We sent a questionnaire to all 57 IGs to obtain information on IG organization structure, staffing, and workload. The following series of 11 questions and answers provide an overall profile of the 56 IGs who responded. More specifically, information is provided that relates to the IGs’ budget obligations, number and classification of staff by occupational job series, career background and years of experience of the current IGs, and techniques used by IGs to help ensure the quality of the work. 1. What were the IG budget obligations for fiscal year 1997? For fiscal year 1997, IG reported obligations totaled $957 million. Of the reported amount, about $912 million (95 percent) was for the presidential IGs and $45 million (5 percent) was for the DFE IGs. Figure 1 shows how these funds were distributed among the various types of work performed by the IGs. The largest single use of the funds for the presidential and DFE IGs was for auditing—financial and performance. For the presidential IGs, about 46 percent of the funds was devoted to auditing; similarly, DFE IGs spent about 47 percent of the funding on auditing. 2. How many and what types of staff were employed by the IGs as of September 30, 1997? In fiscal year 1997, the IGs stated that they had a total of 9,348 staff of which 8,818 staff (94 percent) worked in presidential IG offices and 530 (6 percent) worked in DFE IG offices. As shown in figure 2, these staff are classified in various types of occupational job series. The largest group of the IGs’ staff (45 percent) are auditors, with the next largest group—26 percent—being investigators. Figure 3 provides a breakdown of the occupational job series held by the presidential and DFE IG staff. The reported distribution of the staff among the various occupations is proportionately about the same for both the presidential and DFE IGs. As requested, we sent a questionnaire to all 57 IGs to obtain their views on current policy issues affecting them. These issues include law enforcement authority, the semiannual report, the 7-day letter, independence, and the effectiveness of PCIE, ECIE, and the Integrity Committee. These issues were identified through discussions with congressional staff and review of congressional testimonies and other publications such as those issued by the Congressional Research Service. Since the IGs’ responses were anonymous, we were unable to follow up and obtain additional information or clarification. The following nine questions and answers summarize the views of the 56 IGs who responded to this questionnaire. 1. What type of law enforcement authority do the IGs think they should be granted on a permanent basis? Currently, law enforcement authorities have not been granted to IGs across-the-board in public law. The IGs that have law enforcement authorities have acquired them through transfers from preexisting offices, specific statutory grants, delegation by the agency head, or special deputation by the Department of Justice. The special deputation can be granted on a case-by-case basis that is limited to the scope and duration of a case or by a blanket authority that covers a broader scope and is renewed after a period of time, as specified in the memorandum of understanding with Justice. In general, the law enforcement authority provided to the IGs in performing investigations include serving arrest warrants, making arrests without warrants, carrying firearms, and serving search warrants. Figure 17 identifies the various types of law enforcement actions that IGs can currently take. Most presidential IGs (81 percent) indicated that they had blanket authority granted by the Department of Justice. Most DFE IGs (60 percent) indicated that they did not have law enforcement authority but could obtain assistance from other IGs or Justice, if needed. Only three presidential IGs and one DFE IG had statutory law enforcement authority. A few IGs (5) had case-by-case authority granted by Justice. Figure 18 identifies the type of law enforcement authority the IGs currently desire. Most IGs—81 percent of the presidential and 57 percent of the DFEs—responded that they should have statutory law enforcement authority. In addition, 77 percent of the presidential and 53 percent of the DFEs stated that blanket authority should be indefinite, unless a problem occurs. On a related issue, a majority—58 percent of the presidential and 60 percent of the DFEs—indicated that they should have testimonial subpoena authority. 2. What are IG views on the usefulness of the 7-day letter? Section 5(d) of the IG Act, as amended, requires IGs to report immediately to the agency head whenever the IG becomes aware of “particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to the administration of programs or operations.” The agency head, in turn, is to transmit the IG report, with the agency head’s comments, to the appropriate committees or subcommittees of the Congress within 7 calendar days. This is referred to as the 7-day letter. The survey responses indicated that none of the IGs had used the 7-day letter during the period January 1, 1990, to April 30, 1998. Earlier surveys have shown that the 7-day letter had been used on occasion by some IGs. For example, a survey conducted by the Inspections and Special Reviews Committee of PCIE in June 1986, and updated in 1989, showed that the 7-day letter had been used on 10 occasions, by seven IGs. Although a 7-day letter has not been issued in recent years, the IGs noted that it is a useful mechanism to encourage agencies to comply with the IGs’ requests. A 10-year review of the IG Act by the House Committee on Government Operations found that the IGs viewed the use of the 7-day letter as a last resort to attempt to force appropriate action by the agency. Our survey responses indicated that the IGs continue to view the 7-day letter useful as a tool. Twelve of the 22 presidential IGs and 20 of the 24 DFE IGs that responded to the question find it useful to a great or very great extent. Three IGs specifically stated that the threat of a 7-day letter gets immediate results. Another IG responded that it had threatened the use of the letter twice and in each instance the agency responded to the IG’s request. Figure 19 provides the IGs’ views on the usefulness of the 7-day letter. 3. In the opinion of the IGs, should the current requirement for the preparation of a semiannual report be modified, replaced, or eliminated? Section 5(a) of the IG Act requires that each IG issue a semiannual report to the Congress and agency management. The IG Act outlines 12 specific areas that are to be covered by each semiannual report, which are listed in appendix V. Overall, the IGs responded that most of the reporting requirements should remain. However, the following three requirements were the most frequently cited as needing change. The percent of IGs favoring each change is shown parenthetically. Audits identifying questioned costs and funds to be put to better use(39 percent) Statistical tables of questioned costs (55 percent) Statistical tables of funds to be put to better use (57 percent) While there was support for some changes to the reporting requirements, only one IG supported elimination of the report and eight IGs suggested substituting another document for the semiannual report, such as the agency’s accountability report or an annual performance report. Thirty-five IGs stated that the reporting requirement should be changed from semiannual to annual. Further, the presidential IGs indicated that the semiannual report is at least moderately useful to the Congress, OMB, agency heads, and program managers. The DFE IGs noted that the report is of great use to the Congress, OMB, and agency heads and of moderate use to program managers. 4. Do the IGs generally believe that they have sufficient independence in the performance of their work? The independence of the IGs is central to the success of the IG concept. Each IG reports to and is under the general supervision of the agency head or in the case of a presidential IG, the official next in rank, to the extent delegated. However, these individuals, with a few specified exceptions, cannot prevent or prohibit the IG from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or investigation or from issuing any subpoena during the course of any audit or investigation. Under the IG Act, as amended, the heads of three Departments—Defense, Justice, and Treasury—may prevent the IG in his or her department from initiating or proceeding with an audit or investigation in order to prevent disclosure of information relating to national security, on-going criminal investigations, and other matters outlined in the IG Act. If the department heads take this action, the IG Act provides for written notification to the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, and other specified committees and subcommittees. Similar exceptions are provided for the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Reserve Board. In addition, the IGs are required to follow GAGAS, which require IGs and individual auditors to be free from personal and external impairments to independence. As shown in figure 20, the survey results indicated that 81 percent of the presidential IGs and 73 percent of the DFE IGs responded that they have the level of independence needed to accomplish their mission. On the other hand, 15 percent of the presidential and 27 percent of the DFE IGs indicated that they do not have sufficient independence, but they did not identify specific areas in which they felt their independence was being compromised. The IGs did suggest some options for enhancing independence. The most frequently cited option was to allow IGs to submit their budget request directly to OMB and the Congress rather than going through the agency review process.