JPDO and ATO have issued key NextGen plans and have reorganized the management structure for NextGen. We have previously reported on stakeholders’ concerns about the fragmented management structure for NextGen and resulting lack of clear accountability for NextGen’s implementation. While recent FAA efforts have made progress on this front, they have yet to fully resolve stakeholders’ concerns. Resolving this issue will be critical to advancing both the implementation of capabilities in the midterm and the full transformation to NextGen in the long term. Since 2003, JPDO and ATO have made progress in planning for and implementing NextGen. In accordance with Vision 100, JPDO created a multi-agency research and development plan for the transition to NextGen. This plan consists of three basic documents—a Concept of Operations, an Enterprise Architecture, and an Integrated Work Plan. Collectively, these three documents form a basis for interagency and industry planning and coordination. JPDO views these plans as iterative and intends to issue further versions as NextGen technologies are developed and implemented. As NextGen progressed from the planning to the implementation phase, ATO produced its NextGen Implementation Plan, which addresses the more detailed level of planning and activities necessary to achieve NextGen capabilities. According to ATO, it and JPDO have worked to align and ensure linkages between these planning documents. The current version of the NextGen Implementation Plan, released in January 2009, focuses on the midterm (2012 though 2018) implementation of NextGen capabilities. In a previous testimony, we raised some concerns about the usefulness of the NextGen planning documents, and we still have some concerns. For example, we reported that the planning documents lacked the type of specific information that industry stakeholders need for their own planning purposes, such as a catalog of critical needs, clearly defined and prioritized intermediate objectives, and a structured plan for achieving tangible results. Recent versions of NextGen planning documents have partially addressed some of these concerns, but industry stakeholders continue to express frustration that the planning documents lack any specific timelines or commitments. A senior FAA official has acknowledged that FAA will face ongoing challenges in attempting to communicate effectively with industry and other stakeholders to ensure that they fully understand the content and objectives of the initiative and remain engaged and committed to its planning and implementation. Initially, JPDO was established as a separate and independent office within FAA reporting directly to both the COO of ATO and the FAA Administrator (see fig. 1). In May 2008, FAA announced a reorganization of its NextGen management structure and named a Senior Vice President for NextGen and Operations Planning who reports to ATO’s COO (see fig. 2.). The reorganization eliminated JPDO’s dual reporting status, and the JPDO Director now reports directly to the newly created Senior Vice President for NextGen and Operations Planning. The reorganization also led to JPDO’s placement lower in FAA’s organizational structure—it is now a fourth-level organization. According to ATO’s COO, a purpose of the reorganization was to respond to industry stakeholders’ concerns about the fragmentation of authority and lack of accountability for NextGen, which might delay its implementation. In particular, stakeholders have expressed frustration that a program as large and important as NextGen does not follow the industry practice of having one person with the authority to make key decisions. In the COO’s view, the reorganization creates one “team” with one person in charge to plan, implement, and oversee NextGen. According to FAA, the Senior Vice President for NextGen and Operations Planning is responsible for integrating and implementing all elements of NextGen. However, this individual does not have budget authority over several key NextGen projects, according to a recent testimony from the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Inspector General. In November 2008, the President issued Executive Order 13479, which took the positive step of treating NextGen as an important national initiative, but potentially added another level of complexity and uncertainty to the management structure for NextGen. The order directed the Secretary to create a staff to support the Senior Policy Committee, an advisory body chaired by the Secretary of Transportation whose members are the heads of the federal partner agencies and whose purpose is to provide policy guidance for NextGen planning. Previously, JPDO coordinated the agenda of the Senior Policy Committee, but now, according to FAA, the new support staff will coordinate the committee’s agenda, although JPDO will continue to be involved in the development of issues and topics for the committee. Furthermore, notwithstanding JPDO’s statutory responsibility for coordinating with the federal partner agencies, the director of the support staff will serve as the senior DOT liaison between the Secretary and the federal partner agencies. It remains unclear how these changes will affect JPDO’s role relative to the Senior Policy Committee or to other federal partner agencies. The executive order also directed the Secretary to establish a committee to advise the Secretary on the implementation of NextGen. According to FAA’s interpretation of the executive order, the new advisory committee will be an external (nongovernmental) committee whose role will be to provide an external stakeholder perspective. The role of this committee could potentially duplicate the roles of other advisory bodies associated with the NextGen initiative. FAA has said that it and JPDO are working with DOT to clarify roles and responsibilities in executing the executive order. It is difficult to tell how well the reorganization and the implementation of the executive order will address stakeholders’ concerns about the fragmentation of authority for NextGen. For example, although the reorganization places JPDO and the office responsible for NextGen integration and implementation under the leadership of the same Senior Vice President, other activities critical to NextGen’s implementation lie outside this official’s jurisdiction. Several types of aviation operations are under the leadership of the Senior Vice President for Operations, and responsibilities for airport and aviation safety activities fall outside ATO altogether and are headed by FAA Associate Administrators. According to FAA, the NextGen Management Board, which is composed of Associate Administrators, the COO, Senior Vice Presidents, and the Director of the JPDO, ensures agencywide support for NextGen. However with no direct line of authority between the Senior Vice President for NextGen and Operations Planning and these other operations and activities, accountability for NextGen outcomes is unclear, creating the potential for delays in implementation. It is also unclear how the reorganization and the implementation of the executive order will affect the overall role created for JPDO by Vision 100. For example, according to one industry stakeholder, their ability to understand and be involved in the NextGen- related efforts of federal partner agencies has been hampered by JPDO’s placement under ATO’s management. Several stakeholders have suggested that an office above the Senior Vice President for NextGen and Operations Planning and these other units—an office that would report directly to the FAA Administrator or the Secretary of Transportation—is needed to ensure accountability for NextGen results. In contrast, another stakeholder suggested that further reorganization may not be needed, but FAA’s existing leadership could play a greater role in clarifying the responsibilities of the various offices involved in planning and implementing NextGen and in clearly assigning accountability for NextGen outcomes. To help address current congestion and delays, many stakeholders have suggested that FAA focus on maximizing what can be done with existing, proven capabilities and existing infrastructure. We have previously characterized this approach as “NowGen.” For example, industry stakeholders highlighted “off-the-shelf” technologies, including Traffic Management Advisor (TMA), Traffic Flow Management (TFM), and User Request Evaluation Tool (URET), as well as performance-based navigation and tailored arrival procedures. Such technologies and procedures are being implemented in airports now and, according to these stakeholders, could be implemented more widely and used more effectively to address capacity constraints. For example, TMA—a decision- support tool that helps controllers manage air traffic flows more efficiently—has been used at some airports to increase capacity. However, according to one stakeholder, some airports equipped with TMA are not using it to its fullest extent to increase capacity. Industry stakeholders also maintain that using existing performance-based navigation procedures during low-visibility conditions—when the required distances separating aircraft are normally increased for safety reasons—would enable greater use of closely spaced parallel runways, thereby increasing capacity. In part to help accelerate the implementation of existing capabilities in the midterm—including technologies that are part of NextGen’s five transformational programs, such as ADS-B—FAA has created a NextGen Midterm Implementation Task Force through RTCA. According to the NextGen Implementation Plan, the task force will focus on maximizing the benefits of midterm NextGen operational capabilities and addressing business and investment-related issues associated with implementing these capabilities. A member of the task force indicated that it will be identifying a handful of capabilities that can be implemented in the midterm and prioritizing them according to their relative net benefits. Furthermore, the task force will be examining the potential for deploying capabilities regionally to address key bottlenecks in the national air transportation system before deploying them nationally. Current plans call for the task force to provide final conclusions and recommendations to FAA in August 2009. Implementing these capabilities in the midterm, as well as over the long term, depends not only on FAA, but also on aircraft operators, who must acquire the necessary equipment. For example, aircraft must be equipped with appropriate technology to use ADS-B. Some airlines have purchased some of the necessary technology, but over all, airlines are waiting for FAA to specify requirements and address funding concerns. In addition, industry stakeholders have expressed concerns about the progress made by FAA in adequately explaining and demonstrating the benefits of equipping aircraft with advanced avionics equipment, which comes at a significant cost to the aviation industry. For example, one industry stakeholder told us that, without an explicit FAA commitment to reduce separation standards—a key benefit of deploying aircraft with ADS-B equipment—the industry has little incentive to voluntarily purchase the equipment.