For most of the first four decades after the country was founded in 1948, South Korea was ruledby authoritarian governments. Ever since the mid-1980s, when widespread anti-government protestsforced the country's military rulers to enact sweeping democratic reforms, democratic institutionsand traditions have deepened in South Korea. In 1997, long-time dissident and opposition politician Kim Dae Jung (commonly referred to as "DJ") was elected to the presidency, the first time anopposition party had prevailed in a South Korean presidential election. By law, Korean presidentscan only serve one five-year term. In December 2002, Kim was succeeded by a member of his party, Roh (pronounced "noh") Moo-hyun , a self-educated former human rights lawyer whoemergedfrom relative obscurity to defeat establishment candidates in both the primary and general elections. Roh campaigned on a platform of reform -- reform of Korean politics, economic policymaking, andU.S.-ROK relations -- to narrowly defeat conservative candidate Lee Hoi Chang in the generalelection. Roh captured 48.9% of the vote to Lee's 46.6%. Prior to assuming the Presidency, Roh's only previous government experience was an eight-month term as Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries in 2000 and 2001, and two stints asa lawmaker in the National Assembly, from 1988-1992 and 1998-2000. During the 1990s, Roh losttwo legislative elections and one bid for the mayoralty of his hometown, Pusan. Ironically, duringthe presidential campaign, the circumstances surrounding these defeats contributed to Roh's imageas a principled reformer. Noteworthy Aspects of the 2002 Presidential Election. The 2002 election was notable for several inter-related reasons. First, itexposed the deep generational divide among South Koreans. Exit polls showed that nearly 60% ofpeople in their 20s and 30s voted for Mr Roh, compared with less than 40% of people in their 50sand 60s. It is perhaps not coincidental that those supporting Lee directly experienced the KoreanWar (1950-53) and its immediate aftermath. Roh, 56, himself represents a generational shift. Eleven years younger than Lee, he also is the first South Korean president who was not an established political figure when the country began toemerge from authoritarian rule in the late 1980s. Second, Roh's victory was due in part to his call for South Korea to become a more "equal" partner in the U.S.-ROK alliance and to his criticism of U.S. policies on the Korean peninsula. Rohpledged to largely continue Kim Dae Jung's "sunshine policy" of engaging North Korea. Althoughthese views resonated most strongly among younger generations of South Koreans, they have enteredthe mainstream of Korean society, as shown by the massive demonstrations in late 2002 protestingthe acquittal of two U.S. servicemen who were operating a military vehicle when it killed twoKorean schoolgirls. Third, the election and the anti-American demonstrations highlighted the growing influence and sophistication of Korean civil society groups, which now have a significant voice in determiningpolicy outcomes in Seoul. Many of these organizations garnered support for Roh during the electioncampaign and organized the anti-U.S. protests and the "Red Devil" rallies to cheer South Korea'snational team on to the semifinal during the 2002 Soccer World Cup. The groups' goals and means-- which tend to rely heavily upon networking through the Internet -- have been particularlyeffective in encouraging younger Koreans to become politically active. Higher-than-expectedturnout of younger voters benefitted Roh, as overall turnout in the 2002 election was a record lowof 70%, compared with 80% in the 1997 election. A Country Divided. The challenge facing Roh, who was inaugurated on February 25, 2003, is how to carry out his reform agenda despite the deepdivisions in South Korea. The country is split not only generationally, but also regionally. TheNational Assembly is controlled by the opposition Grand National Party (GNP). And Roh's ownparty, the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) is also divided between his supporters and a largefaction of party elders that nearly succeeded in ousting Roh as the MDP's presidential candidateseveral weeks before the election. Roh's task will be complicated by the National Assembly elections scheduled to take place in April 2004. These are likely to exacerbate the zero-sum tendency in South Korean politics, in whichruling and opposition parties rarely cooperate. Furthermore, both the ruling MDP and oppositionGNP are under significant internal stress, and there is speculation that there will be a major politicalrealignment before the next legislative election. A Weak Legislature. Nominally, power in SouthKorea is shared by the President, who is elected to one five-year term, and the 273-memberunicameral National Assembly. National Assembly members are elected to 4-year terms. Of these,227 members represent single-member constituencies. The remaining 46 are "at large" membersselected on the basis of proportional voting. As mentioned above, the next legislative elections willbe held in April 2004. Since the Assembly's powers were enhanced in the 1987 constitution, it has at times altered the political climate by providing opposition parties with a forum to criticize, inspect, and attempt toembarrass the executive branch. Indeed, one of the Assembly's major accomplishments since 1987has been to institutionalize its oversight of the executive; executive branch officials regularly appearbefore committees, helping to make South Korean policy-making more transparent. Also, from timeto time, opposition parties have used Assembly proceedings to successfully stymie presidentialinitiatives, usually by boycotting legislative sessions. In reality, however, the President continues to be the dominant force in South Korean policymaking, as formal and informal limitations prevent the National Assembly from initiatingmajor pieces of legislation. For instance, the Korean constitution grants the Assembly the poweronly to cut funds from the President's budget, not to propose any increases or alter the executive'sbudgetary allocations. (Article 57) Also, the Assembly must act on the budget not later than thirtydays before the start of the new fiscal year on January 1. (Article 54) South Korean legislators suffer from numerous other limitations. They have little in the way of legislative support agencies, and the typical Seoul legislative office is staffed by three salaried,full-time workers. Even the Prime Minister, who has little power, is nominated by the President. The fact that parties in the Assembly repeatedly have resorted to the brinkmanship tactic of theboycott reflects the legislative branch's weakness. Institution-Building by the National Assembly. Roh's election has accelerated moves by the opposition Grand National Party (GNP), which controls theNational Assembly, to increase the National Assembly's resources through the creation ofinstitutions modeled after the U.S. Congressional Budget Office, the Congressional ResearchService, and/or the General Accounting Office. The Assembly's Other Powers. A bill in the National Assembly may be introduced by members or by the executive branch. If passed, a bill is sent to theexecutive for presidential promulgation within 15 days. The President may veto the bill and sendit back to the National Assembly for reconsideration. If the assembly overrides the veto with theconcurrence of two-thirds or more of members present, the bill will become law. With respect tothe judiciary, the consent of the National Assembly is also required for the presidential appointmentof all Supreme Court justices. Also required is the ratification by the Assembly of treaties andagreements as well as international acts or conventions to which South Korea is a signatory. Thedeclaration of war, the dispatch of troops abroad, or the stationing of foreign troops in South Koreanterritory requires the consent of the Assembly as well. PDFversion Political Parties. South Korean political partiesform, disband, and merge regularly, in part because they tend to be regionally-based and centeredaround charismatic personalities rather than substantive issues. It is not uncommon for members ofthe National Assembly to jump from one party to another, a practice that has led to considerabledisaffection among the South Korean electorate. During the 2002 presidential election, RohMoo-hyun benefitted from his image of a principled politician who had suffered personally becauseof his resolution not to participate in these political machinations. In 1990, Roh chose not to followhis mentor and long-time opposition leader, Kim Young Sam, into an alliance with the then-rulingparty, a decision that contributed to Roh's defeats in the 1992 National Assembly election and the1995 Pusan mayoralty election. In 1992, Kim won the presidential election. Presently, there are three major political parties in South Korea: President Roh Moo-hyun's center-left ruling Millennium Democratic Party ( MDP , formerly the National Congress for NewPolitics), which has 101 seats in the National Assembly (137 seats constitutes a parliamentarymajority); the generally conservative opposition Grand National Party ( GNP ), which at 153 seatshasa majority in the Assembly; and the smaller (14 seats) conservative United Liberal Democrats(ULD), which is led by the veteran politician Kim Jong-pil and has declined dramatically in size andinfluence in recent years. In April 2003, the GNP further increased its majority by winning 2 of 3bi-elections that were notable for a turnout of below 30%, the lowest in nearly 40 years. There is speculation that there may be a major political realignment before the April 2004 National Assembly elections. The MDP and GNP both are undergoing unsettled times. The GNP,which suffered from defections early in the presidential campaign, is still recovering from Lee HoiChang's defeat.