NIEs analyze issues of major importance and long-term interest to the United States and are the IC’s most authoritative projection of future developments in a particular subject area. NIEs are intended to help policymakers and military leaders think through critical issues by presenting the relevant key facts, judgments about the likely course of events in foreign countries, and the implications for the United States. In this regard, former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) William Casey stated: “the highest duty of a Director of Central Intelligence is to produce solid and perceptive national intelligence estimates relevant to the issues with which the President and the National Security Council need to concern themselves.” NIEs are produced by the National Intelligence Council (NIC), an organization composed of 12 National Intelligence Officers who report directly to the DCI. To prepare an NIE, the NIC brings together analysts from all the intelligence agencies that have expertise on the issue under review.However, in the final analysis, an NIE is the DCI’s assessment with which the heads of the U.S. intelligence agencies concur, except as noted in the NIE’s text. Based on a synthesis of the published views of current and former senior intelligence officials, the reports of three independent commissions, and a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) publication that addressed the issue of national intelligence estimating, an objective NIE should meet the following standards: quantify the certainty level of its key judgments by using percentages or “bettors’ odds,” where feasible, and avoid overstating the certainty of judgments; identify explicitly its assumptions and judgments; develop and explore “alternative futures:” less likely (but not impossible) scenarios that would dramatically change the estimate if they occurred; allow dissenting views on predictions or interpretations; and note explicitly what the IC does not know when the information gaps could have significant consequences for the issues under consideration. All or part of the three NIEs we reviewed addressed the nature of the current and future threat to the United States from foreign missiles. NIE 95-19 was specifically prepared by the IC to support decisions on missile defense systems for North America. In the United States, this issue is a critical one for the Congress and the administration as they debate the desirability and planned characteristics of a proposed multibillion dollar national missile defense system. Such a system would aim to protect the United States from limited ballistic missile attacks, whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate. Ballistic missiles are self-propelled missiles guided in the ascent of a high-arch trajectory and freely falling in the descent. If launched from any of the 18 countries analyzed in NIE 95-19 (except Cuba), such missiles would have to travel between 5,000 and 13,000 kilometers (3,100 to 8,100 miles) to reach North America, classifying them as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). The main judgment of NIE 95-19 was worded with clear (100 percent) certainty. We believe this level of certainty was overstated, based on the caveats and intelligence gaps noted in NIE 95-19. On the issue of certainty in judgments, in 1992 then-DCI Robert Gates opined: “While we strive for sharp and focused judgments for a clear assessment of likelihood, we must not dismiss alternatives or exaggerate our certainty under the guise of making the ‘tough calls.’ We are analysts, not umpires, and the game does not depend on our providing a single judgment.” The wording of NIE 95-19’s main judgment implies a 100-percent level of certainty that the predicted outcome will hold true during the next 15 years. However, the caveats and intelligence gaps noted in the NIE do not support this level of certainty. For example, at the beginning of NIE 95-19, the estimate notes “as with all projections of long-term developments, there are substantial uncertainties.” A 1993 NIE stated its view that substantial uncertainties cloud the IC’s ability to project developments, especially beyond 10 years. Finally, in NIE 95-19’s Intelligence Gaps section, it noted several shortcomings in the IC’s collection of information on foreign plans and capabilities. NIE 95-19 did not (1) quantify the certainty level of nearly all of its key judgments, (2) identify explicitly its critical assumptions, and (3) develop alternative futures. However, in accordance with standards for producing objective NIEs, NIE 95-19 acknowledged dissenting views from several agencies and also explicitly noted what information the IC does not know that bears upon the foreign missile threat. Given the important role NIEs play in the national security decision-making process, U.S. policymakers require, and expect, objective estimates. “The paramount value [in NIEs] is objectivity,” according to a former NIC Vice Chairman. Adds the CIA, “dedication to objectivity—tough-minded evaluation of information, description of sources, and explicit defense of judgments—provides credibility on uncertain and often controversial policy issues.” We believe that five standards, previously discussed, apply to an objective NIE. These standards were synthesized from our review of the published views of nine current or former senior intelligence officials, three independent commissions, and a CIA publication that addressed the issue of national intelligence estimating. We were unable to obtain the DCI’s current, official standards (if any exist) for the essential elements of an objective NIE, because the DCI refused to grant us access to the NIC. (See our Scope and Methodology section for more details on this scope impairment.) NIE 95-19 did not quantify the certainty level associated with its key judgments, by either using bettors’ odds or percentages. It used unquantified words or phrases such as “unlikely,” “likely,” “probably,” “normally,” “sometimes,” “some leakage,” and “feasible, but unlikely.” The CIA has told its analysts to be precise in conveying the levels of confidence they have in their conclusions because policymakers and others rely on these assessments as they define and defend U.S. interests. Different people can hear very different messages from the same words, especially about probabilities, and therefore good estimates should use quantitative measures of confidence, according to a former NIC Vice Chairman. For example, a “small but significant” chance could mean one chance in a hundred to one person; for another it may mean one chance in five. Similarly, a former NIC Chairman wrote that NIEs with only words such as “possibly” are not of much help to someone trying to make an important decision. Instead, where feasible, NIEs should use a percentage, a percentage range, or bettors’ odds to better serve policymakers—a controversial, but necessary, approach, according to this former official. Some intelligence judgments, such as estimating foreign economic developments well into the future, may not easily lend themselves to specifying a meaningful level of confidence, using numbers. NIE 93-17 quantified the certainty of one of its key judgments by estimating a “small but significant chance (10 to 30 percent)” that an event would occur. The certainty levels of its other key judgments were not quantified. NIE 93-19 did not quantify the certainty levels of any of its key judgments. NIE 95-19 did not explicitly identify its critical assumptions either by separately listing them in one place or by introducing them throughout the text with wording such as “we have assumed . . .” Critical assumptions, also known as “linchpin assumptions,” are defined by CIA as analysts’ debatable premises that hold the argument together and warrant the validity of judgments. Therefore, as previously mentioned, assumptions should be explicitly distinguished from other information, including judgments. Estimative judgments are to be defended by fully laying out the evidence and carefully explaining the analytic logic used, according to a former Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA. Writing about NIEs, a former Vice Chairman of the NIC agreed. As a general rule, the more complex and controversial an issue, the more analytic effort is required to ensure that critical assumptions are precisely stated and well defended, according to the CIA. Good analysis will clearly identify its key assumptions so that policymakers are aware of the “foundations” of the estimate and can therefore judge for themselves the appropriateness of the assumptions and the desirability of initiating actions to hedge against a failure of one or more assumptions. From our reading of NIE 95-19, we identified what appear to be its implicit critical assumptions. Most of these assumptions first appear in the NIE’s Key Judgments section, leading the reader to believe that the IC considers these assumptions to be fact-based judgments. However, we did not find a body of evidence in NIE 95-19 that would allow us to consider these statements as judgments, rather than assumptions. NIE 95-19 had only one explicit assumption, which was not a critical one, concerning Iraq. Some of NIE 95-19’s implicit critical assumptions are listed below. Three other assumptions that we identified included classified information. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) will continue to significantly limit international transfers of missiles, components, and related technology, but some leakage of components and critical technologies will likely continue. No country with ICBMs will sell them. Three countries—all of which were assessed as being “high” in both technical ability and economic resources—will not be interested in developing an ICBM that could reach the United States (and elsewhere). A flight test program lasting about 5 years is essential to the development of an ICBM. An attack against the United States from off-shore ships using cruise missiles, while feasible, is unlikely to occur . . . In addition, NIE 95-19 did not specify its assumption about the payload weight or weights the IC used in forecasting the range for North Korea’s Taepo Dong 2 ballistic missile.