National security threats have evolved and require involvement beyond the traditional agencies of DOD, the Department of State, and USAID. The Departments of Homeland Security, Energy, Justice, the Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce, and Health and Human Services are now a bigger part of the equation. What has not yet evolved are the mechanisms that agencies use to coordinate national security activities such as developing overarching strategies to guide planning and execution of missions, or sharing and integrating national security information across agencies. The absence of effective mechanisms can be a hindrance to achieving national security objectives. Within the following key areas, a number of challenges exist that limit the ability of U.S. government agencies to work collaboratively in responding to national security issues. Our work has also identified actions that agencies can take to enhance collaboration. Although some agencies have developed or updated overarching strategies on national security-related issues, our work has identified cases where U.S. efforts have been hindered by the lack of information on roles and responsibilities of organizations involved or the lack of mechanisms to coordinate their efforts. National security challenges covering a broad array of areas, ranging from preparedness for an influenza pandemic to Iraqi governance and reconstruction, have necessitated using all elements of national power—including diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement support. These elements fall under the authority of numerous U.S. government agencies, requiring overarching strategies and plans to enhance agencies’ abilities to collaborate with each other. Strategies can help agencies develop mutually reinforcing plans and determine activities, resources, processes, and performance measures for implementing those strategies. The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) provides a strategic planning and reporting framework intended to improve federal agencies’ performance and hold them accountable for achieving results. Effective implementation of GPRA’s results-oriented framework requires, among other things, that agencies clearly establish performance goals for which they will be held accountable, measure progress towards those goals, and determine strategies and resources to effectively accomplish the goals. Furthermore, defining organizational roles and responsibilities and mechanisms for coordination in these strategies can help agencies clarify who will lead or participate in which activities and how decisions will be made. It can also help them organize their individual and joint efforts, and address how conflicts would be resolved. Our prior work, as well as that by national security experts, has found that strategic direction is required as a foundation for collaboration toward national security goals. We have found that, for example, in the past, multiple agencies, including the State Department, USAID, and DOD, led separate efforts to improve the capacity of Iraq’s ministries to govern, without overarching direction from a lead entity to integrate their efforts. Since 2007, we have testified and reported that the lack of an overarching strategy contributed to U.S. efforts not meeting the goal for key Iraqi ministries to develop the capacity to effectively govern and assume increasing responsibility for operating, maintaining, and further investing in reconstruction projects. We recommended that the Department of State, in consultation with the Iraqi government, complete an overall strategy for U.S. efforts to develop the capacity of the Iraqi government. State recognized the value of such a strategy but expressed concern about conditioning further capacity development investment on completion of such a strategy. Moreover, our work on the federal government’s pandemic influenza preparedness efforts found that the Departments of Homeland Security and Health and Human Services share most federal leadership roles in implementing the pandemic influenza strategy and supporting plans; however, we reported that it was not clear how this would work in practice because their roles are unclear. The National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza and its supporting implementation plan describes the Secretary of Health and Human Services as being responsible for leading the medical response in a pandemic, while the Secretary of Homeland Security would be responsible for overall domestic incident management and federal coordination. However, since a pandemic extends well beyond health and medical boundaries—to include sustaining critical infrastructure, private-sector activities, the movement of goods and services across the nation and the globe, and economic and security considerations—it is not clear when, in a pandemic, the Secretary of Health and Human Services would be in the lead and when the Secretary of Homeland Security would lead. This lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities could lead to confusion or disagreements among implementing agencies that could hinder interagency collaboration. Furthermore, a federal response could be slowed as agencies resolve their roles and responsibilities following the onset of a significant outbreak. We have also issued reports recommending that U.S. government agencies, including DOD, the State Department, and others, develop or revise strategies to incorporate desirable characteristics for strategies for a range of programs and activities. These include humanitarian and development efforts in Somalia, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, foreign assistance strategy, law enforcement agencies’ role in assisting foreign nations in combating terrorism, and meeting U.S. national security goals in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas. In commenting on drafts of those reports, agencies generally concurred with our recommendations. Officials from one organization—the National Counterterrorism Center—noted that at the time of our May 2007 report on law enforcement agencies’ role in assisting foreign nations in combating terrorism, it had already begun to implement our recommendations. Organizational differences—including differences in agencies’ structures, planning processes, and funding sources—can hinder interagency collaboration. Agencies lack adequate coordination mechanisms to facilitate this collaboration during planning and execution of programs and activities. U.S. government agencies, such as the Department of State, USAID, and DOD, among others, spend billions of dollars annually on various diplomatic, development, and defense missions in support of national security. Achieving meaningful results in many national security– related interagency efforts requires coordinated efforts among various actors across federal agencies; foreign, state, and local governments; nongovernment organizations; and the private sector. Given the number of agencies involved in U.S. government national security efforts, it is important that there be mechanisms to coordinate across agencies. Without such mechanisms, the results can be a patchwork of activities that waste scarce funds and limit the overall effectiveness of federal efforts. A good example of where agencies involved in national security activities define and organize their regions differently involves DOD’s regional combatant commands and the State Department’s regional bureaus. Both are aligned differently in terms of the geographic areas they cover, as shown in figure 1. As a result of differing structures and areas of coverage, coordination becomes more challenging and the potential for gaps and overlaps in policy implementation is greater. Moreover, funding for national security activities is budgeted for and appropriated by agency, rather than by functional area (such as national security), resulting in budget requests and congressional appropriations that tend to reflect individual agency concerns. Given these differences, it is important that there be mechanisms to coordinate across agencies. In addition to regional bureaus, the State Department is organized to interact through U.S. embassies located within other countries. As a result of these differing structures, our prior work and that of national security experts has found that agencies must coordinate with a large number of organizations in their regional planning efforts, potentially creating gaps and overlaps in policy implementation and leading to challenges in coordinating efforts among agencies. Given the differences among U.S. government agencies, developing adequate coordination mechanisms is critical to achieving integrated approaches. In some cases, agencies have established effective mechanisms. For example, DOD’s U.S. Africa Command had undertaken efforts to integrate personnel from other U.S. government agencies into its command structure because the command is primarily focused on strengthening security cooperation with African nations and creating opportunities to bolster the capabilities of African partners, which are activities that traditionally require coordination with other agencies. However, in other cases, challenges remain. For example, we reported in May 2007 that DOD had not established adequate mechanisms to facilitate and encourage interagency participation in the development of military plans developed by the combatant commanders. Furthermore, we noted that inviting interagency participation only after plans have been formulated is a significant obstacle to achieving a unified government approach in the planning effort. In that report, we suggested that Congress require DOD to develop an action plan and report annually on steps being taken to achieve greater interagency participation in the development of military plans. Moreover, we reported in March 2010 that DOD has many strategy, policy, and guidance documents on interagency coordination of its homeland defense and civil support mission; however, DOD entities do not have fully or clearly defined roles and responsibilities because key documents are outdated, are not integrated, or are not comprehensive. More specifically, conflicting directives assigned overlapping law enforcement support responsibilities to three different DOD entities, creating confusion as to which DOD office is actually responsible for coordinating with law enforcement agencies. DOD’s approach to identifying roles and responsibilities and day-to-day coordination processes could also be improved by providing relevant information in a single, readily-accessible source. This source could be accomplished through a variety of formats such as a handbook or a Web-based tool and could provide both DOD and other agencies a better understanding of each other as federal partners and enable a unified and institutionalized approach to interagency coordination. We recommended, and DOD agreed, that the department update and integrate its strategy, policy, and guidance; develop a partner guide; and implement key practices for management of homeland defense and civil support liaisons. We have reported other instances in which mechanisms are not formalized or fully utilized. For example, we found that collaboration between DOD’s Northern Command and an interagency planning team on the development of the command’s homeland defense plan was largely based on the dedicated personalities involved and informal meetings. Without formalizing and institutionalizing the interagency planning structure, we concluded efforts to coordinate may not continue when personnel move on to their next assignments. We made several recommendations, and DOD generally concurred, that the department take several actions to address the challenges it faces in its planning and interagency coordination efforts.