In early March 2006, President Bush made a three-day trip to India, the first such visit by aU.S. President in six years. In a speech preceding his trip, the President called India a "naturalpartner for the United States" and identified five broad areas of bilateral cooperation: counterterrorism, democracy promotion, trade promotion, health and environmental protections, andenergy initiatives. On March 2, the President and Prime Minister Singh issued a statementexpressing their mutual satisfaction with the "great progress" made in advancing the U.S.-India"strategic partnership." The statement, which reviewed bilateral efforts to expand ties in a numberof key areas and called for further such efforts, notably announced "successful completion of India's[nuclear facility] separation plan," a reference to ongoing and complex negotiations related toPresident Bush's July 2005 vow to achieve "full civilian nuclear energy cooperation with India." OnMarch 9, the Administration informally submitted to key congressional committee chairman aproposal for adjusting U.S. laws relevant to nuclear commerce. As President Bush was in NewDelhi, the Pentagon issued a statement lauding bilateral military relations with India and anticipatingpossibly major arms sales to that country. (1) In the wake of major U-S.-India bilateral agreements signed in the summer of 2005, Congressheld four relevant hearings in the latter months of that year. On September 8, October 26, andNovember 16, the House International Relations Committee (HIRC) considered the perspectives ofState Department officials and nongovernmental experts on the progress and meaning of increasinglywarm U.S.-India relations and relevant agreements. Similar panels testified before the SenateForeign Relations Committee on November 2. This Senate hearing, along with the October Househearing, was focused specifically on what has become the most controversial aspect of the July 2005Joint Statement issued by President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh: an intention toachieve full bilateral civilian nuclear energy cooperation. In mid-October 2005, the chairs and ranking members of the Senate Foreign Relations andHouse International Relations Committees sent a letter to Secretary of State Rice requesting that theAdministration begin "substantive discussion" with their committees on possible legislativeproposals related to envisaged civil nuclear cooperation with India. During the October 26 HIRChearing, Committee Chairman Henry Hyde called "strange and unusual" the Administration'sminimal consultation with Congress on the details of such plans and said he was "troubled" by publicstatements from the Administration suggesting that congressional support for such cooperation wasbroad and virtually guaranteed. (2) In a November letter which echoed much of the analysis ofnongovernmental hearing witnesses, a group of 18 experts, scholars, and former U.S. governmentofficials urged Members of the Congress to "critically examine" the proposed nuclear cooperationagreement, saying it "poses far-reaching and potentially adverse implications for U.S. nuclearnonproliferation objectives" and is unlikely to bring India "into closer alignment with other U.S.strategic objectives." (3) In late January, U.S. Ambassador to India Mulford caused a diplomatic stir when heexplicitly linked progress on the proposed nuclear deal with India's upcoming International AtomicEnergy Agency (IAEA) vote on Iran, saying if India chose not to vote with the United States, hebelieved the U.S.-India initiative "will die in the Congress." A State Department spokesman calledthe Ambassador's comments a "personal opinion" and denied that the issues were linked. India'sExternal Affairs Ministry responded that India "categorically rejects" any attempts to link the twoissues, and opposition and leftist Indian political figures criticized the remarks as "a serious affrontto India and its sovereignty." (4) On February 4, India voted with the majority (and the UnitedStates) on an IAEA resolution to refer Iran to the U.N. Security Council. New Delhi called theresolution "well-balanced" and insisted that its vote should not be interpreted as detracting fromIndia's traditionally close relations with Iran. The United States later expressed being pleased withIndia's vote. (5) Developments relevant to civil nuclear cooperation with India have progressed in countriesother than the United States. In September 2005, India and France issued a joint statement promisingthat the two countries would work toward "conclusion of a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement,"and France committed itself to working with other countries and the NSG to accomplish this. However, after four months of uncertainty over the issue of separating India's civilian and militarynuclear facilities, Paris indicated that New Delhi would have to make "some compromises" in thisarea, with the French Ambassador to India identifying a common French-U.S. interest in reachinga consensus among NSG members, which he said "is not easy." Also in September, Canada reversedits previous policy and announced that it would supply nuclear-related "dual-use items" to India'scivil nuclear program. Following the March 2 U.S.-India Joint Statement, Australia, which is hometo nearly half of the world's unmined uranium, indicated that it might alter its policy of not sellingthis resource to non-signatories of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, meaning India may becomeeligible. (6) After more than seven months of intensive negotiations over a "credible, defensible, andtransparent" Indian plan to separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities as per the July 18 JointStatement, U.S. and Indian officials were able to reach agreement just hours before the issuance ofthe March 2 Joint Statement while President Bush was in New Delhi. The Indian plan, whichrequires India to move 14 of its 22 reactors into permanent international oversight by the year 2014and place all future civilian reactors under permanent control, exempts India's fast breeder reactorsand also would guarantee an uninterrupted supply of nuclear fuel for India's civilian facilities. UnderSecretary of State Burns, the lead U.S. negotiator, insists that the plan is a boost for U.S.nonproliferation efforts, claiming that the percentage of Indian nuclear facilities under safeguardswill grow as most future facilities are likely to be designated civilian. Numerous nonproliferationexperts remain critical of of the proposed deal. On March 8, the White House issued a press releaseresponding to critics. (7) On November 1, 2005, S. 1950 , to promote global energy security throughincreased cooperation between the United States and India on non-nuclear energy-related issues, wasintroduced in the Senate. On December 15, H.Con.Res. 318 , expressing concernregarding nuclear proliferation with respect to proposed full civilian nuclear cooperation with India,was introduced in the House. On July 18, 2005, during the first state visit to Washington, D.C., by an Indian leader sinceNovember 2001, President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh issued a JointStatement resolving to establish a "global partnership" between the United States and India throughincreased cooperation on economic issues, on energy and the environment, on democracy anddevelopment, on non-proliferation and security, and on high-technology and space. Of particularinterest to many in Congress were the statement's assertion that, "as a responsible state withadvanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other suchstates," and President Bush's assurance that he would work on achieving "full civilian nuclear energycooperation with India." (8) Such cooperation would require changes in both U.S. law and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)guidelines. This clause is widely viewed as representing the most direct (if still implicit) recognitionto date of India's de facto status as a nuclear weapons state and thus as a reversal of more than threedecades of U.S. nonproliferation policy. Notably omitted from the July 18 statement was anymention of India's aspirations for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council. Just weeks earlier,the United States and India signed a ten-year defense framework agreement. (9) Many observers view this andother U.S. moves to build strategic relations with India as part of an effort to "counterbalance" therise of China as a major power, although both Washington and New Delhi insist that their strategiccooperation is not directed against any third party. This report reviews the major provisions of U.S.-India bilateral agreements signed in 2005and further explicated in March 2006, including the status of issues addressed in the now completedNext Step in Strategic Partnership initiative, security relations, economic relations, and global issues. The report reviews arguments made in favor of and in opposition to increased bilateral cooperationin each major issue-area and includes Indian perspectives. Regional issues involving China,Pakistan, and Iran also are discussed. (10) U.S.-India agreements in June and July 2005 represent a new set of landmarks in rapidlywarming ties between the world's two most populous democracies. After decades of estrangementduring the Cold War, U.S.-India relations were freed from the constraints of global U.S.-Sovietbipolarity in 1991, the same year that New Delhi began efforts to transform its once quasi-socialisteconomy through fiscal reform and market opening. However, relations with India continued to beviewed primarily through the lens of U.S. nonproliferation interests. The marked improvement ofrelations that began in the latter months of the Clinton Administration -- President Clinton spent sixdays in India in March 2000 -- was accelerated after a November 2001 meeting between PresidentBush and then-Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, when the two leaders agreed to greatlyexpand U.S.-India cooperation on a wide range of issues. India's swift post-9/11 offer of full supportfor U.S.-led counterterrorism operations was widely viewed as reflective of the positive newtrajectory in bilateral relations.