In 2009, the war in Iraq appears to be winding down, as security gains made since the height of the insurgency in 2006 and 2007 continue to be sustained, and as Iraqis increasingly seek management of their own affairs. A new U.S.-Iraqi Security Agreement that went into effect on January 1, which confirmed the Iraqis' responsibility for their own security, introduced a new era in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)—the US-led coalition military operation in Iraq—and in US-Iraqi bilateral relations. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called the Agreement a "watershed, a firm indication that American military involvement in Iraq is winding down." U.S. military commanders on the ground have indicated that in most parts of Iraq, the focus of U.S. military efforts has shifted from counterinsurgency (COIN) to stability operations, including advising the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and supporting security, economic, and governance capacity-building. On February 27, 2009, at Camp Lejeune in North Carolina, President Obama delivered a speech addressing "how the war in Iraq will end," in which he announced the drawdown of U.S. combat forces by August 2010 and the transition of the rest of the military mission to training and advising Iraq security forces, conducting counter-terrorism, and providing force protection for U.S. personnel. The United States begins this transition from a position of significant commitment – including some 140,000 U.S. troops deployed in Iraq as of March 2009, in addition to civilian experts and U.S. contractors, who provide substantial support to their Iraqi counterparts in the fields of security, governance, and development. Senior U.S. officials, including outgoing U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker, and Secretary Gates, have suggested that lasting change in Iraq will require substantially more time, and that while the U.S. military presence will diminish, U.S. engagement with Iraq is likely to continue. The Government of Iraq (GoI), for its part, still faces challenges at the operational level, in countering the lingering threads of the insurgency; and at the strategic level, in achieving a single, shared vision of the Iraqi state, and in improving its capacity to provide good governance, ensure security, and foster economic development for the Iraqi people. Key policy issues the Obama Administration may choose to address, with oversight from the 111 th Congress, include identifying which U.S. national interests and strategic objectives, in Iraq and the region, should guide further U.S. engagement; monitoring and evaluating the impact of the changes in the U.S. presence and role in Iraq; and laying the groundwork for a future, more traditional bilateral relationship. OIF was launched on March 20, 2003. The immediate goal, as stated by the George W. Bush Administration, was to remove Saddam Hussein's regime, including destroying its ability to use weapons of mass destruction or to make them available to terrorists. The broad, longer-term objective included helping Iraqis build "a new Iraq that is prosperous and free." In October 2002, Congress had authorized the President to use force against Iraq, to "defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq," and to "enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq." After the initial combat operations, the focus of OIF shifted from regime removal to the more open-ended mission of helping an emerging new Iraqi leadership improve security, establish a system of governance, and foster economic development. Over time, challenges to the emerging Iraqi leadership from homegrown insurgents and some foreign fighters mounted. Sectarian violence grew, catalyzed by the February 2006 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra. In January 2007, in an attempt to reverse the escalation of violence, President Bush announced a new strategic approach, the "New Way Forward," including a "surge" of additional U.S. forces, together with additional civilian experts. The troop surge included five Army brigade combat teams (BCTs), a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), and two Marine battalions. More importantly, most observers agree, Ambassador Crocker and the Commanding General of Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), General David Petraeus, institutionalized counterinsurgency approaches across the force and the U.S. effort as a whole. Those approaches emphasized population security, empowering the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) through close partnership, and building GoI capacity to govern and foster economic development in order to capitalize on security gains. Over the course of the surge, observers generally agreed, security conditions on the ground improved markedly. In August 2008, GEN Petraeus agreed that there had been "significant progress" but argued that it was "still not self-sustaining." "We're not celebrating," he commented, and there are "no victory dances in the end zone." Practitioners and observers have identified a number of factors that may have contributed to the security improvements, including the additional surge forces; new and institutionalized counter-insurgency approaches concerning population security and reconciliation; the application of high-end technological capabilities by Special Operations Forces (SOF) and closer integration between SOF and conventional forces; the accumulated experience of U.S. leaders at all levels after multiple tours in Iraq; the growing numbers and capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces; the ground-up rejection of violence and support for the coalition by many Sunni Arabs; and the ceasefire declared by Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and the abandonment of violence by many of his followers. While conventional, force-on-force wars tend to end with the unequivocal defeat of one party, the parameters for "mission success" in counter-insurgency efforts like OIF tend to be less definitive and more subject to qualitative interpretation. OIF appears poised to end with policy decisions by the U.S. and/or Iraqi governments, rather than with a decisive military victory on the battlefield. On November 17, 2008, U.S. and Iraqi officials signed two key new agreements, designed to define the terms of their future partnership at the strategic and operational levels. On November 27, the Iraqi parliament voted its support for the two agreements, and on December 4, the Iraqi Presidency Council approved them. The first document was the broad Strategic Framework Agreement, designed to provide a basis for future cooperation in multiple fields including diplomacy, culture, economics and energy, health and the environment, information technology, and law enforcement. This Agreement was based broadly on a declaration of principles, signed by President Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, on November 27, 2007. The second document, the Security Agreement, was similar to a status of forces agreement (SOFA). It was the product of a contentious negotiations process that began in spring 2008. It elaborated the terms of the bilateral security partnership at the operational level, and provided the legal basis for the U.S. troop presence in Iraq. When approving the two agreements, the Iraqi parliament made the Security Agreement subject to a popular referendum, scheduled to be held by July 2009. The Agreement went into effect on January 1, 2009, at the expiration of the United Nations mandate that had provided the legal basis for the presence of the multi-national force in Iraq. The Security Agreement underscored both Iraqi sovereignty and the "temporary" nature of the U.S. military presence, and it imposed a number of constraints on the presence and operations of U.S. forces. It provided for the withdrawal of all U.S. combat forces from Iraqi cities and towns by June 30, 2009, and for the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Iraq by December 31, 2011. This language was a stricter version of earlier drafts that reportedly had provided for time "horizons" or target dates. The Security Agreement stipulated that the United States shall not use Iraqi land, sea or air as a "launching or transit point for attacks against other countries." The Strategic Framework Agreement, which echoed this language, also provided that the United States shall not seek a "permanent military presence" in Iraq. The negotiations process reportedly considered various formulations regarding external threats to Iraq's sovereignty. The agreed language, in the Security Agreement, required bilateral consultations in case of such a threat, but made no other actions compulsory. The Security Agreement required that U.S. forces coordinate all military operations with Iraqi authorities. It tightly constrained the role of U.S. forces in detaining Iraqis and mandated the transfer of current detainees to Iraqi custody. It also granted Iraq some legal jurisdiction over U.S. servicemembers and defense civilians – specifically, in cases of "grave, premeditated felonies" committed off base and "outside duty status." As senior officials on the ground have underscored, the Security Agreement acknowledged that many of its provisions would require further interpretation. To that end, it established a committee structure to provide implementation guidance. On February 27, 2009, at the Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, President Obama announced "a new strategy to end the war in Iraq through a transition to full Iraqi responsibility." The setting for the speech quietly echoed its theme of transition. U.S. Marines entered Iraq at the start of OIF and helped lead both major combat and counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts. Recently, senior Marine Corps officials have argued that significantly increasing the Marine deployment to Afghanistan will require drawing down in Iraq—"during calendar year 2010." The President's policy calls for the withdrawal of all U.S. combat forces by August 31, 2010. That decision marked the culmination of a comprehensive strategic review of Iraq war efforts that President Obama ordered on his first full day in office. Military commanders were reportedly asked to review alternative 16-month, 19-month, and 23-month timeline options for the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces.