The individual states have been the primary regulators of insurance in this country for the past 150 years. The 1945 McCarran-Ferguson Act specifically authorized the states' role, and Congress has recognized state primacy in insurance regulation in more recent laws shaping the financial regulatory system, such as 1999's Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) and 2010's Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank Act). Although Congress may have generally reaffirmed the state-based system in such laws, congressional interest in the operation of the insurance regulatory system has continued. Much of the congressional focus on the insurance regulatory system since 1999 has been on the efficiency of the state-based system. Organizations such as the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) and the National Conference of Insurance Legislators (NCOIL) create model laws and undertake other steps to harmonize insurance regulation and laws across the country. To be legally binding, however, any models suggested by the NAIC or NCOIL must first be adopted in a state. The states may amend models to fit local circumstances or completely reject suggestions from outside groups. Various federal proposals have been advanced to change the workings of the state-based regulatory system, ranging from creation of a broad federal charter that might replace much of the state-based system to narrower concepts using federal powers to preempt some state laws while leaving the state-based regulatory system largely in place. In the 113 th Congress, issues around licensing for insurance agents and brokers (known generally as insurance producers ) came to the fore in the form of legislation—the National Association of Registered Agents and Brokers Act, passed in different forms by both the Senate and the House. This legislation, which would mandate the creation of a National Association of Registered Agents and Brokers (NARAB), is generally referred to as "NARAB II" legislation. The 114 th Congress passed identical versions of H.R. 26 , which included NARAB II provisions as Title II. The President signed the bill, now P.L. 114-1 , on January 12, 2015. Licensing of insurance producers has long been an integral part of the insurance regulatory system. Individual states typically require insurance producers operating within their borders to obtain a license from that state, with different licenses often required for different lines of insurance. Such licensure provides a mechanism for insurance regulators to enforce standards of conduct, particularly with regard to consumer protections, as well as a revenue source to help defray the cost of the insurance regulatory system. Aspects of insurance producer licensing include specific education or knowledge requirements, such as passage of a written exam prior to licensing and continuing education afterward, and, in some states, criminal background checks. The NAIC has adopted model laws regarding licensure and a model insurance producer license form, but individual states are free to modify such models, or not adopt them at all, resulting in variability in licensing requirements across the country. The number of insurance producers potentially affected by the variability of state licensing laws appears relatively large; in one survey, 83% of producers reported having licenses in at least 2 and up to 10 states. Larger insurance agencies tend to hold a greater number of licenses, with 47% of the firms of more than 500 financial advisors having licenses in 21 or more states. Insurance producers that operate in multiple states have long sought increased uniformity and reciprocity across states to reduce their costs resulting from the multiplicity of license requirements. Insurance producers report, for example, that, on average, 3% of agency operating expenses are spent on "licensing compliance efforts," with higher figures (4.3%) at the smallest agencies. Although insurance producers consider the multiplicity of licenses to be a burden, others consider the requirements for local licenses and knowledge of specific local risks or legal requirements to be important consumer protections by others. One consumer representative has argued, for example, that "[property and casualty] insurance varies too much state to state as respects law and risk to not maintain local control of licensure." GLBA attempted to address the multiplicity of different requirements among states for insurance producer licensing. Although many states satisfied the GLBA statutory requirements for reciprocity by 2002, insurance producers continued to identify inefficiencies and costs of the state licensing system in the years following. In 2008 testimony before a House subcommittee, for example, an insurance agent representative indicated that states continued to "impose additional conditions and requirements" on nonresident agents despite the reciprocity called for in law. In 2009, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) cited issues regarding fingerprinting and background checks as particular barriers to uniformity or reciprocity in producer licensing and as potentially creating uneven insurance consumer protection in states in which full-background checks were not able to be performed. GAO also determined that differences in licensing requirements and insurance line definitions could potentially be creating inefficiencies that "could result in higher costs for insurers, which in turn could be passed on to consumer[s]." In addition to concerns about the substance of the reciprocity in place, reciprocity laws have not been adopted by every state. The NAIC ultimately certified 47 states as reciprocal, but the 3 states not certified—California, Florida, and Washington—together represented nearly 20% of the nation's population. In addition to the costs that might result from the specific aspects of the insurance licensing system, any professional licensing regime acts as a barrier to entry for those who might be interested in providing services that require a license. Economic theory suggests such barriers increase consumer costs to some degree and have the potential to be used as a protectionist measure to prevent competition, allowing license holders to extract economic rents from consumers. Whether the public benefits resulting from licensure outweigh the costs is determined by policy makers on a case-by-case basis. Some form of licensure for those in the financial services industry has been generally accepted and is required in federal law for people involved in securities transactions with the public, for example. H.R. 26 in the 114 th Congress was identical aside from technical corrections to the amended version of S. 2244 that passed the House in the 113 th Congress. Thus, it included NARAB II provisions in Title II, but did not include the Section 335 sunset language that had been included in the Senate-passed version of S. 2244 . The House and Senate passed H.R. 26 on January 7, 2015, and January 8, 2015, respectively. The President signed the bill, now P.L. 114-1 , on January 12, 2015. P.L. 114-1 , Title II creates a National Association of Registered Agents and Brokers. Key features of this association include the following: The association shall be a private, nonprofit corporation and is specifically forbidden from receiving federal funds. To gain membership, insurance producers are required to be licensed as an insurance producer in their home state, pass a criminal background check, and meet other criteria determined by the association, which shall not be "less protective of the public" than that contained in the NAIC Producer Licensing Model Act as of January 12, 2015. NARAB members will be able to operate in any other state subject only to payment of the licensing fee in that state rather than having to obtain a separate license in the additional states. Members will still be subject to each state's consumer protection and market conduct regulation, but individual state laws that treat out-of-state insurance producers differently from in-state producers are preempted. The association will be overseen by a board of eight appointees who are current or former state insurance commissioners and five appointees with demonstrated expertise in different areas of insurance. Appointments are to be made by the President with advice and consent by the Senate. The President can dissolve the board as a whole or suspend the implementation of any rule or action taken by the association. The association is to submit copies of the NARAB bylaws, standards, and an annual report, to the President through the Department of the Treasury and to the States, as well as to make these publically available on the NARAB website. S. 534 , the National Association of Registered Agents and Brokers Reform Act of 2013, was introduced by Senator Jon Tester on March 13, 2013, and referred to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. The committee's Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment held a hearing on the bill on March 19, 2013, and the full committee marked up S. 534 and ordered the amended bill be favorably reported on June 6, 2013. S. 534 as introduced would have established a NARAB. Key features of this association included the following: The association would have been a private, nonprofit corporation. To gain membership, insurance producers would have been required to be licensed as an insurance producer in their home state, pass a criminal background check, and meet other criteria determined by the association, which should not be "less protective of the public than that contained in the NAIC Producer Licensing Model Act." NARAB members would have been able to operate in any other state subject only to payment of the licensing fee in that state rather than having to obtain a separate license in the additional states, as is often the case. Members would still have been subject to each state's consumer protection and market conduct regulation, but individual state laws that treat out-of-state insurance producers differently from in-state producers would have been preempted. The association would have been overseen by a board of eight appointees who are current or former state insurance commissioners and five appointees representing the insurance industry. Appointments would have been made by the President with advice and consent by the Senate. The President could have dissolved the board as a whole or suspend the implementation of any rule or action taken by the association. The association would have submitted annual reports to the President and the NAIC.