The military services and defense agencies face three long-standing challenges with processing, exploiting, and disseminating ISR data. First, since 2002, DOD has rapidly increased its ability to collect ISR data in Iraq and Afghanistan; however, its capacity for processing, exploiting, and dissemination is limited and has not kept pace with the increase in collection platforms and combat air patrols. For example, the Air Force has substantially increased the number of combat air patrols that ISR collection platforms are performing in the U.S. Central Command theater of operations. Specifically, the number of combat air patrols flown by the Air Force’s Predator and Reaper unmanned aircraft systems has increased from 13 to 36 since 2007. Moreover, in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, DOD stated that it will continue to expand the Predator and Reaper combat air patrols to 65 by fiscal year 2015. This increase in data collection will also increase the burden on the Air Force’s ground processing system, which processes, exploits, and disseminates the ISR information collected by these platforms. Second, transmitting data from ISR collection platforms to ground stations where analysts process, exploit, and then disseminate intelligence to users requires high-capacity communications bandwidth. However, bandwidth can be limited in a theater of operations by the satellite and ground-based communication capacity. An insufficient amount of bandwidth affects the ability to send, receive, and download intelligence products that contain large amounts of data. For example, intelligence products derived from ISR geospatial data have high bandwidth requirements—the higher the resolution of the product, the longer the transmission time via a given bandwidth. DOD officials have acknowledged that limited bandwidth is a continual challenge in Iraq because of the warfighter’s reliance on geospatial data. GAO and others have reported that DOD continues to face a growing need for communications bandwidth in combat operations. Third, the military services and defense agencies are challenged by shortages in the numbers of analytical staff available to exploit all of the electronic signals and geospatial ISR information being collected, raising the risk that important information may not be analyzed and made available to commanders in a timely manner. For example, according to U.S. Central Command officials, the command exploits less than one-half of the electronic signals intercepts collected from the Predator. According to DOD officials, finding native speakers of the collected languages to successfully translate and exploit data collected in those foreign languages is difficult, and training language analysts takes time and is difficult to manage with the deployment schedule. In addition, language analysts who translate and exploit electronic signals intelligence data must qualify for security clearances that require rigorous background examinations. The National Security Agency has experienced difficulties in hiring language analysts who can obtain clearances and have the appropriate skill levels in both English and the language for translation. DOD has recognized the need to enhance its processing, exploitation, and dissemination capabilities and is developing and implementing initiatives to do so, but its initiatives are in the early stages of implementation and it is too soon to tell how effective they will be in addressing current challenges. For example, in the short term, DOD has placed its priority for processing, exploitation, and disseminating electronic signals intelligence on the information collected in Afghanistan because the Commander of U.S. Central Command has designated those missions as a high priority. In the long term, DOD has taken several actions intended to sustain, expand, and improve processing, exploitation, and dissemination capabilities. For example, DOD has studies, such as an ISR force-sizing study, under way which include examining how to improve the management of its processing, exploitation, and dissemination capabilities. However, DOD has not set dates for when all of these studies will be complete and it is too soon to know whether they will lead to the desired effect of increased support to the warfighter for current operations. The Air Force and the National Security Agency also have plans to increase analyst personnel in response to the increase in ISR collection. The Air Force, reacting to scheduled increases in Predator and Reaper combat air patrols, is planning to add personnel who process, exploit, and disseminate ISR data. The National Security Agency also has taken steps to address shortages in language analyst personnel. For example, to better target its hiring effort for language analysts the agency is using U.S. Census Bureau data to locate centers of populations that contain the language skills needed to translate and exploit the foreign languages that are collected. According to National Security Agency officials, these efforts have helped increase the number of language analysts available to process and exploit collected signals intelligence data. DOD is also working on developing technical solutions to improve processing, movement, and storage of data. For example, files from wide-area sensors have to be saved to a computer disk and flown back to the United States for exploitation and dissemination because current networks in the theater of operations cannot handle the large amounts of data these sensors collect. U.S. Joint Forces Command is currently designing and testing technology already in use by the commercial entertainment industry to improve storage, movement, and access to full motion video data from wide-area sensors. Although DOD has recognized the need for maximizing the efficiency and effectiveness of the information it collects and has been taking steps to increase information sharing across the defense intelligence community, progress has been uneven among the military services. DOD began plans for its Distributed Common Ground/Surface System (DCGS), an interoperable family of systems that will enable users to access shared ISR information, in 1998. DOD subsequently directed the military services to transition their service-unique intelligence data processing systems into DCGS and each of the military services is at a different stage. As shown in table 1, the Air Force and the Navy each plan to have a fully functional version of DCGS by the end of fiscal years 2010 and 2013, respectively, and the Army does not expect to have a fully functional system until 2016. The Marine Corps has not yet established a completion date for the full operational capability of its DCGS. DOD has developed a system of standards and protocols, called the DCGS Integration Backbone (DIB), which serves as the foundation for interoperability between each of the four military services’ DCGS programs. However, the services have not completed the process of prioritizing and tagging the data they want to share in accordance with these standards and protocols or developed timelines to do so. As a result, the services are not sharing all of their collected ISR data. Although the Air Force has the capability to share some Air Force- generated ISR information with other DOD users through the DIB standards and protocols, it has not developed timelines or taken steps to prioritize the types of additional data that should be shared with the defense intelligence community. The Army also has the capability to share some of its intelligence data with other users, but has experienced difficulties tagging all of its data because of its large inventory of legacy ISR systems. Moreover, the Army has not established timelines for sharing data. The Navy and Marine Corps are not currently tagging all of the ISR data they intend to share and have neither developed timelines nor taken steps to prioritize the types of data that should be shared with the defense intelligence community. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence has responsibility for ensuring implementation of DOD intelligence policy, including monitoring the services’ progress toward interoperability. Although the services are responsible for managing their DCGS programs and conforming to information-sharing standards, according to Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and military service officials, DOD has not developed overarching guidance, such as a concept of operations that provides needed direction and priorities for sharing intelligence information within the defense intelligence community. Without this overarching guidance, the services lack direction to set their own goals and objectives for prioritizing and sharing ISR information and therefore have not developed service-specific implementation plans that describe the prioritization and types of ISR data they intend to share with the defense intelligence community. For example, a concept of operations could provide direction to the military services and defense agencies to select data to prioritize for meta-data tagging and sharing, such as electronic signals intelligence data. As a result, it is not clear how much of the collected data are not being shared. Until DOD identifies what types of ISR information should be shared and assigns priorities for sharing data, it is unclear whether mission-critical information will be available to the warfighter. In addition, the inability of users to fully access existing information in a timely manner is a contributing factor to the increasing demand for additional ISR collection assets. Therefore, in our January 2010 report, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense take the following two actions: Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, to develop guidance, such as a concept of operations that provides overarching direction and priorities for sharing intelligence information across the defense intelligence community. Direct the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to develop service-specific implementation plans, consistent with the concept of operations, which set timelines and outline the prioritization and types of ISR data they will share with the defense intelligence community through the DIB. In written comments on our report, DOD agreed with our recommendations overall and stated that there is guidance either issued or in development to address our recommendations. However, this guidance does not fully address the intent of our recommendations, and we believe additional guidance is necessary. DOD officials cite ISR as vital to mission success in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Congress has responded by funding additional ISR assets. However, until all participants in the defense enterprise successfully share ISR information, inefficiencies will hamper the effectiveness of efforts to support the warfighter, and ISR data collection efforts may be unnecessarily duplicative.