During the preceding two decades, Congress played an active and at times leading role in setting U.S. policy towards Burma. Since Burma's ruling military junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), transferred power to a quasi-civilian government in March 2011, Congress has been largely deferential to the decisions of the White House, the Department of State, and the Department of the Treasury on the conduct of U.S. policy towards Burma. With a few important exceptions, adjustments in U.S. policy towards Burma over the last two years have been done using executive authority granted by the U.S. Constitution or existing legislation. The Obama Administration has consulted regularly with the congressional committees with jurisdiction, as well as with key Members of Congress, as it made changes in bilateral relations. However, the Obama Administration has used much of its discretionary authority and may require direct congressional action to implement additional changes in U.S. policy towards Burma. In addition, Congress may determine it is time to reassess the situation in Burma and to resume its more active role in the determination of U.S. policy towards this politically dynamic country. The Obama Administration has ushered in a new approach to U.S. relations with Burma (Myanmar). On September 28, 2009, the State Department announced a change in U.S. policy towards Burma after seven months of review, discussion, and consultation. The existing sanctions regime would remain in place, but new elements of U.S. policy were added. First, the Administration announced its willingness to engage in direct dialogue with Burma's ruling military junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), on how to promote democracy and human rights in Burma. Second, it sought to cooperate to a greater extent with the SPDC on international security issues, such as nuclear nonproliferation and counternarcotics efforts. The Obama policy would also continue to pursue the same goals of the two preceding administrations—namely, to support "a unified, peaceful, prosperous, and democratic Burma that respects the human rights of its citizens." In order to achieve these goals, the Obama Administration would press Burma's military leaders to release all its political prisoners, end all its conflicts with ethnic minorities, cease its human rights violations, and initiate "a credible internal political dialogue with the democratic opposition and ethnic minority leaders on elements of reconciliation and reform." It would also call for Burma to sever its political and military ties to North Korea and abandon its alleged nuclear weapons program. In addition, the Obama Administration would continue to communicate with other nations and coordinate their respective policies towards Burma. The months following the announcement of a new U.S. policy towards Burma would see the nation undergo a dramatic political transformation. The SPDC called for and held parliamentary elections in November 2010, the first such elections in 20 years. A few days after the election, opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest. While the conduct of the elections was far from free and fair by international standards, the SPDC abided by the results of those elections. On March 30, 2011, the SPDC transferred power to a quasi-civilian government (most of the leaders are ex-generals and one-quarter of the members of the parliament are military officers) under the provisions of a new constitution largely written by the SPDC and purportedly approved by a public plebiscite in 2008. Since assuming power, Burma's quasi-civilian government, led by President Thein Sein—ex-general in the Burmese military and the SPDC's last prime minister—has undertaken a number of political and economic reforms that many see as encouraging signs. Hundreds of political prisoners have been released from detention and a few of Burma's more oppressive laws have been repealed or amended by Burma's Union Parliament. In April 2012, Burma held parliamentary by-elections in which Nobel Peace Prize recipient Aung San Suu Kyi and her political party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), won 43 of the 46 seats. While the conduct of the by-elections was still flawed, the acceptance of the results by the Thein Sein administration and the Burmese military was generally seen as a positive political development. Over the last two years, the Obama Administration has responded to such promising developments in Burma by enhancing and increasing high-level meetings with the Thein Sein government and selectively easing many of the existing sanctions on Burma. Since adopting the new Burma policy, the first U.S. ambassador to Burma in 20 years has been appointed, Hillary Clinton became the first Secretary of State in over 50 years to visit Burma, and President Obama subsequently became the first U.S. President to visit Burma while in office. Many of the specific sanctions on Burma—including the general ban on importing Burmese goods, the ban on new investments in Burma, and the restrictions on the provision of financial services to Burma—have been waived using presidential authority provided by the laws imposing sanctions on Burma. Plans are underway to increase U.S. assistance to Burma, including the reopening of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) mission in Burma after a 23-year hiatus. Even with the various changes that have taken place in Burma since the quasi-civilian government took power, the political and economic situation in the country remains serious, and the reforms are generally viewed as fragile and reversible. Despite ongoing negotiations and the signing of 12 preliminary ceasefire agreements, fighting between the Burmese military, or Tatmadaw, and various ethnic-based militias continues across the country. Fighting is particularly serious in the Kachin State, with regular reports of the Tatmadaw committing serious human rights violations against civilians in conflict areas. Rioting in Rakhine State in western Burma has uncovered festering ethnic tensions in the country. While the Union Parliament has passed some laws providing better protection of civil liberties, many of the country's more oppressive laws (including a few dating back to British colonial rule) remain on the books. The NLD was able to register and compete in the April 2012 by-elections, but several other political parties have not been allowed to register or refuse to register because some of their members remain in detention for political reasons. In spite of multiple prisoner releases since May 2011, over 200 political prisoners are being held in Burma's prisons. The 113 th Congress may choose to consider a number of different issues raised by the Obama Administration's Burma policy, as well as Burma's political and economic development, including: Is President Thein Sein's government committed to democracy and the protection of human rights in Burma, and does it have the ability to continue to implement reforms? Will it be able to work with the Union Parliament and the Burmese military to promote political and economic reform? Is U.S. policy too closely tied to President Thein Sein's government, opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, and the NLD to the neglect of developing relations with Burma's ethnic minorities and their representative organizations? What can the United States do to encourage progress in the ongoing negotiations between the Burmese government and the various ethnic-based organizations? Has the Obama Administration moved too quickly or too slowly in its easing of sanctions? What would have to occur in Burma in order for the sanctions to be removed or the waivers reversed? Are the current sanctions on Burma being fully and properly enforced in accordance with the law? What types of aid or assistance should the United States provide to support Burma? How does U.S. policy towards Burma fit with the Obama Administration's rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region and its objectives in Southeast Asia? What role does Burma play in the geopolitical dynamic between China and India and relations within Southeast Asia? Many observers trace the origins of the Obama Administration's Burma policy to a 2007 article in Foreign Affairs , co-authored by Michael Green and Derek Mitchell. In their article, Green and Mitchell stated that U.S. policy towards Burma at the time was "stuck," and wrote that a change in approach was necessary to press Burma's ruling military junta to undertake political and economic reforms. The changes recommended by Green and Mitchell in their article are very similar to those announced by the State Department in September 2009—direct engagement with the country's military regime and the continuation of sanctions. While the conceptual basis of Obama's Burma policy may have been set, the Obama Administration's attitude and approach towards Burma has seemingly evolved over time. Initially, the White House and the key figures in handling U.S. relations with Burma expressed some skepticism and reservations about the quasi-civilian Union Government, its leadership, and the prospects for significant political and economic reform. The Obama Administration also appeared to keep President Thein Sein's administration at arm's length, and made efforts to balance relations with the new government with contact with Aung San Suu Kyi, other opposition parties, and representatives of ethnic groups. Over time, and in response to various actions by the Burmese government, the Obama Administration's assessment of President Thein Sein and his government became more optimistic, and ties between the two governments became closer—possibly, in the view of some experts, at the expense of relations with Burma's opposition parties and ethnic groups. After the NLD agreed to participate in parliamentary by-elections in April 2012, U.S. policy shifted to a focus on promoting perceived progressive forces within the Thein Sein government and isolating individuals and organizations considered anti-reform. U.S. officials now speak of a partnership with President Thein Sein's government.