U.S. and Chinese trade in goods with Angola has risen dramatically, dominated by oil imports, with China’s trade surpassing the United States’. From 2001 through 2011, China’s and the United States’ total trade with Angola rose rapidly, reflecting a similarly rapid increase in imports of crude oil; China’s total trade surpassed the United States’ in 2008, and China’s imports of crude oil exceeded the United States’ in 2004 and in 2007 through 2011 (see fig. 1). Imports accounted for 90 percent of the United States’ total trade with Angola, and crude oil made up 96 percent of those imports. Imports represented 90 percent of China’s total trade, and almost all of its imports were crude oil. as frozen poultry products. Figure 3 shows the trends and composition of U.S. and Chinese exports to Angola from 2001 through 2011. From 2006 through 2011, total U.S. trade in services with Angola averaged about $2.2 billion annually, with U.S. imports of services averaging about $411 million and U.S. exports of services averaging about $1.8 billion. For U.S. trade in services with Angola, the largest sectors for U.S. imports were transportation services and travel and passenger fares, and the largest sector for exports was business, professional, and technical services. No comparable data are available for China’s trade in services with Angola, in part because China does not publish country-specific information on its trade in services. U.S. and Chinese firms largely have not competed in similar sectors in Angola for donor-funded and host-government contracts, including contracts for provision of goods and services. According to data on World Bank-financed contracts in Angola for which U.S. and Chinese firms won contracts between 2001 and 2011, Chinese firms won fewer contracts but a larger share of contract dollars than U.S. firms and were active in providing construction services. U.S. firms won a smaller share of contract dollars and were primarily active in consulting services, such as management and technical advice, and legal advisory services. Figure 4 shows World Bank contracts in Angola that firms from the United States, China, and other countries won in 2001 through 2011. From 2001 to 2010, the U.S. government committed $804 million in grants to Angola, primarily for health and humanitarian assistance. As figure 6 shows, the level of U.S. government aid to Angola has varied over time, peaking in 2003 at about $152 million, declining until 2006 as humanitarian assistance was reduced sharply, and increasing again somewhat by 2010. The composition of U.S. aid to Angola has also varied over time, with humanitarian assistance constituting the bulk of assistance between 2002 and 2005 and health assistance generally increasing from 2006 to 2010. In contrast to the United States, China does not publish data on its grants to Angola. The U.S. government committed about $711 million in loans and related financing, such as loan guarantees and insurance, between 2001 through 2011 to support U.S. exports to, and U.S. firms’ investments in, Angola. The Export-Import Bank of the United States (U.S. Ex-Im) committed about $678 million—95 percent of total U.S. government loan commitments— primarily for U.S. aerospace products and parts. Also, through OPIC, the U.S. government committed about $32 million in financing from 2001 through 2011 to support U.S. firms’ investments in Angola in sectors such as credit financing, cement and concrete manufacturing, and grain and oilseed milling. Figure 7 shows U.S. government loans and related financing committed for U.S.-made products and U.S. firms’ investments in Angola from 2001 through 2011. 1), according to the Angolan Ministry of Finance and a U.S. official.Chinese government loans to Angola are generally guaranteed by Angola’s oil in case of default and are repaid through proceeds from the sale of oil, according to officials from the U.S. government and a donor agency in Angola. According to the Angolan Ministry of Finance, U.S. officials, and a donor agency official in Angola, Chinese government loans to Angola have been for infrastructure construction, such as roads, rail, hospitals, schools, housing, water supply, and telecommunications. Angolan NGO and former Chinese ambassador noted that Chinese firms usually did not meet Angola’s requirements for local hiring; according to the Angolan NGO, this resulted in part from a lack of skills among Angolans after the country’s long civil war. Consequently, a large number of Chinese work in Angola on these projects. For example, data published by China’s Ministry of Commerce showed that more than 31,000 Chinese laborers were in Angola by 2009, and the former Chinese ambassador to Angola estimated that between 60,000 and 70,000 Chinese were in Angola in 2011, to implement projects financed through the Chinese credit lines, according to a news report published in March 2011. Figure 8 shows examples of Chinese firms’ construction projects in Angola. U.S. firms’ investments in Angola, largely in the oil sector, exceed Chinese firms’ reported investments. U.S. cumulative foreign direct investment flows from 2007 through 2011 were $3.4 billion, while China’s reported investment flows were about $214 million (see fig. 9). According to experts, data on China’s foreign direct investments are likely under-reported, and according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), data on U.S. foreign direct investments may also be underreported, limiting precise comparisons of the United States’ and China’s investments. BEA reports that in 2011, the top sector of U.S. foreign direct investment stock was mining, predominantly crude-oil extraction, and that from 2006 through 2011, one of the fastest growing sectors was companies related to oil-related manufacturing. Comparable data for China’s foreign direct investment in Angola by sector are not available. rules and regulations. In addition, U.S. firms have purchased ownership interests in 5 oil blocks as nonoperators, generally with a minority stake but no responsibility for operations. Chinese firms, generally lacking the technology and capacity to manage offshore oil operations, have purchased ownership interests as nonoperators in 12 oil blocks in Angola.help mitigate the operator’s financial risks, given the large investments required in oil exploration and production operations. In addition, through these ownership interests, Chinese firms participate in, and learn management experience through, the decision-making process of oil well operations, according to an official from a major oil firm. Since 2003, China’s total trade in goods with Ghana has surpassed U.S. trade (see fig. 11). From 2001 through 2011, the United States’ total trade with Ghana grew by a factor of 5, from approximately $384 million to nearly $2 billion, while China’s total trade with Ghana grew by a factor of 19, from approximately $182 million to nearly $3.5 billion. Exports to Ghana made up a significant portion of both the United States’ total trade (66 percent) and China’s total trade (approximately 92 percent) during that 11-year period. insecticides. As figure 12 shows, the United States exported approximately $1.2 billion in goods to Ghana in 2011, six times its exports in 2001. Top U.S. exports in 2011 included machinery and transport equipment, mainly machinery for minerals extraction and motor vehicles, and mineral fuels, primarily refined oil. Figure 12 shows U.S. and Chinese exports to Ghana by key categories. increased its imports of ores from 2001 to 2011 and also began importing crude oil in 2011. duty exemptions under China’s trade preferences for least developed countries. From 2006 to 2011, total U.S. trade in services with Ghana averaged about $1.2 billion annually, with U.S. imports of services averaging about $644 million per year and U.S. exports of services averaging about $546 million per year. The largest sector for U.S. imports of services was travel and passenger fares. The largest sectors for U.S. exports of services were business, professional, and technical services; and travel and passenger fares. No comparable data are available for China’s trade in services, in part because China does not publish country-specific information on its trade in services. U.S. and Chinese firms generally have not competed in similar sectors in Ghana for donor-funded contracts. According to data on Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)–funded projects in Ghana for which U.S. and Chinese firms won contracts in 2007 through 2012, all MCC contracts implemented by Chinese firms were for construction projects. Furthermore, officials who oversaw procurement for MCC-funded contracts in Ghana said that U.S. firms did not bid on any MCC construction contracts (see table 2). Implementation of MCC’s 5-year, $547 million compact with Ghana began in 2007, with a focus on reducing poverty through agribusiness development. As table 2 shows, U.S. firms won 11 MCC contracts totaling nearly $32 million (6 percent of the value of MCC contracts in Ghana), all for consulting services. Chinese firms won 7 contracts totaling approximately $112 million (22 percent of the value of MCC contracts in Ghana), nearly 40 percent of which funded construction of a section of the National “N1” Highway in Accra (see fig. 15). Because of the higher values of construction contracts, Chinese firms’ contracts were larger (5 of the 10 largest MCC contracts) than U.S. firms’ (1 of the 10 MCC largest contracts).