Securing foreign contributions to the military effort in Iraq, and the follow-on stabilization and reconstruction effort, has been a major priority for U.S. policymakers since before the launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003. International participation has been sought to support the initial major combat operations, the follow-on stabilization operations, the training and equipping of Iraqi security forces, and the provision of financial support to reconstruction efforts. For many countries, the passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1511 on October 6, 2003, marked an important milestone in establishing the legitimacy of the post-war international presence in Iraq. Resolution 1511 authorized a multinational force under unified (interpreted as U.S.) command to assist Iraqis in securing their country and in training their security forces. Security Council Resolution 1546 of June 8, 2004 reaffirmed this authorization and established the current U.N. mandate under which the U.S.-led multinational force is responsible for "[contributing] to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq." That mandate has since been extended for twelve month periods by Resolution 1637 (November 11, 2005), Resolution 1723 (November 28, 2006), and Resolution 1790 (December 18, 2007). On November 26, 2007, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and President Bush signed a "Declaration of Principles," expressing the decisions of both governments to work, by July 2008, to codify a long-term bilateral "strategic framework agreement" intended to replace the current U.N. mandate. The roles of U.S. and coalition forces in combat operations and the training of Iraqi security forces are likely to be key topics in the strategic framework negotiations. In particular, most observers agree that training is one of the activities most likely to be continued under any continuing U.S. or coalition presence in Iraq. The outcome of the U.S.-Iraqi negotiations is likely to shape the size, structure, and focus of the U.S. military presence in Iraq. Any changes to the U.S. mission, and any new Iraqi government positions concerning the roles of coalition forces, could easily affect both the need for and the perceived legitimacy of, foreign contributions to stabilization operations and training efforts. This report characterizes foreign contributions to Iraq in terms of personnel and resources, including trends over time, based on best-available information. The first section addresses financial contributions, including pledged grants and loans, and related debt relief. The second section describes troop contributions to the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I). The third section addresses contributions to the Iraqi security forces training effort. These sections are followed by a detailed chart that includes both financial and personnel contributions, and by a chronology of significant coalition-related events. The report will be updated as events warrant. In October 2003, the World Bank and United Nations Development Group (UNDG), in conjunction with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), estimated that the potential cost of Iraqi reconstruction needs would amount to $55 billion over a four year period from 2003 through 2007. This figure reflected the sum total of a joint World Bank/UNDG needs assessment of 14 sectors of the Iraqi government and economy—$36 billion—combined with a $19.4 billion Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) projection for security, oil, and other sectors not covered by the World Bank/UNDG assessment. These amounts, calculated in mid-2003, did not take into account the significant costs created by the instability and security disruptions that have occurred since that time. Shortly after the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1511 in October 2003, an international donors' conference for Iraq was held in Madrid, Spain. At that event, members of the international community, excluding the United States, pledged approximately $13.5 billion for reconstruction assistance to Iraq, including roughly $10 billion in loan pledges. As of October 2007, roughly $2.9 billion in additional pledges had been made, bringing the pledge total to approximately $16.4 billion. Loan pledges represent $10.8 billion of this total, and Iraq has accepted $2.2 billion in pledged loan assistance to date. Of the $5.6 billion pledged for grants, Iraq has received $4.8 billion. According to the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq, $1.766 billion of the pledged assistance has been channeled to the World Bank Iraq Trust Fund and UNDG Iraq Trust Fund. The UNDG Fund had committed close to $800 million for planned projects by the end of October 2007. To date, the United States Congress has appropriated nearly $43 billion for reconstruction programs in Iraq. Many observers credit persistent security problems and Iraqi government capacity deficiencies for the slow rate at which pledged international assistance has been committed and disbursed. Iraq's Ministry of Planning has established a Donor Assistance Database "to record donor assistance, analyze donor activities, and monitor the implementation of donor-funded projects." Iraq also has pursued debt relief through negotiations with members of the Paris Club as well as in the context of the International Compact with Iraq (ICI), which was launched at a summit in Sharm al-Sheikh, Egypt, on May 3, 2007. As of December 2006, Iraq's government owed its international creditors $89 billion. During 2007, roughly $28.9 billion in further loan forgiveness has been pledged. Four countries participated directly and openly in the major combat phase of operations in Iraq: the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Poland. Dozens of other coalition partners sent troops to Iraq in the immediate aftermath of major combat operations, and total troop contribution numbers reached their zenith in the early stabilization phase. The U.S.-led military command in Iraq has been known since May 2004 as the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I), and is headed by U.S. Gen. David Petraeus. More recently, coalition troop contribution numbers have experienced an overall decline. Some countries have withdrawn their contingents altogether, while others—in a common pattern—have withdrawn the bulk of their contingent, leaving a relatively small number of staff officers at headquarters within MNF-I. The United States remains the largest overall contributor of forces to MNF-I, with 161, 783 pairs of "boots on the ground" as of December 1, 2007. That number reflects the beginning of the drawdown of "surge" forces, beginning with the December 2007 redeployment of the 3 rd Brigade Combat Team of the 1 st Cavalry Division from Diyala province. Overall U.S. troop levels in Iraqi have varied over time, based on operational requirements, and included a peak of about 250,000 during major combat operations, and a post-major combat peak of about 168,000 in October 2007, reflecting the full "surge" force. Currently, the largest non-U.S. troop contributors to MNF-I are the United Kingdom, Georgia, Australia, South Korea, and Poland. All of these countries' major deployments are currently in some state of flux: The United Kingdom, under the leadership of new Prime Minister [author name scrubbed] since June 2007, is in the process of drawing down from a force of about 5,500 last summer, to 2,500 by spring 2008. Beginning in March 2007, Georgia increased its forces in Iraq from 850 to 2,000. Georgia will hold early presidential elections in January 2008, in a heated domestic political climate, and the results are likely to have a major impact on the future of the Georgian deployment. In November 2007, Australians elected a new Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, who had campaigned on plans to withdraw Australia's roughly 500-person "combat force" from Iraq by mid-2008. Some reports suggest that an Australian withdrawal decision, when made, may not affect approximately 1,000 Australian personnel involved with training, logistics and headquarters staffing in Iraq, and with maritime security operations in the northern Persian Gulf. In late October 2007, South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun announced a government decision to extend the deployment mandate for another year but to draw down the force from 1,200 to 600; South Korea holds presidential elections on December 19, 2007 and the Iraq deployment has been a key issue in the debates. In November 2007, in his first address to parliament, new Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk stated that his goal is to withdraw Poland's contingent from Iraq—in consultation with coalition partners—by the end of 2008. Ultimately, foreign government decisions to send forces to Iraq, or to redeploy them, may rest on a number of factors including the overall security situation; the domestic political environment in a donor country; legal restrictions these countries face in deploying troops in Iraq; the potential for foreign companies to invest in Iraq's economy; and bilateral arrangements between the United States and possible donors. Public discussions about the extent of the coalition force presence in Iraq have been marked by some confusion. There are several reasons for the apparent discrepancies. The actual number of troops on the ground is constantly in flux, in several ways: a troop-contributing country may decide to change the size of its contingent and/or the kinds of units deployed; the size of a contingent may change slightly at regularly scheduled unit rotations; and contingent size may vary to some degree based on individual situations such as injury or illness. Countries may deploy troops to Iraq to one of several different organizations: the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I); the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I); or the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). Further, some countries, such as Japan and Singapore, deploy troops that directly support MNF-I but are based outside Iraq (see below). The U.S. Department of Defense, which maintains regularly updated records of troop levels in Iraq, maintains those records in classified format.