It is the federal government’s responsibility to assure the physical protection of its facilities and the safety of employees and visitors of those federal buildings. GSA, through its Public Building Service (PBS) is the primary property manager for the federal government, owning or leasing 39 percent of the federal government’s office space. Approximately one million federal employees, millions of visitors, and thousands of children and their day-care providers enter these facilities each day. Within PBS, the Federal Protective Service is responsible for the security of most GSA- managed buildings. Over thirty other executive branch agencies, including DoD and the departments of State, Veterans Affairs, and Transportation, have some level of authority to purchase, own, or lease office space or buildings. These agencies are responsible for the security of their own sites. The U.S. Secret Service is in charge of the security of the White House and other executive office buildings. The U.S. Capitol Police secures the Capitol complex, which includes the Capitol and House and Senate office buildings. The marshal of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court Police tend to the security of the Supreme Court. Marshals from the Department of Justice’s U.S. Marshals Service ensure the security of other federal courts. The 1995 domestic terrorist bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, aroused governmentwide concern about the physical security of federal buildings. One day after the bombing, then President Clinton directed Justice to assess the vulnerability of all federal office buildings in the United States, particularly to acts of terrorism and other forms of violence. Justice led a working group in developing a report that established governmentwide minimum standards for security at all federal facilities. Also in 1995, the president directed executive departments and agencies to upgrade the security of their facilities to the extent feasible based on the report’s recommendations, giving GSA this responsibility for the buildings it controls. Among the minimum standards for buildings of a higher risk level specified by the Justice report are security technologies, including closed-circuit television (CCTV) surveillance cameras, intrusion detection systems with central monitoring capability, and metal detectors and x-ray machines to screen people and their belongings at entrances to federal buildings. In June 1998, we testified on GSA’s efforts to improve federal building security. We reported that although GSA had made progress implementing security upgrades in its buildings, it did not have the valid data needed to assess the extent to which completed upgrades had helped to increase security or reduce vulnerability to the greatest threats to federal office buildings. We also expressed concerns about whether all GSA buildings had been evaluated for security needs. We recommended that GSA correct the data in its tracking and accounting systems, ensure that all GSA buildings were evaluated, and develop program goals, measures, and evaluations to better manage its security enhancement program. In October 1999 we again testified on GSA’s efforts. During this review, we found that the accuracy of GSA’s security upgrade tracking system had improved and that almost all of its buildings had been evaluated for security needs. However, a review we performed in April and May 2000 exposed a significant security vulnerability in the access controls at many government buildings. Posing as law enforcement officers, we gained access to 18 federal facilities, where we reached the offices of 15 cabinet secretaries or agency heads. Our briefcases were not searched for weapons or explosives. As mentioned previously, last September’s terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon have focused even greater security concerns about federal buildings. Such concerns have prompted agency officials to create a more stringent security environment at their facilities. For example, the Federal Emergency Management Administration recently informed GSA officials that it was canceling plans to move its national headquarters and 1,000 workers to the Potomac Center redevelopment near the waterfront in Washington, D.C. Citing security concerns about the new building, the agency backed out of a 10-year lease. Despite a show of increased security, it remains uncertain whether effective countermeasures have actually been implemented. For example, reporters who visited a number of government agencies in late October demonstrated that, without thorough screening, nonemployees could easily gain access to freely wander the buildings. Since the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, the federal government has already spent more than $1.2 billion on increased security measures for the federal government’s office space. Following the September 11th terrorist attacks, increased resources have been appropriated for this purpose. Specifically, on September 18, 2001, President Bush signed the Fiscal Year 2001 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 107- 38), appropriating $40 billion to respond to the terrorist attacks. The act provides funding to cover the physical protection of government facilities and employee security. On September 21, 2001, the president allocated $8.6 million from this appropriation to GSA’s Federal Buildings Fund to provide increased security for federal buildings. On October 17, 2001, the president requested that Congress increase the total to $200.5 million for the Federal Building Fund for additional security services at federal buildings. The president’s fiscal year 2003 budget requests that $367 million be made available from the Federal Building Fund to fund costs associated with implementing security improvements to federal buildings. On March 21, 2002, the Bush administration asked Congress for an additional $27.1 billion in emergency funding for fiscal year 2002 for needs stemming from the September 11th terrorist attacks, $5.5 billion of which were for domestic security. Some of these requested funds will most likely be invested in technologies to enhance building security. It will be important to ensure that the technologies that these funds are spent on are effective. The approach to good security is fundamentally similar regardless of the assets being protected. As GAO has previously reported for homeland security and information systems security, applying risk management principles can provide a sound foundation for effective security whether the assets are information, operations, people, or federal facilities. These principles, which have been followed by members of the intelligence and defense community for many years, can be reduced to five basic steps that help to determine responses to five essential questions. Because of the vast differences in types of federal facilities and the variety of risks associated with each of them, there is obviously no single approach to security that will work ideally for all buildings. Therefore, following these basic risk management steps is fundamental to determining security priorities and implementing appropriate solutions. The first step in risk management is to identify assets that must be protected and the impact of their potential loss. Included among the assets of federal facilities are the physical safety and peace of mind of the occupants, the value of the structure itself, and the importance of the mission of the organization housed in the facility. The symbolic value of certain landmark federal facilities and monuments must also be considered in the assessment. Who Are My Adversaries? The second step is to identify and characterize the threat to these assets. Is the threat, for example, that unauthorized individuals can gain access to the building to commit some crime, or that an authorized yet disgruntled employee intent on causing harm to fellow employees or the facility can get in, or, still more menacing, that a terrorist will introduce a chemical/biological agent or even a nuclear device into the building? The intent and capability of an adversary are the principal criteria for establishing the degree of threat to these assets. The terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, the Oklahoma City bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in 1995, the U.S. embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998, and last year’s September 11th terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center leave no doubt as to the existence of adversaries intent on causing the maximum harm. And, as these events have tragically demonstrated, our adversaries certainly have the capability. Moreover, more recent information gathered by intelligence and law enforcement agencies have led government officials to believe that both foreign and domestic terrorist groups continue to pose threats to the security of our nation’s infrastructure, including our public buildings. How Am I Vulnerable? Step three involves identifying and characterizing vulnerabilities that would allow identified threats to be realized. In other words, what weaknesses can allow a security breach? For a facility, weaknesses could include vulnerabilities in the physical layout of the building, its security systems, and processes. For example, the lack of a standoff distance between vehicle access and the building itself, which would allow an adversary to detonate a car or truck bomb within a dangerous distance of the building, is an example of a vulnerability in the perimeter security of a building. Or, it might be that an antiquated and labor-intensive access control system in combination with an inadequate security staff create weaknesses in security systems and processes that allow entrance to a building. What Are My Priorities? In the fourth step, risk must be assessed and priorities determined for protecting assets. Risk assessment examines the potential for the loss of or damage to an asset. Risk levels are established by assessing the impact of the loss or damage, threats to the asset, and vulnerabilities. For example, the risk of loss of human life due to poor access controls on weekends, when fewer people are working in the building, is lower than on weekdays during standard working hours. What Can I Do? The final step is to identify countermeasures to reduce or eliminate risks. In doing so, the advantages and benefits of these countermeasures must also be weighed against their disadvantages and costs. Many security technologies were developed in a research environment. However, in a real-world environment, some degree of security must be traded off against operational and safety considerations. Extreme security countermeasures cannot be implemented if they could disrupt operations or adversely affect the safety of the occupants of a building. For example, an access control system that uses draconian methods to screen employees at public entrances would be inappropriate except in buildings at the highest risk level because it would cause maximum inconvenience to large numbers of building occupants at peak traffic hours.