The ISS program began in 1993 with several partner countries: Canada, the 11 member nations of the European Space Agency, Japan, and Russia. From 1994 through 2010, NASA estimates that it directly invested over $48 billion in development and construction of the on-orbit scientific laboratory, the ISS. NASA intended ISS assembly to be complete much sooner than it was. For example, in 1995, NASA expected to ISS assembly to be finished by June 2002, whereas the agency actually completed assembly in 2010. With ISS expected to be in use only through 2015, this slower pace shortened the amount of time NASA had available to take advantage of the significant monetary investment and to fully utilize the station. As a result, the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 required the NASA Administrator to take all actions necessary to ensure the safe and effective operation of the ISS through at least September 30, 2020. The ISS is the largest orbiting man-made object. (See fig. 1) It is composed of about 1 million pounds of hardware, brought to orbit over the course of a decade. The ISS includes (1) primary structures, that is, the external trusses which serve as the backbone of the station and the pressurized modules that are occupied by the ISS crew, and (2) functional systems made up of replaceable units, that is, systems that provide basic functionality such as life support and electrical power that are made of modular components that are replaceable by astronauts on orbit. The ISS was constructed to support three activities: scientific research, technology development, and development of industrial applications. The facilities aboard the ISS allow for ongoing research in microgravity, studies of other aspects of the space environment, tests of new technology, and long-term space operations. The facilities also enable a permanent crew of up to six astronauts to maintain their physical health standards while conducting many different types of research, including experiments in biotechnology, combustion science, fluid physics, and materials science, on behalf of ground-based researchers. Furthermore, the ISS has the capability to support research on materials and other technologies to see how they react in the space environment. NASA planned for the space shuttle to serve as the means of transporting crew, hardware, and supplies to the ISS through the end of the station’s life. However, in 2004, President George W. Bush announced his Vision for Space Exploration (Vision) that included direction for NASA to develop new spaceflight systems under the Constellation program to replace the space shuttle as NASA’s primary spaceflight system. The Vision also included provisions for NASA to pursue commercial alternatives or providing transportation and other services to support the ISS after 2010.NASA established the Commercial Crew and Cargo Program in 2005 to facilitate the private demonstration of safe, reliable, and cost-effective transportation services and purchase these services commercially. When the Constellation program was cancelled in 2010, the commercial vehicles became NASA’s primary focus for providing cargo and crew transportation to the ISS. The success of commercial efforts became even more important in 2010 when Congress authorized the extension of space station operations until at least 2020 from 2015, and the President directed that NASA transition the role of human transportation to low- earth orbit to commercial space companies. The greatest challenge facing NASA is transporting cargo and crew to and from the ISS to make effective use of the ISS. NASA plans to rely on ISS international partner and new commercial launch vehicles to transport cargo and crew to and from the ISS until at least 2020. NASA hopes to begin using new commercial cargo vehicles in 2012 and crew vehicles to transport astronauts to and from the ISS beginning in 2017. NASA’s decision to rely on the new commercial vehicles is inherently risky because the vehicles are still in development and not yet proven or fully operational. NASA is relying on 51 flights of international partner and commercial vehicles to transport cargo to the ISS from 2012 through 2020, but agreements for international flights after 2016 are not in place and the commercial vehicles are unproven. NASA has agreements in place with the European and Japanese space consortiums for their respective vehicles—the European Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV), and the Japanese H-II Transfer Vehicle (HTV)—to conduct cargo resupply missions beginning in 2012 through 2016. The ATV and HTV are unmanned vehicles that have flown to the ISS, and carry such items as hardware and water.of 12 international partner launches—8 from 2012 to 2016 and 4 from 2017 through 2020. NASA does not have agreements in place for international partners to provide cargo services to the ISS beyond 2016. NASA plans to use the ATV for a number of cargo flights through 2014, but no longer anticipates its use after that time. NASA plans to use HTV for a number of cargo flights through 2016, but its negotiations with the Japanese partners for flights beyond 2016 are in their infancy. NASA’s current plans anticipate employing a total NASA also plans to use two types of domestic commercial launch vehicles to maintain ISS from 2012 through 2020. Development of these vehicles—the Falcon 9 and Antares initiated effort known as Commercial Orbital Transportation Services. These vehicles are being developed by private industry corporations— Falcon 9 by SpaceX and Antares by Orbital Sciences Corporation. In late 2008, NASA awarded contracts to both companies to provide cargo transport services to the ISS. Only SpaceX will be able to safely return significant amounts of cargo to earth, such as the results of scientific experiments. NASA anticipates that SpaceX will begin providing that capability in 2012. —was fostered under a NASA- Commercial vehicles are essential to sustaining and utilizing the ISS. As table 1 indicates, SpaceX and Orbital are scheduled to fly 20 (71 percent) of the 28 launches NASA plans through 2016 and follow-on commercial resupply vehicles are expected to fly 19 (83 percent) of the 23 launches from 2017 through 2020. The Antares was previously known as the Taurus II. This plan relies on commercial vehicles meeting anticipated—not proven—flight rates. As we have previously reported, both SpaceX and Orbital are working under aggressive schedules and have experienced delays in completing demonstrations. SpaceX flew its first demonstration mission in December 2010, some 18 months late, because of such factors as design issues and software development. Currently, SpaceX’s next demonstration launch to the ISS has been delayed from November 2011 to late April 2012 because of additional testing and resolution of some technical issues such as electromagnetic interference. Likewise, Orbital experienced programmatic changes and developmental difficulties that led to multiple delays of several months’ duration. In May 2011 testimony, we noted that Orbital’s inaugural demonstration mission had been delayed to December 2011. Currently, this flight has been delayed further to August or September 2012, primarily because of issues related to construction and testing of the launch pad at Wallops Island, Virginia. NASA has made efforts to accommodate delays in commercial vehicle development, including use of the final shuttle flight in July 2011 to pre-position additional ISS spares. However, if the commercial vehicle launches do not occur as planned in 2012, the ISS could lose some ability to function and sustain research efforts due to a lack of alternative launch vehicles to support the ISS and return scientific experiments back to earth. If the international partner agreements and commercial service provider contracts do not materialize as NASA plans for the years beyond 2016, this could lead to a potential cargo shortfall. As we reported in 2011, NASA’s strategic planning manifests showed that, when anticipated growth in national laboratory demands and margin for unforeseen maintenance needs are accounted for, the 56 flights NASA was planning for at the time of our review might not cover all of NASA’s anticipated needs. These shortfalls amounted to a total of 2.3 metric tons— approximately the cargo that one SpaceX commercial vehicle will be able to transport to the ISS. As of March 2012, NASA has cut its planned number of flights from 2012 through 2020 from the 56 flights we reported to 51 flights. However, its current ongoing analysis is no longer projecting a cargo shortfall even with the decreased number of flights. According to an ISS program official, cargo estimates, particularly beyond 2013, are for planning purposes and could change as they are updated frequently based on launch vehicle availability and the ISS’s need for spares. NASA faces two major challenges in transporting crew to the ISS— adjusting its acquisition strategy for crew vehicles to match available funding and deciding if and when to purchase crew seats on the Russian Soyuz in case domestic commercial crew vehicles are not available as planned in 2017. In 2010, President Obama directed NASA to transition the role of transporting humans to low-Earth orbit to commercial space companies. Consequently, in 2010 and 2011 NASA entered into funded and unfunded Space Act agreementsdevelop and test key technologies and subsystems to further commercial with several companies to development of crew transportation services. NASA’s intent was to encourage private sector innovation and to procure safe, reliable transportation services to the space station at a reasonable price. Under this acquisition approach, NASA plans to procure seats for crew transportation to the ISS from the private sector through at least 2020. In 2011, we reviewed NASA’s plans for contracting for additional commercial crew development efforts and found that the agency’s approach employed several good acquisition practices including competitive contracting that—if implemented effectively—limit the government’s risk. As we also noted in that report, NASA’s funding level for fiscal year 2012 is almost 50 percent less than it anticipated when it developed its approach for procuring commercial crew services. Given this funding level, NASA indicated it could not award contracts to multiple providers, which weakened prospects for competition in subsequent phases of the program. The main premise of its procurement approach to control costs—full and open competition for future phases of the program—therefore was likely no longer viable. Without competition, NASA could become dependent on one contractor for developing and providing launch services to the space station. Reliance on a sole source for any product or service increases the risk that the government will pay more than expected, since no competitors exist to help control market prices.