The VSS were developed in response to concerns raised in the 1970s and 1980s about thethen largely unregulated voting technology industry. In 1977, an FEC advisory panel recommendedthe development of voluntary standards, following an FEC-requested study released in 1975 by theNational Bureau of Standards (renamed the National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST,in 1988). Two years later, Congress enacted legislation directing the FEC to perform a study on thematter in cooperation with the National Bureau of Standards. The study, submitted to Congress in1984, reaffirmed the advisory panel's recommendation, and the FEC received federal funding overthe next several years to develop the VSS; however, Congress did not establish the VSS specificallyby statute (see CRS Report RS21156 , Federal Voting Systems Standards and Guidelines:Congressional Deliberations , by by [author name scrubbed] for more detail about congressionaldeliberations). The VSS were first released in 1990. They applied to computer-based voting systems --namely, punchcard, marksense (optical scan), and direct recording electronic (DRE) systems. Theywere developed for both hardware and software and included functional and documentationrequirements, performance characteristics, and testing procedures. No standards were developed forlever-machine or hand-counted paper ballot systems. The FEC developed a plan to implement the VSS through cooperative action by the FEC,NIST, a set of laboratories that would be called the independent test authorities (ITAs), state andlocal governments, and voting system vendors. Under the plan, states would adopt the standards andthe ITAs would test voting systems to determine whether they met the standards. NIST's intendedrole was to assist in accreditation of the ITAs. However, the plan did not materialize as originallyconceived. Instead, the National Association of State Election Directors (NASED), which wasestablished in 1989, appointed a voting systems board (1) to choose ITAs and administer a process for qualifying votingsystems under the VSS . The testing program began in 1994. NASED chose The Election Center,a professional organization of election officials, to serve as the secretariat for voting systemqualification. States began adopting the VSS, with some requiring that voting systems be qualified underthe standards before being used in the state, and others adopting elements of the VSS into staterequirements. As implementation proceeded and technology continued to evolve, calls increased forrevising and updating the VSS . The FEC began a project to update the standards in 1997. Thesecond version was approved by the FEC in May 2002. The revision took a broader approach thanthe original version, focusing on the voting medium -- paper-based versus electronic -- rather thanspecific kinds of voting systems. It also included or expanded coverage of functions andrequirements not in the original version -- such as accessibility and some aspects of usability,telecommunications, and audit trails. While this update was underway, Congress was considering legislation to respond to theproblems that arose in the November 2000 presidential election. The enacted version, HAVA, theHelp America Vote Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-252 ), was signed into law in October 2002. It includesvoting system requirements and an administrative structure for promulgating standards and certifyingsystems. The act established the EAC and assigned it responsibility for developing the VVSG. Italso created three bodies -- a Standards Board, a Board of Advisors, and a Technical GuidelinesDevelopment Committee (TGDC) -- to provide advice on standards and other matters; and it gaveNIST a substantial role. For example, it made the director of NIST the chair of the TGDC. Sec. 222of HAVA effectively renamed the VSS as the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines ( VVSG ), (2) to be developed by the EACpursuant to recommendations by the TGDC and with support from NIST. Thus, HAVA provideda statutory basis for the VSS . HAVA does not direct the EAC to include any specific issues in theguidelines. However, in the debate on the House floor before passage of the HAVA conferenceagreement on October 10, 2002, a colloquy ( Congressional Record, daily ed., 148: H7842) stipulatedan interpretation that the guidelines specifically address the usability, accuracy, security,accessibility, and integrity of voting systems. Also, Sec. 221(e) requires NIST to provide supportto the TGDC for development of guidelines relating to security, voter privacy, human factors, remotevoting, and fraud detection and prevention. The current VSS will serve as the guidelines until new ones are completed. Work ondevelopment of the first version of the VVSG, a partial revision of the VSS, began in 2004 with theappointment of the TGDC. That committee transmitted its recommendations, in the form of aproposed version 1 of the VVSG, to the EAC on May 12, 2005. After reviewing the recommendedguidelines and making some revisions, mostly but not entirely of an organizational nature, (3) the EAC released the draft VVSG on June 27, 2005, for a 90-day public comment period, with adoption initially anticipated inOctober 2005. (4) They willgo into effect two years after being adopted. (5) HAVA also requires the EAC to provide for testing and certification of voting systems (Â§231)by laboratories it has accredited, with support from NIST, thereby transferring that responsibilityfrom NASED. The act stipulates that the current system of NASED certification will continue untilthe EAC adopts its replacement. HAVA does not specify whether the guidelines it establishes areto be used as the standard against which voting systems are tested and certified, but that is how the VSS have been used, and it is how the EAC intends to use the VVSG . (6) NIST began the process of soliciting applications for accreditation in June 2005, under itsNational Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP). (7) It will make recommendationsthrough this program on accreditation of individual laboratories. Because of the length of theaccreditation process, in August the EAC adopted a resolution to provide temporary accreditationto the laboratories (ITAs) accredited by NASED. (8) Most sections of the draft version of the VVSG released for public comment are virtuallyidentical to those in the 2002 update of the VSS . That was a consequence of a stated intent by theEAC to create a version that could be used in preparation for the 2006 election cycle. (9) Consequently, major revisionfocused mainly on usability and certain aspects of security. Major changes included addition of a conformance clause; revised and expanded standards for accessibility and usability; revised standards for security, including voter-verified paper ballots used withelectronic voting machines (DREs) (10) ; some changes to testing procedures; and some new and expanded appendices. A more extensive revision is reportedly underway. (11) A brief summary ofprovisions in the current draft is provided below, and a section-by-section summary is included atthe end of this report in Appendix 1. These summaries are intended only to aid in understanding thebasic scope and contents of the guidelines from a legislative perspective; other writers might chooseto emphasize different aspects. The VVSG, like the VSS, are divided into two volumes. Volume I provides performanceguidelines for voting systems and is intended for a broad audience. It includes descriptions offunctional requirements and performance standards, as well as requirements for vendors in qualityassurance and in configuration management, a complex discipline that involves ensuring that asystem and its components function in the ways they are specified to function under variousmodifications and throughout their life cycles. It includes an extensive glossary and references,suggested practices for election officials in some areas covered by the guidelines, and discussion ofverification concepts for future design of voting systems. Volume II provides details of the testing process for certification of voting systems. It isaimed at a narrower audience of vendors, testing laboratories, and election officials. It includes adescription of the data that vendors are required to provide when submitting a system for testing, andbasic requirements for testing against the standards described in Volume I. It also provides guidanceand requirements for testing laboratories in planning tests and reporting certification results. Many of the issues described below, as well as a number of more specific ones, have beencaptured in the various public comments made on the draft VVSG . (12) Commenters includeelection officials, vendors, academic researchers, representatives of professional associations andinterest groups, and members of the public. However, the discussion is not limited to issues raisedin the comments. The VVSG, like the VSS before them, are voluntary technical standards, not regulatoryrequirements. Such standards are usually developed through a consensus process. They are commonin industry, and federal law encourages their use by federal agencies. (13) Some observers believethat making standards voluntary at the federal level cannot ensure sufficient quality of voting systemsand that adherence should be mandatory or at least a condition of receiving any federal grants forvoting equipment. (14) Others state that mandatory standards would give too large a role to the federal government andreduce the flexibility of state and local governments to respond to their specific needs. They alsopoint out that most states have adopted the VSS in whole or in part -- many require that any newvoting systems purchased adhere to the VSS or VVSG . The practical effect of such state requirementsis that voting system vendors can successfully market systems only if they are certified under the VSS or VVSG . In this sense, the provisions have acquired some of the force of regulation, in that they aretreated by manufacturers as requirements. Comments by vendors often reflect that perception.