The recent war against Iraq, known formally as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), was the largestU.S. military operation since the 1991 Persian Gulf war, and may have implications for variousdefense programs of interest to Congress. This report, which is similar to one that CRS preparedfollowing the 1991 Persian Gulf war, (2) surveys someof those potential implications. It will beupdated periodically as new information becomes available. This report focuses on how the Iraq war may affect defense programs that Congress may address in acting on defense authorization and appropriation bills for FY2004 and subsequent fiscalyears. It does not cover broader defense policy issues such as U.S. national security strategy orCongress' role in declaring war. Nor does it cover the post-war occupation and reconstructionefforts in Iraq or the potential impact of the war on U.S. foreign relations and the U.S. role in theworld. Issues like those are covered in other CRS products. Although the Department of Defense (DoD) and other organizations customarily produce "lessons learned" reports following the conclusion of a major military operation like the Iraq war,this report for the most part avoids using the term "lessons" because it can imply the making ofrecommendations - something that CRS reports do not do. Even so, certain cautionary notesassociated with "lessons-learned" reports apply to this report. These include the following: Information is imperfect; early lessons are subject to change. Public information about the Iraq war is currently incomplete, and will likely remain so for some time. Although certain aspects of the war, such as the operations of U.S. Army and Marine Corps groundforces moving from Kuwait to Baghdad, received extensive press coverage, many details of theseoperations are not known. Other aspects of the war, such as coalition air operations, were reportedin less detail. And some aspects of the war, such as the activities of special operations forces, havereceived very little press coverage. Knowledge about the war at this point is thus fragmentary andunbalanced. Historically, moreover, early information that is publicly available about a war oftenproves to be inaccurate. Attempts to identify lessons should be tempered by an appreciation for gapsand imperfections in the available information. As information becomes more complete andaccurate with time, early lessons may need to be modified or dropped. Each war is unique; avoid "overlearning" the lessons of this war. Particularly for U.S. military forces, which fight conflicts in different parts of the world againstvarious adversaries, each war is characterized by a unique combination of variables such asgeographic setting, pre-conflict warning and preparation time, U.S. and enemy war aims, the size andcomposition of enemy military forces, the quality of enemy military training and leadership, theamount and kind of military assistance that the United States or the enemy receives during the warfrom other governments or groups, the enemy government's degree of popular support among itsown population, and the presence or absence of factional divisions within the enemy country'spopulation due to ethnic differences or other factors. Given how at least some of these factorsusually change for the United States from one war to the next, it has long been a staple of U.S.lessons-learned reports to note that lessons from one conflict may not necessarily apply to the next,might need to be applied with caution, or might contradict lessons of previous conflicts. Some ofthe lessons of the Iraq war, for example, may differ from lessons of the U.S.-led war in Afghanistanin 2001-2002 or the U.S. military operation in Kosovo in 1999. In short, the lessons of the Iraq warshould not be "overlearned" because the Iraq war in some ways might not serve as an accuratetemplate for future conflicts. Non-U.S. observers derive lessons as well, possibly devaluing U.S.-perceived lessons. The United States is not the only country that derives lessons from U.S. militaryoperations; observers in other countries do so as well. Non-U.S. observers keenly observe the U.S.way of war and draw conclusions about its strengths and weaknesses. These conclusions, if correct,can be applied by potential U.S. adversaries to improve their ability to contest U.S. forces in a futureconflict. Serbia, for example, observed the 1991 Persian Gulf war and drew lessons from it on howto counter the effects of U.S. air power. These lessons were applied with some success by Serbianforces in Kosovo in 1999. In short, lessons that U.S. observers reach about a given U.S. militaryoperation can be devalued by lessons that potential adversaries draw from that same operation. Thisis another reason to avoid "overlearning" the lessons of a given U.S. militaryoperation. Numerous persons or organizations may offer what they contend are the lessons of the Iraq war. In evaluating purported lessons offered by various sources, one factor to consider is whether thosesources have a potential financial, institutional, or ideological stake in the issue. Persons ororganizations identifying the lessons of a war can be influenced, perhaps strongly, by such a stake. Indeed, some persons or organizations may deliberately identify and publicize purported lessons withthe aim of influencing policy decisions on defense programs in a way that promotes their owninterests. Although lessons offered by persons or organizations with a stake in the issue in manycases may be reasonable or correct, policymakers may wish to take such interests into account inevaluating lessons put forward by such sources. The remainder of this report consists of a series of discussions on various defense program issues that might have been affected in one way or another by the Iraq war. The discussions aredesigned to be fairly self-contained, so that readers may browse topics using the Table of Contentsand read those of interest. A footnote at the start of each discussion identifies the CRS analyst whoprepared that section. Iraq War Viewed As A Test. In the weeks leading up to the Iraq war, many observers anticipated that the conflict would serve as a test of theadministration's vision for defense transformation - its concept for overhauling the U.S. military toexploit new technologies and counter 21st-Century security threats. (4) Following the war, many ofthese observers concluded that the war validated this vision, or at least major parts of it, and alsostrengthened Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's authority to implement this vision over theobjections of persons or organizations opposed to parts of it. Some observers speculated that the warmay encourage the administration to increase the scope of its planned defense transformation orimplement it more quickly. (5) Potential Significance for Congress. These conclusions and speculations, if correct - and not all observers agree with them (6) - are potentially ofgreat significance to Congress, for at least two reasons: Implementing the Administration's vision for defense transformation could substantially affect the composition of U.S. defense spending, shifting defense funding towarddefense programs that are judged to be transformational and away from defense programs that arejudged to be non-transformational or "legacy." Such shifts could significantly affect revenues andemployment levels at companies associated with the affected programs. The Administration may be encouraged to invoke the theme of transformation to help justify or seek rapid congressional consideration of legislative proposals affecting DoD thatmay or may not be transformational, depending on one's definition of transformation, includingproposals which could, if implemented, affect Congress' role in conducting oversight of U.S. defenseactivities. A potential case in point is the "Defense Transformation for the 21st Century Act," a205-page legislative proposal that the administration submitted to Congress on April 10, 2003 that would,among other things, permit DoD to establish its own policies for hiring, firing, and compensatingits civil service employees; change the terms in office for certain senior generals and admirals; giveDoD increased authority to transfer funds between DoD budget accounts; and eliminate many DoDreporting requirements that were instituted to assist Congress in conducting oversight of DoDactivities. (7) The Administration's Transformation Vision. The administration identified defense transformation as a major goal for DoD soon after taking officeand has since worked to define its transformation vision. In general, that vision calls for shiftingU.S. military planning away from a reliance on massed forces, sheer firepower, military servicesoperating in isolation from one another, and attrition-style warfare, (8) and toward a greater relianceon speed and agility, stealth, precision application of firepower by widely distributed forces,information technology, joint (i.e., integrated multi-service) operations, and effects-based warfare. (9) Some transformation advocates characterize these changes as shifting from an Industrial Ageapproach to war to an Information Age approach. Transforming the military along these lines, theadministration and its supporters argue, will permit the United States to apply military power morerapidly and flexibly in distant parts of the world, outpace enemy decisionmaking on the battlefield,more effectively counter so-called asymmetric military threats, (10) and generally achieve U.S. militarycombat goals with fewer forces, more quickly, and at lower cost. The Administration'stransformation vision also includes proposals for changing DoD's business practices, particularlywith an eye toward streamlining those practices so as to accelerate the fielding of new weapons andgenerate savings that can be used to invest in them. Transformational vs. Legacy Programs. Within the discussion on defense transformation, there has been significant debate over which programsqualify as transformational and which do not.