Several studies on maritime security conducted by federal, academic, nonprofit, and business organizations have concluded that the movement of oceangoing cargo in containers is vulnerable to some form of terrorist action, largely because of the movement of shipments throughout the supply chain. Relatively few importers own and operate all key aspects of the cargo container transportation process, which includes overseas manufacturing and warehouse facilities, carrier ships to transport goods, and the transportation operation to receive the goods upon arrival. Most importers must rely on second-hand parties to move cargo in containers and prepare various transportation documents. Second-hand parties within the cargo container supply chain may include exporters, freight forwarders, customs brokers, inland transportation providers, port operators, and ocean carriers. Every time responsibility for cargo in containers changes hands along the supply chain, there is the potential for a security breach; specifically, this change in responsibility creates opportunities for contraband to be placed in containers and opportunities for fraudulent documents to be prepared. According to the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, importers who own and operate all aspects of the supply chain suffer the fewest security breaches because of their increased level of control. While CBP has noted that the likelihood of terrorists smuggling WMD into the United States in cargo containers is low, the nation’s vulnerability to this activity and the consequence of such a disaster are high. With about 90 percent of the world’s maritime cargo moving by containers, terrorist action related to cargo containers could paralyze the maritime trading system and quickly disrupt U.S. and global commerce. In a strategic simulation of a terrorist attack sponsored by the consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton in 2002, representatives from government and industry organizations participated in a scenario involving terrorist activities at U.S. seaports. The scenario simulated the discovery and subsequent detonation of “dirty bombs”—explosive devices wrapped in radioactive material and designed to disperse radiological contamination—hidden in cargo containers at various locations around the country. These “events” led simulation participants to shut down every seaport in the United States over a period of 12 days. Booz Allen Hamilton published a report in October 2002 about the results of the simulation, which estimated that the 12-day closure would result in a loss of $58 billion in revenue to the United States’ economy, including spoilage, loss of sales, manufacturing slowdowns, and halts in production. Further, according to the report, it would take 52 days to clear the resulting backlog of vessels and 92 days to stabilize the container backlog, causing a significant disruption in the movement of international trade. According to CBP, the large volume of imports and the bureau’s limited resources make it impractical to inspect all oceangoing containers without disrupting the flow of commerce. CBP also noted it is unrealistic to expect that all containers warrant such inspection because each container poses a different level of risk based on a number of factors including the exporter, the transportation providers, and the importer. CBP has implemented an approach to container security that attempts to focus resources on particularly risky cargo while allowing other cargo to proceed. CBP’s domestic efforts to target cargo to determine the risk it poses rely on intelligence, historical trends, and data provided by ocean carriers and importers. Pursuant to federal law, CBP requires ocean carriers to electronically transmit cargo manifests to CBP’s Automated Manifest System 24 hours before the cargo is loaded on a ship at a foreign port. This information is used by CBP’s Automated Targeting System (ATS). ATS is characterized by CBP as a rule-based expert system that serves as a decision support tool to assess the risk of sea cargo. In addition, CBP requires importers to provide entry-level data that are entered into the Automated Commercial System and also used by ATS. According to CBP officials, ATS uses this information to screen all containers to determine whether they pose a risk of containing WMD. As shown in figure 1, CBP targeters at domestic ports target containers by first accessing the bills of lading and their associated risk scores electronically. The assigned risk score helps the targeters determine the risk characterization of a container and the extent of documentary review or inspection that will be conducted. For example, containers characterized as high-risk are to be inspected. Containers characterized as medium-risk are to be further researched. That is, targeters are to consider intelligence alerts and research assistance provided by the National Targeting Center (NTC) to the ports, and their own experience and intuition, in characterizing the final risk of shipments. Containers characterized as low-risk are generally to be released from the port without further documentary review or inspection. There are, generally, two types of inspections that CBP inspectors may employ when examining cargo containers—nonintrusive inspections and physical examinations. The nonintrusive inspection, at a minimum, involves the use of X-ray or gamma-ray scanning equipment. As shown in figure 2, the X-ray or gamma ray equipment is supposed to scan a container and generate an image of its contents. CBP inspectors are to review the image to detect any anomalies, such as if the density of the contents of the container is not consistent with the description of the contents. If an anomaly is apparent in the image of the container, CBP inspectors are to decide whether to conduct a physical examination of the container. According to CBP officials, they have a policy to determine the type of physical examination to be conducted depending on the location of the anomaly. CBP inspectors also are to use radiation detection devices to detect the presence of radioactive or nuclear material. If the detectors indicate the presence of radioactive material, CBP officials are to isolate the source and contact the appropriate agency, such as the Department of Energy, for further guidance. Announced in January 2002, CSI was implemented to allow CBP officials to target containers at overseas seaports so that any high-risk containers may be inspected prior to their departure for U.S. destinations. According to the CSI strategic plan, strategic objectives for CSI include (1) pushing the United States’ zone of security beyond its physical borders to deter and combat the threat of terrorism; (2) targeting shipments for potential terrorists and terrorist weapons, through advanced and enhanced information and intelligence collection and analysis, and preventing those shipments from entering the United States; (3) enhancing homeland and border security while facilitating growth and economic development within the international trade community; and (4) utilizing available technologies to leverage resources and to conduct examinations of all containers posing a high risk for terrorist related activity. Another objective cited by CBP officials, although not included in the CSI strategic plan, is to raise the level of bilateral cooperation and international awareness regarding the need to secure global trade. To implement CSI, CBP negotiates and enters into bilateral arrangements with foreign governments, specifying the placement of CBP officials at foreign ports and the exchange of information between CBP and foreign customs administrations. CBP first solicited the participation of the 20 foreign ports that shipped the highest volume of ocean containers to the United States. These top 20 ports are located in 14 countries and regions and shipped a total of 66 percent of all containers that arrived in U.S. seaports in 2001. CBP has since expanded CSI to strategic ports, which may ship lesser amounts of cargo to the United States but may also have terrorism or geographical concerns. As shown in table 1, as of February 2005, CSI was operational at 34 ports, located in 17 countries or regions. For fiscal year 2004, the CSI budget was about $62 million, with a budget of about $126 million in fiscal year 2005 for the program. To participate in CSI, a host nation must meet several criteria. The host nation must utilize (1) a seaport that has regular, direct and substantial container traffic to ports in the United States; (2) customs staff with the authority and capability of inspecting cargo originating in or transiting through its country; and (3) nonintrusive inspection equipment with gamma- or X-ray capabilities and radiation detection equipment. Additionally, each potential CSI port must indicate a commitment to (1) establishing an automated risk management system; (2) sharing critical data, intelligence, and risk management information with CBP officials; (3) conducting a thorough port assessment to ascertain vulnerable links in a port’s infrastructure and commit to resolving those vulnerabilities; and (4) maintaining a program to prevent, identify, and combat breaches in employee integrity. To prepare for implementation of CSI, CBP sends an assessment team to each potential CSI port to collect information about the port’s physical and information infrastructure, the host country’s customs operations, and the port’s strategic significance to the United States. CBP then deploys a CSI team, which generally consists of three types of officials—special agents, targeters, and intelligence analysts. These officials come from either CBP or U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The team leader is a CBP officer or targeter who is assigned to serve as the immediate supervisor for all CSI team members and is responsible for coordinating with host government counterparts in the day-to-day operations. The team leader is also to prepare a weekly report on container targeting and inspection activity at the port. The targeters are team members responsible for targeting shipments and referring those shipments they determine are high-risk to host government officials for inspection. The targeter may also observe inspections of containers. The intelligence analyst is responsible for gathering information to support targeters in their efforts to target containers. In addition, the special agents are to coordinate all investigative activity resulting from CSI-related actions, as well as liaison with all appropriate U.S. embassy attachés.