Since it started development in 2003, FCS has been at the center of the Army’s efforts to modernize into a lighter, more agile, and more capable combat force. The FCS concept involved replacing existing combat systems with a family of manned and unmanned vehicles and systems linked by an advanced information network. The Army anticipated that the FCS systems, along with the soldier and enabling complementary systems, would work together in a system of systems wherein the whole provided greater capability than the sum of the individual parts. The Army expected to develop this equipment in 10 years, procure it over 13 years, and field it to 15 FCS-unique brigades—about one-third of the active force at that time. The Army also had planned to spin out selected FCS technologies and systems to current Army forces throughout the system development and demonstration phase. As we reported in 2009, the FCS program was immature and unable to meet the Department of Defense’s (DOD) own standards for technology and design from the start. Although adjustments were made, such as adding time and reducing requirements, vehicle weights and software code grew, key network systems were delayed, and technologies took longer to mature than anticipated (see fig. 1). By 2009, after an investment of 6 years and an estimated $18 billion, the viability of the FCS concept was still unknown. As such, we concluded that the maturity of the development efforts was insufficient and the program could not be developed and produced within existing resources. In April 2009, the Secretary of Defense proposed a significant restructuring of the FCS program to lower risk and address more near-term combat needs. The Secretary noted significant concerns that the FCS program’s vehicle designs—where greater information awareness was expected to compensate for less armor, resulting in lower weight and higher fuel efficiency—did not adequately reflect the lessons of counterinsurgency and close-quarters combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. As such, the Secretary recommended accelerating fielding of ready-to-go systems and capabilities to all combat canceling the vehicle component of the FCS program, reevaluating the requirements, technology, and approach, and relaunching the Army’s vehicle modernization program; and addressing fee structure and other concerns with current FCS contracting arrangements. In June 2009, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics issued an acquisition decision memorandum that canceled the FCS acquisition program, terminated manned ground vehicle development efforts, and laid out plans for follow-on Army Brigade Combat Team Modernization efforts. DOD directed the Army to transition to an Army-wide modernization plan consisting of a number of integrated acquisition programs, including one to develop ground combat vehicles (GCV). Subsequently, the Army has been defining its ground force modernization efforts per the Secretary’s decisions and the June 2009 acquisition decision memorandum. Although the details are not yet complete, the Army took several actions through the end of calendar year 2009. It stopped all development work on the FCS manned ground vehicles—including the non-line-of-sight cannon—in the summer of 2009 and recently terminated development of the Class IV unmanned aerial vehicle and the countermine and transport variants of the Multifunction Utility/Logistics and Equipment unmanned ground vehicle. For the time being, the Army is continuing selected development work under the existing FCS development contract, primarily residual FCS system and network development. In October 2009, the Army negotiated a modification to the existing contract that clarified the development work needed for the brigade modernization efforts. The Army is implementing DOD direction and redefining its overall modernization strategy as a result of the Secretary of Defense’s decisions to significantly restructure the FCS program. It is transitioning from the FCS long-term acquisition orientation to a shorter-term approach that biennially develops and fields new increments of capability within capability packages. It now has an approved acquisition program that will produce and field the initial increment of the FCS spinout equipment, which includes unmanned aerial and ground vehicles as well as unattended sensors and munitions, and preliminary plans for two other major defense acquisition programs to define and develop follow-on increments and develop a new GCV. The Army also plans to integrate network capabilities across its brigade structure and to develop and field upgrades to other existing ground force equipment. The first program, Increment 1, is a continuation of previous FCS-related efforts to spin out emerging capabilities and technologies to current forces. Of the Army’s post-FCS modernization initiatives, Increment 1, which includes such FCS remnants as unmanned air and ground systems, unattended ground sensors, the non-line-of-sight launch system, and a network integration kit, is the furthest along in the acquisition development cycle (see fig. 2). The network integration kit includes, among other things, the integrated computer system, an initial version of the system-of-systems common operating environment, early models of the Joint Tactical Radio System, and a range extension relay. In December 2009, the Army requested and DOD approved, with a number of restrictions, the low-rate initial production of Increment 1 systems that are expected to be fielded in the fiscal year 2011-12 capability package. The Army will be continuing Increment 1 development over the next 2 years while low-rate initial production proceeds. The projected development and production cost to equip nine brigades with the Increment 1 network and systems, supported by an independent cost estimate, would be about $3.5 billion. Provides enhanced situational awareness and force protection through reduced exposure to hazards during soldier-intensive and/or high-risk functions. Provides enhanced communications and situational awareness through radios with multiple software waveforms, connections to unattended sensors, and links to existing networking capabilities. Provides force protection in an urban setting through a leave- behind, network-enabled reporting system of movement and/or activity in cleared areas. Provides independent, soldier-level aerial reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition capability. Provides the ability to precisely attack armored, lightly armored, and stationary or moving targets at extended ranges despite weather/environmental conditions and/or presence of countermeasures. Provides enhanced situational awareness, force protection, and early warnings in a tactical setting through cross-cues to sensors and weapon systems. For the second acquisition program, Increment 2 of brigade modernization, the Army has preliminary plans to mature Increment 1 capabilities—potentially demonstrating full FCS threshold requirements— as well as contributing further developments of the system-of-systems common operating environment and battle command software, and demonstrating and fielding additional capabilities. For example, these may include the Armed Robotic Vehicle Assault (Light)—an unmanned ground vehicle configured for security and assault support missions—and the Common Controller, which will provide the dismounted soldier a handheld device capable of controlling, connecting, and providing data transfer from unmanned vehicles and ground sensors. Army officials indicated that they are currently working to define the content, cost, and schedule for Increment 2 with a low-rate initial production decision planned for fiscal year 2013 and a Defense Acquisition Board review expected later in fiscal year 2010. The third acquisition program would develop a new GCV. The Army reviewed current fighting vehicles across the force structure to determine whether to sustain, improve, divest, or pursue new vehicles based on operational value, capability shortfalls, and resource availability. Per DOD direction, the Army also collaborated with the Marine Corps to identify capability gaps related to fighting vehicles. For development of a new GCV, the Army’s preliminary plans indicate the use of an open architecture design to enable incremental improvements in modular armor; network architecture; and subcomponent size, weight, power, and cooling. DOD and the Army met in February 2010 to make a materiel development decision on the GCV, and the Army was subsequently authorized to release a request for proposals for GCV technology development. Over the next several months, the Army will be conducting an analysis of alternatives to assess potential materiel solutions for the GCV. The Army expects to follow the analysis with a Milestone A decision review on whether to begin technology development in September 2010. After Milestone A, Army officials are proposing the use of competitive prototyping with multiple contractors—the number of which will depend on available funding— during the technology development phase, which will feature the use of mature technologies and the fabrication and testing of prototype subsystems. In the technology development phase, the contractors will be expected to fabricate and evaluate several subsystem prototypes, including an automotive test rig and a mine blast test asset. The contractors will also be expected to develop a near-critical design review level design for their integrated vehicle and, in the process, inform the GCV concept development document. That document is expected to be finalized at the Milestone A decision point. Competitive prototypes will be fabricated and tested during the engineering and manufacturing development phase. A preliminary design review would be used to validate contractor readiness to enter detailed design at Milestone B in fiscal year 2013. The Army’s preliminary plans indicate that the first production vehicles could be delivered in late fiscal year 2017, about 7 years from Milestone A. The Army is planning to incrementally develop and field an information network to all of its brigades in a decentralized fashion, that is, not as a separate acquisition program. The Army has defined a preliminary network strategy and is in the process of defining what the end state of the network will need to be, as well as how it may build up that network over an undefined period of time. In the near term, the Army is working to establish a common network foundation to build on and to define a common network architecture based on what is currently available and expected to become available in the near future. Current communications, command and control, and networking acquisition programs will continue and will be expected to build upon the current network foundation and architecture over time.