Figure 1 compares original cost estimates and current cost estimates for the broader portfolio of major space acquisitions for fiscal years 2008 through 2013. The wider the gap between original and current estimates, the fewer dollars DOD has available to invest in new programs. As shown in the figure, estimated costs for the major space acquisition programs have increased by about $10.9 billion from initial estimates for fiscal years 2008 through 2013. The declining investment in the later years is the result of the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program’s no longer being considered a major acquisition program and the cancellation and proposed cancellation of two development efforts that would have significantly increased DOD’s major space acquisition investment. Figures 2 and 3 reflect differences in total life-cycle and unit costs for satellites from the time the programs officially began to their most recent cost estimate. As figure 2 notes, in several cases, DOD has had to cut back on quantity and capability in the face of escalating costs. For example, two satellites and four instruments were deleted from National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) and four sensors are expected to have fewer capabilities. This will reduce some planned capabilities for NPOESS as well as planned coverage. Figure 4 highlights the additional estimated months needed to complete programs. These additional months represent time not anticipated at the programs’ start dates. Generally, the further schedules slip, the more DOD is at risk of not sustaining current capabilities. For this reason, DOD began a follow-on system effort, now known as Third Generation Infrared Surveillance, to run in parallel with the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) program. This fiscal year, DOD launched the second Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) satellite. WGS had previously been experiencing technical and other problems, including improperly installed fasteners and data transmission errors. When DOD finally resolved these issues, it significantly advanced capability available to warfighters. Additionally, the EELV program had its 23rd consecutive successful operational launch in April. However, other major space programs have had setbacks. For example: In September 2008, the Air Force reported a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach of the critical cost growth threshold for the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) communications satellite because of cost growth brought on by technical issues, schedule delays, and increased costs for the procurement of a fourth AEHF satellite. The launch of the first satellite has slipped further by almost 2 years from November 2008 to as late as September 2010. Further, the program office estimates that the fourth AEHF satellite could cost more than twice the third satellite because some components that are no longer manufactured will have to be replaced and production will have to be restarted after a 4-year gap. Because of these delays, initial operational capability has slipped 3 years—from 2010 to 2013. The Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) communications satellite estimates an 11-month delay—from March 2010 to February 2011—in the delivery of on-orbit capability from the first satellite. Further, contractor costs for the space segment have increased about 48 percent because of the additional labor required to address issues related to satellite design complexity, satellite weight, and satellite component test anomalies and associated rework. Despite the contractor’s cost increases, the program has been able to remain within its baseline program cost estimate. The first Global Positioning System (GPS) IIF satellite is now expected to be delayed almost 3 years from its original launch date to November 2009. Also, the cost of GPS IIF is now expected to be about $1.6 billion—about $870 million over the original cost estimate of $729 million. (This approximately 119 percent cost increase is not that noticeable in figures 2 and 3 because the GPS II modernization program includes the development and procurement of 33 satellites, only 12 of which are IIF satellites.) The Air Force has had difficulty in the past building GPS satellites within cost and schedule goals because of significant technical problems—which still threaten its delivery schedule—and challenges it faced with a different contractor for the IIF program, which did not possess the same expertise as the previous GPS contractor. Further, while the Air Force is structuring the new GPS IIIA program to prevent mistakes made on the IIF program, the Air Force is aiming to deploy the GPS IIIA satellites 3 years faster than the IIF satellites. We believe the IIIA schedule is optimistic given the program’s late start, past trends in space acquisitions, and challenges facing the new contractor. Total program cost for the SBIRS program is estimated around $12.2 billion, an increase of $7.5 billion over the original program’s cost, which included 5 geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) satellites. The first GEO satellite has been delayed at least 7 years in part because of poor oversight, technical complexities, and rework. Although the program office set December 2009 as the new launch goal for the satellite, it is currently assessing the satellite launch schedule and expects to have a new plan in place by June 2009. Subsequent GEO satellites have also slipped as a result of flight software design issues. The NPOESS program has experienced problems with replenishing the current constellation of aging weather satellites and was restructured in July 2007 in response to a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach of the critical cost-growth threshold. The program was originally estimated to cost about $6.5 billion for six satellites from 1995 through 2018. The restructured program called for reducing the number of satellites from six to four and included an overall increase in program costs, delays in satellite launches, and deletions or replacements of satellite sensors. Although the number of satellites has been reduced, total costs have increased by almost 108 percent since program start. Specifically, the current estimated life-cycle cost of the restructured program is now about $13.5 billion for four satellites through 2026. This amount is higher than what is reflected in figure 2 as it represents the most recent GAO estimate as opposed to the DOD estimates used in the figure. We reported last year that poor workmanship and testing delays caused an 8-month slip in the delivery of a complex imaging sensor. This late delivery caused a delay in the expected launch date of a demonstration satellite, moving it from late September 2009 to early January 2011. This year it is also becoming more apparent that space acquisition problems are leading to potential gaps in the delivery of critical capabilities. For example, DOD faces a potential gap in protected military communications caused by delays in the AEHF program and the proposed cancellation of the TSAT program, which itself posed risks in schedule delays because of TSAT’s complexity and funding cuts designed to ensure technology objectives were achievable. DOD faces a potential gap in ultra high frequency (UHF) communications capability caused by the unexpected failures of two satellites already in orbit and the delays resulting from the MUOS program. DOD also faces potential gaps or decreases in positioning, navigation and timing capabilities because of late delivery of the GPS IIF satellites and the late start of the GPS IIIA program. There are also concerns about potential gaps in missile warning and weather monitoring capabilities because of delays in SBIRS and NPOESS. Addressing gaps in any one of these areas is not a simple matter. While there may be opportunities to build less complex “gap filler” satellites, for example, these still require time and money that may not be readily available because of commitments to the longer-term programs. There may also be opportunities to continue production of “older” generation satellites, but such efforts also require time and money that may not be readily available and may face other challenges such as restarting production lines and addressing issues related to obsolete parts and materials. Further, satellites on orbit can be made to last longer by turning power off at certain points in time, but this may also present unacceptable trade-offs in capability. Our past work has identified a number of causes behind the cost growth and related problems, but several consistently stand out. First, on a broad scale, DOD starts more weapon programs than it can afford, creating a competition for funding that encourages low cost estimating, optimistic scheduling, overpromising, suppressing bad news, and, for space programs, forsaking the opportunity to identify and assess potentially more executable alternatives. Programs focus on advocacy at the expense of realism and sound management. Invariably, with too many programs in its portfolio, DOD is forced to continually shift funds to and from programs—particularly as programs experience problems that require additional time and money to address. Such shifts, in turn, have had costly, reverberating effects. Second, DOD has tended to start its space programs too early, that is, before it has the assurance that the capabilities it is pursuing can be achieved within available resources and time constraints. This tendency is caused largely by the funding process, since acquisition programs attract more dollars than efforts concentrating solely on proving technologies. Nevertheless, when DOD chooses to extend technology invention into acquisition, programs experience technical problems that require large amounts of time and money to fix. Moreover, when this approach is followed, cost estimators are not well positioned to develop accurate cost estimates because there are too many unknowns. Put more simply, there is no way to accurately estimate how long it would take to design, develop, and build a satellite system when critical technologies planned for that system are still in relatively early stages of discovery and invention. While our work has consistently found that maturing technologies before a program’s start is a critical enabler of success, it is important to keep in mind that this is not the only solution. Both the TSAT and the Space Radar development efforts, for example, were seeking to mature critical technologies before program start, but they faced other risks related to the systems’ complexity, affordability, and other development challenges. Ultimately, Space Radar was cancelled, and DOD has proposed the cancellation of TSAT.