Although the Cold War has ended, the threat of foreign espionage to the nation still exists from a variety of countries, and recent revelations of intelligence activities against the United States involving Russia, China, and South Korea have raised concerns that such activities are on the increase. The Department of Energy (DOE) and its facilities, especially its nuclear weapons laboratories, are key targets of foreign intelligence interest. Not only do these laboratories conduct activities related to the design, construction, and maintenance of nuclear weapons—a long-standing target of foreign espionage—but they also conduct research into many areas of high technology, such as laser fusion, high-performance computers, and microelectronics. Their research is often done in collaboration with industry, and sometimes foreign countries, to develop new technologies for commercial applications. Accordingly, their work is of interest to other countries, and thousands of foreign nationals visit these laboratories each year to participate in such research. The high number of foreign visitors, as well as some recent investigative cases involving foreign nationals at DOE’s laboratories, have increased concerns that these laboratories are targets of foreign espionage efforts. DOE’s nuclear weapons laboratories—the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California and the Los Alamos National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico—have been the cornerstones of the U.S. weapons program for over 40 years. In this regard, they are unique among DOE’s laboratories. Government-owned and contractor-operated, these three laboratories have been assigned specific missions for nuclear weapons development as well as other programmatic responsibilities. Over time, the laboratories have increasingly expanded their responsibilities in nondefense research areas. The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is operated by the University of California for DOE. Established in 1952, the laboratory occupies 1-square mile in Livermore, California. The laboratory’s major missions include nuclear weapons research and development to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile; other weapons and defense-related activities for DOE and the Department of Defense; inertial confinement fusion (a technology that has both energy and nuclear weapons testing applications); and nuclear nonproliferation. The Los Alamos National Laboratory, also operated by the University of California for DOE, was established in 1943 as part of the Manhattan Project that developed the first nuclear weapons. Located approximately 35 miles from Santa Fe, New Mexico, the laboratory covers an area of approximately 43 square miles. The laboratory conducts an array of classified and unclassified activities, including all phases of nuclear weapons research, design, and testing; other weapons-related research for DOE; and management of special nuclear materials, such as plutonium. Recently, Los Alamos was given responsibility for the production of certain weapons components. The Sandia National Laboratories are operated for DOE by the Lockheed Martin Corporation. Sandia, established in 1949, is located in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and works in conjunction with Livermore and Los Alamos to design and develop nuclear weapons. Sandia conducts research, development, and engineering on all facets of weapons design and development except the nuclear explosive components. Sandia also produces some of the nonnuclear components, such as neutron generators, that are needed for nuclear weapons. Although the Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia laboratories are involved in research and development activities related to nuclear weapons, in recent years many of their efforts have expanded beyond issues strictly related to defense or national security. The laboratories are now involved in such areas as high-performance computers, lasers, and microelectronics. Furthermore, they perform research in such diverse areas as biomedicine, environmental restoration, and global climate change. In addition, the laboratories are working with industry to develop new technologies and products for the commercial market. Such activities include work on advanced automobile propulsion systems, medical applications, and waste management. Furthermore, each laboratory conducts basic scientific research in areas of its own choosing—termed Laboratory Directed Research and Development. This research involves such subjects as astrophysics and space science, particle physics, materials science, and chemistry. Because the Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia laboratories are world-leading centers of research in many technologies and scientific disciplines, many foreign scientists are attracted to them and invited to come there to exchange information or participate in research activities. DOE’s policy supports an active program of unclassified visits to these laboratories for the benefit of its programs. In fact, DOE and the laboratories have cooperative activities with certain countries to exchange scientists and information and to collaborate on research in selected scientific areas. With the easing of global tensions since the breakup of the Soviet Union and the changing missions of the weapons laboratories, the number of unclassified foreign visits to the laboratories has increased significantly. The average annual number of visits by foreign nationals to the laboratories has increased over 50 percent from the late-1980s to the mid-1990s. Furthermore, this increase in foreign visitors is continuing. As shown in figure 1.4, the number of unclassified foreign visits to the laboratories has increased each of the last 3 years, to a level of about 7,000 visits in 1996. This represents a significant portion of the 20,000 or more unclassified foreign visits estimated by DOE to have occurred at all of its laboratories during 1996. Allowing foreign nationals to visit the weapons laboratories and participate in their unclassified activities provides valuable benefits to the laboratories and the country, such as using the visitors’ skills to increase the chances of making significant scientific advancements. However, because such visits are not without risk, DOE Order 1240.2b—Unclassified Visits and Assignments by Foreign Nationals, September 3, 1992—establishes responsibilities and policies and prescribes administrative procedures for controlling unclassified visits and assignments to DOE’s facilities. Until recently, the foreign visitor program was principally administered by the Office of Policy and International Affairs, but in March 1997 this responsibility was transferred to the Office of Resource Management in the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security. Other principal organizations involved in administering and controlling unclassified foreign visits include the Nuclear Transfer and Supplier Policy Division, Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation; the Office of Safeguards and Security, Office of Security Affairs; the Counterintelligence Division, Office of Energy Intelligence; the appropriate headquarters program office that is sponsoring the visit; DOE field offices; and laboratory management. As defined by the order, visits are short-term stays of 30 days or less for the purposes of orientation, technical discussions, observation of projects or experiments, training, or discussion of collaboration on topics of mutual interest. Assignments are long-term stays of more than 30 days (within a 12-month period) to actively participate in the work of a facility or contribute to its projects. Assignments are limited to 2 years but may be extended. Assignees may include foreign nationals who are employees, as well as those who are guests or consultants. According to DOE’s estimates, over 25 percent of the foreign visitors to its weapons laboratories are assignees. DOE’s foreign visit and assignment order identifies several requirements for reviewing, approving, and documenting foreign nationals’ access to its nuclear weapons laboratories. Although the order, in general, allows most foreign nationals access with little oversight by DOE, the Department views some visits and assignments to be of potential concern. These include visits from countries DOE considers sensitive for reasons of national security, nuclear nonproliferation, regional instability, or terrorism support (see app. I for a list of these countries). Data from DOE and the laboratories show that almost 30 percent of the visitors to its weapons laboratories are from sensitive countries. DOE is also concerned about visits involving subjects which, although unclassified, are considered sensitive because they have the potential to enhance nuclear weapons capability, lead to nuclear proliferation, divulge militarily critical technologies, or reveal other advanced technologies (see app. II for a list of these subjects) as well as visits to areas located within the laboratories where special nuclear material and/or classified information and equipment are located. Certain requirements must be met if a foreign visit or assignment involves a sensitive country, a sensitive subject, or a security facility where classified work is conducted. According to the foreign visits and assignments order, all assignments and visits involving sensitive subjects or security facilities where classified work is conducted must be reviewed and approved by DOE. Furthermore, before an assignment involving a visitor from a sensitive country begins, a national security background check must be completed to determine if appropriate U.S. government agencies have derogatory information, such as an intelligence affiliation, about that individual. DOE also has security procedures that control the access of foreign visitors to the weapons laboratories. All foreign visitors—whether on a visit or an assignment—must wear an appropriate badge to obtain entry to various parts of a weapons laboratory. Furthermore, depending upon the facility involved, the days of the week and the hours during which the foreign national can actually be on site are restricted. Finally, guards and other security countermeasures are used to control access to those parts of the laboratories where classified work is conducted. Security forces and other countermeasures are also used to monitor and control access to the less protected, controlled areas known as property protection areas—which are not open to the general public and which may contain unclassified sensitive information—to ensure that this information is not compromised. As an added line of defense, DOE and its laboratories operate counterintelligence programs to identify and mitigate the risk that sensitive information could be divulged to foreign countries. Among other things, the counterintelligence personnel conduct awareness programs to keep employees aware of the risk of foreign intelligence-gathering activities, brief and debrief employees who host foreign visitors, conduct assessments of foreign visitor activity, and disseminate relevant information throughout the DOE community. However, they have no approval authority for foreign visitors. The laboratories’ counterintelligence programs do not conduct counterintelligence “operations,” such as surveillance activities.