Kyrgyzstan is a small and poor country that gained independence in 1991 with the breakupof the Soviet Union. (1) Itwas long led by Askar Akayev, who initially was widely regarded as a reformer but in recent yearsappeared increasingly autocratic. Despite this, the country was still considered "the most open,progressive and cooperative in Central Asia," according to the U.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopment. (2) TheUnited States has been interested in helping Kyrgyzstan to enhance its sovereignty and territorialintegrity, increase democratic participation and civil society, bolster economic reform anddevelopment, strengthen human rights, prevent weapons proliferation, and more effectively combattransnational terrorism and trafficking in persons and narcotics. The United States has pursued theseinterests throughout Central Asia, with special strategic attention to oil-rich Kazakhstan andregional-power Uzbekistan, and somewhat less to Kyrgyzstan. The significance of Kyrgyzstan tothe United States increased after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. TheU.S. military repaired and upgraded the air field at the Manas international airport for trans-shippingpersonnel, equipment, and supplies to support coalition operations in Afghanistan and the region. In early 2005, the base hosted about 800 U.S. and 100 Spanish troops. (3) Many people both inside and outside Kyrgyzstan were hopeful that the national legislativeelection on February 27, 2005 would strengthen political pluralism, easing the way for a peacefulhandover of executive power in late 2005 when President Akayev was expected to step down. Nearly 400 prominent politicians and businessmen and 40 parties (many united in blocs) ran for 75seats in the highly contentious race. Many in Kyrgyzstan thought it unseemly that the president'sand prime minister's children were running for seats, along with many other family members andfriends of high officials. Balloting resulted in the filling of less than half the seats, with run-offs heldon March 13 in districts where no one candidate received over 50% of the votes cast. On March 22,the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) announced that results for 71 districts were valid. Lessthan 10% of seats were won by opposition candidates, although there reportedly were many closeraces where they "lost" only by a few votes. These results incensed many in the opposition camp,who alleged massive vote fraud. An initial report by election observers from the Organization forSecurity and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Parliament fueled this discontent bystating that serious irregularities had taken place, including the questionable exclusion of severalopposition candidates from running, biased state-controlled media and other heavy government useof administrative resources, and problematic voter lists. (4) After opposition candidates won only two seats in the first round, opposition party-leddemonstrators called for a new election and for Akayev to resign. In southern Kyrgyzstan, protestorsstormed and occupied government facilities, including in the regional centers of Osh and Jalalabad. Many of these southerners (including a majority ethnic Uzbek community) viewed themselves asdiscriminated against both economically and politically by a central government dominated bynortherners. (5) Somecounter-demonstrations in support of the government also were reported. Protests widenedthroughout both the north and south in the wake of the March 13 run-off. Akayev hastily convenedthe new legislature immediately after the CEC announced voting results on March 22, and urged thepublic to focus on the upcoming planting season rather than a past election. He blamed foreignNGOs and religious extremists for the protests, and his spokesman warned that the unrest markedefforts by drug lords and terrorists to take power. Kyrgyzstan's capital Bishkek remained relatively calm until an opposition rally on March 23was successfully dispersed by police and armed Akayev supporters. The next day, thousands ofangry demonstrators converged on government offices. According to one account, a violent attackon the protesters by some of Akayev's supporters enraged the demonstrators and they stormed andoccupied the presidential and other offices. Akayev fled the melee and he and his family soon flewto Moscow. Akayev's prime minister resigned. The protesters released opposition party leaderFeliks Kulov from prison, where he had been held on embezzlement charges that many observershad deemed politically motivated. Going to the occupied compound, he hailed the "revolution madeby the people." (6) Indicative of the chaotic legal situation, the Kyrgyz Supreme Court on March 24 recognizedthe former legislature as still duly empowered. Deputies from the former legislature met that night. They were shocked by rampant looting in Bishkek, and appointed Kulov to oversee the Security,Interior (police), and Defense ministries. They also appointed opposition figure Kurmanbek Bakiyevacting prime minister, and the next morning named him acting president as well. Bakiyev quicklyproposed a provisional government composed of opposition politicians, most prominently RozaOtunbaeva as acting minister of foreign affairs; Adakhan Madumarov, acting deputy prime minister;and Azimbek Beknazarov, acting prosecutor-general (for further information on selected politicians,see the Appendix ). The old legislature wrangled with Bakiyev over the appointments, perhapsspurring him to decide to dispense with it and endorse the powers of the new legislature. Over the weekend, the Constitutional Court, Bakiyev, Kulov, and a newly appointed headof the CEC proclaimed that the new legislature was constitutionally legitimate and should beempowered, although granting that twenty or more district races might need to be held again. Thenew legislature met on March 28 and elected Omurbek Tekebayev as speaker and reaffirmedBakiyev as prime minister and acting president. The interim government has announced that apresidential election will take place on July 10, 2005. Akayev's formal resignation as president on April 4, 2005, was a major boost to thelegitimacy of the interim government. The resignation agreement called for Akayev to foreswearrunning for president again and for the new Kyrgyz authorities to respect existing law that grantsretired presidents immunity from prosecution. Russia pledged to assist the parties in honoring theircommitments. The Kyrgyz legislature accepted Akayev's resignation on April 11. Among early policy decisions, Bakiyev on March 29 stated that he would combat corruptionthat siphons away investment capital and compromises the educational and legal systems. He alsoannounced that personnel in the former government responsible for electoral fraud and attacks ondemonstrators would be prosecuted, and that some property belonging to the Akayev family mightbe confiscated. Both Bakiyev and Otunbayeva stressed that Kyrgyzstan's foreign policy would notchange, including its close relations with Russia and the United States and the presence of theirmilitary bases in the country. Observers remain divided on prospects for Kyrgyzstan, with some suggesting that it willcontinue to democratize because it has a relatively vibrant civil society, compared to the rest ofCentral Asia. Others are less optimistic, pointing to the economic development challenges facingKyrgyzstan and the high level of disaffection among its population. They also point to the socialfragility of a country where the north and south have differing interests and where even groundtransport back and forth is difficult during the winter because of mountainous terrain. The main division among the groups vying for power and influence during the late Marchevents appeared to be between pro-Akayev regional, clan, and family groups -- which togetherconstituted the political and economic elite -- and other regional, clan, and family groups that feltdeprived of their share of political and economic power. Ethnic issues appeared at least initially lesssignificant, since many ethnic Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan joined other southerners in topplingthe regime. However, ethnic tensions remain of concern. Beyond their anti-Akayev stance anddemands for redistributing political and economic power, the opposition parties mostly lackwell-developed policies and strategic plans for the future of Kyrgyzstan. Some observers have raisedconcerns that interim government leaders are engaging in nepotism and other corrupt practicesrather than combating them. Several commentators view the coup as involving two anti-regime groups, the dispossessedand the political opposition. To some degree, the former are younger and the latter are older. Theformer were the active agents in taking over government offices, and reportedly were motivatedmore by poverty and unemployment than by opposition politics. Otunbayeva stressed that "mainlypoor people" rather than party stalwarts stormed the government complex on March 24. Thesecommentators warn that if a new government fails to remedy economic distress, more violence couldoccur. (7) Other analystshave placed less credence on the "poor people" theory, suggesting that at least some of the politicalopposition may have planned to forcibly oust Akayev on March 24. (8) No one opposition leader appears to enjoy overwhelming public and elite support, althoughBakiyev's influence appears to have grown in recent months. (9) As was the case in Georgia,some of the most influential opposition leaders appear at least initially to be cooperating in runningthe government. However, the planned July presidential election appears to be accentuating tensionswithin the opposition camp, in particular between Bakiyev and Kulov.