Shortly after President Bush took office in January 2001, the Administration declared itsintent to undertake a full review of U.S. policy towards North Korea, distancing itself from theClinton engagement policy that culminated in Madeleine Albright's October 2000 visit to Pyongyangfor talks to curtail North Korea's missile program. (2) The reformulated policy, announced in June 2001, outlined afurther lifting of U.S. sanctions (3) , increased assistance to North Korea, and "other political steps" ifthe North agreed to 1) start to take serious, verifiable steps to reduce the conventional weapons threatto the South, 2) undertake "improved implementation" of the 1994 Agreed Framework, and 3) allowverifiable "constraints" on North Korea's missile exports. Formal negotiations between Washingtonand Pyongyang did not occur, however, during 2001. Following the 9/11 attacks, Bush linked NorthKorea to the war on terrorism by including it in the "axis of evil" along with Iraq and Iran in hisJanuary 2002 State of the Union address. The Administration insisted, however, that its stated policyof resuming a dialogue with the North Koreans "any time, any place," remained in effect. Scheduled bilateral talks were postponed in summer 2002 due to a naval skirmish betweenthe North and South Koreans; during this delay, U.S. intelligence, building on evidence dating backto 1998, reportedly indicated that the North Koreans were secretly developing a highly enricheduranium program. Prospects for successful talks were derailed when Assistant Secretary of StateJames Kelly reportedly presented the North Koreans with evidence of the program during a visit toPyongyang in October 2002. North Korea reportedly confirmed the allegations. The BushAdministration maintained that the suspected uranium program constituted a breach of Pyongyang'sinternational obligations under the 1994 Agreed Framework and the Nuclear Non-proliferationTreaty (NPT). With this confrontation, already uneasy relations abruptly shifted to a more hostilestance. After the confrontation became public, the Agreed Framework quickly unraveled. At U.S.urging, KEDO's executive board decided to halt the heavy fuel oil shipments in November 2002. This prompted a series of angry and consequential responses from the North Koreans: shrilldenouncements of the U.S. failure to live up to its obligations under the agreement, the removal ofIAEA monitors from the Yongbyon plant, the expelling of IAEA inspectors from the country, theremoval of fuel rods from the storage pond, and withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty (NPT). The Bush Administration maintained that a serious flaw of the Clinton approach during theAgreed Framework talks in the 1990's was the willingness to engage Pyongyang in direct bilateralrelations, instead of relying on a more multilateral process to pressure the North into compliance. As the 1994 agreement faltered, the Administration stood by its conviction that the previousarrangement rewarded North Korea for bad behavior and failed to engage regional powers,particularly China, in enforcement. Pyongyang, meanwhile, insisted that direct talks withWashington were the only way to reach a resolution. Together with the Chinese, the Administrationset the stage for a multilateral forum to address the North Korean nuclear issue. In April 2003, around of three-party talks was held in Beijing among the United States, North Korea (also knownas the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or the D.P.R.K. ), and China (also known as thePeople's Republic of China, or the P.R.C.). In the month that followed, President Bush met withSouth Korean President Roh Moo-hyun and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, pledgingto include both countries in future talks. North Korea rejected the arrangement. At the ASEANRegional Forum (ARF) in mid-June, China also called for Japan and South Korea (also known asthe Republic of Korea, or the R.O.K.) to "join the efforts," and Pyongyang relented. Four monthsafter the three-party talks, the first round of six party talks convened in Beijing, also including formerNorth Korean patron Russia. Central to the Administration's initiative of multilateral talks was the involvement of China,the North's last major ally. China earlier had been reluctant to engage in multilateral efforts to dealwith North Korea and did not play a direct role in the 1994 Agreed Framework. Because China isthought to be North Korea's top trading partner and source of aid, Beijing's cooperation wasconsidered crucial to any attempts by the international community to put economic pressure on thePyongyang regime. President Bush cultivated Chinese cooperation by addressing the nuclear issuewhen Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited Crawford, Texas in October 2002, and later callingJiang directly to request his help in resolving the escalating crisis. On both occasions, Jiang statedChina's commitment to a non-nuclear Korean peninsula. China's new activism in diplomacycontinued under Jiang's successor Hu Jintao, who officially assumed the presidency in March 2003. Chinese leadership pushed firmly for the formation of the six-party talks and, according to reports,shut down an oil pipeline to North Korea for three days early in 2003, demonstrating its resolve toPyongyang. Beijing also reportedly gave the North Koreans substantial amounts of money, oil, andfood in exchange for attendance at the six-party meetings. Beijing reportedly fears the profoundly destabilizing effects of either a robust nuclear-armedNorth Korea, which could set off an arms race in the region, or the collapse of the regime, whichcould send thousands of refugees over the border into China. China has struggled to deal with tensof thousands of North Koreans who are believed to be living in and traveling to and from China.Some observers have noted the limitation of depending on China, which prioritizes stability on theKorean peninsula above all, while some members of the Bush Administration reportedly favorregime change in Pyongyang. Three rounds of talks -- in August 2003, February 2004, and June 2004 -- failed to achievesignificant breakthroughs. Analysts blamed a number of factors for the stalemate: most significantly,intransigence by Pyongyang and inflexibility by Washington. Semantics also stalled meaningfuldebate, as negotiators disagreed over the meaning of phrases such as the U.S.-demanded "complete,verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement"(which became known by its acronym CVID) of NorthKorea's weapons program and "simultaneous" or "reciprocal" actions. The formation of workinggroups during the second round of talks was also criticized as slowing the process by detractingattention from the higher-level plenary sessions. Many observers faulted the perceived struggle within the Administration for severely limitinglead U.S. negotiator Kelly's freedom to work out compromises. The United States did not putforward a detailed negotiating proposal until June 2004, despite requests from Chinese, Japanese,and South Korean leaders. According to reports, an influential coalition in the Administrationconsisted of the offices of the Secretary of Defense and the Vice President, and non-proliferationspecialists in the State Department and the National Security Council. This group reportedly opposeddirect negotiations with and concessions to North Korea, favored the issuance of demands forunilateral North Korean concessions on military issues, and advocated an overall U.S. strategy ofisolating North Korea diplomatically and economically. Officials within this group expressed hopeand/or expectations of a collapse of the North Korean regime. A second faction, mainly in the StateDepartment and NSC, was composed of officials with experience on East Asian and Korean issues. This faction believed that the Administration should attempt negotiations before adopting morecoercive measures in order to build coalitions among the other parties, and they reportedly doubtedthe effectiveness of a strategy to bring about a North Korean collapse. (4) Despite regular denunciations of the talks, North Korea set forward a series ofvaguely-worded proposals. Prior to the second round of talks, North Korea indicated that it may bewilling to end its nuclear program if the United States issued a non-aggression pact or securityguarantee. President Bush indicated in a statement in October 2003 that he would support a multilateral security guarantee. (5) A separate plan advanced by the North Koreans in December 2003included a "freeze"of its weapons program in exchange for a list of U.S. concessions, includinglifting economic sanctions and energy assistance. The United States rejected this proposal, insistingon a complete dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear programs before entering into othernegotiations. The U.S. eventually countered with a proposal at the June 2004 talks, which wasloosely modeled on Libya's decision to abandon its nuclear weapons program in December 2003:a freeze of North Korea's weapons' program, followed by a series of measures to ensure completedismantlement, and, eventually, a permanent security guarantee and discussions on a return tonormal relations. In the interim, Japan and South Korea would provide heavy oil. The proposalclosely resembled one presented by South Korea earlier in the talks. After some mixed reactions,the North Koreans ultimately rejected the offer. A major obstacle to the negotiations was NorthKorea's suspected uranium enrichment program: North Korean envoys refused to acknowledge itsexistence, while the United States insisted that its verified dismantlement be a prerequisite for furtherprogress. Many analysts used a "1-3-2" formulation to describe the dynamics of the six- party talks:North Korea on its own; South Korea, Russia, and China favoring a more conciliatory approach ofoffering incentives to North Korea and more emphasis on a nuclear freeze instead of dismantlement;and Japan and the United States preferring a mix of dialogue and pressure on Pyongyang.