The existence of war, terrorism, or other international conflict does not suspend the TakingsClause's protection of private property. (4) Still, severalbroad takings-law principles of particularrelevance to international threats and national security present daunting obstacles for takings claimsin this area. Heightened judicial deference in regulatory takings cases International dangers have consistently prompted courts to extend extra deference to responsive government measures when dealing with regulatory takings claims. ("Regulatory takings claims"are those based on the government's restriction of a property's use , rather than its physical invasionor outright expropriation of the property.) Indeed, the judicial deference is great enough that ourresearch failed to reveal any instance where a regulatory taking claim based on federal governmentaction against an international threat has succeeded. Statements of judicial deference are found in numerous cases rejecting regulatory takings claims against the United States - claims based on (1) the federal government's temporary wartimeshutdown of non-essential gold mines to free up needed mine workers and mining equipment, UnitedStates v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958) ("In the context of war, we have beenreluctant to find that degree of regulation which, without saying so, requires compensation to be paidfor resulting losses of income. "); (2) wartime rent controls, Block v. Hirsh , 256 U.S. 135, 157 (1920)("[a] limit in time, to tide over a passing trouble, well may justify a law that could not be upheld asa permanent change"), and Bowles v. Willingham , 321 U.S. 503, 519 (1944) ("A nation which candemand the lives of its men and women in ... war is under no constitutional necessity of providinga system of price control on the domestic front which will assure each landlord a fair return ...."); (3)a federal order during the Arab oil embargo that an oil production company sell oil to a particularrefiner, Condor Operating Co. v. Sawhill , 514 F.2d 351 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.) (citing Blockv.Hirsh quote, supra ), cert. denied , 421 U.S. 976 (1975); and (4) a federal prohibitionon the exerciseof stock options in a U.S. company by a foreign national with ties to Libya, a nation accused ofsponsoring terrorism, Paradissiotis v. United States , 49 Fed. Cl. 16, 23 (2001) ("It is unfortunate thatplaintiff lost his property outright. The preservation of the national security interest of the UnitedStates nevertheless greatly outweighs plaintiff's loss. "), affirmed , 304 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2002). (5) The Condor Operating Co . and Paradissiotis decisions demonstrate that heightened judicialdeference is not restricted to international dangers of the traditional-war variety, or even to hostilitiesat all. One element of the general regulatory takings analysis is a balancing of the governmental interest advanced by the challenged government action against the burden imposed on the propertyowner. (6) The foregoing decisions in the internationalconflict and terrorism realms often do notexplicitly link their statements of deference to this broad takings-test factor - but such a relativeweighing is obviously what they are doing. In the case of major threats to the security of the state,the governmental interest is deemed to be so compelling as to be dispositive, or nearly so. Reduced expectations when doing business internationally Another factor in the general regulatory takings test is the extent to which the government's action frustrated the reasonable investment-backed expectations of the property owner-plaintiff. (7) Citing this factor, the courts unanimously have spurned the takings claims of persons whose relations with foreign countries - through contracts, leaseholds, causes of action for compensation,etc. - were frustrated when the United States responded to deteriorating or hostile relations withthose countries. When dealing in foreign commerce, these decisions say, the possibility of changingworld circumstances and U.S. response thereto make any expectation of government noninterference unreasonable . One is charged with awareness that relations between the affected countries mightsour, and that the government might act in a way that interferes with one's property rights. (8) See, e.g.,767 Third Avenue Assocs. v. United States , 48 F.3d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Chang v. UnitedStates ,859 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Paradissiotis v. United States , 49 Fed. Cl. 16 (2001), affirmed , 304F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Abrahim-Youri v. United States , 36 Fed. Cl. 482, 486 (1996), affirmed ,139 F.3d 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1997), cert. denied , 524 U.S. 951 (1998); Rockefeller Center Propertiesv. United States , 32 Fed. Cl. 586, 592 (1995); Belk v. United States , 12 Cl. Ct. 732, 734 (1987), affirmed , 858 F.2d 706 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Most of the just-cited cases involve property interests (e.g., contracts) acquired at a time when the international situation was already foreboding - as in 767 Third Ave. Assocs. with the threat ofethnic strife in Yugoslavia, and in Chang and Paradissiotis with Libyan support ofinternationalterrorism. Or the plaintiffs had chosen to live in a country "where the potential for kidnapping andother terrorist acts existed and the possibility that the United States would have to intervene wasalways present." Belk , 12 Cl. Ct. at 734 (with regard to Iran). However, such pre-acquisitionstormclouds are not a prerequisite for courts to discount the property owner's expectations ofgovernment nonintervention, and deny the taking claim. It is enough that the property interest wasacquired at a time when the President had broad statutory authority to impose measures againstforeign assets in response to international conflicts. (9) 767 Third Ave. Assocs. , 48 F.3d at 1580-1581; Rockefeller Center Properties , 32 Fed. Cl. at 592-594. Benefits accruing to the plaintiff In several cases, courts have rejected the taking claim because the challenged government action also conferred substantial benefit on the plaintiff, even if incidental benefit accrued to the UnitedStates as well. The leading case is YMCA v. United States , 395 U.S. 85, 92 (1969), where no takingwas found when U.S. troops occupied buildings in Panama to protect them from rioters. Accord , Abrahim-Youri v. United States , 139 F.3d 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Belk v. United States ,858 F.2d 706,709 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Deference to government conduct of foreign policy and the President's role as commander in chief / Political question doctrine Yet another recurring hurdle for the taking plaintiff is judicial deference to the President's constitutional role as representative of the federal government in the field of international relations,and his latitude as commander in chief. "Matters intimately related to foreign policy and nationalsecurity are rarely proper subjects for judicial intervention." Haig v. Agee , 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981). Accord , Regan v. Wald , 468 U.S. 222, 242 (1984). This deference plays out both as to (1)thereviewability of the government action on which the taking claim is based, and (2) as a factor in thetaking analysis itself. Reviewability of the government action on which the taking claim is based. Governmentdeclarations and decisions involving national emergencies, war, and foreign relations are often heldto be outside the judicial reach - generally on "political question" grounds. The classic statement ofthe political question doctrine remains that of Baker v. Carr , 369 U.S. 186 (1962), which recognizedthat only certain types of cases are committed to the judicial branch for resolution. To be beyondjudicial reach under the doctrine, a case must involve at least one of six factors, among them whetherthere is a "a textually demonstrable commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department,or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it ...." Id . at 217. Numerous takings claims involving international conflicts have foundered on the political-question shoal. (10) For example, Belk v. United States , 858 F.2d 706 (Fed. Cir. 1988), dealtwith the Algerian Accords, under which the United States and Iran ended the hostage crisis in 1981. Several of the former hostages argued that because the Accords extinguished their causes of actionagainst Iran, the U.S. had taken those causes of action. (11) Though denying their claim on the merits,the court concluded alternatively that review of a policy decision made by the President during aninternational crisis is barred as a political question. "Most, if not all, of [the Baker v. Carr ] concernsare present in this case." Id . at 710. Most recently, the Federal Circuit used the political question doctrine to rebuff a taking claim brought by the owner of a manufacturing plant in the Sudan destroyed by U.S. cruise missiles. El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Co. v. United States , 378 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2004).