Shortly after combat operations began pursuant to the congressional authorization to use military force in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President Bush issued a Military Order (M.O.) authorizing trial by military commission of non-citizens suspected of terrorist acts or associations who were to be designated as subject to the M.O. President Bush subsequently determined that 20 of the detainees at the U.S. Naval Station in Guantánamo Bay held in connection with the conflict were subject to the M.O., and 10 were eventually charged for trial before military commissions. The M.O. specified that persons subject to it would have no recourse to the U.S. court system to appeal a verdict or obtain any other sort of relief, but the Supreme Court essentially invalidated that provision in its 2004 opinion, Rasul v. Bush . Military commissions are courts usually set up by military commanders in the field to try persons accused of certain offenses during war. They may also try persons for ordinary crimes in cases of martial law or military occupation, where regular civil courts are not able to function. Past military commissions trying enemy belligerents for war crimes directly applied the international law of war, without recourse to domestic criminal statutes, unless such statutes were declaratory of international law. Historically, military commissions have applied the same set of procedural rules that applied in courts-martial. By statute, military commissions have long been available to try "offenders or offenses designated by statute or the law of war." For the most part, military commissions have been employed where U.S. armed forces have established a military government or martial law, as in the war with Mexico, the Civil War, the Philippine Insurrection, and in occupied Germany and Japan after World War II. President Bush's Military Order establishing military commissions to try suspected terrorists was the focus of intense debate both at home and abroad. Critics argued that the tribunals could violate any rights the accused may have under the Constitution as well as their rights under international law, thereby undercutting the legitimacy of any verdicts rendered by the tribunals. The Bush Administration established rules prescribing detailed procedural safeguards for the tribunals. These rules were praised as a significant improvement over what might have been permitted under the language of the M.O., but some continued to argue that the enhancements did not go far enough. Critics also noted that the rules did not address the issue of indefinite detention without charge, as appeared to be possible under the original M.O., or that the Department of Defense (DOD) may continue to detain persons who have been cleared by a military commission. The Pentagon reportedly stated that its Inspector General (IG) looked into allegations, made by military lawyers assigned as prosecutors to the military commissions, that the proceedings were rigged to obtain convictions, but the IG did not substantiate the charges. Congress took no action with respect to military commissions until after the Supreme Court's Rasul decision. At the end of December 2005, Congress enacted the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA). The DTA did not authorize military commissions, but amended title 28, U.S. Code to revoke all judicial jurisdiction over habeas claims by persons detained as "enemy combatants," and it created jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to hear appeals of final decisions of military commissions. The Supreme Court, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld , invalidated the military commission system established by presidential order, holding that although Congress had in general authorized the use of military commissions, such commissions were required to follow procedural rules as similar as possible to courts-martial proceedings, as required by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). In response, Congress promptly passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA) to authorize military commissions and establish procedural rules that are modeled after, but depart from in some significant ways, the UCMJ. The Department of Defense issued regulations for the conduct of military commissions pursuant to the MCA. One detainee, David Matthew Hicks of Australia, was convicted of material support to terrorism pursuant to a plea agreement in 2007. In 2008, Salim Hamdan was found guilty of one count of providing material support for terrorism and sentenced to 66 months' imprisonment, but credited with five years' time served. Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul of Yemen was found guilty of multiple counts of conspiracy and solicitation to commit certain war crimes and of providing material support for terrorism in connection with his role as al Qaeda's "propaganda chief." He refused representation and boycotted most of his trial, and was subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment. On January 22, 2009, President Barack Obama issued an Executive Order requiring that the Guantanamo detention facility be closed no later than a year from the date of the Order. The Order requires specified officials to review all Guantanamo detentions to assess whether the detainee should continue to be held by the United States, transferred or released to another country, or be prosecuted by the United States for criminal offenses. During the review period, the Secretary of Defense is required to take steps to ensure that all proceedings before military commissions and the United States Court of Military Commission Review are halted, although some pretrial proceedings have continued to take place. Fifteen detainees currently stand charged under the MCA, while charges were dismissed without prejudice against five other detainees, one of whom has been ordered released by a federal judge. One case was moved to a federal district court. In May, 2009, the Obama Administration announced that it was considering restarting the military commission system with some changes to the procedural rules. The Department of Defense informed Congress about modifications to the Manual for Military Commissions, to take effect July 14, 2009. President Obama's Detention Policy Task Force issued a preliminary report July 20, 2009, reaffirming that the White House considers military commissions to be an appropriate forum for trying some cases involving suspected violations of the laws of the war, although federal criminal court would be the preferred forum for trials of detainees. The disposition of each case referred is to be assigned to a team comprised of DOJ and DOD personnel, including prosecutors from the Office of Military Commissions. Appended to the report was a set of criteria to govern the disposition of cases involving Guantanamo detainees. This protocol identifies three broad categories of factors to be taken into consideration: Strength of interest, namely, the nature and gravity of offenses or underlying conduct; identity of victims; location of offense; location and context in which individual was apprehended; and the conduct of the investigation. Efficiency, namely, protection of intelligence source and methods; venue; number of defendants; foreign policy concerns; legal or evidentiary problems; efficiency and resource concerns. Other prosecution considerations, namely, the extent to which the forum and offenses that can be tried there permit a full presentation of the wrongful conduct, and the available sentence upon conviction. Federal prosecutors are to evaluate their cases under "traditional principles of federal prosecution." The Military Commissions Act of 2006 ("MCA") grants the Secretary of Defense express authority to convene military commissions to prosecute those fitting the definition under the MCA of "alien unlawful enemy combatants." The Secretary delegated the authority to a specially appointed "convening authority," who has responsibility for accepting or rejecting charges referred by the prosecution team, convening military commissions for trials, detailing military commission members and other personnel, approving requests from trial counsel to communicate with the media, approving requests for expert witnesses, approving plea agreements, carrying out post-trial reviews and forwarding cases for review, along with other duties spelled out in the MCA or in DOD's Regulation for Trial by Military Commission. The MCA eliminates the requirement for military commissions to conform to either of the two uniformity requirements in article 36, UCMJ, which President Bush's military commissions were held in Hamdan to violate. Instead, it establishes chapter 47A in title 10, U.S. Code and excepts military commissions under this chapter from the requirements in article 36. It provides that the UCMJ "does not, by its terms, apply to trial by military commissions except as specifically provided in this chapter." While declaring that the enacted chapter is "based upon the procedures for trial by general courts-martial under [the UCMJ]," it establishes that "[t]he judicial construction and application of [the UCMJ] are not binding on military commissions established under this chapter." It expressly exempts these military commission from UCMJ articles 10 (speedy trial), 31 (self-incrimination warnings) and 32 (pretrial investigations), and amends articles 21, 28, 48, 50(a), 104, and 106 of the UCMJ to except military commissions under chapter 47A. Other provisions of the UCMJ are to apply to trial by military commissions under chapter 47A only to the extent provided therein. The MCA establishes jurisdiction for military commissions somewhat more narrowly than that asserted in President Bush's M.O. The M.O. was initially criticized by some as overly broad in its assertion of jurisdiction, because it could be interpreted to cover non-citizens who had no connection with Al Qaeda or the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as well as offenders or offenses not triable by military commission pursuant to statute or the law of war. A person designated by the President as subject to the M.O. was amenable to detention and possible trial by military tribunal for violations of the law of war and "other applicable law." The MCA largely validated the President's jurisdictional scheme for military commissions.