The nation’s special operations forces provide the National Command Authorities a highly trained, rapidly deployable joint force capable of conducting special operations anywhere in the world. In November 1986, Congress enacted section 1311 of Public Law 99-661, which directed the President to establish USSOCOM, a unified combatant command to ensure that special operations forces were combat ready and prepared to conduct specified missions. USSOCOM’s component commands include AFSOC, the Army Special Operations Command, the Naval Special Warfare Command, and the Joint Special Operations Command. AFSOC, located at Hurlburt Field, Florida, deploys and supports special operations forces worldwide. To ensure that special operations were adequately funded, Congress further provided in section 1311 of Public Law 99-661 that the Department of Defense create for the special operations forces a major force program (MFP) category for the Future Years Defense Plan of the Department of Defense. Known as MFP-11, this is the vehicle to request funding for the development and acquisition of special operations-peculiar equipment, materials, supplies, and services. The services remain responsible under 10 U.S.C. section 165 for providing those items that are not special operations-peculiar. Since Operation Desert Storm, AFSOC’s threat environment has become more complex and potentially more lethal. More sophisticated threat systems, both naval and land-based, have been fielded, and the systems are proliferating to more and more countries. Even nations without complex integrated air defense systems have demonstrated the capability to inflict casualties on technologically superior opponents. According to threat documents, worldwide proliferation of relatively inexpensive, heat-seeking missiles is dramatically increasing the risk associated with providing airlift support in remote, poorly developed countries. Increased passive detection system use is also expected throughout lesser developed countries. Passive detection allows the enemy to detect incoming aircraft without alerting the crew that they have been detected, thereby jeopardizing operations. Finally, commercially available, second-generation night vision devices, when linked with warfighter portable air defense systems (e.g., shoulder-fired missiles), provide these countries with a night air defense capability. This night air defense capability is significant because AFSOC aircrews have historically relied on darkness to avoid detection. AFSOC aircraft carry a wide variety of electronic warfare systems to deal with enemy threat systems. Some of AFSOC’s systems are common with systems used by the regular Air Force, while others are unique to special operations. Memoranda of Agreement (MOA) between USSOCOM and the military services lay out specifically the areas of support the services agree to undertake in support of the special forces. An MOA, dated September 16, 1989, and one of its accompanying annexes, dated February 22, 1990, entered into between the Air Force and USSOCOM list those items and services the Air Force agrees to fund in support of AFSOC’s special operations mission. This list includes modifications common to both AFSOC and regular Air Force aircraft, and electronics and telecommunications that are in common usage. Part of AFSOC’s electronic warfare equipment for fixed-wing aircraft is acquired with USSOCOM MFP-11 funds as special operations-peculiar items because the Air Force historically has employed very little electronic warfare equipment on its C-130s. AFSOC’s acquisition strategy for electronic warfare equipment is contained within AFSOC’s Technology Roadmap. The Technology Roadmap identifies and ranks operational deficiencies and links the deficiencies to material solutions. The Roadmap flows out of AFSOC’s mission area plans for mobility, precision engagement/strike, forward presence and engagement, and information operations. For C-130s, the Roadmap indicates that AFSOC has serious electronic warfare operational deficiencies in several areas and identifies solutions for each of these operational deficiencies. These solutions include introducing a mix of new systems and making upgrades to older systems (See app. II for descriptions of AFSOC’s C-130 aircraft.) AFSOC’s acquisition strategy is sound because it is based on eliminating operational and supportability deficiencies confirmed by an Air Force study, test reports, and maintenance records. According to AFSOC officials responsible for electronic warfare acquisition, AFSOC’s C-130s are most vulnerable to three types of threat systems: (1) infrared missiles, (2) passive detectors, and (3) radar-guided missiles.These deficiencies have become more critical since Operation Desert Storm in 1991 as more sophisticated threats have been developed and spread to more areas of the world. An ongoing Air Force Chief of Staff directed study, the Electronic Warfare Operational Shortfalls Study, confirms what AFSOC officials maintain. This study found that there are many electronic warfare-related operational deficiencies within the overall Air Force, including the C-130 community. The study identified deficiencies with missile warning system missile launch indications and warning times, infrared expendables and jamming effectiveness, signature reduction, passive detection, situational awareness, and electronic warfare support equipment. Classified test reports and threat documentation corroborate the study’s findings. According to Air Force officials, electronic warfare deficiencies within Air Force components, including AFSOC, are so extensive that the solutions necessary to correct all of them are not affordable within the framework of Air Force fiscal year 2000-2005 projected budgets. AFSOC’s aging electronic warfare systems are also failing more often and requiring more staff hours to support. According to AFSOC’s Technology Roadmap and maintenance records, all AFSOC electronic warfare systems have some supportability problems. AFSOC maintenance personnel told us that they are working more hours to repair the systems, and maintenance records show that system failures are becoming more frequent. The ALQ-172(v)1 high band radar jammer in particular is problematic, requiring more staff hours for maintenance than any other AFSOC electronic warfare system. The staff hours charged for maintaining the ALQ-172(v)1 represent 34 percent of the total time charged to maintaining all electronic warfare systems from 1995 through 1997. AFSOC has made several efforts to correct deficiencies and maximize commonality in electronic warfare systems. USSOCOM is funding the Common Avionics Architecture for Penetration (CAAP) program, which is designed to make AFSOC’s C-130 aircraft less susceptible to passive detection, enhance the aircrews’ situational awareness, lower support costs, and improve commonality. AFSOC has sought to begin several other efforts in the past several years, as well, but USSOCOM has rejected these requests. In addition to addressing deficiencies identified in the Technology Roadmap, AFSOC is trying to improve commonality among its electronic warfare systems by eliminating some of those systems from its inventory. For example, it is replacing the ALR-56M radar warning receiver on its AC-130U Gunships with the ALR-69 radar warning receiver already on the rest of its C-130s. AFSOC also planned to replace ALQ-131 radar jamming pods on its AC-130H Gunships with a future upgraded ALQ-172(v)3 radar jammer for its AC-130s and MC-130Hs. Achieving commonality avoids duplicating costs for system development, lowers unit production costs through larger quantity buys, and simplifies logistical support. According to USSOCOM officials, in selecting what to fund they had to determine which programs would maximize capability, including sustainability, while conserving resources. The USSOCOM officials said that these decisions were difficult because although some systems offer tremendous improvements in capabilities, they require significant commitment of resources. For instance, USSOCOM did not have sufficient resources to fund both the CAAP program and the ALQ-172(v)3 upgrade program to improve commonality and capability against radar-guided missiles. Additionally, AFSOC had planned to replace its ALE-40 flare and chaff dispensers with the newer programmable ALE-47 to improve protection against infrared-guided missiles. But, because of budget constraints, AFSOC will have to keep the ALE-40 on two of its C-130 model aircraft while the other models are upgraded to the ALE-47 configuration. Furthermore, in prioritizing resources for fiscal year 2000-2005, USSOCOM is accepting increased operational and sustainment risks for systems it does not anticipate being key in 2010 or beyond. Under this approach, USSOCOM is dividing AFSOC’s C-130s into so-called legacy and bridge aircraft. The older legacy aircraft will receive flight safety modifications but not all electronic warfare upgrades; newer bridge aircraft will receive both. As a result, the legacy aircraft will become less common over time with the newer bridge aircraft, even as they become more vulnerable to threats and more difficult to maintain. Because, according to AFSOC officials, the legacy aircraft are planned to remain in service for 12 more years, for the foreseeable future, AFSOC will have to operate and maintain more types of electronic warfare systems. Since AFSOC’s electronic warfare acquisition strategy was adopted, the Air Force has decided to fund a $4.3-billion Air Force-wide C-130 modernization program of all C-130s, including the special operations fleet. This avionics modernization program shares many common elements with the USSOCOM CAAP program. CAAP includes $247 million of MFP-11 funds for upgrades/systems to address AFSOC’s C-130 aircraft situational awareness and passive detection problems. Consistent with the provisions of title 10, the MOA requires that the Air Force, rather than USSOCOM, fund common items. Therefore, the overlap between the two programs creates an opportunity for USSOCOM to direct its MFP-11 funding from CAAP to other solutions identified in AFSOC’s Technology Roadmap instead of paying for items that will be common to all Air Force C-130s.