In November 2005, the President of the United States released the Homeland Security Council’s National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza to guide the country’s overall effort to address the threat that highly pathogenic AI could create a human pandemic influenza. The strategy identified four lead agencies, each responsible for developing a plan to implement a component of the strategy: USDA is responsible for the veterinary response, HHS is responsible for the medical response, the Department of State is responsible for international activities, and DHS is responsible for overall domestic incident management and federal coordination. In May 2006, the Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza was issued to describe how the strategy would be implemented. Specifically, this implementation plan describes more than 300 critical actions that the appropriate federal agencies must carry out to address the threat of pandemic influenza. The department has responsibility for nearly 100 of these critical actions. The U.S. poultry industry consists, in large part, of a relatively small number of large companies that own all aspects of the production process—from the hatchery to the processing facility. The most common types of poultry raised commercially are chickens for consumption (called broilers) and chickens that lay eggs (called layers), as well as turkeys (see fig. 1). Broilers represent 93 percent of poultry produced in the United States (see fig. 2) and almost three-quarters of poultry and poultry products by value sold to consumers (see fig. 3). There are also commercial birds that are genetic breeding stock whose main function is to produce offspring that facilitate mass production and are economical to raise. Commercial poultry operations typically raise tens of thousands of birds in confined poultry houses. Such operations can include multiple houses located close to each other. Because of the environment in which commercial birds are raised, if one bird becomes infected with highly pathogenic AI, hundreds of thousands of birds can be exposed and need to be depopulated. In addition to poultry raised commercially, numerous types of birds are raised in backyards, with flocks up to 1,000 birds. These “backyard” birds are typically chickens used for personal egg production and consumption; game fowl used for fighting; and game birds, such as quail and pheasant. These birds may run loose or be confined to a poultry house. In addition, there are birds in live bird markets—facilities that sell live poultry, which is often slaughtered on-site, to the general public—and some are sold at auctions and swap meets. When poultry become infected with AI, it may be spread by the movement of contaminated people and equipment to and from a site where the infected birds are located (see fig. 4). For example, a poultry worker enters one bird house containing birds infected with AI but does not disinfect boots or change clothing before entering another house, carrying the virus and causing the disease to spread. As a precaution, commercial producers often implement biosecurity measures. For example, the number of people entering a bird house is restricted, and these people must dress in special, sometimes disposable, clothing. Moreover, vehicles arriving at a farm are usually required to be disinfected upon entry and exit. The workers’ boots and hands are also disinfected. For highly valuable birds, such as genetic breeding stock, biosecurity may be higher—for example, visitors may be required to shower before entering and leaving the facility. Despite biosecurity measures, outbreaks among commercial poultry have recently occurred (see table 1). For example, in 2002, Virginia experienced an outbreak of low pathogenic AI that resulted in the depopulation of nearly 5 million birds in order to control the disease. In 2003, Connecticut had an outbreak of low pathogenic AI that affected more than 3 million commercial laying hens. While low pathogenic AI is detected from time to time in domestic poultry, highly pathogenic AI is known to have occurred only three times in the United States: in 1924, 1983, and 2004. It is believed that all three of these highly pathogenic outbreaks originated in live bird markets. The Pennsylvania outbreak in 1983 began as a low pathogenic AI virus but mutated into a highly pathogenic strain, leading to the depopulation of 17 million birds. Although diagnostic testing confirmed that a virus in Texas in 2004 was technically highly pathogenic, the virus did not cause high mortality in the infected birds, as would be typical with highly pathogenic AI. An outbreak of AI can have serious trade repercussions. The World Organization for Animal Health is an international animal health group with 167 member countries, including the United States. Members agree to notify the organization of outbreaks in domestic poultry of all highly pathogenic AI and some low pathogenic strains—those with H5 and H7 proteins—because they have the capacity to mutate into highly pathogenic AI. Consequently, when a country’s poultry tests positive for “notifiable” AI, its international trading partners are likely to restrict trade with that country until the partners believe the virus is eradicated—an outcome that can take many months to achieve. For example, when a single farm in Texas was infected with highly pathogenic AI in 2004, more than 50 countries instituted complete or partial bans on U.S. poultry; Mexico has yet to lift its ban. Therefore, when a flock is infected with AI, the goal becomes controlling and eradicating the disease as rapidly as possible in order to prevent the spread of the disease and to regain the confidence of U.S. trading partners that any future imports will be disease free. This is accomplished by acting quickly in the affected area to, among other things: (1) quarantine susceptible animals; (2) implement biosecurity measures; (3) depopulate infected and exposed birds; (4) dispose of contaminated and potentially contaminated materials, including animal carcasses; and (5) clean and disinfect the infected premises. Once the disease is eradicated, USDA, states, and the poultry industry continue to test birds to monitor for AI. USDA derives its authority to carry out operations and measures to prevent, detect, control, and eradicate AI from the Animal Health Protection Act. The act authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to hold, seize, treat, destroy, or dispose of any animal, vehicle, or object that can harbor the disease, or to restrict their movement in interstate commerce. The act also authorizes the Secretary to transfer funds from other USDA appropriations or available funds to manage an emergency in which a disease of livestock threatens any segment of agricultural production in the United States. In addition, the act authorizes the Secretary to declare an “extraordinary emergency” when it has been determined that a state’s actions are inadequate to control or eradicate a livestock disease that threatens domestic livestock. Under this declaration, the Secretary’s authority to regulate includes any animal, vehicle, or object that can harbor the disease in intrastate, as well as interstate commerce. Within USDA, a number of agencies have responsibility for protecting U.S. poultry from AI. The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) operates the National Veterinary Services Laboratories, the only laboratory in the United States recognized by the World Organization for Animal Health to perform confirmatory testing for AI. Also, APHIS’ Smuggling, Interdiction, and Trade Compliance unit conducts activities to prevent smuggled and prohibited agricultural goods from entering and being distributed throughout the country. In addition, the Agricultural Research Service conducts research on endemic and exotic poultry diseases, including highly pathogenic AI; the Food Safety and Inspection Service works to ensure that the nation's commercial supply of meat, poultry, and egg products is safe for human consumption; the Office of Communications coordinates public information from USDA program agencies. In the past few years, USDA’s total obligations for AI preparedness efforts have increased from approximately $3.2 million in fiscal year 2004 to $74.1 million in fiscal year 2006. In 2005, USDA received $91.35 million from the 2-year Emergency Supplemental Appropriation to Address Pandemic Influenza. The bulk of USDA’s supplemental funding ($80.3 million) was allocated to APHIS, which in turn obligated $43 million for AI surveillance of domestic wildlife, commercial poultry, and live bird markets in fiscal year 2006. In addition, USDA obligated portions of the remaining emergency supplemental funding to areas such as AI research and public communications. According to USDA officials, the department is requesting $82 million for fiscal year 2008 to support its ongoing AI programs. While USDA has for many years been responsible for protecting livestock and poultry from foreign animal diseases, it now does so under new authorities and has additional roles and responsibilities. Following the terrorist attacks of 2001, the Congress passed the Homeland Security Act of 2002, establishing DHS as the chief coordinating agency for efforts to protect the United States from terrorist acts and disasters, including those that affect the agriculture sector. As such, DHS undertook major policy initiatives to promote emergency preparedness, including developing the National Incident Management System, the National Response Plan, and the National Preparedness Goal. The National Incident Management System is intended to provide a consistent framework for incident management at all jurisdictional levels regardless of cause, size, or complexity of the situation and to define the roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and local governments during an emergency event. A key component of this system is the Incident Command System, designed to coordinate the communications, personnel, and procedures of different agencies and levels of government within a common organizational structure during an emergency. The National Response Plan is an all-hazards plan built on the template of the National Incident Management System. It established a single, comprehensive approach to domestic incident management to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. The National Response Plan is stated to always be in effect. Under the National Response Plan, resources are grouped into Emergency Support Functions that would most likely be needed during a domestic incident.