FAA, the air carriers, and the airport operators share the responsibilities for aviation security. FAA is responsible for assessing threats, such as terrorism, to the aviation system and determining the procedures and equipment that will most effectively deter these threats. FAA’s regulations prescribe the security responsibilities of air carriers and airport operators. The air carriers and airport operators are responsible for complying with the regulations and procedures. The air carriers are responsible for screening all passengers and baggage, hiring and training their employees or contracting for screening services, and procuring equipment to screen passengers and baggage. The screening of passengers and baggage is a critical element in FAA’s strategy against terrorism. FAA’s regulations provide basic standards for the screeners, equipment, and procedures to be used in screening operations. The airport operators are responsible for providing secure airport facilities and providing local law enforcement support relating to air carrier and airport security measures. The funding of the security operations is divided among FAA, the air carriers, and the airport operators. FAA is responsible for paying the salaries and costs associated with its oversight of air carrier and airport security programs, including security inspections of screening operations at airports, and for aviation security research and development activities. FAA’s aviation security budget for fiscal year 1999 includes $100 million for purchasing and deploying advanced explosives detection equipment to selected airports, $52 million for research and development, and $123 million for operations. Air carriers are responsible for paying for the security personnel and checkpoint screeners, screening equipment, such as X-ray machines and metal detectors, and the operation and maintenance costs of that equipment. Airport operators are responsible for paying for law enforcement officers, access control systems, and perimeter fences and lighting. Currently, airport operators can fund certain security functions, such as perimeter fencing, with funds from FAA’s Airport Improvement Program. Both the White House Commission and the Congress recognized the need to improve screeners’ performance. The Commission’s initial report in September 1996 made 20 specific recommendations for improving security, one of which was the development of uniform standards for the selection, training, certification, and recertification of screening companies and their employees. Following this report, the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act mandated that FAA (1) study and report on the current security responsibilities at airports and the potential sources of funding for these activities, (2) certify screening companies, and (3) improve the training and testing of security screeners through the development of performance standards for security-screening services. While FAA currently has training and testing requirements for screeners, it does not have a requirement that screening companies be certified. FAA issued the report required under section 301 of the Reauthorization Act of 1996 on January 5, 1999, about 2 years after the date mandated in the act. FAA’s report concludes that there should be no change to the current system of shared aviation security responsibilities among FAA, the air carriers, and the airport operators or to the current funding sources for aviation security. FAA did not meet the January 9, 1997, deadline established by section 301 of the Reauthorization Act for submitting its report to the Congress. In a letter dated January 21, 1997, FAA informed the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation that because the act directed FAA to consider the findings of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security and because of the time required to complete analytical work, FAA was unable to meet the January 9, 1997, deadline and expected to release its report in April 1997. The report was delivered to the Congress in January 1999. FAA officials said the report was delayed because of the complex issues involved and the need to consider the findings of numerous groups that have studied these issues. FAA’s report is based, in part, on an 8-year-old internal FAA study that analyzed alternatives for shifting security responsibilities with respect to passengers, baggage, and cargo from the air carriers to airport operators. The study is appended to the report. FAA also reviewed other reports, including reports from the President’s Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, the National Civil Aviation Review Commission, and Coopers & Lybrand. In addition, FAA conducted a literature search and reviewed testimony provided for the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security and various congressional hearings on aviation security. FAA’s report considered the views of the various commissions and other parties that studied or commented on transferring air carriers’ security responsibilities to the airport operators or to the federal government, or for sharing responsibilities among the air carriers, the airport operators, and the federal government. The report also considered the Commissions’ and other parties’ views on potential sources of funding for aviation security, such as the Airport Improvement Program, Passenger Facility Charges, and user fees. The report points out that the source of security funding has been a matter of continuing controversy over the last 30 years. FAA concluded that there appears to be a consensus in the civil aviation community to retain the current system of shared responsibilities for aviation security. Therefore, FAA would continue to be responsible for establishing and enforcing regulations, policies, and procedures and for identifying potential threats and appropriate countermeasures. Air carriers would bear the primary responsibility for applying screening and other security measures to passengers, baggage, and cargo. Airport operators would be responsible for maintaining a secure airport environment and for providing local law enforcement support. FAA also concluded that there is no apparent consensus for changing the overall system of funding for aviation security and that there is no definitive answer to the long-standing question of who should pay for aviation security. FAA therefore did not make any legislative proposals for transferring security responsibilities from air carriers or any recommendations for changing funding sources. FAA officials, however, stated that even though the report made no recommendations regarding funding sources for aviation security, this issue will continue to need discussion and study because of its high cost. FAA estimated in May 1997 that the total 10-year cost to the federal government, airport authorities, and the airlines for security programs at the nation’s largest and busiest airports alone would be close to $3 billion. Thus, funding methods for aviation security improvements is an issue that the Congress and FAA will be faced with for a number of years. Officials of three principal aviation industry associations that we contacted—Air Transport Association (ATA), Airports Council International-North America (ACI-NA), and American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE) —generally agreed with the current division of airport security responsibilities. These officials stated that the continuity of screening would be broken if the air carriers were not the ultimate responsible party. For example, under current procedures, if a passenger is identified as a potential threat at the airport check-in or ticket counter, the air carrier will label the passenger’s bag appropriately and that air carrier will take additional security measures for examining the passenger’s bag, such as sending the bag through explosives detection equipment. Under any scenario where the carrier is not responsible for all screening operations, the air carrier would have to transfer the information about the potential security threat to another entity, such as the airport operator, and then that entity would further scrutinize the passenger’s bag. This would disrupt the continuity of the baggage-screening process and allow for a potential break in the chain of information. The associations expressed differing views with regard to funding aviation security. Two of the associations—ACI-NA and AAAE—believe that the federal government should provide the initial funding for any increase in the baseline security standards and then, through the use of increased Airport Improvement Program funding and an expanded local funding mechanism, namely the Passenger Facility Charge, the airport users would have a greater ability to raise funds for the increased security. However, the third association, ATA, does not support an increased Passenger Facility Charge for security improvements at airports. ATA believes that the funding for explosives-detection-screening equipment should be provided under direct federal appropriations and not from Airport Improvement Program funds and Passenger Facility Charges. FAA is developing a regulation to comply with the mandated section 302 requirements to certify screening companies and improve the training and testing of security screeners. FAA expects the final regulation to be issued in late 2000. While the aviation industry generally agrees that national standards for security-screening operations are needed, some issues could impede the final regulation’s issuance. FAA plans to issue a new regulation that would establish the requirements for certifying screening companies. One of the requirements for certification would compel screening companies and air carriers to comply with the performance standards that would be established by FAA and to implement FAA-approved training and testing programs for screeners. As the first step toward issuing a regulation, FAA, on March 11, 1997, issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking requesting comments and suggestions on issues related to the certification of screening companies and the improvement of screening operations. FAA identified 10 issues of particular interest. They included the establishment, by regulation, of a uniform security-screening program for use by all air carriers and screening companies, methods for measuring screeners’ performance, and a curriculum for training screeners. FAA also sought comments on the estimated costs of meeting any qualification or operational requirements that might be imposed. (See app. I for a list of all the issues on which FAA requested comments.) FAA recognizes that a critical step in the certification of screening companies is having a reliable and consistent way to measure their performance. By collectively analyzing and measuring screener’s performance, FAA can hold screening companies accountable for safe, effective screening operations. FAA has focused its efforts on developing, field testing, and validating an automated screener testing-system called Threat Image Projection (TIP) which would provide the basis for establishing and monitoring performance standards for screening companies. TIP is an automated system that was developed to improve and maintain the effectiveness of image interpretation by screening personnel employed at screening locations in airports.