Joint STARS is a multiservice, multimode radar system that is to provide the capability to locate, track, and classify wheeled and track vehicles beyond ground line of sight, during day and night, under most weather conditions. It is to provide Army Corps and Division commanders an “electronic high-ground” from which to observe enemy forces across the forward line of their own troops into an enemy’s first and second echelons. The Joint STARS radar is mounted on an Air Force E-8 aircraft, a Boeing 707 variant. It is to provide real-time information simultaneously to operators in the aircraft and operators in Army GSMs. These GSMs are to have the ability to supplement this radar data with unmanned aerial vehicle imagery and electronic intelligence reports. Through fiscal year 2001, the total cost of the Army’s Joint STARS development and acquisition is estimated at $1.4 billion. Since the Joint STARS program inception, four versions of GSMs have been developed prior to the CGS. They are the Limited Procurement Urgent, the Interim GSM, the Medium GSM, and the Light GSM. Descriptions of the various GSMs are provided in appendix I. Production quantities by fiscal year and GSM variant are detailed in table 1. The Army recently issued a solicitation for the CGS system and selected a contractor to produce the system. It awarded an 8-year production contract on December 14, 1995, and made a fiscal year 1996 commitment to the production of 18 systems, the maximum production allowed by the solicitation. The CGS system is to provide the same functionality as the Light GSM with an initial enhancement of the integration of secondary imagery data, and planned additional enhancements provided by post-award contract modifications. The CGS acquisition strategy provides for 2 years of LRIP, during which the Army anticipated buying 22 CGS systems at an estimated cost of about $138 million, though it received approval from DOD to procure up to an additional 16 CGS systems to accommodate other service and allied requirements. The Army’s first year commitment to 18 systems and current plan to acquire 16 systems in the second year raises the estimated 2-year LRIP cost to over $153 million. Regarding program cost, DOD stated that the CGS LRIP quantity includes not only the number needed for testing purposes, but considers production rate efficiencies and cost factors. It believes that producing only four prior to test would require the stop and restart of production, resulting in loss of skilled people, inefficient use of contractor resources, and higher costs. The CGS LRIP quantity does not, however, reflect consideration of production rate efficiencies and cost factors because under the CGS contract’s pricing structure, the planned second LRIP year acquisitions can be purchased in later years at lower cost. In sum, under the CGS contract, the Army can save millions of dollars by lowering future CGS LRIP acquisitions to the minimum quantity necessary to maintain the contract and then contracting for those systems in the post-LRIP years. The Light GSM and the Medium GSM were scheduled to be operationally tested during a Joint STARS multiservice OT&E. That test was delayed and then altered because of the deployment of Joint STARS assets to the European theater to support Bosnian operations. The Army now plans to evaluate the Medium and Light GSMs during that deployment and follow-on tests, if needed. It also plans to conduct an initial OT&E of the CGS system in the first quarter of fiscal year 1998. The degree and length of that initial OT&E will depend on how similar the CGS system is to its predecessors, which will be a function of the approach that the CGS contractor follows. The CGS solicitation provided functional specifications such that the proposals received may or may not represent significant hardware and software differences from already procured GSMs. The degree of technological difference between the CGS system and its predecessor systems, the Light GSM and Medium GSM, depends on the approach taken by the contractor. That difference will, in turn, influence the degree to which the Light and Medium GSM’s performance during any OT&E can and should be relied upon as an indicator of the CGS’s maturity to continue production. Furthermore, the more similar the CGS system is to its predecessors, the less extensive its initial OT&E will need to be. The Army began procuring CGS systems prior to the completion of an OT&E by any GSM. However, the Army did not perform any risk analyses demonstrating that there was (1) an urgent need for the added capabilities of the CGS system or (2) any significant benefit to be derived from its accelerated procurement. According to DOD, the revised CGS development and production schedule fields ground stations in synch with E-8C aircraft deliveries. Under the prior development schedule, the Army planned to continue to buy pre-CGS model ground stations—presumably also in synch with E-8C aircraft deliveries. Furthermore, an Army official in the program executive office that has oversight of the Army’s Joint STARS program stated that the Air Force is behind in its E-8C delivery schedule and that, as a result, GSM acquisition is currently scheduled ahead of aircraft fieldings. Over the years, we have reported on numerous instances in which production of both major and nonmajor systems were optimistically permitted to begin under LRIP and continue based on factors other than the systems’ technical maturity. In our November 1994 report on the use of LRIP in the acquisition process, we detailed a number of examples of systems that entered LRIP before operational tests were conducted and that later experienced significant problems. For example, a year into the LRIP of the Navy T-45A aircraft, OT&E demonstrated that the T-45A was not effective in a carrier environment and was not operationally suitable because of safety deficiencies. Subsequent major design changes included a new engine, new wings, and a modified rudder. DOD believes that, unlike the Navy T-45A aircraft, the CGS is not a new, immature system. It has stated that the CGS system uses 100 percent of the Light GSM mechanical design, rack structure, power distribution, lighting, ventilation, and air conditioning. It has also stated that the Light GSM software baseline is the CGS baseline and that the CGS system represents the Light GSM functional baseline with the addition of product improvements. However, the CGS contractor may make configuration changes that could represent significant hardware and software differences from already procured GSMs. Furthermore, DOD’s position is also contradicted by the 2-year delay of the GSM full-rate production decision to follow a CGS OT&E and by the Joint STARS integrated product team’s call for an independent assessment of the CGS’s testing risk, given the nature and extent of the configuration changes that the selected contractor may make. The risks of systems starting production before operational tests are conducted are numerous. They include reliability that is significantly less than expectations, systems that cannot meet current specifications, systems that are never fielded and/or retired after fielding because of poor performance, and systems that require significant and expensive post-fielding repairs for faults identified during OT&E. While there is an operational need for Joint STARS, and despite the desire of operational commanders to have more capable systems as soon as possible, the fact remains that the Army has not adequately justified the urgency or benefits to be derived from accelerated fielding of the CGS in 1998 versus the originally planned fielding in fiscal year 2002. The Army’s CGS acquisition strategy seems to ignore the fact that to date the GSMs have undergone limited testing and demonstrated disappointing results in those tests. That acquisition strategy allowed the Army to begin procuring CGS systems without demonstrating resolution of issues raised as a result of prior tests and will allow it to continue procuring systems without demonstrating resolution of those issues. In December 1991, a decision was made that the Medium GSM would undergo a limited user test rather than a traditional initial OT&E. The absence of important functionality, including an unmanned aerial vehicle interface, a production representative data link, Defense Mapping Agency electronic map databases, and trained military operators, prompted this decision. Based on the results of this test, which occurred in early 1993, the Army Operational Test and Evaluation Command provided an overall assessment of the Medium GSM’s performance. It stated that the Medium GSM “consistently demonstrated potential to be operationally effective” and that the Medium GSM “demonstrated potential to be operationally suitable” (emphasis added). However, this was not a finding that the Medium GSM was operationally effective or suitable. The Command also noted that the “current software lacks robustness and reliability, and limits mission performance.” One of the Command’s recommendations was that prior to LRIP fielding, the Medium GSM “must successfully complete an independently evaluated operational demonstration including simultaneous employment of all software, interface, and tactics, techniques, and procedures corrections.” The Medium GSM has yet to successfully complete an independently evaluated operational test. Its initial OT&E was to be the multiservice OT&E. The Medium GSM follow-on system, the Light GSM, was also to participate in the multiservice OT&E. Like the Medium GSM, the Light GSM has yet to complete an OT&E. The Light GSM has, however, undergone other tests, including a Force Development Test and Evaluation (FDT&E) in September 1994; reliability confidence testing from October through December 1994; and a follow-on demonstration at Eglin Air Force Base in January 1995.