This report examines Congress' legislative authority with respect to the Judicial Branch. While Congress has broad power to regulate the structure, administration and jurisdiction of the courts, its powers are limited by precepts of due process, equal protection and separation of powers. Usually congressional regulation of the judicial branch is noncontroversial, but when Congress proposes to use its powers in a manner designed to affect the outcome of pending or previously decided cases, constitutional issues can be raised. For instance, Congress has in recent years considered using or has exercised its authority in an attempt to affect the results in cases concerning a number of issues, including abortion, gay marriage, freedom of religion, "right to die" and prisoners' rights. This report addresses the constitutional foundation of the federal courts, and the explicit and general authorities of Congress to regulate the courts. It then addresses Congress' ability to limit the jurisdiction of the courts over particular constitutional issues, sometime referred to as "court-stripping." The report then analyzes Congress' authority to limit the availability of certain judicial processes and remedies for constitutional litigants. Congressional power to legislate regarding specific judicial decisions is also discussed. Much of the material in the section on congressional power over court jurisdiction is also included in CRS Report RL32171, Limiting Court Jurisdiction Over Federal Constitutional Issues: " Court-Stripping " , by [author name scrubbed]. If one reads the first three Articles of the Constitution carefully, a striking observation immediately emerges. Article I (the legislative branch) is quite detailed and specific with respect to the authority of and limits on Congress, especially when compared with Article II (the executive branch) and Article III (the judicial branch). One reason for this detail is that Article I deals not only with the nature of the legislature but also with the overall powers of the federal government. But this contrast also makes it clear that Congress possesses the authority to fill out the powers conferred on the Executive and Judiciary. This is revealed in several specific provisions but most notably in the final provision of the Article, the "necessary and proper clause." That clause not only empowers Congress to enact all "necessary and proper" laws in order to execute the powers conferred on Congress, but also allows Congress to make laws to execute "all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States or in any department or officer thereof." The Constitution contains few requirements regarding the structure of the federal courts. Article III, Section 1, of the Constitution provides that The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office. Although Article III provides for a Supreme Court headed by the Chief Justice of the United States, nothing else about its structure and its operation is specified, so the size and composition of the Court is left to Congress. The lack of a constitutionally prescribed number has provided opportunities to manipulate, or to attempt to manipulate, the Court. As Congress also determines the time and place of the Supreme Court's meeting, it has also used this power to influence the make-up of the judiciary. Utilizing its power to establish inferior courts, Congress has created the United States district courts, the courts of appeals for the thirteen circuits, and other federal courts, identified their location, the places in which they sit, and the number of justices or judges for each court. Congress, has also addressed a range of aspects of the administration of the courts. For example, Congress, through its exercise of Spending Clause power, provides funding for the operation of the courts, including judicial salaries, subject to the limitation on diminution of compensation of judges during their terms of office. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts is established by statute, as are the judicial councils of the circuits, the judicial conferences of the circuits, and the Judicial Conference of the United States. On the other hand, Congress has delegated much of its court rule-making authority to the federal courts. For example, in the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress gave the federal courts power "to make and establish all necessary rules for the orderly conducting of business in said courts, provided such rules are not repugnant to the laws of the United States." Pursuant to these statutory authorities, the United States Supreme Court has promulgated rules of civil procedure (including supplemental rules for admiralty and maritime cases), habeas corpus , criminal procedure, evidence, appellate procedure, and bankruptcy. Where Congress has deemed it appropriate, it has by statute rejected or amended proposed rules, delayed the effective dates of proposed rules, or drafted and enacted court rules itself. The remainder of Section 1 of Article III contains two critical provisions regarding federal judges. First is "good behavior" tenure, which effectively has come to mean lifetime tenure for Article III judges subject to removal only through conviction on impeachment. The second provision relates to security of compensation, meaning that a federal judge's compensation may "not be diminished during their continuance in office," although, as controversies over the years have shown, the compensation need not be sufficient within the judges' understanding. Impeachment, which is addressed in Article II of the Constitution, applies to all civil officers of the United States in both the executive and judicial branches. However, a majority of the fifteen officials who have been impeached in the House of Representatives and tried in the Senate, and all of the seven convicted and removed from office, have been judges. The imposition of punishment for judicial misconduct by the federal judiciary has also been addressed by statute, but these provisions do not provide for the removal of a judge or Justice from office. That Congress "may from time to time ordain and establish inferior courts" may be thought to imply that Congress may expand and contract the units of the system. But what happens to the judges who occupy posts on the courts that are abolished or reduced in the number of judges? This was the question that occurred with the repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801, but no resolution of the issue was achieved at that time. Congress did not exercise this power again until 1913, when it abolished the special Commerce Court, which had proved disappointing to its sponsors. In 1913, Congress provided for the redistribution of the judges of the Commerce Court among the circuit courts. Since then, as Congress has rearranged some courts, it has always provided for the same kind of redistribution, usually assigning judges to those courts that received the jurisdiction of the abolished courts. On its face, there is no limit on the power of Congress to make exceptions to and regulate the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, to create inferior federal courts and to specify their jurisdiction. However, that is true of the Constitution's other grants of legislative authority in Article I and elsewhere, but this does not prevent the application of other constitutional principles to those powers. "[T]he Constitution is filled with provisions that grant Congress or the States specific power to legislate in certain areas," Justice Black wrote for the Court in a different context, but "these granted powers are always subject to the limitations that they may not be exercised in a way that violates other specific provisions of the Constitution." The elder Justice Harlan seems to have had the same thought in mind when he said that, with respect to Congress' power over jurisdiction of the federal courts, "what such exceptions and regulations should be it is for Congress, in its wisdom, to establish, having of course due regard to all the Constitution." Thus, it is clear that while Congress has significant authority over administration of the judicial system, it may not exercise its authority over the courts in a way that violates the Fifth Amendment due process clause or that violates precepts of equal protection. For instance, Congress could not limit access to the judicial system based on race or ethnicity. Nor, without amendment of the Constitution, could Congress provide that the courts may take property while denying a right to compensation under the takings clause. In general, the mere fact Congress is exercising its authority over the courts does not serve to insulate such legislation from constitutional scrutiny. It is also clear that Congress may not exercise its authority over the courts in a way that violates precepts of separation of powers. The doctrine of separation of powers is not found in the text of the Constitution, but has been discerned by courts, scholars and others in the allocation of power in the first three Articles, i.e., the "legislative power" is vested in Congress, the "executive power" is vested in the President, and the "judicial power" is vested in the Supreme Court and the inferior federal courts. That interpretation is also consistent with the speeches and writings of the framers. But while the rhetoric of the Supreme Court points to a strict separation of the three powers, its actual holdings are far less decisive. Nevertheless, beginning with Buckley v. Valeo , the Supreme Court has reemphasized separation of powers as a vital element in American federal government. The two approaches that the Court has used in its separation of powers cases have been characterized as a formalist or strict approach and as a functionalist approach. A formalist or strict approach examines the text of the Constitution to determine the degree to which branch powers and functions may be intermingled, emphasizing that powers committed by the Constitution to a particular branch are to be exercised exclusively by that branch. Such an approach looks to a textual analysis to determine whether and the extent to which the actions of one branch aggrandize the power of that branch or encroach upon that of another branch. In contrast to such a textual analysis, the more flexible functionalist approach to separation of powers focuses upon the preservation of the core functions of the three branches, looking in a given case to whether the exercise of power by one branch impinges upon a core function of a coordinate branch.