The John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts, which was established in 1964 as both a national cultural arts center and a memorial to the 35th President, opened in September 1971 as an independently administered bureau of the Smithsonian Institution. Shortly thereafter, in 1972, the Secretary of the Interior, through the National Park Service, assumed responsibility for maintenance and all other services related to the administration of the Kennedy Center facility. In 1994, legislation was enacted that transferred responsibility for operations and maintenance of the facility to the Kennedy Center Board of Trustees. The 1994 legislation also required the Kennedy Center to develop and update annually a comprehensive building needs plan that details the condition of the Kennedy Center facility and planned renovations. The Kennedy Center receives annual appropriations to fund operations and maintenance as well as construction. For example, in fiscal year 2003, Congress appropriated $16.2 million for the Kennedy Center’s operations and maintenance and $17.5 million for construction. The Kennedy Center has other sources of funds to finance capital improvements in addition to annual appropriations, such as charitable donations and the ability to borrow funds. The John F. Kennedy Center Act, as amended, provides that no changes may be made to the grounds of the Kennedy Center without the approval of Congress and the Secretary of the Interior. The John F. Kennedy Center Parking Improvement Act of 1997 gave the Kennedy Center approval to design and construct the parking garage expansion and site improvements. The garage expansion is being funded through a loan from the District of Columbia, which issued revenue bonds to provide the related funding, and the site improvements are being funded through annual appropriations. To maintain a separation between the appropriated and nonappropriated funds, the Kennedy Center arranged for separate construction management and general contractors for the two parts of the project—the parking garage expansion and the site improvements. The Kennedy Center also maintains separate accounting for the garage expansion and the site improvements. To assist in the construction of the garage expansion, the Kennedy Center has hired a construction management firm. For the site improvements, the Kennedy Center is using construction-contracting services available to federal entities through a Corps of Engineers indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity contract. The Corps of Engineers is also providing limited management assistance to the project. Figure 1 shows the Kennedy Center building and adjacent area. As of July 2003, Kennedy Center officials estimated the cost of the garage expansion and site improvement project at $88 million. This estimate includes $43 million for the site improvements and $45 million for the garage expansion, including revenue bond issuance costs and capitalized interest payments. The garage expansion is to include 525 new parking spaces. The site improvements are designed to improve vehicle and pedestrian access to the Kennedy Center and include repairs and changes to the sidewalks, roads, and landscaping surrounding the Kennedy Center site. Regarding the garage expansion, 104 spaces are open and operating, and the remainder will open in December 2003. Kennedy Center officials estimated that the site improvements will be completed in the summer of 2004. These current estimates reflect changes made after the 2001 contract award and include such things as an approximately 1-year increase in time frames and a $3.3 million, or 15 percent, increase in the garage expansion costs since the time of award. These increases were primarily due to (1) changes to the project design required by the National Capital Planning Commission and the Commission of Fine Arts; (2) large amounts of snow and rain during the winter and spring of 2003 that caused project delays; and (3) unforeseen site conditions, such as deteriorated concrete and greater-than-expected amounts of soil contamination. Kennedy Center officials told us that the site contains petroleum and coal-tar contamination. Although the Kennedy Center performed a soil test before construction began, the extent of the contamination was greater than expected. The costs associated with removing this soil contamination account for over half of the 15 percent increase over the awarded base contract amounts. The July 2003 estimates of the project’s costs, time frames, and scope vary substantially from estimates that the Kennedy Center provided to Congress in 1997 and 1998. At that time, Kennedy Center officials estimated that the garage expansion would cost $25 million and would include 900 to 1,000 parking spaces, and that the site improvements would cost $3 million and include construction of a new front-entry driveway. Kennedy Center officials estimated that the project would be completed by August 2000. Table 1 summarizes the differences between the current and the 1997 and 1998 estimates of the project cost, scope, and schedule. In addition, at the time that the Kennedy Center officials were planning the garage expansion and site improvement project, they were also planning to construct a large format movie theater at an additional cost of $7 million to $10 million. This portion of the project was later dropped due to cost considerations. It was anticipated that repayment of the loan from the District of Columbia would come, in part, from parking fees and movie theater revenue. Kennedy Center officials recognize that the reduction in planned parking spaces from approximately 1,000 to 525, as well as elimination of the movie theater revenue, will result in a reduced amount of revenue available for loan payments. However, they said they are confident that given planned increases in parking prices over the next 30 years, they will still be able to pay off the loan with revenue from the new parking spaces. A table of the Kennedy Center’s projected parking revenue is included in appendix I. Kennedy Center officials told us that they have reevaluated some planned capital projects, and that making these changes allowed them to expand the scope of the site improvements portion of the project. These officials said that they decided to (1) eliminate two projects involving the installation of a mezzanine in the Grand Foyer and windows in the building facade; (2) delay the construction of a curtain wall; and (3) construct planned repairs to elevators and an expansion of the sprinkler and fire suppression systems in phases, rather than simultaneously. Furthermore, in commenting on a draft of this report, Kennedy Center officials noted that the scope of the site improvements has increased substantially since the 1997 estimate, and that the scope now includes repairs and improvements to pedestrian walkways, the underground building service tunnel, garage exhaust systems, and the marble walkways and exterior wall coverings. Table 2 shows the scope of the components of the current site improvements. Kennedy Center officials said that they were initially planning on making these repairs at a later date. However, by including them with the site improvements, they hoped to expedite the work, achieve a more uniform architectural design, and reduce the number of contractors involved, thereby simplify scheduling and coordination efforts. Kennedy Center officials said these scope changes account for $38.6 million of the difference between the $88 million actual cost and the $28 million 1997 estimate. Kennedy Center officials were unable to provide a detailed explanation of how they arrived at the preliminary 1997 and 1998 cost and schedule estimates because they had experienced high staff turnover since the estimates were developed, and records were either not available or not retained. Despite this fact, these officials said that it appeared that the estimates were based on some unrealistic assumptions. For example, they said the initial estimates were incorrectly based on construction costs of garages outside the District of Columbia, which was a poor comparison because they are less expensive to construct; did not adequately consider the need to keep the Kennedy Center open 365 days per year, which had an effect on construction phasing and coordination issues and subsequently on the estimated costs and time frames; and did not account for the unusually expensive, busy, and competitive construction market conditions during this period. Furthermore, the project was delayed for approximately 2 years as Kennedy Center officials worked through multiple efforts to design and bid the project and reduce project costs. For example, as part of the National Capital Planning Commission and the Commission of Fine Arts project review process, the Kennedy Center was required to redesign some portions of the project to comply with their decisions regarding design elements, finishes, landscaping, and the elimination of planned valet parking on top of the semi-elliptical terrace. In addition, budget constraints led the Kennedy Center to undertake various efforts in an attempt to lower the project cost, such as (1) redesigning portions of the project, (2) performing value engineering to identify and eliminate unnecessary costs, and (3) rebidding the project after initial contractor bids far exceeded the Kennedy Center’s expectations and it was unsuccessful in negotiating with the lowest bidder. Kennedy Center officials acknowledged that they should have better informed Congress of the preliminary nature of the 1997 and 1998 estimates and the subsequent events in the planning and bidding phases of the project that affected the project’s costs, time frames, and scope. As a result, these officials said that they now have monthly meetings with congressional stakeholders to discuss the status of ongoing construction projects. In addition to problems associated with the planning and bidding phases of the project, we found that the Kennedy Center faces a number of challenges in managing large construction projects. The Kennedy Center lacks (1) adequate policies and procedures to guide the planning and management of the construction process, (2) some timely construction data on schedules and costs for effectively overseeing construction projects and measuring results, and (3) key human capital resources and expertise that would be highly beneficial in managing the construction process. More specifically: Policies and procedures. Although the Kennedy Center had some limited construction-related guidance, such as safety plans developed by the construction management contractor, it does not have formal, written project management policies and procedures to help guide and administer construction projects. A typical project management guide would include policies and procedures on the organization of the project, quality control and assurance standards, project execution procedures, and requirements for day-to-day administration of contracts, all of which would help to ensure overall project oversight. Other federal agencies that manage construction projects, such as the General Services Administration, the Department of State, and the Architect of the Capitol, use such guidance. Timely construction data. The Kennedy Center does not always receive timely construction data on schedules and costs.