In the fall of 2011 and early 2012, the Obama Administration announced that it would be intensifying the U.S. role in the Asia-Pacific region. To do this, it intends to raise the region's priority in U.S. military planning, foreign policy, and economic policy. With U.S. troops gone from Iraq and poised to be drawn down in Afghanistan, Administration officials say they plan to "rebalance" U.S. attention toward planning for future challenges and opportunities, such as those represented in the Asia-Pacific region. As President Barack Obama stated in a November 2011 address to the Australian parliament, his goal is to ensure that "the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region [the Asia-Pacific] and its future." The ultimate goal, according to National Security Advisor Tom Donilon, is to promote U.S. interests by helping to shape the norms and rules of the Asia-Pacific region, to ensure that "international law and norms be respected, that commerce and freedom of navigation are not impeded, that emerging powers build trust with their neighbors, and that disagreements are resolved peacefully without threats or coercion." As part of its proclaimed "strategic turn" toward Asia, since the fall of 2011 the United States has, among other steps: announced new troop deployments to Australia, new naval deployments to Singapore, and new areas for military cooperation with the Philippines; stated that, notwithstanding reductions in overall levels of U.S. defense spending, the U.S. military presence in East Asia will be strengthened and be made "more broadly distributed, more flexible, and more politically sustainable"; released a new defense planning document that confirmed and offered a rationale for the rebalancing to Asia while retaining an emphasis on the Middle East; joined the East Asia Summit (EAS), one of the region's premier multinational organizations; and secured progress in negotiations to form a nine-nation Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement (FTA). The Administration's increased emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region appears to have been prompted by four major developments: the growing economic importance of the Asia-Pacific region, and particularly China, to the United States' economic future; China's growing military capabilities and its increasing assertiveness of claims to disputed maritime territory, with implications for freedom of navigation and the United States' ability to project power in the region; the winding down of U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan; and efforts to cut the U.S. federal government's budget, particularly the defense budget, which threaten to create a perception in Asia that the U.S. commitment to the region will wane. Many aspects of the "Pacific Pivot" represent an expansion rather than a transformation of U.S. policy. The Obama Administration follows a long line of U.S. governments that, since the end of World War II, has sought to underpin stability and security in the Asia-Pacific by maintaining a large troop presence in East Asia and by involving the United States in most major diplomatic developments in the region. The level of continuity in the "pivot" may help ensure that the U.S. emphasis on the Asia-Pacific will continue regardless of the outcome of the 2012 U.S. presidential election. A number of the Obama Administration's discrete initiatives build on previous actions, so much so that some observers argue that the Administration has overstated the depth and extent of its "pivot." For instance, in the military sphere, the Administration is accelerating and expanding policies undertaken under President George W. Bush to intensify the U.S. focus on the southern and western parts of the region by carrying out operations there mainly through rotational deployments rather than through deployments of permanent bases. The Obama Administration is also expanding Bush-era initiatives such as strengthening relations with existing allies in Asia; negotiating the TPP; and forging new partnerships with India, Indonesia, and Vietnam. The "rebalancing" to the Asia-Pacific also represents a deepening of the Obama Administration's efforts, begun in 2009, to upgrade U.S. diplomatic visibility and presence in the Asia-Pacific. Perhaps most notably, since 2009, the Administration has consistently given considerable time and emphasis to Southeast Asia and to regional multilateral institutions. Prior to President Obama taking office, many Southeast Asian leaders in the region felt they had been neglected by the United States. The Administration's increased emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region appears to be more of a change in means (i.e., the level of resources and leadership attention devoted to this part of the world) than a change in policy goals. Fundamental U.S. interests in the region—including stability, freedom of navigation, the free flow of commerce, the promotion of democracy and human rights—are essentially unchanged. Moreover, underlying much of the Obama Asia-Pacific policy is the longstanding challenge of managing tensions in Sino-U.S. relations while seeking to deepen China's integration into the international community. That said, there are at least three broad new features of U.S. policy that are worth emphasizing: new military priorities and deployments; an arguably more integrated and region-wide approach to the Asia-Pacific; and a vision of the region's geography to include the Indian Ocean. The highest-profile new initiatives lie in the security sphere. (See Text Box.) The planned deployments of troops and equipment to Australia and Singapore represent an expanded U.S. presence. Moreover, the pledge that reductions in defense spending will not come at the expense of the Asia-Pacific or the Middle East signals the Administration's desire to reorient the Department of Defense's (DOD's) priorities. The most obvious implication, subsequently reflected in the DOD's January 2012 "Strategic Guidance," has been to minimize cuts in the size of the Navy, with reductions focused instead on Army and Marine ground forces. With the exception of the Korean Peninsula, Asia is seen mainly as a naval theater of operations, and the decision not to cut the Navy as sharply as other services reflects a shift in priorities that is unusual in year-to-year defense planning. The Defense Department is complementing these changes with perhaps equally far-reaching shifts in military-technological priorities in the U.S. defense posture, aimed at responding to potential future challenges as conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan recede. A number of initiatives are relevant to assessments of potential challenges in Asia, in general, and from China in particular. Among other things, the Defense Department's Strategy Review endorsed the continued deployment of 11 aircraft carriers and reemphasized efforts to improve capabilities to defeat what planners describe as "Area Denial/Anti-Access" strategies, which are known to be a focus for China's military. A second new dynamic is the way the various new and old military, diplomatic, and economic initiatives have been presented as parts of one package. The implication is that going forward, the United States will aim to have a much more integrated approach to the region, in which the various tools of power and influence are utilized in a more deliberate and coherent fashion. As of mid-March 2012, there were few outward signs of greater internal policy coordination, though this could be attributable to the absence of any major region-wide meetings or issues. In the Administration's FY2013 budget proposal, the White House, Defense Department, and State Department do appear to have worked to spare the Asia-Pacific from most of the deeper programmatic cuts that were experienced by other regions. Another new element to the Obama Administration's policy is the inclusion of the coastal areas of South Asia in the geographic scope of the "Pacific pivot," because of the strategic importance of the energy resources and trade that pass through the Indian Ocean and the Straits of Malacca before reaching the manufacturing centers of East Asia. East Asia and South Asia have often been conceived as distinct strategic sub-regions of Asia, but an estimated 50% of world container traffic and 70% of ship-borne oil and petroleum transit the Indian Ocean, the vast majority on its way to East Asia. Increasing strategic rivalry between China and India also serves to bring these Asian sub-regions into a larger Asia-wide strategic dynamic. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Kurt Campbell has described the task of operationally making the linkage between the Indian and Pacific Oceans as "the next challenge" of U.S. strategic thinking. Although the Administration's increased emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region does not seem to represent a new global strategy, it does potentially mark an important signal of new priorities in several policy areas. It appears that the Administration did not consult deeply with Congress prior to deciding on and announcing these changes. As discussed below, the Administration's "rebalancing" poses several potential oversight and appropriations questions for Congress related to U.S. military, diplomatic, and economic policies, and for the role of Congress as a partner with the executive branch in the determination of U.S. strategy (see in particular the " Implications for Congress " section below). As with any assertion of a new strategy, the "rebalancing" toward the Asia-Pacific will produce a number of foreseeable benefits and risks. The latter are likely to be brought into sharp relief by ongoing efforts to reduce the federal government's debt and budget deficit. Underlying the "pivot" is the Administration's belief that the center of gravity for U.S. foreign policy, national security, and economic interests is shifting towards Asia, and that U.S. strategy and priorities need to be adjusted accordingly. Since 2000, Asia has become the United States' largest source of imports and second-largest export market after the North America region. (See Table 1 .)