Since the 1960s, the United States has used satellites to observe the earth and its land, oceans, atmosphere, and space environments. Satellites provide a global perspective of the environment and allow observations in areas that may be otherwise unreachable or unsuitable for measurements. Used in combination with ground, sea, and airborne observing systems, satellites have become an indispensable part of measuring and forecasting weather and climate. For example, satellites provide the graphical images used to identify current weather patterns, as well as the data that go into numerical weather prediction models. These models are used to forecast weather 1 to 2 weeks in advance and to issue warnings about severe weather, including the path and intensity of hurricanes. Satellite data are also used to warn infrastructure owners when increased solar activity is expected to affect key assets, including communication satellites or the electric power grid. When collected over time, satellite data can also be used to observe climate change—the trends and changes in the earth’s climate. These data are used to monitor and project seasonal, annual, and decadal changes in the earth’s temperature, vegetation coverage, and ozone coverage. Since the 1960s, the United States has operated two separate operational polar-orbiting meteorological satellite systems: the Polar- orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) series, which is managed by NOAA, and the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP), which is managed by the Air Force. Two operational DMSP satellites and one operational POES satellite are currently in orbit and are positioned so that they cross the equator in the early morning, midmorning, and early afternoon. In addition, the government relies on a European satellite, called the Meteorological Operational satellite, for data in the midmorning orbit. Together, they ensure that, for any region of the earth, the data provided to users are generally no more than 6 hours old. With the expectation that combining the POES and DMSP programs would reduce duplication and result in sizable cost savings, a May 1994 Presidential Decision Directive required NOAA and DOD to converge the two satellite programs into a single satellite program—NPOESS—capable of satisfying both civilian and military requirements. To manage this program, DOD, NOAA, and NASA formed a tri-agency Integrated Program Office, with NOAA responsible for overall program management for the converged system and for satellite operations, the Air Force responsible for acquisition, and NASA responsible for facilitating the development and incorporation of new technologies into the converged system. When its primary contract was awarded in August 2002, NPOESS was estimated to cost about $7 billion through 2026 and was considered critical to the United States’ ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting and global climate monitoring. To reduce the risk involved in developing new technologies and to maintain climate data continuity, the program planned to launch a demonstration satellite, called the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) in May 2006. NPP was to demonstrate selected instruments that would later be included on the NPOESS satellites. The first NPOESS satellite was to be available for launch in March 2008. However, in the years after the program was initiated, NPOESS encountered significant technical challenges in sensor development, program cost growth, and schedule delays. By November 2005, we estimated that the program’s cost had grown to $10 billion, and the schedule for the first launch was delayed by almost 2 years. These issues led to a 2006 restructuring of the program, which reduced the program’s functionality by decreasing the number of planned satellites, orbits, and instruments. The restructuring also led agency executives to decide to mitigate potential data gaps by using NPP as an operational satellite. Even after the restructuring, however, the program continued to encounter technical issues in developing two sensors, significant tri- agency management challenges, schedule delays, and further cost increases. To help address these issues, in recent years we have made a series of recommendations to, among other things, improve executive- level oversight and develop realistic time frames for revising cost and schedule baselines. Faced with costs that were expected to exceed $14 billion and launch schedules that were delayed by over 5 years, in August 2009, the Executive Office of the President formed a task force, led by the Office of Science and Technology Policy, to investigate the management and acquisition options that would improve the NPOESS program. As a result of this review, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy announced in February 2010 that NOAA and DOD would no longer jointly procure the NPOESS satellite system; instead, each agency would plan and acquire its own satellite system. Specifically, NOAA is responsible for the afternoon orbit and the observations planned for the first and third NPOESS satellites. DOD is responsible for the early-morning orbit and the observations planned for the second and fourth NPOESS satellites. The partnership with the European satellite agencies for the midmorning orbit is to continue as planned. In May 2010, we reported on NOAA’s and DOD’s preliminary plans for initiating new environmental satellite programs and highlighted key transition risks facing the agencies. At that time, NOAA had developed preliminary plans for its new satellite acquisition program—called the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS). Specifically, NOAA planned to acquire two satellites (called JPSS-1 and JPSS-2) for launch in 2015 and 2018. NOAA also planned technical changes to the satellites, including using a smaller spacecraft than the one planned for NPOESS and removing sensors that were planned for the NPOESS satellites in the afternoon orbit. In addition, NOAA planned to transfer the management of the satellite acquisition from the NPOESS program office to NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center so that it could be co-located at a space system acquisition center, as advocated by an independent review team. NOAA developed a team to lead the transition from NPOESS to JPSS and planned to begin transitioning in July 2010 and complete a transition plan—including cost and schedule estimates—by the end of September 2010. NOAA estimated that the JPSS program would cost approximately $11.9 billion to complete through 2024. It also anticipated funding of about $1 billion in fiscal year 2011 to set up the new program office and handle the costs associated with transitioning contracts from the Air Force to NASA while continuing to develop NPP and the first JPSS satellite. DOD was at an earlier stage in its planning process at the time of our June 2010 testimony, in part because it had more time before the first satellite in the morning orbit was needed. DOD officials were developing plans—including costs, schedules, and functionality—for their new program, called the Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS). At that time, DOD expected to make final decisions on the spacecraft, sensors, procurement strategy, and staffing in August 2010, and to begin the program immediately. In our report, we noted that both agencies faced key risks in transitioning from NPOESS to their separate programs. These risks included the loss of key staff and capabilities, delays in negotiating contract changes and establishing new program offices, the loss of support for the other agency’s requirements, and insufficient oversight of new program management. We reported that until these risks were effectively mitigated, it was likely that the satellite programs’ costs would continue to grow and launch dates would continue to be delayed. We also noted that further delays could lead to gaps in the continuity of critical satellite data. We made recommendations to ensure that the transition from NPOESS to its successor programs was efficiently and effectively managed. Among other things, we recommended that the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce direct their respective NPOESS follow-on programs to expedite decisions on the expected cost, schedule, and capabilities of their planned programs and to direct their respective follow-on programs to develop plans to address the key transition risks we identified. As discussed below, the agencies have not yet fully implemented these recommendations. Over the last year, NOAA and NASA have worked to establish the JPSS program, to keep the NPP satellite’s development on track, and to begin developing plans for the JPSS satellite. However, of the funding made available to NOAA in its fiscal year 2011 appropriations, JPSS was allocated $471.9 million—far less than the $1 billion identified in the President’s budget to establish a program and stay on track with satellite deliverables. As a result, the JPSS program office decided to focus on developing NPP and the satellite’s ground system so that it could remain on track for an October 2011 launch. The program slowed development efforts on the first JPSS satellite and halted work on the second JPSS satellite. Table 1 shows the status of key components of NPP and JPSS-1. Although we recommended in May 2010 that NOAA expedite decisions on the cost, schedule, and capabilities of JPSS, NOAA has not yet done so. According to NOAA officials, uncertainty surrounding the agency’s fiscal year 2011 budget has made it difficult to establish a program baseline. However, NOAA has developed a requirements document and is obtaining an independent cost estimate. The agency expects to have a complete program baseline in place by February 2012. Until this baseline is in place, it is not clear what functionality will be delivered by when and at what cost. Given the critical development activities planned for 2012, it is imperative that NOAA move expeditiously to establish a credible program baseline. NOAA is facing a potential gap in satellite data continuity. When NPOESS was first disbanded, program officials anticipated launching the JPSS satellites in 2015 and 2018 (while acknowledging that these dates could change as the program’s plans were firmed up). Over the past year, as program officials made critical decisions to defer work on JPSS in order to keep NPP on track, the launch dates for JPSS-1 and JPSS-2 have changed.