In 1990, we first designated DOE program and contract management as an area at high risk of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. In January 2009, to recognize the progress made at DOE’s Office of Science, we narrowed the focus of the high-risk designation to two DOE program elements, NNSA and the Office of Environmental Management. In February 2013, our most recent high-risk update, we narrowed this focus to major projects (i.e., projects over $750 million) at NNSA and the Office of Environmental Management. DOE has taken some steps to address our concerns, including developing an order in 2010 (Order 413.3B) that defines DOE’s project management principles and process for executing a capital asset construction project, which can include building or demolishing facilities or constructing remediation systems.NNSA is required by DOE to manage the UPF construction project in accordance with this order. The project management process defined in Order 413.3B requires DOE projects to go through five management reviews and approvals, called “critical decisions” (CD), as they move forward from project planning and design to construction to operation. The CDs are as follows: CD 0: Approve a mission-related need. CD 1: Approve an approach to meet a mission need and a preliminary cost estimate. CD 2: Approve the project’s cost, schedule and scope targets. CD 3: Approve the start of construction. CD 4: Approve the start of operations. In August 2007, the Deputy Secretary of Energy originally approved CD 1 for the UPF with a cost range of $1.4 to $3.5 billion. In June 2012, the Deputy Secretary of Energy reaffirmed CD 1 for the UPF with a cost range of $4.2 to $6.5 billion and approved a phased approach to the project, which deferred significant portions of the facility’s original scope. According to NNSA documents, this deferral was due, in part, to the project’s multibillion dollar increased cost estimate and to accelerate the completion of the highest priority scope. In July 2013, NNSA decided to Table 1 shows the combine CD 2 and CD 3 for the first phase of UPF.UPF’s phases, scope of work, cost estimate, as of June 2012, and proposed start of operations. However, the future status of the UPF project and the process by which enriched uranium operations at the Y-12 plant will be modernized are unclear. NNSA has recently decided to: (1) delay later UPF phases, (2) assess options other than the UPF for enriched uranium operations at the Y-12 plant, (3) change a key technological requirement for the UPF, and (4) develop a strategy for how NNSA will maintain the Y-12 plant’s uranium capabilities into the future. Specifically: NNSA is delaying UPF Phase II and Phase III a minimum of 2 years. In a December 2013 testimony before the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, the NNSA Acting Administrator said that the agency does not expect to move out the facilities that house machining operations (Building 9215) as well as assembly and dismantlement operations (Building 9204-2E) until 2038 due primarily to budget constraints. NNSA previously estimated that these capabilities would be operational in the UPF no later than 2036. NNSA is currently evaluating alternatives to the UPF. In early January 2014, NNSA began to consider options other than the UPF for enriched uranium operations at the Y-12 plant because, according to the UPF Federal Project Director, the project is facing budget constraints, rising costs, and competition from other high-priority projects within NNSA—such as the planned B61 bomb and W78/88 warhead nuclear weapon life extension projects. NNSA has initiated a formal analysis of UPF alternatives—an analytical comparison of the operational effectiveness, costs, and suitability of proposed solutions to address a mission need. According to the UPF Federal Project Director, the analysis of alternatives, which is scheduled to be completed by April 15, 2014, will include a potential solution for replacing only uranium purification and casting capabilities (Building 9212) by July 2025 at a cost that does not exceed $6.5 billion. According to the NNSA Acting Administrator, NNSA does not plan to continue full operations in Building 9212, which has been operational for over 60 years, past 2025 because the building does not meet modern safety standards, and increasing equipment failure rates present challenges to meeting required production targets. While NNSA is undertaking the analysis of alternatives, the UPF project team is currently (1) delaying the start of approximately $300 million in site preparation and long lead procurement activities and (2) will no longer complete engineering work to have the UPF’s design reach the 90 percent complete milestone by August 2014, as previously planned. NNSA is currently evaluating alternatives for a key uranium purification technology originally planned for UPF Phase I, which now may be part of UPF Phase II. In late January 2014, NNSA decided to consider alternatives from its baseline uranium purification technology—which was to be part of UPF Phase I scope and had been under development since 2005—to a new technology, according to the UPF Federal Project Director. NNSA believes the new technology will require less space in the UPF and be more efficient to operate. In early February 2014, NNSA directed the UPF contractor to suspend design efforts in two UPF processing areas impacted by the potential technology change. Furthermore, NNSA is now considering installing this new technology as part of UPF Phase II scope, pending the results of further analysis. NNSA is currently developing a Uranium Infrastructure Strategy for the Y-12 plant. In early February 2014, the NNSA Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs directed his staff to develop a Uranium Infrastructure Strategy, which establishes the framework of how NNSA will maintain the Y-12 plant’s uranium mission capabilities into the future. Key aspects that are to be considered during the strategy’s development include, among other things: (1) an evaluation of the uranium purification capabilities and the throughput needed to support requirements for life extension programs and nuclear fuel for the U.S. Navy; (2) an evaluation of the alternatives to the UPF that prioritizes replacement capabilities by risk to nuclear safety, security, and mission continuity; (3) an identification of existing infrastructure as a bridging strategy until replacement capability is available in new infrastructure. A draft of the strategy is due to the Deputy Administrator by early April 2014. To assess the maturity of new technologies, DOE and NNSA adopted the use of Technology Readiness Levels (TRL). DOE took this action in response to our March 2007 report that recommended that DOE develop a consistent approach to assess the extent to which new technologies have been demonstrated to work as intended in a project before starting construction.which is the least mature; through TRL 4, in which the technology is validated in a laboratory environment; to TRL 9—the highest maturity level, where the technology as a total system is fully developed, integrated, and functioning successfully in project operations. As shown in table 2, TRLs start with TRL 1, we found that DOE’s TRL guidance was not always consistent with best practices followed by other federal agencies, as well as with our prior recommendations. Specifically, DOE’s TRL guidance recommended that new technologies reach TRL 6—the level where a prototype is demonstrated in a relevant or simulated environment and partially integrated into the system—at the start of construction (CD 3). However, best practices followed by other federal agencies and our prior recommendations state that new technologies should reach TRL 7— the level where a prototype is demonstrated in an operational environment, has been integrated with other key supporting subsystems, and is expected to have only minor design changes—at the start of construction. In our November 2010 report, we recommended that the Secretary of Energy evaluate where DOE’s guidance for gauging the maturity of new technologies is inconsistent with best practices and, as appropriate, revise the guidance to be consistent with federal agency best practices. In September 2011, DOE issued its revised TRL guidance, but the guidance does not incorporate federal agency best practices and is not fully responsive to our recommendation. Specifically, DOE’s revised TRL guidance continues to recommend that new technologies reach TRL 6 at the start of construction, while stating that reaching TRL 7 at the start of construction is a recognized best practice. In November 2010, we reported that NNSA was developing 10 advanced uranium processing and nuclear weapon components production technologies for the UPF. Since that time, NNSA eliminated 1 technology as the agency removed certain operations from the UPF. In April 2013, NNSA chartered an independent peer review team to examine various aspects of the UPF project, including assessing the current TRLs for new technologies. In an August 2013 report, the independent peer review team found that 6 of the 9 new technologies were not as mature as previously reported in the UPF contractor’s May 2013 TRL assessment; the independent peer review report also stated that no fundamental technology show stoppers were identified. In addition, the independent peer review report contained multiple technology development related findings and recommendations, and NNSA and the UPF contractor developed a corrective action plan to address them. Table 3 provides a description of the new technologies, the phase in which each technology will be deployed, and the TRL assessment concluded by the UPF contractor in May 2013 and the UPF independent peer review in August 2013. Since our November 2010 report, we identified five additional risks associated with using new technologies in the UPF. Specifically: Integration risks for microwave casting technology.