Fueled by global markets, more open borders, and improvements in telecommunications, international crime has become a growing worldwide problem. In 1995, the President identified international crime as a threat to the national interest of the United States. Prior to and since then, the federal government has been engaged in a crosscutting effort to address various types of such crime, including money laundering, terrorism, and public corruption. Despite the multiagency nature of the federal response, no sustained executive-level coordination—for which NSC has the designated responsibility—has been apparent. Furthermore, in the past, the government has neither tracked nor prioritized the billions of dollars in spending on certain elements of the response, such as combating terrorism. In addition, because of the absence of governmentwide, outcome-oriented performance measures, the effectiveness and impact of the response are unclear. Our prior work on other national issues that involve crosscutting responses—ranging from employment training to counterterrorism—shows that, ultimately, achieving any meaningful results requires firm linkages of strategy, resources, and outcome-oriented performance measures. Otherwise, scarce resources are likely to be wasted, overall effectiveness will be limited or not known, and accountability will not be ensured. Accordingly, we are recommending that the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs take appropriate action to ensure sustained executive-level coordination and assessment of the multiagency federal efforts in connection with international crime. Presented below is summary information about each of the topics that we studied. More detailed information about each topic is presented in appendixes II through VII, respectively: U.S. framework for addressing international crime. The U.S. government’s framework for addressing international crime was the result of several developments. For example, in October 1995, recognizing that international crime presented a direct and immediate threat to national security, Presidential Decision Directive 42 (PDD-42) directed the development of an effective U.S. response. As a key part of the response, in May 1998, the President announced the U.S. government’s International Crime Control Strategy, which was formulated with input from multiple law enforcement agencies and was intended to serve as a dynamic, evolving roadmap for a coordinated, long-term attack on international crime. The strategy consists of 8 overarching goals (e.g., “counter international financial crime”) and 30 implementing objectives (e.g., “seize the assets of international criminals through aggressive use of forfeiture law”) and was intended to complement and not supplant related strategies, such as the National Drug Control Strategy. The crime control strategy has not been updated since its inception to reflect changes in the threat from international crime. In April 2001, in response to our inquiry, NSC officials told us that the issue of international crime and the framework for the U.S. response were under review by the new administration. The NSC officials had no estimate of when the review would be completed; however, the officials said that PDD-42 and the International Crime Control Strategy were still considered to be in effect during the ongoing review process. (See app. II.) Extent of international crime. While there is general consensus among law enforcement officials, researchers, and others that international crime is growing, there is also agreement that measuring the true extent of such crime is difficult. Nevertheless, several efforts have attempted to gauge the extent of and the threat posed by international crime to the United States and other countries. For example, in 1999 and 2000, threat assessments were prepared to support the International Crime Control Strategy. While the 1999 threat assessment was classified, a published version of the 2000 assessment provided various indicators or measures of international crime within five broad categories—(1) terrorism and drug trafficking; (2) illegal immigration, trafficking of women and children, and environmental crimes; (3) illicit transfer or trafficking of products across international borders; (4) economic trade crimes; and (5) financial crimes. Furthermore, within each of the five broad categories, specific types of crimes were discussed. Regarding the financial crime category, for example, the assessment noted that worldwide money laundering could involve roughly $1 trillion per year, with $300 billion to $500 billion of that representing laundering related to drug trafficking. The assessment acknowledged, however, that there is little analytical work supporting most estimates of money laundering. According to NSC, whether the threat assessment would continue to be updated periodically is being considered as part of the new administration’s review of international crime and no decisions had been made in this regard. (See app. III.) Selected federal entities’ roles in responding to international crime and coordination of the response. In response to our inquiry, NSC identified 34 federal entities—including cabinet-level departments and their components, and independent agencies—that it considered as having significant roles in fighting international crime. The federal entities included those that are the focus of this report, namely the departments of Justice, Treasury, and State, and USAID. Within Justice, for example, relevant components include the Criminal Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. National Central Bureau of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), U.S. Marshals Service, and U.S. Attorney Offices. Relevant Treasury components include the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF); Customs Service; Internal Revenue Service-Criminal Investigation; Secret Service; Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN); the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center; and the Office of Foreign Assets Control. Within State, the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs has a significant role, which includes coordinating and funding U.S. training assistance provided to foreign law enforcement entities; also within State, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Coordinator for Counterterrorism have roles in combating international crime. To illustrate the broad interagency nature of international crime control, in 1997 we identified 43 federal entities with terrorism-related programs and activities. Similarly, 41 federal entities have an interest or are involved in operations at U.S. seaports; 15 of these entities have some jurisdiction over criminal activities occurring at these seaports, according to an interagency commission report. Implementation of the International Crime Control Strategy inherently involves some jurisdictional overlaps, which necessitate coordination among agencies. To facilitate executive-level coordination of the strategy, PDD-42 established the Special Coordination Group on International Crime, composed of high-level officials from relevant agencies and chaired by a senior NSC official. The Special Coordination Group was to meet periodically to ensure an integrated focus on the federal response to international crime. According to State and NSC officials, however, while the Special Coordination Group met 14 times in 1998, it met infrequently thereafter. At one point the Special Coordination Group did not meet at all for about 9 months (between September 1999 and June 2000) because some of its members were involved in other activities, such as preparing for year-2000 computer compliance and because of staffing shortages. In this regard, two NSC staff were assigned to coordinate international crime matters. A Presidential directive issued in February 2001 (National Security Presidential Directive 1, or NSPD-1) reorganized NSC and abolished the existing structure of interagency groups, including the Special Coordination Group. The directive did not indicate how the overall response to international crime would be coordinated at the time under NSC’s new structure. In April 2001, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs established a Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) for International Organized Crime. The PCC is to be comprised of officials at the Assistant Secretary level from relevant federal entities and is to be chaired by the NSC Senior Director for Transnational Threats. The PCC is to coordinate policy formulation, program oversight, and new initiatives related to a number of international crime issues, including arms trafficking, trafficking in persons, and foreign official corruption. According to NSC, one of the PCC’s priorities is to evaluate the 1998 International Crime Control Strategy. Various other departmental and agency-level coordination mechanisms— such as coordination centers, interagency coordinators, and working groups—have been established over the years to address specific types of international crimes. For example, Justice and State recently created a center for combating trafficking in persons and migrant smuggling. (See app. IV.) Efforts to combat public corruption internationally. The International Crime Control Strategy addresses corruption in two contexts. One context involves efforts to eliminate the use of bribes in transnational business activities, such as government contracting. In this context, an international anti-bribery agreement adopted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) represents an effort to eliminate bribery of foreign public officials in business transactions. This agreement—the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions—entered into force in 1999. The Convention generally requires signatory nations to criminalize bribes to foreign public officials made to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the conduct of international business. Essentially, the Convention, according to State, reflects the long-term U.S. interest in creating a level playing field among the world’s major trading nations by internationalizing the anti- bribery principles of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (P.L. 95-213),which the United States enacted in 1977. The Departments of State and Commerce are required to provide the Congress with annual reports on the implementation of the OECD Convention. In its third annual report, issued in July 2001, Commerce noted that progress has been made on the first priority of ensuring that all signatories deposit an instrument of ratification with OECD. As of July 2001, 33 of the 34 signatories to the Convention had deposited instruments of ratification and 30 have legislation in place to implement the Convention. The report pointed out that the United States continued to have concerns about the adequacy of countries’ legislation to meet all commitments under the Convention.