NWS uses a variety of systems and manual processes to collect, process, and disseminate weather data to and among its network of field offices and regional and national centers. Prior to the modernization, these systems and processes were largely outdated. Radar equipment dated back to the 1950s, and much of the current information processing, display, and data communications system has been in use since the 1970s. To enhance its ability to deliver weather services, NWS determined some 15 years ago to use the power of technology to “do more with less.” To reach the goal of better forecasting and earlier warnings with a smaller, downsized operation, the Weather Service has been acquiring new observing systems—including radars, satellites, and ground-based sensors—as well as powerful forecaster workstations. The goals of the modernization were to (1) achieve more uniform weather services nationwide, (2) improve forecasting, (3) provide more reliable detection and prediction of severe weather and flooding, (4) permit more cost-effective operations, and (5) achieve higher productivity. The modernization includes four major systems-development programs, which I will briefly describe. This program integrates, for the first time, satellite, radar, and other data to support weather forecaster decision-making and communications; it is the linchpin of the NWS modernization. Operating under a $550-million funding cap, the system is expected to be fully deployed in 1999. AWIPS development systems have been delivered to 16 locations nationwide; this represents the first two of six modules, or “builds.” AWIPS is planned for a total of 152 locations once fully deployed. This is a program to acquire, launch, and control five satellites for identifying and tracking severe weather events, such as hurricanes. The first satellite was launched in 1994, and the second in 1995. Three more satellites are planned for launch between now and 2002. The total cost for these five satellites is estimated to be just under $2 billion. This is a program to acquire 163 Doppler radars. Largely deployed, these radars have helped NWS increase the accuracy and timeliness of warnings for severe thunderstorms, tornadoes, and other hazardous weather events. Scheduled for completion this year, 121 of a planned 123 NWS NEXRAD radars have been delivered to operational locations. The cost of this program is just under $1.5 billion. This is a program to automate and enhance methods for collecting, processing, and displaying surface weather conditions, such as temperature and precipitation, and to replace human weather observers. Scheduled for completion in fiscal year 1998, the system has been installed at 265 of 314 planned NWS operational locations. Estimated costs for ASOS are about $351 million; this includes the NWS units and 554 units for the Federal Aviation Administration and the Department of Defense. The modernization also includes upgrades to existing systems, improved weather models, and the acquisition of several smaller systems. In addition, NWS is restructuring its field offices to be more efficient; table 1 indicates the before-and-after plan. The Weather Service has generated better data—particularly with the new radars and satellites—and greatly improved forecasts and warnings. These can be related directly to saving lives and reducing the effects of natural disasters. As shown in figure 1, lead times of warnings for severe storms and tornadoes improved by about 5 minutes between 1986 and 1996, which is not insignificant. With tornadoes, for example, it can mean the difference in whether people have time to reach shelter. In some instances, lead times are much earlier. Last year, for instance, NWS issued flood potential “statements” 2-3 days in advance of Hurricane Fran. Flash flood warnings were issued with 6 hours’ lead time. Similarly, in the East Coast blizzard of 1996, NWS issued forecasts 3 to 5 days in advance. Notwithstanding such successes, however, each of the four programs has experienced cost increases and schedule delays. Some of these increases and delays can be attributed to changes in requirements; others were caused by program management and development problems. We reported in 1995 that six of eight sensors in the ASOS system did not meet contract specifications for accuracy or performance. For example, the precipitation accumulation sensor underreported rainfall amounts during heavy downpours, and the temperature and dew point sensor readings frequently fell short of dew point reliability requirements. Some of these shortfalls occurred because of the contractor’s failure to deliver products that met specifications, and others resulted from the failure of government-furnished equipment to meet specifications. In addition, we found that ASOS users from the aviation, meteorology, and climate communities had needs that the ASOS system, as specified, did not satisfy. We recommended that NWS define and prioritize—in conjunction with ASOS users—all system corrections, enhancements, and supplements necessary to meet valid user needs. We further recommended that NWS formulate—again in conjunction with ASOS users—explicit system performance and cost/benefit criteria governing the release of human observers. Because of these problems, NWS delayed plans for releasing human weather observers and implemented actions to correct shortfalls in meeting specifications and to address other user concerns. In reference to NEXRAD, we testified in 1995 that many NWS and Air Force radars were not available nearly as often as required. For example, between 10 and 62 percent of Air Force NEXRAD radars were falling short of availability requirements. (NWS did not know if its radars were meeting the availability requirement because it was not monitoring availability on a site-by-site basis.) Further, we found that a radar upgrade to address one cause of unavailability—the lack of an uninterruptible power supply—was not to be completed until fiscal years 1999 and 2002 for the Air Force and NWS, respectively. We recommended that NWS analyze and monitor system availability data on a site-specific basis for operational NEXRADs and correct any shortfalls in system availability revealed by the analysis. We also recommended that the Air Force improve the reliability of Air Force NEXRAD availability data and correct any shortfalls found. NWS and the Air Force did initiate steps in 1995 to implement our recommendations to improve NEXRAD availability. In terms of staffing, the sizable reductions promised as a result of the modernization will not be realized. While NWS originally planned to reduce staff by 21 percent, we reported in 1995 that the goal had been scaled back to 8 percent. NWS attributes the reduced goal primarily to the need for more staff than originally envisioned to operate new systems, and to other unanticipated requirements. Mr. Chairman, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) ultimate success in completing the modernization depends, in part, on how well and how quickly it can complete a systems architecture and address specific risks associated with the crucial AWIPS system. The modernization needs an overall architecture to guide systems development; NWS agrees that such a technical blueprint is necessary, and is currently working on one. Yet until such an architecture is developed and enforced, the modernization will likely continue to be subject to higher costs and reduced performance. This is an important point as component systems continue to evolve to meet additional demands and take advantage of improved technology. We cannot emphasize too strongly the need for an overall architecture to guide system evolution. An architecture would help ensure that changes to NEXRAD, for example, are compatible with the many systems with which NEXRAD must exchange data. As we have reported several times over the past few years, full utilization of the data from the new observing systems has been prevented by delays and continuing problems with AWIPS. We have made several recommendations that we feel will strengthen the Weather Service’s ability to acquire AWIPS. First, we recommended that NWS ensure that each “build” is fully tested and all material defects corrected before beginning software development associated with the next build. Second, we recommended that NWS establish a software quality assurance program to increase the probability of delivering promised AWIPS capability on time and within budget. Third, we recommended that NWS obtain an independent assessment of the cost to develop and deploy AWIPS. Progress to date in these areas has, however, been uneven, and we remain concerned about AWIPS development risks—risks that threaten the system’s ability to be completed on time, within budget, and with the functional capability that AWIPS must be able to provide. Until AWIPS is deployed and functioning properly, NWS will not be able to take full advantage of the nearly $4 billion investment it has made in the other components of the modernization. After early successes in demonstrating the technical feasibility of system functions, design problems and disagreements between NOAA and the development contractor in 1993-1994 stymied progress. Some development responsibility was brought in-house—to NWS/NOAA labs—in 1995. The AWIPS program strategy was changed again in 1996, when even more development responsibility—for AWIPS data acceptance, processing, and display capabilities—was brought in-house, primarily to NOAA’s Forecast Systems Laboratory (FSL). At that time, NWS decided to use FSL’s prototype system, called Weather Forecast Office (WFO)-Advanced, which was being developed in parallel with AWIPS as a risk-reduction tactic. NWS officials chose WFO-Advanced because of its demonstrated superior data-acceptance, processing, and display capability over the contractor’s version, hoping that it would enable the agency to deploy these AWIPS capabilities to field operations more quickly. The contractor did, however, retain responsibility for communications, system monitoring and control, and other capabilities. With these changes, NWS expects AWIPS to make its 1999 target date for full deployment, within the $550-million cap.