Approximately 2.6 million federal employees throughout the United States and abroad execute the responsibilities of the federal government. Fed employees work in every state, with about 90 percent outside the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. Federal workers perform functions across a multitude of sectors, from those vital to the long-term well-being of the country—such as environmental protection, intelligence, social work, and financial services—to those directly charged with aspects of public safety—including corrections, airport and aviation safety, medical services, border protection, and agricultural safety. Worker protection strategies are crucial to sustain an adequate workforce a during a pandemic. During the peak of an outbreak of a severe influenz pandemic in the United States, an estimated 40 percent of the workforce ly could be unable to work because of illness, the need to care for ill fami s to members, or fear of infection. While the commitment of federal worker carry out the missions of their agencies during natural and man-made disasters and emergencies is evident from past disasters, critical federal workers have sometimes been left to fend for themselves during such situations. For example, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, many essential federal personnel in New Orleans did not have housin and, therefore, were not able to return to work. Unlike oil and gas w in New Orleans, whose companies sought to secure housing for them, local federal workers did not have an advocate that would ensure the speedy reconstitution of essential services. In many cases, essential federal employees queued up for temporary housing in long lines. The federal government has issued guidance to assist organizations of all types in developing plans for pandemic events, including a national strategy that discusses the threat and potential impact of a pandemic influenza event and an implementation plan for the national strategy that identifies roles and responsibilities for the federal government sector, and others. HHS has also published a series of checklists inten to aid preparation for a pandemic across all segments of society. These ded include checklists for organizations such as state and local governments U.S. businesses, individuals and families, schools, health care organizations, and community organizations. As pandemic influenza presents unique challenges to the coordination of the federal effort, joint and integrated planning across all levels of government and the private sector is essential to ensure that available national capabilities and authorities produce detailed plans and response actions that are complementary, compatible, and coordinated. All federal agencies are expected to develop their own pandemic plans that along with other requirements, describe how each agency will prov for the safety and health of its employees and support the federal government’s efforts to prepare for, respond to, and recover from a pandemic. Because the dynamic nature of pandemic influenza requires that the scope of federal government continuity of operations (COOP) planning includes preparing for a catastrophic event that is not geographically or temporally bounded, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) concluded that planning for a pandemic requires a state of preparedness that is beyond traditional federal government COOP planning. For example, for pandemic planning purposes, essential functions may be broader than 30-day traditional COOP-essential functions. Federal agency pandemic planning guidance can be found at http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/federal/index.html. The Implementation Plan issued in May 2006 directs federal agencies to have operational pandemic plans. Agencies’ responses to our survey questions indicate that the agencies’ preparedness efforts are less than uniform. Although all of the 24 CFO Act agencies reported being engaged in planning for pandemic influenza to some degree, several agencies reported that they were still developing their pandemic plans. According to the survey responses, the development of practices for federal workforce protection in the event of a pandemic is also at the beginning stages for several agencies. In November of 2006, the HSC issued the Key Elements of Departmental Pandemic Influenza Operational Plan (Key Elements), which had a checklist for federal agencies to use in their pandemic preparedness. The Key Elements checklist covered subjects dealing with the safety and health of department employees, essential functions and services and how agencies will maintain them in the event of significant and sustained absenteeism, support of the federal response, and communication with stakeholders during a pandemic. The Key Elements stated that to ensure uniform preparedness across the U.S. government, the HSC was including a request that by December 2006 the agencies certify in writing to the HSC that they were addressing applicable elements of the checklist. A letter to the council stating that an agency was addressing the elements in the checklist in its planning was sufficient for certification. According to White House counsel from the prior administration, all of the 24 CFO Act agencies required to certify with the HSC did so, although not all of the agencies met the December 2006 deadline. Subsequently, in August 2008, the HSC revised the Key Elements to reflect current federal government guidance on pandemic planning. The HSC requested that all department and agency heads recertify that their pandemic plans were addressing all the applicable elements of pandemic planning stipulated in the updated checklist by October 15, 2008. The updated checklist provided revisions of some key elements and added new elements. Additionally, the revised checklist required that agencies plan for a severe pandemic, which requires planning for prolonged implementation of community mitigation measures that could affect workforce absenteeism, such as school closures, for up to 12 weeks. A new planning element also asked if the agency planned to purchase and stockpile antiviral medications and personal protective equipment for employees identified through risk assessments. Our survey questions for the pandemic coordinators of the 24 CFO Act agencies focused on areas similar to the elements from the HSC checklist dealing with the safety and health of agency employees and essential functions. In addition to asking agencies about their pandemic plans, we asked them whether they have identified essential functions other than first response that cannot be performed remotely in the event of a pandemic, planned measures to protect workers who will not be able to work remotely, established social distancing strategies, tested their IT capabilities, and communicated their human capital pandemic policies. Survey responses represent the main department or agency only unless components are specifically mentioned. In the introduction to the Key Elements, the HSC recognized that pandemic planning is not a static process and encouraged departments and agencies to revise their plans and procedures as new federal guidance is developed. However, several of the agencies we surveyed reported that they were still formulating their pandemic plans in May 2008. For example, the Small Business Administration (SBA) stated that the agency had begun drafting its pandemic plan but had not completed or cleared it. In February 2009, SBA reported that it had begun to draft a more complete pandemic influenza annex to its COOP plan with an estimated completion date of spring 2009. The Department of Defense (DOD) had completed its overarching departmentwide plan, which tasked its components to develop COOP pandemic plans. The department was coordinating the plans among the combatant commands and military services. DOD officials commented that some DOD components have had pandemic influenza plans in place for several years. In addition, DOD installations have been required to have Force Health Protection Plans for years, and DOD reported that the installations are tailoring these plans to include pandemic influenza considerations. All of the 24 CFO Act agencies surveyed, with the exception of OPM, the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), required their components to develop pandemic plans. OPM indicated that all of its essential functions are performed at the department level. NSF reported not having any essential functions as defined by Federal Continuity Directive 2 but that it does have important government functions that the agency intends to continue during a pandemic. According to an NSF continuity manager, all of NSF’s government functions are performed at the department level. HUD did not explain why it did not require its components to develop pandemic plans. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), SBA, the General Services Administration (GSA), the Department of State (DOS), the Department of Energy (DOE), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) required regional and program offices, in addition to components and bureaus, where applicable, to develop pandemic plans, and as mentioned previously, the DOD combatant commands and services were required to prepare and validate plans. Six of the agencies surveyed—the Department of Commerce (DOC), the Department of Education (Education), EPA, Treasury, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and SBA—reported requiring their components to incorporate pandemic planning into or develop pandemic annexes or addenda to their COOP plans. DOC, for example, reported providing templates to each of its components to assist them in developing their own annexes or addenda to their COOP plans. The Implementation Plan instructs agencies that institutional planning efforts should address the question of the agency’s essential functions and how they will be maintained in the event of significant and sustained absenteeism. Furthermore, the Key Elements asks for plans to include definitions and identification of essential functions needed to sustain agency mission and operation. This includes the determination of which, if any, essential functions, or nonessential operational support functions can be suspended and for what duration before adversely affecting agency mission. The Key Elements also calls on agencies to identify positions, skills, and personnel needed to continue essential functions and develop a plan to ensure and consider appropriate level of staffing to continue these functions. Identifying essential functions and enumerating the employees who would perform them is the first step in training those employees, communicating the risks and expectations of working during a pandemic, and budgeting and planning for measures that would mitigate those risks. Of the 24 agencies surveyed, 19 reported that they have identified essential functions at both the department and component levels that cannot be continued through telework in the event of pandemic influenza or, in the case of OPM and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), determined that all of their essential functions could be performed remotely. NSF reported that all of its important government functions could be performed remotely.