The National Response Plan (NRP) was issued in December 2004 to establish a single, comprehensive framework for the management of domestic incidents, including natural disasters. The NRP is the federal government’s plan to coordinate its resources and capabilities across agencies and integrate them with other levels of government, as well as private sector organizations, for prevention of, preparedness for, response to, and recovery from natural disasters, terrorism, or other emergencies. According to the plan, the NRP serves as the foundation for the development of detailed supplemental plans and procedures to effectively and efficiently implement federal assistance for specific types of incidents. The heart of the NRP is its base plan, which outlines planning assumptions, roles and responsibilities, and incident management actions. The NRP also contains 15 emergency support function annexes, which describe the mission, policies, structure, and responsibilities of federal agencies in an incident. Appendix II contains a table that shows organizational responsibilities for the 15 emergency response functions. It shows that DOD does not have sole primary responsibility for any emergency function, and its role is primarily that of a supporting agency. While multiple agencies support each emergency support function, DOD is the only agency with supporting responsibilities for all 15 emergency support functions. The NRP also contains seven incident annexes describing responsibilities, processes, and procedures for specific types of incidents. One of these annexes addresses catastrophic incidents. The catastrophic incident annex establishes the strategy for implementing an accelerated, proactive response when a catastrophic incident occurs. The NRP defines a catastrophic incident as any natural or manmade incident that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, or government functions. In terms of its combined casualties, damage, and disruption to the population, environment, and economy, Hurricane Katrina was clearly a catastrophe and it was arguably the most devastating natural disaster in United States’ history. More than 1,300 people lost their lives; damage stretched over a 90,000 square mile area; more than a million people were driven from their homes; buildings, bridges, roads, and power and communications infrastructure were destroyed or severely damaged; and millions of gallons of oil were spilled into the environment. We may never fully know the financial cost of Hurricane Katrina but one projection has put it at more than $200 billion. During disasters and catastrophes, the military may provide support at two different levels. First, the military may provide support at the state level through its National Guard personnel and units. The governor of a state may call the National Guard forces within that state to active duty in response to a local or statewide emergency. In these cases, the state pays the salaries of the National Guard members. Under an existing Emergency Management Assistance Compact that establishes a framework for mutual assistance, governors may also call their National Guard forces to active duty in a state status and then send them to another state that is facing a disaster. The governor of the affected state, through the state’s adjutant general, commands both the National Guard forces from the affected state and the out-of-state National Guard forces that may flow into the affected state under emergency management assistance compacts. National Guard troops also respond to disasters under Title 32 of the United States Code. Under Title 32, National Guard troops continue to report to the governor of the affected state but they receive federal pay and benefits. In response to Hurricane Katrina, National Guard forces were generally activated in a state active-duty status and then eventually placed in Title 32 status. The military can also respond to disasters at the federal level. The federal military response can consist of active component or Reserve or National Guard personnel. Active component troops that deploy to disaster areas remain under the control of the President and the Secretary of Defense, but they usually deploy in response to a request from an affected state. The President can also send Reserve and National Guard troops to a disaster area in a federal status under Title 10 of the United States Code. However, federal laws place certain limitations on the use of federal troops. For Hurricane Katrina, the federal military response consisted of active component troops and Reserve volunteers. The use of the military for disaster relief is authorized by the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. Under procedures to implement the Stafford Act, the military provides support to civil authorities through a specific request process. However, under its immediate response authority, which is outlined in DOD directives, a local military commander can assist civil authorities or the public without prior approval if the action is necessary to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions. On March 25, 2003, DOD established the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense to oversee homeland defense activities for DOD, under the authority of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and as appropriate, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This office develops policies, conducts analysis, provides advice, and makes recommendations on homeland defense, support to civil authorities, emergency preparedness and domestic crisis management matters within the department. Specifically, the assistant secretary assists the Secretary of Defense in providing policy direction to the United States Northern Command and other applicable commands to guide the development and execution of homeland defense plans and activities. This direction is provided through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense also serves as the DOD Domestic Crisis Manager. In this capacity, he represents the department on all homeland-defense-related matters with all levels of government, ranging from state and local officials to the Department of Homeland Security and the Executive Office of the President. In 2002, following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United States, DOD established the United States Northern Command with a dual mission of homeland defense and civil support. Northern Command receives policy direction on both missions from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. Northern Command’s civil support activities are triggered by the President or the Secretary of Defense, generally in response to requests for federal assistance. Following a catastrophic incident, DOD may provide extensive lifesaving and sustaining support to civil authorities. However, DOD may also provide smaller scale support for other incidents such as wild fires, floods, tornados, blizzards, or other disasters. The United States Joint Forces Command generally provides Northern Command the military resources and forces it needs to assist civil authorities. The National Guard Bureau is the federal military coordination, administrative, policy, and logistical center for the Army and Air National Guard and serves as the channel of communication between the United States Army, the United States Air Force, and the National Guard in 54 states and territories. The Bureau is responsible for formulating, developing, and coordinating policies, programs, and plans affecting Army and Air National Guard personnel. However, the Bureau does not have operational control over National Guard forces that are operating in either a state or federal status. The governor is the commander in chief of all National Guard units within the state’s jurisdiction that are not in active federal service. Command is normally exercised through the state’s adjutant general. During military support to civil authority operations, the National Guard Bureau provides policy guidance and facilitates assistance, when needed, by locating and coordinating out-of-state National Guard assistance. However, the actual execution of mutual assistance agreements between the states does not involve the National Guard Bureau. Over the years, we have completed a number of reviews related to disaster preparedness and response, and a list of our related reports and testimonies is included at the end of this report. Two reports that we issued in 1993 following Hurricane Andrew are of particular note. In the first, we identified problems related to inadequate damage assessments and coordination. In the second, we also addressed coordination issues. In both, we suggested that to improve DOD’s ability to respond to catastrophic events, the Congress might wish to consider amending Title 10 of the United States Code to allow reserve component units to be involuntarily activated to provide military assistance during catastrophes. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, disaster plans and training exercises involving the military were insufficient, and did not incorporate lessons learned from past catastrophes to fully delineate the military capabilities that could be needed to respond to a catastrophic natural disaster. The military had responded to numerous natural disasters and catastrophes in the past but these prior experiences were not reflected in key planning documents or in the disaster exercises that had been conducted prior to Hurricane Katrina. For example, the NRP contained few details about the specific military capabilities that would likely be needed in a natural disaster, even if the natural disaster were catastrophic. DOD’s emergency response plan also did not fully address the military capabilities that could be needed to respond to a catastrophic natural disaster. DOD’s primary planning document, Functional Plan 2501, was inadequate because it did not address the functions DOD could be asked to perform as a supporting agency for all 15 NRP emergency support functions. National Guard state plans, which had been sufficient for past smaller disasters, were also insufficient for large-scale catastrophes and did not adequately account for the outside assistance that could be needed during a catastrophe. Moreover, disaster plans had not been tested and refined with a robust exercise program. As a result of the inadequate plans—and the lack of realistic exercises to test those plans—a lack of understanding existed within the military and among federal, state, and local responders as to the types of assistance and capabilities that the military might provide, the timing of this assistance, and the respective contributions of the active- duty and National Guard components. Disaster plans in place prior to Hurricane Katrina did not adequately delineate military capabilities that could be needed to respond to a catastrophic event. Over the years, the military has been frequently called upon to provide assistance in the aftermath of hurricanes and other disasters. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the largest disaster-relief deployment of military forces was in 1992 when Hurricane Andrew swept across south Florida.