U.S. assistance to Colombia, virtually all of it related to counternarcotics efforts, has increased steadily sinceFY1995 (see Tables 1 and 6 ). The United States hasprovided equipment, supplies, and other aid for the counternarcotics efforts, initially largely to the ColombianNational Police (CNP), but recently increasingly tothe Colombian military. As of FY2000, more is being provided to the military. Most of the funding has supportedthe tracking, interdiction and arrest oftraffickers, the destruction of laboratories, and eradication efforts. Of pre-Plan Colombia assistance, a small amountsupported reforms to the judicial system, andalternative development. This amount was increased greatly in the Plan Colombia legislation. The State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) has been the primary agency in counternarcotics efforts. INL runs the airwing which supplies aircraft for the narcotics crop eradication program in South America, in which Colombia isa major participant. INL also coordinates theactivities of other civilian agencies, such as the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Agency forInternational Development, and the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation (FBI), providing them with funds from the State Department's International Narcotics Control (INC)account. These agencies have worked withColombia's judicial system to improve law enforcement capabilities, criminal justice procedures, and theaccessibility and fairness of the justice system. Theyalso have assisted Colombia's eradication and interdiction efforts. The Department of Defense (DOD) also has been a major source of funding and support for Colombian counternarcotics efforts, mainly through programs whichare not considered "traditional foreign aid" programs. (1) Under defense legislation, DOD provides support for efforts to detect and monitor illicit narcoticsoperations, principally the maintenance of five radar sites in Colombia. DOD also conducts surveillance overflightsfrom locations outside Colombia. During1999, DOD helped establish, train and equip the first special Colombian Army counternarcotics battalion (CACB)of some 950 troops, which commencedoperations towards the end of that year. (2) Thebattalion was set up to conduct its own CN missions, as well as to provide security for the police counternarcoticsforces in their operations. DOD also sponsors a riverine CN program, training personnel of the Colombian Navyand Marines to control narcotics traffickingalong Colombia's extensive network of rivers. (3) Thenumbers of U.S. uniformed military personnel assisting in these efforts has varied in the low hundreds. The U.S. military and other agencies also have provided other support to the Colombian military and police. Through Section 506 (a) of the Foreign AssistanceAct of 1961, as amended, DOD and other agencies (see Tables 1 and 6 ) have provided substantialamounts of equipment to the Colombian military and police. (4) In addition, the United States has funded the construction of the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) at TresEsquinas in southwest Colombia to strengthen police andmilitary intelligence gathering and analysis capabilities, and to encourage them to share intelligence. Many of the critics of military assistance have argued that although the aid is provided for counternarcotics purposes, it can be used to further counterinsurgencyefforts. News reports in the summer of 1998 alleged that the United States had provided covert assistance to theColombian military for counternarcotics andcounterinsurgency operations, including the participation of active duty military personnel and private contractors. (5) At the same time, the press reported thepresence of U.S. special operations forces who were training with Colombian military units under the JointCombined Exchange Training program (U.S.C. Title10, Section 2011), (6) which some interpreted asproviding de facto counterinsurgency aid. Although the Clinton Administration denied that the United States was providing counterinsurgency assistance, analysts acknowledged that some types of U.S.counternarcotics training provide lessons that can also be applied to counterinsurgency operations. The ClintonAdministration had also held that assistanceprovided to police and military forces in operations targeted at guerrilla drug production or protection activities fitwithin the definition of counternarcotics aid. InMarch 1999, however, the Clinton Administration expanded the conditions under which it provided intelligenceto Colombian security forces, routinely providinga Colombian police-military Joint Task Force with intelligence information related to the guerrillas. Although theUnited States provided the information to assistwith counternarcotics operations, the General Accounting Office reported that the U.S. Embassy in Colombia didnot have a system to ensure that the informationwas used only for counternarcotics purposes. (7) Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Colombia, FY1999-FY2001 (Obligations and authorizations, $ millions) Sources : General Accounting Office (GAO -01-26), Department of State, Congressional BudgetJustification for Foreign Operations for FY2001; U.S. Agencyfor International Development Budget Justification for FY2001, Annex IV; and information provided by Department of State and Department of Defenseofficials. This chart includes direct U.S. foreign assistance (i.e., the categories usually counted as U.S. foreign aid,which are in italics), as well as the costs of goods and services provided to Colombia from other U.S. government programs supporting counternarcotics effortsin Colombia. The United States alsoprovides a small amount of DOD Excess Defense Articles (EDA) to Colombia. Other funds are spent in Colombiaon counternarcotics and other activities thatare considered part of U.S. programs: for instance, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) spends its ownfunds on joint operations in Colombia. Figureson FY2000 and FY2001 State Department INC funding provided January 10-11, 2001. Figures on DOD Sections1004, 124, 1004/124, and 1033 fundingprovided June 29, 2001; some $10.9 million of funds in the DOD accounts was planned for an FY2001 obligation,but as of July 5, 2001 had not actually beenobligated. * DOD Sections 124, 1004, and 1033 funding is taken from regional accounts and the tentative allocations forColombia can be shifted to respond to developingneeds in other areas. (Section 124 covers U.S. operated radar systems in Colombia and elsewhere, and other costsof U.S. detection and monitoring of drugflights.) a For FY1999, includes $173.2 million in Congressionally-mandated supplemental appropriationsfunding for helicopters, helicopter and aircraft upgrades, radar,and police assistance. FY2000 non-DOD Plan Colombia supplemental funds were all assigned to the StateDepartment INC account; the State Department istransferring them to the other agencies carrying out programs in Colombia with those funds. b The AID FY1999 figure includes $10.0 million in disaster relief funding and $3.0 million inEconomic Support Funds (ESF). AID pipeline funding of $5.0million in development funding authorized in previous years was expended in FY1999. The AID FY2000 andFY2001 figures are all ESF. These AID figures donot include funds provided to AID from the INC account. c FMF pipeline funding of $13 million authorized prior to FY1995 and funding available from theFY1995 FMF authorization was intended to be expended frommid-FY1997 through FY1999. As presented to the 106th Congress, initially on January 11, 2000, and then with the annual budget request on February 7, 2000, the Clinton Administration aidproposal to support the Colombian government's "Plan Colombia" contained over $954 million in supplementalFY2000 funding and over $318 million forFY2001 spending. (This was in addition to about $150 million allocated and planned for existing programs in eachfiscal year.) The proposal's centerpiece wasthe "Push into Southern Colombia" program, which was intended to enable the Colombian government to extendCN activities throughout southern Colombia. There, coca cultivation was expanding rapidly throughout areas where the Colombian guerrillas have operated. Thecore of the Southern Colombia programincluded training and equipping two new army CN battalions, and purchasing Blackhawk and Huey helicopters totransport them. According to DOD sources, thetwo new battalions could complete training for operations within seven months of the date funding was approved;the Black Hawk helicopters requested for theirtransportation could be provided, and pilots trained to operate them, about 18 months from the funding date. Totalfunding for the Southern Colombia (SC)program requested by the Administration was $512 million in FY2000 and $88 million in FY2001. Of this, AIDwould receive $31 million to resettle and fundalternative economic opportunities for peasants who would be deprived of their livelihood by operations in SouthernColombia. The remaining proposedassistance, to be administered by six agencies, was divided into five other categories: (1) drug traffickinginterdiction, (2) improving CNP eradication capabilities,(3) economic development, (4) "boosting government capacity," i.e., funding to support human rights monitors andimprove the justice system and the rule of law;and (5) other economic assistance and assistance for the peace process. According to Administration sources, the Push into Southern Colombia program was the first part of a planned six-year counternarcotics effort. In testimonybefore the House Armed Services Committee on March 23, 2000, Gen Charles E. Wilhelm, Commander in Chiefof the U.S. Southern Command, outlined asix-year plan for attacking the cultivation and production of illegal narcotics. He testified that the efforts in SouthernColombia are the first phase of a three phasecounternarcotics plan of the Colombian security forces.