Created by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in January 2006, JIEDDO is responsible for leading, advocating, and coordinating all DOD actions in support of the combatant commanders’ and their respective joint task forces’ efforts to defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence. Prior DOD efforts to defeat IEDs included various process teams and task forces. For example, DOD established the Joint IED Defeat Task Force in June 2005 for which the Army provided primary administrative support. This task force replaced the Army IED Task Force, the Joint IED Task Force, and the Under Secretary of Defense, Force Protection Working Group. To focus all of DOD’s efforts and minimize duplication, DOD published a new counter-IED policy in February 2006 through DOD Directive 2000.19E, which changed the name of the Joint IED Defeat Task Force to JIEDDO and established it as a joint entity and jointly staffed organization within DOD, reporting directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The directive states that JIEDDO shall “focus” (i.e., lead, advocate, and coordinate) all DOD actions in support of the Combatant Commanders’ and their respective Joint Task Forces’ efforts to defeat IEDs as “weapons of strategic influence.” GAO, Defense Management: More Transparency Needed over the Financial and Human Capital Operations of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, GAO-08-342 (Washington D.C.: Mar. 6, 2008). controls. DOD and JIEDDO agreed with our recommendations and have taken actions in response. Beginning in February 2006, JIEDDO has been responsible for developing DOD’s IED defeat strategic plan for countering the IED threat, but its strategic-planning actions have not followed leading strategic management practices, or have since been discontinued. In March 2007, we found that JIEDDO had not developed a strategic plan and as a result could not assess whether it was making the right investment decisions or whether it had effectively organized itself to meet its mission. We recommended that the Secretary of Defense require the Director of JIEDDO, in developing DOD’s IED defeat strategic plan, to clearly articulate JIEDDO’s mission and specify goals, objectives, and measures of effectiveness. JIEDDO fully concurred with our recommendations and was working to complete a strategic plan when we issued this report, and in September 2007, JIEDDO completed its DOD- wide counter-IED strategic plan. However, JIEDDO’s 2007 strategic plan did not contain a means of measuring its performance outcomes, which is a leading strategic management practice. Subsequent JIEDDO strategic- planning efforts also did not follow leading strategic management practices or have been discontinued. For example, JIEDDO’s 2009–2010 strategic plan contained performance measures, but JIEDDO discontinued using these measures because they determined that the data from these measures were not relevant to the organization’s goals. We have previously reported that good strategic planning helps organizations (1) make the key decisions that will drive their actions, (2) measure the effectiveness of their actions to achieve intended results, and (3) if not achieving intended results, have the data to determine modifications needed to achieve intended results—all attributes of a plan that helps maximize organizational resources. Many of JIEDDO’s plans contained output measures such as the percentage of initiatives for which JIEDDO completes operational assessments or the percentage of counter-IED initiatives that were adopted by one of the Military Services. While collecting outputs is an important initial step in measuring progress, they do not provide information about progress toward achieving JIEDDO’s mission as outcome measures would. Since 2006, JIEDDO has made several attempts to develop a counter- IED strategic plan including its 2007 and 2009–2010 strategic plans, which in the case of the 2007 plan, included elements for guiding DOD subordinate organizations and the military services involved with counter- IEDs in developing their own counter-IED planning. However, those plans did not have outcome-related goals specific enough for JIEDDO and these organizations to be able to develop enduring measures of effectiveness that inform DOD whether its counter-IED mission is being met. As shown in figure 1, we identified 17 key actions or triggering events applicable to DOD that were to either produce counter-IED strategic plans for the department or further develop the strategic plans. However, the 17 actions have either been discontinued or did not satisfy key strategic-management-planning practices, including developing results-oriented strategic goals, performance measures, and the adjustment of plans or intended actions based on the results of these measures. For some of the 17 actions and events, we found that while JIEDDO had made efforts to satisfy leading strategic management practices, these efforts fell short of developing results-oriented goals and performance measures that link with DOD’s counter-IED mission. We assessed some efforts as partially fulfilling strategic management practices because developing output measures is a step toward developing outcome measures, and measuring individual initiatives contributes toward the overall counter-IED effort. However, JIEDDO has not expanded its assessments beyond these individual efforts and determined how these efforts, overall, help to achieve DOD’s counter-IED mission. In early January 2012, JIEDDO issued its counter-IED strategic plan for 2012–2016, which established five principal goals for JIEDDO with three to six supporting objectives for each goal. This plan did not specify what actions JIEDDO planned to take to achieve these goals. On January 19, 2012, JIEDDO augmented its strategic plan by issuing an annex detailing numerous actions to achieve these objectives, and establishing 230 separate metrics that JIEDDO expects will provide the means of assessing its progress. In addition, JIEDDO is planning to begin, in March 2012, quarterly internal reviews to assess progress and make adjustments to its counter-IED efforts accordingly. Such action has not been a step JIEDDO has included in its past efforts. We see good potential in JIEDDO’s strategic plan; however, because the portion of the plan relevant to our recommendations was issued on January 19, 2012— shortly before issuance of this report—we did not evaluate the plan and have not therefore assessed the extent to which this new plan will follow leading strategic management practices and provide results-oriented strategic goals and sufficient performance metrics for JIEDDO. Further, according to JIEDDO officials, the strategic plan applies only to counter- IED efforts managed by JIEDDO and does not apply to all other counter- IED efforts departmentwide. Consequently, successful implementation of JIEDDO’s strategic plan alone will not provide the means necessary for determining the effectiveness of all counter-IED efforts across DOD. According to JIEDDO officials, DOD will produce a departmentwide counter-IED strategic plan in the future, but there is no specified timeline for issuance of this plan. As JIEDDO moves forward to implement its counter-IED strategic plan, and DOD develops a departmentwide counter-IED strategic plan, DOD will continue to face difficulty in developing measures of effectiveness, if it does not have results-oriented strategic goals to accompany DOD’s general counter-IED mission statement. The department has identified eliminating IEDs as a weapon of strategic influence as the overarching mission of its counter-IED programs, but has not translated this mission into actionable goals and objectives. Without actionable goals and objectives established by DOD, JIEDDO, and other DOD components cannot tie individual performance measures to DOD’s desired outcomes. As a result, DOD and external stakeholders are left without a comprehensive, data-driven assessment as to whether DOD’s counter- IED efforts are achieving DOD’s mission. Furthermore, without a means to measure the success of JIEDDO’s efforts in achieving DOD’s counter- IED mission, JIEDDO’s basis for determining how to invest its resources among its three lines of organizational effort—to attack the network, defeat the device, and train the force—is limited. While JIEDDO has established procedures to assess counter-IED gaps and prioritize and manage its requirements and individual investments—including coordinating and collaborating with various DOD entities—to rapidly pursue these critical lines of effort, JIEDDO and DOD are not informed about the overall effectiveness of their counter-IED efforts and use of resources as they relate to DOD’s mission. Lastly, JIEDDO has not had a completed, fully developed strategic plan until recently, with long-term strategic goals that informed incoming directors about which actions have taken place and which must be continued in order to maintain continuous progress toward achieving long-term goals. Having such a strategic plan would have benefitted JIEDDO leadership as JIEDDO’s directors changed four times over the 6 years JIEDDO has existed (see fig. 1). Without this framework, new strategic-planning efforts have been initiated under each of these directors to improve the organization and manage counter-IED support— efforts that contributed in varying degrees to strategic management but, as discussed above, were not implemented or were discontinued in many instances. Now that JIEDDO has completed its strategic plan, it should work to ensure that implementation helps provide continuity for the organization as JIEDDO leadership changes in the future. A provision in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 repealed certain quarterly reporting requirements. See Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1062(d)(5) (2011). However, reporting requirements for other information related to counter IED efforts may remain. comprehensive list of counter-IED efforts that would provide a better basis for determining key efforts to report to Congress. Technology Matrix Database: In 2009, DOD developed this database through JIEDDO in response to our recommendation to establish a comprehensive counter-IED database, expending a total of $225,000.