Russia's then-Premier (and current President) Vladimir Putin ordered military, police, andother security forces to enter the breakaway Chechnya region (with a population variously estimatedat less than one-half to one million) in September 1999, and these forces occupied most of the regionby early 2000. (1) Theconflict has ebbed and flowed since then and has resulted in thousands of military and civiliancasualties and the massive destruction of housing and infrastructure. Chechen rebel forces, estimatedby Russian officials to have declined to several hundred dedicated fighters, currently appearweakened but still tenacious. (2) They now mainly engage in small-scale armed attacks andbombings, including suicide bombings, against both Russian troops and civilians in Chechnya andother parts of Russia. Suicide bombings had been relatively rare occurrences in both Chechnya conflicts butappeared to increase after 2001. The deadliest incidents were the hostage-taking at a Moscow theaterin October 2002 (although most of the 130 deaths of hostages resulted from the rescue effort) anda suicide truck bombing in December 2002 that destroyed a government building in Chechnya andkilled more than seventy. Ten suicide bombings throughout Russia in 2003 -- that resulted in over200 casualties -- seemed aimed in part to publicize the Chechnya conflict and to sway voters inupcoming elections in Russia and Chechnya. Chechen rebel leader Shamil Basayev reportedly tookresponsibility for the Moscow theater hostage-taking and at least two of the suicide bombings. (3) The pace and lethality of suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks increased in 2004, andthese attacks spread far beyond Chechnya. A suicide bombing in the Moscow subway in Februaryresulted in about forty casualties. Chechen female suicide bombers downed two Russian commercialairliners in August, killing 89. Other incidents included an attempt to assassinate the leader ofRussia's Ingushetia region in April and a large-scale Chechen terrorist attack against security forcesand government offices in Ingushetia in June, causing the deaths of about 100 Ingush police. Basayev reportedly took responsibility for this attack, and he received praise from Maskhadov. Attacks in Chechnya's capital of Grozny on August 21, 2004, reportedly resulted in the deaths ofabout 120 pro-Moscow Chechens. Basayev also claimed responsibility for a September 2004 attackin the town of Beslan in Russia's North Ossetia region, where terrorists seized over 1,100 gradeschool teachers, students, parents, and others as hostages. The hostage standoff ended with thedestruction of the school and the deaths of 320 children and others. Basayev likewise allegedly claimed to be the primary planner of an October 2005 attack onpolice and security offices in Nalchik, the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria, that reportedly resulted inthe deaths of over 100 police and rebels and nearly two dozen civilians. Russian officials accusedtwo communities of local Islamic extremists of involvement in the attacks (the Yarmuk Jama'at andthe Institute of Islamic Studies) with Basayev's assistance, indicating the spread of such extremismthroughout the North Caucasus, according to some observers. (4) Maskhadov was killed during a skirmish with the Russian military on March 8, 2005, andwas replaced as "president" and "prime minister" of Chechnya by Abdul-Khalim Sadulayev. In2002, Maskhadov reportedly had designated Sadulayev as his heir, and Basayev announced afterMaskhadov's death that the State Defense Committee (Majlis ul-Shura) of Chechnya had concurredwith Maskhadov's wishes. (5) In August 2005, Sadulayev announced a reorganization of therebel "government" that included naming new "ministers" and dismissing Maskhadov's "diplomatic"representatives abroad, including "foreign minister" Ilyas Akhmadov. Indicative of close ties,Sadulayev made Basayev his second in command by appointing him the "first deputy primeminister." While criticizing Basayev's tactic of hostage-taking as ineffective (but not unethical), hereportedly praised his military leadership and gave him control over all security functions of the rebel"government." (6) Sadulayev announced another government re-organization in February 2006 that appeared to furtherreduce the influence of "moderate" Chechen rebels. He decreed that Zakayev would no longer bethe deputy prime minister, with responsibility for foreign policy guidance, although he would remainminister of culture. At the same time, Sadulayev elevated the status of the hardline Islamicideologist Movladi Udugov by naming him head of a new Information Service. (7) Since the 2002 Moscow theater siege, the Putin administration has appeared unequivocallyopposed to talks with the rebels and more dedicated to establishing a pro-Moscow government inChechnya. This regional government increasingly is using its own forces to battle the remainingrebels. According to some estimates, there are now about 20,000 Chechen police and securitypersonnel. This has permitted the disengagement and withdrawal of thousands of Russian troopsfrom the region. This "Chechenization" of the conflict, along with related pacification efforts,constitutes the main elements of the Russian government's campaign to wind down the Chechnyaconflict. Pacification efforts aim to gain the support or acquiescence of the population to federalcontrol and include rebuilding assistance and elections. The assassination of the Chechen presidentin May 2004, and the attack on the school in Beslan in September 2004 have raised questions aboutwhether Chechenization and pacification are succeeding. The Putin government long claimed that the fight against terrorism in Chechnya required thesuspension of some civil rights. However, it claimed in 2002 that ebbing fighting permitted thebolstering of civil rights and arranged a constitutional referendum and a presidential election in theregion in 2003. Many human rights organizations nonetheless have documented or alleged ongoinghuman rights abuses by Russian and pro-Moscow Chechen forces, including sweeps of villages bytroops in search of hiding rebels. Such sweeps result in civilian disappearances, summary killings,and hostage-taking for ransom. Although the scale and number of such sweeps may have declinedto some degree since 1999, more than 400 civilian abductions may have occurred in 2004 and morethan 200 in 2005, according to Russia's Memorial human rights organization. (8) Many observers have objectedto an apparent Chechen government policy of abducting the relatives of rebel leaders, includingMaskhadov's, to compel the leaders to surrender. (9) Chechen rebels also continue to commit abuses. The Putin government in 2003-2004 pressed displaced Chechens outside the region to returnto Chechnya, arguing that civil order had been largely restored and that rebuilding had commenced. By June 2004, authorities had closed tent cities in Chechnya's neighboring Ingush region to forcethese displaced people to return to Chechnya (or to move elsewhere). During his January 2004 visitto Chechnya, U.N. Undersecretary-General Jan Egeland raised concerns about these efforts to forcethe Chechens to return, such as by bulldozing camps or turning off electricity, especially since hefound that living conditions in Chechnya were still harsh and unsafe. A mid-2005 U.N. assessmentindicated that there were still large numbers of internally displaced and ill-housed Chechens. (10) To encourage displaced Chechens to return to the region and to bolster popular support, theRussian government launched a limited program of compensation for the destruction of housingduring the conflict that reportedly assisted about 39,000 Chechen families. Reconstruction inChechnya is lagging far behind schedule, however, because of a lack of coordination between federaland regional governments and widespread corruption. (11) Noting this slow progress, the U.N. appeal for aid for 2005stated that the region's population still faced abductions, tortures, terrorist attacks, extrajudicialmurders, and rape. The appeal reported that most Chechens remained unemployed and in poverty,many without homes or basic services such as healthcare, education, electricity, water, and seweragesystems. (12) The scheduling of popular elections in Chechnya has been a primary component of Russia'seffort to foster peace. The Russian government has hailed elections as restoring civil order,affirming the region's status as a constituent part of Russia, establishing new pro-Moscow politicalinstitutions, and formally repudiating the former Chechen government of President AslanMaskhadov. The Russian government hopes that the new political system will come to be viewedas legitimate by the international community, and that Chechens will at least acquiesce to the newsystem. The strategy has included holding a constitutional referendum and presidential, legislative,federal, and local elections in Chechnya. This strategy was put to a severe test in May 2004 with theassassination of Akhmad Kadyrov, who had been elected to the Chechen presidency just monthspreviously. The Putin government continued on this course, however, and held new presidentialelections in the region in August 2004. The assassination delayed a legislative election until late2005. (13) The Russian government has portrayed the promulgation of a new Chechen constitution andthe holding of a referendum as marking the will of the people to re-establish the rule of law. Apro-Moscow Chechen constitutional commission decided on a final draft constitution in August2002.