Electronic waste (e-waste) is a term that refers loosely to obsolete, broken, or irreparable electronic devices like televisions, computer central processing units (CPUs), computer monitors (flat screen and cathode ray tubes), laptops, printers, scanners, and associated wiring. E-waste has become a concern in the United States in part because of the high volumes in which it is generated and the hazardous ingredients it often contains (such as lead, mercury, and chromium). E-waste is essentially unregulated at the federal level—meaning it can be disposed of with common household garbage in municipal solid waste landfills (the primary disposal method) or incinerators. U.S. producers of e-waste may also opt to export it overseas for processing. Although it is difficult to know exactly how much e-waste is exported, developing countries in Asia or Africa appear to be active importers of it. Many of these countries lack, or do not enforce, labor or environmental laws that would mitigate or prevent the harms associated with e-waste processing. The result is that e-waste recycling operations in those countries may pose a significant risk to human health and the environment. Environmental impacts reportedly include contamination of the local soil, air, surface water, and groundwater. Although the United States has been involved in international efforts aimed at regulating the transboundary movements of hazardous waste for decades, it is not a party to the primary multilateral agreement governing the international waste trade: the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (Basel Convention). This Convention forbids parties from exporting hazardous wastes to a party who has not received notice of, and consented to, that export. It also requires parties to adopt domestic policies aimed at reducing the production of hazardous waste. An amendment to that Convention, which has not yet entered into force, would ban hazardous waste exports from "Annex VII" parties—members of the OECD, European Union, and Liechtenstein—to other Convention parties, which are primarily developing countries. Recently, momentum has developed for domestic legislation restricting e-waste exports from the United States. These restrictions could take many forms, including a ban akin to the one proposed by the Ban Amendment to the Basel Convention, an e-waste export licensing system, or a quota on e-waste exports. These restrictions may be difficult to reconcile with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), one of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreements, and could be susceptible to challenge before a WTO panel. Since the 1980s, the United States has been a party to international agreements governing the transboundary movements of hazardous wastes. These agreements, one among the member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and two bilateral agreements with Canada and Mexico, condition hazardous waste exports on the notification of both exporting and destination countries and the destination country's consent. However, these agreements cover a broader category of waste—all hazardous waste—than the hazardous electronic waste commonly called e-waste. Although the United States has engaged in some international efforts to regulate hazardous waste exports, it is not a party to the primary multilateral agreement governing the international waste trade: the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (Basel Convention). Over 170 other countries are parties to the Basel Convention, which was negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations Environment Programme. The Basel Convention forbids parties from exporting hazardous wastes to any other party who has not received notice of, and consented to, that export. Article 4 of the Basel Convention imposes several other prohibitions and obligations on the parties, including, inter alia : a prohibition on the export of hazardous wastes to (or importing hazardous wastes from) non-parties unless the exporting and importing countries have entered into an international agreement with provisions on environmentally sound waste management that are at least equivalent to those in the Convention; an obligation to ensure that the generation of hazardous wastes within their territories is reduced to a minimum; a requirement to prohibit persons within their jurisdictions from transporting hazardous wastes unless they are authorized to do so; and an obligation to require that hazardous waste exports are managed in an environmentally sound manner in the state of import. In addition, in 1995, Basel Convention parties adopted an amendment to the Convention to impose an absolute ban on hazardous waste export from "Annex VII" parties—members of the OECD, European Union, and Liechtenstein—to other Convention parties, which are primarily developing countries. Although some parties implemented the ban domestically, the "Ban Amendment" has not entered into force. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is one of the foundational agreements of the WTO's legal regime. At its most general, the GATT sets the maximum tariffs for particular goods and disciplines certain trade-restricting measures adopted by WTO Members. Among the GATT's cornerstone provisions are Article XI, which prohibits quantitative prohibitions or restrictions on the exportation of goods to any other Member country, and Article I, which bans measures that grant less favorable treatment to the products of one WTO Member country than to the like products of any other country. The WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) provides a means for WTO Members to resolve disputes arising under WTO agreements. WTO Members must first attempt to settle their dispute through consultations, but, if these fail, the Member initiating the dispute may request that a panel examine and report on its complaint. In addition, a Member may appeal a panel's report to the WTO Appellate Body. Members whose measures are deemed inconsistent with its WTO obligations and unjustified under one of the GATT exceptions, such as those in Article XX, are expected to implement the panel and/or Appellate Body's report. That is, the defending Member must withdraw, modify, or replace its inconsistent measures. If a disagreement arises as to whether the defending Member has, in fact, implemented the report, a WTO panel may be convened to hear the dispute over compliance. The WTO Appellate Body hears appeals of these compliance panel reports. Ultimately, when a defending Member fails to implement a panel or Appellate Body report within the established compliance period, the prevailing Member may request that the defending Member negotiate a compensation agreement. If these negotiations are not requested or if an agreement is not reached, the prevailing Member may also request authorization to impose certain trade sanctions against the non-complying Member. Specifically, the WTO may authorize the prevailing Member to suspend tariff concessions or other trade obligations that it otherwise owes the non-complying Member under a WTO agreement. Article XI:1 of the GATT bars the institution or maintenance of quantitative restrictions on exports to, and imports from, any WTO Member's territory. Quantitative restrictions limit the amount of a product that may be imported or exported. Common examples are embargoes, quotas, minimum import or export prices, and certain import or export licensing requirements. Only duties, taxes, and other charges are Article XI:1 consistent methods of restricting imports or exports. Article XI:1's constraints apply to a broad range of government actions (all "measures")—including those, like government agency practices, that are not required by a law or regulation. Article XI prohibits WTO Members from taking these actions if they impose or have the effect of a quantitative restriction. Moreover, a measure that expressly institutes an import or export ban constitutes a quantitative restriction within the meaning of Article XI:1 regardless of whether it has, in practice, impeded imports or exports. Because the GATT protects both existing and future trade flows, a measure that would , by its terms, preclude certain potential exports is inconsistent with Article XI:1. To date, only a few WTO panels have considered export restrictions under Article XI:1. However, measures that ban or impose a licensing system on e-waste exports could constitute export restrictions prohibited by Article XI:1. As discussed above, any government action that expressly precludes the importation or exportation of certain goods constitutes a quantitative restriction per se and is necessarily inconsistent with the GATT. Although there are few GATT or WTO panel decisions on export bans, as discussed below, panels have consistently found that import bans implemented through compulsory licensing systems violate Article XI. This jurisprudence can be expected to inform any WTO panel decision on the GATT consistency of export bans and licensing. Brazil – Tyres is one example of a WTO panel decision striking down an import ban implemented through a licensing system. In that case, the European Union challenged the GATT consistency of a set of Brazilian laws designed to limit imports of certain products—retreaded tires—that Brazil believed had a negative environmental impact. Specifically, Brazil had adopted a licensing system under which a person could only import retreaded tires after obtaining a license, but a person would be ineligible for this license when the retreaded tire imports originated in a non-MERCOSUR country. Although the panel acknowledged that Brazil did not explicitly prohibit retreaded tire imports from non-MERCOSUR countries, it found that because no person could obtain the license required to import these goods, the licensing measure plainly "operate[d] so as to prohibit" their importation. The panel therefore held that the measure constituted an import ban barred by Article XI:1 of the GATT. In another dispute over a licensing system, India – Quantitative Restrictions , a WTO panel struck down a measure under which both exporters sending specified goods to India and importers bringing specified goods into India were required to obtain a license. The measure established license eligibility criteria that distinguished between importers on the basis of their reasons for importing the covered goods.