a judicial remedy for an Article 36 violation when they only become aware of the VCCR's consular notification requirements after having been convicted of an offense. As is the case on the federal level, state procedural default rules generally prevent the reopening of cases to consider claims that were not raised on a timely basis (e.g., before or during trial). The rule may preclude the raising of claims based on the violation of a treaty or (in many cases) a constitutional right. Although lower federal courts have jurisdiction to review state criminal convictions pursuant to writs of habeas corpus, the scope of such review is limited. A person convicted in state court who petitions for federal habeas relief on account of a violation of the Constitution or a federal statute or treaty must have first raised the claim in state court if he is to be provided an evidentiary hearing under federal habeas review. The availability of a judicial remedy for an Article 36 violation has been the subject of both domestic and international jurisprudence. Prior to U.S. withdrawal from the Optional Protocol, the ICJ considered a claim brought by Mexico against the United States for violating obligations owed under VCCR Article 36. In Avena , the ICJ held that Article 36 confers an individually-enforceable right to consular notification, and that the state convictions of 51 named Mexican nationals were entitled to review and reconsideration, regardless of whether such review was otherwise barred by state procedural default rules. Although the United States subsequently withdrew from the Optional Protocol, the President thereafter issued a Memorandum instructing state courts to give effect to the ICJ's decision in Avena with respect to the 51 Mexican nationals at issue in that case. In the 2006 case of Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon , the Supreme Court found that even assuming that Article 36 created an individually enforceable right for detained foreign nationals, (1) suppression of evidence in a criminal proceeding is never an appropriate remedy for an Article 36 violation; and (2) federal and state procedural default rules prevent the raising of Article 36 claims that were not made on a timely basis. Although the Court considered the ICJ's interpretation of Article 36 as deserving respectful consideration, it did not deem it to be legally binding or necessarily persuasive. Because the Sanchez-Llamas case did not involve individuals named in the Avena decision, the Supreme Court's ruling addressed neither the domestic effect of the ICJ judgment instructing the United States review of the state criminal convictions of certain Mexican nationals, nor the legal weight of the President's Memorandum instructing state courts to comply with the Avena judgment. Ernesto MedellÃ­n, who had been convicted and sentenced in Texas state court for murder, was one of the Mexican nationals named in the Avena decision. In 2004, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case of MedellÃ­n v. Dretke , in which MedellÃ­n argued, among other things, that his conviction by a Texas court should be reconsidered in light of the ICJ's ruling, despite such reconsideration being barred by Texas's procedural default rules. Prior to the Supreme Court reaching a decision on this issue, President Bush issued the Memorandum instructing state courts to give effect to the Avena decision. The Court subsequently dismissed its writ of certiorari in MedellÃ­n as improvidently granted, as it was no longer clear that MedellÃ­n had exhausted his remedies at the Texas state level in light of the President's Memorandum. On November, 15, 2006, the Texas Criminal Court of Appeals held that neither Avena nor the President's Memorandum preempted state procedural default rules, and it rejected Medellin's petition for habeas relief. The Supreme Court thereafter granted certiorari to review the Texas court's judgment. The Court granted certiorari in MedellÃ­n to address two issues: (1) whether the ICJ's decision in Avena was directly enforceable in U.S. state courts; and (2) whether the President's Memorandum independently compelled states to review and reconsider the claims of the 51 Mexican nationals named in Avena without regard to state procedural default rules. The Court first examined whether the ICJ's judgment in Avena constituted binding domestic law. MedellÃ­n argued that treaties requiring compliance with the Avena judgmentânamely, the Optional Protocol, ICJ Statute, and U.N. Charterâconstituted the "law of the Land" under the Supremacy Clause, thereby preempting contrary state procedural default rules that otherwise barred reexamination of Medellin's habeas petition. The Court began its analysis by acknowledging that the Optional Protocol, ICJ Statute, and U.N. Charter imposed upon the United States "an international law obligation" to comply with the ICJ's judgment in Avena . However, the Court went on to explain that it had "long recognized the distinction between those treaties thatâwhile they constitute international law commitmentsâdo not themselves function as binding federal law" enforceable by U.S. courts. Here, the Court distinguished between the domestic legal effect of two categories of treatiesâthose that are self-executing and those that are non-self-executing. The Court defined a self-executing treaty as having "automatic domestic effect as federal law upon ratification." A non-self-executing treaty, in contrast, "does not by itself give rise to domestically enforceable federal law. Whether such a treaty has domestic effect depends upon implementing legislation passed by Congress." Further, even when treaties are considered "self-executing in the sense that they create federal law, the background presumption is that international agreements, even those directly benefitting private persons, generally do not create private rights or provide for a private cause of action in domestic courts." The Court held that the Avena judgment did not constitute automatically enforceable domestic law because none of its underlying treaty sourcesâi.e., the Optional Protocol, the ICJ Statute, or the U.N. Charterâcreated binding domestic law in the absence of implementing legislation, and no such legislation had been enacted by Congress. In assessing whether these treaty sources were self-executing, the Court first looked to the relevant treaty text in order to determine whether each treaty's terms "reflect[ed] a determination by the President who negotiated it and the Senate that confirmed it that the treaty has domestic effect." Though the Court stated that treaty interpretation, like statutory interpretation, "begins with its text," it also acknowledged that nontextual resources, including the negotiating and drafting history of the treaty and the postratification understanding of treaty parties, could also serve as "aids to its interpretation." Turning first to the Optional Protocol, the Court concluded that the "most natural reading of the Optional Protocol is as a bare grant of jurisdiction" to the ICJ to hear disputes between VCCR parties.