From fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2008, the U.S. government provided approximately $16.5 billion for the training and equipping of Afghan National Security Forces. State and Defense officials told us they will request over $5.7 billion to train and equip the Afghan army and police in fiscal year 2009. The goal of these efforts is to transfer responsibility for the security of Afghanistan from the international community to the Afghan government. As part of this effort, from June 2002 through June 2008, CSTC-A obtained about 380,000 small arms and light weapons from the United States and other countries for the Afghan army and police. The United States purchased over 240,000 of these weapons for about $120 million and shipped them to Afghanistan beginning in December 2004. Also, CSTC-A reported that it coordinated the donation of about 135,000 additional weapons from 21 countries, which valued their donations at about $103 million (see app. II). Figure 1 illustrates the number of weapons obtained for ANSF by USASAC, Navy IPO, and international donors since June 2002. The United States and international donors have provided rifles, pistols, machine guns, grenade launchers, shotguns, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and other weapons. About 80 percent of the U.S.-procured weapons were “non-standard” weapons, which are not typically supplied by Defense. Many non-standard weapons, including about 79,000 AK-47 rifles, were received from former Warsaw Pact countries or were obtained from vendors in those countries. (See fig. 2 for details on U.S.- procured weapons shipped to Afghanistan for ANSF.) USASAC and Navy IPO procured most of the 242,000 weapons for ANSF through an adaptation of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program referred to by Defense as “pseudo-FMS.” As in traditional FMS, pseudo-FMS procurements are overseen by DSCA. However, in contrast to traditional FMS procurements, for Afghanistan, Defense primarily used funds appropriated by the Congress for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund to purchase weapons to train and equip ANSF. USASAC procured about 205,000 (85 percent) of these weapons, including about 135,000 non-standard weapons purchased from four U.S.-based contractors. Navy IPO provided the remaining 37,000 (15 percent) M-16 rifles for the Afghan National Army. After procuring weapons for ANSF, Defense or its contractors transported them to Afghanistan by air, and CSTC-A received the weapons at Kabul International Airport. The Afghan National Army transported the weapons from the airport to one of two central storage depots in Kabul— one for the Afghan National Army and another for the Afghan National Police. Due to the limited operational capacity of the Afghan army and police and the extremely hostile environment in which they operate, CSTC-A retains control and custody of the weapons provided by the United States and international donors during storage at the central depots until the weapons are issued to ANSF units. In addition to maintaining the security and control of weapons stored at the central depots, CSTC-A trains ANSF in inventory management and weapons accountability. To this end, the central depots are staffed by U.S. and coalition military personnel, U.S. contractors, contract Afghan staff, and ANSF personnel. According to DSCA officials, equipment provided to ANSF is subject to end use monitoring, which is meant to provide reasonable assurances that the ANSF is using the equipment for its intended purposes. CSTC-A serves as the security assistance organization (SAO) for Afghanistan, with responsibility for monitoring the end use of U.S.-procured weapons and other equipment provided to ANSF, among other security assistance duties. DSCA’s Security Assistance Management Manual provides guidance for end use monitoring, which is classified as either “routine” or “enhanced,” depending on the sensitivity of the equipment and other factors, as follows: Routine end use monitoring. For non-sensitive equipment provided to a trusted partner, DSCA guidance calls for SAOs to conduct routine monitoring in conjunction with other required security assistance duties. As such, according to DSCA officials, DSCA expects SAOs to record relevant end use monitoring observations made during interactions with host country military and defense officials, such as visits to defense facilities, meetings or telephone conversations, military ceremonies, and dignitary visits. Enhanced end use monitoring. For sensitive defense articles and technology transfers made within sensitive political situations, DSCA guidance calls for more intensive and formal monitoring. This includes providing DSCA with equipment delivery records with serial numbers, conducting routine physical inventories of the equipment by serial number, and quarterly reporting on inventory results. Figure 3 illustrates the accountability process for weapons that CSTC-A provides to ANSF. Defense did not establish clear guidance on what accountability procedures apply when it is handling, transporting, and storing weapons obtained for ANSF through U.S. procurements and international donations. As a result, our tests and analysis of inventory records show significant lapses in accountability for these weapons. Such accountability lapses occurred throughout the weapons supply process. First, when USASAC and CSTC-A initially obtained weapons for ANSF, they did not record all the corresponding serial numbers. Second, USASAC and CSTC-A did not maintain control or visibility over U.S.-procured weapons during transport to the two ANSF central storage depots in Kabul. Third, CSTC-A did not maintain complete and accurate inventory records or perform physical inventories of weapons stored at the central depots. Finally, inadequate U.S. and ANSF staffing at the central depots along with poor security and persistent management challenges have contributed to the vulnerability of stored weapons to theft or misuse. These lapses have hampered CSTC-A’s ability to detect weapons theft or other losses. CSTC-A has recently taken steps to correct some of the deficiencies we identified, but CSTC-A has indicated that its continued implementation of the new accountability procedures is not certain, considering staffing constraints and other factors. Defense did not clearly establish what accountability procedures applied to the physical security of weapons intended for ANSF. As a result, the Defense organizations involved in providing weapons for ANSF, including DSCA, USASAC, Navy IPO, U.S. Central Command, and CSTC-A, did not have a common understanding of what accountability procedures to apply to these weapons while they were in U.S. control and custody. Defense guidance on weapons accountability lays out procedures for Defense organizations to follow when handling, storing, protecting, securing, and transporting Defense-owned weapons. These procedures include (1) serial number registration and reporting and (2) 100 percent physical inventories of weapons stored in depots by both quantity and serial number at least once annually. The objective of serial number registration and reporting procedures, according to Defense guidance, is to establish continuous visibility over weapons through the various stages of the supply process, including “from the contractor to depot; in storage.” However, Defense did not specifically direct U.S. personnel to apply these or any alternative weapons accountability procedures for the weapons in their control and custody intended for ANSF, and CSTC-A officials we spoke to were uncertain about the applicability of existing Defense guidance. In August 2008, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence emphasized the importance of safeguarding weapons in accordance with existing accountability guidance until they are formally transferred to ANSF, stating that “the security of conventional [arms, ammunition, and explosives] is paramount, as the theft or misuse of this material would gravely jeopardize the safety and security of personnel and installations world-wide.” However, in October 2008, Defense’s Inspector General reported that U.S. Central Command had not clearly defined procedures for accountability, control, and physical security of U.S.-supplied weapons to ANSF, and as a result, misplacement, loss, and theft of weapons may not be prevented. The Inspector General recommended, among other things, that U.S. Central Command issue formal guidance directing the commands and forces in its area of responsibility, including CSTC-A, to apply existing Defense weapons accountability procedures. U.S. Central Command and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence concurred with this recommendation. Nonetheless, U.S. Central Command officials we spoke to in December 2008 did not have a common understanding of when formal transfer of the weapons to ANSF is considered to have occurred, and hence up to what point to apply Defense accountability procedures, if at all. As of December 2008, U.S. Central Command had not decided what new guidance to issue. In July 2007, we made Defense and the Multinational Force-Iraq aware that they had not specified which accountability procedures applied for weapons provided to Iraq under the train-and-equip program in that country. To help ensure that U.S.-funded equipment reaches the Iraqi security forces as intended, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense determine which accountability procedures should apply to that program. In January 2008, the Congress passed legislation requiring that no defense articles may be provided to Iraq until the President certifies that a registration and monitoring system has been established and includes, among other things, the serial number registration of all small arms to be provided to Iraq, and a detailed record of the origin, shipping, and distribution of all defense articles transferred under the Iraq Security Forces Fund or any other security assistance program.