In the past several years, we have made a number of recommendations for CMS to address missed opportunities for savings in the Medicare program, which the agency has not fully implemented. These include recommendations related to the Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) and Medicare Advantage (MA) programs. Minimizing improper payments and fraud. We have a body of issued and ongoing work about improper payments in Medicare. In 2007, we reported on program integrity activities conducted by CMS contractors to minimize improper payments for medical equipment and supplies. We recommended that CMS require its contractors to develop automated prepayment controls to identify potentially improper claims when billing reaches atypical levels. CMS agreed with the recommendation, but has not implemented it. The agency has added other prepayment controls to flag claims for services that were unlikely to be provided in the normal course of medical care. However, implementing our recommendation and adding additional prepayment controls could enhance identification of improper claims before they are paid to reduce reliance on “pay and chase” strategies. In 2009, we reported that fraudulent and abusive practices in home health agencies, such as overstating the severity of a beneficiary’s condition, contributed to Medicare home health spending To strengthen controls on improper payments in home and utilization.health agencies, we recommended that CMS amend current regulations to expand the types of improper billing practices that are grounds for revocation of billing privileges. CMS told us that it has begun to explore its authority to expand the types of practices that are grounds for revocation of billing rights. We believe that CMS should do so expeditiously. In 2010, we recommended that CMS designate responsible personnel with authority to evaluate and promptly address vulnerabilities identified to reduce improper payments. CMS concurred with this recommendation and has begun to implement this process, but does not yet have written policies and procedures for a fully developed corrective action process that includes monitoring of actions taken. Likewise, we recently testified before the Senate Committee on Finance regarding CMS efforts to combat Medicare fraud. We reiterated our prior recommendation and noted that CMS could do more to strengthen provider enrollment screening to avoid enrolling those intent on committing fraud, improve pre- and postpayment claims review to identify and respond to patterns of suspicious billing activity more effectively, and identify and address vulnerabilities to reduce the ease with which fraudulent entities can obtain improper payments. Enhancing payment safeguard mechanisms. In 2008, we reported on rapid spending growth for advanced imaging services. We recommended that CMS examine the feasibility of adding front-end approaches, such as prior authorization, to improve payment safeguard mechanisms. CMS has not implemented our recommendation, but is currently engaged in a demonstration project to assess the appropriateness of physicians’ use of advanced diagnostic imaging services furnished to Medicare beneficiaries. Aligning coverage for services with clinical recommendations. We reported in early 2012 that Medicare beneficiaries’ use of preventive services did not always align with the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force’s recommendations. We concluded that opportunities exist to improve the appropriate use of preventive services through means such as revising coverage and cost-sharing policies and educating beneficiaries and physicians. In the case of osteoporosis screening, for instance, Medicare coverage rules may preclude utilization of the recommended screening by all those for whom the service is recommended. Conversely, given that the Task Force recommended against prostate cancer screening for men aged 75 or older, the absence of cost sharing for that population may encourage inappropriate use of this service. To better align preventive service use with clinical recommendations, we recommended that CMS provide coverage for Task Force recommended services, as appropriate, given cost- effectiveness and other criteria. In response to our recommendation, the agency stated that it had recently used its authority to expand benefits to cover several new preventive services. This additional coverage, however, does not address the misalignment that remains between Medicare coverage for certain services and the corresponding Task Force recommendations. We also offered a matter for congressional consideration. We suggested that Congress consider requiring beneficiaries to share the cost of the services if they receive services the Task Force recommends against. Better reflecting beneficiary health status in payments to MA plans. In 2010, the federal government spent about $115 billion on the MA program, a private plan alternative to the Medicare FFS program. In January 2012, we reported that CMS could achieve billions of dollars in additional savings by more accurately adjusting for differences between MA plans and Medicare FFS providers in the reporting of beneficiary diagnoses.construct a risk score for each beneficiary. Higher risk scores result in CMS uses this diagnosis data and other information to increased Medicare payments to plans, while lower risk scores result in reduced Medicare payments to plans. Risk scores should be the same among all beneficiaries with the same medical conditions and demographic characteristics, regardless of whether they are in MA or Medicare FFS. MA plans have an incentive to code diagnoses more comprehensively because doing so affects plan payments, which is not the case in Medicare FFS. CMS is required by law to make an adjustment to MA risk scores to bring them in line with those of Medicare FFS. In this report, we found that CMS’s adjustment for diagnostic coding differences was too small. We estimated that MA beneficiary risk scores in 2010 were from 4.8 to 7.1 percent higher than they likely would have been if they had been enrolled in FFS, while CMS’s adjustment for diagnostic coding differences was only 3.4 percent. Compared to CMS’s analysis, our analysis incorporated more recent beneficiary data and accounted for additional beneficiary characteristics that affect risk scores, such as health status and sex. A revised methodology that incorporated this information could have saved Medicare between $1.2 billion and $3.1 billion in 2010 in addition to the $2.7 billion in savings from the adjustment CMS made. We expect that savings in 2011 and future years would be even greater. CMS has continued to use its 2010 adjustment method for 2011 and 2012, even though both we and CMS noted an upward trend in the impact of coding differences over time. To improve the accuracy of the adjustment made for differences in coding practices over time, we recommended that the Secretary of HHS direct the Administrator of CMS to incorporate the most recent data available in its estimates; identify and account for all years of diagnostic coding differences that could affect the payment year for which any adjustment is made; account for the upward trend of the annual impact of coding differences in its estimates; and to the extent possible, account for all relevant differences in beneficiary characteristics between the MA and Medicare FFS populations. CMS stated that it found our findings informative, but did not comment on our recommendations. Canceling the MA Quality Bonus Payment Demonstration. We recently reported that CMS could achieve billions of dollars in savings by canceling the MA Quality Bonus Payment Demonstration—which CMS’s Office of the Actuary has estimated will cost more than $8 billion over 10 years.in the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), as amended, CMS is conducting a nationwide demonstration to test whether a scaled bonus structure would lead to larger and faster annual quality improvement for MA plans at various performance levels. Compared with PPACA’s quality bonus payment system, the demonstration extends the bonuses to average-performing plans, accelerates the phase-in of the bonuses for plans with above-average performance, and increases the size of the bonuses in 2012 and 2013. We found that the demonstration’s estimated $8.35 billion cost offsets more than one-third of PPACA’s MA payment reductions during its 3-year time frame and that most of the additional spending will go to average-performing plans rather than to high-performing plans. The MA Quality Bonus Payment Demonstration dwarfs all other Medicare demonstrations—both mandatory and discretionary—conducted since 1995 in its estimated budgetary impact. It is at least seven times larger than that of any other Medicare demonstration conducted since 1995 and is greater than the combined budgetary impact of all those demonstrations. For a variety of reasons, the design of the demonstration precludes a credible evaluation of its effectiveness in achieving CMS’s stated research goal. We therefore believe that it is unlikely that the demonstration will produce meaningful results. Accordingly, we recommended that the Secretary of HHS cancel the demonstration and allow the MA quality bonus payment system established by PPACA to take effect. HHS did not concur with our recommendation, stating that it believed the demonstration supports a strategy to improve the delivery of health care services, patient health outcomes, and population health. We have conducted a substantial body of work on Medicaid program management. Our recommendations have involved a variety of topics and have included different aspects of payment arrangements with states. Improving oversight of supplemental payments. We have reported on varied financing arrangements involving supplemental payments— disproportionate share hospital (DSH) payments that states are required to make to certain hospitals and other non-DSH supplemental payments—that increase federal funding without a commensurate increase in state funding. Our work has found that while a variety of federal legislative and CMS actions have helped curb inappropriate financing arrangements, gaps in oversight remain. For example, while there are federal requirements designed to improve transparency and accountability for state DSH payments, similar requirements are not in place for non-DSH supplemental payments, which may be increasing. From 2006 to 2010, state-reported non-DSH supplemental payments increased from $6.3 billion to $14 billion; however, according to CMS officials, reporting was likely incomplete. We made numerous recommendations aimed at improving oversight of supplemental payments. We have recommended that CMS adopt transparency requirements for non-DSH supplemental payments and develop a strategy to ensure that all state supplemental payment arrangements have been reviewed by CMS. CMS has taken action to address some of these recommendations, but we continue to believe additional action is warranted. CMS has raised concern that congressional action may be necessary to fully address our recommendations. GAO, Medicaid Demonstration Waivers: Recent HHS Approvals Continue to Raise Cost and Oversight Concerns, GAO-08-87 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2008).