North Korea has several nuclear facilities that, collectively, have the potential to produce nuclear fuel for weapons. Most are located at Yongbyon, 60 miles north of Pyongyang. The major installations include (1) a 5-megawatt electric (MW(e)) research reactor, (2) two larger reactors that were under construction—a 50-MW(e) reactor in Yongbyon and a 200-MW(e) reactor at Taechon, and (3) a plutonium reprocessing facility. The 5-MW(e) research reactor was constructed in the 1980s and is thought to be capable of producing about 7 kilograms of plutonium annually. The two reactors under construction were expected to yield another 200 kilograms of plutonium annually—enough plutonium for about 50 atomic bombs per year. The reprocessing facility separates weapons-grade plutonium-239 from the reactor’s spent fuel. The reactor facilities reportedly were not attached to a power grid, increasing concern that the facilities were intended to produce material for making nuclear weapons rather than for producing electricity. Under the Agreed Framework, North Korea made a commitment to, among other things, (1) remain a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty—a treaty aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons; (2) freeze the operation and construction of its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities, including the reprocessing plant, and eventually dismantle them; and (3) cooperate with the United States to safely store and dispose of the spent fuel in its possession. In return for these concessions, the United States agreed to, among other things, create an international consortium of member countries to (1) replace North Korea’s graphite-moderated reactors with a light-water reactor project by a target date of 2003 and (2) supply North Korea with energy—heavy oil for heating and electricity production—pending the completion of the first light-water reactor. (App. I provides additional information about the contents of the agreement.) According to State and other administration sources, the agreement to replace North Korea’s 5-MW(e) reactor and the two larger reactors under construction was needed because, unlike light-water reactors, the North Korean reactors and related nuclear facilities were particularly well suited to produce nuclear materials. In addition, if the two nuclear reactors had been completed, North Korea would have vastly increased the amount of nuclear material in its possession. Finally, North Korea was believed to be doubling its plutonium separation capacity. (App. II provides a chronology of events preceding the Agreed Framework, including information on North Korea’s suspected reprocessing activities.) On March 9, 1995, the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (South Korea) founded KEDO to finance and supply the reactors (the “light-water reactor project”) and interim energy. On December 15, 1995, KEDO and North Korea concluded negotiations on an agreement for supplying the project (supply agreement). The supply agreement obligates KEDO to provide two light-water reactors—each with a generating capacity of about 1,000 MW(e)—to North Korea. The reactors will be an advanced version of a design of U.S. origin and technology currently under construction in South Korea. The agreement specifies that KEDO will finance the cost of the project—expected to exceed $4 billion—and that North Korea will repay the interest-free loan over an extended period. The supply agreement authorizes KEDO to select a prime contractor to carry out the project. KEDO selected the Korea Electric Power Corporation—the South Korean, partially state-owned utility with experience in the construction, operation, and maintenance of nuclear power plants. Preliminary construction at the reactor site is expected to begin in the fall of 1996 at Sinpo, North Korea. See figure 1 for a map identifying Sinpo and other relevant North Korean sites. The Agreed Framework can be properly described as a nonbinding political agreement. The Agreed Framework’s broad pledges—as later implemented in more defined, binding agreements—and the subsequent actions of the parties suggest that both the United States and North Korea regarded the Agreed Framework as a nonbinding, preliminary arrangement. Officials at State said that the United States executed a nonbinding political document because it would not have been in the United States’ interest to accept an internationally binding legal obligation to provide the reactors and interim energy to North Korea. Instead, they said that the United States wanted the flexibility to respond to North Korea’s policies and actions in implementing the Agreed Framework—flexibility that binding international agreements, such as a treaty, would not have provided. According to State, its position that the agreement is nonbinding is supported by (1) the agreement’s language and form, which are not typical of binding international agreements, and (2) the fact that neither side has since acted in a manner that is inconsistent with such an understanding. In connection with the language used in the Agreed Framework, State maintains that the most important indicator of the parties’ intent is the absence of the word “agreed” and the use, instead, of the word “decided” in the agreement’s preamble. In our view, the language of the Agreed Framework is not entirely clear about the intent of the United States and North Korea to establish a nonbinding political agreement. Nevertheless, the agreement’s tone and form and, particularly, the subsequent actions of the United States and North Korea suggest that the Agreed Framework was intended to be a nonbinding international agreement. The agreement consists of four general pledges, all of which are consistent with the kind of broad declaration of goals and principles that characterize nonbinding international agreements. Furthermore, the agreement omits provisions—such as provisions on the process for amending the agreement and for resolving disputes—that would normally be included in a binding agreement. The subsequent actions by the United States and North Korea also suggest that the Agreed Framework was intended to be a nonbinding, preliminary arrangement. In a joint press statement on June 13, 1995, at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, the two countries reaffirmed their “political commitments to implement the . . . Agreed Framework.” Of greater significance was the conclusion of both the KEDO and supply agreements—two binding international agreements that implement the Agreed Framework’s provisions for supplying the reactors and interim energy to North Korea. Executing nonbinding international agreements like the Agreed Framework does not require prior congressional involvement or approval and, as we have suggested in the past, can have the effect of pressuring the Congress to appropriate moneys to implement an agreement with which it had little involvement. For the North Korean project, this issue is complicated by the political importance of the agreement and the existence of the KEDO and supply agreements—neither of which received formal congressional approval. Taken together, these binding international agreements—described in very concrete and specific terms—effectively incorporate the Agreed Framework’s provisions for supplying the reactors and energy to North Korea. If the Agreed Framework had been structured as a treaty or some other form of binding international agreement, its pledges would have established legally binding commitments, under both international law and the domestic law of the United States. It would also have been subjected to greater formal congressional oversight. (App. III provides our full analysis on the structure of the Agreed Framework, including our analysis of the structure’s impact on (1) the legal enforceability of the agreement and (2) congressional oversight.) According to KEDO, it places a high priority on protecting the present and future members of KEDO against the risk of nuclear liability that may arise from North Korea’s light-water reactor project. As a result, KEDO developed a “comprehensive risk management program” to protect itself and its member countries. The foundation of the risk management program is contained in the KEDO and supply agreements. Over time, KEDO plans to negotiate additional protections to fully shield itself and its members from the risk of nuclear liability. Without knowing the contents of these future protections, it is not possible to fully assess the adequacy of the liability protection that will be provided to KEDO and its members. Nevertheless, the provisions already negotiated and KEDO’s plan to secure additional protections, suggest that KEDO and its members will be adequately protected. Moreover, according to KEDO, it will not ship any fuel assemblies to North Korea or allow the reactors to be commissioned unless and until KEDO and its members consider that all aspects of the risk management program are in place. The supply and KEDO agreements contain a number of protections that are intended to preclude North Korea from making claims against KEDO or KEDO members for damages from a nuclear incident. The principal protection requires North Korea to set up a legal mechanism for satisfying all claims brought within North Korea. The supply agreement also contains a provision precluding North Korea from bringing claims against KEDO for any nuclear damage or loss, and both the supply and KEDO agreements contain a general limitation-of-liability provision that appears to cover nuclear damage. The principal protection in the supply agreement requires North Korea to “ensure that a legal and financial mechanism is available for satisfying claims brought within North Korea for damages from a nuclear incident.”Consistent with international practice, the agreement specifies that “he legal mechanism shall include the channeling of liability in the event of a nuclear incident to the operator on the basis of absolute liability.” North Korea must also ensure that the operator—a North Korean entity—is able to satisfy potential claims for nuclear damage. North Korea has not yet enacted legislation—referred to as channeling legislation—satisfying its responsibilities under the Agreed Framework. In the next few years, KEDO intends to help North Korea draft the required legislation and to monitor North Korea’s efforts to establish the financial mechanism for paying possible nuclear damage claims.