Even as Congress finalized legislation creating the FEC in 1974, some Members of the House and Senate disagreed over how the agency should be constituted, what powers it should have, and how broad its enforcement authority should be. Perhaps unsurprisingly, almost immediately, the FEC's enforcement activities generated controversy. Fo r some, they were too vigorous; for others, too lax. Partially due to enforcement controversies, Congress has occasionally considered restructuring the agency. In the 114 th Congress, H.R. 2931 would replace the current six-member body with a five-member commission, including a chairperson with enhanced enforcement powers. Recent Congresses have also engaged in oversight concerning the FEC's enforcement practices and transparency. The controversy surrounding the FEC's enforcement of campaign finance law and regulation continues. During 2015, as the FEC marked its 40 th anniversary, prominent media accounts and opinion pieces chronicled tense relations among commissioners and stalemates over new regulations and enforcement. In recent years, commissioners have sparred at open meetings and in the media about whether the agency's enforcement activities are inadequate or overzealous. The debate over enforcement is not merely about internal agency disagreements. Rather, it represents broader controversies about what the FEC does and what it should do, and what federal campaign finance policy is and should be. Some also contend that enforcement establishes the boundaries of permissible campaign behavior. This report is not about the FEC's individual enforcement controversies, but, rather, about why controversies surrounding the enforcement process might matter to Congress as it provides the agency with overall direction and shapes campaign finance policy generally. This report highlights examples of FEC or congressional attention to enforcement topics, but it is not intended to provide comprehensive discussion of particular enforcement matters. Rather, it discusses selected major issues that appear to be most consequential for Congress. Other topics might be relevant for practitioners or agency officials but are generally not addressed here. Unless otherwise noted, the report does not address criminal enforcement handled by the Justice Department or activities regulated by agencies such as the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The report is not a legal analysis of commission activity. Other CRS products cited throughout this report provide additional information about related topics. In particular, another CRS product provides an overview of the FEC. Finally, the report does not provide compliance guidance to those regulated by FECA or FEC rules. This report uses the terms "FEC," "commission," and "agency" interchangeably. Some discussions of the FEC's authority, which are generally beyond the scope of this report, use the term "commission" to denote members of the FEC as opposed to agency staff. This distinction is not central to this report but is relevant for some material in the " Transparency and the Enforcement Process " section. Members of Congress have a dual stake in campaign finance policy: as regulators and as the regulated. By enacting legislation, appropriating funds, and conducting oversight, Congress establishes the rules that campaigns—including their own—must follow and provides resources for ensuring compliance. More generally, enforcement is one of the most prominent topics in federal campaign finance policy. Policy debates often characterize enforcement as an indicator of other issues, such as the health of the FEC or the extent of government regulation of political speech. Enforcement can also indicate to what extent emerging campaign practices will be permitted, as the FEC considers how existing law and regulation might apply to new circumstances. Proposals to restructure the FEC typically have enforcement implications. For all these reasons, even a basic understanding of enforcement can enhance familiarity with campaign finance policy overall. As noted elsewhere in this report, Congress has regularly considered legislation and held hearings that could affect the FEC's enforcement duties. Congress has considered various campaign finance legislation, and conducted FEC oversight, for decades. Much of that activity has addressed campaign finance policy generally rather than FEC enforcement specifically. The same is true of more current legislation and hearings. Recent developments particularly relevant for enforcement include the following. In the 114 th Congress, H.R. 2931 would replace the current six-member FEC with a five-member commission, including a chairperson with enhanced enforcement powers. The 113 th Congress extended until 2018 operating authority for the FEC's Administrative Fine Program (AFP). The legislation also expanded the program to cover late reports filed by non-candidate committees and for independent expenditures. During the 113 th Congress, a Senate Judiciary Committee subcommittee held a hearing on criminal enforcement of campaign finance law. The hearing included witnesses from the Department of Justice, Internal Revenue Service, and interest groups, but did not focus on the FEC. During the 112 th Congress, the Committee on House Administration, Subcommittee on Elections, examined FEC enforcement through an oversight hearing. Subsequently, the FEC released additional information about its enforcement activities. The FEC is a six-member independent regulatory agency. Commissioners are appointed by the President and subject to Senate confirmation. The Senate most recently confirmed commissioners in 2013 (the 113 th Congress), as shown in Table 1 . Another CRS report provides additional detail about the commission. Three major enforcement options are at the commission's disposal: (1) what the agency has termed the "general enforcement process" established in FECA; (2) the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Program; and (3) the Administrative Fine Program (AFP). The first category includes the most complex and sometimes controversial matters that the commission might handle, designated as "Matters Under Review" (MURs). They may entail lengthy investigations or audits, protracted negotiations between the commission and H.R. 3487 respondents, substantial civil penalties, or litigation—although the pace can vary depending on individual circumstances. By contrast, matters handled under the AFP and ADR programs typically are simpler and less controversial. ADR cases can involve various issues; the program is designed to facilitate negotiation that leads to relatively speedy resolution of fairly simple matters. AFP cases are limited to straightforward matters involving late filings. A five-year statute of limitations applies to campaign finance enforcement matters. The enforcement process typically begins when one of four entities files a complaint or makes an internal referral to the FEC. These include the following: a complaint from an individual or other group (e.g., an opposing campaign); a referral from another government agency (e.g., Department of Justice); a referral from the FEC Audit Division or Reports Analysis Division (RAD); or a violation that is self-reported by a political committee or other regulated entity (a sua sponte submission). The details of processing and resolving complaints vary based on whether the matter is handled through the MUR, ADR, or AFP methods. In general, once complaints or referrals are complete, the commission notifies the respondent (the subject of the complaint or referral) of the receipt or referral; the respondent has an opportunity to reply to the complaint and may choose to be represented by an attorney; and the commission determines which enforcement method, if any, to pursue: the MUR, ADR, or AFP processes. Regardless of the enforcement mechanism, FECA dictates much of how the process must unfold and how long it takes. In particular, FECA specifies how complaints must be filed and, except for AFP cases, that the commission must seek voluntary compliance before imposing a penalty. FECA also requires commissioners to vote on key enforcement decisions throughout the process. In particular, affirmative votes from at least four commissioners are required to find "reason to believe" (RTB) that a violation has occurred or is about to occur, which commences additional action (e.g., an investigation); find probable cause that a violation has occurred or is about to occur; resolve a matter (e.g., through a conciliation agreement, penalties, etc. ); and authorize filing a lawsuit if a matter cannot otherwise be resolved. Without an affirmative vote from at least four commissioners in each of these instances, substantive action stops. The " Deadlocked Votes " section contains additional detail. Table 2 below lists the major steps and potential timelines required for cases routed through the MUR process, typically the most complex and consequential enforcement cases. The table excludes optional steps, such as hearings or presentation of legal questions to the commission, which require additional time. At least two transparency issues are central to the enforcement process. First, FECA bars the FEC or its personnel from releasing any information about individual enforcement matters until after cases are closed. This confidentiality requirement was designed to prevent competing campaigns from using complaints as political weapons. Nonetheless, campaigns and other political actors routinely publicize complaints they have filed, even if the commission cannot comment. Second, Congress has dedicated some recent oversight activities to agency transparency concerning enforcement. Apparently both on its own initiative and in response to congressional interest, in recent years, the FEC has reexamined how it provides enforcement information to the public or those regulated by campaign finance law and commission rules. Highlights appear below. As noted previously, in November 2011, during the 112 th Congress, the Committee on House Administration, Subcommittee on Elections, held an FEC oversight hearing. Much of that hearing emphasized transparency surrounding the FEC's enforcement process. After the November 2011 hearing, negotiations between the committee and commission appear to have resulted in the ongoing effort to approve and publicly release a new FEC enforcement manual. In May 2012, the FEC released on its website more than 1,200 pages of documents concerning its enforcement and audit procedures. During the summer of 2013, controversy developed concerning an Office of General Counsel (OGC) draft of the enforcement manual and proposed revisions to that draft from some commissioners. A major source of controversy appeared to be the extent to which OGC staff should be restricted from sharing information with other agencies (particularly the Justice Department), or from conducting research that might constitute an "investigation" as contemplated in FECA, without specific commission authorization.