Prior to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, insurance covering terrorism losses was normally included in general insurance policies without a specific premium being paid for this coverage. The attacks, and the more than $30 billion in insured losses that resulted from them, caused a rethinking of the possibilities of future terrorist attacks. In response to the new appreciation of the threat and the perceived inability to calculate the probability of loss and gather the loss data critical for pricing insurance, both primary insurers and reinsurers pulled back from offering terrorism coverage. Many argued that terrorism risk is essentially uninsurable by the private market due to the uncertainty and potentially massive losses involved. Because insurance is required for a variety of economic transactions, many feared that a lack of insurance against terrorism loss would have wider economic impact, particularly on large-scale developments in urban areas that would be tempting targets for terrorism. Congress responded to the disruption in the insurance market by passing the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) , which was signed by the President in November 2002. TRIA created the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program, which was enacted as a temporary program, expiring at the end of 2005, to calm the insurance markets through a government backstop for terrorism losses and give the private industry time to gather the data and create the structures and capacity necessary for private insurance to cover terrorism risk. Terrorism insurance became widely available under TRIA, and the insurance industry greatly expanded its financial capacity in the three years from 2002 to 2005. Less progress, however, was made on creating terrorism models that are sufficiently robust for insurers to return to offering widespread terrorism coverage without a government backstop, and practically no progress was made on a private pooling mechanism to cover terrorism risk. Again fearing economic disruption from the absence of terrorism insurance, Congress passed, and the President signed, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act of 2005 (TRIEA) in December 2005. TRIEA extended the program for two years while increasing the private sector exposure under the program. The two years' experience under TRIEA proved to be similar to the three under TRIA. During this time, terrorism risk insurance was available, pricing was moderate, and takeup rates slowly increased. Some additional progress was made on a larger scale private solution and some private groups outlined proposals for such a solution. There was, however, little concrete movement towards adopting such proposals. The industry focus seemed to be on promoting the possibility of another extension of the TRIA program. Some see this experience as proof of the argument that the private market will never be able to offer insurance to cover terrorism risk and continue to see the possibility of wider economic consequences if terrorism insurance again is unavailable. Others, notably the U.S. Treasury Department, respond that TRIA itself is retarding the growth of this private market by offering essentially free reinsurance against terrorism risk. Thus, it should be allowed to expire, or at least be reduced from its current form. In the first session of the 110 th Congress, three different bills addressing the impending expiration of the TRIA program saw committee or floor action, two in the House and one in the Senate. As was the case in the TRIA extension debate in 2005, the House bills were more significant revisions and expansions of the TRIA program, whereas the Senate bill had a narrower focus—extending the program while making more limited changes. Also as in 2005, the Administration generally supported the Senate's approach. Representative Michael Capuano, along with 23 cosponsors, introduced H.R. 2761 on June 18, 2007. Referred to the Financial Services Committee, the bill was the subject of a hearing in that committee's Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises on June 21, 2007. H.R. 2761 as introduced would have extended and revised the current structure of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program, adding significant new elements to this structure. Within the existing TRIA structure, the bill would have extended the program 10 years, to the end of 2017, while reducing the program trigger to $50 million and generally leaving the individual insurer deductibles and aggregate retention unchanged at 20% of direct earned premium and $27.5 billion, respectively. It also would have expanded the scope of TRIA by including domestic terrorism as a covered event, adding group life insurance as a covered line, and mandating that insurers make available coverage for nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological (NCBR) terrorist events. Under the bill as introduced, group life insurance would have had a separate pool, with its own deductibles and recoupment amounts based on the amount of insurance at risk, rather than direct earned premiums. NCBR coverage would have had a lower (7.5%) deductible compared to non-NCBR terrorist events (20%). In addition, H.R. 2761 as introduced included so-called reset provisions, that would have lowered the program trigger and deductible thresholds for areas that have suffered past terrorist attacks or that suffer terrorist attacks in the future if the damage from the attacks exceeds $1 billion. Finally, the bill would have expanded the mandatory availability provisions to include restrictions on life insurers' ability to consider lawful international travel as a factor in underwriting decisions. H.R. 2761 was marked up by the House Financial Services Committee's Subcommittee on Insurance, Capital Markets and Government Sponsored Enterprises on July 24, 2007, and by the full committee on August 1, 2007. Substantial amendments were adopted at both markups. The subcommittee markup began with a complete substitute amendment by Chairman Kanjorski being adopted by voice vote. This substitute changed the NBCR provisions, delaying the make available provisions until 2009 and lowering the deductible to 3.5% with a 0.5% increase per year. It also included a requirement for biennial reporting on the TRIA program by the Treasury and changed the composition of the independent commission created by the bill to make recommendations on the program. Several amendments to reduce the 10-year extension of the program were rejected, as was one to require full recoupment of federal funds expended beyond the $27.5 billion aggregate retention amount in current law. Amendments adopted by the subcommittee included one by Representative Gary Ackerman to include the Secretary of Homeland Security in the certification of a terrorist attack under TRIA, and one by Representative Richard Baker to apply the lower trigger amount in the retrospective reset provisions to the entire country rather than just to the affected area. The full committee markup began with an amendment by Chairman Barney Frank making a number of technical changes and three primary substantive changes. First, Chairman Frank's amendment changed the reset provisions, removing the retrospective reset altogether and applying the prospective reset provisions to the entire country. Thus, if there were a future terrorist attack resulting in more than $1 billion in damages, the trigger would be reduced to $5 million and the insurer deductible would be reduced to 5% for those insurers suffering terrorism losses. Second, it included temporary preemptions from state rate and form approval laws for NBCR coverage mandated under the bill. Third, it would have established a "terrorism buy down fund" in the U.S. Treasury, essentially allowing insurers to put aside reserves that would grow tax-free to cover losses from future terrorist attacks that are not reimbursed by TRIA. The U.S. Treasury could have also borrowed from this fund to cover the federal share of a future terrorist attack. The committee adopted a number of additional amendments, including: (1) an exemption for small insurers from the requirement to make NCBR coverage available; (2) the return of farmowners multiple peril as a TRIA-covered line; (3) a specific allowance for insurers to partner in meeting the requirement to make NCBR coverage available; (4) indexing various dollar amounts in the bill to an unspecified measure of inflation; (5) provision for a report by the Secretary of the Treasury in the event that the Secretary decides not to recoup expended federal funds beyond $27.5 billion; (6) extension of the program for 15 years, to the end of 2022; and (7) an increase in the post-reset deductible by 0.5% per year. The amended bill was forwarded to the full House by a vote of 49-20. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) issued a cost estimate for H.R. 2761 on September 6, 2007. CBO found that the bill as reported would increase direct spending by $3.7 billion from 2008 to 2012 and $10.4 billion from 2008 to 2017. This spending would be offset by additional revenues of about $100 million from 2008 to 2012 and $2.0 billion from 2008 to 2017. Since the cost estimate found that an increase in the budget deficit, or decrease in surplus, would result from the bill, it appeared to fail to meet the requirements of the "pay-as-you-go" (PAYGO) rule adopted by the House at the beginning of the 110 th Congress. In response to the PAYGO issues, the special rule ( H.Res. 660 ) under which TRIREA was considered on the House floor included a self-executing amendment that inserted language into the underlying bill requiring passage by Congress of a joint resolution before any funds could be expended. H.Res. 660 provided for expedited consideration of this future resolution, including a waiver of all points of order against it and its consideration. This requirement for future congressional action introduced uncertainty to the TRIA program that did not exist before. It was unclear exactly how the insurance market might have reacted to this uncertainty, should this language have become law. H.R. 2761 was brought up on the House floor under H.Res. 660 on September 19, 2007. The rule made in order two floor amendments and a motion to recommit with instructions. The manager's amendment ( H.Amdt.