Since we identified DOD’s Personnel Security Clearance program as a high-risk area, DOD, in conjunction with Congress and other executive agency leadership, took actions that resulted in significant progress toward resolving problems we identified with the security clearance program. In 2011, we removed DOD’s personnel security clearance program from our high-risk list because of the agency’s progress in improving timeliness and the development of tools and metrics to assess quality, as well as DOD’s commitment to sustaining progress. Importantly, congressional oversight and the committed leadership of the Suitability and Security Clearance Performance Accountability Council (Performance Accountability Council) –which has been responsible for overseeing security clearance reform efforts since 2008—greatly contributed to the progress of DOD and the governmentwide security clearance reform. Leadership in Congress and the executive branch demonstrated commitment to reforming the security clearance process to address longstanding problems associated with the personnel security clearance program. As we have previously noted, top leadership must be committed to organizational transformation. Specifically, leadership must set the direction, pace, and tone and provide a clear, consistent rationale that brings everyone together behind a single mission. Figure 1 illustrates key events related to the Suitability and Personnel Security Clearance Reform Effort. Congressional legislation and oversight has helped focus attention and sustain momentum to improve the processing of security clearances not only for DOD but governmentwide. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) established, among other things, milestones for reducing the time to complete initial clearances. We previously identified best practices for agencies to successfully transform their cultures including among other things, setting implementation goals and a timeline to build momentum and show progress from day one. IRTPA established an interim objective to be met by December 2006 under which DOD and other agencies that adjudicate security clearances were to make a decision on at least 80 percent of initial clearance applications within 120 days, on average. Further, IRTPA called for the executive branch to implement a plan by December 17, 2009, under which, to the extent practical, at least 90 percent of decisions are made on applications for an initial personnel security clearance within 60 days, on average. Additionally, IRTPA required the executive branch to begin providing annual reports to Congress in 2006 on the progress made the preceding year toward meeting IRTPA’s objectives for security clearances, including the length of time agencies took to complete the investigations and adjudications—the decision as to whether an individual should be granted eligibility for a clearance. GAO has testified on security clearance reform before this committee as well as the (1) Subcommittee on Intelligence Community Management, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, (2) the Subcommittee on Government Management, Organization, and Procurement, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and (3) Subcommittee on Readiness, House Committee on Armed Services. security clearance reform efforts. After that meeting, OMB, ODNI, DOD, OPM, and GAO provided a memorandum on May 31, 2010 to Chairman Akaka containing a matrix with 15 metrics for assessing the timeliness and quality of investigations, adjudications, reciprocity (an agency’s acceptance of a background investigation or clearance determination completed by any authorized investigative or adjudicative agency), and automation. The development of these metrics played a key role in GAO’s decision to remove DOD’s Personnel Security Clearance program from the high-risk list. Furthermore, we have noted for many years the central role that the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) could play in identifying and fostering improved coordination across related federal program efforts. The GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) for a more coordinated and crosscutting approach to achieve meaningful results. GPRAMA provides an opportunity for agencies to collect and report more timely and useful performance information on crosscutting programs. This performance information can play an important role in congressional decision making. In fact, Mr. Chairman, we conducted work for you focusing on how Congress can use such information to address challenges facing the government. DOD’s personnel security clearance program was one of three case studies we used to illustrate how Congress has used agency performance information in its decision making. Pub. L. No. 111-352, 124 Stat. 3886 (2011). GPRAMA amended the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285 (1993). placed the program on our high-risk list, top executive branch leadership put in place an effort to reform the security clearance process. For example, in 2007, DOD and ODNI formed the Joint Security Clearance Process Reform Team, known as the Joint Reform Team, to improve the security clearance process governmentwide. Specifically, they tasked the Joint Reform Team to execute joint reform efforts so that they achieve IRTPA timeliness goals and improve the processes related to granting security clearances. In 2008, the President in a memorandum called for a reform of the security clearance program and subsequently issued an executive order establishing the Performance Accountability Council. Under the executive order, this council is accountable to the President for leading the implementation of reform, including aligning security and suitability processes, holding agencies accountable for implementation, and establishing goals and metrics for progress. DOD worked with the Joint Reform Team and the Performance Accountability Council to develop a corrective action plan to improve timeliness and demonstrate progress toward reforming the security clearance process. For example, DOD’s leadership, in conjunction with the Joint Reform Team, developed a plan for reform that continuously evolved to incorporate new goals and address identified issues. To communicate these plans, the Joint Reform Team issued an initial reform plan in April 2008 that presented a new seven-step design intended to streamline the security clearance process, including the use of a more sophisticated electronic application, a more flexible investigation process, and the establishment of ongoing evaluation procedures between formal clearance investigations. The report was updated in December 2008 to include an outline of reform progress and further plans, and in March 2009 the Joint Reform Team issued its Enterprise Information Technology Strategy for the security clearance and suitability reform program. Then, in line with GAO recommendations, DOD worked with the Performance Accountability Council to issue a strategic framework that the council included in its 2010 report to the President. The strategic framework identified key governmentwide reform goals and identified the root causes for timeliness delays and delays to agencies honoring reciprocity. It also set forth a governmentwide mission, performance measures, a communications strategy, roles and responsibilities, and metrics to measure the quality of security clearance investigations and adjudications. DOD continues to work with the Performance Accountability Council to sustain clearance reform efforts and enhance transparency and accountability through annual reporting to Congress. DOD issued guidance on adjudication standards. In May 2009, we found that although DOD asserted that adjudicators follow a risk- management approach for granting security clearances, DOD had not issued formal guidance clarifying if and under what circumstances adjudicators can adjudicate incomplete investigative reports—such as missing information relevant to residences, employment, or education. As a result, we recommended that DOD issue guidance that clarifies when adjudicators may use incomplete investigative reports as the basis for granting clearances. Subsequently, on November 8, 2009, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence issued guidance on adjudication standards that outline the minimum documentation requirements adjudicators must adhere to when documenting personnel security clearance determinations for cases with potentially damaging information. On March 10, 2010, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence issued additional guidance that clarifies when adjudicators may use incomplete investigative reports as the basis for granting clearances. This guidance provides standards that can be used for the sufficient explanation of incomplete investigative reports. Further, according to DOD officials, in 2010, DOD created a Performance Accountability Directorate within the Directorate of Security to provide oversight and accountability for the DOD Central Adjudication Facilities that process DOD adjudicative decisions. One of DOD’s key actions that led to the removal of its personnel security clearance program from our high-risk list was that DOD was able to demonstrate its progress in having implemented corrective measures. Longstanding backlogs and delays in the clearance process led to our initial designation of this area as high risk. For example, in 2004, we testified that from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2003, the average time for DOD to determine clearance eligibility for industry personnel increased by 56 days to over 1 year. In 2005, we reported that DOD could not estimate the full size of its backlog, but we identified over 350,000 cases exceeding established timeframes for determining eligibility. Moreover, in 2007 and 2009, we reported that clearances continued to take longer than the timeliness goals prescribed in IRTPA. In 2011, we reported that DOD processed 90 percent of initial clearances in an average of 49 days for federal civilians, military, and industry personnel and met the 60-day statutory timeliness objective for processing all initial clearances in fiscal year 2010. Also we found that DOD completed 90 percent of initial clearances for industry personnel in an average of 63 days for all the data we reviewed in fiscal year 2010,demonstrating an improvement from what we found in 2004, when the average processing time for industry personnel was over a year. Our high-risk designation was based not only on problems with timeliness but also incomplete documentation of investigations and adjudications. We reported on missing documentation in investigative reports prepared by OPM that DOD adjudicators had used to make clearance eligibility decisions. In 2009, we estimated that 87 percent of about 3,500 OPM investigative reports provided to DOD in July 2008 were missing required documentation, which in most cases pertained to residences, employment, and education.