The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, P.L. 95-511 , 92 Stat. 1783 (October 25, 1978), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801 et seq . (hereinafter FISA), was enacted in response both to the Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (otherwise known as the Church Committee) revelations regarding past abuses of electronic surveillance for national security purposes and to the somewhat uncertain state of the law on the subject. While FISA now provides a statutory framework for gathering foreign intelligence information through the use of electronic surveillance, physical searches, and pen registers or trap and trace devices, and access to business records and other tangible things, the 1978 Act dealt only with electronic surveillance. The provisions passed almost 30 years ago became Title I of FISA. As originally enacted, the measure provided a statutory framework for collection of foreign intelligence information through the use of electronic surveillance of communications of foreign powers or agents of foreign powers, as those terms were defined in the act. The act has been amended repeatedly in the intervening years in an effort to address changing circumstances. Then, as now, the Congress sought to strike a balance between national security interests and civil liberties. A number of FISA bills have received recent attention in the 110 th Congress. On August, 5, 2007, the Protect America Act, P.L. 110-55 was enacted into law. This measure, in part, construed the term "electronic surveillance" under FISA not to include surveillance directed at a person reasonably believed to be located outside of the United States, and provided authority for warrantless acquisition of foreign intelligence information concerning persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States where certain criteria were satisfied. As originally enacted, the measure was to sunset on February 1, 2008. On January 29, 2008, both the House and the Senate passed H.R. 5104 , a 15-day extension to the sunset for the Protect America Act, to allow further time to consider, pass, and go to conference on proposed legislation to amend FISA, while ensuring that the intelligence community would have the authority it needed in the intervening period. It was enacted into law as P.L. 110-182 . The House of Representatives passed H.R. 3773 , the Responsible Electronic Surveillance That is Overseen, Reviewed, and Effective Act of 2007, or the RESTORE Act of 2007, on November 15, 2007, while S. 2248 was reported out of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on October 26, 2007, and an amendment in the nature of a substitute to S. 2248 , the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendments Act of 2007, or the FISA Amendments Act of 2007, was reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee on November 16, 2007. A modified version of the Senate Judiciary Committee's amendment in the nature of a substitute to S. 2248 was tabled. The Senate passed S. 2248 , the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, as amended, on February 12, 2008. After striking all but the enacting clause of H.R. 3773 and inserting the text of S. 2248 as amended, the Senate then passed H.R. 3773 , the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. On March 14, 2008, the House passed an amendment to the Senate amendment to H.R. 3773 . After intensive negotiations, a compromise bill, H.R. 6304 , was introduced in the House on June 19, 2008. The measure passed the House the following day. A cloture motion on the measure was presented in the Senate on June 26, 2008. Further activity on H.R. 6304 is anticipated after the Senate returns from the July 4 th recess. The current legislative and oversight activity with respect to electronic surveillance under FISA has drawn national attention to several overarching issues. This report briefly outlines three such issues and touches upon some of the perspectives reflected in the ongoing debate. These issues include the inherent and often dynamic tension between national security and civil liberties, particularly rights of privacy and free speech; the need identified by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Admiral Mike McConnell, for the intelligence community to be able to efficiently and effectively collect foreign intelligence information from the communications of foreign persons located outside the United States in a changing, fast-paced, and technologically sophisticated international environment, and the differing approaches suggested to meet this need; and limitations of liability for those electronic communication service providers who furnish aid to the federal government in its foreign intelligence collection. This report briefly examines these issues and sets them in context. Two constitutional provisions, in particular, are implicated in this debate—the Fourth and First Amendments. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. As the Fourth Amendment protects the people's privacy rights, so the First Amendment reflects a recognition of the value of free expression of ideas and lawful political dissent to the preservation of a free society. In introducing S. 1566 , the bill that became the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, P.L. 95-511 , Senator Edward Kennedy addressed the challenge of striking an appropriate balance between the legitimate government need to safeguard the nation against the intelligence activities of foreign agents and the concomitant need to protect civil liberties, stating: The complexity of the problem must not be underestimated. Electronic surveillance can be a useful tool for the Government's gathering of certain kinds of information; yet, if abused, it can also constitute a particularly indiscriminate and penetrating invasion of the privacy of our citizens. My objective over the past six years has been to reach some kind of fair balance that will protect the security of the United States without infringing on our citizens' human liberties and rights. This sentiment was echoed in a hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee on S. 1566 when Attorney General Griffin Bell testified for the Carter Administration in favor of the measure: I believe this bill is remarkable not only in the way it has been developed, but also in the fact that for the first time in our society the clandestine intelligence activities of our government shall be subject to the regulation and receive the positive authority of a public law for all to inspect. President Carter stated it very well in announcing this bill when he said that "one of the most difficult tasks in a free society like our own is the correlation between adequate intelligence to guarantee our nation's security on the one hand, and the preservation of basic human rights on the other." It is a very delicate balance to strike, but one which is necessary in our society, and a balance which cannot be achieved by sacrificing either our nation's security or our civil liberties.... In providing background for its report on H.R. 7308 , the House FISA bill then under consideration, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence noted: The history and law relating to electronic surveillance for "national security" purposes have revolved around the competing demands of the President's constitutional powers to gather intelligence deemed necessary to the security of the nation and the requirements of the fourth amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court has never expressly decided the issue of whether the President has the constitutional authority to authorize warrantless electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. Whether or not the President has an "inherent power" to engage in or authorize warrantless electronic surveillance and, if such power exists, what limitations, if any, restrict the scope of that power, are issues that have troubled constitutional scholars for decades. Electronic surveillance can provide vital information needed to identify those who are acting or preparing to act against U.S. interests for the benefit of foreign powers, including those engaged in espionage, sabotage, or terrorist acts or who otherwise pose a threat to the nation or its citizens, and to uncover their plans or activities. This information may not be readily uncovered by other investigative means. Thus, surveillance can provide a valuable tool for protecting the security of the nation and its citizens. However, this investigative technique, by its nature, can intrude into the privacy of both the target of the surveillance and those with whom the target communicates. It also has the potential of chilling political discussion and lawful dissent. The framing of the current debate on this issue flows, in part, from questions arising with respect to the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP), first revealed in press accounts in December 2005. While little information regarding the details of this NSA program is publicly available, the President has indicated that, "since shortly after September 11, 2001, he had authorized the National Security Agency (NSA) to intercept international communications into and out of the United States of persons linked to al Queda or related terrorist organizations. The purpose of the intercepts is to establish an early warning system to detect and prevent another catastrophic terrorist attack on the United States." Concerns surrounding the TSP have led to continuing congressional oversight and a number of legislative proposals focused upon providing the intelligence community with the tools it needs for foreign intelligence collection to protect the United States and its citizens, while also protecting the civil liberties of those impacted by such collection. The current level of complexity and sophistication of global communications technology can provide both increased opportunities for lawful private communications and public debate, and increased means for communications between those engaged in criminal wrongdoing or plans or actions which pose a threat to U.S. national security.