Iraq has had a long history of displacement due to wars and the policies of the Saddam Hussein regime. That regime instituted “Arabization” policies to force out many non-Arabs from Kirkuk and the surrounding areas and replace them with Arab citizens to strengthen the regime’s political control over the areas’ oil fields and fertile lands. Displacement occurred during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980’s; the campaign against the Kurds, which intensified after the war in 1988; the draining of the marshes in southern Iraq during the war and again after the first Gulf War in 1991; and the 2003 fall of the Saddam Hussein regime. UNHCR reported in December 2009 that an estimated 2.76 million individuals were displaced in Iraq, 1.2 million of which had been displaced prior to 2006. The latest wave of large-scale displacement occurred after the February 2006 bombing of the Al-Askari Mosque in Samarra, which triggered a rise in sectarian violence. According to State and UN reports, insurgents, death squads, militias, and terrorists increased their attacks against civilians in 2006. According to UNHCR and IOM, there was a sharp increase in the numbers of Iraqis abandoning their homes for other locations in Iraq and abroad as a result of the sectarian intimidation and violence that erupted during this period. IOM reported that the majority of the Iraqi displacement occurred in 2006 and 2007. According to IOM, as of September 2008, about 90 percent of the post-2006 IDPs in Iraq originated from Baghdad, Diyala, and Ninewa governorates (see fig. 1). According to IOM, 4 years after the Al-Askari bombing, displaced families are returning and new displacement is rare; however, the number of those displaced who had returned (returnees) remains well below the estimated number of those who remain displaced. As of the end of 2009, UNHCR estimated that of those who were displaced before and after the Al-Askari bombing, 745,630 IDPs and 433,696 refugees had returned. IOM reported in February 2010, that of those who were displaced after the 2006 Al- Askari bombing, IOM returnee field monitors had identified an estimated 374,166 returnees. Additionally, the numbers of returnees varies by governorate, with Baghdad experiencing the largest share of IDP and refugee returns, according to UNHCR. The majority of those who initially returned were IDPs rather than refugees, which is a pattern that has been seen in other displacement situations worldwide, according to IOM and UNHCR officials. IOM reported in February 2010, that its assessments of an estimated 1.3 million IDPs identified by its field monitors, showed that 49 percent of all post-Al-Askari bombing IDPs want to return to their places of origin, 29 percent want to remain and integrate into their current places of displacement, 19 percent want to resettle to a third location, and 3 percent are waiting to make a decision. According to UNHCR officials, displaced Iraqis tend to be educated and come from urban, middle-class backgrounds, which is in sharp contrast to displaced communities in other nations. UNHCR also reported that the displaced Iraqi population comprises Sunnis, Shias, Christians, and other groups that were forced to relocate to areas where they constitute the dominant groups. According to IOM, 58 percent of the 1.3 million IDPs that they had assessed reported to be Shia Muslim and 33 percent reported to be Sunni Muslim, as of February 2010 (see fig. 2); however, religious affiliations and ethnicity varied by governorates. According to UNHCR, 21 percent of the Iraqi refugees that were actively registered in neighboring countries at the end of 2008 identified themselves as Shia Muslims, and 56 percent identified themselves as Sunni Muslims (see fig. 3). The UN’s Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement defines an internally displaced person as one who has been forced or obliged to leave his or her home as a result of armed conflict, generalized violence, violation of human rights, or disaster, but has not crossed an international border. A refugee, as defined by the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 protocol, is a person who “owing to a well- founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.” According UNHCR’s Handbook for Repatriation and Reintegration Activities, reintegration is a process that should result in the disappearance of differences in legal rights and duties between returnees and their compatriots and the equal access of returnees to services, productive assets, and opportunities. UNHCR’s Handbook also states that such a process assumes that refugees return to societies that are more or less stable, and, when this is not the case, returnees and communities in areas of return should benefit equally from improved access to productive assets and social services. According to UNHCR, voluntary repatriation and reintegration is the preferred durable solution for refugees. Iraqi and U.S. government entities, international organizations, and NGOs play significant roles in addressing Iraqi displacement in Iraq and the region. For information on the key responsible entities and their respective roles, see appendix II. Problems in securing a safe environment, property and shelter, income, essential services, and government capacity and commitment may impede large numbers of returns and the reintegration of displaced Iraqis, according to U.S. government, UNHCR, and IOM officials. UNHCR considers that the basic conditions necessary to encourage and sustain large-scale returns to Iraq have not been established. UNHCR had predicted large-scale returns for 2009 after security conditions had improved in the latter half of 2007 and in 2008, but they did not materialize, according to U.S. government, UNHCR, and IOM officials. UN, IOM, and U.S. government officials agree that the decision to return and the ability to reintegrate involve a complex set of factors that may vary by location and individual circumstance. Moreover, according to the UN, IOM, and NGOs, many of these factors also negatively affect vulnerable Iraqis in the communities that host IDPs and Iraqis who did not have the means to flee the conflict or the ensuing economic hardships. Although the overall security situation in Iraq has improved since 2006, the actual and perceived threat across governorates and neighborhoods continues to impede Iraqi returns and reintegration, according to U.S. government, UNHCR, and IOM officials. According to the UN, voluntary return is the preferred solution, but Iraqis should not be encouraged to return until the security situation allows for large-scale return and sufficient monitoring of returns. According to DOD, overall violence in Iraq, after peaking in 2007, remains at its lowest level in 5 years. However, the level and nature of violence has varied by governorate. DOD reported that from December 2009 to February 2010, about 73 percent of the attacks occurred in 4 out of the 18 governorates—Baghdad, Diyala, Ninewa, and Salah al-Din. The first three of these governates account for 89 percent of the displacement occurring after the February 2006 Samarra Al-Askari Mosque bombing, according to the UN. In contrast, the Kurdistan Region, with its relatively homogenous population and the presence of the Kurdish security forces, remained relatively safe and stable, according to DOD. Many displaced Iraqis may be afraid of returning because of the fear of violent reprisals from militants and members of opposing sects, according to USAID and UNHCR officials. IOM reported in 2008 that returnees were threatened, shot at, or killed after returning home. An MODM official reported that one of the initial families that had returned to a Baghdad neighborhood was killed as a warning to others not to return. UNHCR and IOM officials stated that some displaced Iraqis, particularly those from targeted minority groups, have no plans to return out of fear of persecution. According to the UN, although a decrease in violence in Iraq has been observed, grave and systematic human rights violations persist and remain largely unreported. The UN also reported that violence against professionals, women, and members of minority communities occur often and are rarely punished. Moreover, many displaced Iraqis and returnees have had difficulties in accessing services, including those provided by humanitarian organizations, because of obstacles such as curfews, checkpoints, and areas affected by intense fighting, according to UNHCR, IOM, other UN agencies, and NGOs. In addition, according to UNHCR, the precarious security situation is requiring UNHCR to increase investments in the security of staff and may continue to limit UNHCR’s mobility inside Iraq (see fig. 4). The UN, UNHCR, IOM, and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) cautioned that while access may be improving overall, the security situation could deteriorate again, which could limit their access to the population. Problems in securing property restitution or compensation and shelter have made it difficult for displaced Iraqis to return and reintegrate or integrate elsewhere in Iraq, according to UNHCR and IOM officials. According to a 2009 United States Institute of Peace (USIP) report, the lack of policies addressing displacement-related property issues is a major obstacle to returns and may prolong instability, hinder reconciliation, and nurture grievances along ethnic or sectarian lines. In November 2009, IOM reported that about one-third of surveyed returnees found their homes in bad condition.