Directing the use of nuclear weapons is surely the gravest decision a President can make. The process established for the President to perform this function is "Nuclear Command andControl" (NC2). NC2 is defined as the exercise of authority and direction by the President,as Commander in Chief, through established command lines, over nuclear weapon operations ofmilitary forces; as Chief Executive over all Government activities that support those operations; and,as Head of State over required multinational actions that support those operations. (1) The infrastructure that supports the President and his Unified Command Commanders inexercising this authority is the Nuclear Command and Control System (NCCS). (2) The NCCS is defined as: The designated combination of flexible and enduringelements including facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, personnel, and the structurein which these elements are integrated, all of which are essential for planning, directing, andcontrolling nuclear weapon operations of military forces and the activities that support thoseoperations. The purpose of the NCCS shall be to provide the President with all capabilities requiredto exercise his authority over nuclear weapons operations. (3) The NCCS supports the President's constitutional responsibilities as Commander in Chiefand is part of Continuity of Government activities, and so may warrant Congressional oversight andinterest. Congress, when authorizing and appropriating funds and in its oversight role, reviewsDepartment of Defense's (DOD's) plans to sustain and modernize the NCCS. In the past, DOD hasconducted reviews of nuclear posture and systems and communicated those findings to thelegislative branch. (4) Increased momentum to implement the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) findings, as well as thepublication of DOD's 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), could provide an opportunity forCongress to revisit the structure and future relevance of the NCCS. Today's NCCS architecture still largely bears a shape that stems from its Cold War origins,despite the 14 years since the dissolution of the USSR. However, as the threat from Russia haswaned, some analysts see the potential for nuclear challenges from China, North Korea, or Iran,which could drive a continued need for robust NC2, but possibly with a structure different fromtoday. Other analysts note that the addition of non-nuclear responses and active defenses advocatedby the 2001 NPR could drive additional complex requirements. Further, the individual platformsthat make up the NCCS serve in secondary roles that give other user agencies equities in continuedsupport for legacy systems. These equities will need to be reconciled with the recommendationsfrom the 2006 QDR to retire some of these Cold War platforms. Despite its strategic and budgetary implications, the NCCS is often not well understood andreceives little attention from outside the military establishment. This report will describe NCCSplatforms and functions, discuss the current role of the NCCS in light of the 2001 NPR and 2006QDR, examine current issues related to the role of the NCCS from both process and technologyperspectives, and review proposed modernization initiatives. The lead elements of the NCCS form the National Military Command System (NMCS). TheNMCS is "the priority component of the Global Command and Control System designed to supportthe Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff in the exercise of their responsibilities." (5) It provides the NationalCommand Authorities (NCA) (6) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) withcommand and control of the armed forces, both nuclear and conventional. (7) The NMCS includes thefollowing command nodes and supporting components: Figure 1. National Military Command System Nodes Source: "National Command & Control: The National Military Command System (NMCS),"October 2001, at http://www.afcea.org/education/briefs/lublinoct2001.ppt . National Military Command Center (NMCC) . The NMCC is the primary location for national command and control on a day to day basis. Thiscenter is staffed around-the-clock, and each "watch team" is led by a General or Admiral, known asthe "Deputy Director for Operations." Located in a shielded room in the Pentagon, the NMCC isresponsible for monitoring nuclear forces and ongoing conventional military operations, and can beaugmented by additional response cells in the event of a crisis. (8) National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC). If ground based command centers are destroyed, the NAOC can serve as a survivable airbornebackup to the NMCC's command and control capabilities. A NAOC aircraft is always on alert, andthe mobility of this airborne platform contributes to its survivability. The NAOCs are a fleet ofmodified Boeing 747-200B aircraft, each of which can include a crew of up to 114 people, and arebased at Offutt AFB in Nebraska. Its communications, which include both Extremely HighFrequency (EHF) and Very Low Frequency-Low Frequency (VLF/LF) links, are hardened againstElectromagnetic Pulse (EMP). Although the Joint Staff tasks the aircraft, U.S. Strategic Command(USSTRATCOM) (9) provides personnel and day-to-day administration, while the Air Force's Air Combat Commandserves as the program's resource manager. (10) Site-R . Located at Fort Ritchie, Maryland, Site-Rcan be activated from a "cold" status to serve as an alternate NMCC location. (11) USSTRATCOM Global Operations Center(GOC). Located underneath the USSTRATCOM Headquarters at Offutt AFB,Nebraska, the GOC can serve as a back up element to the NMCS for essential emergency actions. This center also serves as the command center for the USSTRATCOM Commander, one of thefour-star-general Unified Combatant Commanders, for the day-to-day management of his forces andfor providing situational awareness. The facility is protected against EMP, and has its ownemergency power supply to enable extended operations. This facility is staffed 24 hours a day, 365days a year, with each team led by a Senior Controller who is always a full Colonel (Air Force,Army, or Marine Corps) or Captain (Navy). (12) USSTRATCOM Airborne Command Post(ABNCP). Should the USSTRATCOM GOC be unable to fulfill its role, the E-6BABNCP can serve as a survivable airborne backup. The ABNCPs are a fleet of modified Boeing 707aircraft, each of which carries a crew of 22, which includes aircrew, communications operators, andbattlestaff personnel. Historically, each battle staff has been led by a General or Admiral, known asthe Airborne Emergency Action Officer (AEAO). This aircraft fulfills two additional key missions. As the Airborne Launch Control System (ALCS), the aircraft has the ability to communicate launchcodes directly to ICBM launch facilities to command launch, in the event that their launch controlcenters are unable to perform that function. Also, the E-6B can serve as the Take Charge And MoveOut (TACAMO) relay for Navy ballistic missile submarines. The airplane can deploy a2Â½-mile-long trailing wire antenna and communicate directives to the submarines over its VLF/LFsystem. In addition to the VLF/LF, the ABNCP can communicate using Ultra-High Frequency(UHF) or EHF satellite systems. While USSTRATCOM provides the battlestaff personnel, theaircraft, aircrew, and communications operators are from the Navy's Strategic Communications(STRATCOMM) Wing One, based at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma. (13) USSTRATCOM Mobile Consolidated Command Center(MCCC). The MCCC is a convoy of trucks that can deploy during a crisis to serveas a survivable road-mobile backup to the USSTRATCOM GOC or ABNCP. (14) The fundamental premise underlying nuclear command and control is that only the Presidentcan direct the use of nuclear weapons. (15) The Nuclear Command and Control System (NCCS) has evolvedto serve the President's requirements for advice and decision making for the strategic nuclear forces. Some of the major functions that the NCCS must perform include: (16) Situation Monitoring. The external military,political, or physical environment could signal upcoming events or shape the freedom of action ofdeterrence forces. Thus, the command elements must monitor strategic intelligence, both fromclassified means and from open sources, for indicators. Most of the NCCS centers include anintelligence cell that is linked to classified national intelligence systems. This capability can helpwith anticipating crises, although sometimes 24-hour news services such as CNN are the firstindicator. Situation monitoring can also include tracking the weather, which can affect aircraftoperations. Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment(TW/AA). Detecting and analyzing a potential attack is one of the mosttime-sensitive functions that contributes to the NCCS process. It is vital to verify quickly a missilelaunch and discern whether it is a false indication, a previously announced space launch, a potentialattack, or some other event. Next, determining the origin, size, and potential targets of the attackshould aid decision makers in shaping their response. To provide a high degree of certaintyregarding this critical information, the TW/AA centers rely on a concept called "dualphenomenology." Dual phenomenology means that two different systems, in this case satellites andradars, are used to verify an attack. Decision Making. Doctrine recommends that thePresident consult with senior commanders in making a decision to employ nuclear weapons.