Uprisings and political change in the Arab world challenge many of the assumptions that have long informed U.S. policy makers while the wave of unrest—often dubbed the "Arab Spring" or "Arab Awakening"—changes the arena in which U.S. policy plays out. However, many long-standing U.S. goals in the region endure. The ongoing uncertainty and fluidity of events suggests that the process of developing a reliable set of new assumptions and policies will be protracted. As Congress provides oversight of U.S. policy and makes decisions regarding military and economic aid, it will be valuable to examine the effect of these shifting realities on the pursuit of long-standing U.S. goals and values. U.S. policy goals in the broader Middle East are generally understood to include: Discouraging interstate conflict that can threaten allies (including Israel) and jeopardize other interests; Preserving the flow of energy resources and commerce that is vital to the U.S., regional, and global economies; Ensuring transit and access to facilities to support U.S. military operations; Countering terrorism (CT); Stemming the proliferation of conventional and unconventional weapons; and Promoting economic growth, democracy, and human rights. Even before the wave of change began, balancing these priorities in the Middle East was complicated. For example, the goals of preserving regional stability and protecting U.S. security through counterterrorism and counter-proliferation necessitated cooperation with leaders who rejected efforts toward democratization and human rights. Indeed, many observers in the region described that cooperation as the United States bolstering dictators who used military and security apparatuses to stifle internal dissent. Arming and providing assistance to allies to preserve security and discourage interstate conflict were further complicated by the difficult relationships some U.S. allies have with each other and with others; for example, Israel and Saudi Arabia might both see the United States as an ally and Iran as a major threat, but they are also uneasy about each other. Since the 1950s, the basic political landscape in the Arab world has remained stable for long periods punctuated by bursts of conflict or rapid—if isolated—political change. Over time, U.S. policy largely tried to balance competing policy priorities while placing a premium on preserving a secure and stable environment seen as essential for the goals described above. Some observers and policy makers have argued that U.S. interests in protecting the political rights and improving the socioeconomic conditions of the inhabitants of the region are worthy aims only to the extent that they do not interfere with other goals. This argument assumed that citizens in many Arab states would not be swayed by U.S. advocacy and assistance and/or that citizens had minimal opportunities to express dissent in ways that could challenge their governments' cooperation with the United States. Other analysts and U.S. officials argued that U.S. investments in the advancement of political rights and the development of societies in the Middle East could serve as potential instruments of strategic policy—a down payment on regional stability and a safety valve against popular demands for swift or disruptive change. This argument assumed that U.S. engagement, advocacy, and assistance could build a broad basis for bilateral cooperation and/or that failure to respond to popular dissent or disassociate the United States from abuses by partner governments could produce a harmful backlash. The latter approach rarely prevailed. Change has now come to several countries in the Middle East in the wake of popular uprisings rooted in discrete demands and shared themes (see textbox below). U.S. policy choices are becoming more complicated as unrest, conflict, and transitions alter basic realities in the region. Relevant aspects of the new regional environment include Public Opinion Power —The crowds that have taken over squares and ousted dictators also have toppled the assumption that outsiders can adequately understand and effectively deal with the Arab world by engaging only with elites. It remains unclear what types of governments will emerge in the states that are undergoing fundamental change, but it seems likely that in both those states and others, rulers now must pay more attention to the demands of public opinion and the competing political and social groups that seek to shape and harness its power. Although the United States has not been a key focus of protesters in the Arab uprisings, many in the Arab world share a belief that some of their leaders have subordinated their national interests to the United States or other external powers in order to receive assistance, arms, and trade benefits. Foreign policy choices, particularly with regard to the Arab-Israeli peace process or foreign assistance, therefore, may be subject to extra scrutiny by emerging leaders and empowered publics. Islamist Support and Success —In the short term, at least, a greater public say in governance may mean electoral support for Islamist parties, whether out of religious conviction; sympathy for those formerly targeted for repression; lack of competition from other well-organized parties; a belief that Islamist parties will be the least corrupt and most likely to champion social justice; or some combination of these reasons. Initial successes by Islamist parties have challenged the viability of the long-standing U.S. preference not to fully engage such parties out of concern about their views on Israel, armed conflict, and certain social and political issues, such as the rights and roles of women and religious minorities. Uncertain Strategic Implications —The United States relied on friendly Arab regimes and Israel as security partners during the Cold War and in the struggle against radicalizing forces such as Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, other violent Islamist extremists, and the governments of Iran and Syria. The ability of the U.S. government to influence events has become more complicated as some friendly regimes have faced upheavals. Certain Al Qaeda figures have embraced the current of change and sought to wrap themselves in the mantle of opposition to regional governments. However, to a large degree, the activism on display in most countries discredits Al Qaeda's claims that violent resistance is the only or best way to achieve change. Some observers contended early on that Iran and its allies were the "winners" of the Arab unrest, as regimes that had worked with the United States against Iran came under internal threat and Islamist parties gained traction. However, the picture for Iran is growing murkier as its primary ally, Syria, remains caught up in violence. The situation in Syria put Iran and its non-state allies in the position of defending an autocratic regime against a popular uprising—the opposite of the image they like to present. Hamas has distanced itself from the Syrian government, while Hezbollah has embraced it. The outcome in Syria, whatever it is, will have tremendous consequences for Iran, including the fate of its allies in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. Israeli Concerns and Complications for Peace Negotiations —Israeli government leaders argue that the wave of unrest in the Arab world is making Israel's security situation more perilous by potentially replacing relatively friendly and reliable neighboring governments with Islamist governments they see as likely to be hostile to Israel. Some Israelis argue that change in the region makes territorial compromise even more dangerous than it was before because governments and groups hostile to Israel may grow stronger. Palestinian leaders see an increased need to respond to a public that demands both a firm line with Israel and unity between Fatah and Hamas. These trends on both sides have further complicated ongoing U.S. efforts to encourage a process that might lead to an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict through a two-state solution between Israel and the Palestinians. Weakened State Security Authorities —Uprisings, unrest, and transition are affecting the ability and willingness of security authorities in several countries in the Middle East and North Africa to assert control over their territory, cities, and borders. Continued violence, dissolved national security bodies, and/or assertive citizen demands for less security control present unique challenges for regional and global policy makers concerned about transnational threats. Terrorists, arms traffickers, and other criminal entities are seeking to take advantage of this trend in places such as Libya, the Sinai peninsula, and Yemen. In addition to the significant changes wrought by the wave of unrest, other events further affect the arena for U.S. policy. For example, the pullout of U.S. troops from Iraq and a forthcoming U.S. military reset in the Gulf region will change calculations by Iran and by U.S. allies in the Gulf about their own security needs after two decades in which the U.S. military presence around or in Iraq and containment of Iran were constants. The Iranian nuclear program continues to challenge U.S. goals, and the uptick in tensions over that issue appears to be raising the risk of military conflict as Iran counters escalating international sanctions with increasing threats. Additionally, economic constraints affecting Europe, the United States, and others have an impact on their willingness to consider additional military interventions to deal with regional instability, or to embark on new or expanded programs of aid and trade negotiations to help emerging democracies succeed. In light of these conditions, the policy tools that Congress may consider continuing, initiating, or terminating—providing military and economic aid, engaging in arms sales and leases, imposing or easing economic sanctions, negotiating trade agreements, and promoting democracy, to name a few—are likely to have different consequences than they have in the past. The story of change in the Middle East is still unfolding; a viable new set of guiding assumptions may not become available in the near term, and ad hoc decision-making may be the necessary but less convenient successor to the stable patterns and calculations that have long guided U.S. Middle East strategy. The following analyses explore how regional change affects U.S. goals and discuss approaches that Congress has taken and may consider taking in response to change in the Middle East. Individual countries are treated in more detail in country-specific reports available online at http://www.crs.gov .