U.S. military operations as part of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) began on October7, 2001, and continue today. The military component is just one aspect in this endeavor, which alsoinvolves diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement, and financial efforts to defeat terrorists aroundthe world. This report focuses on U.S. military operations in four areas -- Afghanistan, Africa, thePhilippines, and Colombia -- although the U.S. military is likely engaged in a variety of activitiesin other countries or regions that are considered part of the GWOT by the Administration. Whilesome consider military operations in Iraq as part of this war, many do not, and because of thecomplexity of this issue, Iraq is treated separately and in greater detail in other CRS reports. (2) Congress has a wide ranging interest in U.S. military operations in these regions. NATOassumption of responsibility for Afghanistan and its impact on U.S. military operations,counternarcotics operations in Afghanistan, and the apparently emerging long-term military strategyfor Africa -- raise a variety of issues for potential congressional consideration. (3) There are approximately 19,000 U.S. military personnel in and around Afghanistan. Troopscurrently in Afghanistan represent the sixth major troop rotation in Operation Enduring Freedom(OEF) since the United States became involved in the fall of 2001. At present, the majority of U.S.ground forces come from the Army's Italy-based 173rd Airborne Brigade and the 1st Brigade of theFort Bragg, North Carolina-based 82nd Airborne Division and Marine elements from the Second (II)MEF from Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. U.S. Special Forces are also operating in Afghanistanand are primarily concerned with capturing or killing Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders. In addition,Army units from the Florida National Guard's 53rd Infantry Brigade have been deployed to train theAfghan National Army (ANA). (5) Drawdown of U.S. Forces in Afghanistan. InDecember 2004, the Department of Defense (DOD) designated the 3rd and 4th Brigades of the 10thMountain Division from Ft. Drum New York and Ft. Polk, Louisiana and elements of the division'sheadquarters as the primary ground forces and command headquarters for OEF 7. (6) On December 20, 2005, DODannounced that one battalion-sized infantry task force from the 4th Brigade stationed at Ft. Polkwould deploy to Afghanistan to assist in the transition of coalition operations in southernAfghanistan in mid-2006 to NATO. (7) DOD attributes this reduction to NATO's growing presence inAfghanistan as well as continued growth and progress of the Afghan National Army (ANA) andAfghan National Police. (8) DOD's decision to deploy only a portion of the 4th Brigade is expected to bring U.S. troop levels --currently at approximately 19,000 -- to approximately 16,500; a reduction of 2,500 troops. (9) Security for Parliamentary Elections. U.S. andCoalition forces, in conjunction with the Afghan National Army (ANA) and National Police,provided security for Afghanistan's September 18, 2005 nationwide National Assembly andProvincial Council elections. Reports suggest that security efforts were relatively effective, despitea number of insurgent harassing attacks prior to the election, and about 16 of 6,270 elections stationswere not opened because of security-related problems. (10) Shortly after the elections, Afghan President Hamid Karzaireportedly questioned the need for further international military operations within Afghanistan,suggesting that instead a "stronger political approach focusing on shutting down guerilla trainingcamps and outside financial support" would be more effective. (11) President Karzai alsosuggested that airstrikes were no longer needed -- a view shared by many as airstrikes have beenresponsible for the deaths and injury of numerous Afghan civilians and has been a past point ofcontention between the United States and the Afghan government. Although insurgents failed to follow through on their vows to disrupt September's elections,U.S. military officials contend that the insurgents have recently reasserted themselves -- killinghundreds of civilians, government workers, soldiers and police in bombings and ambushes insouthern and eastern Afghanistan. (12) The commander of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, Army Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, reportedlysuggested that this pattern would continue and that U.S. and coalition forces would continue to stayon the offensive against insurgents. Operational Issues. Changing Insurgent Tactics? A number of reportsnote that in the past months, insurgent tactics have shown an increase in the use of suicide androadside bombings, not unlike the tactics being used by insurgents in Iraq. (13) There have been over 20suicide attacks in Afghanistan since September 2005 including car bomb attacks against U.S. andNATO convoys -- resulting in four NATO deaths -- as well as individuals with explosives strappedto their bodies throwing themselves at vehicles or detonating their explosives in crowds. Most ofthese bombings failed to hit their intended targets but instead killed or wounded Afghan civilians.In one of the more successful attacks, on September 28, 2005, an insurgent dressed in an ANAuniform, blew up a motorcycle near Afghan troops boarding transportation outside their base inKabul, killing 9 soldiers and injuring 28. A top Taliban commander reportedly stated that he hadmore than 200 insurgents willing to become suicide attackers against U.S. and allied forces but theAfghan government dismissed this claim as "propaganda"suggesting instead that this was anindication of the insurgent's weakening military power. While U.S. military officials postulate that insurgents no longer have a pool of resources tomount a serious offensive they also acknowledge that insurgent forces are "far from being on theropes." (14) The U.S.military asserts that the insurgents are recruiting younger fighters and staging smaller-scale attacks, often times using a hit-and-run approach as opposed to the major combat operations of the past.According to an unnamed Afghan source with supposed ties to Taliban insurgents, the Taliban havedivided up into groups of 18 to 20 fighters and in each unit there is an Al Qaeda member fromPakistan or an "Arab" who teaches the group tactics developed in Iraq. According to this source,"rogue" elements from Pakistan's Intelligence Service help to further refine these tactics as wellprovide these groups sanctuary and training in Pakistan, provided these groups return to Afghanistanto fight U.S. and allied forces. In instances where U.S. forces have engaged insurgents, they noted that insurgents were"extremely resolute and fought to the last man." Insurgents were also characterized as well-organizedand reacted well to battlefield situations. Despite this perceived proficiency, the U.S. Army claimsto have killed more than 1,200 insurgents in 2005 -- including a number of senior commanders. U.S.forces have reportedly used small U.S. formations such as platoons (16 to 50 soldiers)to draw outinsurgent forces, who will often "swarm" into larger formations to overwhelm the smaller U.S. unit.The smaller U.S. unit then engages the insurgent forces to "fix" it, while other infantry units andU.S. airpower engage and destroy it. Combat Operations Against Insurgents. U.S. andcoalition forces continue combat operations, primarily in the border provinces where the Talibancontinue to exert a degree of control. On August 31, 2005, U.S. and ANA forces, backed by attackhelicopters, raided a Taliban camp in the mountains of southern Afghanistan, killing nine suspectedinsurgents. (15) Thiscamp was believed to have sheltered 80 insurgents using it as a base camp to launch attacks inUruzgan province. (16) On September 4 and 5, U.S. and Afghan forces conducted raids in Zabol and Kandahar provinces,killing 25 suspected Taliban and capturing dozens more. (17) Pakistani Involvement. Prior to Afghanistan's September 18 parliamentaryelections, Pakistan reportedly deployed thousands of reinforcements to its borders to help preventinsurgent attacks. (18) According to Pakistani defense officials, about 5,000 additional troops were sent to the NorthwestFrontier Province and approximately 4,500 additional troops were sent to Baluchistan. (19) On September 13,Pakistan conducted an operation with thousands of troops and helicopter gunship support in NorthWaziristan, reportedly destroying a "major Al Qaeda hideout" and arresting 21 suspectedmilitants. (20) OnSeptember 29, Pakistan began a series of attacks in North Waziristan region and reportedlyencountered considerable resistance from insurgents, resulting in the deaths of at least five Pakistanisoldiers and an unknown number of insurgents. (21) Despite the significant presence of the Pakistani Army inPakistan's Tribal Zone bordering Afghanistan, the Taliban and Al Qaeda are said to be rallying inthe Waziristan region. (22) According to reports, there appears to be evidence that Arab, Uzbek, and Chechen fighters linkedto Al Qaeda are operating in that area and openly recruiting local tribesman to fight in their "jihad"against the Pakistani Army and U.S. forces in Afghanistan. (23) This has supposedlyresulted in fighting between local tribesman that have aligned themselves with the Pakistani Armyand those siding with the insurgent. (24) Renewed Fighting.