Ballistic missile defense is a challenging mission for DOD, requiring a unique combination of defensive components—space-based sensors, surveillance and tracking radars, advanced interceptors, command and control, and reliable communications—working together as an integrated system. A typical scenario to engage an ICBM is expected to unfold as follows: Overhead satellites detect a missile launch and alert the command authority of a possible attack. Upon receiving the alert, the BMDS directs its land- and sea-based radars to track the missile complex and (if so designed) to identify the warhead from decoys and associated objects. Based on accurate track data, an interceptor—consisting of a “kill vehicle” mounted atop a booster—is launched. The interceptor boosts itself toward the predicted intercept point and releases its kill vehicle to engage the threat. The kill vehicle uses its onboard sensors and divert thrusters to acquire, identify, and steer itself into the warhead. With a combined closing speed on the order of 10 kilometers per second (22,000 miles per hour), the warhead is destroyed through a “hit-to-kill” collision with the kill vehicle. To meet this challenge, DOD intends to develop and field a ballistic missile defense system capable of defeating ballistic missiles during all phases of flight (see fig. 1). Under the evolutionary, capabilities-based acquisition strategy being pursued by DOD, the BMDS has no fixed design or final architecture, and there are no firm requirements. According to DOD, this approach gives MDA increased flexibility to develop a system that can more readily respond to a changing threat and more easily insert new technologies for enhancing system performance. The missile defense capability of Block 2004 is primarily one for defending the United States against ICBM attacks from Northeast Asia and the Middle East. It is built around the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) element, augmented by shipboard Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) radars, and integrated by the Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) element. The Block 2004 BMDS also includes the Army’s Patriot element for point defense of deployed U.S. forces against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. The Block 2006 program builds directly upon Block 2004. It continues element development and funds the next increment of fielding that adds interceptors, new radars, and enhanced battle management capabilities. MDA is also carrying out an extensive research and development effort to expand its current operational capability into future blocks. During fiscal year 2004, MDA funded the development of four other major BMDS elements—Airborne Laser (ABL), Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI), Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS), and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)—in addition to those elements comprising the Block 2004 defensive capability. MDA intends to integrate these elements, when ready, into future BMDS blocks. Table 1 provides a brief description of these elements, and more information about them is provided in appendixes II through VIII of this report. As part of MDA’s planning process, MDA defines overarching program goals for the development and fielding of BMDS block configurations. The goals describe the composition of a block (components and elements under development and planned for fielding), provide the costs and schedules associated with element development and fielding, and summarize performance capabilities at the component and system levels. A block’s cost goal is the portion of MDA’s budget dedicated to development and fielding activities associated with the block. MDA has established Block 2004 and 2006 “Development Goals” for the continued development and testing of six BMDS elements—ABL, Aegis BMD, C2BMC, GMD, STSS, and THAAD—and stand-alone components such as forward-deployed radars. These goals identify the developmental areas MDA is funding as part of the Block 2004 and 2006 programs. The associated cost goals, which are the planned budgets for these activities, are approximately $5.7 billion and $12.2 billion for Block 2004 and 2006, respectively. MDA also established a complementary set of goals—referred to as “Fielded Configuration” Goals—in response to the President’s December 2002 direction to begin fielding a limited ballistic missile defense capability. The fielding goals build directly upon the Development Goals but aim to deliver an operational missile defense capability during a given block’s time frame. For example, Block 2004 goals identify the components of the BMDS available for defensive operations by the end of December 2005. MDA states that the cost goals associated with the Block 2004 and 2006 fieldings are $1.7 billion and $3.8 billion, respectively. Therefore, the total cost goals for Block 2004 and 2006 are $7.4 billion and $16.0 billion, respectively. Figure 2 depicts MDA’s total budget between fiscal years 2005 and 2011 broken out by block. As illustrated, funding for a given block spans more than the 2-year period. For example, MDA estimates it will need about $12.0 billion to fund Block 2008 activities over the next 7 years through 2011. Many activities completed in fiscal year 2004 by the various element programs pertain to the completion of the LDO capability—the initial capability fielded by MDA. Although LDO is not formally listed by MDA as a Block 2004 goal, it does include the delivery of a capability on the path to meeting the fielding goals. Table 2 summarizes MDA’s fielding goals. The GMD, Aegis BMD, and C2BMC programs completed scheduled activities in fiscal year 2004 necessary to support the fielding of LDO, an integral part of Block 2004. Most notably, the GMD program completed construction activities at GMD sites, delivered and emplaced five GMD interceptors in their silos at Fort Greely, Alaska, and completed the upgrade of the Cobra Dane radar. The Aegis BMD program upgraded three destroyers for the long-range surveillance and tracking mission that supports homeland defense against ICBMs. In addition, the C2BMC program completed software development, activated control centers, and worked to integrate elements of the system. These programs also continued developmental and fielding activities in early fiscal year 2005 to enhance LDO so that the full Block 2004 capability could be realized by the end of calendar year 2005. For example, the GMD program delivered a sixth interceptor at Fort Greely in October and two interceptors at Vandenberg Air Force Base in December, completed the upgrade of the Beale early warning radar, and initiated the upgrade of the Fylingdales early warning radar. In addition, the Aegis BMD program completed the assembly of five missiles and continued with software development in the upgrade of its cruisers and destroyers. Similarly, the C2BMC program continued with software development and testing leading to the final Block 2004 version. Progress made toward achieving program goals relative to the fielding of the LDO and Block 2004 capabilities is summarized in tables 3 and 4, respectively. Detailed evaluations of activities completed in fiscal year 2004 by all BMDS elements are given in appendices II through VIII of this report. DOD did not activate the LDO capability MDA developed and fielded. Although the LDO capability was expected to be placed on alert by the end of September 2004, officials from the office of the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) told us that September 30, 2004, was a planning date rather than a “hard date.” The officials indicated that the system had not been put on alert for the following reasons: Shakedown. Since October 2004, the system has been undergoing a “shakedown”—a necessary transition phase between development and operations. During this time, the system is exercised as though an attack is under way. It enables the warfighter to become familiar with the system and, importantly, to plan for unexpected failures. Training. While initial training of operators has been completed, more is needed. For weapon systems in general, the warfighter does not have a military capability without trained operators, and training cannot begin until a weapon system is delivered (or at least far along in development). Policy. USSTRATCOM must receive an Execution Order from the Secretary of Defense before the LDO capability is declared operational. This order, which would reflect DOD policy, is to include a clear identification of command and control relationships. USSTRATCOM plans to advise the Secretary of Defense on the military utility of the system and could advise against declaring the system operational if, for example, more testing were needed to increase the command’s confidence in the system’s effectiveness. Also, the concept of operations (CONOPS) was not finalized, and issues such as the integration of defensive and offensive operations still had to be worked out. USSTRATCOM officials further explained that the declaration of LDO may or may not mean the system is “on alert” for defensive operations—LDO operation is more complicated than “being on” or “being off” alert. For example, the system could be in “developmental mode” when operated by MDA for testing but capable of being transitioned to an “operational mode” for defensive operations given sufficient time. As of March 2005, DOD had not announced a specific date for activating the initial missile defense capability. MDA completed a number of ground tests and exercises in fiscal year 2004, but key flight tests using LDO-configured components were delayed. For example, MDA verified integration and connectivity between its GMD, Aegis BMD, and C2BMC elements, and the warfighter participated in several missile defense exercises (wargames) as part of their training to understand and operate the system. However, the GMD program office conducted two booster tests (non-intercept attempts) in fiscal year 2004 even though six flight tests were planned.