DOD’s supply chain is a global network that provides materiel, services, and equipment to the joint force. DOD has had weaknesses in maintaining visibility of supplies, such as problems with inadequate radio- frequency identification information to track all cargo movements. We added this area to the High-Risk List in 1990. Since that time, we have reported on various aspects of DOD’s supply chain, including asset visibility. Most recently, in our 2015 High Risk update, we reported on progress DOD has made in addressing weaknesses in its asset visibility, including developing its 2014 Strategy for Improving DOD Asset Visibility. In May 2012, we evaluated DOD’s implementation of IUID and found that the department had taken some steps to improve its approach to implementing IUID technology but had not employed best management practices, such as goals and interim milestones, for gauging its progress in implementing IUID. Further, we found that DOD’s ability to track and share IUID data across components was hampered because the data were not fully integrated into the components’ enterprise information systems. DOD had not developed complete, integrated master schedules for integrating IUID DOD-wide and within the components’ systems. In 2012, we recommended several actions, including that DOD (1) develop quantifiable goals and milestones for marking its legacy items that would allow it to track progress toward those goals and (2) develop or revise master schedules for integrating IUID technology into the components’ Enterprise Resource Planning Systems. DOD concurred with these recommendations and stated that its IUID working group would establish interim milestones to track the progress of marking its legacy assets. Actions DOD has taken to address this recommendation in its 2014 and 2015 strategies are discussed later in this report. In February 2013, we reviewed DOD’s draft strategy for in-transit visibility and found that it included some, but not all of the elements GAO had previously identified as necessary for a comprehensive strategic plan, including a mission statement; a problem definition, scope, and methodology; goals and objectives; activities, milestones, and performance measures; resources and investments; information about organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination; and a description of key external factors that could affect the achievement of goals. At that time, we found that the 2013 draft strategy fully included one of the seven elements of a comprehensive strategic plan, partially included four elements, and did not include two elements. For example, we found it included overarching goals and objectives, but it did not include information on DOD’s planned resources and investments to achieve those goals or key external factors that could affect the achievement of the goals. We recommended that DOD finalize its 2013 draft strategy and ensure that it contained all the key elements of a comprehensive strategic plan, including the elements that were not included in the draft strategy. DOD concurred with our recommendation and developed its 2014 Strategy for Improving DOD Asset Visibility. We discuss the extent to which DOD included many of these elements later in this report. In January 2014, DOD issued its Strategy for Improving DOD Asset Visibility. The 2014 Strategy included 22 implementation plans developed by the components that outlined initiatives intended to improve asset visibility. We reviewed DOD’s 2014 Strategy and reported in January 2015 that it included five of the seven elements of a comprehensive strategic plan but only partially included the other two elements. For example, 4 of the 22 implementation plans did not include resources, investments, and key external factors. As part of our January 2015 report, we recommended that DOD take four actions to improve its management of asset visibility including that DOD include information in subsequent updates to the Strategy and accompanying SEPs about which elements were used in developing cost estimates for resources and investments. DOD again concurred with our recommendations and stated in written comments included in the January 2015 report that it planned to address all four of our recommendations in its forthcoming 2015 Strategy. We discuss the status of these recommendations later in this report. In February 2015, GAO issued its 2015 High-Risk Series Update, which included DOD’s Supply Chain Management. For DOD asset visibility, we reported that DOD had demonstrated leadership commitment and had made considerable progress in addressing the remaining four criteria for removal from the High-Risk List (capacity, corrective-action plan, monitoring, and demonstrated progress) through actions like developing its 2014 Strategy. We reported that DOD needed to take a number of actions to address the remaining four high-risk criteria that it had partially met. Specifically, DOD needed to include information in updates to the 2014 Strategy on the factors it had used in developing cost estimates for resources and investments. We also advised that DOD needed to clearly specify the linkage between the goals and objectives in the 2014 Strategy and the plans intended to implement it. We reported that DOD should assess, and refine as appropriate, existing performance measures to ensure that these measures assess implementation of individual plans as well as progress toward achieving the overarching goals and objectives outlined in the 2014 Strategy. Lastly, we reported that DOD needed to continue implementing the plans identified in the 2014 Strategy, refining them over time as appropriate, and demonstrating that implementation of these plans results in measurable outcomes and progress toward realizing the goals and objectives in the 2014 Strategy. DOD concurred, and the status is discussed later in this report. In October 2015, DOD issued its update to the 2014 Strategy. Like its predecessor, DOD’s 2015 Strategy states that it is intended to create a framework whereby the DOD components can work collaboratively to enhance asset visibility in a manner that provides accurate, reliable, and timely data to track assets throughout their life cycle. DOD’s 2014 Strategy and accompanying implementation plans fully address six and partially address five of the statutory elements set forth in the Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act; and DOD’s 2015 Strategy and accompanying implementation plans address additional information for most of the statutory elements, including fully addressing four of the five elements that were partially addressed in the 2014 Strategy. DOD’s 2014 Strategy and implementation plans contain limited information on its collaboration efforts with industry to identify and incorporate best practices, but its 2015 Strategy provides more information on its efforts to collaborate with industry, including examples where that collaboration has resulted in initiatives intended to improve asset visibility. Additionally, DOD continues to make progress in addressing weaknesses in its implementation of IUID by establishing in its 2014 Strategy milestones for its implementation of IUID. Finally, in its 2014 Strategy, DOD identified 22 implementation plans but did not link its plans with the Strategy’s overarching goals and objectives. DOD has implemented 16 of its original 22 implementation plans and has identified in its 2015 Strategy new plans that link to the overarching goals and objectives in the 2015 Strategy. We reviewed DOD’s 2014 Strategy and determined that the documents fully addressed 6 of the 11 statutory elements and partially addressed the remaining 5 (see table 1). Specifically, DOD’s 2014 Strategy fully addressed the following 6 elements: (1) overarching goals and objectives desired from implementation of the strategy; (2) a description of steps to achieve these goals and objectives, as well as milestones and performance measures to gauge results; (3) a description of the roles and responsibilities for managing and overseeing and implementing the Strategy; (4) a detailed description of asset marking requirements and how automated information and data-capture technologies could improve readiness, cost effectiveness, and performance; (5) a defined list of all categories of items that program managers are required to identify for the purposes of asset marking; and (6) a description of steps to improve asset tracking and in-transit visibility for classified programs. For example, we determined that DOD’s 2014 Strategy and accompanying implementation plans fully addressed roles and responsibilities for managing and overseeing the Strategy because they discuss the management structure established to oversee the execution and track progress. The 2014 Strategy also assigns roles and responsibilities and discusses several forums or working groups, such as the Asset Visibility Working Group, that provide a forum for discussion and input on improvements to asset visibility. However, not all of the statutory elements were fully addressed. Specifically, the following 5 elements were partially addressed in the 2014 Strategy: (1) an estimate of the costs associated with executing the plan, and the sources and types of resources and investments required to meet the goals and objectives; (2) a description of key factors external to DOD and beyond its control that could significantly affect achievement of the long-term goals contained in the strategy; (3) steps to be undertaken to facilitate collaboration with industry designed to capture best practices, lessons learned, and any relevant technical matters; (4) a description of how improved asset tracking and in-transit visibility could enhance audit readiness, reduce counterfeit risk, enhance logistical processes, and otherwise benefit DOD; and (5) an operational security assessment designed to ensure that all DOD assets are appropriately protected during the execution of the strategy and implementation plan. For example, we determined that an operational security assessment was partially addressed, because while the 2014 Strategy provided examples of safeguards that are either in place or planned to ensure the security of DOD assets, it is not clear whether an operational security assessment had been conducted and, if it has, what the results of that assessment were. Table 1 includes our assessment of the extent to which DOD’s 2014 Strategy addressed the 11 statutory elements. Additionally, since DOD issued its 2015 Strategy during our review, we assessed the 2015 Strategy for changes to the strategy from 2014 through 2015. In addition to assessing DOD’s 2014 Strategy and accompanying implementation plans to determine the extent to which DOD satisfied its mandate, we also reviewed DOD’s 2015 Strategy, which was issued in October 2015, to determine changes that had been made between 2014 and 2015. We found that four of the five elements that were partially addressed in the 2014 Strategy are fully addressed in the 2015 Strategy.