The U.S.-led effort to end permanently Afghanistan's role as a base for anti-western Islamicterrorists requires not only the defeat of the Taliban-which has been achieved through American,allied, and Afghan military action, but also the reconstruction of a stable, effective and ideologicallymoderate Afghan state. Otherwise, the country could again become a base for terrorism. Failure toachieve stability in Afghanistan is also likely to have wider repercussions for the stability of Pakistanand the Central Asian states. Unlike 1989, when the U.S. Government closed its embassy in Kabul only ten days after the withdrawal of the last Soviet forces, the Bush Administration has concluded that the United Stateshas a major stake in the creation of a stable Afghanistan, and that it cannot be left to the armedAfghan contenders for power alone to decide the country's future. The Administration has not yetgiven a detailed indication of what longer-term role it envisions for the United States in the political,economic, and social reconstruction of Afghanistan beyond current plans for emergency food andagricultural assistance, assistance in the formation of a new national army, and anti-narcotics aid. However, both the President and the Congress have declared that the United States will play a majorrole, in conjunction with NATO allies and Japan, the United Nations, and international financialinstitutions, to promote economic development and encourage political stability in Afghanistan. (1) The stakes for the United States include denying sanctuary and support for Al Qaeda terrorists, maintaining positive influence with a nuclear-armed and politically unstable Pakistan, curtailing themassive flow of opium-based drugs from Afghanistan, and, possibly, facilitating the creation of analternative to Iran and Russia as routes for the export of Central Asian oil and gas. For all of thesereasons, the future U.S. role in Afghanistan and the adjacent region is likely to be an important focusof interaction between the Administration and Congress in considering foreign assistance anddefense budget priorities and policy issues during the Spring of 2002. Congress has strongly supported American involvement in supporting the fledgling government headed by Karzai, and many of the several dozen Members of Congress who have visitedAfghanistan have advocated more U.S. aid than is currently planned, the more prompt delivery ofaid to the Karzai administration, and an expanded U.S. role in peacekeeping. In terms of action byCongress, H.R. 3994 (Hyde), the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002, wasintroduced "To authorize economic and democratic development assistance for Afghanistan and toauthorize military assistance for Afghanistan and certain other foreign countries." The bill wasmarked up by the House International Relations Committee on March 20 and reported (amended)on April 25 ( H.Rept. 107-420 ), addresses the overall direction and focus of U.S. policy towardshumanitarian relief and refugee repatriation, economic reconstruction, the suppression of narcoticsproduction, and support for a democratic and market-oriented Afghanistan. The bill would authorizeabout $1.05 billion in appropriations for assistance to Afghanistan, subject to certain conditions,from FY2002 to FY2005. A Senate version of the bill, S. 2712 , was introduced bySenator Chuck Hagel on July 9, 2002. This report provides information on and analysis of the current situation in Afghanistan, taking into consideration the country's essential characteristics and political developments since about thetime of the overthrow of the last Afghan King, Zahir Shah, in 1973, and sketches out four possiblescenarios for Afghanistan's future. The scenarios incorporate the profound effects of the Communistcoup of 1978, the 1979-1989 Soviet occupation, subsequent civil war, and the rise and fall of theTaliban. Finally, the report identifies and analyzes factors that will influence Afghanistan's politicalfuture, and discusses three policy areas in particular in which actions by the United States could becrucial, and three policy issues for congressional consideration. An appendix contains keydocuments relating to the December 2001 Bonn Agreement, which is the framework for currentefforts to create a stable and democratic Afghanistan. This report will be updated in response to major political developments, but it is not intended to track issues concerning Afghanistan on a regular basis. Broader and more frequently updatedcoverage of issues concerning Afghanistan and U.S. policy is contained in CRS Report RL30588 , Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy Concerns , by [author name scrubbed]. For information andanalysis concerning U.S. and other international humanitarian and reconstruction assistance toAfghanistan, see CRS Report RL31355 , Afghanistan's Path to Reconstruction: Obstacles,Challenges, and Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed]. Achieving the goal of a stable and moderate Afghanistan depends on the establishment of apolitical process that has at least the tacit support of the major organized ethnic and tribal groups andcontenders for power, as well as ordinary Afghans who are simply seeking some kind of peace andnormalcy in their lives. After nearly three decades since the overthrow of the Afghan monarchy andthe onset of a three-cornered struggle involving the forces of moderate reform and market-orientedeconomic modernization, Islamic fundamentalism, and Marxism, most of the past elements ofAfghan unity and stability have been shattered and are not even remembered by the more than halfof the current population who were born after the overthrow of the last monarch, Zahir Shah. (2) A beginning towards the goal of reconstructing a stable and moderate Afghanistan was made at an international conference near Bonn, Germany, during December 2001, when representativesof various parties and ethnic groups agreed to the creation of an Interim Administration, and aprocedure, with timetables, for drafting a new constitution and establishing, within two years, anelected government. As in the case of a U.N.-backed effort in 1992, which failed, the composition of the delegation was more representative on paper than in reality. The 23 signatories to the December 2001agreement represented four anti-Taliban groups: The Northern Alliance , representing the ethnicTajik and Uzbek forces then occupying Kabul and other northern cities; the Rome Process ,representing largely Pashtun exile followers of former King Zahir Shah; the Cyprus Group ,representing largely Shi'a Muslim groups supported by Iran; and the Peshwar Group , consistinglargely of Pashtun exile factions with headquarters in Peshawar, Pakistan. Of these, only theNorthern Alliance, which became closely allied with U.S. forces in the campaign against the Talibanand Al Qaeda, commanded significant military power. The composition of the Rome and Peshawargroups was heavily tilted towards Western-educated professionals and other members of the formerurbanized Pashtun elite. (3) Pashtun commanders andlocal shura (governing councils) in SouthernAfghanistan, the home base of the Taliban, were not directly represented. As agreed, the parties to the negotiations inaugurated a 28-member multi-ethnic interim Afghan administration on December 22, 2001, headed by Hamid Karzai, a prominent Pashtun tribal leaderwith a modern, democratic outlook, close ties to the former royal family and the westernized,expatriate elite, and good relations with the Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance. The InterimAdministration also included two women, both medical doctors, who head the ministries of women'saffairs and health, respectively. Indicative of the fragile nature of the bargaining to date, anagreed-upon roadmap for the achievement of a democratic political structure leaves most of thedetails for the future. (See Appendix I for the terms of the agreement.) Another important milestone was achieved in June 2002 with the generally successful conclusion of an Emergency Loya Jirga ("Grand Council"), which confirmed Karzai as head of aTransitional Administration charged with organizing an effective government, supervising thedrafting of a constitution, and preparing the country for national elections in December 2002. Thedelegates to the Loya Jirga also informally approved Karzai's choices for the most important cabinetposts, but not without considerable complaint from groups which felt they had received insufficientrepresentation in the new administration. These include members of the various Pashtun tribes, whotogether constitute a plurality of 35-40 percent of the population, and other non-Tajik ethnic groupssuch as the Uzbeks and Hazaras. (For a fuller analysis of the Loya Jirga outcome see below.) One way to envision the circumstances that might support the creation of a stable and moderateAfghan state is to consider the country's past political history and the factors that in the past haveenhanced or undermined stability and modernization. The establishment of Afghanistan as a nationstate dates essentially from 1747, when Ahmad Shah Durrani, a tribal Pashtun (4) chief of the Sadozailine of the Abdali tribe, gained election by his tribe as the ruler (Amir) of territories approximatingthe present boundaries of Afghanistan. Under the Durrani ascendancy, Afghanistan experienced allthe vicissitudes of dynastic chance and survived as a political entity largely as a buffer state whosenorthern and southern boundaries conformed to the high water line of the expanding British andRussian empires, and the periodically resurgent Iranian empire. In the 20th century Afghanistan teetered between bursts of Western and Soviet-aided modernization and recurrent reaction spearheaded by the twin sources of rural power in the Pashtunheartland: secular leaders, including tribal chieftains, local notables, or commanders, and Muslimclerics of various kinds, including mullahs and influential pirs (spiritual leaders) of the mystical Sufi Islamic sects, which predominate in Afghanistan and Southern Asia.