The collapse of the Soviet Union left Russia with the largest arsenal of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the world. Unclassified U.S. estimates of the current number of Russia’s nuclear warheads range from 18,000 to 25,000, and Russia inherited an estimated 600 metric tons of the uranium and plutonium that could be used to build nuclear devices. Russia also assumed control of more than 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons and an extensive complex of sites used in research on dangerous biological pathogens, such as smallpox and anthrax, and the development of those pathogens as biological weapons. In the closed Soviet system, security systems emphasized heavy surveillance of site workers with severe penalties imposed on those who violated security procedures. The Soviets relied on closed cities and physical security measures to stem any threats posed by outsiders. However, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and subsequent social, political, and economic changes in Russia not only revealed gaps in the physical security surrounding sites containing WMD but made evident weaknesses in Russia’s ability to deter threats from inside those complexes. A senior member of the Russian Ministry of Defense stated in 1999 that the greatest threat to nuclear warhead security stems from insider knowledge of security systems and procedures. Both enhanced insider threat and decreased ability to protect against external threat have created opportunities for agents from countries of concern to obtain WMD. In response to this threat, Congress authorized the Department of Defense (DOD) to establish the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program in 1992 to help Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan secure and protect nuclear weapons. Members of Congress were concerned that nuclear weapons or materials might be lost, stolen, or sold and that nuclear scientists and technicians might be persuaded to sell their knowledge to nations or terrorists seeking to develop such weapons. Between 1992 and 2003, Congress authorized $6.4 billion for a wide array of threat reduction and nonproliferation programs implemented by DOD, the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of State, and other agencies. As shown in figure 1, these appropriations have been directed into destruction and dismantlement, demilitarization (the conversion of military facilities and research to civilian purposes), and security efforts. Most funds have been for programs in Russia. Destruction and dismantlement projects, for which $2.65 billion has been appropriated, are designed to help with the elimination of nuclear, chemical, and other weapons and their delivery vehicles. For example, DOD has helped Russia destroy missiles and submarines to meet arms control requirements and is currently helping Russia design a destruction facility for its chemical weapons stockpile. In addition, DOD has financed the destruction of silos that contained intercontinental ballistic missiles. Demilitarization efforts—projects that encourage Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to convert military facilities and research to civilian purposes—have been appropriated $1.1 billion. These include funds to pay scientists of the former Soviet Union who once developed nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and missile systems to conduct peaceful research. Demilitarization funds also support projects that seek to convert defense facilities in the former Soviet Union to factories that produce civilian products such as medical treatments. Security programs have been appropriated $2.65 billion from 1992 through 2002. These efforts help Russia and other former Soviet nations secure their WMD. For example, DOD and DOE have provided Russia with fences, sensors, video surveillance systems, and computerized inventory control systems. As shown in figure 2, as of September 2002, DOD and DOE had obligated a total of $1.8 billion to upgrade security at sites where Russia has WMD material. Most of these funds have been used to help secure nuclear warheads and nuclear material. Two percent of these funds have been used to address security threats at chemical weapons storage sites and institutes with dangerous biological pathogens. Since 1995, DOD has obligated $796 million to enhance security at Russian nuclear weapons sites. The department has installed fences, developed warhead inventory control systems, and upgraded railcars used to transport warheads. In 1998, DOD expanded its program by providing assistance to improve security over sites in Russia with dangerous biological pathogens. As of September 2002, DOD had obligated about $14 million for these programs. In 1999, Congress became concerned about the threat of chemical weapons and appropriated $20 million for security enhancements at chemical weapons storage sites in Russia. DOD had obligated $19.8 million of these funds as of September 2002. In 1993, DOE and the Russian government began working together to secure sites housing weapons-usable nuclear material. In 1995, DOE established the Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program. Under MPC&A, DOE has installed modern nuclear security systems with three components: physical protection systems such as fences around the buildings containing nuclear materials; metal doors protecting rooms where material is stored; and video surveillance systems to monitor storage rooms; material control systems such as seals attached to nuclear material containers to indicate whether material has been stolen from the containers and badge systems that allow only authorized personnel into areas containing nuclear material; and material accounting systems such as inventories of nuclear material and computerized databases to track the amount and type of nuclear material contained in specific buildings. DOE has obligated $835 million for these programs since 1995. In 1998, at Russia’s request, DOE expanded the scope of its efforts with the Russian Navy from protecting naval reactor fuel to helping secure nuclear warheads. Since 1999, when DOE started working with the Russian Navy to protect sites where warheads are stored, DOE has obligated $159 million for this effort. The Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Financial Management, the Budget, and International Security, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, asked us to report on U.S. programs to help improve security at Russian WMD sites. To address these issues, we assessed U.S. efforts to enhance security at sites in Russia that store (1) weapons-usable nuclear material, (2) nuclear warheads, (3) dangerous biological pathogens, and (4) chemical weapons. For each area, we assessed U.S. plans to address these security threats at WMD sites in Russia; U.S. progress in implementing these plans, and the primary challenges and unresolved issues facing DOD and DOE in their efforts to secure Russian sites. Our review focused on U.S. efforts to secure WMD material and did not include U.S. programs to employ WMD scientists or destroy WMD material. To assess U.S. efforts to help secure weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia, we reviewed program documents from DOE and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM). We also visited two sites in Russia that have received security assistance from DOE: the Moscow State Engineering Physics Institute (MEPhI) and the Russian naval fuel storage Site 49. We requested visits to the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant and the nuclear weapons complex facility at Mayak (also known as C- 65), but were denied access by the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy. We were able to meet with managers from these sites outside their facilities. We also visited Los Alamos National Laboratory to observe U.S. approaches to securing nuclear material. We collected and analyzed reports and other publications on nuclear material security issues from the federal government and nongovernmental organizations. Our analysis of DOE’s financial spending patterns was based on our previous work and budget data on fiscal year 2001 and 2002 appropriations, obligations, and expenditures, which we obtained from DOE. We met with officials from DOE; Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia National Laboratories; the Ministry of Atomic Energy in Russia; Gosatomnadzor, the Russian nuclear regulatory authority; and site officials from the Moscow State Engineering Physics Institute, the Russian Navy’s Site 49, Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant, and Mayak. To assess U.S. efforts to help secure nuclear warheads in Russia, we reviewed program documentation from DOE, DOD, the National Security Council, and Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia National Laboratories. During our site work in Russia, we visited several locations related to securing nuclear warheads: We visited two Russian Navy sites where DOE had installed security improvements. During these visits, we toured inside the facilities, saw the security equipment DOE had installed, and spoke with officials from the Russian Navy. We visited the Fissile Material Storage Facility, where Russia says it will store plutonium from dismantled nuclear warheads. At the time of our visit, the facility was still under construction, so we were not able to see all of the planned security features in place. During our visit, we spoke with officials from DOD, which is financing the construction of the facility, and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, which will operate the site after it is completed. We visited a factory in Russia, where the United States pays to have railcars refurbished and repaired. We saw the factory and met with factory officials. We visited the Security Assessment and Training Center (SATC), where we saw examples of the security systems DOD plans to install at warhead storage sites in Russia and some of the equipment the Russian Ministry of Defense uses to screen personnel who work with nuclear warheads. During this visit, we met with officials from the Russian Ministry of Defense and DOD. We also visited a location in the United States where nuclear warheads are stored to gain an understanding of how the United States secures its own warheads. During our work, we met with officials from DOD and DOE, the National Security Council, Sandia, Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories, the Russian Ministry of Defense, and the Russian Navy.