By all accounts, the U.S. military dominates state-on-state conflict. The United States has notfaced a true peer military competitor since the Soviet Union disintegrated. Recent conflicts, such asPanama, Libya, Iraq (Desert Storm) Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq (Iraqi Freedom) illustratethat U.S. armed forces have proven very effective at achieving classic military objectives againstother countries' armed forces in a variety of circumstances. Achieving politically significant militaryobjectives against non-state actors, including terrorists and insurgents, has proven moredifficult. (1) In the past, combating non-state actors was seen by many to be a "lesser included case. "Non-state actors appeared to be less threatening to national security than the well funded, wellorganized, and much more militarily potent armed forces of an enemy nation-state. If, for example,the U.S. military was deemed adequate to deter or defeat the Soviet military, then it was also deemedadequate to combat non-state actors. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 graphically illustrate, however, that small groupsof non-state actors can exploit relatively inexpensive and commercially available technology toconduct very destructive attacks over great distances. Few observers today consider non-state actorsto be a "lesser included case." Increasingly it is recognized that in many cases, combating non-stateactors presents a different -- and in many cases greater -- set of challenges than combating aconventional military foe. Senior decision makers have a number of tools at their disposal to attempt to find, identify,track, capture, neutralize, or kill terrorists and other non-state actors. A survey of recentanti-terrorism efforts indicates, that military aviation plays a prominent role in performing thesetasks. The issues for Congress include whether U.S. military aviation forces are appropriatelyfunded, trained, equipped, employed and organized to effectively combat non-state actors. As the Department of Defense (DOD) endeavors to revamp itself for the different demandsof the war in Iraq and the "global war on terror", (GWOT) friction will likely ensue over funding.Will the military services divert funding from major weapons programs such as combat aircraft andaircraft carriers to fund more terrorism-relevant technologies? Or will major programs continue asplanned, or be given additional funding to increase their abilities against non-state actors? The next section provides background on terrorism and non-state actor challenges, and howmilitary aviation may contribute to operations against these actors. The following section willaddress issues associated with the use of military aviation against non-state actors, and potentialoptions for consideration. The U.S. armed forces that are fielded today were organized, trained and equipped principallywith conventional, state-on-state warfare in mind. Senior leaders in the Department of Defense(DOD) appear to appreciate the distinct challenges that combating non-state actors present, however,and are taking steps to ensure that these challenges are reflected in long-term military plans,programs, and policies. In the spring of 2004, DOD's 2006 Strategic Planning Guidance found that the U.S. is wellpositioned to deal with a conventional military adversary. Increasingly, however, the U.S. may finditself facing non-conventional foes, for which it is not well prepared. (2) Further, it has been reportedthat DOD leadership has instructed regional combatant commanders to "develop and maintain newwar plans designed to reduce the chance of postwar instability like the situation in Iraq." (3) Based on these plans, somepredicted that the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) "could upend U.S. military procurementplans as Pentagon officials shift their focus from waging conventional warfare to developing newways to counter catastrophic, disruptive and irregular threats -- in a word, terrorism." (4) U.S. military forces may be employed against a country that sponsors terrorism or thatharbors terrorists. It is generally agreed that conventional U.S. military forces are adequately trainedand equipped to meet the challenge of defeating conventional forces of states that sponsor terrorism. The focus of this report is on a number of challenges associated with uses of military aviation incombating terrorists and other non-state actors directly. These challenges can be divided into threecategories: operational challenges, mindset challenges, and cost challenges. Operational challenges. Compared to thearmed forces of a nation state, non-state actors are easy to defeat in direct combat. Non-state actorstypically lack the equipment, training and discipline that define a military service. Actually engagingin direct combat with non-state actors is the core operational challenge. Non-state actors typicallydon't wear uniforms. Indeed, they generally strive to integrate themselves into the local civilianpopulation. Thus, target identification is very challenging. Non-state actors rarely mass into easilyrecognizable formations. They typically lack large infrastructure or obvious logistics processes.Therefore, non-state actors present few "high value" targets for U.S. forces. This challenge has notbeen lost on DOD leadership. For example: For many years, though, there's been a concern thatintelligence collection capability basically rested in the ability to find a tank or an artillery piecehiding in a grove of trees. The problem now becomes how to find individuals hiding in groups ofpeople...This presents a huge problem for us. (6) The leadership and structure of non-state organizations, such as Al Qaeda, are opaque. Suchorganizations might be diffuse and operate over long distances. Al Qaeda, for example, oftenoperates through partner organizations which might be small and have fluid leadership. One DODleader has said "When we kill or capture one of these leaders, another one steps in and quickly takestheir place." (7) Therefore,even characterizing the non-state actor target can be difficult for military planners. Once identified, non-state actors are often difficult to engage due to concerns over collateraldamage. Even conventional state-on-state conflict presents collateral damage concerns. When oneparty is actively trying to shield itself behind non-combatants, however, delivering weapons effectswith extreme precision takes on increased importance. A RAND study summed up the operationalchallenges: ...ferreting out individuals or small groups of terrorists,positively identifying them, and engaging them without harming nearby civilians is an extremelydemanding task. Substantial improvements will be needed in several areas before the Air Force canbe confident of being able to provide this capability to combatant commanders. (8) Mindset Challenges. Successfully combatingnon-state actors will likely require different training, tactics, doctrine, political strategies, andpotentially rules of engagement, than are optimal for conventional military warfare. Collectively,these changes may combine to require a different politico-military mindset for senior decisionmakers. The U.S. military, policy makers and the general population, desire short conflicts, with clearsuccess criteria, exit strategies, and decisive victories. In a conventional setting, "victory" typicallyentailed an adversary's unconditional surrender. But non-state actors may define victory as notlosing; their continued existence is a victory. This mindset characterizes several Palestinian terroristgroups that fought Israel's occupation of Palestinian territories. In most cases, they themselvescannot achieve rapid, decisive victory, so they follow a strategy of protracted war. According to onescholar "...insurgent, terrorist and criminal organizations consciously design themselves so that ourmilitary and police forces cannot rapidly and decisively defeat them." (9) Others note that "even dyingfor their cause intentionally or voluntarily is perceived as a victory (for terrorists). It's a differentparadigm than the traditional military concern for limiting casualties." (10) This is characteristic ofgroups such as Hamas and Al Qaeda that employ suicide tactics. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 may require, and may have already initiated, achange in mindset regarding what level of threat should trigger U.S. military action. Fear thatterrorists or other non-state actors, may acquire a weapon of mass destruction (a nuclear, biologicalor chemical weapon) has engendered debate on pre-emptive or preventative employment of U.S.armed forces. While many would support a pre-emptive attack to obviate an imminent attack on U.S.interests, the definition of what qualifies as "imminent" is highly debatable. (11) Further, preventinginsurgent victory over a friendly government may not be enough to prevent this threat. Instead, theUnited States will likely desire to prevent non-state actors from taking over large portions ofnation-states because these territories could be used to train terrorists and initiate attacks at globaldistances. The recent reported discovery of an insurgent chemical weapons lab in Fallujah, Iraq,exemplifies this threat. In a conventional warfare setting, armed forces typically attempt to avoid civilians or shieldthem from the war's consequences. When combating non-state actors, however, civilians may needto be engaged at an unprecedented level. Winning the "hearts and minds" of the local population, orat least not alienating them could become a large part of the overall counter insurgent, or counterterrorist strategy. Terrorists and insurgents require at least tacit, if not active, support from the local populationto operate effectively. In the words of one British general responsible for counter-insurgencyoperations "The shooting side of the business is only 25 percent of the trouble. The other 75 percentis getting the people of this country behind us." (12) However, the military activities at which today's armed forcesexcel, such as precisely destroying buildings or vehicles, may work counter to this "hearts andminds" strategy.