By 1986, recruit quality was at historically high levels. All services had met or exceeded their overall enlistment objectives for percentages of recruits who held high school diplomas and scored in the top categories on the test taken to qualify for military service. Specifically, the percentage of recruits with high school diplomas increased from 72 percent during the 1964-73 draft period to 92 percent in 1986. Also, 64 percent of new recruits in 1986 scored in the upper 50th percentile of the Armed Forces Qualification Test, up from 38 percent in 1980. The services’ success in recruiting high quality enlistees continued through the 1980s and into the 1990s, with the percentage of high school graduates reaching a high of 99 percent in 1992 and the percentage of those scoring in the upper half of the Armed Forces Qualification Test peaking in 1991 at 75 percent. Studies of attrition have consistently shown that persons with high school diplomas and Armed Forces Qualification Test scores in the upper 50th percentile have lower first-term attrition rates. For example, for those who entered the services in fiscal year 1992 and had high school diplomas, the attrition rate was 33.1 percent. For persons with 3 or 4 years of high school and no diploma, the rate was 38.9 percent; and for those with General Education Development certificates, the attrition rate was 46.3 percent. Similarly, those who scored in the highest category, category I, of the Armed Forces Qualification Test had an attrition rate of 24.7 percent, and those in category IVA had a rate of 40.7 percent. Increases in the quality of DOD’s recruits since the 1970s, coupled with the lower attrition rates of those considered “high quality” recruits, logically should have resulted in lower first-term attrition rates throughout the services. However, first-term enlisted attrition has remained at 29 to 39 percent since 1974. For enlistees who entered the services in fiscal year 1992, first-term attrition was 33.2 percent. The Army’s attrition was the highest of all the services, at 35.9 percent, followed by the Marine Corps at 32.2 percent, the Navy at 32 percent, and the Air Force at 30 percent. The highest portion of attrition occurs during the early months of enlistees’ first terms. Of enlistees who entered the services in fiscal year 1992, 11.4 percent were separated in their first 6 months of service. Attrition was fairly evenly distributed over the remaining period of enlistees’ first terms. The rate was 3.4 percent for those with 7 to 12 months of service, 7.3 percent for those with 13 to 24 months of service, 6 percent for those with 25 to 36 months of service, and 5 percent for those with 37 to 48 months of service. On the basis of DOD-provided cost data, we estimated that in fiscal year 1996, DOD and the services spent about $390 million to enlist personnel who never made it to their first duty stations. Of this total cost, which includes the cost of DOD’s training and recruiting infrastructure, about $4,700 was spent to transport each recruit to basic training; to pay, feed, house, and provide medical care for the recruit while at basic training; and to transport the separated recruit home. We estimated that if the services could reduce their 6-month enlisted attrition by 10 percent, their short-term savings would be $12 million, and their long-term savings could be as high as $39 million. DOD and the services need a better understanding of the reasons for early attrition to identify opportunities for reducing it. Currently, available data on attrition does not permit DOD to pinpoint the precise reasons that enlistees are departing before completing their training. While the data indicates general categories of enlisted separations based on the official reasons for discharge, it does not provide DOD and the services with a full understanding of the factors contributing to the attrition. For example, of the 25,430 enlistees who entered the services in fiscal year 1994 and were discharged in their first 6 months, the data showed 7,248 (or 29 percent) had failed to meet minimum performance criteria, 6,819 (or 27 percent) were found medically unqualified for military service, 3,643 (or 14 percent) had character or behavior disorders, and 3,519 (or 14 percent) had fraudulently entered the military. These figures were based on data maintained by the Defense Manpower Data Center and collected from servicemembers’ DD-214 forms, which are their official certificates of release or discharge from active duty. Because the services interpret the separation codes that appear on the forms differently and because only the official reason for the discharge is listed, the Data Center’s statistics can be used only to indicate general categories of separation. Therefore, DOD does not have enough specific information to fully assess trends in attrition. In an attempt to standardize the services’ use of these codes, DOD issued a list of the codes with their definitions. However, it has not issued implementing guidance for interpreting these definitions, and the services’ own implementing guidance differs on several points. For example, if an enlistee intentionally withholds medical information that would disqualify him or her and is then separated for the same medical condition, the enlistee is discharged from the Air Force and the Marine Corps for a fraudulent enlistment. The Army categorizes this separation as a failure to meet medical/physical standards unless it can prove that the enlistee withheld medical information with the intent of gaining benefits. The Air Force and the Marine Corps do not require this proof of intent. The Navy categorizes this separation as an erroneous enlistment, which indicates no fault on the part of the enlistee. To enable DOD and the services to more completely analyze the reasons for attrition and to set appropriate targets for reducing it, we recommended that DOD issue implementing guidance for how the services should apply separation codes to provide a reliable database on reasons for attrition. In the absence of complete data on why first-term attrition is occurring, we examined the various preenlistment screening processes that correspond to the types of separations that were occurring frequently. For example, because a significant number of enlistees were being separated for medical problems and for fraudulent entry, we focused our work on recruiting and medical examining processes that were intended to detect problems before applicants are enlisted. These processes involve many different military personnel. Recruiters, staff members at the Military Entrance Processing Stations, drill instructors at basic training, instructors at follow-on technical training schools, and duty-station supervisors are all involved in transforming civilians into productive servicemembers. The process begins when the services first identify and select personnel to serve as recruiters. It continues when recruiters send applicants to receive their mental and physical examinations at the Military Entrance Processing Stations, through the period of up to 1 year while recruits remain in the Delayed Entry Program, and through the time recruits receive their basic and follow-on training and begin work in their first assignments. Reexamining the roles of all persons involved in this continuous process is in keeping with the intent of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, which requires agencies to clearly define their missions, to set goals, and to link activities and resources to those goals. Recruiting and retaining well-qualified military personnel are among the goals included in DOD’s strategic plan required under this act. As a part of this reexamination, we have found that recruiters did not have adequate incentives to ensure that their recruits were qualified and that the medical screening processes did not always identify persons with preexisting medical conditions. We believe that the services should not measure recruiting success simply by the number of recruits who sign enlistment papers stating their intention to join a military service but also by the number of new recruits who go on to complete basic training. We also believe that the services’ mechanisms for medically screening military applicants could be improved. We found that recruiters did not have adequate incentives to ensure that their recruits were qualified. Accordingly, we have identified practices in each service that we believe would enhance recruiters’ performance and could be expanded to other services. Specifically, in our 1998 report on military recruiting, we reported that the services were not optimizing the performance of their recruiters for the following reasons: The Air Force was the only service that required personnel experienced in recruiting to interview candidates for recruiter positions. In contrast, many Army and some Marine recruiting candidates were interviewed by personnel in their chain of command who did not necessarily have recruiting experience. The Navy was just beginning to change its recruiter selection procedures to resemble those of the Air Force. The Air Force was the only service that critically evaluated the potential of candidates to be successful recruiters by judging their ability to communicate effectively and by using a screening test. The Army, the Marine Corps, and the Navy tended to focus more on candidates’ past performance in nonrecruiting positions. Only the Marine Corps provided recruiter trainees with opportunities to interact with drill instructors and separating recruits to gain insight into ways to motivate recruits in the Delayed Entry Program. This interaction was facilitated by the Marine Corps’ collocation of the recruiter school with one of its basic training locations. Only the Marine Corps conducted regular physical fitness training for recruits who were waiting to go to basic training, though all of the services gave recruits in the Delayed Entry Program access to their physical fitness facilities and encouraged recruits to become or stay physically fit. Only the Marine Corps required all recruits to take a physical fitness test before reporting to basic training, though it is well known that recruits who are not physically fit are less likely to complete basic training. Only the Marine Corps’ and the Navy’s incentive systems rewarded recruiters when their recruits successfully completed basic training.