DS currently provides training in hard skills to a diverse student population. DS provides security familiarization training for Foreign Service and other civilian personnel and their families. It also provides advanced courses for DS agents, such as the High Threat Operations Course, an intensive 10-week course designed to provide agents with specialized training in a variety of tasks, including leadership, weapons, small unit tactics, air operations, and movement security procedures needed to operate in high-threat, high-risk posts. In addition, through the Antiterrorism Assistance program, DS provides training to foreign security personnel in areas such as crisis response, explosive incident countermeasures, post-blast investigations, and armored vehicle driving. DS has expanded its training over the last decade, and following the 2012 attack on the U.S. Special Mission compound in Benghazi, Libya, the independent ARB recommended further security training for DS agents and all other Foreign Service personnel. In June 2015, DS projected that it would train nearly 6,300 students in hard skills in fiscal year 2015, compared to 3,500 students in 2007. DS estimates that it will provide more than 9,000 students with over 20,000 weeks of training per year once its training facility is fully operational. For our September 2015 report, we analyzed four of DS’s requirements that we determined were critical in the selection of a site for DS’s training facility and found that Fort Pickett fully met all four while FLETC did not fully meet any. Consolidation. Building FASTC at Fort Pickett would enable DS to consolidate at one location 10 of the 12 widely scattered hard-skills training venues it is currently using. FLETC can accommodate many of these venues on its Glynco campus but would have to conduct some exercises, such as training in long-range weapons and heavy explosives, as well as some nighttime exercises, at the Townsend Bombing Range, a Marine Corps training facility about 30 miles from Glynco. FLETC did not include costs for using this facility in its 2013 proposal. Proximity to Washington, D.C. The Independent Panel on Best Practices, established as a result of the Benghazi ARB, recommended a consolidated training center, located in proximity to State’s Washington, D.C., headquarters, given State’s reliance on military units and other government agencies located nearby. Fort Pickett is located about 160 miles from Washington, D.C., or nearly 3 hours by car one way, compared to FLETC, which is approximately 640 miles from Washington, D.C., or 5 to 6 hours by airplane one way. Over 90 partner organizations conduct training at FLETC; however, DS’s primary training partners, including the Marine Corps’ Security Augmentation Unit and its Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team, are based in Virginia, and an official responsible for Marine Security Guard training told us that the cost of transporting personnel and equipment to and from FLETC would be prohibitive. Exclusivity of use. The Independent Panel on Best Practices “strongly endorsed” State’s efforts to develop a training facility that it could control, noting that agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Secret Service, and the Drug Enforcement Administration have adopted such a policy as a best practice. At Fort Pickett, DS would control its training venues and have the flexibility to implement scheduling changes to respond to rapidly evolving security situations overseas. FLETC stated that DS would be assured of priority scheduling, but not exclusive use, for those facilities that would be built for DS and provided a detailed plan showing the facilities currently available and those that would be constructed for DS. FLETC officials stated that when DS was not using facilities prioritized for its use, other federal, state, and local agencies would be allowed to train at and benefit from the facilities. 24/7 availability. DS conducts training during hours of darkness on about 190 days per year, including 140 nights that involve loud noises such as gunfire and small explosions. We found that Fort Pickett, which covers about 42,000 acres and is set in a rural area, is available for nighttime training. FLETC, which is adjacent to the town of Brunswick, Georgia, does not conduct certain types of training at night, and FLETC officials told us that exercises there currently end by 10:00 p.m. According to FLETC officials, DS could conduct such nighttime exercises at the Townsend Bombing Range. In our September 2015 report, we found that neither the FASTC nor the FLETC estimate for capital costs fully meets best practices for reliable cost estimates. The FASTC estimate fully or substantially meets three of the four characteristics—comprehensive, well documented, and accurate—and partially meets one characteristic of reliable cost estimates—credible; the FLETC estimate partially or minimally meets all four characteristics (see table 1). FLETC officials noted that their estimate was prepared in a short period of time based on incomplete information regarding State’s requirements; more complete information would have enabled them to develop a more comprehensive estimate. Our assessment of the reliability of these cost estimates focused on the processes used to develop the estimates rather than estimates themselves, enabling us to make a more direct comparison of their reliability. In September 2014, State and GSA estimated that acquisition and construction costs for the reduced-scope plan for FASTC would be $413 million. FLETC’s November 2013 proposal included a cost estimate comparable to the full-scope plan for FASTC; however, FLETC officials said that because they did not have complete information regarding the reduced-scope plan for FASTC, they were unable to develop a comparable cost estimate. For example, these officials said that State did not tell them which venues had been removed from the plan and that they were unaware of some of DS’s training exercises. These officials said that they subtracted the costs of some facilities from the FLETC full-scope estimate to arrive at a reduced-scope estimate of $243 million. FLETC has not refined its cost estimate since OMB notified it that the administration had selected the FASTC proposal in April 2014. In addition to capital costs for acquisition and construction of a DS training center, the analysis in our September 2015 report included projections for recurring costs for operations and maintenance (O&M) and for recapitalization investment—the costs of replacing broken systems and equipment. Our analysis also included recurring staffing and associated costs for each proposal. Using data provided by State, GSA, and FLETC, we projected these costs over 10, 25, and 50 years. We projected the capital and recurring O&M, recapitalization investment, and staffing costs to be $201 million more, in net present value, for FASTC over 10 years, $266 million more for FASTC over 25 years, and $372 million more for FASTC over 50 years (see table 2). Finally, the government is expected to incur costs of sending students to training. These recurring student costs include travel, lodging, meals and incidental expenses, and compensation for time spent traveling. We projected these costs over 10, 25, and 50 years in three different scenarios for both the FASTC and FLETC proposals. We estimated that the costs of sending students to FASTC over 10 years would be $43 million to $121 million less, in net present value, than sending students to FLETC. The difference in student costs between FASTC and FLETC increases over time, from between $122 million and $323 million less for FASTC after 25 years, to between $309 and $736 million after 50 years (see table 3). Chairman Perdue, Ranking Member Kaine, and Members of the Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time. If you or your staff have any questions about this testimony, please contact Michael J. Courts, Director, International Affairs and Trade, at (202) 512-8980 or courtsm@gao.gov. 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