The federal government relies heavily on contractors to supply it with goods and services. Each year, fraud by these contractors potentially costs the government billions of dollars. Detecting, prosecuting, and deterring contractor fraud poses a challenge to federal agencies, which often possess limited resources. Contractor fraud comes in many forms, including false or fraudulent claims for payment made under a contract or as part of the contract disputes process; false statements; bid rigging; defective pricing; cost mischarging; product substitution; and false certification of small business size or status. Congressional efforts to deter contractor fraud extend at least as far back as the passage of the False Claims Act (FCA) during the Civil War. Since that time, Congress has enacted several statutes that allow the federal government—and in some instances, private parties—to recover damages, civil penalties, or forfeitures for false or fraudulent claims for payment and other misconduct. Since the passage of the FCA, Members of Congress, courts, and others have continued to debate the proper scope of liability under these civil fraud statutes. Recoveries of large damage awards and penalties by the government or private parties under these statutes have brought new attention to this debate. For example, in FY2013, the Department of Justice (DOJ) recovered about $3.8 billion in settlements and judgments under the FCA, which represents the federal government's primary civil fraud remedy. Of this amount, recoveries from procurement fraud cases accounted for a record $890 million. The government has also recovered large civil penalties and forfeitures from contractors who submit fraudulent claims for payment as part of the contract disputes process, including in a recent case in which the Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of Federal Claims' (COFC's) assessment of a $50.6 million civil penalty against a contractor under the Contract Disputes Act's (CDA's) anti-fraud provision and rendered judgment of forfeiture of a $13.3 million contractor claim under the Forfeiture of Fraudulent Claims Act (FFCA). Some federal statutory civil fraud remedies may be cumulative, raising the possibility that the government could potentially recover significant sums, particularly if it suffers damages. In addition to the significant damage awards that plaintiffs may recover under some of these statutes, courts may find a contractor civilly liable under these laws for conduct that may not amount to fraud under traditional common law definitions. Although many provisions in federal civil fraud statutes require the existence of a "claim" for payment from the government, the statutes may impose civil penalties and forfeitures even when the government has not relied on, or suffered damages from, the claim. Moreover, recent statutory and judicial developments under the FCA have reduced the level of "knowledge" that a defendant must possess in order to be liable and extended the scope of the act to cover a wider range of conduct than the common law typically encompasses. Congress has an interest in the scope of federal civil fraud remedy statutes. In order to be effective, these statutes must be broad enough to punish and deter fraud that often evades detection, wastes taxpayer funds, and negatively impacts government programs. On the other hand, if courts interpret a fraud statute so broadly that it imposes civil liability on contractors for minor regulatory violations or ordinary breaches of contract—possibly resulting in a contractor having insufficient notice as to which actions will result in liability —contractors may decline to compete for government contracts. This could lead to higher prices for the government. This report provides an overview of federal statutes that provide civil remedies for contractor fraud, as well as issues stemming from judicial interpretation of these statutes. These statutes include the civil FCA, anti-fraud provision of the CDA, FFCA, and the Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act. The report also briefly examines regulatory and judicial developments that have implications for enforcement of the FCA, including the circuit split regarding the calculation of treble damages under the FCA; the Mandatory Disclosure Rule; and the Presumed Loss Rule. Congress originally enacted the FCA in 1863 to combat fraud by Civil War defense contractors. Since that time, Congress has occasionally adjusted the scope of the FCA's civil liability provisions in response to judicial developments and shifting perceptions of the prevalence of fraud against the federal government. In its current form, the FCA imposes civil liability on "any person" who engages in at least one of seven forms of misconduct. The FCA authorizes the Attorney General, as well as certain private parties that sue on behalf of the United States under the act's qui tam provisions, to bring a civil action against an alleged violator of the act. Liability under the FCA requires no specific proof of intent to defraud. Liability under two provisions of the FCA frequently used against contractors requires, among other things, the existence of a "false or fraudulent" claim for payment from the government. Some federal courts have developed theories that expand the definition of a "false or fraudulent" claim. Under the implied false certification and fraud in the inducement theories, claims for payment that are not explicitly false may become false by implication because of a party's actions or omissions prior to contract formation or during contract performance. Some courts have expressed concerns that, under these theories, a defendant could become liable for ordinary breaches of contract or minor regulatory violations. Thus, some courts have limited the use of the theories by strictly enforcing the FCA's mental state requirement; the heightened pleading requirements for fraud allegations under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b); or some form of materiality requirement. In addition to discussing the scope of liability under the FCA, this section also examines a circuit split involving the method by which courts calculate treble damages under the act when the contractor has provided at least some value to the government. Congress enacted the FCA in 1863 to detect, punish, and deter fraud against the federal government by defense contractors during the Civil War. In its current form, the FCA imposes civil liability on "any person" who engages in at least one of seven forms of misconduct. Parties bringing claims against contractors under the FCA frequently invoke two of the act's provisions. These provisions impose liability for treble damages and a civil penalty on "any person" who "knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval" or "knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim." Many federal courts of appeals require parties bringing an FCA cause of action to show that the falsity of the claim or statement is material to the government's (or its intermediary's) decision to pay the claim. The party bringing an FCA cause of action against a contractor must prove its elements, including damages, "by a preponderance of the evidence." Unlike some of the other federal civil fraud remedy statutes discussed in this report, liability under the FCA requires no specific proof of intent to defraud. The FCA authorizes the Attorney General, as well as certain private parties that sue on behalf of the United States under the act's qui tam provisions (known as "relators"), to bring a civil action against an alleged violator of the act. Generally, the Department of Justice (DOJ) may intervene in a relator's suit within a certain time period after receiving the complaint and other material information. If the DOJ intervenes, then it conducts the action. If the DOJ declines to intervene, the relator may proceed with the action. When the DOJ conducts an action initially brought by a relator, the court may award the relator between 15 to 25 percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement of the claim "depending upon the extent to which the person substantially contributed to the prosecution of the action." If the government declines to intervene, the relator may receive between 25 and 30 percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement. Since enacting the FCA, Congress has periodically amended the act to, among other things, change the extent to which the act exposes contractors and other parties to potential civil liability. For example, in 1943, the Supreme Court expanded the reach of the act's qui tam provisions, holding that a relator's action under the FCA could be based solely on knowledge already possessed by the government and made public in a criminal indictment. Congress reversed this decision by enacting a law that stripped federal courts of jurisdiction over suits brought by relators when the government already had knowledge of the alleged fraud underlying the relator's complaint. In the same law, Congress also limited whistleblower lawsuits by reducing the share of the recovery a relator could obtain in a successful suit. By contrast, decades later, Congress sought to strengthen the FCA in the wake of evidence of extensive fraud against the federal government by defense contractors and others. In 1986, Congress restored courts' jurisdiction over some qui tam suits based on publicly disclosed information, including suits in which relators were an "original source" of information about the alleged fraud. The amendments also relaxed the knowledge standard for liability, making clear that liability required no specific intent to defraud. More recently, Congress amended the FCA in response to various judicial developments that some perceived as having weakened the act. In 2009, Congress passed the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act (FERA). Among other things, FERA eliminated language suggesting that a false claim must be submitted directly to a federal officer or employee and added a specific materiality element to the act's "false statements" provision. Congress made additional amendments to the FCA in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) of 2010 that, among other things, reduced some of the jurisdictional obstacles to qui tam suits. As described above, one element that the United States or a relator must prove in order to establish a defendant's liability for fraudulent misconduct under sections 3792(a)(1)(A)-(B) of the FCA is that the claim is "false or fraudulent."