Issues and questions related to the killing of Osama bin Laden (OBL) are multifaceted and may have operational, regional, and policy implications. Operational policy issues include congressional notification, legal considerations, and current and future military activities. The chairmen of the House and Senate intelligence committees have stated that they were briefed on OBL's whereabouts during the past few months including, according to Representative Mike Rogers, chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, some details regarding the Abbottabad compound. The Senate majority leader, Senator Harry Reid, has also indicated that he had been briefed on the plans to confirm OBL's location and take action. Chariman Rogers indicated that the entire "Gang of Eight" had been briefed on the plans although not all were briefed at the same time. The Gang of Eight refers to the eight Members of Congress (the Speaker, House minority leader, the Senate majority and minority leaders, and the chairmen and ranking Members of the two intelligence committees) who, by statute, must be advised of presidential findings of covert actions (along with other members of the congressional leadership as may be included by the President). A finding is an official determination by the President that a specific covert action is in the national interest. A covert action is an activity to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad where the role of the United States will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly. In a PBS News Hour interview on May 3, CIA Director Leon Panetta stated, "this was what's called a 'Title 50' operation, which is a covert operation, and it comes directly from the President of the United States who made the decision to conduct this operation in a covert way." He added that, consistent with Title 50, he commanded the mission but it was carried out by Vice Admiral William McRaven, the commander of the Joint Special Operations Command. For additional background on covert action notification issues, see CRS Report R40691, Sensitive Covert Action Notifications: Oversight Options for Congress . Notwithstanding the notification process that was carried out with this particular operation, other considerations and questions may still emerge. For example, In retrospect, was congressional notification overly restrictive? When was the written presidential finding (required by 50 USC 413b(a)(1)) reported to the several members of the Gang of Eight? Has the written finding now been shared with all members of the two intelligence committees? Did the operation necessarily constitute a covert action? Could it have been considered a traditional military activity? Was the role of the CIA Director essential to carrying out the operation? Could it have been carried out by the Secretary of Defense? Other than the role of Director Panetta what was the contribution of CIA officials to carrying out the raid? Should there be statutory provisions requiring that the Armed Services committees (or their respective leaderships) be advised of activities such as the Abbottabad raid? The death of OBL appears to have little, if any, immediate consequence for the legal framework governing the conflict with Al Qaeda (AQ) and its affiliates. Shortly after the attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress passed the Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF, P.L. 107-40 ), which authorized the President: to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons. By conferring authority "to use all necessary and appropriate force" against entities involved in the 9/11 attacks, the AUMF is understood to not only authorize the use of force against such groups, but also to permit other fundamental incidents to the waging of war, including the detention of captured enemy belligerents to prevent their return to hostilities. Pursuant to this authority, the United States has engaged in military operations against AQ, the Taliban, and associated forces located in Afghanistan and other locations, and it has detained belligerents captured in these operations at the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and other locations. Due to OBL's position in AQ's command structure, along with his role in the 9/11 attacks, there appears to be clear consensus that he constituted a legitimate target under the AUMF at the time of his death. Additionally, the AUMF does not restrict the exercise of the authority it confers to a particular geographic location. Accordingly, at least for purposes of domestic law, the fact that OBL was killed outside of Afghanistan, where U.S. operations against AQ have primarily occurred, does not appear to affect the lawfulness of his targeting. While OBL was a legitimate target under the AUMF, his death does not result in the termination of the authority conferred by the act. The AUMF authorizes the use of force against all "nations, organizations, or persons" determined to have been involved in the 9/11 attacks. OBL's demise would not appear to affect the AUMF's continued application to AQ and any other entity believed to have "planned, authorized, committed, or aided" the 9/11 attacks or harbored such persons or groups, so as to prevent any future terrorist attacks by such entities against the United States. Even though OBL's death does not have the immediate legal consequence of modifying the authority conferred by the AUMF, it is nonetheless possible that his demise may inform future deliberations by policymakers as to whether to alter the legal framework governing U.S. policy towards AQ and its affiliates. The successful U.S. military operation against OBL carries with it possible military implications for the future. In terms of U.S. adversaries, it can be argued that the operation can serve as a powerful deterrent to both current and aspiring terrorist leaders. The search for OBL took almost a decade to develop and execute, spanned two very different Administrations with the operation conducted in a sovereign nation, apparently without their knowledge or consent, against a target that was considered by some analysts as well hidden and protected. Some contend that this sends the message that no matter how long it takes and how difficult the circumstances, the United States will ultimately kill or capture senior terrorist leadership. While this could convey a potential deterrence message, it also suggests that in the future, more concerted measures will need to be taken by terrorist organizations to protect their leadership, which could make military operations against them more difficult. Another implication is that the U.S. military has demonstrated a highly refined and sophisticated ability to locate, track, and interdict high-value targets anywhere in the world. While this capability has been associated with counterterrorism efforts, there are also implications for counter weapons of mass destruction (WMD) efforts as well as other national security-related efforts. These capabilities could also affect physical security planning and measures of adversarial countries or non-state actors that either aspire to or possess WMDs. During the President's May 1, 2011, address to the nation about the killing of OBL, he noted that, "and so shortly after taking office, I directed Leon Panetta, the director of the CIA, to make the killing or capture of Osama bin Laden the top priority of our war against Al Qaeda." During later briefings, it was revealed that the operation was carried out by U.S. Navy SEALs from the U.S. Special Operations Command. These and other briefings seem to suggest that the military operation to kill OBL was commanded by the CIA as opposed to the more traditional military chain of command. While this would not be unprecedented, it can be considered unusual and Congress might wish to clarify the operation's actual chain of command with the Administration. There could also be concerns that this arrangement might have been a less than optimal arrangement and that there could have been undue friction between the CIA and the Department of Defense (DOD), resulting in a negative impact on mission planning, resourcing, and execution. On the other hand, if this arrangement proved to be highly successful and relatively problem-free, the CIA/military command arrangement might serve as a model for future operations of a similar nature. Reports that the CIA commanded the operation suggest a number of considerations that might merit further examination. For example: Why was this particular command arrangement chosen over a more traditional CIA-commanded/CIA-conducted operation or a military-commanded/military-conducted operation? Was there a legal basis for this command arrangement or were special authorities or arrangements required? If the command arrangement is seen as a model, do current U.S. laws and policies support this type of arrangement, to include legal provisions pertaining to congressional notification and oversight? The killing of OBL nearly 10 years after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States poses many questions about the continuing destructive capabilities of AQ, the effects on regional affiliates, and U.S. policy implications in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Ascertaining the near- and long-term implications of OBL's death on AQ operations will be the subject of much analysis and debate for U.S. policymakers. Those implications may differ for core AQ leaders, their global affiliates, and non-affiliated ideological adherents of AQ around the world. In describing the significance of OBL's role in AQ government leaders and analysts offer a variety of perspectives. Some argue that OBL's role in AQ at the time of his death was largely inspirational, as his ability to communicate with followers and offer strategic and operational guidance and support had increasingly been degraded since the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. Others argue that OBL remained an active participant in both the strategic direction and operational activities of all aspects of the AQ movement.