The Congressional Review Act (CRA) is an oversight tool that Congress may use to overturn a rule issued by a federal agency. When Congress passes a law, it often grants rulemaking authority to federal agencies to implement provisions in the law. That delegation of rulemaking authority, and the rules issued by federal agencies under this authority, is a crucial component of the policy process. Congress has an interest in ensuring that, when issuing rules, federal agencies are faithful to congressional intent. To conduct proper oversight of federal agency actions, Congress has a number of tools available, including the CRA. The CRA was enacted in 1996 as part of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA). Under the CRA, before a rule can take effect, an agency must submit the rule to Congress and the Government Accountability Office (GAO). Upon receipt of the rule by Congress, Members of Congress have a specified time period in which to submit and take action on a joint resolution disapproving the rule. If both houses pass the resolution, it is sent to the President for signature or veto. If the President were to veto the resolution, Congress could vote to override the veto. The CRA establishes a special set of parliamentary procedures for considering a joint resolution disapproving an agency final rule. Supporters cite two main advantages to these procedures over the regular legislative process. First, when a joint resolution of disapproval meets certain criteria, it cannot be filibustered in the Senate. Specifically, once 20 calendar days have passed after the receipt and publication of the final rule, the Senate committee to which a joint resolution disapproving the rule has been referred can be discharged of further consideration if 30 Senators sign and file a petition. Once the committee is discharged, any Senator can make a nondebatable motion to proceed to consider the disapproval resolution. Should the Senate choose to consider the disapproval resolution, debate on it is limited and a final vote would be all but guaranteed. The second advantage of the CRA process often cited by its supporters is that if a joint resolution of disapproval is enacted, it not only invalidates the rule in question, but in most cases also bars the agency from issuing another rule in "substantially the same form" as the disapproved rule unless authorized to do so in a subsequent law. In the case of some major rules, use of the CRA mechanism may make the rule go into effect more quickly than it otherwise would. Under the requirements of the CRA, agencies must delay the effective date of major rules by at least 60 days. This is essentially an extension of the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA's) requirement that agencies delay the effective date of rules by at least 30 days. Should either chamber choose to consider a joint resolution disapproving a major rule and then vote to reject it, the rule in question may go into force immediately, notwithstanding any layover period in its effective date established by the CRA. No rule may go into effect, however, until the effective date set by the agency in the rule itself has been reached. This provision of the CRA could be viewed as an advantage for Members who support a particular major rule and want it to take effect as soon as possible. The CRA provides Congress with a method of conducting oversight of agency rulemaking. Not only can Congress use the CRA to overturn agency rules, but certain provisions of the CRA may help to increase congressional awareness of federal agency actions in general. The requirement for agencies to submit their rules to Congress, and the subsequent referral of each rule to the committee of jurisdiction, functions as a notification mechanism through which committees and Members can be made aware of rulemaking activity in which they may be interested. Although Members are likely to become aware of high-profile rules that are of broad interest and receive national media attention, the referral of each rule upon receipt in Congress provides an additional notification for rules that may be of a more localized or specialized interest to Members. In addition, the threat of submission or passage of a disapproval resolution may provide a mechanism through which a Member can pressure an agency for a particular outcome, either on that particular rule or on another matter. On the other hand, however, the single successful use of the CRA to overturn an agency rule in 2001 (discussed in more detail below) suggests that agencies may not consider use of the CRA to be a credible threat, and Members of Congress may be best served by exploring other options to influence agency actions. As discussed more below (see " Presidential Veto/De Facto Supermajority Requirement "), the biggest obstacle to enactment of a CRA resolution is generally considered to be the likelihood that a President would veto a joint resolution disapproving a rule issued by his own Administration. It might be expected, however, that Presidents are more likely to sign a resolution disapproving a rule that has been issued by an independent regulatory agency, a type of agency over which the President has less control. Congress created a number of federal agencies with certain characteristics to make them independent from the President, and, in some cases, from Congress itself. Those agencies are generally referred to as independent regulatory agencies or independent regulatory commissions. The President has limited ability to remove officials from those agencies, for example, and those agencies' budget requests may be submitted directly to Congress without modification by the President. In addition, some agencies may receive their funding outside the annual appropriations process. Most notably for rulemaking purposes, the independent regulatory agencies do not submit their regulations to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review, unlike executive agencies such as Cabinet departments. Therefore, the independent regulatory agencies' regulations are considered to be more removed from presidential control than executive agencies', because the President—through OMB—does not have a direct influence over the content of their rules. As such, the rules issued by those agencies are more likely to be incongruent with the President's policy preferences, so that he may be more likely to sign a resolution disapproving such a rule. As one scholar states, "while still not representing much of a change from the Article I legislative process, the CRA may provide some real power in the case of political review of rulemaking by independent agencies." Another potential advantage of the CRA is that it provides a method for Members of Congress to draw attention to a particular rule or to make clear their position on a rule. The required language of a joint resolution of disapproval, which is stipulated in the CRA, provides for a relatively straightforward process through which a Member can make clear his or her opposition to a rule. In addition, the expedited procedures by which a resolution may reach the Senate floor provide an opportunity for a minority of the Senate to obtain floor consideration. Another benefit of the CRA, for Members of Congress as well as for the public, is that it has increased opportunities for transparency in the federal rulemaking process, primarily through a database compiled by GAO. Since the CRA's enactment, GAO has posted the rules agencies submit to GAO under the CRA to a database on its website that is publicly available. The website can be used to search for final rules that have been published by agencies, by elements such as the title, issuing agency, date of publication, type of rule (major or non-major), and effective date. The website also contains GAO's reports on major rules that are required under the CRA and discussed more below. Use of the CRA mechanism also involves several potential procedural disadvantages: First, one might argue that the likelihood of a presidential veto (discussed in detail below) constitutes a de facto supermajority requirement to which most CRA disapproval resolutions are likely to be subject. Second, the CRA does not establish any "fast track" procedures for initial consideration of a disapproval resolution in the House of Representatives. As a result, unless the House majority party is willing to schedule the measure for consideration, it in all likelihood will not be considered. Third, unlike the regular legislative process, the CRA disapproval mechanism is available in the Senate only during certain specific time periods. Fourth, calculating the periods established by the CRA for submitting and acting on a disapproval resolution can be difficult, especially in cases where the act provides for additional submission and action periods in a subsequent session of Congress. Fifth, unlike regular legislation, each CRA disapproval resolution can only be aimed at a single agency final rule in its entirety; multiple disapproval resolutions cannot be "bundled" together and still maintain their privileged parliamentary status. Finally, as is noted above, if either chamber rejects a CRA disapproval resolution on a major rule, it could have the effect of putting a regulation in force sooner than would otherwise be the case. This provision of the CRA could be viewed as a disadvantage for Members who oppose a particular major rule and would prefer as long of a period as possible to elapse before the rule becomes effective. Unlike under the regular legislative process, the CRA can only be used to invalidate an agency final rule in its entirety; it cannot be used to modify or restructure a rule in order to make it acceptable to Congress. If Congress were to use the regular legislative process instead of the CRA, Congress could invalidate part of a rule or instruct the agency to amend or repeal part of a rule. However, regular legislation would not be eligible for the same expedited procedures in the Senate in the same way a CRA resolution would. It would not be assured of the opportunity for floor consideration and might be subject to filibuster. Perhaps the most widely cited reason why the CRA has been used to overturn only one rule is that a President is generally expected to veto a joint resolution of disapproval attempting to overturn a rule proposed by his own Administration. A joint resolution of disapproval requires the signature of the President to become law—a very unlikely prospect if his own Administration issued the rule. If the President were to veto the measure, Congress could attempt to override the veto.