The original U.N. Headquarters complex, located in New York City, was considered among the most modern facilities when it was constructed between 1949 and 1952. The United States financed construction of the original complex—the General Assembly, Secretariat, and Conference Building—by providing the United Nations with a no-interest loan equivalent to about $420 million in 2003 dollars. The rest of the complex— the Dag Hammarskjöld Library, the underground North Lawn Extension, South Annex, and Unitar Building—was built between 1960 and 1982 and was funded through the U.N. regular budget or private donations (see fig. 1). Currently, the complex accommodates the needs of 191 U.N. member countries and approximately 4,700 U.N. staff. However, the U.N. buildings do not conform to current safety, fire, and building codes and do not meet U.N. technology or security requirements. The United Nations estimates it would cost more than $2 billion over 25 years for repairs and system replacements in the absence of a major renovation. In June 2001, we reported that the Secretary-General’s first Capital Master Plan had defined the need for renovation, established the Secretary- General’s expectations for the project, and provided options for a multiyear effort to renovate the headquarters. The General Assembly reviewed the plan and approved $8 million to further develop the conceptual designs and associated cost estimates for the renovation. The General Assembly agreed with the Secretary-General’s assumptions, which provided the framework for the renovation planning. These assumptions included the following: The headquarters complex would remain at its current location in New York. The complex should be energy efficient, free of hazardous materials, and compliant with host city building, fire, and safety codes. The complex should meet all reasonable security requirements. Disruption to the work of the United Nations should be kept to a minimum. In August 2002, the Secretary-General presented the General Assembly with a more detailed Capital Master Plan and endorsed a renovation approach that included the temporary relocation of most U.N. staff and delegates to “swing space” in a proposed new building (see fig. 2 for the swing space location and app. II for more information on the renovation approach). In December 2002, the General Assembly adopted a resolution endorsing the renovation approach and approved $25.5 million for detailed designs and cost estimates to be developed in 2003. The General Assembly also approved $26 million to complete the design process in 2004–2005. The General Assembly does not plan to make a final decision on whether to proceed with the renovation until financing is secured. In developing the renovation conceptual plan and cost estimate, U.N. officials, their architect-engineering firm, and subconsultants followed a reasonable planning process that was consistent with leading practices. In addition, U.N. officials and their security subconsultant followed a process consistent with recognized guidelines to develop plans for improving security at the U.N. complex. The United Nations is still in the early planning stages of the project—the first phase of a five-phase process. For this reason, changes to the scope and cost of the proposed renovation are to be expected. The overall U.N. process to develop a conceptual plan followed leading facility acquisition practices. Competitively procured an architect-engineering firm. U.N. renovation officials used a competitive process to procure the services of an architect-engineering firm (see app. III for the names of the firms involved). The United Nations received 15 responses to its request for proposals from firms representing six different countries. In 2001, the United Nations selected and hired an architect-engineering firm to prepare a comprehensive renovation design concept and cost analysis. The architect-engineering firm used subconsultants with recognized expertise in construction disciplines such as cost estimation, security, and structural engineering. Obtained assessments of the complex’s condition. The architect- engineering firm and subconsultants reviewed condition assessments conducted in 1998 and performed additional inspections and assessments of the complex’s condition as needed. For example, they completed a new assessment of the Secretariat Building’s deteriorating window structure. U.N. officials subsequently concluded that it was more cost effective to replace the window structure than to renovate it, as had been previously planned. Retained firm to review the renovation conceptual plan. U.N. officials retained the services of a consulting engineer to assist them in reviewing the conceptual planning reports and recommendations. Involved U.N. managers in the planning. U.N. officials involved facility managers, such as those responsible for building and program management, security, and information technology, in the planning process to ensure that the renovation would meet their needs. The managers were asked to verify the conditions and problems identified by the architect-engineering firm and subconsultants and comment on whether the proposals would address their needs. To develop a preliminary cost estimate, U.N. officials and the cost estimating subconsultant followed industry best practices established by the Construction Industry Institute. Defined the scope of the project and work plan, including responsibilities, schedule, and project budget. U.N. officials identified the building improvements that were to be included in the project scope: replacing heating, air conditioning, and electrical systems; refurbishing the window structure on the Secretariat Building; enhancing security measures; and modernizing communication and technology capabilities. The U.N. contract with the architect-engineering firm established the schedule for the cost estimating subconsultant to submit three cost estimates for approval. To compare the renovation approach budgets, U.N. officials also instructed the cost estimating subconsultant to develop one renovation approach within the budget parameters of the 2000 Capital Master Plan. Standardized the cost estimate format. U.N. officials used a standardized cost estimate format, including elements such as professional fees, labor and material costs, design and construction contingencies, and escalation costs to account for inflation. The standardized format enables U.N. officials to compare current and future cost estimates as the project progresses through the design process. Reviewed and checked cost estimate. U.N. officials reviewed the cost estimate to ensure that the conceptual planning estimates were within acceptable cost parameters. For the final review, U.N. officials hired a cost estimating consultant to peer review the cost estimate. While the peer reviewer’s assumptions were more conservative than the subconsultant’s assumptions, the peer reviewer’s cost estimate was within 5 percent of the subconsultant’s cost estimate. Based on the peer review, U.N. officials adjusted the cost estimate. Documented and reported the final cost estimate and range of accuracy. The cost estimating subconsultant delivered the final cost estimate, including contingencies that are meant to reflect the accuracy of the estimate, to U.N. renovation officials for the 2002 Capital Master Plan in August 2002. Consistent with industry practices, the subconsultant added a design contingency to allow for changes that typically occur during the design process. The subconsultant also added a construction contingency to allow for unforeseen or unknown costs. For example, structural conditions hidden by current construction may conflict with planned renovations and require contract changes. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United Nations enhanced security at the U.N. complex and added security measures to the Capital Master Plan (see app. IV for further information). U.N. officials and the U.N. security subconsultant identified the additional security measures through a process consistent with recognized security risk management guidelines. We have previously reported on these guidelines, which members of the U.S. intelligence and defense community follow and can provide a sound foundation for effective security. Identified the assets to be protected and the impact of their potential loss. The security subconsultant identified assets at the United Nations to be protected, such as the buildings and the perimeter. The United Nations also evaluated the importance of each asset, the potential impact of its loss, and the methods to maintain operations if the assets were lost or damaged. Identified threats to those assets. U.N. security officials consulted with relevant federal and local U.S. officials to assess changing threats to the United Nations. According to U.N. officials and the security subconsultant, they designed the security initiative in the Capital Master Plan to address these threat levels. Identified vulnerabilities. The security subconsultant reviewed five previous vulnerability assessments and conducted their own assessment of the entire complex to verify vulnerabilities and identify needed security upgrades. Assessed risks (potential for loss or damage) and determined priorities. Following security guidelines from the U.S. Interagency Security Committee, the security subconsultant developed a risk assessment that reflected its analysis of the threats to the U.N. complex and its vulnerabilities. Based on the risk assessment, U.N. officials then prioritized the security needs of the complex. According to an expert from the Interagency Security Committee, the risk assessment process used to develop the planned security upgrades was reasonable based on the consultant’s report to the United Nations. Identified countermeasures that mitigate risks. The security subconsultant used the risk assessment to identify and recommend more than 100 security measures for the Capital Master Plan. U.N. officials organized these security upgrades into two components—those in the baseline scope of the Capital Master Plan and those in a package of options. The security risk management guidelines are not a rigid set of procedures, but rather recognized steps to ensure that critical issues are considered when designing a security program. Additionally, U.N. security officials sought peer review input from other U.N. departments and public and private sector security experts when designing the security program. According to security officials from the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy and the General Services Administration, the U.N. process for developing the security initiatives in the Capital Master Plan was reasonable. U.N. officials have completed only the first phase of the renovation process by developing a conceptual plan for the proposed renovation.