The U.S. government has imposed numerous sanctions targeting Iran since 1987, in part to deter Iran from supporting terrorism and developing its nuclear program. U.S. laws and executive orders have established a U.S. trade and investment ban targeting Iran, have been used to impose sanctions against foreign entities that support Iranian terrorist organizations or proliferation activities, and have imposed financial sanctions targeting Iran. According to a Treasury official, the U.S. trade and investment ban was aimed at making it more difficult for Iran to procure U.S. goods, services, and technology, including those that could be used for terrorism or proliferation. In 1987, the United States enacted a ban on imports of Iranian goods and services, and in 1995, executive orders banned specified U.S. exports and investment in Iran. These prohibitions apply to U.S. persons, including U.S. companies and their foreign branches. In 1996, Congress enacted the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (ISA), which authorized the imposition of sanctions on foreign firms that make certain investments in Iran’s energy sector. In ISA, Congress declared that it is the policy of the United States to deny Iran the ability to support acts of international terrorism and to fund the development and acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them by limiting the development of Iran’s ability to explore for, extract, refine, or transport by pipeline its petroleum resources. The UN and EU, as well as other countries, have also imposed sanctions to pressure Iran to suspend the development of its nuclear program and end its support for terrorism. In 2002, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed allegations that Iran was building facilities that could produce fissile material for the development of a nuclear weapon. After Iran failed to suspend its uranium enrichment program in 2006 pursuant to UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1696, the UNSC adopted resolutions that imposed several sanctions targeting Iran between 2006 and 2010. Following a UNSC determination that Iran had not suspended the development of its nuclear program, the UNSC adopted additional resolutions that imposed sanctions on Iran, including, among others,  a proliferation-sensitive nuclear and ballistic missile programs-related  a ban on the export or procurement of any arms and related material from Iran and a ban on the supply of seven categories, as specified, of conventional weapons and related material to Iran; and  a travel ban and an assets freeze on designated persons and entities. The assets freeze also applies to any individuals or entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of, the designated persons and entities, and to entities owned or controlled by the designated persons or entities. In addition to the UN, the EU has expressed serious and deepening concerns over the Iranian nuclear program, and has imposed sanctions targeting Iran since 2007. Recent sanctions that the EU enacted in 2012 imposed, among other things, restrictive measures on the energy sector, including a phased embargo of Iranian crude oil imports into the EU and financial sanctions against the Central Bank of Iran. Specifically, recalling the potential connection between Iran’s revenues derived from its energy sector and the funding of its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities as underlined in USCR 1929, the sanctions prohibited the import, purchase, and transport of Iranian crude oil and petroleum products by member states. In addition, the EU has enacted targeted financial measures to freeze the assets of persons and entities associated with Iran’s nuclear activities. The Council of the European Union decided on March 15, 2012, to prohibit the provision of specialized financial messaging services to certain persons and entities that are designated by the UN or EU, or have engaged in, supported, or been associated with Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. In response to the council’s decision, on May 17, 2012, the Belgium-based Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) announced it would end all transactions with Iranian banks that had been designated by the EU. Figure 1 identifies selected U.S. and international actions targeting Iran. U.S. law allows the export of certain agricultural goods, medicine, and medical devices to Iran under certain conditions. The Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA) required the President to terminate any unilateral agricultural or medical sanction. In addition, some of the laws and executive orders authorizing U.S. sanctions targeting Iran include language that allows for certain exceptions to the sanctions, such as for agricultural goods or medicine. For the purposes of this report, we refer to agricultural goods, medicine, and medical devices that are authorized for export to Iran as “humanitarian goods.” Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issues licenses that authorize the export and reexport of humanitarian goods pursuant to TSRA. OFAC indicated that it provides exporters with an efficient and expedited process to export humanitarian goods. Recent congressional legislation and a number of executive orders enacted since 2010 have established additional U.S. financial sanctions targeting Iran. According to Treasury, recent U.S. financial sanctions targeting Iran are authorized by, and outlined in, four laws and a number of executive orders. The discussion below provides examples of some of the financial sanctions authorized by these laws and executive orders from 2010 through 2012. According to an Under Secretary of the Treasury, the new legislation that Congress has enacted has increased financial and economic pressure on Iran. In 2010, Congress passed the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA) to amend the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 and to enhance U.S. diplomatic efforts with respect to Iran by expanding economic sanctions targeting Iran. According to an Under Secretary of the Treasury, “CISADA set a new precedent” because “… t gave the Secretary of the Treasury the authority for the first time to require U.S. banks to terminate correspondent banking relationships with foreign banks that knowingly engaged in significant transactions with designated Iranian banks.” Among other actions, section 104(c) of CISADA required the Secretary of the Treasury to prescribe regulations to prohibit or impose strict conditions on the opening or maintaining in the United States of a correspondent account or a payable-through account by a foreign financial institution found to have knowingly engaged in certain activities or facilitating a significant transaction by entities such as Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Furthermore, section 104(d) of CISADA required Treasury to “prescribe regulations to prohibit any person owned or controlled by a domestic financial institution from knowingly engaging in…transactions with or benefitting the ,” its agents, or its affiliates whose property or interests in property are blocked pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). This provision in CISADA also extends certain monetary penalties under IEEPA (50 U.S.C. § 1705(b)) to domestic financial institutions if a person owned or controlled by the domestic financial institution violates the regulations and if the domestic financial institution knew, or should have known, about the violation. In 2011, Congress enacted the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (NDAA). The act required the President to block the property and interests in property, which is subject to U.S. jurisdiction, of all Iranian financial institutions, including the Central Bank of Iran. In addition, the act required the President to prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose strict conditions on the maintenance, of a correspondent or payable-through account in the United States by a foreign financial institution found to have knowingly conducted or facilitated any significant financial transaction with the Central Bank of Iran or another designated Iranian financial institution. This sanction applies to foreign central banks, only insofar as the transactions are related to the sale or purchase of petroleum or petroleum products to or from Iran. Moreover, the sanction applied to transactions related to the purchase of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran only if the President has made a determination that there is a sufficient supply of petroleum or petroleum products from countries other than Iran. However, if the President does determine that there is a sufficient supply of petroleum and petroleum products, the financial sanctions will not apply if the President determines that the country with primary jurisdiction over the foreign financial institution has significantly reduced its volume of crude oil purchases from Iran in a specific period. The President delegated the authority to determine whether a country has significantly reduced the volume of Iranian crude oil purchases in a specific period to the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Energy, and the Director of National Intelligence. In 2012, Congress passed the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (TRA) to strengthen Iran sanctions laws for the purpose of compelling Iran to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons and other threatening activities and for other purposes. TRA expanded sanctions in a number of areas including sanctions relating to Iran’s energy sector. For example, the TRA amends CISADA by requiring the Secretary of the Treasury to revise the regulations prescribed under CISADA section 104(c) to apply, to the same extent that they apply to a foreign financial institution found to knowingly engage in an activity described in CISADA section 104(c)(2), to a foreign financial institution that the Secretary of the Treasury finds (1) knowingly facilitates, or participates or assists in, an activity described in section 104(c)(2) of CISADA; (2) attempts or conspires to facilitate or participate in such an activity; or (3) is owned or controlled by a foreign financial institution that the Secretary finds knowingly engages in such an activity. Moreover, section 312 of the TRA also amended CISADA to require Treasury to determine whether the National Iranian Oil Company or the National Iranian Tanker Company is an agent or affiliate of the IRGC. On September 24, 2012, Treasury made a determination that the National Iranian Oil Company is an agent or affiliate of the IRGC.