Larger vessels—such as cruise ships, container ships, and oil and natural gas tankers—can travel among small vessels that operate with little scrutiny or notice, and some of these larger vessels have suffered waterborne attacks overseas by terrorists or pirates who operated from small vessels. Although there have not been any small vessel attacks in the United States, terrorists have used small vessels to facilitate their attacks, such as those on the USS Cole in 2000 (see fig. 1), the French oil tanker Limburg in Yemen in 2002, and the Japanese tanker M Star in 2010. Our prior work has found that the use of small vessels to deliver improvised explosive devices was one of the most significant concerns for The concern about small vessel attacks is exacerbated larger vessels.by the fact that some larger vessels, such as cruise ships, sail according to precise schedules and preplanned itineraries that could provide information to terrorists in preparing for and carrying out an attack against a vessel. Small vessels have also been successfully employed by pirates to hijack international cargo vessels, and at least three cruise ships have been attacked by pirates aboard small vessels who were armed with automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenades. In addition, DHS reported that small vessels have the potential to be used to smuggle weapons of mass destruction into the United States. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, from 1993 through 2012, there were 2,331 confirmed incidents of illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material. Although these incidents do not all involve the use of small vessels, the former commandant of the Coast Guard testified that small vessels pose a greater threat than cargo containers for smuggling nuclear materials. In addition, DHS reported that there is limited ability to screen small vessels for weapons of mass destruction, and as a result, small vessels could be used by terrorists to transport such weapons. In January 2009, we reported that DNDO had developed and tested equipment for detecting nuclear material on small vessels, but that efforts to use this equipment in a port area had been We further reported that DNDO had not limited to pilot programs.established a detailed plan to address gaps and vulnerabilities and recommended that DHS develop a plan to help ensure the future success of initiatives aimed at closing gaps and vulnerabilities and that this plan should focus on, among other things, small vessels. To address this recommendation, DHS issued a strategic plan in December 2010 and an implementation plan in April 2012. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, maritime enforcement efforts have been primarily focused on large commercial vessels (over 300 gross tons), while federal efforts to address small vessels are more limited. In particular, large commercial vessel security is governed by Coast Guard regulations issued pursuant to the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 and other relevant legislation. For example, certain larger vessels are required to submit information—in advance of U.S. arrival or departure—on crew members, passengers, cargo, and vessel operations.to conduct risk-based analyses and gain a greater awareness of large This advance information allows the Coast Guard and CBP commercial vessel operations, their passengers, and their crews. In addition, certain large commercial vessels are also required to carry and operate transponders—such as an automatic identification system— which broadcast information on the vessels and their locations, allowing authorities to track their movements. In contrast, small vessels are generally exempt from these requirements. As a result, the federal government has limited knowledge regarding the owners and locations of small vessels. Although small vessels are generally unregulated, the federal government has put in place some requirements for these vessels. For example, small vessel operators traveling to foreign ports or places are required to report to CBP upon their return to the United States. However, CBP estimates that a small percentage of the international small vessel traffic returning to the United States actually report this information. According to CBP, this low level of compliance is due, in part, to a lack of (1) public awareness of the reporting requirements, and (2) inspections to emphasize and ensure compliance. CBP has taken actions to help address this issue as part of its Small Vessel Reporting System initiative, which is discussed later in this report. At the international level, the International Maritime Organization issued guidelines in 2008 regarding the security of small vessels that are not subject to the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, but these guidelines are voluntary. In March 2009, we reported on the challenges of tracking small vessels using available technologies. For example, we reported that although the Coast Guard and other agencies may have technology systems that can track small vessels within some ports, these did not always work in bad weather or at night. Further, we reported that even with systems in place to track small vessels, there is agreement among maritime stakeholders that it is difficult to detect threatening activity by small vessels without prior knowledge of a planned attack. Ultimately, DHS documents report that the U.S. government has only limited knowledge about international recreational boaters and their travel patterns. According to the SVSS, in the United States, there is a tradition and expectation among small vessel operators to generally have unrestricted access to U.S. waterways. In addition, small vessel operators have expressed concerns about the cost of requirements that would allow the government to track their movements. For example, DHS conducted outreach efforts with the small vessel community while developing the SVSS, and DHS reported that small vessel operators and national recreational vessel associations expressed concern that the cost of transponders would present an objectionable burden for recreational boaters. Accordingly, DHS faces a challenge in balancing the collection of information necessary for the proper assessment of risks posed by small vessels with the freedom of the seas expected by small vessel operators. In June 2007, DHS held an initial small vessel security summit to engage private, commercial, and government stakeholders in discussions on a range of issues involving the security risks posed by small vessels in the U.S. maritime environment. During this summit, the stakeholders that attended provided numerous recommendations to DHS, including a recommendation that DHS develop a national strategy regarding small vessel security. In response to this recommendation, DHS convened the Small Vessel Security Working Group in August 2007, which consisted of representatives from DHS components, such as the Coast Guard, CBP, and the Transportation Security Administration, as well as participation by representatives from the Departments of Justice and Defense. The working group developed the SVSS in April 2008 to address the potential for small vessels to be used (1) to smuggle terrorists or weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, into the United States; (2) as a standoff weapon platform; or (3) as a direct attack method to deliver a waterborne improvised explosive device. The four overarching goals— which include more specific objectives—of the SVSS are to develop and leverage a strong partnership with the small vessel community and public and private sectors in order to enhance maritime domain awareness; enhance maritime security and safety based on a coherent plan with a layered, innovative approach; leverage technology to enhance the ability to detect; determine intent; and, when necessary, interdict small vessels; and enhance coordination, cooperation, and communications between federal, state, local and tribal partners and the private sector, as well as international partners. DHS subsequently issued the SVSS Implementation Plan in January 2011.subject matter experts at DHS components to provide input on what action items should be included. From these efforts, DHS includes a total of 132 action items in the plan, organized according to the four overarching SVSS goals. Each of the action items provides a description of the action to be taken and the lead federal department or component responsible for coordinating and implementing the action. Examples of action items include the following: In developing the plan, the SVSS Working Group relied on increase systematic visits to maritime facilities to build relationships, improve knowledge of threat conditions at marinas, and deter criminals; partner and coordinate with foreign countries, particularly in the Caribbean region, on radiological and nuclear detection and interdiction; explore research and development of a permanent sensor system to detect and track noncooperative vessels; and improve federal, state, tribal, and local interagency information sharing, joint targeting, collaboration on boardings, and related operations. Based on input from the DHS components’ subject matter experts, the SVSS Implementation Plan also includes information on the general time frames, estimated relative costs, and anticipated impacts that each action item may have in achieving the goals of the SVSS. After DHS issued the SVSS Implementation Plan, each federal agency or component was responsible for separately determining the feasibility of the relevant action items and deciding which ones to implement after taking into account its specific mission, priorities, and the resources available.a guidance document to provide greater specificity about how preexisting programs may be developed and coordinated to achieve the goals and objectives outlined in the SVSS. DHS components have completed some initiatives and have other initiatives under way to address small vessel security concerns. Some of these initiatives go back more than a decade, and include security measures that the components have implemented to protect vessels and infrastructure from small vessel attacks, including the enforcement of security zones around certain vessels—such as ferries—or infrastructure. Another security measure is the escort of larger vessels—such as cruise ships and liquid natural gas tankers—into a port, as shown in figure 2. More recently, DHS components developed initiatives to address small vessel security concerns that relate to the four goals of the SVSS— although many initiatives began prior to issuance of the SVSS Implementation Plan. The SVSS Implementation Plan states that many of the initiatives in the plan are not new or uniquely dedicated to terrorist threats or small vessels, and that a number of the initiatives are ongoing in the various federal agencies responsible for facilitating maritime safety, security, recreation, and commerce. Further, more than one DHS component may be responsible for addressing a single action item in the SVSS Implementation Plan, and a single action item could be addressed through several initiatives. In addition, DHS officials stated that initiatives often aligned with multiple action items in the plan.