On June 14, 2012, Andry Rajoelina, the president of Madagascar's unelected transitional government, the High Transitional Authority (HAT, its French acronym), agreed to meet with Marc Ravalomanana, the country's former, most recently elected president. Ravalomanana was ousted by a Rajoelina-led coalition of civilian political groups, in league with the military, in early 2009. The agreement comes in the wake of renewed pressure on the two men, the two principal protagonists in Madagascar's ongoing political crisis, to meet to resolve disputes over a number of issues, discussed below. Their failure to do so has long been seen as a key stumbling block in internationally mediated efforts—as stated in a June 1 Southern African Development Community (SADC) heads of state summit communiqué—"to ensure full implementation of the Roadmap and create an enabling environment for holding credible, free and fair elections." The political environment remains volatile. It is characterized by regular, relatively low level political disputes—including accusations of HAT ill-treatment of Ravalomanana-linked political figures; restrictions on and, in some cases, violent suppression of large public political gatherings; and selected restrictions on journalists. Nevertheless, substantial progress has been made in the implementation of key provisions of the roadmap, in part based on two meetings of its signatories. Prim e Minister Appointed. In late October 2011, a "consensus" prime minister, Jean Omer Beriziky, a former Malagasy diplomat and academic, was appointed from more than a dozen candidates nominated by the various roadmap signatories. While he was required to be from a region and a political party different than that of Rajoelina, as he was ultimately selected by Rajoelina, his appointment was not universally supported by all signatories. He drew notable objections from a Ravalomanana spokesman, who alleged that he was from a party that had formerly backed Rajoelina. Beriziky, who assumed office on November 2, has reportedly taken a relatively neutral stance vis-à-vis the differences between Rajoelina and Ravalomanana, especially regarding the issue of amnesty (see below), and other matters. This has reportedly insulated him from potential political pressure from Rajoelina, as any attempt by the latter to dismiss him would likely be viewed by the international community as an abrogation of the roadmap. It has also earned him a reputation as a consensus-oriented, moderate leader who may be able to bridge the long-standing divide between Rajoelina and Ravalomanana. Some international and Malagasy actors reportedly believe that the two should agree not to run in the anticipated election, and Beriziky is reportedly viewed by some Malagasy as a major viable alternative presidential contender. Cabinet Appointed. In late November, a 35-member, national union government cabinet was appointed, days after a roadmap deadline requiring this outcome had passed due to disputes over the proposed makeup of the cabinet. The cabinet includes 12 opposition members, but not all opposition parties were satisfied by the appointments. Some had reportedly wanted portfolios other than what they were given, and spokespersons from the Mouvance Ravalomanana and Mouvance Zafy reportedly boycotted the cabinet's initial meeting, alleging that the cabinet selection process was not in accordance with the roadmap. Legislature Appointed . In early December, the Congress of Transition (CT, the lower legislative chamber, akin to the House of Representatives) and the Superior Council of Transition (CST, the upper legislative chamber, akin to a Senate) were both enlarged, the former from 256 seats to 417 seats, and the latter from 90 seats to 189 seats. Incumbents in the transitional legislature appointed in October 2010 retained their posts, but additional seats were allocated according to the recommendations of signatories to the roadmap. They were selected under criteria that took into consideration partisan, regional, and gender balance, and the nominations of various political parties. Seats allocated to the Mouvance Zafy, which did not name any nominees, were not filled. Electoral Commission Appointed. On March 12, 2012, an independent transitional electoral commission (the CENI-T, after its French acronym) was inaugurated. Its members include 10 civil society, 9 political party, and 2 Rajoelina administration designees plus a president, Béatrice Atallah; an appeals court judge; and a member of a former national elections council. Provisional Electoral Timetable Adopted. On May 27, the CENI-T adopted a partial electoral administrative process timetable, with a projected completion date of November 11, 2012, as required by the electoral code. It requires that the election be held during the dry season, between April 30 and November 30, unless otherwise mandated due to a court-declared force majeure. The final scheduling of elections will be dependent on completion of various electoral procedures associated with voter registration, voter education, vetting of the voter rolls, and the like. Some of this work is likely to be challenging; the current voter registry is reportedly highly inaccurate and is missing large numbers of listings from the southern portions of the island. The CENI-T, whose work is dependent on central government funding, has pledged to issue biweekly progress updates. It expects to publish a more specific electoral calendar in August, pending substantial completion of its pre-poll tasks. Amnesty Law Passed. In mid-April 2012 the lower and upper houses of parliament passed an amnesty law—albeit belatedly vis-à-vis the roadmap implementation schedule—broadly covering responsibility for possible violations of the law associated with political events between 2002 and 2009, that is, between the election and deposition of Ravalomanana. While the amnesty law nominally complies with the demands of SADC, it excludes from the amnesty certain "serious violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms," including murder, as permitted under the roadmap. This effectively means that the amnesty does not apply to Ravalomanana, as he was sentenced in absentia in August 2010 to lifetime imprisonment with hard labor for complicity in the murder of some 30 pro-Rajoelina protesters by the presidential guard on February 7, 2009. Passage of the law as enacted—with the murder reference included—was not surprising, in light of repeated efforts by the Rajoelina administration to prevent Ravalomanana from returning to Madagascar, most recently in January 2012, and reportedly widespread, if not unanimous, public support for this position. The law, however, also appears to directly conflict with article 20 of the roadmap, which allows "all Malagasy citizens in exile for political reasons to return to the country unconditionally, including Mr. Marc Ravalomanana." SADC has consistently and strongly supported this goal, the prevention of which is viewed as one of the most abiding hindrances to a successful realization of the transition process. Implicit in this rationale is the view that Ravalomanana's ability to return to Madagascar and compete in an election is essential to creating a credible, fair, and open electoral outcome. A political deal to address the impasse over amnesty is seen as feasible because Ravalomanana's prosecution, conviction, and sentencing—in what he characterized in 2010 as a "mock trial" with a "political objective to accuse me unfairly in order to prevent me from running in the next presidential elections" and to undermine the transitional peace and reconciliation process—is widely viewed as politically motivated and illegitimate by the international community. Some observers have speculated that a deal may ultimately be negotiated under which Ravalomanana—who continues to be widely viewed as a potentially potent political force—would be given amnesty in exchange for not running for the presidency, making Rajoelina the likely winner of the presidential poll, and giving the political party members of the HAT a high likelihood of success in the legislative elections. In the meantime, however, the Rajoelina camp appears to have engineered an arguably sound basis for enactment of the law. The transitional government reportedly invited and received SADC assistance in drafting it, implying that the law had received the endorsement of SADC, although the government was responsible for its final provisions. Furthermore, as Rajoelina administration officials have reportedly stressed, the spirit and letter of the law appears to fully comply with an explicit "interpretation of the term 'unconditionally'" appended by SADC in the roadmap. Given this state of affairs, in May 2012, Mouvance Ravalomanana figures holding government posts began to boycott their duties. These include cabinet ministers, members of Parliament, and CENI-T members. There are additional challenges associated with article 11 of the roadmap, which requires the establishment of a temporary Special Electoral Court to hear electoral disputes and certify final results of presidential elections. The Malagasy Constitutional High Court reportedly contends that it has the constitutional right and duty to decide these matters, and is seeking to ensure controls over the Special Electoral Court. Another electoral issue of debate is the CENI-T's authority to decide the timing and sequence in which legislative and presidential elections are held. Some political figures reportedly contend that this matter should be decided by elected officials. A lack of local reconciliation processes and efforts to include the perspectives of average citizens reportedly played a role in the failure of earlier internationally mediated agreements to end the crisis, and could determine the relative success of current transitional processes defined by the roadmap.