The Air Force has made efforts to manage its UAS pilots but has not fully addressed issues related to: identifying personnel requirements, recruiting and retention difficulties, the potential use of DOD civilians as pilots, pilots completing their required training, moving pilots through the training pipeline, and analyzing pilot promotion rates. We found in April 2014 that the Air Force had not accurately identified optimum personnel requirements, or the crew ratio, for the number of UAS pilots it requires. As a result, Air Force UAS units may be operating at personnel levels that are too low, which may diminish the combat capability and flight safety of these units. The Air Force conducted a study in 2008 to determine the appropriate crew ratio for MQ-1 Predator squadrons but did not account for all of the flying and administrative tasks required of those squadrons due to the study’s reporting timeframes. Based on the study, the Air Force concluded that the crew ratio for MQ-1 Predator squadrons should be 10:1, which calls for 10 UAS pilots to support one near-continuous 24-hour flight presence of an Air Force UAS over a particular geographic location. Headquarters Air Force officials stated that, because of the omitted tasks, the study’s recommended 10:1 crew ratio probably did not provide enough pilots to perform the work in an MQ-1 squadron. In addition, some UAS unit commanders and UAS pilots in some of the 10 focus groups we conducted at three Air Force bases said that the 10:1 crew ratio was too low. High-performing organizations use complete and current data to inform their strategic human capital planning and remain open to reevaluating workforce planning efforts. Consequently, we recommended that the Air Force update crew ratios for UAS units to help ensure that the Air Force establishes a more-accurate understanding of the required number of UAS pilots in its units, and the Air Force concurred with our recommendation. The Air Force has taken some actions in response to our recommendation, but Air Force officials told us that as of March 2016, the Air Force has not updated its UAS unit crew ratio. In our May 2015 report, we found that the Air Force had a three-phase personnel requirements study underway that was designed to update the UAS unit crew ratio. Air Force officials stated that the preliminary results of the study pointed to updating the UAS unit crew ratio and increasing the required number of pilots in UAS units. In May 2015, the officials also stated that they expected to update the UAS unit crew ratio later in 2015 but has not yet done so. Without an updated crew ratio, the Air Force lacks information needed to accurately identify the number of Air Force UAS pilots it requires and may need additional pilots. As we also found in April 2014, Air Force documentation showed that crew ratios in UAS units had not met the 10:1 crew ratio identified in the 2008 study and instead fluctuated between 7:1 and 8.5:1, indicating that between 7 and fewer than 9 UAS pilots were used to sustain 24 hours of Predator operations rather than the 10 pilots recommended by the study. We found that the Air Force operated at these levels in order to provide a higher number of CAPs to meet the requests made by combatant commanders. An Air Force instruction states that a crew ratio establishes the number of personnel required to support a unit mission and that if a ratio is too low, combat capability is diminished and flight safety suffers. We recommended at that time that the Air Force establish a minimum crew ratio in Air Force policy below which UAS units cannot operate without unacceptable levels of risk to mission accomplishment and safety. The Air Force concurred with our recommendation and in comments on our report the Air Force stated that it anticipated that it would implement our recommendation by February 2015. We reported in May 2015 that the three-phase personnel requirements study would also address the recommendation to establish a minimum crew ratio, but according to Air Force officials that study has not been finalized. In February 2016, the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff of Operations directed that the Air Force use the 10:1 crew ratio as the minimum. However Air Force officials stated that due to personnel shortages, that ratio has not been enforced. As of February 2016, UAS units had been operating at a 9.4:1 crew ratio, meaning that between 9 and 10 UAS pilots were used to sustain 24 hours of Predator operations rather than the 10 pilots recommended by the study. Without a minimum crew ratio established in Air Force policy, the Air Force lacks information needed to determine when UAS units are operating at crew ratio levels that expose the Air Force to unacceptable levels of risk to accomplishing its mission and ensuring safety. In addition, UAS pilots may continue to experience a high pace of operations that limits their time for training and impacts their quality of life. We found in April 2014 that the Air Force faced challenges recruiting UAS pilots and had not achieved its recruiting goals for UAS pilots in fiscal years 2012 and 2013. Air Force officials cited a number of reasons for missing the targets, including that potential UAS pilot recruits had a limited understanding of the UAS mission because the Air Force lacked recruiting officials with UAS experience. High-performing organizations tailor their strategies to the specific needs and challenges of the workforce to recruit high-quality personnel with critical skills, but the Air Force had not developed a strategy to address recruiting and retention of UAS pilots, including increasing the appeal of the UAS pilot career to potential recruits. As a result, the Air Force risked personnel shortages and continued reliance on manned-aircraft pilots to fill its personnel requirements. We recommended that the Air Force develop such a tailored strategy to recruiting and retaining UAS pilots to help ensure that the Air Force can meet and retain required staffing levels, and the Air Force concurred. In 2015, Air Force senior leadership and headquarters officials stated that the Air Force was in the process of developing strategies to recruit UAS pilots. The Air Force has taken a number of actions that officials say have helped improve UAS pilot recruiting. For example, Air Force officials stated that Headquarters Air Force has efforts underway to educate potential recruits at the commissioning sources such as the Air Force Academy on the UAS mission. Officials told us that the Air Force is providing cadets information on the UAS pilot career and it is assigning UAS pilots to the Academy so that they can share their on-the-job experiences with cadets who may be interested in becoming a UAS pilot In addition, the Air Force began requiring cadets to volunteer to serve in any of the four aviation-related careers rather than applying for one specific career. This process allows the Air Force to assign cadets to any of the four careers based on Air Force needs, among other factors. Air Force officials stated that the Air Force has also opened up eligibility for becoming a UAS pilot by removing age requirements and granting waivers for certain medical requirements. In April 2014 we also found that the Air Force may face challenges retaining UAS pilots. Pilots in 7 of the 10 focus groups we conducted at three Air Force bases indicated that retention of UAS pilots is or will be a challenge and UAS unit commanders in one location we visited and other Air Force officials stated that they were concerned with future retention rates of UAS pilots. As mentioned above, we recommended that the Air Force develop a tailored strategy that addresses both recruiting and retention of UAS pilots and the Air Force concurred. To retain pilots, officials stated that the Air Force pays UAS pilots a monthly assignment incentive pay which is equivalent to the amount that manned pilots receive in aviation pay. Also, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 granted the Air Force the authority to increase the annual amount that it pays UAS pilots in a retention bonus from $25,000 to $35,000. A Headquarters Air Force official told us in January 2016 that the Air Force has not used this authority to pay UAS pilots the increased amount of this retention bonus for two reasons. First, OSD has not yet issued related policy that the act required be issued before the Air Force could begin paying this increased amount. Second, the Air Force does not have enough data to determine what the retention patterns of this population will be because most of the pilots who specialize in flying UAS have not reached the end of their six-year service commitment. The official stated that the Air Force would like to determine if retention of this population is a concern before exercising the authority to offer these pilots the increased retention bonus amount. Further, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force testified that the Air Force was not using the increased amount of the retention bonus. Specifically, he stated that the Air Force did not use that increased bonus for UAS pilots because the current amount was commensurate with that of other critically manned pilot categories. He further stated that the Air Force has other pilot categories that are even in more crisis than UAS at this point in time. We will be exploring further with the Air Force their plan to use this bonus and UAS pilot retention rates. The Air Force is pursuing initiatives to address shortages in the MQ-1 and MQ-9 pilot community that Air Force officials say will have a positive impact on retention. For example, the Air Force is supplementing its UAS pilot population with the Air Force Reserve and contractor support. The Air Force has taken positive steps toward improving recruiting and, according to Air Force officials, has met or nearly met its UAS pilot recruiting goals for fiscal years 2014 and 2015, which shows progress toward resolving the recruiting challenges we found in 2014. At the same time, issues related to recruiting UAS pilots may warrant the Air Force’s attention. In particular, the recruiting goals themselves may not be appropriate because, as previously discussed, the crew ratio has not yet been updated and the crew ratio is used to determine the total number of UAS pilots the Air Force requires.