Approximately 2.6 million federal employees throughout the United States and abroad execute the responsibilities of the federal government. Federal employees work in every state, with about 90 percent outside the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. They perform functions across a multitude of sectors, from those vital to the long-term well-being of the country—such as environmental protection, intelligence, social work, and financial services—to those directly charged with aspects of public safety—including corrections, airport and aviation safety, medical services, border protection, and agricultural safety. Worker protection strategies are crucial to sustain an adequate workforce during a pandemic. During the peak of an outbreak of a severe influenza pandemic in the United States, an estimated 40 percent of the workforce could be unable to work because of illness, the need to care for ill family members, or fear of infection. Under the Implementation Plan, all federal agencies are expected to develop their own pandemic plans that along with other requirements, describe how each agency will provide for the safety and health of its employees and support the federal government’s efforts to prepare for, respond to, and recover from a pandemic. Because the dynamic nature of pandemic influenza requires that the scope of federal government continuity of operations (COOP) planning includes preparing for a catastrophic event that is not geographically or temporally bounded, the Federal Emergency Management Agency concluded that planning for a pandemic requires a state of preparedness that is beyond traditional federal government COOP planning. For example, for pandemic planning purposes, essential functions may be more inclusive and extend longer than the 30-day traditional COOP-essential functions. Our survey questions for the 24 agencies were drawn from pandemic planning checklists and federal guidance to help agencies plan for protecting their employees during a pandemic. The 24 agencies we surveyed reported being in various stages of formulating their pandemic plans. While most of the agencies had developed plans, several reported that they were still formulating their plans. For example, in February 2009, the Small Business Administration (SBA) reported that it had begun to draft a more complete pandemic influenza annex to its COOP plan with an estimated completion date of spring 2009. The Department of Defense (DOD) had completed its overarching departmentwide plan, and DOD reported that its installations were tailoring their Force Health Protection Plans to include pandemic influenza considerations. Identifying essential functions and enumerating the employees who would perform them is the first step in training those employees, communicating the risks and expectations of working during a pandemic, and planning and budgeting for measures that would mitigate those risks. Nineteen agencies reported that they had identified essential functions at both the department and component levels that cannot be continued through telework in the event of pandemic influenza or, in the case of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the National Science Foundation (NSF), determined that all of their essential or important government functions could be performed remotely. Of the remaining 5 agencies, DOJ reported identifying essential functions at the component level but noted that it was revising its department-level plan. At the time of our survey, the General Services Administration (GSA) reported not identifying its essential functions in the event of a pandemic while three agencies—DOD, SBA, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)—were in the process of either identifying essential functions or determining which functions could be continued through telework. The pandemic coordinators in three agencies did not know whether the employees who performed essential functions in their agencies had been notified that they might be expected to continue operations during a pandemic. We also asked the pandemic coordinators from the 24 agencies whether they had planned or budgeted for any of seven potential measures to protect workers whose duties require their on-site presence during a pandemic. The measures included in our survey included procurement of personal protective equipment such as masks and gloves; supplemental cleaning programs for common areas; distribution of hygiene supplies (hand sanitizers, trash receptacles with hands-free lids, etc. ); obtaining antiviral medications; arrangements to obtain pandemic vaccines to the extent available; prioritization of employees for vaccinations; and prioritization of employees for antiviral medications. Federal pandemic guidance recommends the measures according to risk assessments for employees, and therefore, based on the agencies’ mission and activities, not all measures are equally appropriate for all agencies. The most frequently reported measure was procurement of personal protective equipment with 19 agencies reporting that they had planned or budgeted for this measure. For example, DHS reported that it had done fit testing of employees for N95 respirators and training on the proper use of other personal protective equipment and had pre-positioned stockpiles of the equipment for employees in 52 locations. Prioritization of employees for vaccinations was the measure least frequently reported with 11 agencies reporting that they had taken this measure. The survey showed that agencies’ most frequently cited social distancing strategies involved using telework and flexible schedules for their workforces. Restrictions on meetings and gatherings and avoiding unnecessary travel were also part of 18 agencies’ plans. Although many of the agencies’ pandemic influenza plans rely on social distancing strategies, primarily telework, to carry out the functions of the federal government in the event of a pandemic outbreak, only one agency, NSF stated that it tested its IT infrastructure to a great extent. The agency reported assessing its telework system formally several times each year and each day through various means. On the other hand, five agencies reported testing their IT systems to little or not extent. Table 1 shows the survey responses. Given the potential severity of a pandemic, it is important that employees understand the policies and requirements of their agencies and the alternatives, such as telework, that may be available to them. Many employees and their supervisors will have questions about their rights, entitlements, alternative work arrangements, benefits, leave and pay flexibilities, and hiring flexibilities available during the turmoil created by a pandemic. Therefore, it is important that each agency implement a process to communicate its human capital guidance for emergencies to managers and make staff aware of that guidance. Twenty-one of the 24 pandemic coordinators surveyed reported making information available to their employees on how human capital policies and flexibilities will change in the event of a pandemic outbreak. Three agencies—DOC, GSA, and SSA—reported that they have not. Of the agencies that reported making information available, two had done so indirectly. HUD stated that it shared information with unions, and Treasury reported that it briefed its human capital officers on the human capital policies and flexibilities available to address pandemic issues. BOP, a component of DOJ, has the mission of protecting society by confining offenders in the controlled environments of prisons and community-based facilities that are safe, humane, cost-efficient, and appropriately secure and that provide work and other self-improvement opportunities to assist offenders in becoming law-abiding citizens. Approximately 35,000 federal employees ensure the security of federal prisons and provide inmates with programs and services. BOP’s pandemic influenza plan was developed through its Office of Emergency Preparedness and was disseminated to its central office and six regional offices in May 2008. BOP’s pandemic plan addresses the need for infection control measures to mitigate influenza transmission and calls for education of correctional workers and the inmate population. Accordingly, all facilities are instructed that they should have readily available and ample supplies of bar soap and liquid soap in the restrooms, alcohol-based wipes throughout the facility, and hand sanitizers if approved by the warden. Based on a historical review of the 1918 pandemic influenza and HHS’ pandemic planning assumptions, BOP intends to supply antiviral medication to 15 percent of correctional workers and inmates in each facility if the influenza outbreak is geographically spread throughout the United States. BOP has some challenges in preparing for pandemic influenza. For example, social distancing measures to protect correctional workers are difficult to implement at the facility level. BOP officials said that there are many situations in which close contact is inevitable between correctional workers and inmates and where personal protective equipment, such as gloves and masks, would not be feasible. A unique pandemic planning challenge facing federal correctional workers is the maintenance of an effective custodial relationship between them and the inmates in federal prisons. According to BOP officials, this relationship depends on communication and mutual trust, as correctional workers in federal prisons do not carry weapons or batons inside the cellblocks. Rather, they use verbal methods of communication to keep order. BOP officials at United States Penitentiary Leavenworth said that they would not allow a situation where correctional workers wear N95 respirators or surgical masks but the inmates do not. Despite the challenges BOP faces with pandemic influenza planning, the bureau has advantages, which are unique to its facilities. Every correctional facility is a closed and self-contained system, and each facility is somewhat self-sufficient, maintaining a 30-day supply of food, water, and other necessities for any type of contingency. Correctional facilities also have well-tested experience in emergency and health hazard planning and management and infection control, which provides them with a solid foundation to build on for pandemic influenza preparedness. Additionally, correctional facilities generally have strong ties with their local communities, important because pandemic influenza will be largely addressed by the resources available to each community it affects. FMS, a component of Treasury, provides central payment services to federal agencies, operates the federal government’s collections and deposit systems, provides governmentwide accounting and reporting services, and manages the collection of delinquent debt owed to the government. FMS has four regional financial centers that are production facilities that rely heavily on integrated computer and telecommunications systems to perform their mission. However, they also rely on light manufacturing operations to print and enclose checks for releasing at specific times of the month. Nearly 206 million of FMS’s payments were disbursed by check in fiscal year 2008.