As we note in our report, significant overall progress has been made to improve timeliness, largely due to DOD, which comprises the vast majority of clearances. IRTPA established an objective for each authorized adjudicative agency to “make a determination on at least 90 percent of all applications for a personnel security clearance within an average of 60 days from the date of receipt of the completed application by an authorized investigative agency” by December 17, 2009. This means that under the current statutory timeliness objective, the executive branch can exclude the slowest 10 percent and then report on an average of the remaining clearances. IRTPA includes 40 days for investigations and 20 days for adjudications within this 60-day average period. As shown in figure 2, DOD, the Department of Energy, and the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency met the 60-day timeliness objective in all three quarters of fiscal year 2010. We also found that timeliness varied widely among executive branch agencies. During the first three quarters of fiscal year 2010, the average for the fastest 90 percent of cases adjudicated by the 14 agencies included in our review ranged from 22 to 96 days for investigation timeliness, 2 to 59 days for adjudication timeliness, and 30 to 154 days for combined timeliness. Based on our discussions with agency officials, we identified a number of challenges to agencies meeting IRTPA timeliness objectives, including variances among the agencies in adopting information technology due to resource and personnel limitations, and additional agency-specific requirements that must be met before granting a security clearance. For example, agency officials with whom we spoke explained that there is a variance in agencies’ adoption of the Electronic Questionnaires for Investigations Processing (e-QIP). According to these officials, e-QIP has sped up investigation timeliness for agencies that have adopted this technology because it provides OPM with more complete and better quality data earlier in the process. However, resource constraints are a limiting factor in agencies’ adoption of this type of technology. In addition, agency-specific requirements can affect timeliness. For example, timeliness for the Intelligence Community has varied because of unique issues related to conditions of employment that require polygraphs or psychological evaluations that extend beyond the standard background investigation. The Performance Accountability Council is responsible for driving implementation of the reform effort and ensuring accountability, but has not reported on the impediments to meeting timeliness objectives or plans to address impediments. IRTPA’s security clearance reform provision requires annual reports to the appropriate congressional committees— through 2011—on the progress made during the preceding year toward meeting its requirements, including timeliness data and a discussion of any impediments to the smooth and timely functioning of its requirements. However, in its most recent report to Congress, the Performance Accountability Council did not provide information on the impediments agencies face in meeting timeliness objectives or plans to address impediments. While the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, in its capacity as Security Executive Agent, has performed a limited number of oversight audits, according to officials we met with at four agencies, the Performance Accountability Council has not met with them to identify the impediments to meeting the timeliness objectives. The Performance Accountability Council has focused its efforts on DOD due, in part, to the DOD security clearance program’s designation as one of GAO’s high-risk areas, as well as the fact that DOD clearances comprise the vast majority of clearance cases that are processed annually. We found that because of the relative size of DOD’s clearance program, DOD’s progress toward meeting IRTPA’s timeliness objectives is a significant factor in reducing the average time required for clearance processing for the government as a whole. However, the Performance Accountability Council’s February 2010 annual report to Congress lacked an identification of the impediments other agencies face to meeting timeliness objectives and did not identify mitigation strategies or action plans. Furthermore, the Performance Accountability Council officials stated that they began conducting one-on- one meetings with individual agencies in September 2010 to enhance communication, assist in implementation planning, and provide a feedback mechanism for agency stakeholders to communicate information and needs to the Joint Reform Team. To further improve timeliness across the federal government, we recommended that the Deputy Director of Management, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in the capacity as Chair of the Performance Accountability council, collaborate with agencies that are not meeting timeliness objectives to take the following actions: (1) identify challenges to timeliness; (2) develop mitigation strategies to enable each agency to comply with the IRTPA timeliness objectives; (3) set timelines for accomplishing the required actions; (4) monitor agency progress; and (5) report on these plans and progress in the annual reports to Congress. OMB concurred with our recommendation, noting through oral comments that the Performance Accountability Council was committed to the timeliness goals of IRTPA and that it was working with agencies currently not meeting the IRTPA timeliness goals by taking steps to assist these agencies. As noted in my statement today, we are strongly encouraged by the progress that the Performance Accountability Council has made over the last few years to reduce overall timeliness. If implemented in accordance with our recommendations, the Performance Accountability Council’s actions to assist the agencies in developing plans to implement the reformed approach appear to be a positive step in helping sustain the momentum of security clearance reform. Agency officials stated that they routinely take steps to honor previously granted security clearances; however, there are no governmentwide metrics to comprehensively track when and why reciprocity is granted or denied. IRTPA generally requires that all security clearance investigations and determinations be accepted by all agencies, with limited exceptions when necessary for national security purposes. Further, ODNI guidance signed in October 2008 amplifies this reciprocity requirement, stating that except in limited circumstances, all Intelligence Community elements are to “accept all in-scope security clearance or access determinations.” Similarly, the OMB issued guidance requiring agencies to reciprocally accept clearances when the prior clearance is current, in-scope, and there is no new derogatory information, among other things. However, agency officials stated that in some cases, they find it necessary to take additional steps to address limitations with available information before granting a reciprocal clearance. For example, although no single, integrated database exists and information currently being shared between agencies may be insufficient, agencies request additional information, such as copies of the original background investigation. Moreover, because of the different types of background investigations required by individual agencies, agencies may perform additional investigative work or request a new background investigation. In addition to addressing limitations with available information, agency officials reported that additional steps must sometimes be taken to conduct suitability determinations or ensure that a prior clearance investigation and adjudication meet their quality expectations before granting reciprocity. All federal agencies conduct basic suitability determinations to ensure that the applicant’s character or conduct is appropriate for the position in question, but some agencies take additional actions to determine the suitability of applicants before they reciprocate a security clearance. For example, the Department of Justice must take steps to ensure that applicants for jobs with the Drug Enforcement Administration have not used drugs, according to agency officials. Similarly, the Intelligence Community requires a polygraph evaluation, among other things, to determine suitability for most positions, according to intelligence officials. Some agencies take steps to ensure that a prior clearance meets their quality expectations. Most agency officials stated that the lack of governmentwide standardized training and certification for investigators and adjudicators is a challenge to immediately reciprocating a security clearance. Without governmentwide standardized training and certification, agencies cannot be certain that a subject’s prior clearance investigation and adjudication meet the quality expectations of the inquiring agency. Consequently, as we have previously reported, agencies are reluctant to be accountable for investigations and/or adjudications conducted by other agencies or organizations. Although OPM has developed some training, security clearance investigators and adjudicators are not required to complete a certain type or number of classes. However, the annual reports to Congress indicate that the Performance Accountability Council is taking steps to make investigations and adjudications more consistent across the government by standardizing the training of investigators and adjudicators. While the Performance Accountability Council has identified reciprocity as a governmentwide strategic goal, there is no clear evidence to show the extent to which reciprocity is granted because agencies lack comprehensive, standardized metrics to track reciprocity. We previously reported that developing metrics for assessing and regularly monitoring all aspects of the clearance process could add value in current and future reform efforts as well as supply better information for greater congressional oversight. However, we found that agencies do not consistently document the additional steps they have taken prior to granting a reciprocal clearance. For example, the Navy keeps electronic documentation, the Department of Energy and the Department of the Treasury keep paper documentation, and the Army and the Air Force do not maintain any documentation on the additional steps taken to accept a previously granted security clearance. Consequently, there is no consistent tracking of the amount of staff time spent on the additional actions that are taken to honor a previously granted security clearance. In addition, agencies do not consistently and comprehensively track the extent to which reciprocity is granted. While OPM has a metric to track reciprocity, this metric captures limited information, such as numbers of requested and rejected investigations, but not the number of cases in which a previously granted security clearance was or was not honored. Similarly, the metrics proposed by the Performance Accountability Council do not track the extent to which reciprocity is or is not ultimately honored.