Lebanon's Hezbollah ("Party of God") is a Shiite Islamist militia, political party, social welfare organization, and U.S. State Department-designated terrorist organization. Its armed element (referred to by many in Lebanon as "the resistance") receives support from Iran and Syria and possesses significant paramilitary and unconventional warfare capabilities that rival and in some cases exceed those of Lebanon's armed forces and police. The United States government holds Hezbollah responsible for a number of kidnappings and high-profile terrorist attacks against U.S., European, and Israeli interests since the early 1980s. In the wake of the summer 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah and an armed domestic confrontation between Hezbollah and rival Lebanese groups in May 2008, Lebanon's political process is now intensely focused on Hezbollah's future role in the country's political system and security sector. Despite its status as a U.S.-designated terrorist organization, Hezbollah politicians won 10 seats out of 128 in parliament in the 2009 national elections, and Hezbollah currently controls the Agriculture and Administrative Reform ministries in the cabinet. Hezbollah's militia also is firmly entrenched in areas it controls, making it unlikely that any domestic security force could uproot it by force. Hezbollah has traditionally defined itself and justified its paramilitary actions as legitimate resistance to Israeli occupation of Lebanese territory and as a necessary response to the relative weakness of Lebanese state security institutions. However, Israel's withdrawal from Lebanese territory in May 2000 and the strengthening of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Internal Security Forces (ISF) with international and U.S. support since 2006 have undermined these arguments and placed pressure on Hezbollah to adapt its rhetoric and policies. The current government's platform asserts "the right of Lebanon, through its people, army and resistance, to liberate or recover the Shib'a Farms, Kfar Shouba Hills and the Lebanese part of the occupied village of Al Ghajar and to defend Lebanon against any assault and safeguard its right to its water resources, by all legitimate and available means." Hezbollah and other Lebanese political parties have long emphasized the need to assert control over remaining disputed areas with Israel. However, current Hezbollah policy statements suggest that, even if disputed areas were secured, the group would seek to maintain a role for "the resistance" in providing for Lebanon's national defense and would resist any Lebanese or international efforts to disarm it as called for in the 1989 Taif Accord that ended the Lebanese civil war and more recently in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1701 (2006). Hezbollah continues to define itself primarily as a resistance movement and remains viscerally opposed to what it views as illegitimate U.S. and Israeli intervention in Lebanese and regional affairs. It categorically refuses to recognize Israel's right to exist and opposes all concluded and pending efforts to negotiate resolutions to Arab-Israeli disputes on the basis of mutual recognition, including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Given these positions, most observers believe that prospects for accommodation and engagement between the United States and Hezbollah are slim, even as the group's close relationships with Syria and Iran, its pivotal role in Lebanese politics, and reinvigorated U.S. engagement in regional peace efforts increase Hezbollah's potential influence over stated U.S. national security objectives. The Obama Administration is requesting $246 million in FY2011 foreign assistance to continue a multi-year program specifically designed to increase the central authority of the Lebanese state and deter the use of force by non-state actors. Since FY2006, the United States has provided more than $1.35 billion in assistance for Lebanon. Of that amount, the United States has invested more than $690 million to improve the capabilities of the LAF and ISF. (See Table 1 below.) It is doubtful that, barring an unforeseen crisis, Lebanon's fractious political leadership could, on their own, solve the dilemma of Hezbollah's militia. National Dialogue consultations on a national defense strategy were renewed in March and April 2010, but appear to remain at an impasse amid what some observers contend is a prevailing political paralysis. Prime Minister Saad Hariri and other leaders insist that discussions over Hezbollah's weapons are sensitive and should remain private, even as the United States and regional actors such as Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Israel continue to seek to influence Lebanon's internal politics with varying degrees of success. Key issues facing U.S. policy makers and Members of Congress include: Assessing the goals and effectiveness of U.S. assistance programs — Identifying the most urgent capabilities that are still lacking among the LAF and ISF and deciding whether to tailor pending assistance programs to create or improve them. Understanding the key political and organizational obstacles to the further expansion or improvement of Lebanon's security forces and developing strategies to overcome them. Managing relations with other external actors —Preventing destabilizing actions by regional parties that could renew conflict. Limiting the transfer of sophisticated weaponry to Hezbollah. Recognizing and seizing opportunities for the United States and its allies to influence the decisions of regional actors in support of U.S. objectives in Lebanon. Safeguarding Israeli security. Influencing Lebanon's National Dialogue —Determining the preferred versus likely outcomes of the current Lebanese National Dialogue discussions about a national defense strategy and Hezbollah's weapons. Deciding if and how the United States should seek to influence these discussions and identifying potential pitfalls. Preparing for potential negative consequences including the potential for return to civil conflict in Lebanon. Critics of U.S. policies aimed at weakening Hezbollah argue that while the United States has taken measures to support the Lebanese state, it has not simultaneously taken direct action to limit the influence of Hezbollah in Lebanon and in the region, to stop the flow of weapons to Hezbollah, or to disarm its militant wing. While U.S. policy focuses on building state institutions in Lebanon in an effort to create the political space for the Lebanese government to manage its own internal security threats and develop its own national defense strategy, analysts and policy makers have posited a number of other potential diplomatic, assistance, and security-related measures that could potentially weaken Hezbollah. For more information see " Issues for Congressional Consideration: Potential Options for Weakening Hezbollah " below. In February 2010, Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair delivered the U.S. intelligence community's most recent unclassified assessment of Hezbollah's capabilities and intentions as a component of his annual global threat assessment testimony before Congress. Director Blair stated: We judge that, unlike al-Qa'ida, Hizballah, which has not directly attacked U.S. interests overseas over the past 13 years, is not now actively plotting to strike the Homeland. However, we cannot rule out that the group would attack if it perceives that the United States is threatening its core interests.… Hizballah is the largest recipient of Iranian financial aid, training, and weaponry, and Iran's senior leadership has cited Hizballah as a model for other militant groups. In August 2010, the Obama Administration reported that Hezbollah is "the most technically-capable terrorist group in the world" and stated that the group has "thousands of supporters, several thousand members, and a few hundred terrorist operatives." According to the Administration, Hezbollah receives financial support from Lebanese Shiite expatriates around the world and "profits from legal and illegal businesses," including some illegal drug activity. The Administration reports that Hezbollah receives "training, weapons, and explosives, as well as political, diplomatic, and organizational aid from Iran, and diplomatic, political, and logistical support from Syria." In turn, Hezbollah reportedly provides material, financial, and political support to "several Palestinian terrorist organizations, as well as a number of local Christian and Muslim militias in Lebanon." The Administration also reported in 2009 that Hezbollah operatives have provided training to Iraqi Shiite insurgents, including training on "the construction and use of shaped charge IEDs [improvised explosive devices] that can penetrate heavily-armored vehicles," a tactic that killed and injured U.S. military personnel in Iraq. In early April 2010, multiple reports surfaced suggesting that Syria may have transferred Scud missiles to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Syria has denied the charges. Unnamed U.S. officials have acknowledged that they believe that Syria intended to transfer long-range missiles to Hezbollah, "but there are doubts about whether the Scuds were delivered in full and whether they were moved to Lebanon." The State Department issued a statement saying, "The United States condemns in the strongest terms the transfer of any arms, and especially ballistic missile systems such as the Scud, from Syria to Hezbollah…. The transfer of these arms can only have a destabilizing effect on the region, and would pose an immediate threat to both the security of Israel and the sovereignty of Lebanon." Subsequent Israeli press reports have cited Israeli military officials as stating that the missiles transferred to date have been M-600s, a ballistic missile with a 185-mile range and half-ton payload. In June 2010, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs Jeffrey Feltman, in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Central Asian Affairs, stated that "While we recognize that Hizballah is not directly targeting the United States and U.S. interests today, we are aware that could change if tensions increase with Iran over that country's nuclear program." Hezbollah emerged during the Israeli occupation of Lebanon in the early 1980s. Its ideological roots stretch back to the Shiite Islamic revival centered in southern Iraq during the 1960s and 1970s, and its early membership was drawn from a range of domestic Shiite groups.