On July 19, 2006, Illinois Special State's Attorney Edward J. Egan and Chief Deputy Special State's Attorney Robert Boyle, named to investigate long standing charges of police brutality by a segment of the Chicago Police Department, released their report, Report of the Special State ' s Attorney: Appointed and Ordered by the Presiding Judge of the Criminal Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County in No. 2001 Misc. 4 (Report) . The Report , the culmination of a 4-year investigation, concluded that criminal charges might have been brought in three cases of police misconduct, but in each instance were barred by the Illinois statute of limitations. Press accounts indicate, however, the Chief Deputy Special State's Attorney Boyle, the Report 's co-author, suggested that a prosecution under federal RICO and Hobbs Act statutes might encounter less severe statute of limitations obstacles. This is a brief examination of the federal criminal statutes implicated by the Report . The Report concluded: â In the case of Andrew Wilson, there exists proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the commanding officer of Area 2 and two other officers who interrogated Wilson committed aggravated battery, perjury and obstruction of justice in violation of Illinois law, but two of the officers are deceased and the Illinois 3 year statute of limitations bars prosecution the former commander of the Area 2 Violent Crime unit, Report at 63, 16. â In the case of Phillip Adkins, there exists proof beyond a reasonable doubt that two other officers who interrogated Adkins committed aggravated battery in violation of Illinois law, but the Illinois statute of limitations bars prosecution, Report at 274, 16. â In the case of Alfonzo Pinex, there exists proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a second pair of officers who interrogated Pinex, committed aggravated battery, perjury and obstruction of justice in violation of Illinois law, but the Illinois statute of limitations bar prosecution, Report at 290, 16. Wilson was arrested at 5:15 on the morning of February 14, 1982, in connection with the investigation of the murder of two police officers, Report at 45. The arresting officers allegedly brutalized Wilson, beating him, burning him, subjecting him to electric shocks, and threatening him with a gun until he confessed, Report at 46-7. The commanding officer of the Area 2 Violent Crime Unit was purportedly present during much of the time and was said to have administered some of the mistreatment, id. At 10:00 in the evening, Wilson was taken to hospital after officers at the lock-up refused to take custody of him because of his condition. After the escorting officers remarked that he would refuse treatment if he knew what was good for him, he "was examined at about 11:15 p.m. by Dr. Geoffrey Korn. Dr. Korn [later] testified that he made note of some 15 separate injuries that were apparent on the defendant's head, chest, and right leg. Two cuts on the defendant's forehead and one on the back of his head required stitches; the defendant's right eye had been blackened, and there was bleeding on the surface of that eye. Dr. Korn also observed bruises on the defendant's chest and several linear abrasions or burns on the defendant's chest, shoulder, and chin area. Finally, Dr. Korn saw on the defendant's right thigh an abrasion from a second-degree burn; it was six inches long and 1 Â½ to 2 inches wide." Wilson was subsequently convicted for the murder of the two officers and sentenced to death, but the Illinois Supreme Court overturned the conviction on appeal because the state had failed to demonstrate that Wilson's confession was not coerced. He was retried, convicted a second time and sentenced to life imprisonment; his conviction and sentence were affirmed and his federal habeas corpus petition denied. Wilson sued the three officers, the Superintendent of Police and the City under 42 U.S.C. 1983, based on allegations of his mistreatment, and ultimately settled with the City after being awarded damages and attorney's fees at trial against the commanding officer. The Office of Professional Standards investigation of the allegations of brutality led to the commanding officer's suspension in November 1991 and, following a Police Board hearing, his dismissal in 1992, Report at 153. The commanding officer denied mistreating Wilson at the suppression hearing (November 9, 1982), in depositions relating to the civil litigation (1988, 1989), and at the hearing before the Police Board (which nevertheless found the three had tortured Wilson, fired the commander, and suspended the other two officers in 1992), Report at 28-29, 44, 49. He seems likely to have denied them to investigators during various Office of Professional Standards investigations, the last of which apparently occurred in November 1991, Report at 153, and during interviews with the Special State's Attorney's office sometime between 2001 and 2006, Report at 15. Adkins was arrested on June 7, 1984, in connection with an armed robbery during which a police officer was assaulted, Report at 266. Adkins asserts that on the way to the station police officers from Area 2 beat him to unconsciousness, Report at 267-69. He was hospitalized in the Intensive Care/Trauma Ward on June 8 and June 9 and discharged on June 10, Report at 271. Adkins successfully sued the officers and the City in federal court and the City settled for $25,000, Report at 267. Thereafter, the Chicago Office of Professional Standards conducted an investigation (May 4, 1993 to December 16, 1993) that concluded that officers had in fact beaten Adkins, Report at 266. Pinex was arrested on June 28, 1985, in connection with a murder charge, Report at 276. His statement while in custody was suppressed for failure to honor his Miranda rule rights, Report at 276-77. The court declined to address the question of whether the statement was the product of a beating, Report at 277. Charges against Pinex were dismissed and he sued alleging that two officers in Detective Area 2 had beaten him to secure his confession while he was in custody, id . The City settled for $5,000 on November 1, 1991, id . The Report addresses several other instances where detainees complained that they were beatenÂ by officers of Detective Area 2. In each instance, the Report concludes that there is a lackÂ of creditable evidence sufficient to convict the officers in question, Report at 178, 182, 202, 240-41, 264. The Report also considers the possibility of charges against those purported to have "covered up" the misconduct of others at Detective Area 2. It observes that, "We have found no evidence that would support a charge beyond a reasonable doubt of obstruction of justice (or 'cover-up') by anyÂ police personnel. There is insufficient evidence of wrongdoing by any member of the State'sÂ Attorneys Office, except for one person," Report at 17; see also, Report at 32-6; 112-29.Â The exception is apparently reserved for the prosecutor who ultimately took Wilson's recorded confession: If he was telling the truth when he testified about the sequence of events leading up to the court-reported confession of Andrew Wilson, . . . then the claim of Andrew Wilson that he had been abused before he gave that confession would be seriously undercut. If, on the other hand, [he] was not telling the truth, his false testimony would stand as strong corroboration of Andrew Wilson . . . He has testified on the motion to suppress and before the jury that convicted Wilson and sentenced him to death. He was named in the Federal civil rights action brought by Andrew Wilson. . . His deposition was taken, and he testified in both civil trials. He also testified as a witness on behalf of [the police commander] in the Police Board hearing in 1992. . . . In our judgment [he] did not tell the truth when he denied that he had been told by Andrew Wilson that he had been tortured by detectives, Report at 53-4. The Report does not indicate that its authors would seek to indict and convict the prosecutor but for impediment of the statute of limitations, nor does it speak to the weight of any evidence that might support charges of perjury or obstruction of justice against the prosecutor. Finally, the Report comments that, "the evidence supports the conclusion that [the] Superintendent [of Police] was guilty of a dereliction of duty and did not act in good faith in the investigation of the claim of Andrew Wilson," Report at 17. It makes no comment on the existence or weight of any evidence to support criminal charges. Although the purpose of the Special State's Attorney's inquiry was to determine whether prosecution under Illinois law might be had, statements contained in the Report suggest the possibility that several federal criminal laws may have been violated. The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures; the Fifth Amendment prohibits compelling an individual to incriminate himself; the Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment; each is binding upon the state and local officials by virtue of the due process clause Fourteenth Amendment. In combination, they prohibit police from torturing and otherwise brutalizing those in custody either to elicit confessions or otherwise; to do so under color of law constitutes a federal crime, 18 U.S.C. 242. It is likewise a federal crime to use force, corruption, or deceit to prevent another from providing authorities with information concerning other federal offenses, 18 U.S.C. 1512; or to directly provide a material false statement in a matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency or department, 18 U.S.C. 1001; or to lie under oath in federal proceedings, 18 U.S.C. 1621. A fifth federal crime, the Hobbs Act, outlaws extortion under color of official right to the extent that the misconduct obstructs, delays or affects commerce, 18 U.S.C. 1951.