Since 1865, the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) has investigated counterfeiting, and since 1901, at the request of congressional leadership, the Service has provided full-time presidential protection. Congress has increased its oversight of the USSS due to concern about terrorism threats, several security breaches, and misconduct of USSS personnel. Recent incidents include abuse of alcohol, and security breaches of the White House grounds and presidential protection. This series of incidents has tarnished the image many have of the USSS and may have potentially affected its operations. For example, on September 19, 2014, a person gained unauthorized entrance into the White House after climbing the fence. On September 30, 2014, following a House Oversight and Government Reform Committee hearing on the USSS, which addressed this breach and previous incidents it became public that on September 16, 2014, a private security contractor at a federal facility, while armed, was allowed to share an elevator with the President during a site visit, in violation of USSS security protocols. Finally, on March 4, 2015, it was reported that two senior USSS special agents, including one who was responsible for all aspects of White House security, disrupted the scene of an investigation of a suspicious package during an elevated security condition at the White House complex. It was further alleged that these two agents were under the influence of alcohol. The USSS is not the only federal law enforcement entity that has been identified with having personnel violating ethics or participating in professional and personal misconduct. For example, in April 2015, the House Judiciary Committee conducted a hearing on "Analyzing Misconduct in Federal Law Enforcement," and focused on misconduct by federal Drug Enforcement Agency personnel. It should be noted, however, that USSS security breaches and ethical violations may have greater consequences, particularly concerning presidential protection. This report provides a brief overview of the USSS's missions and structure, as currently constituted, and explores enacted and proposed changes and reforms stemming from the recent series of incidents embarrassing to the USSS and affecting its mission. To put the issues surrounding the USSS in context, one needs to first understand the two concurrent USSS missions. The USSS has two missions that are integrated and executed concurrently, criminal investigations and protection. Criminal investigation activities encompass financial crimes, identity theft, counterfeiting, computer fraud, and computer-based attacks on the nation's financial, banking, and telecommunications infrastructure, among other areas. The protection mission, however, is the more prominent, covering the President, Vice President, their families, and candidates for those offices. The protection mission also includes the securing of the White House and the Vice President's official residence, and the President's and Vice President's personal residences, through the Service's Uniformed Division. Protective duties also extend to foreign missions in the District of Columbia and to designated individuals, such as the DHS Secretary and visiting foreign dignitaries. The USSS is structured and staffed, as discussed in the next section, to execute these concurrent missions. Additionally, the USSS is the lead federal agency responsible for coordinating, planning, exercising, and implementing security for National Special Security Events (NSSE). NSSEs are major federal government or public events that are considered to be nationally significant; these events include presidential inaugurations, presidential nominating conventions, some major sporting events, and major international meetings. The USSS is structured and staffed not only to execute its concurrent criminal investigations and protection missions, but also to support the Service's management and administration with internal entities and offices. Current staffing levels for each major USSS component are identified in this report. In general, the USSS is composed of two major divisions, one that deals with the Service's administrative functions, led by a Chief Operating Officer. The other, led by a Deputy Director, is the entity responsible for the criminal investigation and protection missions and their support organizations. The organization chart below depicts the current organization of the USSS (as of May 17, 2015; USSS has not provided a more recent organization chart). See Appendix A for a brief description of USSS components, and Appendix B for a map of USSS field offices. USSS personnel are comprised of special agents; Uniformed Division law enforcement officers; and Administrative, Professional, and Technical (APT) positions. Special agents are assigned to protection and criminal investigations, Uniformed Division officers conduct protective actions only, and APTs support both missions. Figure 1 above displays the organization of staff and Table 1 provides staffing numbers of major USSS components. There are personnel who conduct both protection and criminal investigations due to the overlap and concurrent missions of the USSS. Specifically, USSS special agents assigned to criminal investigations field offices conduct protection mission activities such as investigating individuals who may be a threat to a USSS protectee, and providing additional protective personnel when a protectee travels to an area with a USSS criminal investigations field office. The USSS states that special agents assigned to criminal investigations conduct the following activities—and the approximate percentage of special agent work associated with these activities as: Protection—32% Protective Intelligence—6% Counterfeiting Investigations—9% Cyber-crime Investigations—10% Financial Crime Investigations—18% Other—25%. One of the facts of the post-9/11 world is the awareness that security is not perfect. There are no infinite security resources; there are no guarantees of complete protection. Presidential protection has been a full-time mission of the USSS since 1901, and there have been seven assaults on Presidents since then. One assault resulted in the death of President John F. Kennedy. USSS protection of Presidents, and others, is more than physical guarding; it also includes securing facilities and locations where USSS protectees are located, and advance work such as liaison with state and local law enforcement. These locations include the White House complex, where there have been approximately 78 "fence jumpers" since 1991. One security violation was on September 19, 2014, when a person gained unauthorized entrance to not only the White House complex grounds, but into the White House itself. Following congressional inquiry into this security breach, the USSS revealed that on September 16, 2014, a private security contractor at a federal facility, while armed, was allowed to share an elevator with the President during a site visit, in violation of USSS security protocols. Along with these security breaches USSS personnel have been accused of ethical violations. For example, on March 4, 2015, it was reported that two senior USSS special agents, including one who was responsible for all aspects of White House security, disrupted the scene of an investigation of a suspicious package during an elevated security condition at the White House complex. It was further alleged that these two agents were under the influence of alcohol. In December 2014 an executive panel issued a report on the USSS protective mission. This report was a response to President Obama's Administration, the DHS Secretary, and the USSS to review potential issues associated with White House complex security. The report recommended the following: Training and Personnel Provide a true "Fourth Shift" for training the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Protective Divisions, so that they spend two weeks out of every eight in training, and ensure that Uniformed Division officers are in training for no less than 10% of their time. Implement integrated training focused on ensuring that all teams at the White House know their roles in responding to specific threats. Train in conditions that replicate the physical environment in which they will operate. Increase the Uniformed Division, as quickly as can be appropriately managed, by an initial 200 positions, and the Presidential Protective Division by 85 positions. Perform additional analyses and, likely, further increases as necessary. Reform and professionalize recruiting, hiring, promotion, and rotation processes to put the most talented, capable individuals in place as efficiently as possible. Technology, Perimeter Security, and Operations Ensure that the Office of Technical Development and Mission Support proactively reviews and refreshes the Service's technological footprint. The Service should receive dedicated funds for technology, both within its own budget and within DHS Science and Technology's budget, to accomplish these tasks. Replace the outer fence that surrounds the 18 acres of the White House complex to give USSS personnel more time to react to intrusions. Leadership Clearly communicate agency priorities, give effect to those priorities through its actions, and align its operations with its priorities. Promote specialized expertise in its budget, workforce, and technology functions. Present a zero-based or mission-based budget that will provide sufficient resources to accomplish its mission, beginning immediately by working within DHS to adopt a workforce staffing model. Create more opportunities for officers and agents to provide input on their mission and train its mid- and lower-level managers to encourage, value and respond to such feedback. Lead the federal protective force community. Receive periodic, outside assessments of the threats to and strategies for protecting the White House complex. Resume participation in international fora with comparable protective services of friendly nations. Give leadership's priorities and reforms the organization's sustained attention and hold the agency accountable through to their completion. Implement a disciplinary system in a consistent manner that demonstrates zero tolerance for failures that are incompatible with its zero-failure mission. Hold forces accountable for performance by using front-line supervisors to constantly test readiness. The next director of the Secret Service should be a strong leader from outside the agency who has protective, law enforcement, or military background and who can drive cultural change in the organization and move the Secret Service forward into a new era. Establish a leadership development system that identifies and trains the agency's future managers and leaders. According to USSS Office of Governmental and Public Affairs personnel, the Service addressed a number of these recommendations and plans to further implement other recommendations when able.