The war in Afghanistan began with a U.S.-led military response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, designed to remove the Taliban-led regime and prevent future terrorist safe havens. The war, currently in its 10 th year, is now a multi-faceted joint, civil-military, combined campaign, including a NATO-led military effort and substantial multi-lateral and bilateral civilian initiatives, broadly aimed at ending the insurgent threat to the Afghan government and helping the Afghan people lay the foundations for lasting stability. For the government of Afghanistan, the war is first of all an existential struggle for survival against the Taliban and other insurgents, as well as a longer-term effort to establish sustainable security and stability. For the Afghan people, the war is only the latest proximate cause of instability and insecurity in 30 years of conflict and dislocation. Their daily lives are shaped by the hardships of providing for their families in settings with very limited economic development and opportunity, intimidation in some areas from insurgent groups, and frustration with the limited capacity and, sometimes, corruption of official government structures. For the major insurgent groups, the war is about achieving some combination of political power, economic leverage, and radical Islamic cultural influence. For the U.S. government—which leads the international military effort, provides substantial civilian expertise, and plays a significant role in shaping the overall strategic direction—the war in Afghanistan concerns helping ensure the security of both Afghanistan and the region, including denying safe haven to terrorists, in order to establish a stable regional security balance and protect U.S. national interests. For regional states, including India and Russia as well as Afghanistan's immediate neighbors Pakistan and Iran, the war is critical because it may have a powerful impact on both security and the balance of power and influence in the region. Pakistan in particular, which willingly or otherwise provides safe haven to Afghan insurgent groups, has deeply vested interests in the outcome of the conflict. For individual member states of the NATO Alliance, the war may be about some combination of defeating terrorist networks, ensuring regional stability, proving themselves as contributing NATO members, and demonstrating the relevance of the Alliance to 21 st century global security challenges. Under the Obama Administration, the war in Afghanistan—after years of being perceived by many as "the other war"—has become the focus of significantly greater leadership time and attention, and the recipient of significantly greater resources. The U.S. government's core goals for the war have remained unchanged since March 2009: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent their return. In December 2009, following a comprehensive strategic review, President Obama announced two decisions: to "surge" both military and civilian personnel to Afghanistan, and to begin withdrawing U.S. forces from Afghanistan, on a "conditions-based" basis, in July 2011. In November 2010, at the NATO Lisbon Summit, the governments of the United States, the other NATO Allies, and Afghanistan expressed support for the full transition of lead responsibility for security to Afghans by the end of 2014. Allies also reaffirmed their "long-term commitment to a better future for the Afghan people." In December 2010, announcing the results of the Administration's Afghanistan Pakistan Annual Review, President Obama confirmed U.S. commitment to both transition by 2014 and a long-term U.S.-Afghan strategic partnership. In early 2011, General David Petraeus, Commander of NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, in a letter to the ISAF troops, credited the hard work of the force, together with its Afghan partners, for "halting a downward security spiral in much of the country and to reversing it in some areas of great importance." In his December 2010 speech, President Obama recognized "considerable gains toward our military objectives," but acknowledged that they were still "fragile and reversible." The U.S. government continues to face major strategic and operational decisions about its engagement in the war in Afghanistan. Elements of the debate that continue to attract attention include refining U.S. national interests in Afghanistan and the region, and a desired end-state based on those interests; determining which diplomatic, economic, and military approaches to adopt, what resources to commit to support those approaches, and how those approaches ought to evolve over time; helping marshal a coordinated application of international efforts in Afghanistan; and prioritizing the Afghanistan war versus other U.S. national security imperatives in the context of a constrained fiscal environment. Avenues available to Congress for exercising oversight of these issues include authorizing and appropriating funding for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and the region; shaping policy through directive legislation; confirming senior administration officials with responsibility for the Afghanistan effort; holding oversight hearings to assess policy formulation and execution; and extending or adjusting Administration reporting requirements. While the proximate cause of the current war in Afghanistan was the set of terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the war takes place against the backdrop of three decades of tumultuous Afghan history including communist rule, the Soviet invasion, civil war, and the repressive Taliban regime. In December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to shore up a puppet communist regime. During the 1980's, armed Afghan resistance groups known as mujahedin waged war against Soviet forces and their allies among the Afghan security forces. During that period, the U.S. government, through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), provided covert assistance to mujahedin groups, working through Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI). In 1989, Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan, and in April 1992, the Soviet-backed Afghan regime in Kabul fell to mujahedin forces, which established a form of rule including a rotating presidency. In November 1994, the ethnic Pashtun-dominated Taliban movement led by Mullah Omar seized the city of Kandahar in southern Afghanistan. In 1996, the Taliban captured Kabul and then retained control over much of the country until ousted by the U.S.-led military campaign in 2001. Throughout its tenure, the Taliban continued to face armed opposition, in particular from the Northern Alliance, a loose network dominated by ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks primarily from northern Afghanistan. Key legacies of Afghanistan's years of civil war, conflict, and oppressive rule included the deaths of over a million people, the displacement of millions more, the proliferation of available weapons, and the destruction of key institutions and infrastructure. The immediate reason for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan was the linkage of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks to al Qaeda, which had trained and operated under Taliban protection in Afghanistan. In an address to a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, President George W. Bush stated U.S. demands for Taliban action, warning: "The Taliban must act, and act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists or they will share in their fate." On October 7, 2001, following the refusal of the Taliban regime to cease harboring al Qaeda, the U.S. government launched military operations in Afghanistan, with the stated purpose of disrupting the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations and of attacking the military capability of the Taliban regime. In contrast to the lengthy, iterative preparations that preceded the launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the U.S. planning process for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan was extremely condensed. The concept of operations was based on Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's vision of defense transformation, including the idea that a heavier reliance on cutting-edge technology and precision weaponry could make possible the deployment of smaller-sized conventional ground forces. Military operations were preceded and complemented by work by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with Afghan opposition groups on the ground. Initial U.S. operations relied on the use of special operations forces (SOF), enabled by air assets, working by, with and through indigenous partners, in particular the Northern Alliance. Many U.S. defense experts regarded the operations as an important demonstration of operational "jointness"—the ability of Military Services to work together seamlessly. The United Kingdom and Australia also deployed forces to support the major combat phase of operations, and dozens of other countries provided basing, access and overflight permission. The demise of the Taliban regime came quickly. In November 2001, the Taliban fled Kabul, and in December they left their stronghold, the southern city of Kandahar. It is generally understood that in December 2001, key al Qaeda and Taliban leaders fled across the border into Pakistan. The major combat operations phase was regarded as a quick success by its Afghan protagonists and their U.S. and other international partners, but the challenges were far from over. The new Afghan leadership faced the profound political challenge of consolidating a fractious, scarred state with very few resources. The new leaders also faced potential violent challenges, both from resurgent al Qaeda and Taliban leaders who were defeated but not eliminated, and from Afghan local powerbrokers, strengthened by years of battle-hardened autonomy and resistance, who might be displeased by their own loss of influence in the emerging post-Taliban order. To fill the political void, in December 2001, in Bonn, Germany, the United Nations launched the so-called Bonn Process by hosting the Bonn Conference. Participants included representatives of four Afghan opposition groupings, and observers included representatives of neighboring and other key countries including the United States. The resulting Bonn Agreement created an Afghan Interim Authority to serve as the "repository of Afghan sovereignty" and outlined a political process for producing a new constitution and choosing a new Afghan government. In contrast to the model pursued in Iraq from 2003 to 2004, in Afghanistan there was no period of formal occupation in which an international authority exercised sovereignty on behalf of the Afghans.