U.S. embassy security needs have evolved and expanded over recent decades. During the 1950s, U.S. embassieswere intentionally grand and highly visible toshowcase the American way of life and promote democracy. It was believed then that by placing embassies in thecenter of foreign cities, U.S. diplomats andservices would be more accessible and inviting to Americans, as well as local officials and residents. Throughoutthe 1960s, Vietnam-related demonstrations andattacks at embassies, mostly involving destruction of property, were on the rise; and in 1965 the United Stateswitnessed the dawning of a new level of violencewhen 3 embassy employees were killed in the U.S. embassy in Saigon. The 1970s were marked by frequent terroristattacks on embassies; the decade ended withthe hostage taking in Tehran in 1979. In response to the increasing frequency and seriousness of incidents, the State Department, with congressional support, initiated the Security EnhancementProgram (SEP) in August 1980. The object of SEP was to improve protection of mission personnel, U.S.government property, and classified information at postswhere the foreign government was unwilling or unable to provide effective protection. Experts were sent abroadto assess certain embassy security needs where ahigh, medium, or low threat of mob violence had been determined, and then recommend improvements. The issue of embassy security again gained focus and urgency after the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Beirut, Lebanon in April 1983, the bombing of the Marinebarracks in Beirut in October 1983, and the bombing of the embassy annex in Beirut in September 1984. Theseincidents awakened the United States to thedestructive power of explosive-laden trucks and car bombs. The bombings resulted in the passage of the 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism ( P.L. 98-533 ), which authorized reward payments for informationleading to the arrest of individuals involved in terrorist acts against Americans or American property and $356.3million for enhanced embassy security. Also in the wake of the three Beirut bombings, Secretary of State George P. Shultz formed a commission-the Advisory Panel on Overseas Security-headed byRetired Admiral Bobby Inman, which reported its recommendations (sometimes referred to as the Inman report)in June 1985. (1) The findings andrecommendations, as modified by subsequent reviews, continue to be the standards (often referred to as the Inmanstandards) for today's security measures. Some of the recommendations by the Inman Panel included (1) a reorganization of the offices in the Department of State that are primarily responsible for securityand counter-terrorism and consolidation of operational security offices into a new bureau for Diplomatic Security;(2) improvements in State's protectiveintelligence, threat analysis, and alerting procedures; (3) improvements in the Department's training of ForeignService personnel and dependents to deal moreeffectively with terrorist threats; (4) improvements in contingency planning at the posts; (5) assigning MarineSecurity Guard detachments to all highly sensitiveposts; (6) revising the Diplomatic Security Service physical security standards; (7) pursuing a substantial buildingprogram to correct security deficiencies; and (8)initiating a capital budgeting procedure to avoid security improvement delays due to budgetary reasons. The panelalso offered a number of classifiedrecommendations. Contrary to widespread belief, the report specifically did not recommend a 100 foot setback for embassies and 9 foot walls-frequently cited as Inman standards. These criteria resulted from the magnitude of the Beirut bombs and the measures that would have protected thosefacilities at the time. The Inman panel set inmotion the focus on security from which the current standards evolved. Following the Advisory Panel report, Congress took up the issue of international terrorism and security and passed the Omnibus Diplomatic Security andAntiterrorism Act of 1986 ( P.L. 99-399 ). This Act became the permanent authorization (often duplicated by thebiannual foreign relations authorization act) forembassy construction and security programs. In 1985, the Advisory panel identified 126 facilities with inadequate security, 50 of them consulates. As of September 1, 1998, 49 facilities have been built orenhanced to meet new security standards. (As of September 2001, the Administration estimates that about 80% ofU.S. overseas facilities do not meet minimumsecurity requirements.) (2) Immediately following the bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa in August 1998, there was disagreement between the Department of State and Capitol Hill overprimary responsibility for under funding embassy security over the years. Since then, Congress has sought evengreater funding levels that the ClintonAdministration for overseas security purposes. At the same time, State Department experts are somewhat conflictedbetween wanting to maintain embassyvisibility and accessibility overseas, while trying to increase setbacks and barriers which would prohibit terroristactions. In February, 1999, Secretary of State Albright announced the selection of the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel (OPAP) chaired by Lewis Kaden. The panelreported its recommendations in November 1999 (3) ,including: 1) improving windows and barriers, warning systems, and emergency response training; 2) creatingan interagency committee to determine the right size and locations for U.S. overseas presence; and 3) establishingan Overseas Facilities Authority (OFA) tomanage the building, maintenance, and renovation of American overseas facilities. In an August 3, 2000 press conference, Secretary Albright responded to a question regarding lack of success in capturing bin Laden: "We [will] never forget thevictims of those bombings...We will continue to do what we must in terms of sanctions and do what we cangenerally with our friends and allies to try to huntdown the terrorists. Their day will come, and there is no statute of limitations and we will pursue them asnecessary." (4) Slightly more than a year later, after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon with more than 6,000 dead, the UnitedStates is now leading a worldwide effort to end terrorism once and for all. The bombings of the U.S. embassies in Africa in August 1998 reinforced the belief that it is impossible to attain100% security. Even though the embassies inNairobi and Dar es Salaam did not meet Inman standards, the size of the blasts underscored the vulnerabilities ofmajor buildings in densely populated areas. After the attacks, a number of Administration officials asserted that as bombs get bigger and more sophisticated,standards will need to be continually revised, butthere can be no guarantees for complete security overseas. Every U.S. overseas post goes through a threat assessment process authorized by the Diplomatic Security Act of 1986. The threat level associated with each postis an evaluation of threat levels for a particular time period and can be changed as events occur or when a newassessment is deemed necessary. The four threatlevel categories are: critical, high, medium, and low. Each post is given a threat level that helps the Department ofState's Diplomatic Security Service allocateresources for overseas security. Given that the assessed threat levels of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzaniawere medium to low, the State Department isreviewing its methodology for evaluating threat levels and the significance the Administration places on threatassessments in its allocation of security resources. According to Secretary of State Albright, "After the Africa bombings, we can no longer consider any post a lowthreat one." (5) Currently, security resource needs of each post are a reflection of the potential for terrorist activity or unrest within a particular country, and other factors such asthe physical location of the facility (i.e., in a city, in a rural area, close to a busy street, set far back from any streets,etc.). Security determinations are made afterconsultation among State's Office of Diplomatic Security, Office of Foreign Buildings Operations, and the embassysecurity officer in the overseas facility. Responsibility for requesting resources for overseas post security ultimately rests with the Secretary of State, uponreceiving recommendations from the AssistantSecretary of Diplomatic Security and the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Foreign Buildings in the Bureau ofAdministration. One problem for U.S. security personnel is deciding how to respond to threats against U.S. facilities andpersonnel. Currently, according to State Departmentofficials, 10 - 12 threats are aimed at U.S. overseas posts each day. That amounts to approximately 3,000 to 4,000threats handled each year by the Department ofState. There is no one set procedure to handle all threats made against American overseas facilities and staff. The U.S. response might differ depending on the country,the type of facility (an embassy, consulate, or living quarters), and whether the threat comes from a walk-in or phonecall. Nevertheless, State Departmentofficials are quick to point out that all threats are taken seriously. Generally, procedures include a first level response in which the resident security officer and the regional officer of a facility confer with officials in Washingtonto discuss the credibility of the threat. Subsequent discussions determine whether the local post can handle thethreat alone or whether a greater response iswarranted. Normally, the regional security officer seeks information from the local police to assist in determiningthe credibility and the nature of the threat. U.S.intelligence also tries to verify the significance of the threat. Some of the actions that the Chief of Mission can takeinclude: closing surrounding streets (withlocal police concurrence), putting up concrete barriers, temporarily reducing staff size in the building, andevacuating all personnel from the area or country. StateDepartment officials in Washington with responsibility for security say that Administration officials would not takeany action against a perceived credible threatwithout first consulting with the Chief of Mission.