The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) authorizes EPA to set minimum operating requirements for hazardous waste facilities to protect the public and the environment. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 authorizes the Department of Labor, through OSHA, to establish standards to protect workers’ health and safety. Under both statutes, states can be authorized to inspect facilities, take enforcement action against facility owners/operators, and assess penalties at facilities that fail to meet states’ federally approved RCRA or OSHA programs. EPA has authorized 46 states to implement their own RCRA programs, and OSHA has authorized 23 states to implement their own OSHA programs. The federal government is responsible for implementing RCRA and OSHA programs in the remaining states. According to EPA’s general operating requirements for hazardous waste facilities, workers must be trained to know the environmental requirements that apply at their facility, and facilities must have contingency plans and emergency procedures for accidents. To ensure facilities’ compliance with regulatory or permit-related requirements, EPA recommends that its regions or the states inspect facilities annually. Every other year, EPA recommends an in-depth inspection lasting several days, rather than the annual 1-day walk-through. Facilities that accept Superfund waste must be inspected within the 6-month period prior to receiving such waste. During inspections, EPA and the states complete checklists of items to review while observing facilities’ operations and reviewing facilities’ records and files. OSHA’s health and safety regulations are intended to ensure that employees can recognize and avoid unsafe conditions and are instructed in the handling of any special equipment, among other things. At hazardous waste facilities, employees must receive special hazardous material training. To ensure compliance with OSHA’s regulatory requirements, federal or state OSHA inspectors conduct either “programmed” (planned) inspections or “unprogrammed” inspections to follow up on complaints, referrals, or accidents. The scheduling of federal programmed inspections is based on industries’ history of health or safety violations. Facilities within the types of industries that have a history of many violations receive programmed inspections for health or safety by OSHA’s field offices. OSHA also reserves some resources to conduct programmed health inspections at randomly selected facilities having a history of few health violations. States may use different methods for scheduling programmed inspections. OSHA and the states conduct unprogrammed inspections in response to complaints, referrals, and accidents resulting in catastrophes or fatalities. According to an OSHA Office of Policy official, during fiscal year 1993, about half of the inspections were programmed, or targeted, as a result of particular industries’ violations. The remainder of the inspections were unprogrammed. OSHA’s inspections rely on inspectors’ observations as well as interviews with employees and reviews of records. As of November 1994, 162 incinerators were operating in the United States. Of these, 141 had their final permits, which impose facility-specific operating requirements. The remaining 21 were considered in interim status. When an existing hazardous waste facility first becomes subject to RCRA’s requirements for permits, it generally assumes “interim status” until its operator completes the permit application process. A facility under interim status is allowed to continue operating under general operating requirements, pending EPA’s or the state’s approval of the facility’s final permits. In May 1990, after local citizens and workers made complaints or allegations about waste handling practices at an incinerator in North Carolina, EPA requested that the Department of Health and Human Services’ Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) evaluate health threats posed by the incinerator. Although routine RCRA inspections conducted while the facility operated from 1976 through 1989 had not detected or confirmed these allegations, ATSDR concluded that waste handling operations at the facility had posed a significant health threat to employees. In September 1990, at EPA’s request, OSHA and EPA formed a task force to evaluate compliance with health and safety requirements at 29 hazardous waste incinerators, including all commercial facilities with final permits, all facilities under interim status, and all incinerators burning Superfund waste. The task force’s May 1991 report summarized the results of these joint inspections. In total, EPA and OSHA detected 395 violations. The task force’s report made five recommendations to EPA and four recommendations to OSHA to improve the coverage of inspections and educate compliance officials and industry, among other things. Of the task force’s recommendations, EPA and/or OSHA have fully implemented three. However, the agencies have not fully implemented four other recommendations. EPA’s and OSHA’s follow-up on violations. On the basis of the 75 RCRA violations detected, EPA and the states initiated enforcement actions and collected over $2 million in penalties. The violations detected include the facilities’ failure to provide adequate environmental training and inability to respond fully to emergencies. OSHA and the states also completed enforcement actions for the 320 OSHA violations and collected $44,000 in penalties. The violations detected include the facilities’ failure to provide adequate hazardous material training, conduct medical surveillance, or update contingency plans for emergencies. EPA’s and OSHA’s education of industry. EPA and OSHA conducted outreach to the combustion industry to ensure the industry’s compliance with their regulations. EPA and OSHA officials said they jointly wrote to combustion industry representatives to emphasize the importance of compliance with health and safety requirements. EPA also met with combustion industry representatives to tell them that the task force had found significant health and safety violations that needed to be addressed. EPA’s education of compliance officials. Following the recommendation that EPA improve its regional and state officials’ knowledge about incineration, EPA developed a training program for and designated combustion experts for conducting inspections in each of the agency’s 10 regional offices. These combustion experts meet regularly to discuss issues concerning hazardous waste incinerators and other combustion facilities. EPA’s inspection coverage. Although the task force’s report recommended that EPA adopt some of the task force’s inspection procedures so that EPA could better scrutinize industry’s compliance with the agency’s regulations, EPA did not fully implement the recommendation. In particular, the task force’s inspectors used a new checklist that expanded the checklist used during EPA’s routine inspections. This new checklist was designed to evaluate the effectiveness and not just the presence of employee training programs, contingency responses, and emergency plans. Furthermore, interviews of employees during the task force’s inspections assessed employees’ knowledge of environmental requirements and employees’ ability to carry out contingency plans and emergency procedures. But in general, during routine inspections, EPA or the states only review employers’ records to ensure that employers have a training program and that plans are on file. After the task force made its recommendations in December 1990, an EPA Assistant Administrator sent a memo to regional administrators asking that they distribute the task force’s inspection checklist and employee interview guide to their staff and the states. EPA’s Technical Assistance Branch Chief also orally instructed regional enforcement section chiefs to include items from the task force’s checklist in the regions’ routine inspections. In addition, EPA included the new checklist in the agency’s inspection training manual and training courses. However, some of the EPA regions and states did not adopt the task force’s checklist as suggested or directed because, according to regional compliance and enforcement officials, they were not aware of headquarters’ instructions. Furthermore, according to an EPA Technical Assistance Branch official, EPA headquarters did not follow up to ensure that inspection procedures were changed because EPA believed the changes would be made, since it included the checklist in the training manual and training courses. An EPA Technical Assistance Branch Chief said that even if regions and states had adopted the task force’s checklist and interview guide, it would be difficult for inspectors to duplicate the information obtained during the task force’s inspections because the inspections included both EPA’s and OSHA’s interviews and were very focused. However, according to a regional inspector, while time is a factor during inspections, interviews of employees could routinely be included in all inspections, routine or in-depth, or on a case-by-case basis. These interviews would help confirm industry’s compliance with EPA’s requirements and assess employees’ knowledge of required duties. As a result of our work, EPA’s Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance Assurance issued a memorandum, dated September 23, 1994, to Regional Administrators and other RCRA officials requiring them to adopt the task force’s inspection protocol, which includes using the revised checklist and employee guide, for workers’ safety and health in regional RCRA Compliance Evaluation inspections. In addition, the memorandum requires that regional inspectors refer these violations to regional OSHA officials. EPA’s research on the use of certain operating equipment and review of permits. EPA did not fully implement the recommendation that it conduct research on the cause for and impact of using certain operating equipment—automatic waste feed cutoffs and emergency safety vents, or vent stacks—and that it reopen permits, as necessary, to address the use of this equipment. During the task force’s inspections, EPA observed the frequent use of automatic waste feed cutoffs at about half of the 29 facilities and the frequent use of vent stacks at 9 of these facilities. Automatic waste feed cutoffs prevent waste from entering the combustion chamber of an incinerator when operating conditions fluctuate outside certain parameters, such as those for temperature. Vent stacks protect workers and equipment by releasing gases when equipment malfunctions. While both are considered safety devices, EPA considers their frequent use an indication of poor operating practices. In particular, the frequent use of waste feed cutoffs (1) may be a sign of unsteady operation and (2) may cause the residue to be treated less efficiently. Furthermore, gases released through vent stacks contain more hazardous particles than gases routed through the air pollution control devices. In response to the recommendation, EPA conducted experiments at two of its research incinerators.