With the changing security environment and the emergence of terrorist coalitions that operate across international borders, the threat of terrorism against U.S. interests and personnel abroad has grown. Over the past decades, and in particular in response to the 1998 embassy bombings in Africa, the State Department has been hardening its official facilities to protect its embassies, consulates, and personnel abroad. However, as State hardened embassies, the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) raised concerns about the vulnerability of soft targets. According to a State Department travel warning, State considers soft targets to be places, including but not limited to, where Americans and other westerners live, congregate, shop, or visit. This can include hotels, clubs, restaurants, shopping centers, housing compounds, places of worship, schools, or public recreation events. Travel routes of U.S. government employees are also considered soft targets, based on their vulnerability to terrorist attacks. The State Department is responsible for protecting more than 60,000 government employees who work in embassies and consulates abroad in 180 countries. These government officials at approximately 260 posts represent a number of agencies besides State—including the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and the Treasury, the Internal Revenue Service, and the United States Agency for International Development—and all fall under chief of mission authority. State officials indicated that only about one-third of officials at all posts are from the State Department. The responsibilities for the protection of U.S. officials and their families are defined in federal legislation and policies. Under the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, the Department of State is given responsibility for the protection of U.S. officials and their families overseas. The act directs the Secretary of State to develop and implement policies and programs, including funding levels and standards, to provide for the security of U.S. government operations of a diplomatic nature and establishes within State the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS). The mission of DS is to provide a safe and secure environment for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Within DS, there are a number of offices that address and implement security policies and practices to protect facilities and personnel at posts. At posts abroad, the chiefs of mission are responsible for the protection of personnel and accompanying family members at the missions. Additionally, regional security officers (RSOs) administer all aspects of security programs at posts. The RSOs’ responsibilities include providing post officials and their families with security briefings upon their arrival; designing and implementing residential security and local guard programs; liaising and coordinating with the host country law enforcement and U.S. private sector communities to discuss threat issues; and offering security advice and briefings to schools attended by dependents of U.S. government officials. The host nation is responsible for providing protection to diplomatic personnel and missions, as established by the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The convention states the host country should take appropriate steps to protect missions, personnel, and their families, including protecting the consular premises against any intrusion, damage, or disturbances. The Overseas Security Policy Board, which includes representatives from 19 U.S. intelligence, foreign affairs, and other agencies, is responsible for considering, developing, coordinating, and promoting security policies, standards, and agreements on overseas operations, programs, and projects that affect U.S. government agencies under the authority of the chief of mission. This responsibility includes reviewing and issuing uniform guidance for residential security and local guard programs based on threat levels. The Security Environment Threat List, published semiannually by State, reflects the level of threat at all posts in six threat categories, including crime, political violence, and terrorism. Over 50 percent of all posts fall under the terrorism threat ratings of critical or high (see fig. 2). State, in consultation with representatives of the board, develops security standards, based on threat levels, for U.S. missions overseas. When a security-related incident occurs that involves serious injury or loss of life or significant destruction of property at a U.S. government mission abroad, State is required to convene an Accountability Review Board (ARB). ARBs are composed of five individuals, four appointed by the Secretary of State and one by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Members investigate the security incident and issue a report with recommendations to promote and encourage improved security programs and practices. State is required to report to Congress on actions it has taken in response to ARB recommendations. As of March 2005, there have been 11 Accountability Review Boards convened since the board’s establishment in 1986. The Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary, in its 2002 and subsequent reports, urged State to formulate a strategy for addressing, in the short and long term, threats to locales abroad that are frequented by U.S. officials and their families. This included providing security enhancements for locations that are affiliated with the United States by virtue of the activities and the individuals they accommodate and therefore might be soft targets. In a number of subsequent reports, the subcommittee has focused its concern about soft targets on schools, residences, places of worship, and other popular gathering places. In fiscal year 2003, a total of $15 million was earmarked for soft target protection, particularly to address security vulnerabilities at overseas schools. Moreover, in fiscal year 2004, Congress earmarked an additional $15 million for soft targets. More recently, the fiscal year 2005 Senate Appropriations Subcommittee report and the subsequent House Conference Report on fiscal year 2005 appropriations further stressed the need to protect these areas. The language in the Senate appropriations report directs State to develop a comprehensive, sustained strategy for addressing the threats posed to soft targets. Specifically, the report language specifies that a strategy should be submitted to the committee no later than June 1, 2005. For fiscal year 2005, Congress earmarked $15 million to secure and protect soft targets, of which $10 million is for security at overseas schools attended by dependents of U.S. government employees. State has a number of programs and activities designed to protect U.S. officials and their families outside of the embassy, including security briefings, protection at schools and residences, and surveillance detection (these programs are discussed in more detail later in this report). Despite these efforts, State has not developed a comprehensive strategy that clearly identifies safety and security requirements and resources needed to protect U.S. officials and their families from terrorist threats outside the embassy. State officials raised a number of challenges related to developing and implementing such a strategy. They indicated they have recently initiated an effort to develop a soft target strategy. As part of this effort, State officials said they will need to address and resolve a number of legal and financial issues. State has not developed a comprehensive soft target strategy to protect U.S. officials and their families from terrorist threats outside the embassy. A comprehensive strategy would focus on protection of U.S. officials and thief families in areas where they congregate, such as schools, residences, places of worship, and other popular gathering spots. However, in a number of meetings, State officials cited several complex issues involved with protecting soft targets and raised concerns about the broader implications of developing such a strategy. DS officials told us that the mission and responsibilities of DS continue to grow and become more complex, and they questioned how far State’s protection of soft targets should extend. They said that providing U.S. government funds to protect U.S. officials and their families at private sector locations or to places of worship was unprecedented and raised a number of legal and financial challenges, including sovereignty and separation of church and state, that have not been resolved by the department. They also told us that specific authorization language would be needed to move beyond a State program that currently focuses on providing security upgrades to schools and off- compound employee association facilities abroad. State officials also indicated they have not yet fully defined the universe of soft targets— including taking an inventory of potentially vulnerable facilities and areas where U.S. officials and their families congregate—that would be necessary to complete a strategy. Although State has not developed a comprehensive soft target strategy, some State officials told us that several existing programs could help protect soft targets. However, they agreed that these existing programs are not tied together in an overall strategy. State officials agreed that they should undertake a formal evaluation of how existing programs can be more effectively integrated as part of a soft target strategy, and whether new programs might be needed to fill any potential gaps. A senior DS official told us that in January 2005, DS formed a working group to discuss and develop a comprehensive soft targets strategy to address the appropriate level of protection of U.S. officials and their families at schools, residences, and other areas outside the embassy. According to the DS official, the strategy should be completed and provided to the Senate Appropriations Committee by June 1, 2005. Investigations into terrorist attacks against U.S. officials found that, among other things, the officials lacked the necessary hands-on training to help counter the attacks. The ARBs recommended that State provide hands-on counterterrorism training to help post officials identify terrorist surveillance and quickly respond to an impending attack. They also recommended State implement an accountability system to reduce complacency about following these procedures. After each investigation, State told Congress it would implement these recommendations, yet we found that State’s hands-on training course is still not mandatory for all personnel going to posts, and procedures to monitor compliance with security requirements have not been fully implemented. According to State, training has been hindered by limitations in funding and training capacities, and implementing new accountability procedures globally is a long-term process. We also found that ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, and RSOs were not trained in how to implement embassy procedures intended to protect U.S. officials outside the embassies.