The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is one of the most serious dangers confronting the United States today and will likely continue to be so for the foreseeable future. Responsibility for thwarting this proliferation is shouldered by numerous federal agencies and by many individual departments within these agencies. Each of these departments brings a specific perspective, strength, and knowledge base to bear on an aspect of the large and complex proliferation problem. NNSA and its Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development Program (R&D program) are key players in the United States’ nonproliferation efforts. NNSA derives its important role from its unique understanding and expertise related to nuclear weapons and nuclear power, based in large measure on the world-class research, design, and engineering capabilities to be found in the multidisciplinary DOE national laboratories that conduct basic and applied research in many areas—from high-energy physics to advanced computing. As of May 31, 2002, the Nonproliferation and Verification R&D Program’s 220 projects were in various developmental stages: from research conducted to develop an idea and assess the feasibility of producing a prototype, to field demonstrating a prototype prior to its transfer to an end user. Some examples of successful research projects conducted by NNSA’s Nonproliferation and Verification R&D Program include: The development of ground-based technology for detecting in real time short-lived radioactive gases released during nuclear explosions and satellite-based detectors that are sensitive to x-ray, gamma ray, and neutron emissions. These projects were developed by the Nuclear Explosion Monitoring research area. Detection equipment, developed by the Proliferation Detection research area, that was fitted into an aircraft and flown over the World Trade Center site to monitor air samples for hazardous chemicals. A decontamination formulation that was used to assist the cleanup of congressional office buildings contaminated with anthrax and equipment to detect the presence of chemical agents in the Washington, D.C., Metro subway system was developed by the Chemical and Biological National Security research area. Nearly 75 percent of the $1.2 billion that NNSA’s R&D program was appropriated over the past 5 years was distributed to Los Alamos, Sandia, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories. According to program officials, these laboratories received the majority of the funding because most of the needed expertise for the program’s projects is resident at these laboratories. The remaining funding was distributed to other DOE laboratories and facilities. NNSA’s R&D program received a total appropriation of $322 million in fiscal year 2002, with the most funding spent on R&D of Proliferation Detection projects. From fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2002, $1.2 billion was appropriated to NNSA’s R&D program. There was little annual variation in the program’s funding between fiscal year 1998 and fiscal year 2001, averaging about $218 million per year. (See fig. 1.) However, the program received a significant increase in fiscal year 2002, and was appropriated about $323 million—including $78 million the program received in the $40 billion emergency supplemental appropriations act passed in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Of the $1.2 billion appropriated to NNSA’s R&D program from fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2002, nearly 75 percent was distributed for R&D efforts at three of DOE’s nuclear weapons laboratories—Sandia and Los Alamos National Laboratories in New Mexico ($352.4 million and $313.6 million, respectively) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California ($228.2 million). (See table 1.) Fourteen percent was distributed to other national laboratories, including, among others, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory in Washington ($85.0 million) and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and Y-12 Plant in Tennessee ($35.1 million). Six percent was distributed to universities, industry (including small businesses), and other governmental agencies. For example, nearly $240,000 was obligated to the U.S. Army for chemical and biological agent detection research. Finally, about 5 percent or $58.8 million has been spent from fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2002 to build the NISC at Los Alamos National Laboratory. This center (that NNSA estimates will cost a total of $63 million before construction is complete in fiscal year 2003) will provide consolidated office and laboratory space for nonproliferation R&D activities that are currently housed in 47 different structures—many of which, according to NNSA, are old and substandard—across the 43-square mile Los Alamos National Laboratory. In fiscal year 2002, R&D activities in the Proliferation Detection research area received 37 percent of the $323 million appropriated to NNSA’s R&D program. The Chemical and Biological National Security research area received 26 percent and the Nuclear Explosion Monitoring research area received 23 percent. (See fig. 2.) The Proliferation Detection research area received about $119 million in fiscal year 2002. The largest single amount ($11.2 million) was obligated to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory for R&D of remote spectroscopy technology. While many of the specific applications and characteristics of this technology are classified, the systems developed are used by several defense and intelligence agencies in a variety of arms control and treaty verification activities. The technology developed is particularly useful in identifying chemical releases associated with proliferation activities. For example, these systems can be used to detect chemical signatures of agents released on a battlefield. One of these systems was also used at the World Trade Center site after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks to monitor for hazardous chemicals that might affect construction workers. Chemical and Biological National Security R&D efforts received $81.1 million in fiscal year 2002. Of this amount, $39.1 million was spent on demonstration programs of integrated chemical and biological detection systems. Examples of these systems include the chemical agent detection system installed in one station of the Washington, D.C., Metro subway system and a biological agent detection system that was deployed at the 2002 Winter Olympic Games in Salt Lake City, Utah. R&D of Nuclear Explosion Monitoring technologies received $75.6 million in fiscal year 2002. Of this amount, $54.5 million was spent primarily at Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories to provide satellite sensors for monitoring nuclear explosions in the earth’s atmosphere and in space. These sensors are installed on U.S. Air Force Global Positioning System satellites and on Defense Support Program early warning satellites. The remaining funds in this research area were spent developing and installing ground-based sensors for monitoring nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, underground, and underwater and for developing computer software used by the operator of the U.S. system for monitoring nuclear explosions—the Air Force Technical Applications Center—to analyze data obtained from these sensors. In contrast to the Nuclear Explosion Monitoring research area, the Proliferation Detection and the Chemical and Biological National Security research areas lack a process to identify users’ needs and do not have sufficient information to oversee project progress. For these latter two research areas, input from specific users is often not sought prior to funding research projects because the research in these two areas is, in many cases, considered to be long-term and the feasibility of the resulting technology is usually unknown. In addition, although required to have project life-cycle plans and quarterly reports that contain detailed information on a project’s time frames, milestones, users, and deliverables, we found that many of these plans and reports for the two research areas lacked these data. Furthermore, NNSA’s R&D program management information system is not designed to capture whether projects are on time or within budget, eliminating an important tool that program managers could use to monitor their projects. In the Nuclear Explosion Monitoring research area, specific R&D projects originate in a classified presidential directive that sets broad guidelines for a U.S. system for monitoring nuclear explosions. These broad guidelines are then refined through an interagency process that includes agencies of the Department of Defense and the intelligence community to leverage resources and prevent duplication. Specific requirements for technologies are then transmitted to the Nuclear Explosion Monitoring research area and specific statements of work and memorandums of understanding are signed between the research area and users of the technology—primarily the Air Force Technical Applications Center—that specify each party’s responsibilities. The Air Force Technical Applications Center has the operational responsibility for ground-based and satellite-based sensor systems that provide technical data for verification of nuclear test ban treaties and nuclear explosion monitoring. The Nuclear Explosion Monitoring research area in NNSA’s R&D program is the principal developer of technology for the Air Force Technical Applications Center. As such, the two parties enjoy a close relationship. This relationship has been facilitated by the fact that some of the test ban treaties the Center is responsible for monitoring—such as the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty between the then Soviet Union and the United States that prohibited underground nuclear explosions above a yield of 150 kilotons—contain detailed monitoring and verification procedures. In addition, operational requirements documents for the U.S. system for monitoring nuclear explosions also contain detailed technical guidelines for researchers conducting R&D for NNSA’s program to follow. In the Proliferation Detection and the Chemical and Biological National Security research areas, the process for identifying users’ needs and developing R&D projects differs from Nuclear Explosion Monitoring. Instead of beginning with formal, detailed requirements, projects in these research areas often are of a more exploratory nature, requiring several years of work before usable technologies are mature and ready for real world application. User input is often not sought prior to funding such research because, according to program managers and national laboratory officials we spoke with, users are often focused on their immediate operational needs and are unable to define requirements for technology whose feasibility is still unknown.