B id protests—or written objections to certain actions, described below, taken by federal agencies when acquiring supplies or services for their direct use or benefit—are of perennial interest to Congress. In some cases, this interest arises from reported increases in the number of bid protests filed annually and the effects that such protests can have on agency missions and operations. In other cases, congressional interest can be prompted by notable protests, or by agency determinations not to follow any nonbinding recommendations made to federal agencies by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in bid protest decisions. GAO is not the only forum with authority to hear bid protests involving federal acquisitions. The procuring agency and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims can also hear bid protests. However, GAO hears more protests than the Court of Federal Claims, the only other forum for which data are readily available. Thus, its protest procedures—which can differ somewhat from those of the procuring agencies and the Court of Federal Claims—are the focus of this report. The report is one of two providing Congress with background on the GAO bid-protest process. It provides an overview of the time frames and procedures in a GAO bid protest, including (1) what issues can be protested with GAO; (2) who can file or be a party to a GAO protest; (3) the procedures for bringing and resolving GAO protests; (4) the time frames involved in GAO protests; (5) the automatic stay of contract award or performance triggered by a GAO protest, as well as the basis for agency overrides of automatic stays and judicial review of agency override determinations; (6) the basis and effects of GAO decisions; and (7) reconsideration and "appeal" of GAO decisions. A companion report, CRS Report R40227, GAO Bid Protests: Trends and Analysis , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], analyzes recent trends in bid protests filed with GAO, particularly protests involving the Department of Defense. Under federal law, a bid protest is a written objection by an "interested party"—a term whose meaning is discussed further below (see " Who Can File or Be a Party to a GAO Protest? ")—to the conduct of a federal agency in acquiring supplies or services for its own direct use and benefit. This conduct can include (A) [a] solicitation or other request by a Federal agency for offers for a contract for the procurement of property or services. (B) [t]he cancellation of such a solicitation or other request. (C) [a]n award or proposed award of such a contract. (D) [a] termination or cancellation of an award of such a contract, if the written objection contains an allegation that the termination or cancellation is based in whole or in part on improprieties concerning the award of the contract. (E) [c]onversion of a function that is being performed by Federal employees to private sector performance. Bid protests only became part of the federal procurement system in the early 20 th century, more than 100 years after the federal government began purchasing supplies and services. However, Congress currently authorizes bid protests in three separate forums—the procuring agency, GAO, and the Court of Federal Claims—in recognition of protests' role in providing redress to disappointed bidders and offerors and ensuring the integrity of the federal procurement process. GAO first began hearing bid protests in the early 20 th century on the theory that its statutory authority to settle and adjust "all claims and demands" against the United States encompassed bid protests. The federal courts did not hear protests at that time. Indeed, in its 1940 decision in Perkins v. Lukens Steel Company , the Supreme Court found that actual or potential bidders who had been disappointed in their dealings with the federal government lacked standing to challenge alleged violations of federal procurement laws by government agencies. The Court reached this conclusion because it viewed these federal procurement laws as having been enacted strictly for the government's benefit, "for the purpose of keeping its own house in order," and thus not enforceable against the government by private parties. However, several decades later, beginning with the 1970 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. John H. Shaffer , the federal courts came to hold that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946 authorized them to hear bid protests. Congress later expressly granted bid protest jurisdiction to GAO when it enacted the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) of 1984. GAO's long history of handling bid protests, coupled with several unique aspects of the GAO bid-protest process, most notably the stay of contract award or performance that may result from the filing of a GAO protest, make it a primary locus for federal bid protests. Although disappointed bidders or offerors would generally have no right to protest if Congress did not provide for this right with either CICA or the APA, Congress has chosen to authorize several judicial and other forums to hear bid protests for several reasons. First, protest mechanisms ensure that entities doing business with the government can air their complaints about government contracting processes and obtain relief. Without such mechanisms, certain frustrations that citizens have with their government could remain unaddressed. Additionally, absent such mechanisms, entities might be less willing to do business with the government, which could diminish competition for government contracts and drive up prices. Second, protest mechanisms enhance the accountability of procurement officials and government agencies by highlighting and correcting mistakes and misconduct. This accountability helps to ensure the integrity of the procurement system. If the government's procurement system were perceived as corrupt or ineffective, contractors might be less willing to compete for government contracts, and the price at which the government acquires goods and services could increase. A corrupt or ineffective procurement system could also waste taxpayers' money. These benefits of bid protests are not costless, however; protests can impede the prompt and efficient acquisition of goods and services needed by the government. Particularly when contract award or performance is stayed due to the filing of a bid protest, as may happen with GAO protests, protests can delay agency procurement actions. Protests also require agency officials to spend time explaining their conduct to disappointed bidders and offerors, and in defending their conduct before judicial or other forums. Moreover, fear of possible protests may increase the time and energy that agencies expend in documenting their procurement decisions. Congress has, however, historically viewed the benefits of protests as outweighing these costs. When it enacted CICA, Congress charged GAO with "provid[ing] for the inexpensive and expeditious resolution of [bid] protests" to "the maximum extent practicable." GAO has attempted to meet these goals through the use of time frames and procedures partly prescribed by statute and partly established by administrative rulemaking. These time frames and procures are discussed below. Under CICA, disappointed bidders or offerors can protest to GAO about an "alleged violation of ... procurement statute or regulation" by a federal agency in (1) soliciting or otherwise requesting offers; (2) cancelling such solicitations or requests; (3) awarding or proposing to award a contract; (4) terminating or cancelling a contract due to improprieties involving its award; or (5) converting functions performed by government employees to private sector performance. The alleged violation may arise prior to contract award, as when a contractor claims that some aspect of the solicitation would impermissibly disadvantage it in competing for the contract. Alternately, the alleged violation may arise with the contract, as when a contractor claims that the government failed to follow the rules for the competition or otherwise acted improperly in awarding the contract to the protestor's competitor(s). Starting in FY2008, under additional jurisdiction granted to GAO by Congress, GAO may also hear alleged violations pertaining to agencies' issuance of task or delivery orders under multiple-award contracts, or contracting out under Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76. It can also hear protests involving Transportation Security Administration contracts, which had formerly been excluded from GAO review. GAO regulations, however, bar GAO from considering certain issues, even when these issues are implicated in the formation of a government contract. These issues generally include the following: disputes between a contractor and an agency regarding the terms and performance of an existing contract; challenges to small business size standards and standard industrial classifications; issuance of or refusal to issue certificates of competency under Section 8(b)(7) of the Small Business Act; determinations to procure particular supplies or services through the Minority Small Business and Capital Ownership Development Program (commonly known as the 8(a) Program); challenges to agency determinations that a prospective contractor is affirmatively "responsible" for purposes of the award of a contract; alleged procurement integrity violations which the protester did not report to the agency responsible for the alleged violations within 14 days of discovering them; procurements by agencies that are not "federal agencies" as defined in Section 3 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act (40 U.S.C. §102); awards or proposed awards of subcontracts, unless the agency awarding the prime contract has requested in writing that subcontract protests be handled by GAO as "non-statutory protests"; the debarment and suspension of government contractors; protests asserting that the protester's proposal should not have been included or kept in the competitive range; and decisions by "agency tender officials" regarding whether to file protests in connection with "public-private competitions," which are competitions conducted to determine whether the "commercial functions" of federal agencies are performed using government personnel or contractor employees. By statute, a GAO bid protest may be filed by any interested party , or any "actual or prospective bidder or offeror whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award of the contract or by failure to award the contract."