International, national, state, and local requirements regulate maritime safety and security. At the international level, IMO is responsible for developing an international maritime regulatory framework. IMO member states (nations) have adopted the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), which is designed to help ensure maritime security and safety worldwide. Among other things, SOLAS provides that companies and vessels should comply with the requirements of the International Safety Management Code (ISM Code), which was adopted by IMO in 1993. Federal laws, regulations, and guidance direct federal agencies and vessel operators within U.S. ports and waters, and state and local requirements may also further direct activities of vessel operators within their jurisdictions. The enforcement of safety and security requirements for all maritime vessels is governed by two different systems: flag state control and port state control. A flag state that signed on to the SOLAS Convention has responsibility for verifying that vessels flying its flag meet international safety and security standards and that the flag state’s standards are at least as stringent as those included in the convention’s ISM Code. A port state is the country where a port is located. Port state control is the process by which a nation exercises its authority over foreign-flagged vessels operating in waters subject to the port state’s jurisdiction. Port state control is generally intended to ensure that these visiting vessels comply with the various international and domestic requirements established to help ensure the safety of the visited port, its environment, and its personnel. Figure 1 shows the regulatory oversight regime affecting cruise vessels; however, there are many additional international and domestic stakeholders with roles contributing to the security and safety of cruise vessels. For a list of key stakeholders and their activities, see appendix I. The Coast Guard administers the U.S. port state control program for foreign-flagged cruise vessels that enter U.S. waters or a U.S. port, to The Coast enforce maritime safety and security in the United States.Guard exercises this enforcement through port state control activities, which include initial, annual, and periodic examinations of foreign flag cruise vessels. These exams allow the Coast Guard to examine vessels at various times: Initial exams: Conducted on vessels with potential U.S. itineraries, these exams include concept reviews during the very earliest stages of design, preconstruction plan reviews by Coast Guard naval architects and fire protection engineers, and mid-construction inspections at the shipbuilder’s yard by Coast Guard marine inspectors. Annual inspection: The Coast Guard inspects each cruise vessel visiting the United States at least twice a year. The first inspection, an annual inspection, focuses on the vessel’s fire protection, lifesaving, and emergency systems as well as any modifications to the vessel that would affect its structural fire protection and means of escape. Periodic inspection: The second Coast Guard inspection, a periodic inspection, focuses on the performance of the officers and crew, with specific attention paid to their training and knowledge of the vessel’s emergency procedures, fire fighting, lifesaving systems, and performance during drills. From January 2008 through March 2013, the Coast Guard performed 1,208 cruise vessel examinations (71 initial, 673 annual, and 464 periodic) and identified 1,802 deficiencies. Nearly half of these deficiencies were related to fire-fighting systems. For example, according to the Coast Guard’s Cruise Ship National Center of Expertise, the most common deficiency identified in 2012 was the improper operation of fire screen doors. In 2011, the most commonly identified deficiency was the improper stowage of combustibles. According to Coast Guard officials, most deficiencies are corrected on the spot or within the time frames allowed by the Coast Guard. Moreover, officials reported that the Coast Guard rarely detains cruise vessels based on substandard compliance— for example, from January 2008 through March 2013, they have detained seven cruise vessels as a result of their 1,208 cruise vessel examinations. Four of the seven cruise vessels made corrections and were released from detention the same day, while the others took 2, 3, and 8 days to make corrections. As part of its regulatory role, the Coast Guard also maintains data on marine casualties (accidents) that occur upon the navigable waters of the United States and its territories or possessions, or whenever an accident involves a U.S. vessel. Coast Guard regulations require that certain types of accidents be reported to the Coast Guard—including accidents that result in the loss of main propulsion or primary steering, or that materially and adversely affect the vessel’s seaworthiness, among other things. Our analysis of Coast Guard data shows that from January 2008 through March 2013, there were 256 marine casualties that involved cruise vessels: 128 of these were classified as failures of equipment or material; 64 were classified as accidents that caused damage to the environment (mostly discharge of oil); and 64 were classified in a variety of other categories—such as fire, loss of electrical power, or collision. 46 C.F.R. pt. 4. On January 13, 2012, an Italian-flagged cruise vessel, the Costa Concordia, ran aground with over 4,000 passengers and crew onboard off the coast of Giglio Island, Italy. The vessel was so badly damaged that five contiguous watertight compartments—which housed machinery and equipment vital for the propulsion and steering of the vessel—rapidly flooded. The vessel then lost propulsion and suffered intermittent power outages, as the emergency backup systems could not handle an emergency on such a scale. The accident resulted in 32 deaths, including 2 U.S. citizens. The Costa Concordia accident triggered an investigation led by the Italian government to ascertain the reasons that the vessel went aground. In May 2013, the Italian government issued its findings and recommendations. The investigation found that the root cause of the accident rested with the vessel’s master for transiting too close to the coastline. According to the investigation, the accident was compounded because of poor emergency management by the master, some staff deck officers, and the vessel’s hotel director. However, the report also offered additional recommendations, including improvements in bridge resource management, emergency power generation, and search and rescue operations, among other things. In 2011, the Coast Guard issued guidance on most of the provisions in the CVSSA, and the cruise lines had already implemented most of the safety measures required by the law. However, as of December 2013, the Coast Guard and MARAD were in the process of developing and publicizing new regulations before moving forward with the implementation of the remaining provisions related to items such as new technology and training certifications required or authorized by the CVSSA. Provisions regarding the publication of information on crimes on cruise vessels have been fully implemented by the FBI and Coast Guard in accordance with the law. Even so, efforts are under way that could address remaining concerns related to the thoroughness, timeliness, and context of reported crime data. The Coast Guard issued guidance for 11 of the 15 CVSSA provisions in June 2011. The Coast Guard guidance was issued in the form of internal Coast Guard policy letters with the main purpose of providing instructions to Coast Guard port state control officers regarding CVSSA requirements. Guidance was provided in the following 11 areas: (1) rail heights; (2) peepholes in passenger stateroom doors, (3) security latches and time-sensitive keys for stateroom doors, (4) safety information provided to passengers, (5) medical licensing and proper equipment to perform sexual assault exams, (6) patient access to information and communications in the event of sexual assault, (7) confidentiality of sexual assault examination and support information, (8) crew access to passenger staterooms, (9) logbook and reporting requirements for CVSSA crimes, (10) availability of crime data on the Coast Guard’s website and the link on cruise lines’ webpages to the Coast Guard’s website, and (11) training standards and curricula—which resulted in the development of the required course on crime scene preservation. Coast Guard officials stated that the guidance was necessary to help clarify some aspects of the CVSSA, especially in those areas that are outside the Coast Guard’s normal area of expertise. For example, the guidance provides specific questions for inspectors to ask medical personnel to verify that adequate training, equipment, and medicine are in place in the event of a sexual assault. Officials from all five of the cruise lines we spoke with, as well as CLIA, told us that there were minor issues with implementing these 11 CVSSA requirements and that most of the safety and security measures required by the law were already in place when the CVSSA was enacted, in July 2010. For example, each of the cruise line officials we met with told us that their vessels already were in compliance with most CVSSA provisions including having peepholes in stateroom doors, using certified medical personnel for sexual assault exams, and carrying rape kits onboard. As a result, according to all of the cruise lines we spoke with, meeting the CVSSA deadline for most of the requirements was not difficult. In the case where a modification was needed to meet a CVSSA requirement, the cruise lines we spoke with described the modification as minor. For example, officials from CLIA stated that, for the most part, the rail heights on their members’ vessels already met the 42-inch height specified in the CVSSA. In one case, officials from a cruise line identified isolated locations where the rail height was below the requirement—such as around entrance gangways and by lifeboat stations—and thus they took steps to modify the railing height to meet the new standard. CLIA officials also reported that developing security information guides for passenger staterooms required a moderate amount of effort for the cruise lines because of the variations in their vessels’ itineraries, which required cruise lines to collect and update information for all of their vessels’ ports of call.