Within DNN, two programs manage research and technology development projects: the DNN Research and Development (DNN R&D) program and the Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NPAC) program. These two programs have established program areas to focus their research and technology development activities. DNN R&D program areas. Within the DNN R&D program, two program areas pursue research and technology development projects: Nuclear Detonation Detection and Proliferation Detection. The Nuclear Detonation Detection program area develops and provides global monitoring capabilities for detecting foreign nuclear weapon detonations, in order to meet both treaty monitoring and military needs. The Proliferation Detection program area develops capabilities to detect special nuclear materials (which include plutonium and highly enriched uranium), to detect weapons production and movement, and to enhance transparent nuclear reductions and monitoring. These two program areas each are divided into three functional areas. The Nuclear Detonation Detection program area’s three functional Space-based Nuclear Detonation Detection, which develops and builds space-based sensors for nuclear explosion detection; Ground-based Nuclear Detonation Detection, which produces and updates modeling and analysis capabilities—such as software codes and algorithms that help distinguish underground nuclear detonations from natural seismic events—and provides other technical support for the nation’s ground-based nuclear explosion monitoring networks; and Forensics-based Nuclear Detonation Detection, which conducts R&D to advance capabilities in the field of nuclear forensics analysis. The Proliferation Detection program area’s three functional areas Nuclear Weaponization and Material Production Detection, which supports the development of technology to detect and characterize the production of nuclear weapons and related materials by foreign entities; Nuclear Weapons and Material Security, which, among other things, develops tools for nuclear security, treaty monitoring and verification, and operational interdiction and nuclear security efforts across NNSA; and Enabling Capabilities, which develops cross-cutting technologies applicable to multiple NNSA and interagency missions. NPAC program areas. Within the NPAC program, two program areas pursue technology development projects: International Nuclear Safeguards (Safeguards), among other things, develops technologies to detect and deter undeclared nuclear materials and activities. Specifically, Safeguards’ activities include developing and transferring tools, technologies, and approaches to improve U.S., IAEA, and IAEA member states’ capabilities in undertaking IAEA safeguards activities, such as monitoring uranium enrichment levels in nuclear facilities. Nuclear Verification (Verification), among other things, develops and deploys technologies to maintain the United States’ ability to monitor and verify nuclear reduction agreements, detect treaty violations, and verify other nuclear nonproliferation commitments. The goals of the Verification program area include developing technologies to verifiably and irreversibly disable nuclear facilities in countries of concern. Figure 1 illustrates the structure of the DNN programs and functional areas that manage research and technology development projects. From fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2015, DNN R&D and NPAC obligated a total of more than $1.1 billion on 511 research and technology development projects. The DNN R&D program obligated more than $1 billion on 420 projects, and the NPAC program obligated about $73 million on 91 projects. According to NNSA officials we interviewed, the Space-based Nuclear Detonation Detection functional area expenditures were mostly for production activities that resulted in technologies deployed to end users, rather than for basic and applied R&D, in contrast with the other DNN R&D program functional areas. DNN R&D and NPAC projects are undertaken at DOE and NNSA national laboratories and sites; these projects generally last about 3 years from beginning to end, according to program officials. Table 1 shows the number of projects undertaken and funding obligated in each program and functional area from fiscal years 2012 through 2015. According to NNSA officials, the end users of technologies resulting from DNN’s research and technology development programs include DOD, including its Defense Threat Reduction Agency, U.S. Strategic Command, and Air Force Technical Applications Center; DHS; State; IAEA and other international organizations, including the CTBTO; international governments; universities; and private industry, including small business. NNSA itself also uses some of the technologies that result from DNN’s research and technology development programs. The full extent to which research and technology development projects managed by NNSA’s DNN R&D and NPAC programs have resulted in advanced, transitioned, or deployed technologies is unclear because NNSA does not consistently track and document all of these project outcomes. However, by reviewing a range of information on a nongeneralizable sample of 91 DNN research and technology development projects, as well as interviewing end users of technologies that resulted from some of the projects, we were able to determine the outcomes of these projects. More specifically, we found that 88 of the 91 projects in the sample resulted in technologies being advanced—that is, the project progressed the technology itself or the scientific knowledge behind the technology. Additionally, we found that, among these 88 projects, 33 resulted in technologies being transitioned—that is, provided to users outside of the project team for further development or deployment. Finally, we found that 17 of these 33 projects resulted in deployed technologies—that is, we were able to confirm that a technology was being actively used in the field by a federal agency or foreign partner. The full extent to which NNSA’s research and technology development projects result in advanced, transitioned, or deployed technologies is unclear because NNSA does not consistently track and document all of these project outcomes. Both the DNN R&D and NPAC programs track and document projects’ results in advancing technologies. For instance, the DNN R&D program uses an online system, WebPMIS, to track project costs and maintain an archive of project-related documentation. This documentation includes project reports that provide information on the scientific and technological advancements that result from a project. Similarly, the NPAC program provided documentation of technology advancement for our review. However, the DNN R&D program, which is by far the larger program, does not consistently track and document projects that result in technologies being transitioned or deployed. NNSA officials acknowledged that the DNN R&D program does not use the WebPMIS system, or otherwise collect and maintain information, to track and document whether its projects result in technologies that have been transitioned to or deployed by end users. As a result, the DNN R&D program was not able to readily provide us with information on the extent to which its projects result in transitioned or deployed technologies. In contrast, we found that the NPAC program tracks and documents the extent to which its safeguards– and verification-related projects have resulted in technology transition or deployment, as well as tracking scientific and technological advancements. For example, NNSA officials provided us with information on all NPAC projects for the past 5 fiscal years that showed whether technologies that projects developed have been deployed; they also provided documentation of technologies that have been transitioned to end users. Both the DNN R&D and NPAC programs list technology transition—which includes providing technologies to end users, who may then deploy them—as a goal in strategic planning documents. In addition, NPAC program officials told us that their program evaluates its success in part based on the extent to which end users deploy technologies that the NPAC program develops. Similarly, DNN R&D program officials said that meeting end users’ technology needs constitutes an important part of their program mission. Moreover, under federal internal control standards, management should design control activities to achieve objectives and respond to risks, and should record, communicate, and use quality information to enable managers to carry out internal control responsibilities and evaluate program performance in achieving key objectives. Differing program emphases—both between the DNN R&D and NPAC programs and among the DNN R&D program’s functional areas—may account for the inconsistencies we found in NNSA’s tracking and documentation of transition– and deployment-related project outcomes. For instance, the NPAC program generally focuses on developing technologies at higher readiness levels to prepare them for transition and deployment in the field, according to NNSA officials. Conversely, most of the DNN R&D program’s functional areas conduct R&D on technologies that are further from being deployment-ready because they require more basic work at lower technology readiness levels, with some exceptions, NNSA officials told us. Notably, the DNN R&D program’s Space-based Nuclear Detonation Detection functional area has a history, dating to the 1960s, of researching, developing, and producing successive upgrades to technologies used by the U.S. Atomic Energy Detection System and its space-based element, the U.S. Nuclear Detonation Detection System, to monitor and detect nuclear detonations, NNSA officials stated. Officials in the DNN R&D program office said that well-defined DOD technology requirements and delivery schedules drive these research, development, and production activities; as a result, the Space-based Nuclear Detonation Detection functional area has a stronger focus on technology production and deployment than the other DNN R&D program functional areas, which typically do not have similarly specific requirements and schedules. relevant data from reliable internal and external sources, processing the data into quality information, and then considering the data to make informed decisions and evaluate program performance. providing end users with tools or knowledge that are sufficiently ready for the end user to take the final steps necessary for the technology’s use in mission-specific purposes, such as adapting a detection algorithm or producing a field-ready detector array.