Illegal drug use, particularly of cocaine and heroin, continues to be a serious health problem in the United States. Under the National Drug Control Strategy, the United States has established domestic and international efforts to reduce the supply and demand for illegal drugs. Over the past 10 years, the United States has spent over $19 billion on international drug control and interdiction efforts to reduce the supply of illegal drugs. The United States has developed a multifaceted drug control strategy intended to reduce the supply and demand for illegal drugs. The 1998 National Drug Control Strategy includes five goals: (1) educate and enable America’s youth to reject illegal drugs as well as alcohol and tobacco; (2) increase the safety of U.S. citizens by substantially lowering drug-related crime and violence; (3) reduce health and social costs to the public of illegal drug use; (4) shield America’s air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat; and (5) break foreign and domestic drug supply sources. The last two goals are the primary emphasis of U.S. international drug control and interdiction efforts. These are aimed at assisting the source and transiting nations in their efforts to reduce drug cultivation and trafficking, improve their capabilities and coordination, promote the development of policies and laws, support research and technology, and conduct other related initiatives. Section 490 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 requires the President to annually certify which drug-producing and -transiting countries are cooperating fully with the United States or taking adequate steps on their own to achieve full compliance with the goals and objectives established by the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances during the previous year. On February 26, 1998, the President issued his certification in which 22 countries were certified; 4 were certified with a national interest waiver (Cambodia, Colombia, Pakistan, and Paraguay); and 4 were denied certification or “decertified” (Afghanistan, Burma, Iran, and Nigeria). ONDCP is responsible for producing the National Drug Control Strategy and coordinating its implementation with other federal agencies. ONDCP has authority to review various agencies’ funding levels to ensure they are sufficient to meet the goals of the national strategy, but it has no direct control over how these resources are used. The Departments of State and Defense and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) are the principle agencies involved in implementing the international portion of the drug control strategy. Other U.S. agencies involved in counternarcotics activities overseas include the U.S. Agency for International Development, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Customs Service, various U.S. intelligence organizations, and other U.S. agencies. Over the past 10 years, the U.S. agencies involved in counternarcotics efforts have attempted to reduce the supply and availability of illegal drugs in the United States through the implementation of the National Drug Control Strategy. Although they have achieved some successes, the cultivation of drug crops has not been reduced significantly, and cocaine, heroin, and other illegal drugs remain readily available in the United States. According to a July 1997 report of the National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee, cocaine and heroin were readily available in all major U.S. metropolitan areas during 1996. The report also states that methamphetamine trafficking and abuse in the United States have been increasing during the past few years. Despite long-term efforts by the United States and many drug-producing countries to reduce drug cultivation and eradicate illegal crops, the total net cultivation of coca leaf and opium poppy has actually increased. While the areas under cultivation have changed from year to year, farmers have planted new coca faster than existing crops have been eradicated. For example, while the amount of coca under cultivation in the primary growing area of Colombia was reduced by 9,600 hectares between 1996 and 1997, cultivation in two other Colombian growing areas increased by 21,900 hectares during this period. Overall, there has been very little change in the net area under coca cultivation since 1988. At the same time, the amount of opium poppy under cultivation increased by over 59,000 hectares, or by more than 30 percent between 1988 and 1997. The amount of cocaine and heroin seized between 1990 and 1996 made little impact on the availability of illegal drugs in the United States and on the amount needed to satisfy the estimated U.S. demand. The July 1997 report by the National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee estimates potential cocaine production at about 760 metric tons for 1996, of which about 200 metric tons were seized worldwide. The remaining amount was more than enough to meet U.S. demand, which is estimated at about 300 metric tons per year. A primary reason that U.S. and foreign governments’ counternarcotics efforts are constrained is the growing power, influence, adaptability, and capabilities of drug-trafficking organizations. Because of their enormous financial resources, power to corrupt counternarcotics personnel, and operational flexibility, drug-trafficking organizations are a formidable threat. Despite some short-term achievements by U.S. and foreign government law enforcement agencies in disrupting the flow of illegal drugs into the United States, drug-trafficking organizations have found ways to continue to meet and exceed the demand of U.S. drug consumers. According to U.S. agencies, drug-traffickers’ organizations use their vast wealth to acquire and make use of expensive modern technology such as global positioning systems and cellular communications equipment. They use this technology to communicate and to coordinate transportation as well as to monitor and report on the activities of government organizations involved in counterdrug activities. In some countries, the complexity and sophistication of their equipment exceed the capabilities of the foreign governments trying to stop them. For example, we reported in October 1997 that many Caribbean countries continue to be hampered by inadequate counternarcotics capabilities and have insufficient resources for conducting law enforcement activities in their coastal waters. When confronted with threats to their activities, drug-trafficking organizations use a variety of techniques to quickly change their modes of operation, thus avoiding capture of their personnel and seizure of their illegal drugs. For example, when air interdiction efforts have proven successful, traffickers have increased their use of maritime and overland transportation routes. According to recent U.S. government reports, even after the capturing or killing of several drug cartel leaders in Colombia and Mexico, other leaders or organizations soon filled the void and adjusted their areas of operations. For example, we reported in February 1998 that, although the Colombian government had disrupted the activities of two major drug-trafficking organizations, the disruption had not reduced drug-trafficking activities and a new generation of relatively young traffickers was emerging. The United States is largely dependent on the countries that are the source of drug production and are transiting points for trafficking-related activities to reduce the amount of coca and opium poppy being cultivated and to make the drug seizures, arrests, and prosecutions necessary to stop the production and movement of illegal drugs. While the United States can provide assistance and support for drug control efforts in these countries, the success of those efforts depends on the countries’ willingness and ability to combat the drug trade within their borders. Like the United States, source and transiting countries face long-standing obstacles that limit the effectiveness of their drug control efforts. These obstacles, many of which are interrelated, are competing economic, political, and cultural problems, including terrorism and internal unrest; corruption; and inadequate law enforcement resources and institutional capabilities. The extent to which the United States can affect many of these obstacles is minimal. The governments involved in drug eradication and control have other problems that compete for limited resources. As we reported over the years, drug-producing countries’ efforts to curtail drug cultivation were constrained by political, economic, and/or cultural problems that far exceeded counternarcotics program managers’ abilities to resolve. For example, these countries often had ineffective central government control over drug cultivation areas, competing demands for scarce host nation resources, weak economies that enhanced financial incentives for drug cultivation, corrupt or intimidated law enforcement and judicial officials, and legal cultivation of drug crops and traditional use of drugs. Internal strife in the source countries is another problem that competes for resources. Two primary source countries—Peru and Colombia—have had to allocate scarce funds to support military and other internal defense operations to combat guerrilla groups, which negatively affects counternarcotics operations. We reported that in Peru, for example, terrorist activities had hampered antidrug efforts. The December 1996 hostage situation at the Japanese Ambassador’s residence in Lima is an example of the Peruvian government’s having to divert antidrug resources to confront a terrorist threat. Although some key guerrilla leaders in Peru and Colombia have been captured, terrorist groups will continue to hinder efforts to reduce coca cultivation and efforts to reduce its dependence on coca as a contributor to the economy. In 1991, 1993, and 1998, we reported similar problems in Colombia, where several guerrilla groups made it difficult to conduct effective antidrug operations in many areas of the country. Colombia has also encountered resistance from farmers when it has tried to eradicate their coca crops. Narcotics-related corruption is a long-standing problem impacting U.S. and foreign governments’ efforts to reduce drug-trafficking activities. Our work has identified widespread corruption in Burma, Pakistan, Thailand, Mexico, Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, and the countries of Central America and the Caribbean—among the countries most significantly involved in the cultivation, production, and transit of illicit narcotics. Corruption remains a serious, widespread problem in Colombia and Mexico, the two countries most significantly involved in producing and shipping cocaine. According to the U.S. Ambassador to Colombia, corruption in Colombia is the most significant impediment to a successful counternarcotics effort.