Under the DERP, DOD is authorized to identify, investigate and clean up environmental contamination and other hazards at FUDS as well as active installations. To that end, DOD has established restoration goals and identified over 31,000 sites that are eligible for cleanup, including more than 21,000 sites on active installations, more than 5,000 sites on installations identified for Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC), and 4,700 FUDS. The DERP was established by section 211 of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) which amended the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980. Under the DERP, DOD’s activities addressing hazardous substances, pollutants or contaminants are required to be carried out consistent with section 120 of CERCLA. DOD delegated its authority for administering the cleanup of FUDS to the Army, which in turn delegated its execution to the Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps). Funding for cleanup activities comes from the Environmental Restoration and BRAC accounts. The Environmental Restoration account funds cleanup at active sites and FUDS properties and, of the $1.4 billion obligated in fiscal year 2007, FUDS property obligations totaled $116.5 million for addressing hazardous substances and $102.9 million for munitions response. To be eligible for FUDS cleanup, a property must have been owned by, leased to, possessed by, or otherwise controlled by DOD during the activities that led to the presence of hazards. These hazards may include unsafe buildings, structures, or debris, such as weakened load-bearing walls; hazardous, toxic, and radioactive substances, which includes contaminants such as arsenic, certain paints, some solvents, and petroleum; containerized hazardous, toxic, and radioactive waste, such as transformers and aboveground or underground storage tanks that contain petroleum, solvents, or other chemicals which have been released into the environment; and ordnance and explosive materials, such as military munitions and chemical warfare agents. To determine if a property is eligible for cleanup under the FUDS program, the Corps conducts a preliminary assessment of eligibility to determine whether the property was ever owned or controlled by DOD and if hazards caused by DOD’s use may be present. If the Corps determines that the property was owned or controlled by DOD but does not find evidence of any hazards caused by DOD, it designates the property as “no DOD action indicated” (NDAI). If however, the Corps determines that a DOD-caused hazard may be present, the Corps begins to further study and/or clean up the hazard, consistent with CERCLA. The CERCLA process generally includes the following phases: preliminary assessment, site inspection, remedial investigation/feasibility study, remedial design/remedial action, and long- term monitoring. To address the release of hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants resulting from past practices that pose environmental health and safety risks on both active sites and FUDS, DOD established the Installation Restoration Program (IRP) in 1985 under the DERP. In fiscal year 2007, the Corps had 2,612 FUDS in the IRP. Performance metrics and comprehensive goals have been developed by DOD to assess progress toward the agency’s IRP goals. These goals include progress in reaching a CERCLA cleanup phase at the site level, progress toward achieving a “remedy in place” or “response complete” status at the installation level, and progress in achieving overall relative-risk reduction. Specific targets are included in DOD’s annual report to Congress. To better focus its munitions cleanup activities on both active sites and FUDS, DOD established the Military Munitions Response Program (MMRP) in September 2001, as part of the DERP, specifically to address potential explosive and environmental hazards associated with munitions. The objectives of the program include compiling a comprehensive inventory of military munitions sites, establishing a prioritization protocol for sequencing work at these sites, and establishing program goals and performance measures to evaluate progress. In December 2001, shortly after DOD established the program, the Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2002, which, among other things, required DOD to develop an initial inventory of defense sites, other than military ranges still in operation, that are known or suspected to contain military munitions by May 31, 2003, and to provide annual updates thereafter. DOD provides these updates as part of its annual report to Congress on Defense environmental programs; in its 2007 report DOD had identified 3,537 sites suspected or known to have munitions contamination, an increase of 221 sites from fiscal year 2006. Table 1 provides a summary of DOD performance goals for MMRP and IRP. The principal government entities involved in the Spring Valley cleanup include the Corps, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the District of Columbia. The Corps has led the effort of identifying, investigating, and cleaning up contamination at the site, whereas EPA primarily consulted with and provided technical assistance to the Corps and the District of Columbia. The District of Columbia’s Department of Health has monitored the cleanup’s status and adequacy, conducting such actions as, according to the Department, assessing the human health risks associated with any exposure to remaining hazards at Spring Valley. Additionally, advisory entities were created to further facilitate decision- making on technical topics. In 2002, we reported that cleanup progress included the identification and removal of a large number of hazards, including buried ordnance, chemical warfare agents in glass containers, and arsenic-contaminated soil. By April 2002 the Corps had identified and removed 5,623 cubic yards of arsenic-contaminated soil from 3 properties and removed 667 pieces of ordnance-- 25 of which were chemical munitions-- and 101 bottles of chemicals. A March 2009 project overview report by the Corps indicated that, in 2004, the Corps excavated 474 drums of soil and recovered more than 800 items, such as construction debris, ordnance scrap, and laboratory glassware and ceramic pieces. The report also indicated that, by 2006, the Corps removed 5,500 cubic yards of soil, 117 munitions debris items, 6 intact munitions items, and 31 intact containers in addition, the excavation, backfilling, and restoration of the debris field that contained these materials was completed. We reported in 2002 that the primary health risks that influenced cleanup activities were (1) the possibility of injury or death from exploding or leaking ordnance and containers of chemical warfare agents; and (2) potential long-term health problems, such as cancers and other health conditions, from exposure to arsenic-contaminated soil. A study by the Department of Health and Human Services’ Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry found no evidence of significant exposure to arsenic in the individuals tested in 2002. In 2003, the Corps discovered perchlorate in groundwater at the site, and installed at least 38 monitoring wells for sampling. Sampling results identified elevated levels of perchlorate in the project area. Further investigation is underway with more wells and sampling planned in 2009. In April 2002, the Army estimated that the remaining cleanup activities at Spring Valley would take 5 years to complete. Total costs for the project were estimated at $145.9 million in fiscal year 2002; by fiscal year 2007, the estimated total costs increased to $173.7 million. Figure 1 presents information on the annual cost to complete and annual amounts spent to date from 2003 to the present at the Spring Valley site. When we reviewed the Spring Valley cleanup in 2002, we found that the Army determined that there was no evidence of large–scale burials of hazards remaining at Spring Valley before it received all technical input. For example, while the Army’s Toxic and Hazardous Materials Agency reviewed work done by American University and documentation from additional sources, it also contracted with EPA’s Environmental Photographic Interpretation Center to review available aerial photographs of the site taken during the World War I era. However, the photographs were not received or reviewed prior to 1993, according to EPA officials. Despite never having received technical input from EPA on the aerial photographs, in 1986 the Army concluded that if any materials were buried in the vicinity of the university, the amounts were probably limited to small quantities and no further action was needed. However, as we now know, subsequent investigations by the Army discovered additional ordnance in large burial pits and widespread arsenic-contaminated soil. The experience at Spring Valley is by no means a unique occurrence. Our review of other FUDS nationwide found significant shortcomings in the Corps’ use of available information and guidance for making decisions relating to cleanup of contamination at these sites. For example, in 2002, we reported that the Corps did not have a sound basis for determining that about 1,468 of 3,840 FUDS properties––38 percent––did not need further study or cleanup action. Specifically, we found No evidence that the Corps reviewed or obtained information that would allow it to identify all the potential hazards at these properties or that it took sufficient steps to assess the presence of potential hazards. That for about 74 percent of all NDAI properties, the site assessment files were incomplete—i.e., the files lacked information such as site maps or photos that would show facilities, such as ammunition storage facilities, that could indicate the presence of hazards (e.g. unexploded ordnance). That for about 60 percent of all NDAI properties the Corps may not have contacted all the current owners to obtain information about potential hazards present on the site. The Corps appeared to have overlooked or dismissed information in its possession that indicated hazards might be present.