OPS regulates the safety of almost 2.2 million miles of pipelines, which is enough to circle the earth 88 times. There are three primary types of pipelines under OPS’ jurisdiction. Natural gas transmission pipelines— about 322,000 miles—transport natural gas over long distances from sources to communities. An additional 1.7 million miles of natural gas distribution pipelines continue transporting the gas throughout the communities to consumers. Finally, about 155,000 miles of hazardous liquid pipelines generally transport crude oil to refineries and continue to transport the refined oil product, such as gasoline, to product terminals and airports. These pipelines transport the bulk of natural gas and petroleum products in the United States and are the safest mode for transporting these potentially dangerous commodities. Although pipeline incidents resulted in an average of about 24 fatalities per year from 1989 to 2000, the number of pipeline incidents is relatively low when compared with those involving other forms of freight transportation. On average, about 66 people die each year in barge accidents, about 590 in railroad accidents, and about 5,100 in truck accidents. Despite the relative safety of pipelines, pipeline incidents can have tragic consequences, as evidenced by the incidents at Bellingham, WA, and Carlsbad, NM. These incidents, which caused 15 fatalities, highlighted the importance of pipeline safety and the need for more effective oversight by OPS. From 1989 through 2000, the total number of incidents per 10,000 miles of pipeline decreased by 2.9 percent annually, while the number of major pipeline incidents (those resulting in a fatality, an injury, or property damage of $50,000 or more) per 10,000 miles of pipeline increased by 2.2 percent annually. (See fig. 1.) Over the same time period, pipeline mileage increased 1.6 percent annually from 1.9 to 2.2 million miles of pipelines. Traditionally, OPS carried out its oversight responsibility by requiring all pipeline operators to comply with uniform, minimum standards. Recognizing that pipeline operators face different risks depending on such factors as location and the product they carry, OPS began exploring the concept of a risk-based approach to pipeline safety in the mid-1990s. In 1996, the Accountable Pipeline Safety and Partnership Act directed OPS to establish a demonstration program to test a risk-based approach. The Risk Management Demonstration Program went beyond OPS’ traditional regulatory approach by allowing individual companies to identify and focus on risks to their pipelines. Since the program’s initiation in 1997, OPS has approved six demonstration projects. Partly on the basis of OPS’ experience with the Risk Management Demonstration Program, the agency has moved forward with a new regulatory approach that requires pipeline operators to comprehensively identify and address risks to the segments of their pipelines that are located in “high consequence areas” where a leak or rupture would have the greatest impact. This approach requires individual pipeline operators to develop and follow an integrity management program. Each program must contain specific elements, including a baseline assessment of all pipelines that could affect high consequence areas, periodic reassessment of these pipeline segments, prompt action to address any problems identified in the assessments, and measures of the program’s effectiveness. Although OPS has issued final rules requiring integrity management programs for operators of hazardous liquid pipelines, the agency has not issued a proposed rule for operators of gas transmission pipelines. In December 2000, OPS issued a final rule for operators of “large” hazardous liquid pipelines, defined as pipeline systems of at least 500 miles. Under this rule, individual operators were required by December 31, 2001 to identify pipeline segments that can affect high consequence areas, and then develop a framework for their integrity management program and a plan for conducting baseline assessments by March 31, 2002. OPS issued a similar rule for operators of “small” hazardous liquid pipelines that are less than 500 miles long on January 16, 2002, with later deadlines. For natural gas transmission pipelines, OPS anticipates issuing a final rule in fall 2002. OPS plans to review and monitor operators’ programs for compliance with the integrity management requirements, but will not formally approve operator programs. OPS is currently in the first of a four-phase plan for reviewing and monitoring integrity management programs for operators of large hazardous liquid pipelines. In phase 1—scheduled to be completed by the end of April 2002—OPS is reviewing operators’ identification of pipeline segments that impact high consequence areas. During phase 2— from July 2002 to July 2004—OPS will inspect the more fully developed framework and assessment plans. After July 2004, OPS plans to monitor operators’ implementation of their individual programs through periodic inspections in phase 3, and review and respond to notifications from operators of changes in their programs in phase 4. OPS is hiring and training additional inspectors to review and monitor operators’ programs. OPS had 56 inspectors in fiscal year 2001 and plans to hire an additional 30 inspectors—a 54-percent increase—by the end of fiscal year 2003. OPS plans to augment its inspection force with contractor and state support as it develops the necessary expertise to review and monitor operators’ programs. OPS has also developed a list of training courses that will be required for federal and state inspectors, and it is currently scheduling this training. OPS officials anticipate that it will take about 2 years to provide this training to all federal and state inspectors. In addition to the integrity management programs, OPS is making progress on other initiatives for improving data, involving states, and increasing the use of fines. These initiatives are intended to improve pipeline safety and the agency’s oversight. DOT’s Inspector General, the National Transportation Safety Board, and others have reported that OPS’ data on pipeline incidents and infrastructure are limited and sometimes inaccurate. For example, in the past, OPS’ incident report forms have used only five categories of causes for incidents on natural gas distribution pipelines, four categories for those on natural gas transmission pipelines, and seven categories for those on hazardous liquid pipelines. As a result, about one-fourth of all pipeline incidents were attributed to “other causes,” which limited OPS’ ability to identify and focus on the causes of incidents. In addition, data on the amount of pipeline mileage in various infrastructure categories (such as age or size) are necessary for a meaningful comparison of the safety performance of individual pipeline companies. OPS did not require hazardous liquid pipeline operators to submit this type of data and did not collect complete data from natural gas pipelines. Finally, the information on incident reports filed by operators sometimes changes as the incident investigation proceeds. OPS did not have a procedure for ensuring that operators submitted revised reports when needed. OPS is taking action to collect data that will allow it to more accurately determine the causes of incidents, analyze industry trends, and compare the safety performance of operators. For example, OPS revised its incident report forms in 2001 for hazardous liquid and natural gas transmission incidents to include 25 categories of causes and plans to revise the form for natural gas distribution incidents by the end of 2002. Furthermore, OPS is assigning an inspector in each region to review incident report forms for completeness and accuracy, and has instituted new electronic notification procedures to ensure that operators submit revised incident reports, if necessary. OPS also plans to institute annual reports for hazardous liquid pipeline operators, and is in the process of revising annual report forms for all natural gas pipeline operators. Finally, OPS is conducting studies of incident information to improve its understanding of the causes of incidents. According to OPS officials, most of these improvements will be implemented for 2002 data. According to the Safety Board and industry groups, OPS’ initiatives address the underlying data problems and will enable OPS to better understand the causes of incidents so the agency can focus its efforts to improve safety. However, officials from industry groups told us that it will be several years before OPS has sufficient data to analyze trends in incidents. Officials from the Safety Board also noted that these initiatives are merely a first step, and they emphasized that OPS should periodically reassess its forms and procedures and take steps to revise them as necessary. We are evaluating OPS’ data improvement initiatives as part of our ongoing work. OPS is allowing more states to help oversee a broader range of interstate pipeline safety activities. Although OPS relies heavily on state inspectors to oversee intrastate pipelines, it reduced its reliance on states to inspect interstate pipelines in the mid-1990s when it moved to a more risk-based, system-wide approach to inspecting pipelines. At that time, OPS believed it would be too difficult to coordinate participation by individual states in the new inspection process. However, in our May 2000 report, we found that allowing states to participate in interstate pipeline safety inspections could improve pipeline safety by increasing the frequency and thoroughness of inspections to detect safety problems. Additionally, state pipeline safety inspectors are likely to be familiar with pipelines in their jurisdictions and the potential risks faced by these pipelines. We recommended that OPS work with state pipeline safety officials to determine which activities would benefit from state participation and, for states that are willing to participate, integrate their activities into the safety program. We also recommended that OPS allow state inspectors to assist in reviewing the integrity management programs developed by the companies that operate in their states to help ensure that these companies have identified and adequately addressed safety risks to their systems. OPS responded to our recommendations in 2001 by encouraging more states to oversee the safety of interstate pipelines in their states. These states may perform a broad range of oversight activities, such as inspections of new construction, oversight of rehabilitation projects and integrity management programs, incident investigation, standard inspections, and participation in nonregulatory program initiatives. Other states that want to participate on a smaller scale may apply for specific, short-term projects, such as inspecting new pipeline construction projects. As of January 2002, 11 states—up from 8 in 2000—have been approved to participate in all oversight activities, and an additional 4 states have been approved to participate on short-term projects. OPS is increasing its use of fines for safety violations, thereby reversing a trend of relying more heavily on less severe corrective actions.