Today the Social Security program faces a long-range and fundamental financing problem driven largely by known demographic trends. The lack of an immediate solvency crisis affects the nature of the challenge, but it does not eliminate the need for action. Acting soon reduces the likelihood that the Congress will have to choose between imposing severe benefit cuts and unfairly burdening future generations with the program’s rising costs. Acting soon would allow changes to be phased in so the individuals who are most likely to be affected, namely younger and future workers, will have time to adjust their retirement planning. Since there is a great deal of confusion about Social Security’s current financing arrangements and the nature of its long-term financing problem, I would like to spend some time describing the nature, timing, and extent of the financing problem. As you all know, Social Security has always been largely a pay-as-you-go system. This means that current workers’ taxes generally pay current retirees’ benefits. As a result, the relative number of workers and beneficiaries has a major impact on the program’s financial condition. This ratio, however, is changing. In 1950, before the Social Security system was mature, the ratio was 16.5:1. In the 1960s, the ratio averaged 4.2:1. Today it is 3.3:1, and it is expected to drop to around 2.2:1 by 2030. The retirement of the baby boom generation is not the only demographic challenge facing the system. People are retiring early and living longer. A falling fertility rate is the other principal factor underlying the growth in the elderly’s share of the population. In the 1960s, the fertility rate was an average of 3 children per woman. Today it is a little over 2, and by 2030 it is expected to fall to 1.95 —a rate that is below the level necessary to replace the population. Taken together, these trends serve to threaten the financial solvency and sustainability of this important program. (See fig. 1.) The combination of these trends means that annual labor force growth will begin to slow after 2010 and by 2025 is expected to be less than a third of what it is today. (See fig. 2.) Relatively fewer workers will be available to produce the goods and services that all will consume. Without a major increase in productivity, low labor force growth will lead to slower growth in the economy and to slower growth of federal revenues. This in turn will only accentuate the overall pressure on the federal budget. This slowing labor force growth is not always recognized as part of the Social Security debate. Social Security’s retirement eligibility dates are often the subject of discussion and debate and can have a direct effect on both labor force growth and the condition of the Social Security retirement program. However, it is also appropriate to consider whether and how changes in pension and/or other government policies could encourage longer workforce participation. To the extent that people choose to work longer as they live longer, the increase in the share of life spent in retirement would be slowed. This could improve the finances of Social Security and mitigate the expected slowdown in labor force growth. It could also help to encourage additional economic growth. Today, the Social Security Trust Funds take in more in taxes than they spend. Largely because of the known demographic trends I have described, this situation will change. Although the trustees’ 2004 intermediate estimates project that the combined Social Security Trust Funds will be solvent until 2042, program spending will constitute a rapidly growing share of the budget and the economy well before that date. In 2008, the first baby boomers will become eligible for Social Security benefits, and the future costs of serving them have already become a factor in the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) 10-year projections. Under the trustees’ 2004 intermediate estimates, Social Security’s cash surplus—the difference between program tax income and the costs of paying scheduled benefits—will begin a permanent decline in 2009. To finance the same level of federal spending as in the previous year, additional revenues and/or increased borrowing will be needed. By 2018, Social Security’s tax income is projected to be insufficient to pay currently scheduled benefits. At that time, Social Security will join Medicare’s Hospital Insurance Trust Fund, whose outlays are projected to begin to exceed revenues this year, as a net claimant on the rest of the federal budget. The combined OASDI Trust Funds will begin drawing on the Treasury to cover the cash shortfall, first relying on interest income and eventually drawing down accumulated trust fund assets. The Treasury will need to obtain cash for those redeemed securities either through increased taxes, and/or spending cuts, and/or more borrowing from the public than would have been the case had Social Security’s cash flow remained positive. Neither the decline in the cash surpluses nor the cash deficit will affect the payment of benefits. The shift from positive to negative cash flow, however, will place increased pressure on the federal budget to raise the resources necessary to meet the program’s ongoing costs. Ultimately, the critical question is not how much a trust fund has in assets, but whether the government as a whole can afford the benefits in the future and at what cost to other claims on scarce resources. As I have said before, the future sustainability of programs is the key issue policy makers should address—i.e., the capacity of the economy and budget to afford the commitment. Fund solvency can help, but only if promoting solvency improves the future sustainability of the program. From the perspective of the federal budget and the economy, the challenge posed by the growth in Social Security spending becomes even more significant in combination with the more rapid expected growth in Medicare and Medicaid spending. This growth in spending on federal entitlements for retirees will become increasingly unsustainable over the longer term, compounding an ongoing decline in budgetary flexibility. Over the past few decades, spending on mandatory programs has consumed an ever-increasing share of the federal budget. In 1964, prior to the creation of the Medicare and Medicaid programs, spending for mandatory programs plus net interest accounted for about 33 percent of total federal spending. By 2004, this share had almost doubled to approximately 61 percent of the budget. (See fig. 4.) In much of the last decade, reductions in defense spending helped accommodate the growth in these entitlement programs. Even before the events of September 11, 2001, however, this ceased to be a viable option. Indeed, spending on defense and homeland security will likely grow as we seek to combat new threats to our nation’s security. GAO prepares long-term budget simulations that seek to illustrate the likely fiscal consequences of the coming demographic tidal wave and rising health care costs. These simulations continue to show that to move into the future with no changes in federal retirement and health programs is to envision a very different role for the federal government. Assuming, for example, all expiring tax provisions are extended and discretionary spending keeps pace with the economy, by midcentury federal revenues may be adequate to pay no more than interest on the federal debt. To obtain balance, massive spending cuts, tax increases, or some combination of the two would be necessary. (See fig. 5.) Neither slowing the growth of discretionary spending nor This testimony is not about the complexities of Medicare, but it is important to note that Medicare presents a much greater, more complex, and more urgent fiscal challenge than does Social Security. Medicare growth rates reflect not only a burgeoning beneficiary population, but also the escalation of health care costs at rates well exceeding general rates of inflation. Increases in the number and quality of health care services have been fueled by the explosive growth of medical technology. Moreover, the actual costs of health care consumption are not transparent. Third-party payers generally insulate consumers from the cost of health care decisions. These factors and others contribute to making Medicare a much greater and more complex fiscal challenge than even Social Security. GAO has developed a health care framework to help focus additional attention on this important area and to help educate key policy makers and the public on the current system and related challenges. Indeed, long-term budget flexibility is about more than Social Security and Medicare. While these programs dominate the long-term outlook, they are not the only federal programs or activities that bind the future. The federal government undertakes a wide range of programs, responsibilities, and activities that obligate it to future spending or create an expectation for spending. GAO has described the range and measurement of such fiscal exposures—from explicit liabilities such as environmental cleanup requirements to the more implicit obligations presented by life-cycle costs of capital acquisition or disaster assistance. Making government fit the challenges of the future will require not only dealing with the drivers— entitlements for the elderly—but also looking at the range of federal activities. A fundamental review of what the federal government does and how it does it will be needed. At the same time it is important to look beyond the federal budget to the economy as a whole. Figure 6 shows the total future draw on the economy represented by Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid. Under the 2004 Trustees’ intermediate estimates and CBO’s long-term Medicaid estimates, spending for these entitlement programs combined will grow to 15.6 percent of GDP in 2030 from today’s 8.5 percent. Taken together, Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid represent an unsustainable burden on future generations. When Social Security redeems assets to pay benefits, the program will constitute a claim on real resources at that time. As a result, taking action now to increase the future pool of resources is important. To echo Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan, the crucial issue of saving in our economy relates to our ability to build an adequate capital stock to produce enough goods and services in the future to accommodate both retirees and workers in the future.