In response to the disclosure of various National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance and data collection programs, a number of legislative changes to the government's intelligence operations authority have been suggested. Many of these proposals include amendments to the practices and procedures of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), and the FISA Court of Review, which reviews rulings of the FISC. Currently, the government's applications for surveillance orders to the FISC are classified, as are most FISA opinions themselves. While traditional federal courts also review classified information in camera , their final opinions are rarely kept confidential. FISA opinions, in contrast, are not released publicly except in special circumstances. According to the FISC, traditional "courts operate primarily in public, with secrecy the exception; the FISC operates primarily in secret, with public access the exception." On the other hand, at least according to the public record, the FISA Court of Review has sat only twice; and both times the court released its opinion with sensitive information redacted. A number of proposals seek to increase government transparency by requiring public disclosure of FISA opinions. At least one group has proposed that all FISA decisions should be published in their entirety; other proposals would allow the government to conduct a declassification review of the material first, substituting a summary of material when appropriate. These proposals might be understood to raise separation of powers issues, namely, the scope of the executive branch's control over national security information. This report will first address current FISC procedures regarding disclosure, and will continue by analyzing the legal implications of mandating executive branch release of FISA opinions. This analysis will include an examination of judicial doctrine and statutory practice regarding control of national security information, concluding that neither branch enjoys exclusive power over the matter; rather, authority is shared between Congress and the executive branch. Requiring the public disclosure of FISA opinions concerns many policy questions involving national security; this report, however, is limited to the legal implications of such a requirement. Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), the FISC reviews government applications to, inter alia , conduct surveillance and engage in data collection for foreign intelligence purposes. If an application is denied, the government may request review from the FISA Court of Review. The government is usually the only party, as FISA provides that most FISC proceedings take place ex parte , and that FISC judges enter ex parte orders. Under FISA, most submissions to the FISC are made under seal, and appeals from FISC rulings are also sent under seal to the FISA Court of Review or the Supreme Court. Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. Section 1803(c), records of the FISC and the FISA Court of Review's proceedings "shall be maintained under security measures established by the Chief Justice in consultation with the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence." Under that authority, Chief Justice Warren Burger established these measures in 1979. In addition, 50 U.S.C. Section 1803(g) permits the FISA courts to individually adopt whatever security procedures "are reasonably necessary to administer their responsibilities." While the FISA Court of Review has not publicly released any more specific security procedures, the FISC's particular procedures took effect November 1, 2010, and specify that the court comply with various executive branch regulations governing classified material, in particular, Executive Order 13526—"Classified National Security Information." In sum, according to the FISC, "the collective effect of these provisions is that applications, orders, and other records ... whether in the possession of the FISC, the Court of Review, [or] the Supreme Court ... shall, as a rule, be maintained in a secure and nonpublic fashion." While the FISC usually sits ex parte , at least two exceptions apply. Recipients of production orders under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and directives under Section 702 of FISA may petition the court. In the event of a contested hearing, FISA permits ex parte and in camera review of classified information upon motion by the government. Under the FISC's procedures, disclosure of the court's opinions is permitted only in a limited number of situations, all of which require compliance with Executive Order 13526. First, a judge who wrote an opinion may sua sponte or by motion of a party publish the opinion. The FISC has discretion in this situation to direct the executive branch to redact the opinion for classified information. Recently, at least one FISC judge has released an opinion in this manner, "[b]ecause of the public interest" in the bulk metadata collection program. Second, the presiding judge may provide copies of court records to Congress on his own volition. Finally, the FISC's rules also provide that the executive branch may provide copies of court records to Congress without prior notification to the court. The executive branch must, however, notify the court "contemporaneously" when it does so. The executive branch recently argued that this provision prevented it from complying with Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests—without FISC approval—for FISC records in the government's possession. The FISC, however, rejected this proposition, explaining that the provision was intended to "stop the government's practice of filing what the Court viewed as unnecessary motions for unsealing before fulfilling its statutory obligations." The court explained that FISA regulated the disclosure of opinions "in the possession of the FISC," but did not regulate the disclosure of opinions already in the possession of the executive branch. Therefore, opinions and orders in the possession of the executive branch may be released to the public without seeking the FISC's permission. However, most filings made to the FISC are classified as Secret or Top Secret by the executive branch before being sent to the court, and the FISC's orders and opinions in the possession of the executive branch are similarly classified. While most classified information is subject to automatic review at 25 years, "FISA files" are not automatically reviewed until after 50 years. The executive branch can, however, choose to declassify portions of opinions, or entire opinions and release them to the public. It has done so in certain instances since the disclosure of the NSA data collection programs. Legislation that requires the executive branch to publicly disclose FISA opinions might raise separation of powers questions. Both Congress and the executive branch claim some power in this area. The central issue is the extent to which Congress may regulate control over access to national security information, including mandating that the executive branch disclose specific materials—a question not definitively resolved by the courts. A preliminary question concerning the public disclosure of FISA opinions is why releasing court opinions—a product of an Article III entity—implicates the power of the President under Article II. Legislation that compels the executive branch to release FISA opinions in its possession directs the President to take specific action with respect to documents he may intend to keep secret, and thus implicates his Article II powers. For example, in the FOIA context, legislation compelling the release of agency records includes judicial opinions in the possession of the executive branch. In United States Department of Justice v. Tax Analysts , the Supreme Court ruled that the location in which specific documents originated was irrelevant in determining whether materials qualified as agency records. Instead, two requirements applied. First, the agency must "create or obtain" the materials; second, the agency must have control of the materials when the FOIA request is made. The government argued that it did not control the opinions because district courts could always modify them. However, the Supreme Court rejected this assertion, explaining that the proper inquiry was "on an agency's possession of the requested materials, not on its power to alter the content." The Court thus held that district court decisions in the possession of the executive branch qualified as agency records. Similarly, FISA opinions are retained by the executive branch as a party to the litigation, and remain in the control of the executive branch. Legislation directing the executive branch to release FISA orders may be analogous to FOIA's applicability to court opinions in the possession of the executive branch. Once the executive branch receives a FISA opinion, that opinion becomes an agency record. Most are then classified as either Top Secret or Secret. A number of FOIA cases have been filed seeking FISA opinions from the executive branch. The Constitution assigns responsibility for the national defense to both Congress and the President. Article II provides that the President is Commander in Chief of the armed forces and instructs him to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. The Supreme Court has been somewhat deferential to the executive branch in matters of national security, noting that the power vested in the President in Article II bestows a "vast share of responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations," including "a degree of independent authority to act." The Supreme Court has indicated that the "grant of [the] war power includes all that is necessary and proper for carrying these powers into execution," and has noted that the Commander-in-Chief Clause gives the President the power to "direct the movements of the naval and military forces at his command, and to employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual to harass and conquer and subdue the enemy." At the same time, Article I grants Congress considerable power over national security and foreign affairs. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that—"out of seventeen specific paragraphs of congressional power [in the Constitution], eight of them are devoted in whole or in part to specification of powers connected with warfare." Additionally, the Court has noted that the President "may not disregard limitations that Congress has, in the proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on his powers." Likewise, the Supreme Court noted in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld , that even during times of conflict, the Constitution "most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when the rights of individuals are at stake."