The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Hong Kong, or HKSAR) held elections for its expanded, 70-member Legislative Council (Legco) on September 9, 2012, ending an 11-month period in which the city also elected members to its District Councils and selected Leung Chu-ying (CY Leung) as its new Chief Executive. The newly elected Legco and Chief Executive will have the opportunity to consider further political reforms that could result in the election of the Chief Executive and the Legco members by universal suffrage in 2017 and 2020, respectively. The process of selecting the new Chief Executive and the results of the 2012 Legco elections, however, may foretell problems for Hong Kong's prospects for democracy. The selection of CY Leung as Chief Executive appeared to be engineered by the Chinese government after an alternative leading candidate lost the favor of Beijing due to a series of personal scandals. In addition, while a majority of the newly elected Legco members are generally regarded as being sympathetic to the preferences of the Chinese government, the pro-democracy members won enough seats to block future election reforms that they consider unacceptable. The 2012 election results may have raised the risk of a political stalemate for democratic reforms in Hong Kong. The outcome of Hong Kong's 2012 elections matters to Congress for three key reasons. First, the Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 ( P.L. 102-383 ) states, "Support for democratization is a fundamental principle of United States foreign policy. As such, it naturally applies to United States policy toward Hong Kong. This will remain equally true after June 30, 1997" (the date of Hong Kong's reversion to China). Second, Hong Kong's Basic Law, a quasi-constitution for the city passed by China's National People's Congress in April 1990, stipulates that the "ultimate aim" is the election of the Chief Executive and "all the members of the Legislative Council" by universal suffrage. The conduct of the 2012 elections and the possibility of additional political reforms are indicators of the Chinese government's commitment to the Basic Law and its support for the democratic reforms within a territory over which it exercises sovereignty. Third, some scholars speculate that Hong Kong may serve as a testing ground for possible democratic reforms in Mainland China, either as part of an officially recognized process or as the result of a populist movement such as occurred in 1989. The notion is that tolerance or acceptance of democracy in Hong Kong may signal a willingness by China's leadership to entertain political reforms in other parts of China. Conversely, if the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) seeks to forestall further democratic reforms in Hong Kong, it may signal the CCP's opposition to changes in its political system. Congress may choose to assess and possibly assist the prospects for democracy in Hong Kong. In the past, funds were appropriated for the promotion of democratic practices in the city, and Congress may decide to continue to appropriate such funds. In addition, Congress may decide to hold hearings or other educational events to garner greater awareness of the democratization of Hong Kong. The Basic Law established an executive-run government in Hong Kong, led by the Chief Executive, similar in structure to how the city was administered under British colonial rule. Under current Hong Kong law, the Chief Executive is selected by an Election Committee that also serves as a nominating committee for candidates for the position. As the result of election reforms approved in 2010, the Election Committee was expanded from 800 to 1,200 members and the threshold for nomination was increased from 100 to 150 members. Most of the Election Committee members are appointed by various organizations and associations, but current Legco members and some elected District Council members are also included. The date for the selection of Hong Kong's fourth Chief Executive was set for March 25, 2012. Three candidates successfully submitted the required nomination papers during the last two weeks of February. Henry Tang Ying-yen—Hong Kong's Chief Secretary at the time, who had previously served as Secretary for Finance, Industry and Technology, and Commerce, and an ex-member of the pro-Beijing Liberal party—was the presumed frontrunner, having received support from 390 Election Committee members for his nomination. CY Leung, who was the Convenor of the advisory Executive Council, was the dark horse candidate who obtained the support of 305 Election Committee members for his nomination. Albert Ho Chun-yan, ex-chairman of the Democratic Party, was the pan-democrat candidate and presumed to have little chance of being selected as Chief Executive. Ho received the backing of 188 members for his nomination. Tang's bid to become Chief Executive ran into problems well before his formal nomination, and the problems continued to dog him up to the selection day. In October 2011, he admitted to having an affair with his administrative assistant. Subsequent stories appeared alleging other past affairs, including the possibility of a "love child" studying overseas. Questions were also raised about his claim of having a master's degree in sociology from Yale University. On February 13, 2012, the Hong Kong media reported on illegal construction work on one of his houses, claiming that an unauthorized 2,200 square foot basement had been built under the existing house that included a private movie theater and a large wine cellar. Tang admitted to the existence of the illegal basement, but said that his wife was responsible for its construction. Tang's dishonesty and his efforts to shift blame to his wife seriously eroded his image with the Hong Kong public. Public opinion surveys showed a sharp shift in support from Tang to Leung. A March survey taken after a debate among the three candidates found 44% of those surveyed supported Leung, 23% supported Ho, and 13% backed Tang. Rumors began to spread that the Chinese government, apprehensive about the appointment of another unpopular Chief Executive, was switching its support from Tang to Leung. The official vote among the 1,200 Election Committee members took place on March 25, 2012, as scheduled. To win, a candidate had to receive a majority of the votes. If no candidate received 600 votes or more, the candidate with the lowest number of votes would be eliminated, and another round of votes would be held. Leung won in the first round of balloting with 689 votes. Tang finished second with 285 votes and Ho was third with 76 votes. On July 1, 2012, Leung was sworn in as Hong Kong's fourth Chief Executive. His swearing in ceremony was a source of some controversy as he took the oath of office in Mandarin Chinese, rather than the local Cantonese Chinese, and Chinese President Hu Jintao presided over the event. Leung also gave his inaugural speech in Mandarin. To some observers, his choice of Mandarin and the presence of President Hu signaled that Leung was more committed to serving the interests of the Chinese government than preserving the autonomy of Hong Kong. Under the Basic Law, the Legislative Council (Legco) has limited power. Its members can only introduce legislation that does not relate to public expenditure or the structure or operation of the Hong Kong government. Most legislation is introduced by the Chief Executive or senior government officials on behalf of the Chief Executive. Legco does have the power to block legislation and limited oversight of the Hong Kong government. Since before Hong Kong's transition to Chinese sovereignty on July 1, 1997, Legco has consisted of two types of members—one elected by geographical constituencies and another chosen by selected functional constituencies. Up until this year's Legco election, while every eligible voter could vote in one of the geographical constituencies, less than 1 of every 10 Hong Kong residents could vote in one of the functional constituencies. Hong Kong's 3.5 million eligible voters had the opportunity on Sunday, September 9, 2012, to cast two votes for the city's 70-member Legislative Council (Legco). Each voter could vote in one of the five multi-seat geographical constituencies and cast a second vote in one of the 28 traditional functional constituencies or in the newly established District Council (second) functional constituency. The 2012 Legco election marked the first time that every Hong Kong voter could vote in both a geographical and functional constituency. About 1.83 million eligible voters cast their ballots in the 2012 Legco election, for a turnout rate of 52.3%, compared to 45.2% for the 2008 election. Most accounts attribute the rise in voter turnout to public discontent with the Hong Kong government, in particular its decision to require Hong Kong schools to teach a "national education" curriculum created by the Chinese government. Although Chief Executive CY Leung announced his decision to make the teaching of the national education curriculum optional just prior to the Legco election, popular concern about recent changes in Hong Kong government policies and attitudes remains high. Under the provisions of election reforms adopted in December 2010, the number of Legco seats was increased from 60 to 70, with half of the seats being elected by geographical constituencies and half by functional constituencies. The 35 geographical constituency seats were divided among five districts, proportionate to the number of eligible voters (see Figure 1 ). The 35 functional constituencies seats were split between 30 seats allocated among the 28 "traditional" functional constituencies used in past elections and 5 new District Council (second) functional constituency seats. Under the reforms, any Hong Kong voter who was not eligible to vote in one of the "traditional" functional constituencies could vote in the new District Council (second) functional constituency. Because 3.2 million voters were eligible to vote in the new District Council (second) functional constituency, the five seats had been dubbed "super seats," and the people elected to those seats were frequently called "super members." Political parties in Hong Kong have generally been characterized as being divided into two camps or informal coalitions.