The nomination of a Justice to the Supreme Court of the United States is one of the rare moments when all three branches of the federal government come together: the executive branch nominates, and the legislative branch considers the nomination, deciding whether the nominee will become a member of the high court. Presidents and Senators have said that, short of declaring war, deciding who should be on the Supreme Court is the most important decision they will make while in office. The Constitution, in Article II, Section 2, divides the responsibility for selecting and confirming members of the Supreme Court between the President and the Senate. It says that the President "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for...." The Senate has traditionally deferred to the President on nominations to the Cabinet, but they have shown less deference to a President's choice for the Supreme Court. Of the 160 nominations Presidents made to the Supreme Court since 1789, 36 were not confirmed. Of the hundreds of Cabinet officials nominated over the same time period, just 15 failed of confirmation. Some nominations to the Supreme Court have won confirmation with little debate and no procedural complications, while others have been debated extensively, with significant resort to parliamentary procedures during consideration. It appears that the Senate has never felt strictly bound by past practice in considering these nominations, but that it has used procedures and forms of consideration that the body has at the time deemed appropriate to each individual case. Nothing in Senate rules, procedures, or practice requires that the Senate proceed to a final vote on a nomination, for example, although in most instances it has done so. Of the 160 nominations for the Supreme Court, 12 never reached the floor and 13 others never received a final vote, although they were debated on the floor. The remaining 11 nominations that failed of confirmation reached a final vote, but were rejected by the Senate. This report examines the ways in which the Senate has handled the 160 Supreme Court nominations the President has sent to the Senate. As the purpose of this report is to examine the forms taken by Senate proceedings on these 160 nominations, it treats each nomination as a separate case. It is not couched in terms of the smaller number of different individuals nominated or the ultimate outcome the confirmation process may have had for each individual. Supreme Court confirmation debates, of course, do not occur in a vacuum. They are a product of the President making the choice, the state of the Senate at the time, the nominee and his or her views, and the prevailing mood of the country. These elements, while critical to understanding specific cases, are not considered in this report; discussions of them can be found in other reports on the Supreme Court. This report focuses on the kinds of actions the Senate has taken during consideration of Supreme Court nominees, how they have changed over time, and how they have affected the process of confirmation. The emphasis of this report is on the 148 nominations on which some form of formal proceedings took place on the Senate floor, not on the ways in which the nominations might have been handled in committee or other pre-floor stages. The information presented was drawn from a comprehensive search of the Executive Journals of the Senate, which are its official record of procedural actions taken in relation to executive business (i.e., nominations and treaties, which are the forms of business submitted to the Senate by the President). For recent Congresses for which the Journal was not yet available, information was taken from the Congressional Record and the Nominations data base of the congressional Legislative Information System. The following discussion first sketches the changing patterns of consideration that have been normal in successive historical periods since 1789, noting their relation to changes in the procedural rules and practice of the Senate. For each period, it not only describes normal and exceptional practice, but also provides examples of proceedings that were either typical or notable. The report then successively addresses three key characteristics of floor action on these nominations: the dispositions the Senate made of them, the length of floor consideration, and the kinds of procedural action taken during consideration. Although the Constitution mandates a role for the Senate in the consideration of nominees to the Supreme Court, it does not include any specific method for doing so. The process by which the Senate has considered these nominations has typically included several stages, from receipt and committee referral through committee consideration and reporting, to scheduling for floor action, followed by floor debate and a final vote. Within this broad outline, the Senate has answered the basic question—what should the procedure be for consideration of nominations?—in different ways at different times. A review of all Supreme Court nominations since 1789 yields two general conclusions about the procedures used. First, the Senate has not felt bound to consider each nomination in exactly the same way that the others before it were considered. Although some Supreme Court nominations, for example, never reached the Senate floor (and hence, did not receive a vote), the Senate spent numerous days debating other nominations. Neither of those practices has been routine, but their use shows how the Senate has reserved to itself the right to take the course of action that it believes best suits consideration of a particular nomination. This stance becomes even more evident when the Senate considers a well-known person for a Supreme Court seat. The Senate received, debated and confirmed the nomination of former President William Howard Taft to be Chief Justice on the same day, for example. Second, although the form of confirmation proceedings has varied, the Senate's process has tended to become longer and more formal over time. Although members of the first Supreme Court were confirmed just two days after their nominations were received, the norm in modern times has tended toward weeks, if not months, between the receipt of the nomination and disposition by the Senate. Early in the Senate's history, it was not typical for Supreme Court nominations to be referred to committee at all; by modern times, it was the norm for the Senate Committee on the Judiciary to spend significant time reviewing nominees. A study of the 160 nominations sent to the Senate finds that the Senate's floor consideration of Supreme Court nominations breaks down relatively naturally into five patterns over time. In the earliest years, the Senate normally considered a Supreme Court nomination, as a matter of course, on the second day after it had been received from the President. There was no routine referral to committee, although at least one nominee, Alexander Wolcott, was referred to a select committee in 1811 (his nomination was defeated). From the beginning, the Senate has considered nominations in executive session, that portion of the Senate's business that was established to consider business that comes directly from the President. At this time, executive session also meant that the doors were closed, only Senators and select staff were permitted to be in the chamber, and the proceedings were to remain secret. The first set of Senate rules, developed and adopted in 1789, did not include any specific provisions for handling nominations. In 1806, the Senate adopted a general revision of its rules, which included a new provision on nominations. This rule required that "when nominations shall be made in writing by the President of the United States to the Senate, a future day shall be assigned, unless the Senate unanimously direct otherwise, for taking them into consideration." Despite adoption of this rule, however, there is no indication that the Senate either fixed a date for consideration of nominations when they were received, or that the Senate waived this rule. The Executive Journal records no motion to consider these early nominations, instead stating simply that "the Senate proceeded to consider" the message from the President. The message from the President became the de facto method of organizing the nominations, apparently representing a precursor of the Calendar Call the Senate was to employ later. Of the 31 Supreme Court nominations sent to the Senate during this period, all 28 confirmations occurred by voice vote; the two rejections were by roll call (one nomination was considered by the Senate but left unfinished). Also, the normal period of floor consideration during this period was one day for each nomination. Five nominations were considered for more than one day: the three nominations not confirmed, Wolcott, John Rutledge (1795), and John J. Crittenden (1828); and two others, those of Alfred Moore (1799) and Robert Trimble (1826). This pattern of consideration is shown in the confirmation of the very first Supreme Court, in the following case study. The Court's first six members, a Chief Justice and five Associate Justices, were nominated by President George Washington on September 24, 1789. The nominations were not referred to committee. These men were personally known to many, if not all, members of the Senate, and there was no extensive investigation into their background. On September 26, the Senate proceeded to consider each of the six men, and in each case, "on the question to advise and consent thereto, it passed in the affirmative." There is no indication of lengthy debate; all six nominations were confirmed on the same day, in the same way. John Jay was confirmed as Chief Justice, and John Rutledge, of South Carolina; James Wilson, of Pennsylvania; William Cushing, of Massachusetts; Robert H. Harrison, of Maryland; and John Blair, of Virginia, were confirmed as Associate Justices. Although the vast majority of nominations during this time were handled in the same way as the above, there were instances of extraordinary procedure, particularly when the nomination appeared to be controversial, as shown in the following case study. On December 17, 1828, President John Quincy Adams nominated John Crittenden, a Kentucky lawyer, to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, to replace Justice Robert Trimble, who had died. The nomination took place after Adams' successor, Andrew Jackson, had been elected in November. Opposition to Crittenden by supporters of Jackson prevented the Senate from confirming him.