The United States signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in the last days of the first Bush Administration (1/13/93), and the Convention was submitted to the Senate for its advice and consentin the midst of the 103rd Congress (11/23/93). In the 103rd, 104th, and 105th Congresses, anextensive series of 13 hearings were held by the Foreign Relations, Armed Services, Intelligence,and Judiciary Committees, complemented with classified briefings from the intelligence community. (See For Additional Reading ) Under a unanimous consent agreement, the CWC ratificationresolution was to have been brought to the Senate floor in mid-September 1996. However, uncertainof sufficient votes to ensure passage, its supporters postponed its consideration. In his 1997 State of the Union address, President Clinton pledged he would make the CWC a high priority in 1997, pressing for Senate consent early in the 105th Congress. After extensivenegotiations between the White House and key Senators, and within the Senate itself, a unanimousconsent agreement was reached to bring the Chemical Weapons Convention ratification resolution( S.Res. 75 ) to the Senate floor on April 23, 1997. The resolution contained 33conditions, 28 of which were agreed to by the White House and within the Senate. Under theunanimous consent agreement, these were not subject to further amendment or motions. Fiveconditions were not agreed to, and each was struck by roll-call vote during floor debate, prior topassage of the resolution. The summary of the conditions below provides only the general intent ofeach; the ratification resolution itself should be consulted for a full understanding of therequirements each condition establishes. The CWC ratification resolution, including agreed upon conditions: Asserts the Senate's right under the Constitution to add reservations to the Convention. Assures congressional oversight of all funds provided under theCWC. Requires Presidential certification that the OPCW has an Inspector-Generaland specifies report requirements. Requires cost-sharing for R&D expenditures forverification. Establishes standards for U.S. intelligence sharing and reports toCongress. Requires submission of any CWC amendments to theSenate. Requires the President to obtain assurances from Australia Group members thatArticle XI is consistent with continued export controls. Requires a report on the assurances offered to countries that forswear the useof nuclear weapons. Requires Presidential certification that restrictions on Schedule 1 chemicalsdo not adversely affect the chemical, biotechnology, and pharmaceuticalindustries. Requires annual country reports of CW activities, compliance, and intelligencemonitoring. Requires the Secretary of Defense to ensure the Armed Forces are effectivelyequipped, organized, trained, and exercised for operations in CBW environments. Asserts the primacy of the U.S. Constitution. Requires the President to use the full range of his authority to enforce compliance. Requires the United States to reject any Russian effort to make its ratificationcontingent on U.S. financial assistance. Requires the United States to limit its CW defensiveassistance under Article X, when extended to countries of concern, to medical antidotes andtreatments. Prescribes U.S. responses to unauthorized release of confidential businessinformation by the OPCW or other parties. States the sense of the Senate that U.S. negotiators should not agree to treatiesthat bar reservations. Prohibits transfer of inspection samples collected in the United States tolaboratories outside the United States. States the Senate finding that chemical weapons terrorism is still athreat. States the Senate declaration that the United States should not be denied itsvote in the CWC organization. Sense of the Senate that the U.S. On-Site Inspection Agency should provideassistance to facilities subject to routine inspection under the CWC. Limits U.S. assessment for OPCW to $25 million; ties increases to theConsumer Price Index; provides for certain exceptions (e.g., verification costs). Reaffirms theSenate's role in treaty interpretation. Reaffirms the Senate's role regarding arms controltreaties. Requires Presidential certification that the CWC does not restrict U.S. use ofriot control agents in certain specified circumstances. Requires notification and consultation whena chemical is added to CWC Schedules. Requires the President to explore alternative technologies for the destructionof the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile. Requires criminal search warrant for challenge inspectionsand administrative search warrant for routine inspections, if not permitted voluntarily. In the 105th Congress, on May 23, 1997 the Senate unanimously passed S. 610. This legislation, as reported by the Judiciary Committee, was an amendment in the nature of a substitutefor the Administration's implementing legislation. CWC supporters with objections to provisionsof S. 610 as reported hoped they could be resolved before final enactment, perhaps inHouse-Senate conference. (Congressional Record, May 23, p. S5078). However, In October 1998,the House incorporated S. 610's language, without amendment, into the FY1999 OmnibusAppropriations Act. This passed the House and Senate, and was signed into law October 20th, 1998( P.L. 105-277 ; 22 USC 75) The implementing legislation sets criminal and civil penalties for the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer, possession, or use of chemical weapons. These penalties wouldalso apply to anyone who assists, encourages, induces, attempts, or conspires to carry out theseproscribed activities. It also establishes: 1) procedures for seizure, forfeiture, and destruction ofcontraband chemical weapons; 2) statutory authority for record-keeping and reporting requirementsrelevant to the CWC; 3) various restrictions on certain chemicals, depending on their likelihood ofbeing used to produce chemical weapons; and 4) a protective regime for confidential businessinformation gathered from private corporations. It also provides detailed procedures to be used foron-site inspections by the OPCW, including limitations on access and search warrant procedures,should they be required. The provisions, now enacted into law, which raise concerns from CWC supporters and the OPCW include: Section 213 -- sets procedures for U.S. firms to seek compensation from the U.S. government, should they suffer the loss of proprietary information through the actions ofOPCW employees. Critics, however, maintain that, as worded, this section does not place a highenough burden of proof on the claimants, and consequently could lead to excessive and unfoundedclaims against the government. Sections 237 -- grants the President the right to deny a request forinspection if it "may cause a threat to U.S. national security interests." The CWC contains noprovision permitting denial of an inspection, and critics note that doing so could place the UnitedStates in non-compliance. They maintain that even if never exercised, this section's existence willencourage other nations to enact similar exemptions, thereby weakening the CWC verificationregime. Section 253 -- exempts discrete organic chemicals not on the CWC control lists and incidental chemical by-products or waste-streams from reporting and inspectionrequirements. This is intended to ease potential burdens, particularly on paper manufacturers, butcritics believe the exemption is too broadly worded and would rule out an effective non-intrusivesampling technique for inspectors. Sections 212 & 238 prohibit requiring that governmentcontractors waive any constitutional rights for any purpose related to the CWC. Some believe thatthis could hinder the CWC routine inspection regime. U.S.-Soviet Memorandum of Understanding (Wyoming MOU),September 1989. In 1989, as the multilateral negotiations slowed, the U.S.-Sovietbilateral talks took on greater importance and assumed a much higher public profile. On September23, 1989, the United States and the Soviet Union signed a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding(MOU) agreeing to data declarations on CW stockpiles and trial inspections. U.S. intelligenceofficials believe that Russian declarations have been incomplete, particularly in the area of binarychemical weapons and novel chemical agents. High level consultations continue to try to resolvethese discrepancies. Compliance with this agreement is a factor in the Bush Administration'sdecision not to provide the certification of Russia's commitment to arms control upon which furtherNunn-Lugar Threat Reduction aid is contingent. The Russian chemical weapons destructionprogram is a beneficiary of this aid program. U.S.-Russian Chemical Weapons Destruction Agreement, June1990. On June 1, 1990, the United States and Russia signed an agreement coveringthe production of chemical weapons and the destruction of current CW stockpiles. This agreement,as yet not implemented, would permit routine bilateral monitoring and challenge inspections of theCW destruction process conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Chemical WeaponsConvention. Russia has communicated to the Administration that the Bilateral DestructionAgreement (BDA) described below has "outlived its usefulness", and should be superseded by theChemical Weapons Convention. U.S. officials, however, still support the BDA and are continuingtalks on the issue. Russian cost estimates concluded that the BDA verification regime would bemore expensive than OPCW monitoring and inspections. More than 100 years of international efforts to ban chemical weapons culminated January 13,1993, in the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The CWC bans the development,production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons (CW) by its states parties. It also requires thedestruction of all chemical weapons and production facilities. The Convention provides the mostextensive and intrusive verification regime of any arms control treaty, extending its coverage to notonly governmental but also civilian facilities. The verification package includesinstrument-monitoring, both routine and random onsite inspections, and challenge inspections forsites suspected of CW storage or production. The Convention also requires export controls andreporting requirements on chemicals that can be used as warfare agents and their precursors.