The Army’s current aviation modernization strategy was documented in the Army’s Aviation Modernization Plan, which was modified by the February 1993 Aviation Restructure Initiative and validated by the September 1993 Department of Defense’s (DOD) Bottom-Up Review. In determining its aviation requirements, the Army has designated the Comanche helicopter as the centerpiece of its aviation modernization strategy. The Army’s latest biennial Aviation Modernization Plan, issued in January 1993, was to be the Army’s aviation modernization guide into the 21st century. However, as the Army was developing the plan, the world situation was changing. Evolving national military strategy expanded the Army’s roles in national assistance, humanitarian assistance, counter-drug activities, peacekeeping operations, and counterterrorism. The focus of the national warfighting doctrine changed from a major European war to regional conflicts. The dependence on foreign-based U.S. troops was replaced by one of rapidly deploying U.S.-based troops overseas. The Army’s total research, development, and acquisition budget declined by 36 percent for fiscal years 1990 through 1994. Army acquisition funding decreased about 50 percent during this time; however, research and development funding was more stable—remaining in the $5 billion a year range. Army officials realized before the 1993 update to the Aviation Modernization Plan was issued that it would not reflect the global and budgetary changes taking place. Therefore, the Aviation Center at Fort Rucker, Alabama, began an effort with the intent of redesigning the aviation force structure to resolve the problems associated with downsizing and affordability. The resultant Army’s Aviation Restructure Initiative was issued February 3, 1993. The current aviation modernization strategy is the product of the 1993 Aviation Modernization Plan and the Aviation Restructure Initiative. The objectives of the Army’s modernization efforts were to (1) correct deficiencies in the Army’s aviation force structure, particularly its reconnaissance and attack capabilities; (2) reduce aviation maintenance and support requirements; (3) reduce aviation operating costs; and (4) retire old aircraft. These objectives were to be achieved within anticipated funding levels. According to the Army, modern armed reconnaissance and attack helicopter capabilities are required to project a force worldwide and achieve battlefield dominance. A modernized Apache fleet and the Comanche, when fielded, would provide those capabilities. To carry out its modernization strategy, the Army intends to (1) procure about 1,300 Comanche helicopters, some with enhancements provided by the Army’s Longbow program, (2) modify 761 existing Apaches with some or all of the Longbow upgrades, and (3) purchase approximately 350 Kiowa Warrior helicopters to use until the Comanche is introduced. The Army plans to spend $6.2 billion in research, development, and acquisition funds to modernize its helicopter fleet during fiscal years 1995-1999. Of that amount, $4.7 billion, approximately 76 percent, will be spent on the Comanche and the Longbow Apache helicopters, with which the Army intends to perform future reconnaissance and attack missions. The implementation of the strategy is scheduled to begin in fiscal year 1995 and is split into two phases. Design goals have been established for the interim time frame—from initiation through the year 2015—and for the objective force—beyond the year 2015 when the Comanche is to be fully fielded. As of February 1993, the Army owned 7,914 helicopters, comprising 10 different types. The strategy calls for 4,965 helicopters, consisting of 5 types—the Chinook, Blackhawk, Apache, Comanche, and Light Utility Helicopter. In its September 1, 1993, report, DOD’s Bottom-Up Review concluded, among other things, that the Army should have 10 active and 5 reserve divisions in order to maintain the capability to win 2 nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. Regarding the Army’s attack and reconnaissance fleet, the review concluded that the Army’s modernization plan provided significant improvements and a balanced, deployable, and sustainable fleet. A group of outside experts evaluated the review’s analysis and concluded that the Army’s plan to acquire the Comanche and the Longbow Apache would provide significant improvements in both reconnaissance and attack capabilities. According to the review, the life-cycle cost estimate of this option was $75.6 billion. At the conclusion of the study, the Secretary of Defense endorsed the Army’s aviation modernization strategy with the Comanche as its centerpiece. The current life-cycle cost estimate for the Comanche and the Longbow Apache helicopters, according to program officials and program documents, is about $157 billion, of which about $51.6 billion is for research, development, and acquisition. The Army’s process for determining its aviation requirements and consolidating them into its budget request involves varying degrees of analysis at three levels of the Army’s organization. The Army Aviation Center at Fort Rucker, Alabama, drafts an aviation branch assessment. This assessment is developed following guidance in the National Military Strategy, the Defense Planning Guidance, and Field Manual 100-5 on Operations and incorporates input provided by Army aviation users. The branch assessment is a fiscally unconstrained prioritized list of requirements—perceived deficiencies in the force that need to be resolved. The Center sends its assessment to the Training and Doctrine Command where it is combined with assessments from the Army’s 16 other branches. The Command evaluates the branch assessments and develops a list of needs for the entire Army. Based on this analysis, the Command decides what the Army must have to be an effective fighting force and produces a list of Army-wide aviation requirements—the Warfighting Lens Analysis. The Command sends this analysis to the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and Acquisition. After reviewing the analysis, they generate the Long-Range Research, Development, and Acquisition Plan—the Army’s fiscally constrained 15-year strategic plan for procurement. This plan helps form the basis for the Army’s portion of DOD’s budget request. The Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Armed Services Committee, requested that we review how the Army is modernizing its aviation force, in particular its attack and reconnaissance helicopters, which represent the major portion of the Army’s aviation modernization investment. Our objectives were to determine whether (1) the Army’s plan for modernizing its aviation fleet is still valid, (2) there are alternative aircraft systems to the ones the Army plans to acquire, and (3) the Army’s funding plans include all of the helicopter systems that it says it needs. We conducted the majority of our review at the U.S. Army Aviation and Troop Command, St. Louis, Missouri; the U.S. Army Aviation Center, Fort Rucker, Alabama; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia; DOD and the Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. In addition, we visited Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and Fort Hood, Texas, to obtain the aviation user’s perspective on requirements. To obtain data on helicopter capabilities, we visited Bell Helicopter Textron, Fort Worth, Texas; Boeing Defense and Space Group, Helicopter Division, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Systems, Mesa, Arizona; and United Technologies, Sikorsky Aircraft, Stratford, Connecticut. We also visited the Comanche Joint Program Office in Trumbull, Connecticut. To determine whether the Army’s helicopter modernization plans were still valid, we interviewed cognizant Army officials involved in the aviation requirements setting process. The purpose of these interviews was to gain a balanced perspective on the requirements process from those at all organizational levels who are involved in its implementation. Officials that we talked to who were directly involved in the process of developing the requirement were located at the office of the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans; Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and Acquisition; the offices responsible for developing requirements data for input to and preparation of the Warfighting Lens Analysis at the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command; and offices responsible for preparing branch assessments, which reflect critical inputs to the requirements process such as threat analyses, doctrine, organizational structure, training, and equipment, at the Army Aviation Center at Fort Rucker, Alabama. We also talked to active unit commanders, pilots, and aviation maintenance personnel at the brigade, battalion, and squadron levels who provide input to the process and eventually implement the decisions the process produces. These individuals represented Force Package I and Force Package II units. Commanders and pilots in Force Package I units are those that deploy first and, therefore, require the highest level of equipment support and training. Commanders and pilots of Force Package II units are those that immediately follow Force Package I units in a deployment. Because these units are among the first to enter a conflict, we believed that they would be keenly aware of the advantages and disadvantages of the systems they use in the missions they perform. Therefore, they could provide valuable insights into the current mission deficiencies in the Army’s aviation systems and how the Army’s planned strategy would address those deficiencies. This approach was especially important in our assessment of the Comanche’s capabilities to correct deficiencies in the reconnaissance and light attack missions as there are no production representative prototypes to evaluate. We were able to obtain users’ perceptions on how the requirements process responded to their observation on needed and unneeded capabilities in the Comanche helicopter. We also obtained documentation on the roles, missions, and doctrinal employment of helicopters and the results of previously conducted studies or tests that evaluated a helicopter’s performance or its requirement. In addition, we obtained the supporting data used in the Bottom-Up Review evaluation of force structure options for Army attack and reconnaissance helicopters.