Future overseas contingencies are inherently uncertain, but effective planning—at both the strategic and operational levels—can help DOD reduce the risks posed by those uncertainties. At a strategic level, planning is an important element in a results-oriented framework; it can help DOD clarify priorities and unify the department in pursuit of common goals for operational contract support. Similarly, at an operational level, effective planning can help better define contract support requirements to avoid potential waste and abuse and facilitate the continuity of services. In Iraq and Afghanistan, we previously reported that insufficient planning for operational contract support may lead to shortages in contractor personnel available to perform key functions, such as not having enough personnel to maintain and repair mission essential vehicles and equipment. Additionally, due in part to limited operational planning for contracted support, we previously reported that DOD faced challenges planning for certain aspects of contracting and contractor management in Iraq during the drawdown. DOD has recognized the need to improve its planning for operational contract support. In addition to the Secretary’s January 2011 memorandum, DOD has communicated and emphasized the importance of operational contract support at the strategic level through the issuance of new policy and guidance and ongoing efforts. For example: In December 2011, DOD issued regulations establishing policy, assigning responsibilities, and providing procedures for operational contract support. The regulations were issued as an interim final rule published in the Federal Register and as Department of Defense According to DOD officials, in 2011, the department revised its Guidance for Employment of the Force and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan to emphasize contractor management, and it is currently revising another core piece of guidance, Joint Publication 4- 10, to help further integrate operational contract support into planning efforts. In 2010, DOD established the Operational Contract Support Functional Capability Integration Board, which is responsible for a variety of tasks including conducting independent assessments and analysis of operational contract support capabilities of the military; advocating for operational contract support capability development in a variety of venues; and establishing and assessing ways to improve measures of performance, metrics, and processes for measuring operational contract support readiness. This board is drafting an Operational Contract Support Action Plan to outline steps the department plans to take to close identified gaps in operational contract support capabilities. Operational Contract Support, 76 Fed. Reg. 81,807 (Dec. 29, 2011) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. pt. 158); Department of Defense Instruction 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS) (Dec. 20, 2011). officials, most of the annexes that had been drafted at that time restated broad language from existing DOD guidance on the use of contractors to support deployed forces but included few details on the type of contractors needed to execute a given plan. We also found shortcomings in guidance for planners on how and when to develop contract support annexes, which resulted in a mismatch of expectations between senior DOD leadership and combatant command planners regarding the degree to which Annex Ws would contain specific information on contract support requirements. Overall, we found that requiring consideration of potential contract support requirements raised awareness of the importance of operational contract support and led to some improvements in planning for contract support. Nevertheless, we found that DOD still risked not fully understanding the extent to which it would be relying on contractors to support combat operations and being unprepared to provide the necessary management and oversight of deployed contractor personnel. One way to help address this risk is to ensure military commanders and senior leaders are cognizant of the roles contractors have in supporting DOD’s efforts, as well as the role that DOD military personnel have in managing and overseeing contractors. In 2006 and again in 2012, we recommended that operational contract support training, with a particular emphasis on contingency operations, be included in professional military education to ensure that all military personnel expected to perform contract or contractor management duties, including commanders and senior leaders, receive training prior to deployment. Military commanders and senior leaders have used contractors to perform a variety of services to help their units execute the mission, including life support, security, and communications support. We previously found that DOD officials in Afghanistan did not always receive training that adequately prepared them for their contract management and oversight duties, and according to DOD officials, the training did not necessarily make them sufficiently capable for their particular assignments. Further, contracting personnel have told us that commanders, particularly those in combat units, do not perceive operational contract support as a warfighter task. DOD has developed a program of instruction on contingency acquisition to be taught at some of the military and senior staff colleges. However, we have previously reported that commanders and senior leaders are not required to take these courses before assuming their contract management roles and responsibilities. In contingencies, having the right people, with the right skills, in the right numbers can make the difference between success and failure. These individuals—whether acquisition professionals or non-acquisition personnel, including military commanders—play critical roles in defining requirements, managing and overseeing contracts and contractors, and helping to ensure that the warfighter receives the goods and services needed in a timely manner while serving to mitigate the risks of fraud, waste, and abuse. Our work, as well as the work of others in the accountability community, has identified numerous instances in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere where these individuals were in short supply, were not properly trained, or were not fully aware of their responsibilities. For example, in 2010, we found that DOD relied on contractors to support contract administration functions in Iraq and Afghanistan, in part because of a shortage of government personnel to perform these functions. In March 2012, we reported that DOD oversight personnel in Afghanistan did not always receive adequate training for their contract management duties, and that DOD continued to lack a sufficient number of oversight personnel for contracts in Afghanistan, which in some cases resulted in projects being completed without sufficient government oversight and problems not being identified until projects were already completed. Further, we have found in the past that some commanders had to be advised by contract oversight personnel that they had to provide certain support, such as housing, force protection, and meals, to contractors. DOD leadership has recognized the need to rebuild, train, and support a highly qualified and knowledgeable acquisition workforce as a strategic priority. This workforce, which was downsized considerably through the 1990s, has faced increases in the volume and complexity of work because of increases in services contracting, ongoing contingency operations, and other critical missions. We reported in June 2012 that, according to DOD, the size of DOD’s civilian acquisition workforce increased from 118,445 in fiscal year 2009 to about 135,981 in December 2011, a gain of 17,536. According to DOD officials, 5,855 individuals were hired using the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund with other growth attributed to hiring new staff using other funding sources, moving contracted work to government employees through insourcing, and reclassifying existing DOD staff as acquisition staff. For example, DOD provided $321 million from the fund to help support increasing the size of the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), two key contract oversight organizations. Last year, we reported that DCMA officials identified a number of ways deployments of DCMA personnel in support of contingencies—which more than tripled over the past 5 years—have affected the agency’s other missions, which include providing contract administration services for DOD buying activities and working directly with defense contractors to help ensure that goods and services are delivered on time, at projected cost, and that they meet performance requirements.years given its limited workforce and growing workload. DOD continues to face challenges in strategic workforce planning for its acquisition workforce. Further, DOD’s ability to effectively execute hiring and other initiatives has been hindered by delays in the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund funding process and the absence of clear guidance on the availability and use of related funds. DCAA has also faced challenges in recent Similarly, while DOD has recognized the important role that non- acquisition personnel—those outside the defense acquisition workforce— play in the acquisition process, DOD continues to face a number of challenges in ensuring that these individuals are identified and have the training and resources needed to perform their roles, in particular as contracting officer’s representatives (CORs). CORs are generally military or civilian DOD personnel that manage and oversee contracts and serve as the liaisons between the contractor, the contracting officer, and the unit receiving support or services. While the contracting officer is ultimately responsible for ensuring that contractors meet the requirements set forth in the contract, CORs serve as the eyes and ears of contracting officers. However, earlier this year, we reported that DOD has experienced challenges ensuring that (1) it has a sufficient number of CORs and (2) the CORs have the subject-matter expertise and training needed to perform their contract management and oversight duties, in particular for construction projects. DOD has taken some actions to enhance training programs to prepare CORs to manage and oversee contracts in contingency operations. For example, DOD developed a new training course for CORs, with a focus on contingency operations and developed a more general certification program for CORs, including the contingency operations course as a training requirement when it is applicable. Continued attention in this area will help DOD ensure better contract management and oversight in future contingencies. DOD’s ability to effectively leverage operational contract support in contingency environments not only depends on having effective plans in place and having a skilled acquisition and oversight workforce, but also on having appropriate tools to account for contracts and contractor personnel. These tools can provide information that DOD can use to help mitigate risks associated with relying on contractors in contingency environments, including tracking which contracts DOD has awarded, where contractor personnel are located, and whether potential vendors or contractor personnel may pose a risk to U.S. interests. Our prior work has shown that a lack of complete and accurate information on contracts and contractor personnel may inhibit planning, increase costs, and introduce unnecessary risk in contingency environments.