On March 27, 2014, the U.N. General Assembly approved a resolution by the vote of 100-11, with 58 abstentions, affirming Ukraine's territorial integrity and terming the March 16 referendum in Crimea illegitimate and not a basis for a change in the status of the region. Russia's U.N. ambassador Vitaly Churkin argued that Russia could not ignore the right of Crimeans to self-determination and that Crimea had been "re-unified" with Russia. Armenia and Belarus joined Russia in voting against the resolution, while Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova voted for it. Among other Soviet successor states that attended the session, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan abstained. China, Afghanistan, and Pakistan also abstained. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan did not participate in the vote. The first U.S. visit by a Georgian prime minister who belongs to the Georgia Dream coalition, Irakli Garibashvili, took place on February 22-March 1, 2014. Meeting with President Obama and Vice President Biden on February 24, 2014, the President and Vice President urged Georgia to continue to advance the rule of law. They thanked Georgia for supporting the United States in international affairs, expressed appreciation for Georgia's contribution to NATO operations in Afghanistan, reaffirmed U.S. support for Georgia's territorial integrity, expressed "unwavering support" for Georgia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations, and discussed opportunities to increase trade and investment in Georgia. The U.S.-Georgia Strategic Partnership Commission and its working groups met on February 26 to discuss cooperation goals for 2014. Secretary Kerry, chairing the U.S. side, expressed appreciation to Prime Minister Garibashvili for Georgia's initialing of an Association Agreement with the European Union. The United States congratulated Georgia on a plan to enhance human rights, including those of minority populations. The two sides highlighted "solid achievements" in Georgia's defense reforms, including NATO interoperability and self-defense capabilities. The two sides discussed the potential of transforming the Northern Distribution Network for sending supplies into and out of Afghanistan into a post-2014 commercial trade network. The United States expressed support for Georgia's efforts to engage peacefully with the residents of the breakaway South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Both sides looked forward to the implementation of new projects funded by the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation. On economic issues, the United States praised Georgia's growing regional economic role, including its potential to become a regional trade and transportation hub. The two sides raised the hope of progress toward concluding a U.S.-Georgia free trade agreement. In remarks at a press conference, Secretary Kerry stated that "we stand by the Bucharest decision [by NATO] that Georgia will become a member of NATO. The United States will work to make sure that Georgia's progress is acknowledged by all members at this year's NATO Summit." Prime Minister Garibashvili stated that Georgia considers the United States as its "foremost partner.... We are united first and foremost by the shared values between the two nations. And I do believe that our existing and prospective avenues of partnership are destined to succeed." Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia are located south of the Caucasus Mountains that form part of Russia's borders (see Figure 1 ). The South Caucasus states served historically as a north-south and east-west trade and transport "land bridge" linking Europe to the Middle East and Asia, over which the Russian Empire and others at various times endeavored to gain control. In ancient as well as more recent times, oil and natural gas resources in Azerbaijan attracted outside interest. The regional peoples can point to periods of past autonomy or self-government. After the Russian Empire collapsed in 1917, all three states declared independence, but by early 1921 all had been re-conquered by Russia's Red (Communist) Army. They regained independence when the Soviet Union collapsed at the end of 1991. By the end of 1991, the United States had recognized the independence of all the former Soviet republics. The United States pursued close ties with Armenia, because of its profession of democratic principles, and concerns by Armenian Americans and others over its fate. The United States pursued close ties with Georgia after Eduard Shevardnadze (formerly a pro-Western Soviet foreign minister) assumed power there in early 1992. Faced with calls in Congress and elsewhere for a U.S. aid policy for the Eurasian states, then-President George H. W. Bush sent the FREEDOM Support Act to Congress; it was signed with amendments into law in October 1992 ( P.L. 102-511 ). Appropriations under the authority of the FREEDOM Support Act are currently included in the State Department's Economic Support Funds (ESF), Global Health Programs (GHP), and International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) accounts. U.S. policy toward the South Caucasus states has included promoting the resolution of conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Azerbaijan's breakaway Nagorno Karabakh (NK) region and between Georgia and its breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (resolving these latter conflicts became much more difficult following the August 2008 conflict; see " The August 2008 Russia-Georgia Conflict ," below). Since 1993, U.S. emissaries have been detailed to try to settle these conflicts. Congressional concerns about the NK conflict led to the inclusion of Section 907 in the FREEDOM Support Act, which prohibits U.S. government-to-government assistance to Azerbaijan, except for non-proliferation and disarmament activities, until the President determines that Azerbaijan has taken "demonstrable steps to cease all blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and NK." Provisions in FY1996, FY1998, and FY1999 legislation eased the prohibition by providing for humanitarian, democratization, and business aid exemptions. In 2002, waiver authority was enacted (see below, " Regional Responses after the September 11 "). Some observers argue that developments in the South Caucasus are largely marginal to U.S. strategic interests. They urge great caution in adopting policies that will heavily involve the United States in a region beset by ethnic and civil conflicts, and some argue that, since the European Union has recognized the region as part of its "neighborhood," it rightfully should play a major role. Some observers argue that the U.S. interest in democratization and human rights should not be subordinated to interests in energy and anti-terrorism. Other observers believe that the United States should be more actively engaged in the region. They urge greater U.S. aid and conflict resolution efforts to contain warfare, crime, smuggling, and Islamic extremism and to bolster the independence of the states. Some argue that such enhanced U.S. relations also would serve to "contain" Russian and Iranian influence and that close U.S. ties with Azerbaijan could benefit U.S. relations with other Islamic countries. They also point to the prompt support offered to the United States by the regional states in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks by Al Qaeda on the United States. Some argue that energy resources in the Caspian region are a central U.S. strategic interest, because Azerbaijani and Central Asian oil and natural gas deliveries could somewhat lessen Western energy dependency on Russia and the Middle East (see below, " Economic Interests "). In his annual worldwide threat assessment, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper testified in late January 2014 that Georgia's new president and prime minister face challenges from a declining economy. Also, the prosecution of former government officials threatens to further polarize politics. While tensions with Russia have eased, reducing the threat of conflict, core disputes, including the status of Georgia's breakaway South Ossetia and Abkhazia, remain unlikely to be resolved. He assessed the chance of renewed Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over the breakaway NK as low, but also viewed the prospects for a peace settlement as dim. Azerbaijan is continuing to build up its military forces to give it a decisive advantage, and Armenia has a strong interest in maintaining the status quo, since ethnic Armenians control NK and surrounding territories. He cautioned, however, that a miscalculation could occur (perhaps implying renewed conflict), given the close proximity of military forces and the frequency of ceasefire violations. The United States has endeavored to reassure Azerbaijan that it continues to be a "strategic partner" in counter-terrorism cooperation and energy security and has appeared to balance these U.S. interests against its concerns about democratization in Azerbaijan. According to some observers, relations between the United States and Azerbaijan had cooled after the Administration supported efforts in 2009-2010 by Armenia and Turkey to improve relations that Azerbaijan opposed (see below, " The Armenia-Turkey Protocols of 2009 ") and after President Aliyev was not invited to the U.S. Nuclear Security Summit in April 2010. Also, according to this view, Azerbaijan may have pursued closer working relations with Russia in the wake of the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict, which showed that Russia remained a major power in the region. While Azerbaijan may have followed such policies, it continued troop support for NATO operations in Afghanistan (see below, " Regional Support for Military Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan ") and played a significant role as part of the Northern Distribution Network for the transit of U.S. and NATO supplies to and from Afghanistan. Also, Azerbaijan continued to plan to step up gas supplies to Europe.