Initially, this report was written in anticipation of a possible strike by National Football League (NFL) players, or a possible lockout by the NFL, in 2011. At that time, developments in professional football's labor-management relations had prompted questions regarding how, when, and in what manner a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA) might be drafted. Interest in this matter included, on the part of some observers, questions about how Congress responded to previous work stoppages in professional sports. This report examines congressional activity related to the three most recent National Football League (NFL) work stoppages, which occurred in 1982, 1987, and 2011, and the 1994 Major League Baseball (MLB) strike. Although the latter strike involved another professional sports league, it is potentially instructive given the extent of congressional activity surrounding the 1994 strike. Work stoppages involving professional sports, whether caused by the players going on strike or the owners imposing a lockout, are by their very nature contentious and not always resolved quickly or easily. Through mid-2012, the four major professional sports leagues in the United States—Major League Baseball (MLB), National Basketball Association (NBA), National Football League, and National Hockey League (NHL)—had experienced a total of 21 work stoppages. Table 1 , Table 2 , Table 3 , and Table 4 list the work stoppages for each sport. Major League Baseball has experienced the greatest number of work stoppages (eight), followed by the NFL (five), NHL (four), and NBA (two). While both NBA work stoppages were lockouts, the other three leagues have experienced a combination of strikes and lockouts. Major League Baseball has had five strikes and three lockouts, and the NHL one strike and three lockouts. The NFL is somewhat unusual in that two of its five work stoppages began as lockouts and concluded as strikes (1968 and 1970). The average length of work stoppages for each league is as follows: MLB, 46 days (excluding the 232-day strike, the average is 20 days); NBA, 139 days; NFL, 31 days; and NHL, 138 days (excluding the 10-day strike, the average is 203 days). The medians for the four leagues are as follows: MLB, 17 days; NBA, 149 days; NFL, 24 days; and NHL, 103 days. In the following three sections, this report describes congressional responses to the 1982 and 1987 NFL strikes and the 1994 MLB strike, respectively. The latter section also includes a discussion of the Clinton Administration's attempts to facilitate the resolution of the baseball strike. A summary of the circumstances of each strike is followed by a table that identifies relevant legislative measures, and an overview of Members' comments and report language regarding the strike, which were drawn from congressional hearings and reports, and remarks made on the House or Senate floor. This information shows the extent of actual, or intended, congressional involvement and how some Members viewed congressional involvement in the strike. A summary of NFL labor-management history may be found in Appendix A . Appendix B provides an overview of key aspects of labor-management relations and sports, and Appendix C includes a discussion of antitrust exemptions applicable to professional sports. On September 20, 1982, NFL players voted to strike after negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement broke down. The previous CBA had expired on July 15, 1982. Initially, the NFL Players Association (NFLPA) sought 55% of the owners' gross revenues. The NFL rejected the players association's demands and offered to share $1.6 billion with the NFLPA over five years. The dispute was resolved when the players association accepted the owners' offer to share $1.28 billion over five years and to provide $60 million to the union to compensate players for salaries not paid during the strike. The season resumed on November 21, 1982. On December 5, 1982, the players association and the owners signed a new five-year CBA. After the strike was resolved, the season resumed with a seven-game regular season schedule and an expanded playoff bracket, which culminated in Super Bowl XVI on January 30, 1983. Table 5 shows the legislative measures that were introduced in response to the strike. Either resolution, if passed, would have urged the parties to take steps to promptly settle the strike and resume the season. Although no hearings were held, the bill's sponsor, Senator Ted Stevens, offered a rationale for congressional involvement when he introduced S. 3003 . Noting that "Congress has clearly established a history of promoting the public interest in professional sports," he then mentioned several instances when legislation involving professional sports was enacted: For example, in 1973, we adopted legislation calling for the telecasting of sold-out home games of professional sports teams. We also enacted legislation encouraging the stability of professional sports leagues by confirming, in 1961, the right of professional sport leagues to jointly sell their television rights to the national networks. In 1966, we authorized the consolidation of the American Football League and the National Football League so that football franchises could continue to operate on a stable basis in their resident communities. Thus we have long recognized the public interest in encouraging professional sports, and have affirmatively acted to encourage the financial stability of the leagues. Senator Stevens also noted the adverse economic consequences of the football strike, mentioning that the "strike produced major economic disruptions and losses in all of the communities which host NFL teams." The 1982 CBA expired on August 31, 1987, and shortly thereafter negotiations broke down between the NFLPA and the NFL over the issue of free agency and other matters. The union voted to strike on September 22, 1987. The owners cancelled the games scheduled for September 26 and September 27, 1987, while announcing their intention to resume the season on October 4, 1987, with replacement players. NFL players who did not share the union's concerns regarding free agency, or who needed the money, played alongside the replacement players. The striking players voted to return to work on October 15, 1987, even though there was no CBA. Team owners, however, banned players who had not agreed to return to work by the owner-imposed deadline of October 14, 1987, from participating in that week's scheduled games. Thus, striking players who did not return to their teams until after the NFLPA vote lost an additional week of pay. Replacement players were released as the regular players returned to their jobs. The 1987-1988 season concluded on January 31, 1988, when the Super Bowl was held at Jack Murphy Stadium in San Diego. Table 6 shows the legislative measure that was introduced in response to the strike. S.Res. 294 , which was agreed to without amendment by a voice vote, called on both parties—the players association and the NFL Management Council—to resume negotiations. Although S.Res. 291 (100 th Congress), which addressed the telecasting practices of the NFL, was not a response to the NFL players' strike, the subject was broached during a hearing on the resolution. Following his introduction of Pete Rozelle, then-commissioner of the NFL, the subcommittee's chairman initiated the following exchange with Rozelle regarding the ongoing strike: Senator METZENBAUM. Mr. Rozelle, as I indicated to you before the hearing, I think for us to have you before this hearing and not inquire of you as to why you as the Commissioner have not been heard from in connection with some effort to settle the strike between the players and the NFL, would be surprising to the many people in this country that are asking that question. I wonder if you would be good enough to tell us why you as the Commissioner have not seen fit to move in and at least attempt to mediate the issue. Mr. ROZELLE. I have had meetings with the President of the Players' Association, Gene Upshaw, and phone conversations. I have attempted to stay close to the situation, of course, on the owners' Management Council side. There has been a very, very strong disagreement on several issues that have inhibited the negotiating process. I am pleased now that I think that perhaps certain pressures are involved on both sides, and I understand they are going to be meeting promptly to get back into negotiating. I think it is unfortunate they could not have accomplished more back in May, June and July, but it was all the thrust at once when the season came on us. Senate METZENBAUM. Well, I might say I think that all of us are pleased to know that management and players are going back to the negotiating table. I never heard of a strike that was settled without direct negotiations, oftentimes through some mediator—whether it is from the U.S. Mediation and Conciliation Service or someone else.... The American people have a strong interest in this issue. They do not have an ownership right, but they feel they have some type of right in professional football. And I think the sooner the matter gets resolved and the parties themselves meet together and resolve it, I think the happier the American people will be. I think it will be one less issue to be on the top of the news in the nightly news every night. In an exchange that occurred later in the hearing, Senator Arlen Specter similarly encouraged the NFL commissioner to assist in settling the strike. The relevant excerpt is as follows: Senator SPECTER. Okay. I would like to disagree with Senator Hatch, even though he is gone, on one small point. That is about the adequacy of the substitute games on this past Sunday. I would join my colleague, Senator Metzenbaum, Commissioner Rozelle, in urging you to do everything you could personally to lend your good offices to settle the strike. You have been a very powerful force in the National Football League for many, many years. I believe you became Commissioner in the 1950s. Mr. ROZELLE. 1960, Senator. Senator SPECTER. 1960. Okay.