RS21816 -- Japan's Self-Defense Forces in Iraq: Motivations, Constraints, and Implications for U.S.-Japan AllianceCooperation Updated April 30, 2004 The April 8, 2004 seizure of three Japanese civilian volunteers near the chaotic city of Fallujah, created the first major test of Prime Minister JunichiroKoizumi's commitment to non-combat military participation in the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq. The kidnapping inFallujah, west of Baghdad, reportedly wascarried out by a group calling itself the " Saraya al-Mujahideen " -- translated as "Mujahideen Brigades." According to the Al-Jazeera Arab news service, thehostage-takers gave the Japanese government three days to withdraw its troops or the hostages -- two men and awoman -- would be burnt alive. The two men,aged 18 and 32, were in Iraq as freelance journalists, while the woman, aged 34, reportedly had worked in anindividual capacity for more than a year helpingIraqi street children and families who had taken shelter in abandoned houses. All three were described in the pressas pacifists opposed to Japan's involvementin the war. (1) The hostage situation, the biggest challenge faced by Prime Minister Koizumi since he first took office on April 26, 2001, threw the government into a crisismode. Koizumi and other senior officials immediately vowed not to give in to the terrorists demands. The mainopposition party, the Democratic Party ofJapan (DPJ), strongly supported Koizumi's stance despite its prior and ongoing opposition to the troop deployment. On April 11, 2004, the Japanesegovernment dispatched a senior foreign ministry official and a special National Police Agency counter-terrorismteam to Jordan to coordinate informationgathering and cooperation with U.S. agencies and special operations forces on a possible rescue attempt. (2) In the end, a rescue attempt proved unnecessary. On April 15, 2004, all three hostages were turned over to a moderate Sunni group, the Islamic ClericsAssociation, which had been negotiating their release, and which then arranged their transfer to the JapaneseEmbassy. (3) The same day, two other Japanese,including a freelance journalist, reportedly were seized from a taxi near the scene of the downing of a U.S. Armyhelicopter outside of Fallujah. These hostagesapparently were not threatened, and were released to the same clerical group and turned over to the Japaneseembassy on April 17. For reasons that remain thesubject of much comment in Japan, a section of the press, the political world -- mainly in the ruling party -- and thegeneral public strongly criticized theformer hostages for ignoring government calls for civilians to leave Iraq, jeopardizing the SDF mission in Iraq, andfor having a leftist political agenda. (4) Senior Bush Administration officials expressed solidarity with Japan in regard to the hostages and U.S. officials in the region gave high priority to cooperationto gain the release of the hostages. Vice President Dick Cheney, who arrived on a previously scheduled visit Tokyoon April 10, in the course of a week-longtrip to Japan, China and South Korea, reportedly gave top priority to urging Japan to continue with its commitment regardless of the outcome of the hostagesituation. The Vice President reportedly reassured Japanese leaders that U.S. forces would make every effort torescue the hostages. (5) Although this provedunnecessary, Japanese and U.S. officials reportedly had begun to prepare for a possible rescue attempt by U.S.forces. (6) Concern about the near term threat posed by North Korea's nuclear weapons program and ballistic missiles, as well as longer term concern about a rising China,has had a major influence on how Japan views its broader alliance relations with the United States and its owninternational role, including its role in Iraq. Thefirst indication of a shift in Japan's security outlook was apparent in the Koizumi government's unusually assertivesupport to the United States after theSeptember 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington. Among its more important actions, the Koizumigovernment pushed controversiallegislation through the Diet (parliament) that allowed Japan to send a small flotilla of the Maritime Self-DefenseForces (MSDF) into the Indian Ocean toprovide fuel and water to U.S. and allied ships supporting operations in Afghanistan. This naval deployment, whichwas unprecedented since the end of WorldWar II, marked a new chapter in U.S.-Japan alliance cooperation. (7) Japan's vocal diplomatic support of U.S. policy toward Iraq before and during and after the U.S./U.K.-led invasion also represented sharp break with Tokyo'spast reticence. During a highly contentious debate over two days in the U.N. Security Council in February 2003involving more than 50 countries, Japan andAustralia stood alone in their unequivocal support for a U.S. and British call for the adoption of a security councilresolution authorizing the use of force againstIraq. (8) On December 9, 2003, despite the devastatingbombing of the Italian police headquarters in Nasiriyah, in Southern Iraq, a few weeks earlier, and theambush killing of two Japanese diplomats on December 1, the Koizumi cabinet adopted a "Basic Plan" for thedeployment of up to 1,100 Japanese troops toIraq. In late December 2003 and early 2004 Japan deployed its first contingents of some 550 troops to Iraq undersignificantly less constrained rules ofengagement than previous Japanese international peacekeeping operations. (9) While explaining his decision to send troops to Iraq in terms of Japan's international obligations, Prime Minister Koizumi has made clear that the NorthKorean threat and the longer term viability of the U.S.-Japan alliance have been uppermost in his thinking. (10) In January 2004, after announcing that Japanese troops would be sent toIraq, Koizumi told skeptical members of a parliamentary committee that "Japan cannot ensue its peace and safetyby itself, and that's why it has an alliance withthe United States." Denying that his government was abandoning Japan's "U.N.-centered" foreign policy, Koizumiargued that in the event of a crisis involvingJapanese security, "the U.N. will not deploy forces to fight with Japan and prevent an invasion." (11) Some American and Japanese analysts also seeJapan'sincreased support of U.S. global and regional policies as carrying the implied expectation of reciprocity in the formof greater U.S. recognition of Japan'sinterests and concerns regarding the Korean Peninsula. (12) The most noteworthy aspect of Japan's logistical support of U.S. and allied warships operating in the Indian Ocean and its later deployment of non-combattroops to Iraq is the extent that these actions stretched what previously had been regarded as clear constitutionalconstraints. Article 9 of Japan's U.S.-imposedpost-World War II "no-war constitution"renounces war and the right of belligerence. Under a long-standing findingby cabinet legal office, the constitutionallows Japan to cooperate with the United States militarily for purposes of self-defense but bars participation in"collective defense" involving third countries. These constraints have been viewed widely in Japan as stretched to the limit by the deployment of ground troopsto Iraq, especially because it could not rule outthat the troops might come under fire by Iraqi insurgents. As a consequence, Japan's main political parties and,according to polls, as much as 65% of the publicnow agree that the time has come to consider revising the constitution, regardless of their views on Japan's role inIraq. Koizumi has charged a committee ofthe LDP with drafting suggested revisions by the end of 2005. (13) Despite the favorable outcome, the hostage incidents have had a significant impact on both the political and bureaucratic leadership in Japan, and on publicopinion. The Japanese public, which generally did not favor sending troops to Iraq, nonetheless has appearedrecently to be warming to Japan's enlargedinternational role. In past hostage situations going back to the 1970s, Japanese policy often has appeared to bemotivated primarily by the desire to save thelives of the hostages. In this case, however, editorials, press commentary, and statements by government officialsindicated awareness that the country'sinternational standing and the U.S.-Japan alliance would be seriously damaged if the demands of the hostage-takerswere met. (14) According to polling data,more than 70% of the public -- including some 88% of younger Japanese -- supported this position. (15) Nonetheless, the deterioration of the security situation in Iraq and the hostage-taking incidents appear generally to have undercut public and political supportfor the Koizumi's policy. Any further incidents of hostage-taking or serious attacks on the SDF troops couldseriously weaken Prime Minister Koizumi'sthree-party coalition government. In addition to criticism from the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ),a number of senior LDP politicians, including aformer head of the Japan Defense Agency, also have expressed the view that it was a mistake to agree to join theU.S.-led coalition. (16) For the Bush Administration, faced with the worst fighting since the fall of Bagdad in April 2003, and the withdrawal of forces by Spain, Honduras, and theDominican Republic, Japan's strong stance has been important to stiffening the resolve of wavering coalitionpartners. The first contingent of Spain's 1,300troops withdrew from Najaf while U.S. Marines were battling the Al-Mahdi Army of the militant Shia cleric,Muqtada-al-Sadr, for control of the city.