Iran's ballistic missile program dates to the late 1970s after the Shah was overthrown and the Islamic Republic of Iran established. The new Iranian government embarked on a ballistic missile program marked by considerable secrecy. Many consider that Iran's ballistic missile development was in full force by the mid-1980s during its protracted war against Iraq, during which Iran reportedly launched more than 600 ballistic missiles. Today, there is little disagreement among most experts that Iran has acquired some number of ballistic missiles from other countries and has developed other ballistic missiles indigenously or in cooperation with others. Iranian ballistic missile proliferation has been a matter of U.S. and international concern. At the same time, however, there has been considerable public disagreement over precisely what kinds of ballistic missile systems Iran has or is developing itself or in cooperation with others. This is because there is little transparency in Iran's ballistic missile programs, which has led to some degree of a lack of confidence in Iran's public assertions of its activities. Finally, details about Iranian ballistic missile programs remain classified in the United States. Because of the secrecy inherent in the development of weapon systems, especially in less open societies, open-source analyses reflect a wide-range of technical views and assessments. This report provides a brief description of what is publicly discussed regarding Iran's ballistic missile programs ; it does not discuss Iranian cruise missiles or rockets. These latter weapons were a source of concern when some reportedly Iranian-made rockets and other missiles may have been used by Hezbollah against Israel in 2006. Charges of Iranian military support to Iraqi insurgents do not include Iranian-made rockets or missiles, however. This report first examines Iran's long-range ballistic missile programs because those efforts generally drive the greatest concerns within the United States, especially when coupled with concern over the development of Iran's nuclear capabilities. A brief overview of Iran's medium and short-range ballistic missile programs then follows. Traditionally, the United States has defined long-range or Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) as those ballistic missiles capable of ranges greater than 5,500 kilometers (about 3,400 miles). To date, five countries have deployed operational ICBMs (all with nuclear weapons): the United States, Russia, China, France, and Britain. Other countries, such as Iran, are believed by some observers to have ICBM programs in varying stages of development. In 1999, the U.S. intelligence community assessed that at some point the United States would probably face ICBM threats from Iran. This remains the official U.S. position, that "Iran could test an ICBM in the last half of the next decade using Russian technology and assistance" (emphasis in the original). A similar report was issued in 2001. This assessment is often interpreted that Iran will have ICBMs by 2015, but the unclassified intelligence statements place various caveats on that potential capability. These intelligence statements serve as the official U.S. basis for assessing the Iranian ICBM threat to the United States and its friends and allies. These assessments drive U.S. military efforts designed to respond to such threats, such as the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program in general and the U.S. proposed missile defense system in Europe specifically, as well as U.S. diplomatic efforts to curb Iranian long-range ballistic missile programs. These assessments, in conjunction with official U.S. assessments of Iranian nuclear weapons development, contribute significantly to ongoing U.S. concerns over Iranian threats to U.S. and international security. These assessments do not mean, however, that there is universal agreement within the U.S. intelligence community on the issue of an Iranian ICBM. According to these unclassified statements, some argue that an Iranian ICBM test is likely before 2010, and very likely before 2015. Other U.S. officials believe, however, that there is "less than an even chance" for such a test before 2015. Furthermore, U.S. assessments are also conditional in that an Iranian ICBM capability would have to rely on access to foreign technology, from, for example, North Korea or Russia. Finally, it is argued that an Iranian ICBM could develop from an Iranian space program under which a space-launch vehicle program might be converted into an ICBM program. Some have argued that Iran could develop and test such a space launch vehicle by 2010. Some observers argue that although the U.S. position may be based upon a realistic assessment, it is also a worst-case analysis of the potential threat from Iran. They argue that "with rare exception this level of threat has rarely turned out to be the historical reality." Beyond these general U.S. public statements about Iranian ICBM developments, there are few unclassified details. Further, non-official public sources reflect little technical or program consensus regarding an Iranian ICBM program. Some have referred to a program called the Shahab-6 (or Kosar in some instances) as a potential ICBM development program, perhaps derived from North Korean or Russian missile technology, or both. Although Iran continues to declare it has no plans to develop an ICBM program, there appears to be considerable public uncertainty and debate as to whether the Shahab-6 is an actual design study concept, or an active or abandoned Iranian ICBM or even space-launch program. In January 2004, Iran's Defense Minister reportedly announced that Iran would launch a satellite within 18 months. Iran then launched its first commercial satellite on a Russian rocket in 2005, and announced that it had allocated $500 million for space projects over the next five years. In February 2008, Iran reportedly launched a low-orbit research rocket in preparation for a later satellite launch. The Bush White House called that launch "unfortunate." In August 2008, Iran said it successfully launched a rocket that could carry its first satellite, but U.S. defense officials said the test aimed failed shortly after launch. In early February 2009, Iran successfully launched its Omid (Hope) satellite on a Safir-2 (or Ambassador-2) rocket , which has a range of about 155 miles. A Pentagon spokesman said this launch was "clearly a concern of ours" because "there are dual-use capabilities here which could be applied toward the development of long-range missiles." Many experts believe that Iran's Shahab-3, which sometimes appears also to be called the Zelzal-3 ballistic missile, is a derivative of the North Korean No-Dong 1 ballistic missile. It has a reported range of about 1,000 to 1,500 kilometers. This could reach potential targets throughout most of the Middle East. Some have speculated that North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan entered into a cooperative effort at one point to develop a missile of this range and capability. Other observers have alleged Russian assistance in Iranian development of this missile. Some reports suggest that Iran has already deployed a number of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs). Of all Iranian ballistic missile programs, there seems to be more publicly available information in relative terms about this particular missile system than others. Even so, there remains considerable and varying differences in open sources about this system. Longer range versions of the Shahab-3, variously referred to as Shahab-3 variants, the Shahab-3A, Shahab-3B, and Shahab-4, and a BM-25, may have range capabilities of 1,500-2,500 kilometers. These missiles potentially could reach targets throughout the Middle East, Turkey, and into southeastern Europe. Some have reported that perhaps several dozen or more of these missile types may be deployed and operational. Some Chinese, North Korean, or Russian involvement is suspected. In 2006, Iran announced the successful test of a Fajr-3 MRBM comparable to the Shahab-3, although U.S. and Israeli intelligence analysts reportedly expressed skepticism. In mid-July 2008, Iran launched a number of ballistic missiles and rockets of varying ranges during military exercises. Some observers noted the missile launches were in direct response to long-range Israeli air force exercises at the time. Iran claimed it flight tested a 2,000 km version of the Shahab-3 that could carry a 1-ton warhead. If accurate, this missile could hit targets throughout the Middle East and Turkey. But some analysts are skeptical of these Iranian claims pending further technical analyses of these recent military exercises, and others have cited Iranian exaggerations of its missile capabilities in the past. Various major international media retracted initial images of the missile launches because they were reportedly digitally altered. Bush Administration officials said Iran did not test new technologies or capabilities, but said the missile launches were evidence of the need for its proposed missile defense system in Europe. Secretary of State Rice stated the exercises were not helpful and that Iran should refrain from such activities. Iran said it successfully test fired a 2-stage solid-fuel missile with a 2,000 kilometer range in November 2008. At the time, a Pentagon spokesman said he could not confirm the launch occurred, but that this was consistent with the fact that Iran continues to develop a ballistic missile program that poses a threat to Iran's neighbors in the region and beyond. Other reports have also surfaced over Iran's development of a much longer MRBM with ranges of 4,000-5,000 kilometers, or even a space launch vehicle derived from these efforts that some refer to as the Shahab-5. The degree to which this effort might be actually underway also is highly uncertain. Iran is widely believed to have deployed a number of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs)—those with ranges less than 1,000 kilometers. In addition, Iran is believed to have various other SRBMs under development, either indigenously or in varying degrees of cooperation with countries such as China, North Korea, or Russia. Beyond these speculations, however, open source materials do not reflect a consensus over technical capabilities and performance.