The Department of Defense (DOD) has several commissioning programs that it uses to bring new officers onto active duty, including the service academies, ROTC, and the services’ Officer Candidate Schools/Officer Training Schools (OCS/OTS). These programs vary in length, intensity, and content; the required period of active duty service incurred; and their cost to DOD. Each of the academies produces about 1,000 graduates a year. Consequently, if 5 percent of the graduates were to enter the guard/reserve, it would involve about 50 graduates a year from each of the 3 DOD academies. In 1996, the numbers of ROTC and OCS/OTS officers produced, respectively, in each of the services were: 2,887 and 350 in the Army, 857 and 1,383 in the Navy, 227 and 365 in the Marine Corps, and 1,637 and 646 in the Air Force. The reserve components have become increasingly central to the U.S. national defense strategy and have played an integral part in most recent military operations, including the Gulf War and Bosnia. The reserve component consists of various categories involving different degrees of participation. The policy proposal we examined specified that placement of academy graduates would be in an active reserve status, which includes only those in the selected reserve. The selected reserve includes those individuals in a part-time, paid drill status in either a reserve or National Guard unit, personnel in the Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) on active duty providing full-time support, and trained personnel called Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) designated to fill specific positions during mobilization. Since AGR personnel are on active duty and IMA personnel are typically fully trained, we focused our examination of the policy proposal only on the drilling guard/reserve. (See app. II for further background on the reserve components.) As of October 1, 1996, the drilling guard/reserve officer corps of 109,594 included 5,014 academy graduates, or about 4.6 percent (see fig. 1). This percentage compares to academy graduates comprising about 17.4 percent of the active duty officer corps (see fig. 2). The Navy reserve has the largest proportion of academy graduates at 10.3 percent, followed by the Air Force at 6.0 percent, the Marine Corps at 3.5 percent, and the Army at 2.6 percent. About 424 academy graduates were on full-time active duty in a reserve component under 10 U.S.C. 12301(d) and 32 U.S.C. 502(f) for the purpose of organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, and training the reservists. See appendix III for additional details on the number of academy graduates serving in the selected reserve. DOD, the active services, and the reserve components, with the exception of the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard, stated that sending service academy graduates directly to the drilling guard/reserve without officer skill training or active duty experience would not enhance the capability of the reserve component. Newly commissioned officers, regardless of whether they come from the academies, ROTC, or OCS/OTS, are not fully prepared for direct entry into military jobs. The military education at the service academies and the other commissioning programs focus on preparing graduates to go into the active component. But these commissioning programs do not provide specific military occupational skills. The transition into the active service is considered a necessary part of completing an officer’s education. Also, DOD officials told us that those officers who enter the guard/reserves without active duty experience would likely be at a competitive disadvantage, which could negatively affect their long-term career potential as a member of the reserve component. An additional concern to the reserve components is funding for mandatory follow-on training for newly commissioned officers transferred directly to units after commissioning. The requirement to train these officers would shift to the respective component, imposing significant increases in training funds because the basic branch qualification courses involve active duty, with sometimes lengthy training. DOD, the service academies, and the reserves believe that serving in the drilling guard/reserve may not be considered by the Congress or the taxpayers to be sufficient recoupment for the cost of an academy education. The service academies spent about $762 million in fiscal year 1995 to produce 2,900 officers. The cost of producing an officer in the class of 1995 was $277,000 at the Military Academy, $218,000 at the Naval Academy, $283,000 at the Air Force Academy, and $82,000 for the scholarship ROTC program. The services’ OCS/OTS programs and the National Guard OCS programs are considerably less expensive. The Congress has expressed concern about ensuring an adequate payback for the cost of officer training. The minimum active duty service commitment for academy graduates is 5 years, and ROTC graduates are obligated to serve 4 years. The active duty service commitment for academy graduates was raised to 6 years, starting with the class entering the academies in 1992, in an effort to ensure a greater return for the cost of an academy education. But before the change took effect, the 6-year obligation was rolled back to 5 years in 1995 because of concerns that it would harm academy recruiting. DOD officials have raised the question of whether attendance at training for 2 days per month and an annual training requirement of about 14 days would provide an adequate payback for DOD’s investment of $218,000 to $283,000 in an academy graduate’s education. If an academy graduate’s 5-year service obligation was required to be served through drilling guard/reserve participation, it would amount to about 190 total days of service. That amount would provide an implicit payback rate for their education of between $1,147 and $1,489 per day of drilling guard/reserve service. Officials cited a number of administrative and practical difficulties that would have to be overcome to make direct accession of academy graduates into the reserves feasible. They cited problems regarding the absence of an employment placement process at the academies; placement of graduates into drilling guard/reserve units; enforcement of guard/reserve service obligations; development of a fair and efficient selection process for determining which academy graduates would go to the guard/reserve, additional funding to provide skill training; the need to increase Navy ROTC enrollments to take the place of the academy graduates on active duty; and limited capacity in the Naval Reserve to absorb additional officers. The academies send their commissioned graduates to active duty and therefore have had no need for a civilian job placement operation. However, since service in the drilling guard/reserve would entail only part-time service (1 weekend a month plus an annual 2-week training period), academy graduates headed for immediate placement in the guard/reserve would need to be offered assistance finding jobs. Job placement assistance for ROTC students who are not offered active duty assignments is handled the same way it is for other students by the college or university they attend. Regardless of the source of commission, there is no guarantee that graduates would take jobs that are geographically close enough to guard/reserve units with vacancies. Potential reservists cannot be directed to specific units with vacancies if they live beyond a certain distance from the unit/reserve training site. The current policy is that guard/reserve members must live within 50 miles, or a 90-minute commute, of their training sites. If multiple training periods are performed together and mess facilities are available at the site, the distance is extended to 100 miles. However, we were told that the Army National Guard makes exceptions to this policy in less populated states for highly qualified officers and enlisted candidates who are willing to travel greater distances. DOD and service officials told us it would be difficult to enforce participation in the drilling guard/reserve by academy graduates or others who decided to leave active guard/reserve service with some remaining service obligation. The guard/reserves depend upon voluntary service. Under current policy, guard/reserve officers with a valid reason, such as family hardship, can move from the drilling guard/reserve to an inactive status at any time. Also, the enforcement alternative of calling to active duty those members who fail to abide by their guard/reserve commitment would be counter to the proposal’s objectives. Sending academy graduates to the guard/reserve directly after graduation would create a dilemma regarding fair and efficient selection criteria. Presently, students select their service assignments based on class standing, with top performing cadets/midshipmen having preference to available assignments over lower performers. A determination would need to be made regarding whether immediate guard/reserve selection would be voluntary or involuntary. If voluntary, there would be at least two issues to consider: whether there should be any restrictions on eligibility and what would happen if less than 5 percent volunteered. If assignment to the guard/reserve was involuntary, academy officials expressed concerns about a negative impact on cadet/midshipman motivation and breaking faith with the promise of an active duty assignment following graduation. During the past 5 years, Air Force Reserve officer accessions have been primarily those with prior active service. Consequently, they have not planned or budgeted for training for officers without active duty experience. The costs of initial skill training for academy graduates would have to be programmed and budgeted by the Air Force Reserves. Sending 5 percent of academy graduates to the reserve components would require rescheduling a similar number of ROTC graduates to active service. Initially, this would be a problem for the Navy. Navy ROTC programs have not been producing any graduates for the reserve. Consequently, the Navy would not currently have a sufficient number of excess ROTC graduates to replace about 50 academy graduates a year diverted from active duty to reserve service.