Over the last few years, nowhere have tensions between the United States and its Europeanallies and friends been more evident than on a range of issues related to the Middle East. (1) These include Iraq, theIsraeli-Palestinian conflict, and Iran. Some worry that U.S.-European differences in combatingterrorism are growing wider. How best to approach the challenges posed by Syria may also figureprominently on the transatlantic agenda in the near future. Although the European countries are notmonolithic in their opinions with respect to the Middle East, views among them often tend to bemuch closer to each other than to those of the United States. This is largely because Europeanperspectives on the region have been shaped over time by common elements unique to Europe'shistory and geostrategic position. Some Bush Administration officials and Members of Congress are concerned that the recentvitriolic disputes between Washington and a number of European capitals on Middle East issuescould constrain U.S. policies, and erode the broader transatlantic relationship and U.S.-Europeancounterterrorism efforts in the longer term. The 9/11 Commission Report notes that nearly everyaspect of U.S. counterterrorism strategy relies on international cooperation, including with Europeangovernments and multilateral institutions such as NATO and the European Union (EU). Someprovisions in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 ( P.L. 108-458 ) seek toenhance international collaboration against terrorism. The Bush Administration has sought to mendtransatlantic relations in its second term, but U.S.-European policy differences over Middle Easternissues are likely to persist. Many analysts argue that the United States and Europe share common vital interests in theMiddle East: combating terrorism; halting proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD);promoting Middle East peace and stability; ensuring a reliable flow of oil; and curtailing Islamicextremism. These experts assert that the goals of U.S. and European policies toward these variouschallenges are not that far apart. Both sides of the Atlantic tend to emphasize different interests. Europe largely views the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the preeminent concern, believing it to be thekey source of regional instability that fuels terrorism, Islamic extremism, and domestic politicalunrest at home. In contrast, the Bush Administration stresses that terrorism and weaponsproliferation must be confronted to ensure U.S. national security, and that the conditions for peaceand stability in the Middle East will not be possible until these twin threats are removed. Thesedifferent perspectives often result in the employment of disparate tactics by the two sides of theAtlantic as they pursue their foreign policy agendas in the region. A combination of factors lie at the root of U.S.-European tensions on the Middle East. Theyinclude different histories, geography, and demographics; the nature of economic ties with theregion; somewhat divergent threat perceptions; and different views on the appropriate role of the useof force. Many analysts also suggest that current U.S.-European frictions over many Middle Eastissues are heightened on the one hand by European views of a unilateralist Bush Administration, andon the other by growing EU ambitions to play a larger role on the world stage. Europe's long and complex history with the Middle East shapes its views toward the regionin ways that are distinct from those of the United States. Europe's ancient religious crusades andmore recent colonial experiences in the Arab world still weigh heavily on its collective psyche, andproduce twin pangs of wariness and guilt. This wariness leads many Europeans, for example, tocaution Washington against overconfidence in its ability to win the battle for Arab "hearts andminds" through force, or to impose stability and democracy. Residual guilt about Europe'scolonialist past causes many of its citizens to identify with what they perceive as a struggle forPalestinian freedom against Israeli occupation; at the same time, the Holocaust engenders Europeansupport for the security of Israel, but Europeans believe this will only be ensured by peace with thePalestinians. Finally, Europe's own bloody history has produced a broad European aversion to theuse of force and a preference for solving conflicts diplomatically (see below). (2) Europeans claim that the Middle East is part of "Europe's neighborhood," and this proximitymakes the promotion of political and economic stability key to ensuring that problems in the regiondo not spill over into Europe. As examples, Europeans point to several incidents of terrorism ontheir soil over the last three decades stemming from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and recent wavesof migrants fleeing political instability and economic hardship. These new migrants add to Europe'salready sizable Muslim population of between 15 to 20 million, which has its roots in Europeanlabor shortages and immigration policies of the 1950s and 1960s that attracted large groups of Turks,North Africans, and Pakistanis. In contrast, the U.S. Muslim population is significantly smaller;estimates range from 4 to 8 million. (3) Moreover, Islam has become a vital force in European domesticpolitics. Some argue this makes European politicians more cautious about supporting U.S. policiesthat could inflame their own "Arab streets" and deepen divisions within European societiesstruggling to integrate growing Muslim populations amid rising anti-immigrant sentiments. Conversely, many analysts suggest that the politically well-organized Jewish community in theUnited States engenders stronger U.S. support for Israel. Europe's extensive economic ties with the Middle East have also received considerable publicattention as a key reason for differing U.S.-European approaches. The EU is the primary tradingpartner of the region. Although a substantial element of this trade is oil, and any changes in the priceor supply of oil would also affect the United States, overall European economic interests are moreintegrated with the region. EU exports to the Middle East, for example, are almost three times thesize of U.S. exports. (4) Some analysts argue that many European countries are primarily motivated by the need to protectthese commercial ties with the region, and often do so at the expense of security concerns. Otherspoint out that if such commercial interests were the drivers of French and German opposition to thewar in Iraq, then both countries would have served those interests better by supporting the U.S.-ledwar to guarantee a share of the post-Saddam Hussein spoils. Still, many experts agree that Europeancountries' extensive trade and economic ties with the region heighten their desires to maintain goodrelations with Arab governments and makes them wary about policies that could disrupt the normalflow of trade and oil. (5) Some observers assert that since the end of the Cold War, American and European threatperceptions have been diverging. Throughout the 1990s, U.S. policy makers often complained thatEurope was preoccupied with its own internal transformation, and largely blind to the newinternational threats posed by terrorism, weapons proliferation, and other challenges emanating fromthe Middle East. Some say the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 exacerbated this gap inU.S.-European threat perceptions. While Europeans view terrorism as a major threat, Americansperceive the threat as being much more severe. European officials assert that while some Europeanleaders, such as UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, see and worry about possible links between terroristgroups and weapons proliferators in the Mideast and elsewhere, the average European citizen doesnot. And in certain European countries like Germany, other issues -- such as the economy andpromoting stability in the nearby Balkans -- have taken precedence. (6) A number of analysts suggest,however, that the March 11, 2004, terrorist bombings in Madrid, Spain, have heightened Europeanperceptions of the threat of Islamist terrorism to Europe. One opinion poll from June 2004 foundthat Americans and Europeans now share broadly similar threat perceptions but differ sharply on theuse of force for managing such threats. (7) As a result of Europe's history both pre- and post-World War II, numerous observers suggestthat Europeans are more prone to emphasize multilateral solutions based on the international ruleof law. Many Europeans claim that it is precisely because they have abided by such rules andworked cooperatively together in institutions such as the United Nations and the European Union(and its progenitors) that they have enjoyed decades of unprecedented peace and prosperity. Combined with the devastation they inflicted on themselves and others in the first half of thetwentieth century, many Europeans -- especially Germans -- shy away from the use of force tomanage conflicts and place greater emphasis on "soft power" tools such as diplomatic pressure andforeign aid. They are wary of the use of preemptive force not sanctioned by the internationalcommunity. U.S. critic Robert Kagan calls it a "power problem," observing that Europe's militaryweakness has produced a "European interest in inhabiting a world where strength doesn't matter,where international law and international institutions predominate." (8) Most Europeans, however,reject this thesis. French and British officials in particular argue that they are not pacifists and citetheir roles in the NATO-led war in Kosovo and the U.S.-led military campaign against the Talibanin Afghanistan as just two examples. Many analysts believe that European perceptions of the Bush Administration as inclinedtoward unilateralism and largely uninterested in Europe are exacerbating current transatlantictensions over the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Before September 11, many European governmentswere critical of the Administration's position on international treaties such as the U.N. KyotoProtocol on climate change and its decision to proceed with missile defense. The terrorist attacksswept some of these contentious issues under the rug for a while, but U.S.-European frictionsreturned in early 2002. Many European leaders were alarmed by President Bush's characterizationof Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as an "axis of evil."