On August 24, 2016, Colombian government negotiators and the negotiating team for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) signed a final peace agreement in Havana, Cuba, after almost four years of formal peace talks. On September 17, 2016, the FARC began their 10 th National Guerrilla Conference, which lasted for five days. At the conference's conclusion, 200 FARC delegates present at the event gave unanimous support to the peace agreement. On September 26, 2016, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos and the head of the FARC—Rodrigo Londoño, alias "Timochenko"—signed the final agreement in a ceremony held in the port city of Cartagena, henceforth known as the Cartagena Agreement. On October 2, 2016, a peace plebiscite vote was held. The measure was narrowly rejected by 50.21% compared to 49.78% of the vote, with departments (or states) and municipalities most affected by the conflict generally voting in favor of the accord. On October 7, 2016, the Norwegian Nobel Peace Prize Committee awarded President Santos the Nobel Peace Prize for his "tenacious effort to put an end to the civil war that has ravaged his country for more than 50 years." On November 12, 2016, the FARC and government negotiators concluded a revised accord that the Santos Administration maintained had modifications and adjustments based on consulting the opposition. On November 30, 2016, the Colombian Congress ratified the new accord with unanimous votes in both chambers. Members who were in opposition (largely the Democratic Center Party headed by former President Álvaro Uribe) walked out and did not vote. On December 13, 2016, the Colombian Constitutional Court approved the fast-track mechanism for swift implementation of the peace accord between the Colombian government and the FARC. On December 28, 2016, the Colombian Congress unanimously approved a law with conditions to benefit rank-and-file FARC. Its passage was seen as a precondition for the FARC's demobilization process to be carried out in different concentration zones around the country. Colombia, a longtime U.S. ally, has long been riven by internal conflict. Its legacy of political violence has roots in the late 19 th century. Despite its long history of democracy, Colombia's lack of a strong central government with presence across the country left room for an insurgency. In the 1960s, numerous leftist groups inspired by the Cuban Revolution accused the Colombian central government of rural neglect that resulted in poverty and highly concentrated land ownership. These groups formed guerrilla organizations to challenge the state. The ensuing internal civil conflict between violent, leftist guerrilla groups and the government continued unabated for half a century. The two main leftist groups are the FARC and the smaller National Liberation Army (ELN). Since the mid-1960s, both rebel groups have conducted terrorist attacks, destroyed infrastructure, and engaged in kidnapping and extortion and other criminal profiteering. Right-wing paramilitaries arose in the 1980s, when wealthy landowners organized to protect themselves from the leftist guerrillas and their kidnapping and extortion schemes. Most of the paramilitary groups organized under an umbrella organization, the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). Intertwined with this legacy of conflict is Colombia's predominant role in the illicit international drug economy. Colombia has been a source country for both cocaine and heroin for more than four decades. Drug trafficking has helped to perpetuate Colombia's internal conflict by funding both left-wing and right-wing armed groups The shift of cocaine production from Peru and Bolivia to Colombia in the 1980s increased drug violence and provided revenue to both guerrillas and paramilitaries. By the late 1990s, the FARC, the ELN, and the AUC were all deeply involved in the illicit drug trade. The U.S. government designated all three violent groups as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). Armed conflict in Colombia over the past five decades has taken a huge toll. Tens of thousands of Colombians have died in the conflict, and the government has registered more than 25,000 as missing or disappeared. According to government figures, more than 6 million people have been displaced, creating one of the largest populations of internally displaced persons in the world (greater than 10% of Colombia's estimated 48 million inhabitants). This large displacement has generated a humanitarian crisis, which has disproportionately affected women, Afro-Colombians, and indigenous populations, and left many dispossessed and impoverished. In addition, the use of land mines laid primarily by the FARC has caused more than 11,000 deaths and injuries since 1990. According to the government, Colombia's casualty rate from land mines is second in the world, behind only Afghanistan. The armed group that came to be known as the FARC began as a rural peasant movement that traced its roots to Colombia's armed peasant self-defense groups that emerged in the 1940s and 1950s. It grew from largely a regional guerrilla movement based in the mountainous region between Bogotá and Cali in a period called " la violencia " to become the armed wing of the Colombian Communist Party. In 1964, the guerrillas announced the formation of the FARC, a group dedicated to rural insurgency and intent on overturning what it perceived as Colombia's systemic social inequality. Working to take power militarily, the FARC grew steadily over the decades and drew resources from criminal activity to better equip and expand its forces. Observing the growing revenues of the illegal drug trade, the FARC initially began collecting taxes from marijuana and coca growers in areas that they controlled, but their role in the drug trade expanded rapidly. The FARC also conducted bombings, mortar attacks, murders, kidnapping for ransom, extortion, and hijackings, mainly against Colombian targets. The FARC's involvement in the drug trade deepened to include all stages of drug processing, including cultivation, taxation of drug crops, processing, and distribution. By the early 2000s, the FARC was thought to control about 60% of the cocaine departing Colombia. During the 1980s, under Colombian President Belisario Bentancur, the FARC attempted to enter politics by establishing a political party, the Patriotic Union ( Union Patriotic a [UP]) as part of the peace process then underway with the government. While scores of UP officials won office in the 1986 and 1988 elections, the group was targeted for assassination, and the UP was soon wiped out by its enemies, mainly paramilitary forces, collaborating Colombian security forces, and, to a much lesser extent, rogue elements of the FARC. As a result, the FARC withdrew from the political process to concentrate on a military victory. Between 1998 and 2002, the Administration of President Andrés Pastrana attempted new negotiations with the FARC and granted a large demilitarized zone (approximately 42,000 square mile area, about the size of Switzerland) within which negotiations could take place. The FARC was widely perceived to have used the demilitarized zone as a "safe haven" to regroup, re-arm, and rebuild its forces. With continued FARC military activity, including the hijacking of a commercial airliner and the kidnapping of a Colombian senator, President Pastrana halted the peace negotiations in early 2002 and ordered the military to retake control of the designated territory. At the same time, President Pastrana began to develop Plan Colombia—a strategy to end the country's armed conflict, eliminate drug trafficking, and promote development. Introduced in 1999, Plan Colombia was originally conceived as a $7.5 billion, six-year plan, with Colombia providing $4 billion and requesting the rest from the international community. In June 2000, the U.S. Congress approved legislation in support of Plan Colombia, providing $1.3 billion for counternarcotics and related efforts in Colombia and neighboring countries, which began a multi-year effort with the United States as the major international funder. In the late 1990s, partly due to the drug profit-fueled FARC insurgency, the Colombian government was near collapse. According to a poll published in July 1999, a majority of Colombians thought the FARC might someday take power by force. In areas where the state was weak or absent, the void had been filled by armed actors. Some observers estimated as much as 40% of Colombian territory was controlled by the FARC forces and the state had no presence in 158 (16%) of Colombia's 1,099 municipalities (counties). By the time the faltering negotiations between the FARC and the Pastrana government broke off in 2002, the Colombian public was totally disillusioned with the prospects for a peace deal with the leftist insurgents. It was during this period of the early 2000s that the FARC reached the peak of its size and power, with an estimated 16,000-20,000 fighters. In 2002, independent candidate Álvaro Uribe was elected president upon assurances that he would take a hard line against the FARC and the ELN and reverse their military gains. President Uribe served for two terms (2002-2010), during which time he reversed Colombia's security decline and made headway against the illicit drug trade. His high levels of popular support reflected the notable security gains and accompanying improvements in economic stability during his tenure, although his policies were criticized by human rights organizations. President Uribe's "democratic security" policy made citizen security the preeminent concern of state action. It combined counterrorism and counternarcotics efforts in a coordinated approach with the goal to assert state control over the entire national territory. In late 2003, the Uribe Administration began a new offensive against guerrilla forces known as Plan Patriota.