On May 5, 2010, President Obama transmitted the text of a renewal of the U.S.-Australian civilian nuclear cooperation agreement to Congress for approval, along with the required Nuclear Proliferation Assessment (NPAS) and his determination that the agreement would promote U.S. national security. The annexed classified NPAS was to be submitted separately. The renewal agreement would replace the agreement in force from July 5, 1979, and expiring on January 16, 2011. The new agreement has an initial term of 30 years from the date of entry into force, and would continue in force for periods of five years each, unless terminated by either party. According to President Obama's letter of transmittal, the agreement meets all the terms of the Atomic Energy Act and therefore does not require any exemptions from the law's requirements. Therefore, the agreement will enter into effect after a 30-day consultation period and a review period of 60 days of continuous session, unless Congress enacts a joint resolution of disapproval. This period began on May 5, 2010. Congress also has the option of adopting either a joint resolution of approval with (or without) conditions or standalone legislation that could approve or disapprove the agreement. The required congressional review period was reached on December 3, 2010, allowing for entry into force of the agreement. Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.) governs significant nuclear cooperation between the United States and other states. The United States has agreements for civil nuclear cooperation in place with almost 50 countries. Such agreements, known as "123 agreements," provide the framework and authorization for cooperation, but do not guarantee certain exports, technology, or material. Before significant nuclear exports can occur, the State Department, with the advice of the Department of Energy, negotiates an agreement, which must meet criteria listed in Section 123.a., (1) through (9), 42 U.S.C. 2151. The agreement permits the export, subject to licensing, of information, material, equipment, and components for nuclear research and nuclear power production. The agreement does not permit transfer of restricted data, sensitive nuclear facilities, or major critical components of those facilities. Sensitive nuclear technology may be transferred only if the agreement is amended. The agreement does not allow for enrichment of uranium transferred under the agreement to levels of 20% U-235 or greater unless mutually agreed. The previous agreement also did not allow for this. In accordance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act (NNPA) of 1978, the United States must approve of enrichment of any nuclear material exported from the United States to Australia. The 2010 agreement modifies the 1979 agreement by expanding the scope of cooperation to cover nuclear forensics and allows the transfer of nuclear material for radioisotope production. It also updates the physical security requirements to reflect current international standards. Uranium from Australia makes up 13% of U.S. uranium supplies. Renewal of the 123 agreement with Australia is necessary for continuing this cooperation. Having an agreement in place also facilitates Australia's export of uranium to countries where it will be used in a reactor with U.S. technology. Congress may consider Australia's role in developing multilateral nuclear fuel cycle services or assurances. Australia's strong bilateral relationship with the United States, political stability, and geographic location could be advantageous to the development of multilateral nuclear fuel facilities. Enrichment technology developed in Australia has been transferred to the United States and is classified by both countries. In the event that Australia reverses current policy and decides to build a uranium enrichment plant on its territory, it would face several obstacles, and the United States would have to reconcile its policies. Uranium enrichment technology holders have committed to a ban on the export of enrichment technology until the Nuclear Suppliers Group decides on criteria for future transfers. It appears that Australia would qualify for transfer under this criteria, but enrichment plants would be a black box or turnkey facility. This type of transfer would be consistent with current U.S. policy. Australian officials have also noted additional concerns, such as cost and finding a local government willing to host a commercial enrichment plant. As noted above, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 provides for congressional review of proposed civilian nuclear cooperation agreements. The review comprises two periods of continuous session, one 30 days and one 60 days. The agreement with Australia meets AEA requirements; therefore, it enters into force after the review period is complete, absent congressional action. The required review period was reached on December 3, 2010, and the agreement entered into force without further action. Members of Congress expressed approval for the agreement on several occasions. On June 15, 2010, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Howard Berman and Ranking Member Ileana Ros-Lehtinen introduced H.J.Res. 88 , which provided for the approval of the U.S.-Australia agreement. The House Foreign Affairs Committee held a hearing on September 24, 2010, about nuclear cooperation agreements, including the renewal agreement with Australia. Questions regarding the congressional calendar in fall 2010 raised concerns that the 90-day period for congressional review of the U.S.-Australian renewal agreement would not be met. In that case, four scenarios would have been possible for approval for the agreement: (1) re-submittal of the agreement in the 112 th Congress; (2) passage of a joint resolution of approval that would include language that waived the required 90-day review period; (3) separate legislation approving the agreement with language to waive the 90-day requirement; (4) changes to the congressional calendar so that the lame duck session would contain enough days for the 90-day review period to lapse. Congress could also have passed a joint resolution of disapproval or include its disapproval in separate legislation. Senator Richard Lugar introduced a bill, "To provide for the approval of the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Australia Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy" ( S. 3844 ), on September 27, 2010. Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen introduced the companion bill, H.R. 6411 , on November 16, 2010. The House passed H.R. 6411 by voice vote on November 30, 2010. S. 3844 and H.R. 6411 would have approved the agreement notwithstanding the congressional review requirements of section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act. Other provisions of the AEA would apply. This bill would have had the agreement come into force on or after October 8, 2010. Notwithstanding the provisions for congressional consideration of a proposed agreement for cooperation in subsection d. of section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 ( 42 U.S.C. 2153 ), the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Australia Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, done at New York May 4, 2010, may become effective on or after October 8, 2010, as if all the requirements in such section 123 for consideration of such agreement had been satisfied, subject to subsection (b) of this section. (b) Applicability of Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and Other Provisions of Law.—Upon coming into effect, the agreement referred to in subsection (a) shall be subject to the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 ( 42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.) and any other applicable United States law as if such agreement had come into effect in accordance with the requirements of section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The context for discussion of U.S.-Australian civilian nuclear cooperation is one set inside a very strong alliance relationship between the United States and Australia that stems from the two nations' shared democratic values, cultural and historic ties, and strategic outlook. According to U.S. Ambassador to Australia Jeffrey Bleich, "the relationship between the United States and Australia is one of our strongest and most productive international alliances. It is a bond solidified during the Pacific battles of World War II and strengthened over the ensuing decades." The President's National Security Strategy document describes Australia, along with our other allies in Asia, as the "bedrock of security in Asia and a foundation of prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region." The Australia New Zealand United States (ANZUS) treaty was signed in 1951 and entered into force in 1952. A key aspect of the alliance with Australia today is the annual Australia-U.S. Ministerial (AUSMIN) meetings. These consultations have been held since 1985 and are attended by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State from the United States, as well as the Australian Defense Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. The United States and Australia conduct joint combined military training exercises, have exchange officers in each others' armed forces, and work to standardize equipment and operational doctrine. In recent years, Australia invoked the ANZUS Treaty after the attacks on the United States in 2001, and Australian troops fought with U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. Australia has the largest non-NATO military contingent in Afghanistan and fought alongside the United States in Vietnam, Korea, World War II, and World War I, as well as in Iraq and Afghanistan. Australia has also played a key role in promoting regional stability in places such as Timor Leste, the Solomon Islands, and Bougainville. The United States and Australia have a very close intelligence relationship. The United States and Australia also concluded a Free Trade Agreement, which came into force in 2005. The two nations signed a Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty in 2007 that would facilitate the trade of defense-related equipment and technology. The U.S. Senate has not yet voted on ratification of this treaty. For all of the above reasons, and others, the United States and Australia share a special relationship that includes a high degree of trust. Australia also is a strong partner to the United States in nonproliferation policy.