A number of DOD organizations have issued orders outlining a phased drawdown from Iraq that meet the time frames set forth in the Security Agreement and presidential guidance, while being responsive to security conditions on the ground. Additionally, much has been accomplished to prepare for the retrograde of materiel from theater, including establishing processes to monitor, coordinate, and facilitate the flow of equipment out of Iraq. Furthermore, several organizations have been created to facilitate the retrograde of equipment and support unity of effort. To date, these efforts have contributed to MNF-I meeting or exceeding its targets for drawing down forces, retrograding equipment, and closing bases. While DOD has made significant progress executing the drawdown, there remains a large amount of personnel, equipment, and bases that must be drawn down within the established timelines. Headquarters, Department of the Army, MNF-I, and its subordinate command responsible for executing the drawdown in Iraq—Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I)—have issued plans outlining how the drawdown should be managed over time. These plans also endeavor to provide flexibility to commanders on the ground to conduct ongoing combat operations while simultaneously executing the drawdown. For example, in order to balance operational needs with the requirement to meet drawdown goals, commanders have the discretion to choose which of their equipment is no longer essential for ongoing operations, and can therefore be retrograded. Subsequent phases will see an increase in the flow of equipment retrograded from Iraq as the pace of the drawdown quickens. In support of these plans, processes have been established to monitor, coordinate, and facilitate the retrograde of equipment out of Iraq. As we reported in September 2008, MNF-I had processes in place to manage the retrograde of various types of equipment from Iraq. Since that time these processes have been refined and new elements have been established to improve them. For example, partly in response to our previous work, representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Lean Six Sigma office conducted six reviews to optimize theater logistics, one of which focused on the process for retrograding equipment from Iraq. This work informed the development of a new data system, referred to as the Theater Provided Equipment Planner, which is intended to streamline the retrograde process by facilitating the issuance of disposition instructions for theater provided equipment while it is still in Iraq. In addition, a second new data system, Materiel Enterprise Non-Standard Equipment, has also been developed to facilitate the issuance of disposition instructions for non-standard equipment. In addition to refining the retrograde processes, several organizations have been created to oversee, synchronize, and ensure unity of effort for the retrograde of equipment from Iraq. In September 2008, GAO reported that the variety of organizations exercising influence over the retrograde process and the resulting lack of a unified or coordinated command structure was not consistent with joint doctrine, led to increased confusion and inefficiencies in the retrograde process, and inhibited the adoption of identified mitigation initiatives. To bolster unity of effort, MNF-I has created a Drawdown Fusion Center, the mission of which is to provide a strategic picture of drawdown operations, identify potential obstacles, address strategic issues, and assist in the development of policy and guidance related to several aspects of drawdown. To accomplish this mission, the Drawdown Fusion Center provides guidance on the disposition of materiel, monitors and advises on transportation options, tracks and monitors the capabilities of ports through which materiel is shipped, tracks logistics actions that impact disposition during drawdown, and acts as a focal point for all external agencies and the Government of Iraq in matters related to the drawdown. Assisting the Drawdown Fusion Center is U.S. Army Central’s Support Element-Iraq, a liaison element established to enhance synchronization and coordination among MNF-I; MNC-I; U.S. Army Central; Headquarters, Department of the Army; and Army Materiel Command. It also generates theater and Department of the Army disposition guidance for all forces and materiel redeploying and retrograding out of Iraq. Finally, the Department of the Army, with Army Materiel Command as the lead agency, created a Responsible Reset Task Force to facilitate the provision of disposition instructions for materiel retrograding out of Iraq and synchronize those instructions to facilitate the reset of Army equipment. DOD organizations reported that their efforts to reduce personnel, retrograde equipment, and close bases in the initial months of the drawdown have exceeded targets. First, according to the MNF-I commanding general, U.S. forces have already begun drawing down in Iraq without compromising security. For example, since May 2009, the number of U.S. servicemembers in Iraq has been reduced by 5,300. Furthermore, the MNF-I commander testified on September 30, 2009, that another 4,000 servicemembers will likely be drawn down in October 2009—earlier than originally planned—due to improvements in Anbar province. Second, as of August 2009, the Army reported that it has exceeded its target figure for the retrograde of rolling stock by 1,800 pieces. Finally, the Army has reported that as of August 2009, it had closed three more bases than originally planned. While DOD’s progress since May 2009 has exceeded its targets, a large amount of personnel, equipment, and bases remain to be drawn down within the established timelines. To meet the presidential target of reducing the number of U.S. forces in Iraq to 50,000 by August 31, 2010, MNF-I must reduce its forces by almost 60 percent by next summer. Furthermore, to meet the other targets established by MNF-I and the Army for August 2010, MNF-I must draw down 32 percent of its contractor personnel workforce, retrograde over 50 percent of its tracked and wheeled vehicles, and close 67 percent of its bases in Iraq. The remaining forces, contractor personnel, and equipment will have to be drawn down during the final 16 months, from September 2010 to December 31, 2011, during which time some of the largest bases in Iraq will also need to be closed or transferred to the Government of Iraq, a task the commanding general of MNF-I stated could take 9 to 10 months to complete. Figure 2 below illustrates the numbers of U.S. forces, contractor personnel, tracked and wheeled vehicles, and bases that have been drawn down since the initiation of drawdown; that must be drawn down by the August 31, 2010, change of mission date; and that must be drawn down before December 31, 2011. Efficient execution of the drawdown from Iraq may be complicated by crucial challenges regarding several unresolved issues that, if left unattended, may hinder MNF-I’s ability to meet the time frames set by the President, the Security Agreement, and MNF-I’s phased drawdown plan. These challenges include: contract services that have not been fully identified; potential costs and other concerns of transitioning key contracts that may outweigh potential benefits; longstanding shortages of contract oversight personnel; some key decisions about the disposition of equipment that have not yet been made; longstanding information technology system weaknesses; and a lack of precise visibility over some equipment. Some of these issues are outside MNF-I’s purview and require action by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Military Departments. Others require a coordinated effort by MNF-I, U.S. Army Central, and other DOD organizations supporting the drawdown effort. DOD has not fully defined the additional contracted services it will need to successfully execute the drawdown and support the remaining U.S. forces in Iraq. Experience has shown that requirements for contracted services will likely increase during the drawdown and joint guidance states that planners should work closely with contracting officers to determine the best approach for purchasing contract services. In Iraq, such efforts may be hampered because contracting officials in Iraq do not have full visibility over the approximately 52,000 contracts in theater. Officials at Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan, the organization responsible for coordinating contract support during the drawdown, are currently trying to get the full picture of operational contract support in Iraq. However, DOD lacks a centralized repository of the specific services available on the various contracts. For example, there are several contracts for trucking services currently being used to transport materiel in support of the drawdown, but planners may lack the details necessary to allocate these services efficiently as drawdown progresses. Joint guidance also calls for DOD to identify contracted support requirements as early as possible to ensure that the military receives contracted support at the right place, at the right time, and for the right price. In particular, for the drawdown of forces to occur according to the timelines, commanders will need to determine their contract support requirements and communicate these to contracting officers several months in advance. Although the MNF-I drawdown order anticipates an increase in its need for contracted services through September 1, 2010, as of July 2009 commanders had not identified the specific types and levels of contracted services they will need during the drawdown. For example, Army officials in Kuwait responsible for the retrograde of theater provided equipment had not defined the specific level of contracted services needed to perform functions such as repairing vehicles and requesting disposition instructions. In planning for the contractor presence needed during the final phase of the drawdown, MNF-I has made assumptions in the absence of defined requirements or full visibility over contracted services that may contribute to wasted resources and may hinder the timely execution of drawdown. Even though it anticipates an increase in contracted services needed during the drawdown, MNF-I has set a target for reducing the number of contractor personnel in Iraq to 75,000 by September 1, 2010. According to MNF-I officials, this target was based on the historic ratio of contractor personnel to servicemembers in Iraq, rather than requirements for contracted support.