FPS and GSA share responsibility for protecting federal facilities. FPS is primarily responsible for protecting federal employees and visitors in federal facilities held or leased by GSA. Specifically, FPS’s law enforcement and protective security services authority include: (1) protecting federal employees and visitors in approximately 8,900 federal facilities under the control and custody of GSA; (2) enforcing federal laws and regulations aimed at protecting such property and persons (including proactively patrolling facilities, responding to incidents, and exercising arrest authority); and (3) investigating criminal offenses against these facilities and persons. To fund its operations, FPS collects security fees from the agencies it protects and does not receive a separate appropriation. FPS conducts its mission by providing security services through two types of activities: physical security activities such as conducting facility risk assessments and recommending countermeasures—such as security cameras, bollards, barriers, physical access control systems, magnetometers, and x-ray machines—aimed at preventing incidents. law enforcement activities such as proactively patrolling facilities, responding to incidents, conducting criminal investigations, and exercising arrest authority. GSA serves as the federal government’s landlord and designs, builds, and manages facilities to support the needs of other federal agencies. GSA funds security fixtures based on facility security level requirements on a prioritized, funds available basis. GSA, or the entity that leases the facility, provides project execution, maintenance, and repair of the security fixtures. GSA also has primary responsibility for providing facilities maintenance, space for communications equipment, and building plans, among other services. Both agencies conduct policy making and high-level planning at the headquarters level. At the regional level, FPS and GSA officials serve as the liaisons from headquarters to the facility level and have responsibility for implementing policies and managing communications. At the facility level, FPS recommends the execution of security countermeasures, provides incident response, and supports emergency plans, whereas GSA manages the government properties. There have been a number of changes over the past decade in structure and authority of government security for federal facility security, especially for FPS. For example, FPS was a component of GSA until 2003, when it transferred to DHS. FPS is currently located within DHS’s National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD). See figure 1 for an overview of key FPS and GSA security and protection roles, responsibilities, and operational relationships as outlined in a 2006 memorandum of agreement (MOA) concerning the security of GSA-controlled space. The areas in which our prior work has found facility security challenges that FPS faces in carrying out its mission, and between FPS and GSA, focus on operational issues, such as conducting entrance screenings and assessing risk at federal facilities; overseeing FPS’s protective security officers; and collaborating with federal, state, and local entities. Further, between FPS and GSA, we have previously found problems with the quality of data exchanged between GSA and FPS on facilities and their locations. As such, we have made previous recommendations to FPS and GSA related to improving their collaboration. For example, in March 2012, we recommended that GSA ensure that efforts to identify the jurisdictions of all GSA facilities are completed and that the data are provided to FPS so that FPS is better equipped to manage jurisdictional roles and responsibilities at GSA facilities. At the time of our 2012 report, FPS lacked complete data from GSA on the jurisdiction of about one-third of the facilities it protects. Since that time, GSA has made progress with identifying facility jurisdictions. Furthermore, in August 2012, we recommended that FPS coordinate with GSA and other federal tenant agencies to reduce any unnecessary duplication in security assessments of facilities held or leased by GSA. According to ISC guidance, as the security organization for such facilities, FPS is required to conduct risk assessments on a scheduled and recurring basis. FPS has reported progress regarding this issue; however, as of November 2015, the agency has not yet provided us with documentation of its efforts to address the recommendation. Therefore, this recommendation remains open. In light of these previously identified operational challenges, in this report, we focused on how FPS’s and GSA’s working relationship reflects key collaboration practices. In our prior work, we have identified eight key collaboration practices that we have used to assess collaboration at a range of federal agencies. These practices can help agencies to implement actions to operate across boundaries, including developing compatible policies and procedures and fostering open lines of communication. We also found that positive working relationships among participants from different agencies bridge organizational cultures, and these relationships can build trust and foster communication, which facilitates collaboration. Given many federal agencies’ long-standing challenges working across organizational lines, following these practices could help agencies to enhance and sustain collaboration at all organizational levels. For this review, to assess FPS and GSA collaboration, we focused on six of eight practices identified in our prior work that are particularly relevant to collaboration between FPS and GSA (see fig. 2). These collaboration practices focus on outcomes and strategies, roles and responsibilities, and policies and procedures to facilitate working across agency boundaries. See appendix II for a detailed overview of all eight collaboration practices. While FPS and GSA officials have drafted a joint strategy, the agencies have not defined and articulated a common outcome or fully established mutually reinforcing or joint strategies because they have not agreed on how they will work together to achieve their respective missions. In our prior work, we have found that the collaborative effort requires agency staff working across agency lines to define and articulate the common federal outcome or purpose they are seeking to achieve. We also found that collaborating agencies need to establish strategies that work in concert with those of their partners. In 2012, FPS and GSA drafted, and subsequently received comments on, a joint strategy that includes a common outcome. The document defines an overarching strategic goal of having a federal facility critical infrastructure that balances public access, security, and resiliency to enable continuity of operations and rapid recovery from all hazards. The document also includes objectives that focus on priority activities and describes some of the challenges that exist in securing federal facilities. The draft joint strategy establishes priorities for enhancing the security and resilience of federal facilities. The two agencies had not agreed on how to proceed with negotiations on the draft joint strategy until the completion of our audit work in October 2015. At that time, FPS officials told us that before finalizing the joint strategy, they plan to complete the following documents: (1) an updated MOA (which will be discussed in the next section); (2) the Control Systems Cybersecurity Strategy for Federal Facilities; and (3) the Government Facilities Sector Specific Plan. As of October 2015, they have no timeline for completing these other efforts or the joint strategy. Joint strategies help in aligning the partner agencies’ activities, core processes, and resources to accomplish a common outcome, and the continuing lack of agreement on common security outcomes and strategies could limit FPS’s and GSA’s ability to fully protect federal facilities and their tenants and visitors. FPS and GSA officials told us that they have not fully agreed on roles and responsibilities for their related missions regarding facility protection because they have not completed discussions on how they will work together based on changes in the facility security environment since 2006. However, as of August 2015, after being stalled for several years, FPS and GSA resumed negotiations on roles and responsibilities. Our prior work supports the value of agencies working together to define and agree on their respective roles and responsibilities. FPS’s and GSA’s facility security roles and responsibilities are documented in regulation, statutes, and policies, some of which are outdated or incomplete (See app. III for more details on these requirements). Among these documents is the 2006 MOA between the two agencies, which has a stated purpose to address roles, responsibilities, and operational relationships between FPS and GSA concerning the security of GSA-controlled space. The MOA lists services provided by FPS and GSA, outlines law- enforcement and physical-security responsibilities, and identifies the need for the two agencies to share information and jointly address security concerns in specific areas, such as new construction and repair and alteration projects. The MOA remains in effect; however, as a result of policy and organization changes affecting roles and responsibilities not reflected in the 2006 MOA, some information is outdated and incorrect. Figure 3 describes policy and organizational changes affecting roles and responsibilities not reflected in the 2006 MOA. We have previously reported that written agreements are most effective when they are regularly updated and monitored. In our prior work, we have reported on delays in updating the MOA, and in 2012, we recommended that the Administrator of GSA ensure that the agency identifies the jurisdictions of all GSA buildings and that these data are provided to FPS officials to better equip them to manage roles and responsibilities at GSA buildings, and an updated MOA would help GSA implement the needed changes to address this issue. FPS and GSA officials at the headquarters level have not been able to agree on the level of detail about roles and responsibilities or the services that should be included in the MOA. After resuming negotiations in August 2015, according to GSA, the issues needing further negotiation include: more detailed information on FPS’s billing to GSA for security costs and timely completion of facility security assessments (FSA). According to FPS, the issues needing further negotiations include: more clearly defining roles and responsibilities to improve FPS and GSA collaboration on security matters and clarifying language that may have previously been subject to misinterpretation by parties in the field. As of October 2015, FPS and GSA officials told us that they plan to address the responsibilities for the condition of countermeasures—such as security cameras, magnetometers and x-ray machines—and fixtures—such as bollards, guard booths, and blast-resistant windows—at facilities in updating the MOA.