The National Security Act of 1947 (P.L. 80-253) established the statutory framework for themanagerial structure of the United States Intelligence Community, including the Central IntelligenceAgency (CIA) and the position of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). A fundamental intent ofthis legislation was to coordinate, and to a certain extent centralize, the nascent intelligence effortsof the United States as an emergent superpower in the face of a hostile Soviet Union. In addition,the act provided the CIA with the ability to assume an operational role by charging it with: Perform[ing] such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to timedirect. (1) In 1947, the foundation of the present-day Intelligence Community consisted only of therelatively small intelligence components in the Armed Services, the Departments of State and theTreasury, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the fledgling CIA. Since 1947, however,the Intelligence Community "has greatly expanded in size and acquired a much broader range ofresponsibilities in the collection, analysis, and dissemination of foreign intelligence." (2) The U.S. Intelligence Community is defined in the National Security Act as amended. It currently includes the following: Central Intelligence Agency; National Security Agency; Defense Intelligence Agency; National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; National Reconnaissance Office; Intelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, the FederalBureau of Investigation, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Energy, and the CoastGuard; Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department ofState; Elements of the Department of Homeland Security concerned with analysesof foreign intelligence information; and Coast Guard. (3) Beginning in January 1948, numerous independent commissions, individual experts, and legislative initiatives have examined the growth and evolving mission of the IntelligenceCommunity. Proposals by these groups have sought to address perceived shortcomings in theIntelligence Community's structure, management, role, and mission. These proposals have rangedin scope from basic organizational restructuring to the dissolution of the CIA. In 1948 and 1949, two executive branch commissions examined the intelligence and operational missions of the CIA, and identified fundamental administrative and organizational loopholes in P.L.80-253. By the 1950s, however, the physical growth and evolving mission of the IntelligenceCommunity led subsequent commissions to broaden the scope of their proposals to include theenhancement of the DCI's community-wide authority, and the establishment of executive andlegislative branch intelligence oversight committees. Unlike the intelligence investigations of the1970s and 1980s, these early studies were primarily concerned with questions of efficiency andeffectiveness rather than with issues of legality and propriety. Following the Vietnam War and "Watergate," investigatory bodies became increasingly critical of the national intelligence effort. Beginning in the mid-1970s, the impetus shifted to the legislativebranch where investigatory committees led by Senator Frank Church and Representative Otis G. Pikeissued a broad range of proposals, including the separation of the DCI and CIA Director positions,dividing the CIA's analytical and operational responsibilities into two separate agencies, and theestablishment of congressional oversight committees. In 1976 and 1977, respectively,recommendations by the these committees led to the establishment of the Senate Select Committeeon Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI). Thesecommittees were heavily involved in the investigations into the Iran-Contra affair of the mid-1980s. With the end of the Cold War, and in the wake of the Aldrich Ames espionage case, both the executive and legislative branches undertook studies to determine the future roles, capabilities,management, and structure of the Intelligence Community. These studies include such issues as theneed to maintain the CIA as a separate entity, the extent and competence of U.S. counterintelligence(CI) efforts, and the managerial structure of intelligence components in the armed services and theDepartment of Defense (DOD). A comprehensive examination of the DCI's roles, responsibilities,authorities, and status was also undertaken. In an era of budgetary constraints and shifting policyconcerns, these studies also examined personnel issues, allocation of resources, duplication ofservices, expanded use of open source Intelligence (OSCINT), and the need for maintaining a covertaction (CA) capability. The results of this effort were reflected in organizational adjustments madeby the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY1997 ( P.L. 104-293 ), but some observers havesubsequently concluded that this legislation did not go far enough and that, in the light of the eventsof September 11, 2001 and the Iraq War, intelligence organization questions need to be reevaluated. The history of these investigations has witnessed the gradual transformation of intelligence from a White House asset to one that is shared between the executive and legislative branches. Congressnot only has access to intelligence judgments but to most information that intelligence agenciesacquire as well as to the details of intelligence activities. Congress has accepted some responsibilityas a participant in the planning and conduct of covert actions. In significant measure, this processhas been encouraged by these external intelligence investigations. This report provides a chronological overview and examination of the major executive and legislative branch intelligence investigations made from January 1949 to date. Major proposals arelisted in chronological order with a brief discussion of their respective results. Proposals specificallyrelating to congressional oversight of the Intelligence Community are not included in this report. Following the Second World War, the United States emerged as a global political, military, and economic leader. In the face of Soviet aggressiveness, the U.S. sought to enhance its nationaldefense capabilities to curb the international spread of communism and to provide security for thenation itself. The National Security Act (P.L. 80-253), signed July 26, 1947, established the statutory framework for the managerial structure of the United States Intelligence Community, including theCentral Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the position of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Theact also created a semi-unified military command structure under a Secretary of Defense, and aNational Security Council (NSC) to advise the President "with respect to the integration of domestic,foreign, and military policies relating to the national security." (4) The fundamental intent of thislegislation was to coordinate U.S. national defense efforts, including intelligence activities, in theface of a Soviet Union intent upon expanding and leading a system of communist states. In response to the rapid growth and changing role of the Federal government following theSecond World War, several studies were conducted to examine the structure and efficiency of theexecutive branch, including the intelligence agencies. (5) Between 1948 and 1949, two importantinvestigations of the national intelligence effort were conducted. The first, the Task Force onNational Security Organization of the First Hoover Commission, was established by a unanimousvote in Congress. The second, known as the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report, was initiated by theNSC at the request of President Harry S. Truman. The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the government was established pursuant to P.L. 80-162 of July 27, 1947. (6) Underthe chairmanship of former President HerbertHoover, the twelve member bipartisan commission conducted a comprehensive review of the federalbureaucracy, including the intelligence agencies. The commission's Task Force on National SecurityOrganization was headed by Ferdinand Eberstadt, a strong advocate of a centralized intelligencecapability who had been instrumental in drafting the National Security Act of 1947. (7) Hearings conducted by the task force began in June 1948. On January 13, 1949, the Hoover Commission submitted the task force's 121 page unclassified report to Congress. (8) Known as theEberstadt Report, it found the "National Security Organization, established by the National SecurityAct of 1947, [to be] soundly constructed, but not yet working well." (9) The report identifiedfundamental organizational and qualitative shortcomings in the national intelligence effort and thenewly created CIA. A principal concern of the task force was the adversarial relationship and lack of coordination between the CIA, the military, and the State Department. It suggested that this resulted inunnecessary duplication and the issuance of departmental intelligence estimates that "have oftenbeen subjective and biased." (10) In large measure,the military and State Department were blamed fortheir failure to consult and share pertinent information with the CIA. The task force recommended"that positive efforts be made to foster relations of mutual confidence between the [CIA] and theseveral departments and agencies that it serves." (11) In short, the report stressed that the CIA "must be the central organization of the nationalintelligence system." (12) To facilitate communitycoordination in the production of national estimates,a founding intent of CIA, the task force recommended the creation within CIA "at the top echelonan evaluation board or section composed of competent and experienced personnel who would haveno administrative responsibilities and whose duties would be confined solely to intelligenceevaluation." (13) To foster professionalism andcontinuity of service, the report also favored a civilianDCI with a long term in office. (14) In the arena of covert operations and clandestine intelligence, the Eberstadt Report supported the integration of all clandestine operations into one office within CIA, under NSC supervision. Toalleviate concerns expressed by the military who viewed this proposal as encroaching upon theirprerogatives, the report stated that clandestine operations should be the responsibility of the JointChiefs of Staff (JCS) in time of war. (15) In examining the daily workings of the CIA, the task force found the agency's internal structure and personnel system "not now properly organized." (16) This led to recommendations for the adoptionof clearer lines of departmental responsibilities, and the establishment of proper personnel selectionand training systems.