In spite of ongoing international efforts to combat Afghanistan's narcotics trade, U.N. officials estimate that Afghanistan supplies over 90% of the world's illicit opium. Afghan, U.S., and international officials have stated that opium poppy cultivation and drug trafficking constitute serious strategic threats to the security and stability of Afghanistan and jeopardize the success of post-9/11 counterterrorism and reconstruction efforts. Since 2001, counternarcotics policy has emerged as a focal point in broader, recurring debates in the executive branch and in Congress about the United States' strategic objectives and policies in Afghanistan. Relevant concerns include the role of U.S. military personnel and strategies for continuing the simultaneous pursuit of counterterrorism and counternarcotics goals, which may be complicated by practical necessities and political realities. Coalition forces pursuing regional counterinsurgency and counterterrorism objectives may rely on the cooperation of security commanders, tribal leaders, and local officials who may be involved in the narcotics trade. Counterinsurgency operations in key poppy growing areas have presented U.S. forces and officials with challenging decisions about the relative merits and risks inherent in simultaneously seeking to limit poppy cultivation and maintain positive relationships with local farmers. U.S. officials and many observers also believe that the introduction of a democratic system of government to Afghanistan has been accompanied by the election and appointment of many narcotics-associated and corrupt individuals to positions of public office. Efforts to combat the opium trade in Afghanistan face the challenge of ending a highly profitable enterprise fueled by international demand that has become deeply interwoven with the economic, political, and social fabric of a war-torn country. Afghan, U.S., and international authorities are engaged in a campaign to reverse the unprecedented upsurge of opium poppy cultivation and heroin production that occurred following the fall of the Taliban. U.S. officials continue to implement a multifaceted counternarcotics initiative that includes public awareness campaigns, judicial reform measures, economic and agricultural development assistance, support for Afghan demand reduction programs, and drug interdiction operations. Questions regarding the likely effectiveness, resource requirements, and implications of counternarcotics strategies in Afghanistan continue to arise as Members of the 111 th Congress review and debate the Obama Administration's policies. Opium production has become an entrenched negative element of Afghanistan's fragile political and economic order over the last 30 years in spite of ongoing local, regional, and international efforts to reverse its growth. At the time of Afghanistan's pro-Communist coup in 1978, narcotics experts estimated that Afghan farmers produced 300 metric tons (MT) of opium annually, enough to satisfy most local and regional demand and to supply a handful of heroin production facilities whose products were bound for Western Europe. From the early 1980s through 2007, a trend of increasing opium poppy cultivation and opium production unfolded during successive periods of insurgency, civil war, fundamentalist government, and recently, international engagement ( Figures 1 and 2 ). During the 2006-2007 poppy growing season, Afghanistan produced a world record opium poppy crop that yielded 8,200 MT of illicit opium—an estimated 93% of the world's supply. A slight reduction in national poppy cultivation and opium output was recorded in 2007-2008, and many international officials attributed the changes to more effective counternarcotics approaches, including governor-enforced poppy cultivation bans and eradication. United Nations and Afghan government officials announced that further reductions in national cultivation and output statistics were recorded for the 2008-2009 season, due in part to bad weather, interdiction efforts, market prices, and improved agricultural assistance in some key poppy growing areas. Estimates for 2010, suggest that production will remain relatively static, with crop disease and poor weather conditions exerting downward pressure on output. Overall, practitioners and observers remained focused on Afghan government, United Nations, and other field reporting that shows reductions in poppy cultivation in some northern, central, and eastern provinces, while large-scale cultivation continues in conflict-ridden southern provinces and remote areas of the east and west. By nearly all accounts, opiate trafficking and related corruption remain nationwide problems. With regard to so-called "poppy free" provinces, experts and practitioners continue to debate the causes and durability of recent reductions in poppy cultivation, with some analysts calling for more targeted development assistance to capitalize on and consolidate what they argue are still-reversible reductions in many areas. Parallel debates focus on the advisability and targeting of interdiction and eradication and the relative importance of and appropriate methods for sustainably replacing poppy cultivation and opium industry labor as income sources for Afghan households. The concentration of poppy cultivation in insecure and remote areas has raised doubts in the minds of some observers about the likelihood of further gains in the absence of more fundamental improvements in security and stability. In the most volatile areas of the country, insecurity and corruption create a climate in which poppy cultivators and drug-trafficking groups remain largely free to operate. Violence and criminality stifle licit economic activity and prevent effective eradication, interdiction, outside investment, or the provision of development assistance. Reports suggest that the drug trade provides financial support to corrupt officials, criminal groups, and insurgents who in turn protect traffickers and perpetuate the chaotic environments that allow illicit trade to thrive. In light of these challenges, current U.S. policy is designed to: break self-reinforcing cycles of insecurity, crime, and violence through direct action against traffickers, insurgents, and corrupt officials; understand, consolidate, and sustain reductions in poppy cultivation where they have occurred; and, reproduce sustainable reductions in cultivation nationwide. According to the 2009 Afghanistan Opium Survey conducted by the Afghan Ministry of Counternarcotics (MCN) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC): Opium poppy cultivation took place in 14 of 34 Afghan provinces in 2008-2009 (see Figure 3 ). The land area under poppy cultivation fell by 22% to 123,000 hectares (equal to 1.6% of Afghanistan's arable land). Cultivation remains overwhelmingly concentrated in conflict-ridden Helmand province, where farmers cultivated over 69,833 hectares of poppy—a 33% decline in the province from the prior season. MCN-UNODC estimates for 2010 suggest that three provinces may lose their poppy-free status while several others could become poppy-free depending on Afghan government responses and international support (see below). The 2008-2009 opium poppy crop had the potential to produce 6,900 MT of illicit opium, a 10% decline from the prior season. However, crop yields once again improved 15% due to better weather conditions in some areas. A range of accepted opium-to-heroin conversion rates indicate that an estimated opium yield of 6,900 MT could produce 690 to 985 MT of refined heroin. Approximately 254,000 Afghan households cultivated opium poppy in 2008-2009, equal to roughly 1.6 million people or 6.4% of the Afghan population. Thousands of laborers, traffickers, warlords, and officials continue to participate. The estimated $438 million farmgate value (equal to volume multiplied by the price of non-dried opium paid to farmers) of the 2008-2009 opium harvest is equivalent in value to approximately 4% of the country's licit GDP. The export value of the 2008 crop may have exceeded $3.4 billion, equivalent to approximately 33% of the country's licit 2008 GDP. Many licit and emerging industries have been financed or supported by profits from narcotics trafficking. As noted above, some experts and practitioners consider provincial and district level data to be a more accurate and informative reflection of counternarcotics challenges and successes. Recent UNODC/MCN reports attribute sustainable declines in poppy cultivation to political stability, economic integration, alternative livelihood assistance, and effective law enforcement. Other variables such as weather, raw opium prices (see Table 1 ), and the prices of licit crops, including wheat, have significant and difficult to quantify effects on farmers' decisions to grow poppy. At present, changes in opium and wheat price trends have led some expert observers and officials to express concern that prevailing price relationships that have undermined poppy cultivation may be slowing or entering a period of reversal. At the same time, weather conditions and disease patterns that have favored high opium yields in recent years appear to have reversed, amid widespread reports of blight from infection and drought. The December 2009 UNODC/Afghan Government opium survey reported further consolidation of poppy cultivation in the southern and western provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Nimroz, Farah, Dai Kundi, Uruzgan, and Zabol. According to the U.S. State Department, 97% of Afghanistan's opium is produced in six of these seven provinces. Overall, UNODC monitoring found a significant decrease in national cultivation levels in 2009, due primarily to an over 33% reduction in cultivation in Helmand province. According to UNODC estimates, three provinces, Kapisa, Baghlan, and Faryab, became "poppy-free" in the last year, while limited production in remote and less secure areas of upper Nangarhar stripped the province of the poppy free designation it earned in 2008. Although wheat prices declined from their 2008 high, they remained at roughly double their 2007 levels during 2009 and thus remained attractive relative to declining prices in Afghanistan's oversupplied opium market. Survey information from early 2010 suggests this price relationship may be shifting, as wheat prices begin to decline at a faster rate than opium prices.