The scope of equipment reset efforts that will be required as a result of ongoing operations related to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) is enormous. The services have committed a significant amount of equipment to these operations. From 2003 until April 2005, the Army had deployed more than 40 percent of its equipment in support of OIF and OEF. As of March 2005, the Marine Corps had about 22 percent of its total fleet assets engaged in Iraq. Recently, the Marines estimated that approximately 40 percent of all Marine Corps ground equipment, 50 percent to 55 percent of communications equipment, and 20 percent of aircraft assets are in use in support of current operations. According to the Army, reset comprises a series of repair, recapitalization, and replacement actions to restore units’ equipment to a desired level of combat capability commensurate with mission requirements and availability of resources. The purpose of reset is to bring unit equipment to combat-ready condition, either for the unit’s next rotation in support of current operations or for other, unknown future contingencies. The Army’s standard level of maintenance is known as 10/20. This standard requires that all routine maintenance be executed and all deficiencies be repaired. Equipment at less than the 10/20 standard can be fully mission capable, which means there are no critical maintenance deficiencies as outlined in the technical manuals and instructions, and no safety deficiencies. Unit commanders have the authority to supersede the technical manuals and declare a system fully mission capable even though it has a non-mission capable deficiency. The Marine Corps’s equivalent term is “mission capable.” The Army’s reset strategy for ground vehicles includes an additional set of maintenance procedures known as Delayed Desert Damage (3D) which are designed to address damage that results from these vehicles operating in a desert environment. These procedures are designed to address damage that might otherwise not be visible. These 3D checks are initially performed at the unit level. Equipment that goes to a depot is subjected to more extensive 3D maintenance procedures. Army aviation equipment is subject to Special Technical Inspection and Repair (STIR). Similar to 3D, this maintenance is designed to address damage caused by operation in a desert environment. STIR also includes other routine maintenance. Although the terms may be slightly different, the Marine Corps equipment repair and replacement process and equipment standards parallel the Army process and standards for equipment maintenance. The Marine Corps equivalent to the Army’s reset process is termed “recovery.” Marine Corps equipment returning from combat theaters is evaluated and transported to either a maintenance depot or to a Marine Corps unit’s home station for repair. The Marine Corps’s equipment recovery process entails restoring all equipment used in Global War on Terror (GWOT) operations to its pre-GWOT condition. For equipment in the Marine Corps prepositioning fleet, this means restoring to a “like new condition,” for all other equipment, this means is restoring to a mission capable status. The Marine Corps also applies procedures similar to the 3D as appropriate. The Department of Defense (DOD) reported in April 2005 that they expected a new set of protocols to emerge based on experience with equipment used in OIF and OEF. These protocols may be similar to 3D and STIR which emerged as maintenance procedures based on experience from Operation Desert Storm. DOD, as part of its ongoing effort to assess stress on equipment, plans to look for unusual wear patterns and methods to address them as well as examining maintenance trends. Depot maintenance is defined as the highest level of maintenance activity, where the most complex maintenance work is done, from overhaul of components to complete rebuilds. Military depots and defense contractors throughout the United States perform depot-level maintenance. In response to the harsh operating environments in Iraq and Afghanistan and the unanticipated and prolonged length and pace of sustained operations, the Army and Marine Corps have developed and implemented several initiatives to equip their forces and maintain extensive amounts of equipment in theater. Specifically, the Army and Marine Corps have implemented initiatives to keep large amounts of unit equipment in theater after the units redeploy to their home stations in the United States for the purpose of rapidly equipping follow-on units, and have developed additional maintenance capacity in theater above the unit level to sustain major equipment items such as high mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), other tracked and wheeled vehicles, and aviation equipment. Environmental factors such as heat, sand, and dust have taken their tolls on major equipment items. In addition, as we have previously reported, the Army and Marine Corps are operating equipment at a pace well in excess of their normal peacetime levels, which is generating a large operational maintenance and replacement requirement that must be addressed when the units return to their home stations. Continued operations have increased the operational tempo for a great deal of Army and Marine Corps equipment. In April 2005, the Department of Defense (DOD) reported Army equipment usage rates averaged two to eight times that of peacetime rates. Senior Marine Corps officials recently testified that the Marine Corps usage rates for ground equipment in ongoing operations were four to nine times that of peacetime rates. Despite these high usage rates, the deployed Army units have generally reported high levels of overall readiness and relatively high levels of equipment readiness. Deployed Marine Corps units, however, report more degraded levels of overall and equipment readiness. Unit commanders in both services are able to subjectively upgrade their overall readiness ratings, although this has been done to a lesser extent by the Marine Corps. Absent such upgrades, overall readiness levels (particularly for the Army) would be significantly lower as a result of units’ low levels of equipment and supplies on hand. To meet ongoing operational requirements, the Army and Marine Corps have developed and implemented initiatives to concentrate equipment in theater. When the Army initially developed its strategy of retaining equipment from redeploying units in theater, it did not envision this to be a long-term mechanism for managing equipment needs, but rather a short- term measure to conserve transportation assets and, more importantly, ensure that units were rapidly equipped. The Marine Corps, like the Army, developed a similar equipment management initiative. Additionally, the Army has developed a pool of equipment in theater to expedite the replacement of equipment damaged during these operations, referred to as theater sustainment stocks (TSS), which includes, for example, tanks, HMMWVs, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and support vehicles. As of January 2006, TSS included an estimated 400 different types of vehicles and other equipment. The Marine Corps recently testified that they have developed a similar pool of ground equipment known as Forward In-Stores to replace damaged major equipment items. To ensure that deployed units receive required amounts of equipment critical for their missions, the Army has designated certain major equipment items, such as add-on-armor vehicles, up-armored HMMWVs, selected communications and intelligence equipment, and other items deemed critical for OIF and OEF missions as “theater provided equipment” (TPE). According to Army officials, based on operational decisions, these theater-specific items are being left in theater because these are force protection items. This equipment is taken from active, Guard, and Reserve forces when they return to the United States and is retained in theater to hand off to follow-on units. TPE includes equipment such as armored vehicles, individual soldier body armor, and equipment used to counter improvised explosive devices. As of November 2005, the Coalition Forces Land Component Commander estimated that there were approximately 300,000 equipment items in the TPE inventory in Iraq, including more than 26,000 vehicles. The Army’s TPE initiative began in late 2003, when the first Army units were directed to leave equipment in theater, then known as “stay behind equipment.” The Army, in November 2005, replaced the term “stay behind equipment” with the term TPE to better manage equipment accountability and also reflect items that were procured directly for the theater. Unlike other less intensely managed equipment items, TPE is transferred directly from units leaving the theater to deploying units taking their place. In most cases, these transfers take place at the unit’s forward station in Iraq. As a result, most of this equipment has been in heavy use in harsh desert and combat conditions since it was first left in theater by the units that originally deployed with the equipment. Because TPE is maintained at the unit level, this strategy has not provided the Army with an opportunity to periodically rotate TPE back to the United States for depot level maintenance. As discussed in a later section, keeping large amounts of equipment in theater for long periods of time without the opportunity for depot-level repair has created a number of related consequences. The Marine Corps, like the Army, has directed that equipment necessary for OIF and OEF operations remain in theater. Because many Marine Corps mission requirements have been exceeding the unit’s typical combat equipment allowances, Marine Corps commanders in theater have developed expanded equipment packages for deploying units that are designed to ensure that units have the required equipment for their missions. Deploying Marine Corps units fall in on and assume custody of equipment left by other units departing the theater. According to recent Marine Corps testimony, this initiative allows it to provide the best equipment possible to forces in theater while also reducing equipment rotation costs. Marine Corps officials estimated they had deployed about 30 percent of its ground equipment, and 20 percent of aviation assets in support of ongoing operations. However, the percentage of ground equipment deployed in support of operations has been as high as 40 percent according to recent Marine Corps testimony. While this initiative has met equipment needs to date, it has caused some major equipment items to remain in constant operation, often in harsh desert conditions. To address the effects of the harsh operating environments and the maintenance needs of rapidly deteriorating equipment that is being held in theater for extensive periods, the Army and Marine Corps have developed initiatives to increase the maintenance capacity in theater to be able to provide near-depot level repair capabilities.