This report discusses the political context and congressional consideration of various funding and other restrictive legislative language applying to military operations in Indochina between 1970 and 1973. The report also briefly mentions similar congressional actions applying to U.S. military operations in Somalia in 1993 and Kosovo in 1999. This discussion is followed by two tables that summarize provisions that were enacted or considered by Congress and an Appendix that cites the specific language for each provision in the tables. Table 1 includes funding restrictions on military operations and Table 2 includes other non-funding approaches. Those provisions that were enacted are listed first followed by provisions that were not enacted but where there was a roll call vote in either house. From the legislative history, it appears that funding cutoffs may have been more effective than non-funding approaches in altering executive branch plans for military operations. During the 1970-1973 period, Congress considered a variety of proposals to restrict U.S. military operations in Indochina and require a withdrawal of troops from Vietnam in response to the growing controversy in the United States over U.S. military involvement in Vietnam during the 1965-1969 period. The specific proposals for legislation often were in response to key elements of the Nixon Administration's policies and were intended to influence or force changes in the Administration's policies on U.S. military involvement, particularly in Vietnam and Cambodia. A main element of the Nixon Administration's policies was the staged withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam from mid-1969 until the end of 1972 as part of the Administration's Vietnamization strategy of turning over the responsibility for ground combat operations in Vietnam to the South Vietnamese government and army. According to Department of Defense statistics, U.S. troop levels fell from 539,000 in June 1969 to 415,000 in June 1970, 239,000 in June 1971, 47,000 in June 1972, and 21,500 in January 1973. In 1974, a non-funding bill was passed to cap personnel levels in Indochina at 4,000 by mid-1975 (2,500 of whom could be members of the armed forces), and at 3,000 by the end of 1975 (1,500 of whom could be members of the armed forces). The Nixon Administration, however, set no goal of a total withdrawal of U.S. forces or a total end of U.S. combat operations in Vietnam. In particular, the Air Force continued bombing operations at a high level. Thus, many of the proposed amendments and bills in Congress in the 1970-1972 period were aimed at requiring the President to withdraw all U.S. troops from Vietnam and prohibit U.S. combat operations in Vietnam and Indochina. Several of these came to votes in the full House of Representatives and the Senate, but none was enacted into law. A second policy element was the incursion of U.S. ground forces into eastern Cambodia that President Nixon ordered on April 30, 1970. U.S. ground troops withdrew by June 30, 1970, but U.S. bombing of North Vietnamese and Khmer Rouge forces in Cambodia continued. Proposed and enacted amendments in Congress were designed to prohibit both the reintroduction of U.S. ground forces into Cambodia after June 30, 1970 and continued U.S. aerial bombing of Cambodia. The "Cooper-Church" amendment, enacted into law in January 1971, prohibited the reintroduction of U.S. ground forces into Cambodia. The restrictive bills passed in June and July 1973 terminated funding for the bombing in Cambodia on August 15, 1973, and bombing stopped on that date. The incursion into Cambodia had an important impact on congressional attempts to legislate restrictions on U.S. military operations. It triggered congressional amendments aimed at restrictions on U.S. military operations not only in Cambodia but in Vietnam as well. The third policy element was the negotiation and signing of an "Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam" between the United States and North Vietnam on January 27, 1973. The agreement, in effect a cease-fire agreement with additional political provisions, provided for the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from South Vietnam within 60 days of the signing of the accord. U.S. troops were withdrawn fully by March 1973. A major problem for President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in negotiating the agreement was securing the support of South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu. In a November 14, 1972, letter, President Nixon assured President Thieu that "But far more important than what we say in the agreement on this issue is what we do in the event the enemy renews its aggression. You have my absolute assurance that if Hanoi fails to abide by the terms of this agreement it is my intention to take swift and severe retaliatory action." President Nixon and other Administration officials hinted publicly in March 1973 that the United States would intervene militarily if North Vietnam violated the cease-fire agreement. On May 3, 1973, President Nixon submitted a report to Congress entitled U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: Shaping a Durable Peace . In it, he asserted that the United States would not tolerate communist violations of the agreement and that North Vietnam would risk renewed confrontation with the United States if it broke the agreement. President Nixon undoubtedly had in mind the renewal of U.S. bombing of North Vietnam and North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam if Hanoi renewed the war. As the Nixon Administration withdrew U.S. ground forces from Vietnam in 1971 and 1972, it ordered heavy bombing of communist forces and installations, including massive bombing by B-52 bombers. These indications of Nixon's policy intention no doubt influenced the legislation proposed and passed by Congress in mid-1973 to cut off funding for combat operations "in or over or from off the shore of North Vietnam, South Vietnam...." For a CRS Report that compares Congressional funding cutoffs of U.S. military forces to use of the War Powers Act, see CRS Report RS20775, Congressional Use of Funding Cutoffs Since 1970 Involving U.S. Military Forces and Overseas Deployments , by [author name scrubbed]. The proposals included in Table 1 adopted funding cutoffs that follow certain patterns. The section that follows describes the types of restrictions and identifies proposals that fall under that category using the number included in both the tables and the Appendix that follow. The proposals to cut off funds generally prohibit obligating or expending funds in a particular bill or bills after Congress has appropriated the funds. Obligations occur when the government signs a contract to buy goods or services or pays its military or civilian personnel. Expenditures, or outlays, take place when the contractor or employee is paid. Generally, funding prohibitions apply as of a certain date, to specific countries, and to particular types of military activities (entries 2, 3, 4, 5). In one case, the Department of Defense was prohibited from transferring funds from its regular programs to finance wartime operations (entry 19). In some cases, funding prohibitions applied to certain military operations—such as combat operations—and were absolute (entries 2, 3, 4, 18). In other cases, funding was to be cut off for some military activities (e.g., combat) but permitted for other activities (e.g., the withdrawal of troops or the protection of U.S. civilians) (entries 7, 8, 11, 15). In other cases, the funding cutoff was contingent upon certain conditions or events taking place, such as the negotiation by the President of a cease-fire, the release of U.S. prisoners of war (POWs), or a presidential determination that personnel can be withdrawn safely (entries 12, 13, 14, 16). In some cases, the President could recommend extending the deadline if certain conditions, such as the safe withdrawal of troops, have not occurred (entries 13, 14). The prohibition on obligating or spending funds could also be reversed if Congress authorized the activity (entries 5, 8, 20, 21). Prohibitions on funding were set to take effect as of or after a particular date or some specified length of time after enactment and applied to the funds included in the bill under consideration, all previous bills of that type, or any bill (entries 2, 3, 8, 17, 20, 25, 27). Funding restrictions were placed in various types of bills, often appropriations bills but sometimes authorization or other bills (e.g., amendments to the Selective Service Act). The range of prohibited military activities included also varied from the specific—"Bomb, rocket, napalm, or otherwise attack by air, any target whatsoever ..." (entry 14) or the "deployment of ground elements" in Yugoslavia (entry 21) to general designations such as combat activities, conducting U.S. military operations (entries 2, 13) or "to support directly or indirectly combat activities," (entry 18) or the "involvement of U.S. military forces in hostilities" (entry 20). The well-known McGovern-Hatfield amendment that was considered in 1970 combined several of the elements above—prohibiting funds for some but not other specified military activities, setting two specific deadlines, one for a ceiling on the number of troops and another for the withdrawal of remaining forces while at the same time giving the President some leeway to propose an alternative. The amendment prohibited the obligation or expenditure of funds "authorized by this or any other act" to "maintain a troop level of more than 280,000 armed forces" in Vietnam after April 30, 1971, unless the President finds that a 60-day extension is necessary and recommends that to Congress. For a set period—between April 30 and December 31, 1971, the amendment limited the "expenditure of funds" in or over Indochina to the "safe and systematic withdrawal of remaining forces," or providing asylum to endangered Vietnamese (entry 9). It was rejected in June 1971.