Since 1995, GAO has focused on the chemical and biological defense area, which has resulted in a series of reports and testimonies before Congress on DOD’s efforts to prepare troops to survive and operate in a chemically and biologically contaminated environment. Major problem areas have included shortfalls in equipment, training, and reporting and weaknesses in coordinating program research and development activities. Although DOD has taken significant actions to improve the program and has increased its funding, serious problems still persist. Our first major report, issued in March 1996, discussed the overall capability of U.S. forces to fight and survive chemical and biological warfare and is the centerpiece for much of the work we have performed since then. We reported that DOD was slow in responding to the lessons learned during the Gulf War. Specifically, early deploying units lacked required equipment such as chemical detector paper, decontamination kits, and sufficient quantities of protective clothing; Army and Marine forces remained inadequately trained for effective chemical and biological defense; joint exercises included little chemical or biological defense training; Army medical units often lacked chemical and biological defense equipment and training; biological agent vaccine stocks and immunization plans remained research and development progress was slower than planned. We also reported that the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) — DOD’s system for reporting the overall readiness of units — was of limited value in determining the readiness of units to operate in a chemically or biologically contaminated environment. The system was established to provide the current status of specific elements considered essential to readiness assessments, such as personnel and equipment on hand, equipment condition, and training. However, we found that this system allowed commanders to report their unit’s overall readiness subjectively regardless of the unit’s actual readiness to operate in a chemically or biologically contaminated environment. We concluded that chemical and biological defense equipment, training, and medical problems were persisting and, if not addressed, were likely to result in needless casualties and a degradation of U.S. war fighting capability. We noted that despite DOD’s increased emphasis on chemical and biological defense, it continued to receive a lower priority than traditional mission tasks at all levels of command. Many field commanders accepted a level of chemical and biological defense unpreparedness and told us that the resources devoted to that area were appropriate, given other threat concerns and budgetary constraints. When we looked again in 2000 at the readiness of early deploying U.S. forces to operate in a chemically or biologically contaminated environment, we found the situation generally improved. Units we reviewed included three Army divisions, two Air Force fighter wings, and one Marine Corps expeditionary force. Military units are generally expected to have at least 70 percent of their equipment requirements on hand. The units we visited had all their required individual protective equipment (such as suits, boots, and gloves) and most chemical and biological medical supplies and detection and decontamination equipment needed to operate in a chemically or biologically contaminated environment. In the medical arena, the Army divisions had all their needed medical supplies. The Air Force wings had most of their medical supplies, but we noted shortages of some critical items. For example, one wing had only 25 percent of the protective masks required to treat contaminated patients and only 48 percent of required patient decontamination kits. The units we visited had shortages in detection and decontamination equipment, but these shortages varied both across and within the services. For example, one Marine Corps unit and one Air Force unit had 31 percent and 50 percent, respectively, of their chemical agent monitors, whereas the other Air Force unit had 100 percent of its monitors. The three Army units we reviewed had between 88 and 103 percent of their requirements for the same item. Officials at the units with shortages of equipment said that when the units deploy, the shortages would be filled from stocks held by later deployers or from war reserves. However, the units had not determined whether this solution would meet their equipment requirements or what impact this action might have on the later deploying units’ capabilities or on war reserves. The medical readiness of some units to conduct operations in a contaminated environment therefore remained questionable. Chemical and biological defense training continues to be a problem area. We reported in 1996 that commanders were not integrating chemical and biological defense into unit exercises and that the training was not always realistic in terms of how units would operate in wartime. For example, Marine Corps commanders did not fully integrate chemical and biological defense into unit exercises, as required by Marine Corps policies, because operating in protective equipment is difficult and time consuming and this (1) decreases the number of combat essential tasks that can be performed during an exercise and (2) limits offensive combat operations. Officials stated that chemical and biological defense training is still being adversely impacted by (1) a shortage of chemical and biological defense specialists and (2) the fact that these specialists are often assigned multiple responsibilities unrelated to their specialties. For example, Army units we reviewed had from 76 to 102 percent of their authorized enlisted chemical personnel and from 75 to 88 percent of their chemical officers. The Marine Corps unit we visited had 84 percent of its authorized enlisted chemical specialists and 80 percent of its chemical officers. We also reported that DOD’s monitoring of chemical and biological defense readiness has improved since our 1996 report. In April 2000, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed changes to the Status of Resources and Training System that would require units to report more clearly on the quantity of chemical and biological equipment on hand and on training readiness. However, we noted the changes do not require that units report on the condition of their chemical and biological defense equipment. Thus, these reports could indicate that a unit had its chemical and biological equipment, but they would not show whether this equipment was serviceable. We have issued a series of reports that address DOD’s coordination of chemical and biological defense research and development programs. For example, in September 1998 we reported on DOD’s approach to addressing U.S. troop exposures to low levels of chemical warfare agents.Low-level exposure is a concern because it may potentially cause or contribute to health problems that may not become evident for years after exposure. Specifically, we reported that: DOD did not have an integrated strategy to address exposure to low levels of chemical warfare agents. Past research by DOD and others indicated that single and repeated low- level exposures to some chemical warfare agents could result in adverse psychological, physiological, behavioral, and performance effects that may have military implications. We also highlighted limitations of the current research. DOD had allocated nearly $10 million (about 1.5 percent) of its chemical and biological defense research, development, testing, and evaluation program to fund projects on low-level chemical warfare agent exposures. In August 1999 we reported on the coordination of federal research and development efforts to develop nonmedical technology related to chemical and biological defense, an issue that DOD has not addressed until recently. We identified four programs engaged in activities ranging from applied research to prototype development: two of these programs developed technologies primarily for military war fighting applications, and two others developed technologies primarily to assist civilians responding to terrorist incidents. We concluded that the formal and informal program coordination mechanisms may not ensure that potential overlaps, gaps, and opportunities for collaboration would be addressed. We highlighted that agency officials were aware of the deficiencies in the existing coordination mechanisms and that some had initiated additional informal contacts. We are currently reviewing the effectiveness of DOD’s research and testing activities in providing the scientific information needed to address doctrinal, policy, and procedural shortcomings affecting DOD’s ability to operate in a chemically contaminated environment, as well as DOD’s approach to ensure the survivability of mission-essential systems in the case of a chemical or biological attack. DOD’s work in this area is crucial for developing the means to assure the restoration of operations in the event of chemical and biological attacks on U.S. forces at critical overseas depots, ports, and airfields. Individual protection is a critically important component of the overall chemical and biological defense program. DOD has recognized that military service members may not be able to avoid exposure to chemical and biological agents and has consequently provided U.S. forces with individual protective equipment, including clothing ensembles. We have conducted several recent reviews on this subject and are continuing to focus on DOD’s acquisition and management of this equipment because of the potential for increased risks in this area. Specifically, our primary concerns involve DOD’s (1) process for assessing the risk of wartime protective equipment shortages, (2) plans for addressing projected suit shortages due to the expiration by 2007 of most of the existing inventory, and (3) related inventory management and business practices. After updating equipment status and trends, we will discuss our recent reports and ongoing work in this area. Until recently, DOD calculated its chemical and biological defense equipment needs in one of two ways: by assessing either how much would be needed to prevail in two nearly simultaneous major theater wars (often referred to as the “2-MTW” requirement), or how much would be needed to fight two MTWs as well as maintaining supplies for peacetime and training use, the “total service requirement.” In its most recent Annual Report to Congress, for example, DOD reported both inventory and these requirements for each item as of the end of fiscal year 2001. The report shows that several items, particularly in Navy stocks, qualify as “high-risk;” that is, less than 70 percent of needed equipment is on hand. Other items, such as masks, are “low-risk;” that is, the services have more than 85 percent of the needed equipment on hand. (We have been able to update some of the data, in which we generally found only modest changes from the data we show here.) Figure 1 shows these inventory levels, by service, for key components of the protective clothing ensemble. We found, though, that the raw data may understate the real risk because the method that DOD has used to calculate risk may be flawed.