According to IAEA, between 1993 and 2006, there were 1,080 confirmed incidents of illicit trafficking and unauthorized activities involving nuclear and radiological materials worldwide. Eighteen of these cases involved weapons-usable material—plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU)—that could be used to produce a nuclear weapon. IAEA also reported that 124 cases involved materials that could be used to produce a device that uses conventional explosives with radioactive material (known as a “dirty bomb”). Past confirmed incidents of illicit trafficking in HEU and plutonium involved seizures of kilogram quantities of weapons-usable nuclear material but most have involved very small quantities. In some of these cases, it is possible that the seized material was a sample of larger quantities available for illegal purchase. IAEA concluded that these materials pose a continuous potential security threat to the international community, including the United States. Nuclear material could be smuggled into the United States in a variety of ways: hidden in a car, train or ship; sent through the mail; carried in personal luggage through an airport; or walked across an unprotected border. In response to these threats, U.S. agencies, including DHS, DOD, DOE, and State, implemented programs to combat nuclear smuggling in foreign countries and the United States. DOD, DOE, and State fund, manage, and implement the global nuclear detection architecture’s international programs. Many international detection programs were operating for several years before DNDO was created. For example, DOE’s Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting program, initiated in 1995, provides support to the Russian Federation and other countries of concern to secure nuclear weapons and weapons material that may be at risk of theft of diversion. In addition, during the 1990s, the United States began deploying radiation detection equipment at borders in countries of the former Soviet Union. DOD’s Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program launched a variety of programs in the early 1990s to help address proliferation concerns in the former Soviet Union, including helping secure Russian nuclear weapons. Two other DOD programs have provided radiation portal monitors, handheld equipment, and radiation detection training to countries in the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. Similarly, State programs have provided detection equipment and training to numerous countries. DHS, in conjunction with other federal, state, and local agencies, is responsible for combating nuclear smuggling in the United States and has provided radiation detection equipment, including portal monitors, personal radiation detectors (known as pagers), and radioactive isotope identifiers at U.S. ports of entry. All radiation detection devices have limitations in their ability to detect and identify nuclear material. Detecting attempted nuclear smuggling is difficult because there are many sources of radiation that are legal and not harmful when used as intended. These materials can trigger alarms— known as nuisance alarms—that may be indistinguishable in some cases from alarms that could sound in the event of a true case of nuclear smuggling. Nuisance alarms can be caused by patients who have recently had cancer treatments; a wide range of cargo with naturally occurring radiation (e.g., fertilizer, ceramics, and food products) and legitimate shipments of radiological sources for use in medicine and industry. In October 2005, a few months after its inception, DNDO completed its initial inventory of federal programs associated with detecting the illicit transport of radiological and nuclear materials. As part of this effort, DNDO defined the architecture’s general approach: a multilayered detection framework of radiation detection equipment and interdiction activities to combat nuclear smuggling in foreign countries, at the U.S. border, and inside the United States. DNDO, in collaboration with other federal agencies, such as DOD, DOE, and State, analyzed the gaps in current planning and deployment strategies to determine the ability of individual layers of the architecture to successfully prevent illicit movement of radiological or nuclear materials or devices. DNDO identified several gap areas with respect to detecting potential nuclear smuggling, such as (1) land border crossings into the United States between formal points of entry, (2) small maritime craft (any vessel less than 300 gross tons) that enter the United States, and (3) international general aviation. In November 2006, DNDO completed a more detailed analysis of programs in the initial architecture. DNDO identified 72 programs across the federal government that focused on combating radiological and nuclear smuggling and nuclear security and it discussed these programs in depth by layer. The analysis also included a discussion of the current and anticipated budgets associated with each of these programs and each of the layers. In June 2008, DNDO released the Joint Annual Interagency Review of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. This report provides an updated analysis of the architecture by layer of defense and a discussion of the 74 programs now associated with each of the layers, as well as an estimate of the total budgets by layer. To address the gaps identified in the domestic portions of the architecture, DNDO has initiated pilot programs to address primary areas of concern or potential vulnerability. For example: For the land border in between ports of entry, DNDO and CBP are studying the feasibility of equipping CBP border patrol agents with portable radiological and nuclear detection equipment along the U.S. border. For small marine vessels, DNDO is working with the Coast Guard to develop and expand the coverage of radiological and nuclear detection capabilities that can be specifically applied in a maritime environment. For international general aviation, DNDO is working with CBP, the Transportation Security Administration, and other agencies to develop and implement radiological and nuclear detection capabilities to scan international general aviation flights to the United States for possible illicit radiological or nuclear materials. To date, we have received briefings on each of these programs from DNDO, but we have not yet fully reviewed how they are being implemented. We will examine each of these more closely during the course of our review. Our preliminary observation is that DNDO’s pilot programs appear to be a step in the right direction for improving the current architecture. However, these efforts to address gaps are not being undertaken within the larger context of an overarching strategic plan. While each agency that has a role in the architecture may have its own planning documents, DNDO has not produced an overarching strategic plan that can guide its efforts to address the gaps and move to a more comprehensive global nuclear detection architecture. Our past work has discussed the importance of strategic planning. Specifically, we have reported that strategic plans should clearly define objectives to be accomplished, identify the roles and responsibilities for meeting each objective, ensure that the funding necessary to achieve the objectives is available, and employ monitoring mechanisms to determine progress and identify needed improvements. For example, such a plan would define how DNDO will achieve and monitor the goal of detecting the movement of radiological and nuclear materials through potential smuggling routes, such as small maritime craft or land borders in between ports of entry. Moreover, this plan would include agreed-upon processes and procedures to guide the improvement of the architecture and coordinate the activities of the participating agencies. DNDO and other agencies face a number of challenges in developing a global nuclear detection architecture, including (1) coordinating detection efforts across federal, state, and local agencies and with other nations, (2) dealing with the limitations of detection technology, and (3) managing the implementation of the architecture. Our past work on key aspects of international and domestic programs that are part of the architecture have identified a number of weaknesses. In order for the architecture to be effective, all parts need to be well thought out, managed, and coordinated. As a chain is only as strong as its weakest link, limitations in any of the programs that constitute the architecture may ultimately limit its effectiveness. Specifically, in past work, we have identified the following difficulties that federal agencies have had coordinating and implementing radiation detection efforts. We reported that DOD, DOE, and State had not coordinated their approaches to enhance other countries’ border crossing. Specifically, radiation portal monitors that State installed in more than 20 countries are less sophisticated than those DOD and DOE installed. As a result, some border crossings where U.S. agencies had installed radiation detection equipment were more vulnerable to nuclear smuggling than others. Since issuing our report, a governmentwide plan encompassing U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling in other countries has been developed; duplicative programs have been consolidated; and coordination among the agencies, although still a concern, has improved. In 2005, we reported that there is no governmentwide guidance for border security programs that delineates agencies’ roles and responsibilities, establishes regular information sharing, and defines procedures for resolving interagency disputes. In the absence of guidance for coordination, officials in some agencies questioned other agencies’ roles and responsibilities. More recently, in 2008, we found that levels of collaboration between U.S. and host government officials varied at some seaports participating in DHS’s Container Security Initiative (CSI). In addition, we identified hurdles to cooperation between CSI teams and their counterparts in the host government, such as a host country’s legal restrictions that CBP officials said prevent CSI teams from observing examinations. Furthermore, many international nuclear detection programs rely heavily on the host country to maintain and operate the equipment. We have reported that in some instances this reliance has been problematic. For example: About half of the portal monitors provided to one country in the former Soviet Union were never installed or were not operational. In additional, mobile vans equipped with radiation detection equipment furnished by State have limited usefulness because they cannot operate effectively in cold climates or are otherwise not suitable for conditions in some countries. Once the equipment is deployed, the United States has limited control over it, as we have previously reported. Specifically, once DOE finishes installing radiation equipment at a port and passes control of the equipment to the host government, the United States no longer controls the equipment’s specific settings or its use by foreign customs officials. Settings can be changed, which may decreased the probability that the equipment will detect nuclear material.