National security challenges covering a broad array of areas, ranging from preparedness for an influenza pandemic to Iraqi governance and reconstruction, have necessitated using all elements of national power— including diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement support. These elements fall under the authority of numerous U.S. government agencies, requiring overarching strategies and plans to enhance agencies’ abilities to collaborate with each other, as well as with foreign, state, and local governments and nongovernmental partners. Without overarching strategies, agencies often operate independently to achieve their own objectives, increasing the risk of duplication or gaps in national security efforts that may result in wasting scarce resources and limiting program effectiveness. Strategies can enhance interagency collaboration by helping agencies develop mutually reinforcing plans and determine activities, resources, processes, and performance measures for implementing those strategies. Strategies can be focused on broad national security objectives, like the National Security Strategy issued by the President, or on a specific program or activity, like the U.S. strategy for Iraq. Strategies have been developed by the Homeland Security Council, such as the National Strategy for Homeland Security; jointly with multiple agencies, such as the National Strategy for Maritime Security, which was developed jointly by the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security; or by an agency that is leading an interagency effort, such as the National Intelligence Strategy, which was developed under the leadership of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Congress recognized the importance of overarching strategies to guide interagency efforts, as shown by the requirement in the fiscal year 2009 National Defense Authorization Act for the President to submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on a comprehensive interagency strategy for public diplomacy and strategic communication of the federal government, including benchmarks and a timetable for achieving such benchmarks, by December 31, 2009. Congress and the administration will need to examine the ability of the executive branch to develop and implement overarching strategies to enhance collaboration for national security efforts. Although some U.S. government agencies have developed or updated overarching strategies since September 11, 2001, the lack of information on roles and responsibilities and lack of coordination mechanisms in these strategies can hinder interagency collaboration. Our prior work, as well as that by national security experts, has found that strategic direction is required as the basis for collaboration toward national security goals. Overarching strategies can help agencies overcome differences in missions, cultures, and ways of doing business by providing strategic direction for activities and articulating a common outcome to collaboratively work toward. As a result, agencies can better align their activities, processes, and resources to collaborate effectively to accomplish a commonly defined outcome. Without having the strategic direction that overarching strategies can provide, agencies may develop their own individual efforts that may not be well-coordinated with that of interagency partners, thereby limiting progress in meeting national security goals. Defining organizational roles and responsibilities and mechanisms for coordination—one of the desirable characteristics for strategies that we have identified in our prior work—can help agencies clarify who will lead or participate in which activities, organize their joint activities and individual efforts, facilitate decision making, and address how conflicts would be resolved. The lack of overarching strategies that address roles and responsibilities and coordination mechanisms—among other desirable characteristics that we have identified in our prior work—can hinder interagency collaboration for national security programs at home and abroad. We have testified and reported that in some cases U.S. efforts have been hindered by multiple agencies pursuing individual efforts without overarching strategies detailing roles and responsibilities of organizations involved or coordination mechanisms to integrate their efforts. For example, we have found the following: Since 2005, multiple U.S. agencies—including the State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and Department of Defense (DOD)—had led separate efforts to improve the capacity of Iraq’s ministries to govern without overarching direction from a lead entity to integrate their efforts. As we have testified and reported, the lack of an overarching strategy contributed to U.S. efforts not meeting their goal of key Iraqi ministries having the capacity to effectively govern and assume increasing responsibility for operating, maintaining, and further investing in reconstruction projects. In July 2008 we reported that agencies involved in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership had not developed a comprehensive, integrated strategy for the program’s implementation. The State Department, USAID, and DOD had developed separate plans related to their respective program activities that reflect some interagency collaboration, for example, in assessing country needs for development assistance. However, these plans did not incorporate all of the desirable characteristics for strategies that we have previously identified. For example, we found that roles and responsibilities—particularly between the State Department and DOD—were unclear with regard to authority over DOD personnel temporarily assigned to conduct certain program activities in African countries, and DOD officials said that disagreements affected implementation of DOD’s activities in Niger. DOD suspended most of its program activities in Niger in 2007 after the ambassador limited the number of DOD personnel allowed to enter the country. State Department officials said these limits were set in part because of embassy concerns about the country’s fragile political environment as well as limited space and staff available to support DOD personnel deployed to partner countries. At the time of our May 2007 review, we found that the State Department office responsible for coordinating law enforcement agencies’ role in combating terrorism had not developed or implemented an overarching plan to use the combined capabilities of U.S. law enforcement agencies to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. Additionally, the national strategies related to this effort lacked clearly defined roles and responsibilities. In one country we visited for that review, the lack of clear roles and responsibilities led two law enforcement agencies, which were unknowingly working with different foreign law enforcement agencies, to move in on the same subject. According to foreign and U.S. law enforcement officials, such actions may have compromised other investigations. We also reported that because the national strategies related to this effort did not clarify specific roles, among other issues, law enforcement agencies were not being fully used abroad to protect U.S. citizens and interests from future terrorist attacks. In our work on the federal government’s pandemic influenza preparedness efforts, we noted that the Departments of Homeland Security and Health and Human Services share most federal leadership roles in implementing the pandemic influenza strategy and supporting plans; however, we reported that it was not clear how this would work in practice because their roles were unclear. The National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza and its supporting implementation plan described the Secretary of Health and Human Services as being responsible for leading the medical response in a pandemic, while the Secretary of Homeland Security would be responsible for overall domestic incident management and federal coordination. However, since a pandemic extends well beyond health and medical boundaries, to include sustaining critical infrastructure, private- sector activities, the movement of goods and services across the nation and the globe, and economic and security considerations, it is not clear when, in a pandemic, the Secretary of Health and Human Services would be in the lead and when the Secretary of Homeland Security would lead. This lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities could lead to confusion or disagreements among implementing agencies that could hinder interagency collaboration, and a federal response could be slowed as agencies resolve their roles and responsibilities following the onset of a significant outbreak. In March 2008, we reported that DOD and the intelligence community had not developed, agreed upon, or issued a national security space strategy. The United States depends on space assets to support national security activities, among other activities. Reports have long recognized the need for a strategy to guide the national security space community’s efforts in space and better integrate the activities of DOD and the intelligence community. Moreover, Congress found in the past that DOD and the intelligence community may not be well-positioned to coordinate certain intelligence activities and programs to ensure unity of effort and avoid duplication of efforts. We reported that a draft strategy had been developed in 2004, but according to the National Security Space Office Director, the National Security Council requested that the strategy not be issued until the revised National Space Policy directive was released in October 2006. However, once the policy was issued, changes in leadership at the National Reconnaissance Office and Air Force, as well as differences in opinion and organizational differences between the defense and intelligence communities further delayed issuance of the strategy. Until a national security space strategy is issued, the defense and intelligence communities may continue to make independent decisions and use resources that are not necessarily based on national priorities, which could lead to gaps in some areas of space operations and redundancies in others. We testified in March 2009 that as the current administration clarifies its new strategy for Iraq and develops a new comprehensive strategy for Afghanistan, these strategies should incorporate the desirable characteristics we have previously identified. This includes, among other issues, the roles and responsibilities of U.S. government agencies, and mechanisms and approaches for coordinating the efforts of the wide variety of U.S. agencies and international organizations—such as DOD, the Departments of State, the Treasury, and Justice, USAID, the United Nations, and the World Bank—that have significant roles in Iraq and Afghanistan. Clearly defining and coordinating the roles, responsibilities, commitments, and activities of all organizations involved would allow the U.S. government to prioritize the spending of limited resources and avoid unnecessary duplication. In recent years we have issued reports recommending that U.S. government agencies, including DOD, the State Department, and others, develop or revise strategies to incorporate desirable characteristics for strategies for a range of programs and activities including humanitarian and development efforts in Somalia, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, foreign assistance strategy, law enforcement agencies’ role in assisting foreign nations in combating terrorism, and meeting U.S. national security goals in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas. In commenting on drafts of those reports, agencies generally concurred with our recommendations.