While the U.S. government supports a wide variety of programs and activities for global food security, it lacks comprehensive data on funding. We found that it is difficult to readily determine the full extent of such programs and activities and to estimate precisely the total amount of funding that the U.S. government as a whole allocates to global food security. In response to our data collection instrument to the 10 agencies, 7 agencies reported providing monetary assistance for global food security programs and activities in fiscal year 2008, based on the working definition we developed for this purpose with agency input. Figure 1 summarizes the agencies’ responses on the types of global food security programs and activities and table 1 summarizes the funding levels. (The agencies are listed in order from highest to lowest amount of funding provided.) USAID and USDA reported providing the broadest array of global food security programs and activities. USAID, MCC, Treasury (through its participation in multilateral development institutions), USDA, and State provide the highest levels of funding to address food insecurity in developing countries. In addition, USTDA and DOD provide some food security-related assistance. These 7 agencies reported directing at least $5 billion in fiscal year 2008 to global food security, with food aid accounting for about half of this funding. However, the actual total level of funding is likely greater. The agencies did not provide us with comprehensive funding data due to two key factors. First, a commonly accepted governmentwide operational definition of what constitutes global food security programs and activities has not been developed. An operational definition accepted by all U.S. agencies would enable them to apply it at the program level for planning and budgeting purposes. The agencies also lack reporting requirements to routinely capture data on all relevant funds. Second, some agencies’ management systems are inadequate for tracking and reporting food security funding data comprehensively and consistently. Most notably, USAID and State—which both use the Foreign Assistance Coordination and Tracking System (FACTS) database for tracking foreign assistance— failed to include a very large amount of food aid funding in that database. In its initial response to our instrument, USAID, using FACTS, reported that in fiscal year 2008 the agency’s planned appropriations for global food security included about $860 million for Food for Peace Title II emergency food aid. However, we noticed a very large discrepancy between the FACTS-generated $860 million and two other sources of information on emergency food aid funding: (1) the $1.7 billion that USAID allocated to emergency food aid from the congressional appropriations for Title II food aid for fiscal year 2008, and (2) about $2 billion in emergency food aid funding reported by USAID in its International Food Assistance Report for fiscal year 2008. USAID officials reported that USAID has checks in place to ensure the accuracy of the data entered by its overseas missions and most headquarters bureaus. However, the magnitude of the discrepancy for emergency food aid, which is USAID’s global food security program with the highest funding level, raises questions about the data management and verification procedures in FACTS, particularly with regard to the Food for Peace program. While the administration is making progress toward finalizing a governmentwide global food security strategy through improved interagency coordination at the headquarters level, its efforts are vulnerable to weaknesses in data and risks associated with the host country-led approach called for in the strategy under development. Two interagency processes established in April 2009—the NSC Interagency Policy Committee on Agriculture and Food Security and the GHFSI working team—are improving headquarters coordination among numerous agencies, as shown in figure 2. The strategy under development is embodied in the Consultation Document issued in September 2009, which is being expanded and as of February 2010 was expected to be released shortly, along with an implementation document and a results framework that will include a plan for monitoring and evaluation. In the fiscal year 2011 Congressional Budget Justification for GHFSI, the administration has identified a group of 20 countries for GHFSI assistance, including 12 countries in sub- Saharan Africa, 4 in Asia, and 4 in the Western Hemisphere. However, the administration’s efforts are vulnerable to weaknesses in funding data, and the host country-led approach, although promising, poses some risks. Currently, no single information database compiles comprehensive data on the entire range of global food security programs and activities across the U.S. government. The lack of comprehensive data on current programs and funding levels may impair the success of the new strategy because it deprives decision makers of information on all available resources, actual costs, and a firm baseline against which to plan. Furthermore, the host country-led approach has three key vulnerabilities, as follows: First, the weak capacity of host governments raises questions regarding their ability to absorb significant increases in donor funding for agriculture and food security and to sustain donor-funded projects on their own over time. For example, multilateral development banks have reported relatively low sustainability ratings for agriculture-related projects in the past. In a 2007 review of World Bank assistance to the agricultural sector in Africa, the World Bank Independent Evaluation Group reported that only 40 percent of the bank’s agriculture-related projects in sub-Saharan Africa had been sustainable. Similarly, an annual report issued by the International Fund for Agricultural Development’s independent Office of Evaluation on the results and impact of the fund’s operations between 2002 and 2006 rated only 45 percent of its agricultural development projects satisfactory for sustainability. Second, the shortage of expertise in agriculture and food security at relevant U.S. agencies can constrain efforts to help strengthen host government capacity, as well as review host government efforts and guide in-country activities. For example, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs noted that whereas USAID previously had a significant in-house staff capacity in agriculture, it has lost that capacity over the years and is only now beginning to restore it. The loss has been attributed to the overall declining trend in U.S. assistance for agriculture since the 1990s. In 2008 three former USAID administrators reported that “the agency now has only six engineers and 16 agriculture experts.” According to USAID, a recent analysis of direct hire staff shows that the agency has since increased the number of its staff with technical expertise in agriculture and food security to 79. A USAID official told us that the agency’s current workforce plan calls for adding 95 to 114 new Foreign Service officers with technical expertise in agriculture by the end of fiscal year 2012. Third, policy differences between the United States and host governments with regard to agricultural development and food security may complicate efforts to align U.S. assistance with host government strategies. For example, Malawi’s strategy of providing subsidized agricultural inputs to farmers runs counter to the U.S. approach of encouraging the development of agricultural markets and linking farmers to those markets. Since 2005 and 2006, the government of Malawi has implemented a large- scale national program that distributes vouchers to about 50 percent of the country’s farmers so that they can purchase agricultural inputs—such as fertilizer, seeds, and pesticides—at highly discounted prices. USAID has supported operations that use targeted vouchers to accelerate short-term relief operations following conflicts or disasters. However, according to USAID, the provision of cheaper fertilizer and seeds does not address the fundamental problem—that poor farmers cannot afford fertilizer on their own and, furthermore, without improvements in irrigation, investments in fertilizer would not pay off in drought years in a country like Malawi, where agriculture is mainly rain-fed. In the face of growing malnutrition worldwide, the international community has established ambitious goals toward halving global hunger, including significant financial commitments to increase aid for agriculture and food security. Given the size of the problem and how difficult it has historically been to address it, this effort will require a long-term, sustained commitment on the part of the international donor community, including the United States. As part of this initiative, and consistent with a prior GAO recommendation, the United States has committed to harnessing the efforts of all relevant U.S. agencies in a coordinated and integrated governmentwide approach. The administration has made important progress toward realizing this commitment, including providing high-level support across multiple government agencies. However, the administration’s efforts to develop an integrated U.S. governmentwide strategy for global food security have two key vulnerabilities: (1) the lack of readily available comprehensive data across agencies and (2) the risks associated with the host country-led approach. Given the complexity and long-standing nature of these concerns, there should be no expectation of quick and easy solutions. Only long-term, sustained efforts by countries, institutions, and all relevant entities to mitigate these concerns will greatly enhance the prospects of fulfilling the international commitment to halve global hunger. In the report issued today, we recommended that the Secretary of State (1) work with the existing NSC Interagency Policy Committee to develop an operational definition of food security that is accepted by all U.S. agencies; establish a methodology for consistently reporting comprehensive data across agencies; and periodically inventory the food security-related programs and associated funding for each of these agencies; and (2) work in collaboration with relevant agency heads to delineate measures to mitigate the risks associated with the host country- led approach on the successful implementation of the forthcoming governmentwide global food security strategy. Four agencies—State, Treasury, USAID, and USDA—provided written comments on our report and generally concurred with our recommendations. With regard to our first recommendation, State and USAID agreed that developing an operational definition of food security that is accepted by all U.S. agencies would be useful. With regard to our second recommendation, the four agencies noted that the administration recognizes the risks associated with a host country-led approach and that they are taking actions to mitigate these risks. Madam Chairwoman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have.