OCS planning, integration, and policy roles and responsibilities, along with the associated contractor-management functions,of DOD command and staff, including the following entities: The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics has overall responsibility for establishing and publishing policies and procedures governing administrative oversight of defense contracts and for developing and overseeing the implementation of DOD-level OCS policy. Within this office, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Support is responsible for monitoring and managing the implementation of OCS policy. The OCS Functional Capabilities Integration Board was created in March 2010 and serves as the main forum for the combatant commands, military departments, and defense agencies to address OCS capability issues for support to the joint warfighter, to include assessing and adopting appropriate lessons learned, and solutions affecting future contingency operations. The Joint Staff’s Logistics Directorate (J-4) is the primary staff directorate on the Joint Staff for OCS matters and is responsible for developing OCS planning policy, related procedures, and templates, as well as ensuring that OCS policies and procedures are incorporated in relevant policy documents and doctrinal publications. J-4 created the Operational Contract Support & Services Division to reflect the increased Joint Staff workload related to institutionalizing OCS. The Defense Logistics Agency is responsible for providing worldwide logistics support to the military departments and the combatant commands as well as to other DOD components and federal agencies. It also provides OCS planning, integration, and exercises support through its Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO). The Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force service component commands plan and execute OCS for their respective forces in accordance with guidance from their respective military departments and combatant commanders. The six geographic combatant commands, which are supported by multiple service component commands, play a key role in determining and synchronizing contracted support requirements and contracting planning, as well as executing OCS oversight. According to Joint Publication 4-10, proper joint-force guidance on common contract support–related matters is imperative for facilitating effective and efficient use of contractors in joint operations. In figure 1, we illustrate the six geographic combatant commands’ areas of responsibility and show the locations of the service component commands that provide support in each of those areas. DOD established the JLLP in 2000 to enhance joint capabilities through knowledge management in peacetime and wartime. The combatant commands and the military services are to use the JLLP to develop lessons learned related to joint capabilities by collecting issues from operations and exercises in order to make improvements to areas such as doctrine, policy, training, and education. For collected issues, according to CJCS Instruction 3150.25E, the combatant commands and the military services are to resolve and integrate them at the lowest organizational level possible, with corrective action taken as close to the issue occurrence as possible. An issue becomes a lesson learned once a DOD entity has implemented corrective action that has contributed to improved performance or that has increased capability at the strategic, operational, or tactical level. According to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3150.25E, JLLP knowledge management is enabled by the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS). As the JLLP’s system of record, JLLIS is to facilitate the collection, management, and sharing of issues and lessons learned to improve the development and readiness of the joint force. An electronic database, JLLIS is supposed to be used to track progress by DOD stakeholders and other organizations involved in the collection of issues. Additionally, if an issue is resolved and determined to be a lesson learned, then it is to be published and shared using JLLIS for proper institutionalization and learning to improve the operational effectiveness of the joint force. According to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3150.25E, organizations participating in the JLLP shall collaboratively exchange information (including issues and lessons learned) to the maximum extent possible. The services have also established service-specific lessons-learned programs and processes that include the collecting, integration, and sharing of lessons learned in support of the JLLP. For example, the Air Force Lessons Learned Program allows Airmen from all functional areas to share their observations to help shape how the Air Force prepares for and executes future operations. The Air Force Lessons Learned Program is a “push-pull” process where members of the lessons-learned offices coordinate with functional subject-matter experts to “pull” data and information by conducting interviews and after-action reviews, issuing flash bulletins, and generating formal issues identified. Reports are loaded into JLLIS so that Airmen can track progress and share knowledge. DOD’s geographic combatant commands have used large-scale operations as sources for collecting OCS issues. For example, in 2012, the U.S. Central Command, with support from JCASO, conducted interviews to collect issues experienced in OCS activities during Operation Iraqi Freedom / Operation New Dawn and made 24 recommendations within three general areas: contractor management, contract closeout, and transition planning. For instance, in the area of transition planning, the command found that OCS planning in Iraq was not fully integrated into the overall joint task force drawdown or transition plans. Therefore, the command recommended that OCS planners be sourced and embedded with the operations directorate 2 years prior to a transition so that contract support requirements between DOD and the Department of State could be properly identified. In Afghanistan, senior U.S. Central Command and U.S. Forces Afghanistan officials provided observations and insights about the OCS Integration Cell (formerly the OCS Drawdown Cell) and reported having several issues that could be used to inform contractor management and OCS planning. For example, the officials reported the need to change the ad hoc organization of the cell, reduce overlap and confusion of duties and responsibilities, and better integrate contracting support into the planning process. In Afghanistan, officials recommended changing the OCS Integration Cell’s organization and physical location, codifying in doctrine the OCS Integration Cell authorities prior to a contingency, improving sharing of OCS-related information with stakeholders, and combining OCS and operational-contracting functions to improve OCS planning and execution, among other things. Smaller-scale operations have also provided the geographic combatant commands with opportunities to collect OCS issues that affect their command. For example, U.S. Pacific Command officials observed OCS issues during Operation Tomodachi in 2011, following the earthquake and tsunami near Japan. Specifically, an observation at U.S. Pacific Command recommended that the command establish a Joint Theater Support Contracting Command to coordinate contracting during the disaster, which subsequently led the command to develop an instruction that includes considerations and procedures for establishing a Joint Theater Support Contracting Command and to hold a rehearsal-of- concept drill. In another smaller-scale operation, Operation Unified Response in Haiti, U.S. Southern Command identified several OCS issues. Specifically, the command identified the need to improve its Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker policy, develop more OCS capabilities at the military service component commands, and establish operational frameworks to enable cross-service OCS collaboration within the context of theater security cooperation efforts. Additionally, the geographic combatant commands are improving efforts to collect OCS issues during exercises. The geographic combatant commands are to use DOD’s Joint Training System in planning, executing, and assessing joint training, like exercises. The Joint Training System provides an integrated, requirements-based method for aligning joint training programs with assigned missions consistent with command priorities, capabilities, and available resources. We have previously reported that evaluating lessons learned and identifying issues for corrective actions are fundamental components of DOD’s training and exercise process. We recommended that DOD develop guidance with specific criteria for postexercise documentation, particularly to allow the results and lessons learned from exercises to be easily reviewed and compared. DOD agreed that such information should be provided in a standardized format that can be easily accessed and understood by authorized organizations that might benefit from such knowledge. However, DOD cautioned that any actions taken in response to this recommendation must accommodate constraints regarding classified information. As of December 2014, four of the six geographic combatant commands—U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Northern Command, and U.S. Southern Command—have identified OCS as a critical capability in their joint training plans and have integrated it into the planning, execution, and assessment of training events. For example, U.S. Southern Command has identified conducting OCS as a critical capability and developed an associated supporting task, which it integrates into its exercises like PANAMAX and Integrated Advance. In the past year, U.S. European Command has identified OCS as a critical capability in its joint training plans, but it has not yet completed a full cycle of planning, executing, and assessing training events that include OCS as a critical capability. The command expects to complete the other phases of the cycle following its forthcoming exercises. Prior to the inclusion of OCS as a critical capability in its joint training plans, the command included prescripted OCS-related events or master-scenario events intended to guide exercises toward specific outcomes. According to U.S. European Command officials, they have included OCS-related master-scenario events as part of their exercises since 2008. While a training proficiency assessment of these events is not typically performed by the geographic combatant commands, master-scenario events can provide command staff the opportunity to perform some OCS-related tasks and familiarize themselves with OCS processes, among other things. U.S. Pacific Command has not identified OCS as a critical capability in the earliest phase of the Joint Training System, which informs later phases like planning, execution, and assessment of OCS.