Mali faces multiple overlapping crises. A separatist rebellion launched in late 2011 by members of the northern-based minority ethnic Tuareg community, known as the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), aggravated intra-military and political tensions in the country. In March 2012, junior military officers overthrew a democratically elected government in a coup, a month ahead of scheduled national elections. The coup led Mali's military and state presence in the north to collapse, effectively leaving a vacuum for armed groups. Islamist extremist groups, who had initially fought alongside the separatists, took advantage of the ensuing chaos to expand their presence in Mali's vast, Saharan north. The civilian-led interim government that took office in the wake of the 2012 coup is headed by President Dioncounda Traoré, former Speaker of the National Assembly. It has suffered from internal divisions, military interference, and limited popular legitimacy. Years of corruption and mismanagement also appear to have hollowed out many state institutions. Furthermore, Mali's leaders face a national recession and revenue crisis. A regional food security crisis, exacerbated by Malian population displacements, also continues to cause suffering. As of late 2012, three loosely connected Islamist extremist groups—Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the AQIM splinter faction Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA/MUJAO), and the Malian Tuareg-led Ansar al Deen—had asserted control over all major towns in northern Mali, an area roughly the size of Texas ( Figure 1 ). These groups appeared increasingly entrenched, having gradually ousted Tuareg separatist leaders. AQIM and associated groups were reportedly leveraging this expanded terrain to run training camps, pursue connections to other extremist organizations, bolster arms stocks, and recruit new fighters. International concerns heightened with reports of foreign fighters traveling to northern Mali, and given long-running reports of involvement by Sahel-based extremists in transnational narcotics trafficking. AQIM-associated groups imposed harsh behavioral codes on local residents and carried out amputations and at least one execution by stoning, inspired by an extremely conservative interpretation of sharia (Islamic law). They also destroyed historic and cultural sites, including UNESCO World Heritage-designated ancient mosques and tombs, and recruited child soldiers, among other abuses. France launched military operations in northern Mali on January 11, 2013, after Islamist fighters—following months of stalemate—suddenly advanced toward the south and defeated Malian military forces in the central town of Konna. France's decision marked an abrupt, major shift in international responses to the situation in Mali, as policymakers had previously emphasized that any solution in Mali had to be African-led. French President François Hollande justified the intervention based on the Malian government's request for help, portraying French action as necessary to prevent Mali's capital from falling into terrorist hands and to protect some 6,000 French residents. French troop reinforcements in Bamako also appeared aimed at deterring actors who might try to further destabilize or attack Mali's interim government. Since then, French forces have made rapid gains in reclaiming cities and towns in the north. U.S. logistical support for French operations has included military transport for French troops and equipment, aerial refueling for French airstrike campaigns, and intelligence sharing. Most core terrorist/insurgent fighters have reportedly withdrawn to Mali's remote, mountainous northern border, although some, namely Malian nationals, appear to have blended into local communities. French and Chadian troops have engaged in particularly intense combat operations in AQIM strongholds in the far north, where they claim to have killed several hundred insurgents, including at least one senior AQIM regional commander, an Algerian national known as Abu Zeid. Despite these successes, the durability of French gains remains to be seen. Recent insurgent attacks in Gao and Timbuktu, including several suicide bombings and attacks in urban areas, point to stark potential challenges. The difficult terrain and social complexity of northern Mali also present particular difficulties for counterinsurgency operations. The Tuareg rebel conflict has not been brought to a close, inhibiting the extension of Malian state authority to French-cleared areas, while long-standing friction between Tuaregs and other ethnic groups in the north has reportedly fed local support for Islamist extremists in some areas. Tuareg communities are also internally divided over religious ideology and support for separatism. The future role of French forces in Mali is uncertain. French President François Hollande has stated plans to begin withdrawing troops in late April from the current level of 4,000, to about 1,000 by year's end. This timeline may reflect domestic pressures and a fear of being drawn into an enduring conflict. Thousands of African troops have deployed to Mali under the U.N.-authorized African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), but their capacity to counter an insurgency or prevent terrorist attacks is likely to be limited. The poor human rights records of some of the regional militaries involved may also be counterproductive. Meanwhile, Mali's ongoing political divisions, along with its own military dysfunction and abuses, have rendered Mali's fragile state authorities unreliable, and in some cases undesirable, partners for international actors. The U.N. Security Council is currently considering options for transitioning AFISMA into a fully U.N.-conducted operation. Debate appears centered on the likely capacity and appropriate mandate for U.N. troops, as well as on a proposal for a separate, rapid-reaction force—of as-yet-undetermined composition—to continue counterterrorism operations. U.S. policy attention to the Sahel region of North-West Africa escalated in 2012 in response to developments in Mali. Attacks on U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya, on September 11, 2012; an assault on the U.S. embassy and American school in Tunisia three days later; and the January 2013 hostage crisis in the southeastern Algerian town of In Amenas further heightened U.S. concerns about terrorism in the region. The United States has generally viewed AQIM as the primary transnational terrorist threat in the North-West Africa region, although AQIM is part of an increasingly complex regional picture for violent extremism. An AQIM splinter faction claimed responsibility for the In Amenas siege, and U.S. officials have pointed to links between AQIM and the Benghazi attackers. U.S. policy deliberations on Mali therefore overlap with debates over regional and global counterterrorism approaches, in addition to assessments of political stability in West Africa and U.S. diplomatic and foreign aid relationships in the region. President Obama's 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism , which appears to consider AQIM an Al Qaeda "affiliate," argues that U.S. efforts to counter AQIM "must draw on and be closely integrated with the broader U.S. regional strategy, especially since the long-term eradication of AQIM will not be addressed by traditional CT tools alone." In practice, divergent assessments of the terrorist threat emanating from the Sahel region have dovetailed with broader U.S. policy debates over how best to approach cross-border terrorist actors who may not be engaged in imminent plans to attack the U.S. homeland, and over how to prioritize sometimes divergent U.S. policy goals in the region. Recent developments in Mali and North Africa have heightened the stakes of these debates, but without necessarily resolving them. In the meantime, a U.S. emphasis on cultivating regional partnerships has been complicated by political instability in North Africa and the limited capacities of West African states. Generally, instability in Mali appears to reflect multiple conflicts and struggles—within the Tuareg community, between separatists and loyalists, between terrorist groups and state actors, over the spoils from transnational crime, and between competing religious ideologies. Whether the United States can secure its interests while not further fueling instability is at issue. To date, the United States has supported French and African military operations in Mali, bolstered U.S. surveillance capacities in the region, and provided new aid to neighboring states to help repel insurgent infiltration. Officials have reportedly also considered adding terrorist individuals based in the region to a U.S. target list, which, if true, could indicate a shift in the U.S. approach to AQIM. U.S. officials have simultaneously urged Mali to organize a peace process and hold elections as part of a political transition to a more legitimate, effective national government. A more direct U.S. role in countering violent extremists in Mali and neighboring states may well hinge on an evaluation of the extent to which AQIM and associated groups and individuals in North-West Africa pose a threat to the U.S. homeland, and/or the extent to which they are linked to "core" Al Qaeda. News reports suggest that Administration officials may disagree over the nature of the threat posed by these groups; over the degree to which existing legal authorities permit U.S. kinetic strikes on terrorist targets in the region (if at all); and over whether such strikes are desirable given potential unintended consequences. For example, U.S. direct intervention could prompt otherwise non-cohesive or locally-focused groups to rally around anti-U.S. or anti-Western sentiment, or to boost recruitment and fund-raising. A more prominent U.S. role in the region could also potentially cause diplomatic friction with regional allies. Congress authorizes and appropriates foreign aid and defense funding, and conducts oversight of U.S. policies and programs.