Between 1975 and 1989, over 2 million Indo-Chinese, many of them Vietnamese, left their countries of origin seeking asylum elsewhere in the region. Most were ultimately resettled in Western countries, including the United States and Canada. However, by the late 1980s an unabating outflow, large numbers of asylum seekers already in asylum camps, and continuing resettlement placed increasing burdens on neighboring countries and territories and Western countries, and the need for a durable solution to the problem became critical. In June 1989, 75 countries, including the United States, Great Britain, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, and Vietnam adopted by declaration the CPA agreement to deal with the problem. The agreement’s primary objectives were to deter clandestine departures, provide temporary refuge to all asylum seekers, establish procedures for determining their refugee status, resettle in third countries those found to be refugees, and repatriate those determined not to be refugees. The agreement stipulated that refugee status determination screening was the responsibility of the national authorities of individual first-asylum countries, in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, bearing in mind the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and taking into account the special situation of asylum seekers and the need to respect the family unit. Refugee status determination procedures were to be structured in accordance with international norms and were to employ internationally accepted refugee status determination criteria. International screening procedures include prescreening counseling for applicants, first-instance screening, and an appeal process for denied applicants. Notwithstanding the responsibilities vested with the first-asylum countries under the CPA, the agreement placed a number of important responsibilities on UNHCR. The CPA’s drafters envisioned the agreement’s implementation as a dynamic process that would require continued coordination and possible adaptation to respond to changing situations. To ensure its effective implementation, the plan, among other things, established that UNHCR, with the financial support of the donor community, would be in charge of continuing liaison and coordination with concerned governments and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations to implement the agreement; UNHCR was to participate in the refugee status determination process in an observer and advisory capacity; and UNHCR would be responsible for (1) providing training to first-asylum country officials to help ensure fairness and consistency in the screening process; (2) coordinating the timely resettlement of those found to be refugees; and (3) administering a safe, dignified repatriation program for those found to be nonrefugees. Appendix I discusses UNHCR’s responsibilities under the CPA relative to its U.N. chartered authorities and responsibilities. The Charter of the Office of High Commissioner authorizes UNHCR to make its own determinations about individuals’ refugee status. This authority is commonly referred to as mandate authority. In what is essentially an additional procedure in the refugee status determination process, UNHCR has examined under mandate authority many asylum seekers that were denied refugee status by national authorities. Some first-asylum countries, such as Hong Kong, have recognized UNHCR’s mandate authority; others have not. Although not a requirement of the CPA, UNHCR has also carried out a returnee monitoring program designed to ensure that asylum seekers returning to Vietnam did so under conditions of safety and dignity and in conformance with Vietnamese and international law. According to State Department statistics, over 120,000 Vietnamese were screened under the CPA. As of March 1996, about 33,200 had been screened and resettled in third countries. About 75,500 had returned to Vietnam. A total of 36,623 remained in asylum camps in the region as of March 1996. (See fig. 1.) In March 1996, the Steering Committee of CPA member countries announced the CPA’s formal closure as of June 30, 1996. The Committee reaffirmed that the only viable option for Vietnamese determined to be nonrefugees was for them to return to Vietnam, either voluntarily or under a mandatory repatriation program. The Steering Committee directed UNHCR to, therefore, phase down its care and maintenance activities and staffing in the first-asylum countries as of that date. In the case of Hong Kong, mindful of the special circumstances prevailing in the territory and the large number of asylum seekers still in the camps, UNHCR was to make other appropriate arrangements to resolve the asylum seeker problem as soon as possible. The application of international and U.S. refugee screening criteria can differ somewhat and could result in different screening decisions. For example, under U.S. criteria an asylum seeker could be properly considered a refugee solely on the basis of past persecution, but under international criteria, this is only one of several elements to be considered. Other elements include whether (1) the past persecution was distant in time, (2) the individual was subsequently able to lead a normal life, and (3) it is reasonably likely that the individual will be persecuted on return to his or her country. Therefore, individuals considered refugees under U.S. criteria may not be refugees under international criteria. (See app. I for a more complete discussion of these differences.) A total of 60,275 persons were screened under the CPA in Hong Kong. Table 1 shows the results of first-instance and appeals screening and the UNHCR mandate review. Hong Kong government reports stated that refugee screening procedures were carried out under UNHCR guidelines in accordance with internationally accepted refugee status determination practices. According to Hong Kong Immigration Department officials, CPA screening was conducted in accordance with the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, and no additional criteria were developed. Hong Kong Immigration Department officials stated that selection of interviewing officers was based on rank, experience, education, and language and writing skills. The selected interviewing officers were experienced naturalization officers, visa officers, and Hong Kong entry point supervisors in the Immigration Department. UNHCR reports and interviews with UNHCR and government officials in Hong Kong indicate that UNHCR took an active role in training government officials involved in the screening process. The officers’ training program included a 9-day seminar of lectures and workshops and an extensive list of readings, including articles and books on Vietnam and human rights topics. Immigration Department officials told us most of the interviewing officers were also sent to Vietnam for 7-day familiarization visits. We were told that an extensive library of materials on conditions in Vietnam was established for the officers’ use. At the height of CPA screening there were approximately 220 interviewing officers. According to UNHCR officers in Hong Kong, informal monthly staff meetings were held during the initial phases of the screening program at which Hong Kong’s procedures were discussed and critiqued. We were told that if issues or points were raised that needed to be brought to the government’s attention they were passed on to Immigration Department officials. The UNHCR officials also said that in accordance with a 1988 agreement with the Hong Kong government, UNHCR monitored and advised the government on its refugee screening procedures and provided the government periodic formal assessments of its procedures. According to UNHCR officials, these assessments identified various problems and suggested improvements. Early problems with Hong Kong first-instance screening procedures that UNHCR brought to the government’s attention included inadequate interpretation of applicants’ statements during screening interviews, questionable interviewing practices and techniques by interviewing officers, and inadequate assessments of applicants’ claims by interviewing officers. Hong Kong government officials with whom we met also acknowledged such problems with screening procedures. UNHCR officials told us the Hong Kong government was very responsive to the problems raised and endeavored to correct them. The Chairman of the Refugee Status Review Board told us that the quality of interviewing officers’ first-instance screening decisions varied widely initially but that the officers had good training and learned quickly. To gain greater insights into Hong Kong’s screening procedures, and as a limited test of them, we examined 10 selected cases in which asylum seekers had been screened out by the Hong Kong authorities and denied mandate by UNHCR. Five of the cases were provided to us by Boat People S.O.S. ; we selected the other five at random from a list of cases another advocacy group had requested that UNHCR reexamine. Among the first five cases, one had been accepted by the United States on family reunification grounds and was awaiting resettlement. Another had been offered resettlement in the United States but refused the offer unless his son, who was screened separately as an adult and denied refugee status, could join him. In two other cases, we concluded, based on the documentation in UNHCR’s files, that the applicants had failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution. In the fifth case, the applicant was screened out due to a lack of plausibility about portions of his claims. However, when we raised questions about portions of his claims and pointed out to UNHCR the strength of those aspects of the claim where plausibility had not been questioned, UNHCR reexamined his case and mandated refugee status for him. A UNHCR official acknowledged judgmental errors in this case. According to the official, any system dependent upon human judgments will sometimes produce errors. In the other five cases, documentation in UNHCR’s case files indicates that the applicants could not establish a well-founded fear of persecution for any of the reasons specified in the 1951 Convention. On the basis of available documentation, it appears these cases were reasonably adjudicated. Both Indonesian government and UNHCR officials stated that refugee screening procedures were generally carried out under UNHCR guidelines, in accordance with internationally accepted refugee status determination criteria. Our review of the process indicated that it met the basic structural requirements of the international guidelines, such as provision for appeal of negative first instance decisions and the application of international refugee status determination criteria.