The term “ombudsman” originated in Sweden and has generally come to mean an impartial official who receives complaints and questions, collects relevant information through an investigation or inquiry, and works toward the resolution of the particular issues brought to his attention. Ombudsmen may make recommendations for the resolution of an individual complaint or improvements related to more systemic problems. Depending on their jurisdiction, ombudsmen may protect those who work within an organization or those who are affected by the organization’s actions. An ombudsman who handles concerns and inquiries from the public, such as EPA’s national hazardous waste ombudsman, is often referred to as an “external” ombudsman. In contrast, internal or “workplace” ombudsmen provide an alternative to more formal processes to deal with conflicts and other issues that arise in the workplace. While there are no federal requirements or standards specific to the operation of ombudsman offices, the Administrative Conference of the United States recommended in 1990 that the President and the Congress support federal agency initiatives to create and fund an external ombudsman in agencies with significant interaction with the public. In addition, several professional organizations have published or drafted relevant standards of practice for ombudsmen. Among these organizations are the Ombudsman Committee of the ABA, The Ombudsman Association, and the U.S. Ombudsman Association. In July 2000, ABA’s Ombudsman Committee released a draft of its recommended Standards for the Establishment and Operation of Ombudsman Offices, which are intended to expand on a 1969 ABA resolution that identified essential characteristics of ombudsmen. An article published by the U.S. Ombudsman Association, “Essential Characteristics of a Classical Ombudsman,” elaborates on these factors and explains why they are necessary. Similarly, The Ombudsman Association has published a generic position description for ombudsmen, including critical skills and characteristics, and the U.S. Ombudsman Association has drafted a model ombudsman act appropriate for state governments. Both the recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States and the standards of practice adopted by ombudsman associations incorporate the core principles of independence, impartiality, and confidentiality. The ABA’s recommended standards define these characteristics as follows: Independence—An ombudsman must be and appear to be free from interference in the legitimate performance of duties and independent from control, limitation, or penalty by an officer of the appointing entity or a person who may be the subject of a complaint or inquiry. Impartiality—An ombudsman must conduct inquiries and investigations in an impartial manner, free from initial bias and conflicts of interest. Confidentiality—An ombudsman must not disclose and must not be required to disclose any information provided in confidence, except to address an imminent risk of serious harm. Records pertaining to a complaint, inquiry, or investigation must be confidential and not subject to disclosure outside the ombudsman’s office. In addition to the core principles, some associations also stress the need for accountability and a credible review process. Accountability is generally defined in terms of the publication of periodic reports that summarize the ombudsman’s findings and activities. Having a credible review process generally entails having the authority and the means, such as access to agency officials and records, to conduct an effective investigation. The role of EPA’s national ombudsman has evolved since it was first established in the 1984 amendments to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. In 1991, EPA expanded the ombudsman’s jurisdiction to encompass all of the hazardous waste programs managed by OSWER, with the most significant addition being the Superfund program. EPA appointed Superfund ombudsmen in each of its 10 regional offices in 1996, when the agency adopted a number of administrative reforms in the Superfund program. The nature of the national ombudsman’s work has also changed; although the emphasis was initially on responding to informational inquiries, he has taken on more detailed investigations in recent years. In January 2001, the ombudsman temporarily suspended his ongoing investigations over disagreements with OSWER management about staffing in the ombudsman’s office. However, we did not address the issue in this report because investigation of internal personnel disputes was beyond the scope of our work. Important characteristics of EPA’s national hazardous waste ombudsman differ from the professional standards of practice adopted by various ombudsman associations. While EPA is not required to comply with such standards—and, in some instances, faces legal or practical constraints to doing so—the standards can serve as a guideline for implementing the core principles of an effective ombudsman: independence, impartiality, and confidentiality. Contrary to these standards, EPA’s national ombudsman is not independent of the organizational unit whose decisions he is responsible for investigating. Moreover, this lack of independence raises questions about the ombudsman’s impartiality and hence his ability to conduct a credible investigation. EPA’s national ombudsman also falls short of existing standards in other areas, such as accountability. When we examined the operations of ombudsmen at other federal agencies, we found that these agencies have found ways to increase their ombudsmen’s ability to adhere to professional standards of practice. EPA is considering several changes to the operations of the national ombudsman, but these changes do not address existing limitations on the ombudsman’s independence and, in some instances, they impose additional constraints. Existing professional standards contain a variety of criteria by which an ombudsman’s independence can be assessed, but in most instances, the underlying theme is that an ombudsman should have both actual and apparent independence from persons who may be the subject of a complaint or inquiry. According to ABA guidelines, for example, a key indicator of independence is whether anyone subject to the ombudsman’s jurisdiction can (1) control or limit the ombudsman’s performance of assigned duties, (2) eliminate the office, (3) remove the ombudsman for other than cause, or (4) reduce the office’s budget or resources for retaliatory purposes. Other factors identified in the ABA guidelines on independence include a budget funded at a level sufficient to carry out the ombudsman’s responsibilities; the ability to spend funds independent of any approving authority; and the power to appoint, supervise, and remove staff. The Ombudsman Association’s standards of practice define independence as functioning independent of line management and advocate that the ombudsman report to the highest authority in the organization. As currently constituted, some aspects of EPA’s national hazardous waste ombudsman are not consistent with existing criteria for independence. In terms of organizational structure, the national ombudsman is located within OSWER, the organizational unit whose decisions the ombudsman is responsible for investigating. In addition, the ombudsman reports to and receives performance evaluations from one of OSWER’s managers. Thus, OSWER management is in a position to control or limit the ombudsman’s performance of assigned duties. OSWER managers told us that the organizational structure was established as a matter of convenience and simply reflects the fact that the ombudsman’s jurisdiction encompasses the hazardous waste programs within the office’s purview. The officials also said that at the time the structure was established, the ombudsman’s workload consisted primarily of responding to informational inquiries rather than conducting investigations. Although OSWER managers acknowledge concerns about the appearance of constraints on the ombudsman’s independence, they point out that most decisions about specific hazardous waste sites or facilities are made at the regional office level. The officials believe that OSWER’s top management is sufficiently removed from site-specific decisions to mitigate such concerns. According to the ombudsman, however, decisions on the most significant or costly sites are the most likely to be elevated to OSWER’s management level at EPA headquarters. He also believes that locating the ombudsman’s office outside of OSWER would increase his independence and lessen the likelihood that he would be reporting to someone who was once responsible for making decisions on specific hazardous waste sites or facilities. On a functional basis, OSWER’s control over the ombudsman’s budget and staff resources also affects the ombudsman’s independence. For example, until recently, the ombudsman did not have a separate budget and was on a “pay-as-you-go” system in which prior approval was required for every expenditure. In November 2000, OSWER created a separate line item within the OSWER budget for ombudsman-related expenditures. According to OSWER managers, having a separate line item made sense in light of the ombudsman’s increased workload. In addition, they decided that it is better to give the ombudsman a budget up front and tell him that he has to set priorities and work within the amount provided than to approve funding on a case-by-case basis. They recognized that the latter approach could create the impression that OSWER is hampering the ombudsman’s independence any time a funding request is disapproved because such a decision would limit his involvement in particular cases. From the ombudsman’s perspective, knowing the amount of available funding at the beginning of a fiscal year allows him to better prioritize and manage his activities. However, without supervisory authority, he does not have the same discretion as other OSWER managers over how the budget resources are used. OSWER exercises similar control over the ombudsman’s staff resources.