Obama Administration officials have expressed strong support for the Moroccan monarchy, while also encouraging political reforms and occasionally voicing human rights concerns. U.S. bilateral aid assists Morocco with economic growth, basic education, democratization, military and police professionalization, and counterterrorism. In addition, a five-year, $697.5 million U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact was completed in September 2013, and Morocco is eligible for a second compact. U.S.-Moroccan military cooperation includes sizable Moroccan purchases of U.S. defense materiel and a large annual bilateral exercise, African Lion. Amid widespread political upheaval in the region since 2011, Moroccan officials have urged the United States to expand bilateral ties. A U.S.-Morocco Bilateral Strategic Dialogue was initiated in 2012, with working groups devoted to political, economic, security, and educational/cultural cooperation. (Strategic Dialogues were also initiated with Algeria and Tunisia.) High-level sessions of the Dialogue have been held in both countries, most recently in April 2014 in Morocco, with Secretary of State John Kerry leading the U.S. delegation. King Mohammed VI conducted an official state visit to Washington, DC, in November 2013, his first since 2004. The king met with President Obama at the White House, and a joint statement emphasized shared support for Morocco's "democratic and economic reforms" and for bilateral cooperation in a number of domains. In November 2014, Vice President Joe Biden visited Morocco for the Global Entrepreneurship Summit and also met with the king. With regard to the disputed territory of Western Sahara, the United States has recognized neither Morocco's claim of sovereignty nor the self-proclaimed independent government-in-exile, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), which is hosted and supported by Algeria. At the same time—in the context of valued bilateral ties with Morocco—the Obama Administration, using phrasing similar to that employed by the George W. Bush Administration, refers to Morocco's proposal for regional autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty as a "serious, realistic, and credible" potential approach to the territory's final status. U.S. policy over the past decade has been to support United Nations (U.N.)-facilitated negotiations between Morocco and the independence-seeking Popular Front for the Liberation of Saqiat al Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario, which formed the SADR) toward a mutually accepted settlement. In April 2014, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, held a hearing on U.S. policy toward Morocco. Several other hearings during the 113 th Congress also examined U.S. policy interests in Morocco and the wider North Africa region. Congressional views on Morocco and the Western Sahara issue have been expressed in foreign aid appropriations legislation (see " Recent Congressional Actions "). The Moroccan royal dynasty has ruled the country since the mid-17 th century, remaining relatively intact under French and Spanish colonial protectorates. King Mohammed VI, who inherited the Moroccan throne in 1999, is the preeminent state authority within a complex political system that also includes an elected parliament and local-level representatives. The king has said that he is committed to building a democracy, and in 2011 he introduced a new constitution (later adopted in a popular referendum) that, if fully implemented, could strengthen the legislature, the judiciary, and local-level government. The constitution, however, preserves the king's role as the ultimate arbiter of state decision-making, head of the military, and Morocco's highest religious authority. Although the constitution grants some executive powers to a head of government (prime minister), the king approves and may dismiss cabinet ministers. He may also dissolve parliament, call elections, and exercise certain powers via decree. The king also has a "shadow government" of royal advisors and is tied to significant domestic economic enterprises. The 2011 constitutional revision and other reforms initiated during the "Arab Spring" did not substantially alter the monarchy's political and economic prerogatives, but they demonstrated responsiveness to public pressures for greater political participation. Many observers argued that in introducing the reforms, the king retained his popular legitimacy and ensured Morocco's continued stability. Ultimately, the degree to which the new constitution leads to significant political changes may depend on how it is interpreted and implemented and the extent to which political parties and other interest groups leverage the political space accorded to them. For example, planned justice sector reforms and decentralization, both nominal priorities of constitutional implementation, have made only halting progress. Constitutional provisions on gender equality and parity, along with civil liberty protections, have yet to be implemented. Protests periodically occur, though they have dwindled in size since their peak in 2011. Some Moroccans continue to call for deeper political changes. Much of the public, however, may have lost any appetite for unrest, in part due to the example of turmoil elsewhere in the region. The bicameral legislature consists of a 270-seat upper house, the Chamber of Counselors, whose members are indirectly elected to nine-year terms, and a 395-seat lower house, the Chamber of Representatives, whose members are directly elected to five-year terms. Sixty seats (about 15%) in the lower house are reserved for women, and 30 seats are reserved for candidates under 40 years of age (candidates for these seats are elected from a separate national list). A law adopted in 2011 expanded previous quotas for women in local-level elected government positions. The Party for Justice and Democracy (PJD, also known as Al Misbah /The Beacon), an Islamist political party, won a plurality of seats (27%) in the most recent elections for the Chamber of Representatives, in 2011. That election was the country's first under the new constitution, which introduced a requirement for the king to appoint the head of government from the largest party in parliament. The PJD's Abdelilah Benkirane was named Prime Minister and leads an often fractious multiparty government coalition. In government, the PJD has focused on reforming fiscally burdensome state pension system and subsidy programs; it hopes to replace the latter with targeted aid for poor households. It has also weighed in on cultural, media, justice sector, and educational policies, sometimes with the apparent aim of introducing greater religiosity into the public sphere, although the party's leadership defines its stance as one of moderation. While the PJD has been legally recognized for two decades, it had not held cabinet positions prior to 2011. Some observers view the PJD as more driven by constituent concerns and more focused on countering corruption than other political parties, and therefore interested in devolving power away from the monarchy and toward elected government. In turn, the PJD has reportedly faced opposition from pro-palace elites. Public perceptions of these dynamics may underlie the personal popularity of Prime Minister Benkirane, despite regular policy setbacks. Still, the PJD has not demanded deep political changes, preferring to reassure the monarchy in tacit exchange for greater acceptance into national politics. The party's influence over policymaking is further constrained by its slim legislative plurality, the role of royal advisors who sit outside of elected government, and economic limitations. Mutual distrust between Moroccan Islamists and liberals has also inhibited political cooperation, despite a potential shared interest in democratization. In 2013, Prime Minister Benkirane was forced to reshuffle the cabinet after a key coalition member, the Istiqlal (Independence) party, withdrew, leaving the coalition without a majority. After months of stalemate, the National Rally of Independents (RNI), which many observers view as close to the palace, joined the government in its place. In exchange, the PJD relinquished several key portfolios, including the Foreign Ministry. Some observers viewed the PJD as weakened by these events, while others posited that it could capitalize on perceptions that it remains an underdog confronting a system of vested interests. Several other Islamist movements wield influence while operating outside of formal politics. Religiously conservative Salafist groups, for example, have been alternately targeted and courted by the authorities. The Justice and Charity Organization (JCO or Al Adl Wal Ihsan ), a domestic Sufi movement, is reportedly Morocco's largest grassroots organization. It opposes the monarchy as un-Islamic and undemocratic, and is therefore banned, but its activities are generally tolerated. The JCO eschews violence and often conveys its views in street demonstrations; it was reportedly a key force, in addition to leftist groups, behind Morocco's 2011 protest movement. Some analysts question whether the JCO might move toward more overt political participation in the wake of the death of its founding leader, Sheikh Abdessalem Yassine, in 2012. Moroccan nationals have been implicated in terrorism abroad, and Morocco has suffered from terrorism at home. Within Morocco, numerous small and reportedly unconnected extremist cells adhering to the Salafiya Jihadiya (Reformist Holy War/"Jihadist") ideology are generally viewed as the top security threat. The deadliest terrorist attack on Moroccan soil occurred in 2003, when 12 suicide bombers reportedly linked to Al Qaeda and the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM, after its French acronym) attacked five Western and Jewish targets in Casablanca, killing themselves and 33 others, and injuring more than 100. Several small-scale attacks have occurred more recently, including two suicide attacks near the U.S. consulate and the American Language Center in Casablanca in 2007, and a bombing at a Marrakesh café popular with tourists in 2011.