The Supreme Court has overruled 228 of its own decisions over the years, and the mostcontroversial of these decisions involved constitutional interpretation. (1) How the Supreme Courtexplains its reversals of direction in constitutional interpretation is the subject of this report. (2) As a general rule, the Supreme Court adheres to precedent, citing the doctrine of stare decisis ("to stand by a decision"). This means that, when the Court has laid down a principle in decidinga case, ordinarily it will apply that same principle in future cases with substantially similarfacts. (3) The general ruleof stare decisis is not an absolute rule, however; the Court recognizes the need on occasion to correctwhat are perceived as erroneous decisions or to adapt to changed circumstances. In deciding whetherto overrule precedent the Court takes a variety of approaches and applies a number of differentstandards, many of them quite general and flexible in application. As a result, the law of staredecisis in constitutional decision making has been called amorphous and manipulable, and has beencriticized as incoherent. (4) Adherence to precedent is a fundamental principle of jurisprudence that promotes certaintyin the law and uniformity in the treatment of litigants, and thereby prevents arbitrariness. (5) The obligation to follow precedent begins withnecessity, and a contrary necessity marks its outer limit. With Cardozo, we recognize that no judicialsystem could do society's work if it eyed each issue afresh in every case that raised it. Indeed, thevery concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over timethat a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable. (6) Stare decisis is not a constitutional command; as Justice Frankfurter wrote, " stare decisis isa principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision." (7) The doctrine reflects a policyjudgment that "in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than thatit be settled right." (8) Asafety valve is deemed necessary, however. In some instances it becomes important to the Court tocorrect an earlier interpretation that it views as erroneous or no longer viable. Although mostJustices agree that error correction should be the exception to the rule, defining the circumstancesunder which a decision should be overruled is a difficult task. An inconsistent approach by the Courtin resolving the tension between the opposing goals of continuity and error correction can itselfcreate uncertainty and unpredictability. The Court often explains that it is less reluctant to overrule a decision that involvesconstitutional interpretation rather than interpretation of a statute. [I]n cases involving the Federal Constitution, wherecorrection through legislative action is practically impossible, this Court has often overruled itsearlier decisions. The Court bows to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning,recognizing that the process of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate alsoin the judicial function. (9) Nonetheless, when justifying an overruling the Court usually looks for something in addition to itsbelief that a case was wrongly decided. "Although adherence to precedent is not rigidly required inconstitutional cases, any departure from the doctrine of stare decisis demands specialjustification." (10) "Special justification" can be one or more of several different considerations, and how stronga justification the Court requires can vary with the importance of the precedent as well as with theimportance the Court attaches to overruling it. The decision whether to adhere to a constitutionaldecision "is a complex and difficult one . . . that must account for a variety of often competingconsiderations." (11) Inreexamining a constitutional precedent, the Court looks to "a series of prudential and pragmaticconsiderations designed to test the consistency of overruling a prior decision with the ideal of therule of law, and to gauge the respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case." (12) The Court has looked tothe following general considerations in overruling precedent. [We] may ask whether the rule has proven to beintolerable simply in defying practical workability, Swift & Co. v. Wickham , 382 U.S. 111, 116(1965); whether the rule is subject to the kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to theconsequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation, e.g., United States v. TitleIns. & Trust Co. , 265 U.S. 472, 486 (1924); whether related principles of law have so far developedas to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine, see Patterson v. McLeanCredit Union , 491 U.S. 164, 173-174 (1989); or whether facts have so changed, or come to be seenso differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification, e.g., Burnet,supra , at 412 (Brandeis, J. dissenting). (13) All of these possibilities may be examined when the Court is asked to overrule a decision atthe heart of a major national controversy. (14) In considering and rejecting a request that it overrule itslandmark abortion decision, Roe v. Wade , (15) the Court looked to the following factors. [W]e may inquire whether Roe 's central rule has beenfound unworkable, whether the rule's limitation on state power could be removed without seriousinequity to those who have relied upon it or significant damage to the stability of the societygoverned by it; whether the law's growth in the intervening years has left Roe 's central rule adoctrinal anachronism discounted by society; and whether Roe 's premises of fact have so far changedin the ensuing two decades as to render its central holding somehow irrelevant or unjustifiable indealing with the issue it addressed. (16) Finding none of these factors present, the Casey majority saw no basis for overruling Roe . In their view, Roe had not proven unworkable; there was reliance of a sort ("an entire generation hascome of age free to assume Roe 's concept of liberty in defining the capacity of women to act insociety, and to make reproductive decisions"); (17) "no erosion of principle going to liberty or personal autonomy"had undermined " Roe 's central holding"; because Roe 's holding was viewed as consistent with otherpersonal liberty decisions, reliance on Roe 's precedent was viewed as unlikely to lead to erroneousdecisions; and, although "time [had] overtaken some of Roe 's factual assumptions," no changedcircumstances had undermined Roe 's central holding. (18) The Casey Court emphasized that "a decision to overrule shouldrest on some special reason over and above the belief that a prior case was wrongly decided." (19) A basic change in the law upon a ground no firmer thana change in our membership invites the popular misconception that this institution is little differentfrom the two political branches of Government. No misconception could do more lasting injury tothis Court and to the system of law which it is our abiding mission to serve. (20) Societal changes were important -- albeit somewhat different -- considerations in two majoroverruling decisions of the Twentieth Century, West Coast Hotel v. Parrish (1937) (21) and Brown v. Board ofEducation (1954). (22) In West Coast Hotel , the Court overruled its 1923 decision in Adkins v. Children's Hospital , (23) which had invalidated astate minimum wage law for adult women. West Coast Hotel was not a narrow ruling, but rather ineffect reversed the whole line of Lochner decisions premised on acceptance of laissez-faireeconomics and relying on employers' liberty of contract to restrict social welfare legislation. (24) The nation's experienceduring the Great Depression had changed perceptions between Adkins and West Coast Hotel . As theCourt put it, reconsideration was "imperative" due in part to "the economic conditions which havesupervened, and in the light of which the reasonableness of the exercise of the protective power ofthe state must be considered." (25) Although also grounding its decision in due process doctrine andin correcting what it viewed as an erroneous interpretation in Adkins , the Court took judicial noticeof "the unparalleled demands for relief which arose during the recent period of depression," andconcluded that a state could legislate to prevent the exploitation of a class of workers who were"relatively defenseless" and who might become dependent upon the community for support. (26) In Brown v. Board of Education , the Court arguably forced social change more than itresponded to it. (27) TheCourt abandoned its interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause as allowing "separate-but-equal"treatment of the races, and held that racial segregation in the public schools was inherentlyunequal. (28) The Courtjustified its changed interpretation by changing its conclusion about the stigmatizing effects ofsegregation. "Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessyv. Ferguson , this finding [that racial segregation stigmatizes minority children] is amply supportedby modern authority. Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected." (29) The Court cited academicstudies, rather than general societal acceptance or experience, for the "modern authority" from whichits "psychological knowledge" was derived. (30) As the Casey Court synthesized Brown and West Coast Hotel , "[e]ach rested on facts, or anunderstanding of facts, changed from those which furnished the claimed justifications for the earlierconstitutional resolutions."