Ports play an important role in the nation’s economy and security. Ports are used to import and export cargo worth hundreds of billions of dollars; generating jobs, both directly and indirectly, for Americans and our trading partners. Ports, which include inland waterways, are used to move cargo containers, and bulk agricultural, mineral, petroleum, and paper products. Ports are also important to national security by hosting naval bases and vessels and facilitating the movement of military equipment and supplying troops deployed overseas. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, the nation’s 361 seaports have been increasingly viewed as potential targets for future terrorist attacks. Ports are vulnerable because they are sprawling, interwoven with complex transportation networks, close to crowded metropolitan areas, and easily accessible. Ports contain a number of specific facilities that could be targeted by terrorists, including military vessels and bases, cruise ships, passenger ferries, terminals, dams and locks, factories, office buildings, power plants, refineries, sports complexes, and other critical infrastructure. The responsibility for protecting ports from a terrorist attack is a shared responsibility that crosses jurisdictional boundaries, with federal, state, and local organizations involved. For example, at the federal level, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has overall homeland security responsibility, and the Coast Guard, an agency of the department, has lead responsibility for maritime security. Port authorities provide protection through designated port police forces, private security companies, and coordination with local law enforcement agencies. Private sector stakeholders play a major role in identifying and addressing the vulnerabilities in and around their facilities, which may include oil refineries, cargo facilities, and other property adjacent to navigable waterways. Information sharing among federal, state, and local officials is central to port security activities. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 recognizes that the federal government relies on state and local personnel to help protect against terrorist attacks, and these officials need homeland security information to prevent and prepare for such attacks. Information sharing between federal officials and nonfederal officials can involve information collected by federal intelligence agencies. In order to gain access to classified information, state and local law enforcement officials generally need to apply for and receive approval to have a federal security clearance. As implemented by the Coast Guard, the primary criterion for granting access to classified information is an individual’s need to know, which is defined as the determination made by an authorized holder of classified information that a prospective recipient requires access to specific classified information in order to perform or assist in a lawful and authorized governmental function. To obtain a security clearance, an applicant must complete a detailed questionnaire that asks for information on all previous employment, residences, and foreign travel and contacts that reach back 7 years. After submitting the questionnaire, the applicant then undergoes a variety of screenings and checks. The Maritime Transportation Security Act, passed in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks and with the recognition that ports contain many potential security targets, provided for area maritime security committees—composed of federal, state, local, and industry members—to be established by the Coast Guard at ports across the country. A primary goal of these committees is to assist the local Captain of the Port—the senior Coast Guard officer who leads the committee—to develop a security plan—called an area maritime security plan—to address the vulnerabilities and risks in that port zone. The committees also serve as a link for communicating threats and disseminating security information to port stakeholders. As of June 2006, the Coast Guard organized 46 area maritime security committees, covering the nation’s 361 ports. Another approach at improving information sharing and port security operations involves interagency operational centers—command centers that bring together the intelligence and operational efforts of various federal and nonfederal participants. These centers are to provide intelligence information and real-time operational data from sensors, radars, and cameras at one location to federal and nonfederal participants 24 hours a day. These interagency operational centers represent an effort to improve awareness of incoming vessels, port facilities, and port operations. In general, these centers are jointly operated by federal and nonfederal law enforcement officials. The centers can have command and control capabilities that can be used to communicate information to vessels, aircraft, and other vehicles and stations involved in port security operations. While area maritime security committees and interagency operational centers are port-level organizations, they are supported by, and provide support to, a national-level intelligence infrastructure. National-level departments and agencies in the intelligence and law enforcement communities may offer information that ultimately could be useful to members of area maritime security committees or interagency operational centers at the port level. These intelligence and law enforcement agencies conduct maritime threat identification and dissemination efforts in support of tactical and operational maritime and port security efforts, but most have missions broader than maritime activities as well. In addition, some agencies also have regional or field offices involved in information gathering and sharing. Area maritime security committees have provided a structure to improve the timeliness, completeness, and usefulness of information sharing. A primary function served by the committees was to develop security plans for port areas—called area maritime security plans. The goal of these plans was to identify vulnerabilities to a terrorist attack in and around a port location and to develop strategies for protecting a wide range of facilities and infrastructure. In doing so, the committees established new procedures for sharing information by holding meetings on a regular basis, issuing electronic bulletins on suspicious activities around port facilities, and sharing key documents, including vulnerability assessments and the portwide security plan itself, according to committee participants. Also, participants noted that these committees allowed for both formal and informal stakeholder networking, which contributes to improvements in information sharing. Our continuing work on the Coast Guard and maritime security, while not specifically focused on information sharing, has continued to indicate that area maritime security committees are a useful tool for exchanging information. For example, we have done work at eight additional ports and found that stakeholders were still using the committees as a structured means to regularly share information about threat conditions and operational issues. In addition, Coast Guard personnel and port stakeholders are using the area maritime security committees to coordinate security and response training and exercises. Also, in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, Coast Guard officials shared information collaboratively through their area maritime security committees to determine when it was appropriate to close and then reopen a port for commerce. While the committees are required to follow the same guidance regarding their structure, purpose, and processes, each of the committees is allowed the flexibility to assemble and operate in a way that reflects the needs of its port area. Each port is unique in many ways, including the geographic area covered and the type of operations that take place there. These port- specific differences influence the number of members that participate, the types of state and local organizations that members represent, and the way in which information is shared. Information sharing at interagency operational centers represents a step toward further improving information sharing, according to participants at the centers we visited. They said maritime security committees have improved information sharing primarily through a planning process that identifies vulnerabilities and mitigation strategies, as well as through development of two-way communication mechanisms to share threat information on an as-needed basis. In contrast, interagency operational centers can provide a continuous flow of information about maritime activities and involve various agencies directly in operational decisions using this information. Radar, sensors, and cameras offer representations of vessels and facilities. Other data are available from intelligence sources and include data on vessels, cargo, and crew. Greater information sharing among participants at these centers has also enhanced operational collaboration, according to participants. Unlike the area maritime security committees, these centers are operational in nature—that is, they have a unified or joint command structure designed to receive information and act on it. At the centers we visited, representatives from the various agencies work side by side, each having access to databases and other sources of information from their respective agencies. Officials said such centers help leverage the resources and authorities of the respective agencies. For example, if the Coast Guard determines that a vessel should be boarded and inspected, other federal and nonfederal agencies might join in the boarding to assess the vessel or its cargo, crew, or passengers for violations relating to their areas of jurisdiction or responsibility. The types of information and the way information is shared vary at the centers we visited, depending on their purpose and mission, leadership and organization, membership, technology, and resources, according to officials at the centers. In our report of April 2005, we detailed three interagency operational centers at Charleston, South Carolina; Norfolk, Virginia; and San Diego, California. As of June 2006, the Coast Guard has two additional interagency command centers under construction in Jacksonville, Florida, and Seattle, Washington. Both are being established as Sector Command Centers—joint with the U.S. Navy—and are expected to be operational in 2006. Of the interagency centers we visited, the Charleston center had a port security purpose, so its missions were all security related. It was led by DOJ, and its membership included 4 federal agencies and 16 state and local agencies. The San Diego center had a more general purpose, so it had multiple missions to include not just port security, but search and rescue, environmental response, drug interdiction, and other law enforcement activities. It was led by the Coast Guard, and its membership included 2 federal agencies and 1 local agency. The Norfolk center had a port security purpose, but its mission was focused primarily on force protection for the Navy. It was led by the Coast Guard, and its membership included 2 federal agencies and no state or local agencies. As a result, the Charleston center shared information that focused on law enforcement and intelligence related to port security among a very broad group of federal, state, and local agency officials. The San Diego center shared information on a broader scope of activities (beyond security) among a smaller group of federal and local agency officials. The Norfolk center shared the most focused information (security information related to force protection) among two federal agencies. The centers also shared different information because of their technologies and resources.