At the Obama Administration's request, in December 2011 Congress enacted into law a new, joint State Department and Department of Defense (DOD) Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) to assist countries with urgent security and stabilization needs. The Administration proposed the GSCF with its FY2012 budget submission as a "pilot project" for State and the DOD to jointly fund and plan security-related assistance. Its stated purpose was to enable the United States to better "address rapidly changing, transnational, asymmetric threats, and emergent opportunities." "Pooled" DOD and State Department funds would be used to develop interagency responses to build the security capacity of foreign states, to prevent conflict, and to stabilize countries in conflict or emerging from conflict. Congress, demonstrating its interest in the experiment, provided GSCF authority as Section 1207 of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act ( P.L. 112-81 ) for four fiscal years rather than the three years requested. As enacted, Section 1207 also contains two transitional authorities for counterterrorism operations in Africa and one for Yemen, all expiring at the end of FY2012. Many see the GSCF as an innovative first step in addressing problems inherent in the current agency-based budgeting and program development systems. Although some view the GSCF primarily as a means to transfer funds from DOD to the State Department, with its relatively smaller budget, others look to it as a possible means to foster more timely, coherent, and effective U.S. government responses to emerging threats and opportunities and to provide an impetus for improving interagency coordination in security and stabilization missions. This report provides basic information on the GSCF legislation. It starts with a brief discussion of the conceptual origins of the legislation and then summarizes the legislation's provisions. It concludes with a short analysis of salient issues. Although the GSCF was proposed as a means to secure flexible funding for emerging needs, the GSCF concept has its origins in long-standing perceptions that multiple deficiencies in current national security structures and practices have undermined U.S. efforts abroad. A core problem is the U.S. government's current agency-centric national security system that inhibits rational budgeting and planning for national security efforts that require contributions from multiple agencies. Analysts have long proposed changes to address deficiencies along the following lines: Provide the State Department with a flexible funding account to respond to emerging needs and crises situations . For many years, the George W. Bush Administration repeatedly sought a State Department emergency response fund that would facilitate immediate responses to crises and emerging threats. Congress denied such requests several times, but in 2005 it authorized DOD to transfer up to $100 million of its own funds to the State Department for such purposes. (Section 1207 of the FY2006 NDAA, P.L. 109-163 , as amended.) This "Section 1207" authority expired at the end of FY2010. Congress established a U.S. Agency for International Development account, the Complex Crises Fund in FY2011 for similar purposes, with a $50 million appropriation in FY2011 and $40 million in FY2012, but has not made a similar account available to the State Department. Develop mechanisms to promote greater interagency cooperation in planning security and stabilization programs. Analysts point to many problems inherent in programming by individual agencies. Because agencies usually do not consult or coordinate with others when planning programs, there is unnecessary duplication and overlap. And because agencies conduct programs targeted at the issues that fall under their purview, there are often serious gaps. Of particular concern are the "governance gaps," i.e., the formulation of security assistance programs to train and equip military forces without components to improve the ability of government institutions to manage those forces. The goal of greater interagency cooperation is to develop coherent security and stabilization programs that address all elements of a problem. Clarif y and rationaliz e security roles and missions. The appropriate division of labor between the State Department and DOD, especially for security assistance, is a matter of debate. Since military assistance first became a significant component of U.S. foreign policy after World War II, oversight of those programs has always been vested in a civilian, usually the Secretary of State. In 1961, Congress made the Secretary of State responsible, by law, for "the continuous supervision and general direction" of that assistance. Beginning in the 1980s, however, Congress has called on DOD to contribute its manpower and funding to an increasingly broad range of national security efforts under new DOD authorities. After the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001 (9/11), DOD requested and Congress approved multiple new DOD authorities. Some fill gaps when civilian funding and personnel are not available. Others, DOD argues, provide a means to address critical needs in an effort to protect U.S. troops and minimize U.S. military operations. The goal is to reach agreement on an appropriate model for post -9/11 civil-military activities and missions, either by strengthening the State Department's ability to lead, by creating a new system of shared responsibility, or by strengthening the State Department's lead while also encouraging greater sharing of responsibility in order to enhance collaboration among all agencies involved in security sector assistance. Creat e a "unified" budget system for national security missions along functional rather than agency lines . For over a decade, analysts have urged the U.S. government to consolidate budgets for national security activities. In particular, they have recommended that the White House present Congress annually with either a unified national security budget or a series of unified budgets for a specific multi-agency national security activity, such as counterterrorism or security assistance. The goal is to rationalize government-wide resource allocation and promote due consideration of the tradeoffs involved in allocating those resources. Unified budgets are also recommended as a means to provide greater transparency and accountability in U.S. government spending, and facilitate congressional oversight of national security programs. The Obama Administration presented the GSCF as a means to identify potential difficulties when combining State Department and DOD funds and to test the possibilities for combining agency expertise and efforts to conduct security activities. If successful, the GSCF is seen as a possible precedent for a broader interagency funding and efforts. Assistance may be provided under the three-year GSCF authority for three purposes, as detailed below. Assistance "may include the provision of equipment, supplies, and training." (GSCF funds are available to either the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense for such assistance.) The first two of these purposes—security and counterterrorism training, and coalition support—are nearly identical to those of the Global Train and Equip authority provided by Section 1206 of the FY2006 NDAA, P.L. 109-163 , as amended, with one exception. For Section 1206 programs, the Secretary of Defense is in the lead. Section 1207 (b)(1)(A) authorizes the use of the GSCF "to enhance the capabilities of military forces and other security forces responsible for conducting border and maritime security, internal security, and counterterrorism operations, as well as the government agencies responsible for such forces." Recipient countries would be designated by the Secretary of State with the concurrence, i.e., approval, of the Secretary of Defense. Programs to provide this support would be jointly formulated by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, and approved by the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense before implementation. Section 1207 (b)(1)(B) permits GSCF assistance to national military forces and other specified security forces to enable them to "participate in or support military, stability, or peace support operations consistent with United States foreign policy and national security interests." Just as with security and counterterrorism training assistance, recipient countries would be designated by the Secretary of State with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense. These programs are also jointly formulated by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, and approved by the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, before implementation. Section 1207(b)(2) authorizes using the GSCF to assist the justice sector (including law enforcement and prisons), and to conduct rule of law programs and stabilization efforts "where the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, determines that conflict or instability in a region challenges the existing capability of civilian providers to deliver such assistance." The Secretary of State also designates recipients of this type of assistance and implements activities with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense. However, unlike the preceding types of assistance where the Secretaries of State and Defense would jointly formulate programs, the Secretary of State formulates these programs in consultation with the Secretary of Defense. State and DOD staff will determine an appropriate consultation mechanism. In addition to the GSCF authority requested by the Administration, Section 1207(n) of the original legislation established three new transitional authorities that would permit the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to assist counterterrorism and peacekeeping efforts in Africa during FY2012. A similar provision was added to the FY2013 NDAA ( P.L. 112-239 ); subsequently, Section 1207(n) was deleted by the FY2014 NDAA. The FY2012 NDAA established a GSCF account "on the books of the Treasury of the United States." As amended by the FY2014 NDAA, there is no overall spending limitation. There is a limit of $200 million on transfers from DOD to the GSCF, but no limit is set on State Department funding. (However, the appropriations legislation sets a limit on State Department transfers; see below.) A proportional limitation provides that the DOD contribution for any activity shall be no more than 80% of the cost of that activity, and the State Department contribution shall be not less than 20%.