Throughout the early and mid-1970s, Congress laid the foundation of modern campaign finance policy. Before and after the Watergate scandal, Congress debated whether or how to regulate contributions, expenditures, and disclosure of campaign finance activities. In particular, the 1974 FECA amendments established much of the regulatory framework that remains today. The Supreme Court considered those matters in its landmark Buckley v. Valeo decision (1976). To this day, these topics continue to structure the policy debate. Perhaps because monumental questions surrounding how and whether to regulate political contributions and spending occupied Congress and the courts, a significant component of the 1974 FECA amendments—creating a new federal agency to administer FECA—received comparatively limited attention. That agency, the Federal Election Commission (FEC), would come to symbolize the fierce debate that occupies campaign finance policy overall. The FEC is responsible for civil enforcement of federal campaign finance law. The commission also administers public financing of presidential campaigns (applicable to participating candidates) and conducts outreach and educational activities. Members of the public, the media, campaign practitioners, and policymakers rely on campaign finance data disclosed on the FEC website—the agency's most public activity. Some allege that Congress designed the FEC to fail, most notably through a bipartisan, six-member structure that requires agreement from at least four commissioners for substantive action. Furthermore, some contend that recent years have marked a particularly problematic period in which, amid policy stalemates, some areas of campaign finance law have gone without adequate interpretation or enforcement. Others respond, equally vigorously, that Congress purposely insulated the FEC from excessive partisanship in the wake of Watergate and in one of the most sensitive areas of constitutionally protected political speech. They also caution that the commission cannot or should not do via regulation what Congress has declined to do by statute. Whether by design or coincidence, fundamental tensions about campaign finance law and regulation have been evident at the FEC throughout its history. Nonetheless, attention to working relationships among commissioners is increasingly part of the narrative about how the commission functions. Some commissioners have openly criticized their colleagues and the agency. As the FEC marked its 40 th anniversary in 2015, according to one media account, "officials past and present argued about whether to rent a theater, whether to publish a report, whether to serve bagels or doughnuts, and whether, in fact, the agency even had an anniversary worth noting." These and similar reports highlighting alleged dysfunction at the FEC are common. Some may be relevant for congressional needs as the House and Senate examine the FEC and form their own opinions on the agency. Discussions of the FEC's organization, duties, and major areas of policy debate—the focus of this report—are less common, but are at least as relevant for Congress. The report provides background information about key areas of controversy and context that might be relevant for Congress as the House and Senate approach their oversight duties, appropriate funds, consider nominations, and explore options for restructuring the FEC or maintaining the status quo. As discussed throughout this report, issues ranging from minor administrative matters to fundamental changes in campaign finance law might be relevant as Congress considers the FEC. Because there appears to be little congressional consensus about how or whether to address the FEC and its functions, this report provides a resource for Congress to examine which policy questions and options are of particular interest, if any. The report is not a legal analysis of commission activity, nor does it provide detailed discussion of relationships with potentially related agencies such as the Department of Justice or Internal Revenue Service. Another CRS report discusses the FEC's role in enforcing campaign finance law and regulation. This report uses the terms "FEC," "commission," and "agency" interchangeably. Some discussions of the FEC's authority, which are generally beyond the scope of this report, use the term "commission" to denote members of the FEC as opposed to agency staff. This distinction is not central to this report but is relevant for some enforcement debates, as noted primarily in another CRS report. Table 1 below summarizes recent legislation substantially devoted to the FEC. Congress most recently held an oversight hearing focusing on the FEC in 2011, as discussed later in this report. The Appendix at the end of this report lists major legislation devoted to the FEC and oversight hearings dating to 1995. The FEC is a six-member independent regulatory agency whose members serve six-year terms. They may continue in "holdover" status after those terms end. Commissioners are appointed by the President and subject to Senate confirmation. As discussed below, the current appointment method differs from the process Congress originally enacted but that was later invalidated. The Senate most recently confirmed commissioners in 2013, as shown in Table 2 . Congress most recently reauthorized the FEC in 1980 (FY1981). A professional staff of approximately 350 employees does the FEC's daily work. Most of these staff members are civil servants. FECA specifies two statutory staff positions: a staff director and general counsel. The commission also has a congressionally mandated inspector general. Figure 1 below shows major commission offices. As an independent agency, the FEC transmits its budget requests directly to Congress, and concurrently to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). In FY2015, Congress appropriated $67.5 million to the FEC. The agency requested approximately $76.1 million for FY2016 in anticipation of negotiating a new lease on its office space. In recent years, the Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bills ( H.R. 2995 and S. 1910 for FY2016) provided the initial legislative vehicle for FEC funding. Proposals for an entity resembling the FEC date to at least the early 1960s. Modern campaign finance policy took root in the 1970s with enactment of FECA and related amendments—where this report begins. Congress first vested campaign finance administrative authority within the House and Senate, and with the Comptroller General. Administering campaign finance first fell to those entities amid debate over whether Congress could or should cede overseeing its campaign activities to an outside body. At first, those duties primarily meant administering disclosure of financial activity, as the 1971 FECA principally mandated reporting requirements similar to those in place today. In what has been described as a "compromise" surrounding separation-of-powers matters and institutional prerogatives in the 1971 FECA, "Congress divide[d] the administrative and enforcement responsibilities for [FECA] among three supervisory offices." The Clerk of the House and Secretary of the Senate were responsible for administering the act for each chamber, respectively, while the Comptroller General, head of the General Accounting Office (GAO, now the Government Accountability Office), handled presidential campaign finance compliance. Longtime Committee on House Administration Chairman Wayne Hays championed the "supervisory officer" framework and staunchly opposed an independent campaign finance regulatory agency. The "supervisory officer" system generally facilitated effective disclosure of campaign finance activity, but enforcement concerns persisted. Some Members of Congress and other observers also raised concerns that three officers who were employed by the House and Senate were not sufficiently independent to administer and enforce the new law. Fundraising controversies in the 1972 election cycle increased calls for an independent campaign finance agency. As the Watergate scandal emerged in 1973-1974, congressional demand for an independent agency took on new momentum, eventually overcoming Representative Hays's preferred approach. The 1974 FECA amendments created the first version of the FEC. As noted below, the Supreme Court's 1976 Buckley decision invalidated the FEC's initial appointment structure. Independent campaign finance administration and enforcement was central to the early 1970s congressional debates over FECA and the 1974 amendments. The House and Senate considered proposals with different numbers of commissioners, appointment structures, and enforcement powers. The three-three structure (plus two later-invalidated ex officio members, discussed below) was unique but reflected elements of various congressional proposals. As campaign finance historian Robert Mutch explains, "No other government agency was so constructed. This unique appointment process appears to have been a grudging acquiescence to [a] form of independence while retaining as much congressional control as possible" through the House and Senate leadership's initial appointment powers. Over time, the FEC's bipartisan structure became central to its identity and to its controversy. Congress's choice to establish a politically balanced and even-numbered membership has been both praised as insulating the agency and criticized as thwarting its effectiveness. From the beginning, the bipartisan structure has made compromise on the most contentious issues difficult and has opened individual commissioners to charges of partisan bias. Congress originally designed eight positions for the FEC: six commissioners and two non-voting ex officio members (the Clerk of the House and Secretary of the Senate). Under that structure, two commissioners were appointed by the President, two by the President pro tempore of the Senate, and two by the Speaker of the House. Two federal court decisions altered the FE C's original design. First and most significantly, in Buckley the Supreme Court of the United States invalidated the original appointments method, holding that congressional appointments violated the Constitution's Appointments Clause. Almost 20 years later, a federal court again found fault with the FEC's appointment structure. In 1993, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held in FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund that the presence of the two congressional ex officio members violated constitutional separation of powers. In a broad revision of FECA in 1976, undertaken in response to the Buckley decision, Congress adopted the current appointment method. Today, all commissioners are presidentially appointed with Senate advice and consent. Members of the congressional leadership or committees of jurisdiction (the House Committee on House Administration and Senate Rules and Administration Committee) apparently continue to influence the appointment process. FECA specifies few qualifications for FEC commissioners, noting simply that they "shall be chosen on the basis of their experience, integrity, impartiality, and good judgment."