EAS, the nation’s primary alerting system, provides capacity for the United States to issue alerts and warnings to the public in response to emergencies. FEMA is responsible for administering EAS at the national level, while FCC manages EAS participation by media-related communications service providers. FCC provides technical standards and support for EAS, rules for its operation, and enforcement within the over- the-air broadcast, cable, and satellite broadcasting industries. Presidential, or national-level, EAS alerts use a hierarchical distribution system to relay important emergency messages. As the entry point for national level EAS messages, FEMA is responsible for distributing presidential EAS alerts to National Primary stations, often referred to as Primary Entry Point (PEP) stations. Broadcasts of these national-level alerts are relayed by the PEP stations across the country to radio and television stations that rebroadcast the message to other broadcast stations and cable systems until all EAS participants have been alerted. This retransmission of alerts from EAS participant to EAS participant is commonly referred to as a “daisy chain” distribution system. FCC rules require EAS participants to install FCC-certified EAS equipment. Radio and television broadcast stations, cable companies, wireless cable companies, direct broadcast satellite, and satellite radio generally must participate in the system and transmit alerts initiated by the President. State and local governments determine the content and transmission procedures of their alerts, in conjunction with local broadcast radio and television stations. These procedures are specified in state EAS plans filed with FCC. In 2007, FCC adopted a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to explore EAS-related issues, such as how non-English speakers may best be served by national, state, and local EAS; and to reexamine the best way to make EAS accessible to persons with disabilities. Organizations that participate in EAS planning and administration include the Primary Entry Point Administrative Council (PEPAC), the Society of Broadcast Engineers, and associations such as the National Association of Broadcasters and individual state broadcasting associations. States and localities organize emergency communications committees whose members often include representatives from broadcasters or local television and radio stations. These committees agree on the chain of command and other procedures for activating EAS alerts. In June 2006, the President issued Executive Order 13407, entitled Public Alert and Warning System, effecting a policy that the U.S. have a comprehensive integrated alert and warning system, and detailing the responsibilities of the Secretary of Homeland Security in meeting this requirement. The order also specified the level of support expected from other departments and agencies in meeting the requirements for a more robust federal warning system. The Secretary of Homeland Security was ordered to “ensure an orderly and effective transition” from current capabilities to the system described by the executive order, and to report on the implementation of the system within 90 days of the order, and on at least a yearly basis, thereafter. The FEMA IPAWS program was initiated in 2004 and the development and implementation of IPAWS has become the programmatic mechanism to carry out the executive order. IPAWS is defined by FEMA as a “system of systems,” which is intended to eventually integrate existing and new alert systems, including EAS. That is, EAS is expected to be superseded as the nation’s primary alert function by IPAWS, with EAS acting as one of its component parts and as one of IPAWS’s mechanisms to disseminate alerts. Another intended partner system is NOAA’s National Weather Radio (NWR). NWR broadcasts National Weather Service forecasts and all-hazard warnings. Non-weather emergency messages are broadcast over NWR at the request of federal, state, and local officials in time-critical situations when public safety is involved. The Warning, Alert, and Response Network Act of 2006 (WARN Act) required FCC to adopt relevant technical standards, protocols, procedures, and other technical requirements to enable commercial mobile service providers (wireless providers) to issue emergency alerts. The act established an advisory panel called the Commercial Mobile Service Alert Advisory Committee (CMSAAC), to recommend the technical specifications and protocols that will govern wireless providers that participate in emergency alerting. The CMSAAC was chaired by then-FCC Chairman Kevin J. Martin and included 42 other members, representing stakeholders in all levels of government and the private sector. FCC adopted most of the recommendations made by the committee regarding the required capabilities of wireless providers to transmit alerts, as well as the proposal to develop a Commercial Mobile Alert System (CMAS). Figure 1 displays the conceptual architecture of IPAWS, with EAS, NWR, and CMAS as mechanisms for disseminating alerts. The Common Alerting Protocol (CAP) is an open, non-proprietary digital message format being used as a standard for new, digitized alert networks using multiple technologies. CAP is compatible with multiple applications and telecommunication methods, and has been developed for use by emergency management officials in sending all types of alert messages. CAP can be used as a single input to activate multiple warning systems, and is capable of geographic targeting and multilingual messaging. FEMA—required by the executive order to adopt alert standards and protocols—intends to adopt CAP and to publish its IPAWS CAP v1.1-EAS Profile (CAP Profile) standard. In an FCC report and order released in July 2007, FCC promulgated new rules, including a requirement for all mandatory EAS participants to accept messages using CAP, no later than 180 days after FEMA adopts the CAP standard. EAS remains the primary national-level public alert system and serves as a valuable public alert and warning tool. It remains available as a mechanism for the President to issue national warnings, and it allows state and local governments to generate weather warnings, America’s Missing: Broadcast Emergency Response (AMBER) Alerts, and other public emergency communications. Nonetheless, as we previously reported, EAS exhibits longstanding weaknesses that continue to limit its effectiveness. In particular, the reliability of the national-level relay system—which would be critical if the President were to issue a national-level alert— remains questionable due to a lack of redundancy among key broadcasters, gaps in coverage, insufficient testing of the relay system, and inadequate training of personnel. Further, EAS alerts have limited coverage, dissemination means, and geographical specificity. FEMA has several projects under way to address some of these weaknesses, but little progress has been made and EAS remains effectively unchanged since our last report, issued in March 2007. Although EAS was established to allow the President to communicate with the public, it primarily serves as a means of disseminating emergency alert and warning information at the state and local level. EAS has never been used to transmit a national-level alert, but instead has evolved into an important public alert and warning tool for state and local governments. State and local emergency operations managers can request activation of EAS for state and local public alert and warning needs. EAS participants transmit state and local alerts via radio and television or other media facilities, such as cable or satellite. These alerts include weather warnings, AMBER Alerts, or other emergency communications, such as evacuation notices. EAS participants may decide individually whether to transmit alerts that originate at the state or local level. Approximately 90 percent of all EAS messages are weather alerts generated by NOAA’s National Weather Service (NWS). NWS broadcasts forecasts, warnings, watches, and other non-weather hazard information, and supplies such information to broadcast and cable entry points designated in approved EAS state and local plans. EAS has longstanding weaknesses that have not been resolved since we reported on them in March 2007. These weaknesses continue to limit the effectiveness of EAS and include (1) a lack of redundancy, (2) gaps in coverage, (3) a lack of testing, and (4) inadequate training for EAS participants. In addition to these weaknesses, EAS is also hampered by how alerts are disseminated to the public. Lack of redundancy. FEMA lacks alternative means of reaching EAS participants should its primary connection fail. Specifically, FEMA can distribute national-level alerts to 35 PEP stations (which serve as the entry points for Presidential alerts) and to 860 public radio stations across the country via EAS phone lines and satellite connectivity, respectively. However, FEMA lacks an alternative means of reaching these participants if those primary connections fail. Furthermore, if a primary connection to a PEP station failed, all of the other EAS participants that rely on that station via the daisy chain relay system would fail to receive alerts. This lack of redundancy could have serious consequences. For example, if a PEP station were disabled during a disaster in a major metropolitan area, an EAS alert would likely fail to reach a sizable portion of the population because FEMA, potentially, would not have access to other stations in that area. Gaps in coverage. Gaps in PEP station broadcast coverage could hinder the successful dissemination of EAS alerts, as some broadcast stations might have difficulty in monitoring their assigned PEP station because the station is geographically distant. Some states, such as Maine, are not covered at all by the PEP system and would have to pick up a national- level message from an alternate source, such as Public Radio. This might not be a fully reliable option, however. Unlike PEP stations, public radio stations do not necessarily have extra fuel and generators on-site to help ensure continuous operations following a disaster. Some broadcasters we contacted expressed concern that other factors might impede their ability to receive alerts from PEP stations. For example, some PEP broadcast signals are too weak to overcome geographical impediments, such as mountains; due to interference, broadcast signals generally do not travel as well during the day as at night and, therefore, have inconsistent EAS coverage; and high definition radio signals can overpower or distort PEP broadcast signals.