TSA is responsible for administering background checks—known as security threat assessments—for maritime, surface, and aviation transportation security programs that have vetted approximately 15 million applicants since 2003, according to TSA officials. Security threat assessments are designed to ensure that only eligible individuals are granted TSA-related credentials, such as a TWIC. Specifically, security threat assessments focus on identifying threats posed by individuals seeking to obtain an endorsement, credential, access, and/or privilege for, among other purposes, unescorted access to secure or restricted areas of transportation facilities at maritime ports and TSA-regulated airports, and for commercial drivers transporting hazardous materials. Implementing these programs is a shared responsibility among multiple TSA offices, including the OIA Program Management Division which manages the programs, and the Adjudication Center within OLE/FAMS, which serves as the primary operational component for conducting security threat assessments for 12 of TSA’s 17 aviation, maritime, and surface transportation credentialing programs—with the TWIC, HME and Aviation Worker programs accounting for a reported 95 percent of the Adjudication Center’s workload. (See appendix I for a TSA organization chart showing TSA offices responsible for implementing transportation security threat assessment programs.) The security threat assessment process includes reviewing information to determine if applicants are disqualified to possess a credential based on criminal offenses, immigration status, or a link to terrorism. The security threat assessment involves two key components: Automated watchlist and related vetting: The initial automated vetting process is conducted to determine whether any derogatory information is associated with the name and fingerprints submitted by an applicant during the enrollment process. Among the checks conducted by TSA, one is against criminal history records maintained by or available through the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). These records contain information from federal, state and local sources in the FBI’s National Crime Information Center database and the FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System/Interstate Identification Index, which maintain criminal records and related fingerprint submissions. A check is also conducted against the Terrorist Screening Database, which is the federal government’s consolidated terrorist watchlist and from which the Selectee and No-Fly lists, among others, are compiled. To determine an applicant’s immigration/citizenship status, applicant information is checked against the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements system. If the applicant is a U.S.-born citizen with no related derogatory information, the system can approve the individual’s application for a credential with no further review of the applicant or human intervention. Adjudication Center review: A manual, second level review is conducted as part of an individual’s security threat assessment if (1) the automated vetting uncovers any derogatory information, such as a criminal offense or (2) the applicant has identified himself or herself to be a non-U.S.-born citizen or national. As such, not all applicants will be subjected to a second-level review. The Adjudication Center plays an integral role in the security threat assessment process by adjudicating cases for which an initial automated check finds potential links to criminal history or immigration eligibility issues. Adjudication Center staff review the program applicant’s enrollment file to determine if derogatory or other information may be potentially disqualifying. The applicant’s files are processed from credentialing program enrollment centers through two-web enabled case management systems, called the Screening Gateway and Consolidated Screening Gateway. Adjudication Center staff use the Screening Gateways as their tool for gathering, viewing, and synthesizing the information needed to conduct security threat assessments. Since its establishment in 2005, the Adjudication Center has relied primarily upon contractor staff to complete its security threat assessment workload, and a smaller number of federal government staff to conduct oversight and other functions. Contractor staff performs initial adjudication of cases, and may either approve applications if they determine an applicant is eligible to obtain a credential or refer the application to a federal (that is, TSA) adjudicator for further review if they determine the applicant to be ineligible. Federal staff review cases of potential ineligibility, issue Preliminary Determination of Ineligibility letters to applicants, and conduct redress actions, among other things. As of May 2013, TSA reported that about two-thirds (37 of 55) of Adjudication Center staff were contractors. Figure 1 shows the TSA credentialing process for the TWIC, HME, and Aviation Worker programs from enrollment through credential issuance, and the functions of the Adjudication Center’s TSA and contract staff in the security threat assessment process. Federal agencies face a complicated set of decisions in finding the right mix of government and contractor personnel to conduct their missions. While contractors, when properly used, can play an important role in helping agencies accomplish their missions, our prior work has shown that agencies face challenges with increased reliance on contractors to perform core agency missions. Consistent with Office of Management and Budget procurement policy, agencies should provide a greater degree of scrutiny when contracting for professional and management support, program evaluation, and other services that can affect the government’s decision-making authority—functions that may be considered as being closely associated with inherently governmental functions. Contractors can provide services that closely support inherently governmental functions, but agencies must provide greater scrutiny and enhanced management oversight to ensure that the contractors’ work does not limit the authority, accountability, and responsibilities of government employees. The DHS BWS refers to the department’s effort to identify the appropriate balance of federal and contractor employees required to support critical agency functions. Consistent with our recommendations and in accordance with the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 DHS adopted the BWS in August 2010 to undertake risk analyses that are to enable the department to achieve the appropriate mix of Federal employees and contractors to accomplish its mission while minimizing mission risk that may result from an over-reliance on contractors. DHS uses an automated tool to help components—such as TSA—perform the necessary analysis to categorize work as appropriate for use of a contractor, inherently governmental, or closely associated with an inherently governmental function. The assessment tool is intended to facilitate an assessment of mission risk, level of contractor oversight needed, risk mitigation strategies, and cost analysis. Based on component responses, the tool is to provide a recommended sourcing decision on whether the work is appropriate for federal or contractor performance, or both. For example, should the BWS assessment find that a function is inherently governmental, the component would recommend the function be insourced to government employees, whereas a determination that the function was closely associated with an inherently governmental function would require the agency to either insource the function (also known as federalizing), or strengthen oversight of the contractor workforce. In December 2011, we reported that the Adjudication Center had faced recurring challenges in meeting its security threat assessment workload requirements and largely attributed these challenges to its reliance on a contractor workforce. Specifically, the Adjudication Center had experienced recurring backlogs in completing its caseload, and Adjudication Center officials attributed these backlogs to staffing limitations caused by contractor turnover. Officials at the time reported that the challenge was that the Adjudication Center had used three different contractors since establishing the Adjudication Center in 2005, and on each occasion the contract adjudicator turnover had led to backlogs as adjudicators were hired and trained. TSA reported that it did not consider the risks of acquiring contractor support services to provide adjudication services before awarding its first contract in 2005. Rather, TSA reported that it chose to use contract adjudicators when the Adjudication Center was created because, at the time, it considered them to be the most readily available workforce and effective way to augment federal staff with skilled resources. TSA reported that the agency had initiated an assessment in March 2011 through the DHS BWS process to determine whether the adjudication functions were appropriate to be performed by a contractor workforce, whether the work was inherently governmental and whether there would be cost savings resulting from conversion of the contract positions to government positions. We recommended TSA develop a workforce staffing plan with timelines articulating how the Adjudication Center will effectively and efficiently meet its current and emerging workload requirements, and incorporate the results of TSA’s study examining the appropriateness and costs and benefits of using contractors. TSA concurred with our recommendation and reported that it had begun taking steps to implement it. TSA has evaluated the Adjudication Center largely based on contractor performance in meeting established metrics and data shows mixed performance since 2011; however the Adjudication Center’s performance measures and practices are limited. We found that the Adjudication Center contractor met two of its three performance measures—for timeliness and accuracy—but did not do so for its caseload size measure. Further, these measures and practices were limited. For example, the Adjudication center’s methodology for calculating contractor adjudicator accuracy was limited because it did not include key information. Moreover, the Adjudication Center has not documented key elements of its performance measurement practices. TSA has used performance data for three primary metrics to measure the performance of the Adjudication Center in conducting security threat assessments for the TWIC, HME, and Aviation Worker programs. The three metrics are timeliness for completing initial adjudication, caseload size, and adjudication accuracy. According to TSA Adjudication Center officials, these performance measures were established to evaluate the performance-based contract for adjudication services at the Adjudication Center. Timeliness. The Adjudication Center contractor met timeliness standards for completing initial adjudication of its TWIC, HME, and Aviation Worker caseloads (see figure 1 for a description of this process). TSA requires that its contract adjudicator workforce complete initial adjudication of 95 percent of cases within 7 calendar days of the case entering TSA’s Screening Gateway case management systems for TWIC, HME, and Aviation Worker cases.