The Obama Administration has pursued the proposed 12-nation Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations as the primary economic component of its "strategic rebalance" of U.S. foreign policy priorities to the Asia-Pacific region. The 12 participating countries announced the conclusion of negotiations and released the text of the agreement in late 2015, and signed the proposed FTA on February 4, 2016. The TPP aims to liberalize and establish rules and disciplines governing trade and investment among its 12 members, and has broad implications for U.S. relations in the region. Congress had an active role in the TPP negotiations through oversight, consultations with the Administration, and formal negotiating objectives established in Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation. Ultimately, Congress would need to pass implementing legislation before the TPP could take effect in the United States. The potential impacts of the agreement may be an active area of debate during the second session of the 114 th Congress. According to TPP proponents, including U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman, "the TPP's significance is not just economic, it's strategic." The term strategic has been used in the context of the TPP debate to capture a range of arguments encompassing both geo-political and geo-economic aspects of U.S. policy, making it difficult to define precisely. In broad terms, however, arguments about the TPP's strategic importance relate to the United States using the agreement as a tool to exert influence in the region and beyond, in both economic and broader political and security spheres, and creating conditions that facilitate other U.S. policy tools. Such arguments maintain that through the TPP, the United States can strengthen regional alliances and partnerships; maintain U.S. leadership and influence in the Asia-Pacific region; enhance U.S. national security; liberalize trade, encourage market-oriented reforms, and drive economic growth; strengthen regional and potentially global trade architecture; and establish and update regional trade rules and disciplines consistent with U.S. interests and modern commercial realities. China is not a TPP member, but features prominently in analysis of U.S. influence in the region. Beijing's economic rise and active trade and investment initiatives in the region form an important backdrop to the strategic aspects of the TPP negotiations. Now the world's second largest economy, China has grown much faster than the United States over the past decade as a trade partner for most Asian countries. Over the past several years, Beijing has initiated or supported a broad set of trade and investment initiatives to spur development in the region. Some analysts argue that through these initiatives China is attempting to create a regional order that seeks to minimize U.S. presence and power. (See " China's Regional "Vision" section below.) As a result, those championing the agreement, including the President, often cast TPP as a vehicle for maintaining U.S. leadership in Asia and establishing trade and investment rules and norms with an eye towards China. Others contend that casting the TPP as an effort to "counter" Chinese initiatives is unproductive, and could create negative perceptions of U.S. intentions, both in China and elsewhere in the region. Some also argue that in many ways U.S. and Chinese goals for trade liberalization and rules and norms in the region may be mutually reinforcing rather than competing. Trade agreements inevitably exist at the intersection of domestic and foreign policy and include both economic and political elements. This can create a tension in balancing various policy priorities, particularly for those policymakers who may support the TPP on some grounds but not others. Some opponents of the agreement argue that focusing on the strategic elements of the TPP distracts the debate from what they view should be its main criteria: the agreement's potential impact on the U.S. economy. While both TPP critics and supporters cite different estimates of economic outcomes to support their positions, the broader strategic implications tend to be highlighted by proponents, and can be difficult to quantify despite their potential significance. This report will examine selected strategic arguments presented by the Administration, as well as by TPP proponents and opponents. Other CRS reports address the specific trade negotiations and economic effects. This report focuses generally on the Asia-Pacific region, with particular emphasis on implications for Asia. The report also raises strategic issues Congress may consider as it examines a final TPP agreement and potentially debates future legislation to approve and implement it. Since the end of World War II, the United States has advanced trade agreements and institutions such as FTAs to promote its broader foreign policy goals. The United States signed its first FTA with Israel in 1985, and many observers argue that political solidarity with Israel weighed more heavily than its economic value at the time. In the 2000s, many observers saw U.S. FTAs with Bahrain, Morocco, and Oman as based not just on economic, but also on security and foreign policy objectives—primarily helping forge closer cooperation on efforts to combat terrorism. The first U.S. FTA in Asia entered into force in 2004 with Singapore, a close U.S. security partner with enormous strategic interests in liberalizing trade. Obama Administration officials and many of the TPP's proponents argue that U.S. trade policy initiatives in Asia, particularly the TPP, have considerable geostrategic importance. The Administration's 2015 National Security Strategy stated: Sustaining our leadership depends on shaping an emerging global economic order that continues to reflect our interests and values. Despite its success, our rules-based system is now competing against alternative, less-open models.... To meet this challenge, we must be strategic in the use of our economic strength to set new rules of the road, strengthen our partnerships, and promote inclusive development. To some observers, TPP is an important test of U.S. credibility as a regional leader. The proposed agreement is the Obama Administration's signature economic initiative in the Asia-Pacific region. Some observers have argued that if the agreement is not approved by Congress, the entire rebalancing strategy could be seen as relatively weak and the United States will be seen as divided on how important it considers its leadership role in Asia. Administration officials argue that the agreement is a key signal that the United States is actively integrated into Asia's economic and diplomatic structures. In a 2014 article in Foreign Affairs , U.S. Trade Representative Froman argued, "For many of the countries that would be party to the TPP, the economic benefits of the agreement are further sweetened by expectations that the United States will become more deeply embedded in the region." These arguments are echoed by many in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly among TPP negotiating partners. At a regional security conference in Singapore in May 2015, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said, "... whatever the merits or demerits of individual line items of trade covered in the TPP, the agreement has a wider strategic significance. Getting the TPP done will deepen links on both sides of the Pacific. Failing to get the TPP done will hurt the credibility and standing of the U.S. not just in Asia, but worldwide." Some proponents also argue that concluding the TPP would be an important aspect of a broader U.S. strategy to develop and strengthen regional institutions in ways that foster cooperation and the peaceful resolution of differences through respect for rules and norms. In 2013, then National Security Advisor Tom Donilon wrote: "Just as our security alliances across two oceans have brought stability that extends far beyond our treaty partners, U.S. economic diplomacy today can advance global prosperity by strengthening the international rules and norms that make trade and growth possible." Linkages between the TPP and the promotion of broader diplomatic and security interests have become a strong part of the Administration's arguments for TPP. In an April 2015 speech providing a status report on the "rebalancing," Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter stated that "passing TPP is as important to me as another aircraft carrier." Other TPP proponents have said that the agreement will reinforce U.S. alliances and partnerships in East Asia. However, when elaborating on security rationales for supporting passage of TPP, many of the agreement's backers do not identify specific, concrete ways that a successful deal would invigorate U.S. security partnerships in the region. Some critics of TPP assert that the strength or weakness of broader bilateral political and security relationships depend more upon countries' assessment of their security interests than on whether they have a trade agreement with the United States. For instance, they contend, it arguably is difficult to pinpoint how, if at all, the South Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA), which went into effect in 2012, by itself has altered either South Korea's or the United States' fundamental interests on the Korean Peninsula or in Northeast Asia. Put another way, the short-term strength of the U.S.-South Korea alliance likely is determined by factors such as the two countries' perception of threats from China or North Korea, rather than by the presence of the KORUS FTA. Likewise, few observers believe the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance depends heavily on the TPP's success or failure. In recent years, Japan's own strategic and political calculations appear to have been the primary drivers behind its moves to deepen strategic cooperation with the United States. TPP may have a larger impact on countries with which the U.S. relationship is not as close. In Vietnam's case, for instance, some argue that a successful outcome in the TPP negotiations would support reform-oriented decisionmakers by requiring the government to enact deeper market-oriented institutional changes that may be required to implement their commitments under TPP provisions. In some cases, these same individuals may also support deepening relations with the United States. Many Vietnamese leaders would see TPP approval as a sign that the United States welcomes closer ties and more normal relations with the country.