On October 19, 1999, Indonesia's parliament voted to confirm the results of the referendum in East Timor ofAugust 30,1999, which rejected autonomy under Indonesia and favored independence. Following the vote, East Timoresemilitiagroups, backed by the Indonesian military, launched a campaign of violence and destruction aimed at supportersofindependence. Hundreds, perhaps thousands of people were killed. Up to 240,000 East Timorese either fled acrosstheborder into Indonesian West Timor or were located there forcibly by the militia groups. The international responseto theviolence led the U.N. Security Council to authorize the dispatch of a peacekeeping force into East Timor to restoreorderand facilitate the withdrawal of Indonesian forces. Australian-led peacekeepers entered East Timor on September20, 1999. By the end of October, the Indonesian military had pulled out of East Timor. A United Nations TransitionalAuthority inEast Timor (UNTAET) was established by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1272 on October 25, 1999, to assistin thetransition to independence. The UNTAET assumed full administration of East Timor in March 2000. UNTAET's mandate has both a military and civilian component. Its tasks include: providing security andmaintaining lawand order; establishing a civil administration; developing social services; coordinating the delivery of humanitarianassistance; reconstruction and development assistance; and helping to establish the conditions for sustainabledevelopment. As of January 1, 2001, UNTAET had 7,765 military personnel, 1,389 police, and 124 military advisors. There were888international civilian personnel and 1,767 local civilian staff. Forty-seven countries, including the United States,providedmilitary, civilian, and police personnel. The plan for the recovery, reconstruction, and transition to independence for East Timor is divided into threephases. Thefirst was emergency humanitarian assistance to feed and house the population. With the exception of the refugeesremaining in West Timor, this phase is nearly over. The second phase, the beginning of power-sharing betweenUNTAETand the Timorese, began in July 2000. The chief governing body is a Transitional Cabinet chaired by the SecretaryGeneral's Special Representative and composed of five East Timorese and four international representatives. A36-member National Council, composed entirely of East Timorese, includes representatives from political parties,districts,religious groups, and civil organizations. It currently plays an oversight role and complements the Cabinet inadministeringthe country. The third, phase, which will lead to East Timor's independence, has begun with planning and publiceducationfor elections expected to be held in 2001. The first step will be the election of an 88-member Constituent Assemblyscheduled for August 30, 2001. Each of the country's 13 districts will elect one representative by majority vote, andtheremaining 75 members will be chosen by proportional representation. The Constituent Assembly then will draftaconstitution for an independent East Timor. U.N. officials had talked of independence by the end of 2001, butstatementsin June 2001 suggested that independence might be postponed until an indigenous East Timorese administrationisfunctioning fully. According to the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), beginning in September 1999 more than450,000 EastTimorese were displaced, including over 200,000 people forced to relocate within East Timor. Many of the latter group have returned to their homes. Currently,some food distribution to these people continues; but U.N. programs have largely moved from relief toreconstruction. Of the roughly 240,000 displaced East Timorese in Indonesian West Timor since October 1999, over 140,000 havereturned to East Timor. According to Indonesian government statistics in March 2001, over 93,000 East Timoresewere inrefugee camps; but the actual number of displaced East Timorese probably is slightly higher. Unknown numbersofrefugees are in other parts of Indonesia. The camps in West Timor vary in size and condition. Some settlementsare largewith up to 9,000 people; others are small with only a few families. Refugees are concentrated in three main areas:Kupang(capital of West Timor), Kefamananu, and Belu District. In September 2000, three U.N. humanitarian workers were killed by members of East Timorese militia groups, resulting inthe suspension of U.N. humanitarian activities in West Timor. The militia groups have controlled the camps,restricting thereturn of people to East Timor through threats and intimidation. (See section on Continuing Threats fromIndonesia). InMarch 2001, UNTAET reopened its office in Kupang and began to assess the prospect of resuming aid programsfor therefugees. Future returns of refugees likely will be influenced by several factors. One will be the extent ofintimidation andviolence orchestrated by the militia, and the level of safety for refugee aid workers. The composition East TimoreseinWest Timor include East Timorese who want to return to East Timor, but it also includes East Timorese who are Indonesian civil servants and members of the Indonesian military. An Indonesian government survey in June 2001foundover 90 percent of the refugees wanted to remain in Indonesia. International observers said the survey wasconducted freeof intimidation. (1) However, other observers believe that, under differentcircumstances, a larger percentage of refugeeswould opt to return to East Timor. A likely emerging issue is the status of displaced East Timorese in Indonesia in East Timor's forthcoming elections inpreparation for independence. Most of these people legally would be eligible to vote, but it is unlikely thatIndonesianauthorities and the militia groups would allow the United Nations to conduct elections in the camps in West Timor. Since the advent of the UNTAET, U.S. assistance to East Timor has included both disaster assistance to thedisplaced andto the refugees in West Timor as well as reconstruction and development assistance in East Timor. Aid has beenprovidedby the Department of State's Population, Refugee and Migration Bureau; USAID's Office of Foreign DisasterAssistanceand Food for Peace; and the Department of Defense. Total U.S. humanitarian assistance for fiscal years 1999 and2000was: No humanitarian assistance is being provided for West Timor in FY2001 because the Indonesians have not met theconditions of security and free access required to provide aid. While many observers praise the work done by UNTAET, all are careful to state that much remains to be done. Destruction in East Timor was extensive. Seventy percent of housing stock, public buildings, and utilities weredestroyed. Eighty percent of schools were destroyed. Virtually all medical facilities stopped functioning. Most of the civilservice andthe professional class have left East Timor, and the ability to fill these jobs with East Timorese is hampered by lowlevelsof education and the lack of a common language (Bahasa Indonesian, Portuguese, and the local language, Tetun,arecommonly used.) Economic reconstruction in East Timor includes both the physical rebuilding of schools, homes, medical facilities,commercial and public buildings, and the training of a work force capable of running the country. Though someelementary school teachers were East Timorese, most junior high, high school, and college teachers wereIndonesians. EastTimor has to train or recruit virtually all its medical personnel. As of early December 2000, the country had hirednearly6,000 civil servants, including over 4,700 teachers. Most core government functions are operational, but the numberofTimorese staff varies from area to area. Senior staff positions have been the most difficult to fill. Many of thosehiredmust be trained in their jobs. Training of staff is taking longer than anticipated. According to a World Bank reportprepared for the December 2000 Brussels meeting, the country is beginning to develop a police force and a policeacademy. Four courts have been established and staffed. Economic activity is beginning though at a low level. Most commerce and trade is stimulated by U.N. and expatriateexpenditures. Little long term investment has been made. Agriculture is recovering in some areas. Coffee exportswill bea key to East Timor's economic future. Oil drilling in the Timor Gap waters between Timor and Australia couldbe asignificant source of revenue if large deposits of oil and/or natural should be discovered. Australia and East Timorhavenegotiated under U.N. auspices a division of the revenues from oil and gas in the Timor Gap. The agreement of July2001gives East Timor 90 percent of future oil and gas revenues from a joint development area, estimated at over $4billion over20 years. Reconstruction of physical plants has been slow, especially of schools. Roads are being rebuilt on schedule, but powerplants are being rebuilt more slowly. According to the U.S. Agency for International Development, East Timor isnot yethalfway through the planned reconstruction program and far from attaining sustainable economic growth. Financing of the international activities in East Timor is done in two ways. The peacekeeping, U.N.administrative, andinternational police personnel are financed by an assessment of all U.N. members. The agreed level of funding fortheperiod July 2000 through June 2001 is $563 million. UNTAET's other functions (reconstruction, establishment ofa civilservice and police, training judges, and establishing media outlets) are funded by voluntary contributions to severalfundswhich were established at a donor conference on December 17, 1999. At the conference, donor governmentspledged over$520 million to rebuild East Timor during 2000-2002.