This is an overview of federal forfeiture law. It sketches the origins and general attributes of forfeiture, describes the distribution of the hundreds of millions of dollars it generates, and identifies some of the constitutional issues it raises. Congress and state legislatures have authorized the use of forfeiture for over 200 years. Forfeiture law has always been somewhat unique. Its increased use has highlighted its eccentricities and attendant policy concerns. Present forfeiture law has its roots in early English law. It is reminiscent of three early English procedures: deodands, forfeiture of estate or common law forfeiture, and statutory or commercial forfeiture. At early common law, the object that caused the death of a human being—the ox that gored, the knife that stabbed, or the cart that crushed—was confiscated as a deodand. Coroners' inquests and grand juries, bound with the duty to determine the cause of death, were obligated to identify the offending object and determine its value. The Crown distributed the proceeds realized from the confiscation of the animal or deadly object for religious and charitable purposes in the name of the deceased. Although deodands were not unknown in the American colonies, they appear to have fallen into disuse or been abolished by the time of the American Revolution or shortly thereafter. In spite of their limited use in this country, deodands and the practice of treating the offending animal or object as the defendant have frequently been cited to illustrate the characteristics of modern civil forfeiture. Forfeiture of estate or common law forfeiture, unlike deodands, focused solely on a human offender. At common law, anyone, convicted and attained for treason or a felony, forfeited all his lands and personal property. Attainder, the judicial declaration of civil death, occurred as a consequence of the pronouncement of final sentence for treason or felony. In colonial America, common law forfeitures were rare. After the Revolution, the Constitution restricted the use of common law forfeiture in cases of treason, and Congress restricted its use, by statute, in the case of other crimes. The third antecedent of modern forfeiture, statutory or commercial forfeiture, figured prominently in cases in admiralty and on the revenue side of the Exchequer in pre-colonial England. It was used fairly extensively against smuggling and other revenue evasion schemes in the American colonies and has been used ever since. In most instances, the statutes called for in rem confiscation proceedings in which, as with deodands, the offending object was the defendant; occasionally, they established in personam procedures where confiscation occurred as the result of the conviction of the owner of the property. Although contemporary American forfeiture law owes much to the law of deodands and the law of forfeiture of estate, it is clearly a descendant of English statutory or commercial forfeiture. Modern forfeiture is a creature of statute. While there are some common themes and general patterns concerning the crimes that trigger forfeiture, the property subject to confiscation, and the procedures associated with forfeiture, federal forfeiture statutes are matters of legislative choice and can vary greatly. Virtually every kind of property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, may be subject to confiscation under the appropriate circumstances. The laws that call for the confiscation of contraband per se, property whose very possession has been outlawed, were at one time the most prevalent and can still be found. Property—particularly vehicles—used to facilitate the commission of a crime and without which violation would be less likely, has long been the target of confiscatory statutes as well. In some instances, Congress has focused upon the profits of crime and authorized the confiscation of the direct and indirect proceeds of illegal activities. And under some circumstances, it has authorized the forfeiture of substitute assets, when the tainted property subject to confiscation under a particular statute has become unavailable. Traditionally, the crimes which triggered forfeiture were (1) those that threatened the government's revenue interest, for example, smuggling, tax evasion, hunting or fishing without a license, or (2) those crimes that because of their perceived threat to public health or morals might have been considered public nuisances subject to abatement, for example, gambling, or dealing in obscene material, or illicit drug use. Beginning with the racketeering statutes, a number of jurisdictions have created another category of forfeiture warranting offenses—crimes that involve substantial economic gain for the defendant even if not at the expense of government revenues, but which may greatly enhance government revenues, for example, racketeering and money laundering. A prime example of this approach is the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (CAFRA), which makes forfeitable, among other things, the proceeds from any of the crimes upon which a money laundering or RICO prosecution might be based. Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Congress authorized the confiscation of another type of crime-related property—property owned by certain terrorists regardless of whether the property is traceable, used to facilitate, or connected in any other way to any practical crime. Federal confiscation ordinarily begins with a federal crime. Federal law, however, permits the confiscation of property located in the United States, derived from or used to facilitate various crimes committed in violation of foreign law overseas. The qualifying felonies include public corruption, crimes of violence, drug trafficking, gun running, bank fraud, and child prostitution. Forfeiture follows one of two procedural routes: criminal or civil. Although crime triggers all forfeitures, they are classified as civil forfeitures or criminal forfeitures according to the nature of the judicial procedure which ends in confiscation. Criminal forfeitures are part of the criminal proceedings against the property owner, and confiscation is possible only upon the conviction of the owner of the property and only to the extent of defendant's interest in the property. Civil forfeitures are accomplished using civil procedure. Civil forfeiture is ordinarily the product of a civil, in rem proceeding in which the property is treated as the offender. Within the confines of due process and the language of the applicable statutes, the guilt or innocence of the property owner is irrelevant; it is enough that the property was involved in a crime to which forfeiture attaches in the manner in which statute demands. Some civil forfeitures are accomplished administratively; some are not. Administrative forfeitures are, in oversimplified terms, uncontested civil forfeitures. Historically, most forfeiture statutes called for civil forfeiture. The procedure for forfeiture varies according to the statute which authorizes confiscation. Although each usually contains a few procedural features, the drug, money laundering, and several other civil forfeiture statutes fill in their procedural gaps by cross-reference to the regime established under the customs laws. CAFRA contains generally applicable procedures and thus reduces the extent to which civil forfeiture procedural matters are resolved by reference solely to the customs laws. As a general rule, since the proceedings are in rem, actual or constructive possession of the property by the court is a necessary first step in any confiscation proceeding. The arrest of the property may be accomplished either by warrant under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; or, if judicial proceedings have been filed, by a warrant under the Supplemental Rules of Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims; or without warrant, if there is probable cause and other grounds under which the Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless arrest; or pursuant to equivalent authority under state law. Because realty cannot ordinarily be seized until after the property owner has been given an opportunity for a hearing, the procedure differs slightly in the case of real property. Where the seizure of the property causes an undue hardship, CAFRA affords an owner the opportunity to petition the court for release of the property pending the completion of forfeiture proceedings. Conversely, the government may be entitled to a restraining or protective order to preserve the property pending the completion of forfeiture proceedings. In the interests of expediency and judicial economy, Congress has sometimes authorized the use of administrative forfeiture as the first step after seizure in "uncontested" cases. It may be somewhat misleading to characterize administrative forfeitures as uncontested forfeitures, given the procedural obstacles that the government and claimants must overcome before the government is put to its burden in a judicial proceeding. For the government the procedure begins with seizure of the property. It must notify anyone with an interest in the property and provide an opportunity to request judicial forfeiture proceedings. Notice of the seizure alone, but without notice of the government's intent to seek confiscation, is not in itself sufficient. Anyone with an interest in the property may contest confiscation with a verified claim under the Supplemental Rules. Property owners have 30 days after the government's filing to submit a claim, and 20 days thereafter to tender their answer. The period within which a claimant must register his or her intent to contest can be a fairly narrow window. Moreover, the courts may consider time of the essence, as long as the government has made reasonable efforts to notify interested parties. Even if the government sustains no appreciable damage, a claim not promptly filed may be a claim lost. The government may petition the court to dismiss a claim for want of statutory standing, which in turn may require the claimant to establish that he lawfully obtained the targeted property. If there are no viable claims, the property is summarily declared forfeited. If the government has failed to provide adequate notice or failed to honor some other due process obligation, the declaration of administrative forfeiture may be set aside. When an administrative forfeiture is set aside for want of notice, section 983(e) gives the government 60 days to initiate judicial forfeiture proceedings notwithstanding the expiration of an otherwise applicable statute of limitations. CAFRA establishes a timetable for administrative forfeitures under which the government must notify those with a property interest of its intent to confiscate within 60 days of seizure. Thereafter, the property owner has at least 35 days within which to file a claim and request a judicial hearing. The government has 90 days within which to initiate judicial proceedings after the receipt of a claim.