Rasul v. Bush , issued by the U.S. Supreme Court at the end of its 2003-2004 term, clarified that U.S. courts do have jurisdiction to hear petitions for habeas corpus on behalf of the approximately 550 persons detained at the U.S. Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in connection with the war against terrorism, establishing a role for federal courts to play in determining the validity of the military commissions convened pursuant to President Bush's Military Order (M.O.) of November 13, 2001. After dozens of petitions for habeas corpus were filed in the federal District Court for the District of Columbia, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA), revoking federal court jurisdiction over habeas claims, at least with respect to those not already pending, and created jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to hear appeals of final decisions of military commissions. The Supreme Court overturned a decision by the D.C. Circuit that had upheld the military commissions, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld , holding instead that although Congress has authorized the use of military commissions, such commissions must follow procedural rules as similar as possible to courts-martial proceedings, in compliance with the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Military commissions are courts usually set up by military commanders in the field to try persons accused of certain offenses during war. They are distinct from military courts-martial, which are panels set up to try U.S. service members (and during declared wars, civilians accompanying the armed forces) under procedures prescribed by Congress in the UCMJ. U.S. service members charged with a war crime are normally tried before courts-martial but may also be tried by military commission or in federal court, depending on the nature of the crime charged. All three options are also available to try certain other persons for war crimes. Federal and state criminal statutes and courts are available to prosecute specific criminal acts related to terrorism that may or may not be triable by military commission. Military commissions trying enemy belligerents for war crimes directly apply the international law of war, without recourse to domestic criminal statutes, unless such statutes are declaratory of international law. Historically, military commissions have applied the same set of procedural rules that applied in courts-martial. The President's Military Order establishing military commissions to try suspected terrorists has been the focus of intense debate both at home and abroad. Critics argued that the tribunals could violate any rights the accused may have under the Constitution as well as their rights under international law, thereby undercutting the legitimacy of any verdicts rendered by the tribunals. The Administration initially responded that the M.O. provided only the minimum requirements for a full and fair trial, and that the Secretary of Defense intended to establish rules prescribing detailed procedural safeguards for tribunals established pursuant to the M.O. The procedural rules released in March 2002 were praised as a significant improvement over what might have been permitted under the language of the M.O., but some continued to argue that the enhancements do not go far enough and that the checks and balances of a separate rule-making authority and an independent appellate process are necessary. The release of the Military Commission Instructions sparked renewed debate, especially concerning the restrictions on civilian attorneys, resulting in further modifications to the rules. Critics noted that the rules do not address the issue of indefinite detention without charge, as appears to be possible under the original M.O., or that the Department of Defense may continue to detain persons who have been cleared by a military commission. The Pentagon has stated that its Inspector General (IG) looked into allegations, made by military lawyers assigned as prosecutors to the military commissions, that the proceedings are rigged to obtain convictions, but the IG did not substantiate the charges. The Department of Defense (DOD) has released ten "Military Commission Instructions" ("M.C.I. No. 1-10") to elaborate on the set of procedural rules to govern military tribunals. Those rules are set forth in Military Commission Order No. 1 ("M.C.O. No. 1"), issued in March 2002 and amended in 2005. The instructions set forth the elements of some crimes that may be tried by military commission, establish guidelines for civilian attorneys, and provide other administrative guidance and procedures for military commissions. Additionally, Major General John D. Altenburg, Jr. (retired), the Appointing Authority for the commissions, issued several Appointing Authority Regulations, governing disclosure of communications, interlocutory motions, and professional responsibility. In August 2005, DOD amended M.C.O. No. 1 to make the presiding officer function more like a judge and to have other panel members function more like a jury. Under the new rules, the presiding officer was assigned the responsibility of determining most questions of law while the other panel members were to make factual findings and decide any sentence, similar to courts-martial proceedings. Other provisions were modified to clarify the accused's privilege to be present except when necessary to protect classified information and only in instances where the presiding officer concludes that the admission of such evidence would not prejudice a fair trial and to require that the presiding officer exclude any evidence that would result in the denial of a full and fair trial from lack of access to the information. President Bush determined that twenty of the detainees at the U.S. Naval Station in Guantánamo Bay are subject to the M.O. and may consequently be charged and tried before military commissions. Six detainees declared eligible in 2003 included two citizens of the U.K. and one Australian citizen. After holding discussions with the British and Australian governments regarding the trial of their citizens, the Administration agreed that none of those three detainees will be subject to the death penalty. The Administration agreed to modify some of the rules with respect to trials of Australian detainees and agreed to return the U.K. citizens, including the two who had been declared eligible for trial by military commission, to Great Britain. The Administration agreed to return one Australian citizen, but another, David Hicks has been charged with conspiracy to commit war crimes; attempted murder by an unprivileged belligerent and aiding the enemy. One citizen from Yemen and one from the Sudan were formally charged with conspiracy to commit certain violations of the law of war (and other crimes triable by military commission). Salim Ahmed Hamdan of Yemen, accused of providing physical security for Osama bin Laden and other high ranking Al Qaeda members and charged with conspiracy to attack civilians, commit murder by an unprivileged belligerent and terrorism, provided the Supreme Court its first opportunity to address the validity of the military commissions. Salim Ahmed Hamdan, who was captured in Afghanistan and is alleged to have worked for Osama Bin Laden as a body guard and driver, brought this challenge to the lawfulness of the Secretary of Defense's plan to try him for alleged war crimes before a military commission, arguing that the military commission rules and procedures were inconsistent with the UCMJ and that he had the right to be treated as a prisoner of war under the Geneva Conventions. U.S. District Judge Robertson agreed, finding no inherent authority in the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces to create such tribunals outside of the existing statutory authority, with which the military commission rules did not comply. He also concluded that the Geneva Conventions apply to the whole of the conflict in Afghanistan, including under their protections all persons detained in connection with the hostilities there, and that Hamdan was thus entitled to be treated as a prisoner of war until his status was determined to be otherwise by a competent tribunal, in accordance with article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention (prisoners of war). Interpreting the UCMJ in light of the Geneva Conventions, which permits the punishment of prisoners of war "only if the sentence has been pronounced by the same courts according to the same procedure as in the case of members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power," Judge Robertson found no congressional authority for Hamdan's trial under the DOD's rules for military commissions. Hamdan, he ruled, was not "an offender triable by military tribunal under the law of war" within the meaning of UCMJ art 21. Further, he found the rules established by DOD to be fatally inconsistent with the UCMJ, contrary to UCMJ art. 36 because they give military authorities the power to exclude the accused from hearings and deny him access to evidence presented against him. The government appealed, arguing that the district court should not have interfered in the military commission prior to its completion, that Hamdan is not entitled to protection from the Geneva Conventions, and that the President has inherent authority to establish military commissions, which need not conform to statutes regulating military courts-martial. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the government's argument that the federal courts had no jurisdiction to interfere in ongoing commission proceedings, but otherwise agreed with the government. Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Randolph reversed the lower court's finding, ruling that the Geneva Conventions are not judicially enforceable, that even if they were, Hamdan is not entitled to their protections, and that in any event, the military commission would qualify as a "competent tribunal" where Hamdan may challenge his non-POW status, within the meaning of U.S. Army regulations implementing the Conventions. The appellate court did not accept the government's argument that the President has inherent authority to create military commissions without any authorization from Congress, but found such authority in the Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF), read together with UCMJ arts. 21 and 36. The court interpreted art. 36 to mean that military commission rules have only to be consistent with those articles of the UCMJ that refer specifically to military commissions, and not that Congress meant to incorporate procedural rules for courts-martial into those applicable to military commissions.