PSCs are defined as private companies, and/or personnel, that provide physical security for persons, places, buildings, facilities, supplies, or means of transportation. These contractors provide security services for a variety of U.S. government agencies in Iraq; however, they principally are hired by DOD and the State Department. Given the security concerns in Iraq, the U.S. government has relied upon PSCs to fulfill a variety of important security functions throughout the country in support of the DOD military mission and the State Department’s diplomatic mission. The mission of PSCs hired by the U.S. government in Iraq is to protect government agency officials as they perform their duties in the unstable security environment currently present. These contractors may be U.S. or foreign-based and their employees are recruited and hired from a wide variety of countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, South Africa, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Fiji. They also include Kurds and Arabs from Iraq. These firms may provide a variety of security related services including: static security – security for housing areas and work sites, including personal security details – security for high-ranking U.S. officials and Chief of Mission personnel; security escorts – security for U.S. government employees, contractor employees, or others as they move through Iraq; convoy security – security for vehicles and their occupants as they make their way into Iraq or within Iraq; and security advice and planning. In Iraq, two distinct authorities are responsible for the security of U.S. government employees and contractors. The U.S. military, under the authority of the Secretary of Defense and the Combatant Commander, is responsible for the security of all personnel who are under direct control of the Combatant Commander. The State Department, under the authority of the Secretary of State, is responsible for the security of all other U.S. government personnel on official duty abroad. In Iraq, that responsibility is delegated to the U.S. Ambassador as Chief of Mission and to the U.S. Embassy’s Regional Security Officer who is the Chief of Mission’s focal point for security issues and as such establishes specific security policies and procedures. While these two agencies also are responsible for providing oversight, coordination and accountability for U.S. government PSCs, the government of Iraq also plays a role. Figure 1 depicts the organizations that play a key role in the oversight and coordination of PSCs operating in Iraq. Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF–I) Multi-National Corp – Iraq (MNC–I) Under the Chief of Mission, the RegionSecrity Officer, who i Ste Deprtment Diplomtic Secrity Service pecigent, overee ll fnction relted to ecrity. Under the combant commnder, MNF–I i the militry commnd, led y the United Ste, which compri the Colition Force. MNC–I, prt of MNF–I, i the tcticnit reponle for the commnd nd control of opertion throghot Irq. Joint Contractin Command – Iraq/Afhanitan (JCC–I/A) Defene Contract Manaement Aency (DCMA) The Deprtment of Ste’ Office of Acqition Mgement mge, pl, nd direct the Deprtment’ cqition progr nd condct contrct opertion in support of ctivitie worldwide, inclding support of the Breau of Diplomtic Secrity’ Irq reqirement. JCC–I provide opertionl contrcting support to MNF–I to efficiently cqire vitsupplie, ervice, nd contrction in support of the Colition Force nd the relief nd recontrction of Irq; nd to provide ccity building to eablih effective contrcting nd procrement process within the Irqi Minitrie to build nd susin elf-sufficient ecrity force. DCMA i combasupport gency within DOD tht perform contrct mgement fnction erving as the deprtment’ contrct mger. The contrcting officer i reponle for overight nd mgement of the contrct, but my delegte ome of thoe fnction to DCMA. DOD and the State Department have both taken action to increase their oversight efforts over PSCs in Iraq, however, staffing and training challenges remain for DOD. In Iraq, MNF-I has established an office to provide PSC oversight and MNF-I has published comprehensive mandatory guidance related to the oversight of DOD PSCs and has made military units more responsible for providing oversight to PSCs in terms of incident reporting and investigating. However, senior military staff as well as units may not be aware of their increased responsibilities because DOD has not incorporated information on the revised guidance and increased responsibilities in its training program. Further, while DOD has increased the number of personnel in Iraq devoted to providing contract oversight and management over private security contracts it is not clear based on our current and past work whether DOD can sustain the increased number of contract oversight and management personnel it has sent to Iraq since late 2007. In addition, the State Department has implemented 11 of the 18 recommendations made by a panel appointed by the Secretary of State to review the agency’s oversight of PSCs in Iraq. Among the recommendations implemented or being implemented are recommendations to increase the number of agents in Iraq to provide oversight over its PSC contractors, install audio and video recording equipment in security vehicles, and a recommendation to place a diplomatic security agent in each PSC motorcade. Prior to the incident in Baghdad in September 2007, the U.S. military lacked a single structure for managing its PSCs in Iraq. In November 2007, MNF-I, established a new organization, the Armed Contractor Oversight Division, to serve as MNF-I’s overall point of contact for policy issues relating to PSCs hired by DOD as well as to provide broad oversight over these contractors. According to MNF-I officials, the office’s goals include (1) working to reduce the number of incidents of PSCs discharging weapons or behaving in a manner that undermines the credibility of U.S. efforts; (2) developing a mechanism for holding PSCs accountable for their actions; (3) reducing the time that elapses between the occurrence of an incident and the reporting of that incident; and (4) minimizing the impact of an incident on the credibility of U.S. efforts in Iraq. The office is currently staffed with 7 full time employees comprised of 3 military personnel and 4 contractors. Figure 2 depicts the Armed Contractor Oversight Division’s organizational structure and the responsibilities of each staff member. One of the key efforts of the Armed Contractor Oversight Division is to monitor, review, and report all PSC incidents. These incidents include those involving injuries; deaths; negative reports in the media; weapons discharges; complaints from U.S. military commanders, local Iraqi citizens or the government of Iraq; and other allegations of PSC misconduct. PSCs are required to report these incidents in writing to the MNC-I CONOC. The office then reviews each incident report to determine whether the incident requires additional investigation. After an investigation is completed by the appropriate unit commander, the Armed Contractor Oversight Division tracks corrective or disciplinary actions initiated by the commander or the PSC. The Armed Contractor Oversight Division also conducts a trend analysis of incident reporting data. According to officials, since the office began oversight over PSCs in October 2007, weapons discharges by PSCs have decreased approximately 60 percent. Figure 3 depicts how the Armed Contractor Oversight Division monitors and reports PSC incidents. According to MNF-I officials, prior to December 2007 there were between 40 and 50 separate fragmentary orders relating to regulations applicable to PSCs in Iraq. As such, contracting officers as well as military commanders rotating into Iraq may not have been aware of all of the regulations covering PSCs. In December 2007, MNF-I issued Fragmentary Order 07- 428, to consolidate the previous fragmentary orders and establish authorities, responsibilities and coordination requirements for MNC-I to provide oversight for all armed DOD contractors and civilians in Iraq including PSCs. The establishment of the consolidating fragmentary order creates a single source for CENTCOM mandated orders, regulations and mandatory contract clauses relating to requirements, procedures, and responsibilities for control, coordination, management, and oversight of PSCs in Iraq. Specifically, the order addresses PSC requirements including arming procedures and responsibilities, rules for the use of force and mandates strengthened serious incident reporting procedures and responsibilities. For example, under the new order when a PSC observes, suspects, or participates in a serious incident such as a weapons discharge, PSCs are required to submit an immediate incident report at the earliest opportunity via the most secure means available to MNC-I and then submit an initial written report of the incident not later than 4 hours after the incident in contrast to the previous 48 hour reporting requirement. The order requires the initial report to contain a highlighted version of the incident, including critical information such as who was involved and when and where the incident occurred. PSCs are required to file a final report with 96 hours of the incident. Additionally, the fragmentary order increases the oversight responsibilities for military units by requiring the military to investigate serious incidents involving a DOD PSC. Previous orders only directed the military to investigate incidents related to contractors firing weapons. According to the December 2007 order, the military unit that receives the contracted security services is required to conduct a preliminary inquiry if contractors are involved in a serious incident. The order also stipulates that at a minimum, a commander’s inquiry will be conducted and documented. Previously, there was no requirement that commanders’ investigations be documented.