Federal officials, policy analysts, and homeland security experts express concern about thecurrent state of chemical facility security. Referring to them as "the single greatest danger of apotential terrorist attack in our country today," some experts fear these facilities are at risk of apotentially catastrophic terrorist attack. (1) The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) identifies chemicalfacilities as being one of the highest priority critical infrastructure sectors. (2) Currently, chemical facility security efforts include a mixture of local, state, and federal laws,industry trade association requirements, voluntary actions, and federal outreach programs. The DHShas identified this composite as being insufficient in addressing security for the entire chemicalssector. Additionally, various costs and requirements may act as disincentives to stakeholdersattempting to create uniform, effective security against terrorist attack. Many in the public and private sector call for federal legislation to address chemical facilitysecurity. (3) Still,disagreement exists over whether federal legislation is the best approach to securing chemicalfacilities, and, if legislation is deemed necessary, what approaches best meet the security need. Sincethe population potentially affected by a chemical release generally resides near specific facilities,some experts may argue that chemical facility security concerns should be dealt with by state or localauthorities. Other experts claim the potentially catastrophic nature of a terrorist attack and thewidespread distribution of chemical facilities make chemical facility security an issue of nationalconcern. Policymakers may decide that chemical facility security is a matter of national homelandsecurity and is best addressed at the federal, rather than state level. Critical issues surrounding chemical facility security legislation include determining whichchemical facilities should be protected, which involves analyzing and prioritizing chemical facilitysecurity risks, identifying which chemical facilities pose the most risk, and establishing whatactivities could enhance facility security to an acceptable level. Because of the widespread use ofchemicals in U.S. society, determining which chemical facilities to protect is a challenge. Selectionmight be based on relative risk, but it is not clear how this risk might be determined. Mechanismsfor assessing security risk might include weighing the known or theoretical terrorist threat faced bya particular facility, the chemical hazards held at a facility, the quantities of those chemicals, and thelocation of those chemicals relative to the surrounding population. Security regulation of some chemical facilities is established under certain statutes, includingthe Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) ( P.L. 107-295 ) and the Safe Drinking Water Act(SDWA), as amended by the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act ( P.L. 107-188 ). Several states haveestablished homeland security statutes and three, New Jersey, Maryland, and New York, have statelaws or regulations specifically addressing chemical facility security. Potential chemical facilitysecurity enhancement might be achieved through a range of policy approaches: providing grants toincrease security at high risk facilities; mandating site vulnerability assessments; compellingvulnerability remediation; establishing federal security standards; or requiring the consideration oruse of specific technologies. Proposed legislation may aim to complement existing law or tooverride it. In the 109th Congress, legislation has been introduced in both chambers addressing concernsregarding chemical facility security. In the Senate, S. 2145 , the Chemical FacilityAnti-Terrorism Act of 2005, and S. 2486 , Chemical Security and Safety Act of 2006,have been introduced. In the House, H.R. 1562 , the Chemical Facility Security Act of2005, H.R. 2237 , the Chemical Security Act of 2005, H.R. 4999 , acompanion bill to S. 2145, and H.R. 5695 , the Chemical FacilityAnti-Terrorism Act of 2005, have been introduced. Each bill contain provisions requiringvulnerability assessment and the creation of security plans, though details vary significantly betweenthe bills. One area of previous contention involves inclusion of consideration or use of inherentlysafer technologies. S. 2486 and H.R. 2237 both explicitly address inherentlysafer technologies, while S. 2145/H.R. 4999, H.R. 5695 and H.R.1562 do not. This report will discuss current chemical facility security efforts, considerations in definingchemical facilities, policy challenges in developing chemical facility security legislation, and selectpolicy approaches. For information on the risks of terrorism at chemical facilities, previouslyestablished federal safety requirements, general policy issues, and an overview of legislativeinitiatives in prior Congresses, see CRS Report RL31530 Chemical Facility Security, by Linda-JoSchierow. Many organizations are undertaking efforts to secure chemical facilities. Some efforts arevoluntary in nature, involving security best practices, or semi-voluntary, such as requirements formembership in trade associations. Other efforts arise from state or local chemical facility securityregulation. Finally, federal security legislation affecting some chemical facilities was enacted inprevious Congresses. Federal agency outreach activities continue. Industry trade associations have developed and publicized security best practices for theirmember companies. (4) These practices vary, but many recommend or require vulnerability assessments of chemicalfacilities, generation of security plans to address the largest vulnerabilities, implementation of thesesecurity plans, and, in some cases, external auditing of these security plans or their implementation. One of the most often discussed trade association security requirements is the American ChemistryCouncil's (ACC) Responsible Care program. (5) The DHS officially recognizes the Responsible Care Security Codeas an Alternative Security Program for the purposes of compliance with MTSA. (6) The ACC companies comprisealmost 90% of basic industrial chemical production, although their members are only a small fractionof the total number of chemical manufacturers. While many other chemical manufacturers anddistributors participate in other trade associations, the DHS testified that approximately 20% of thechemical facilities that DHS identifies as high risk do not participate in any voluntary securityprogram. (7) Some argue that a voluntary security program is insufficient to meet the risk of a significantterrorist attack. One security expert testified that ... it is a fallacy to think that profit-maximizingcorporations engaged in a trade as inherently dangerous as the manufacture and shipment of TIH[Toxic Inhalation Hazard] chemicals will ever voluntarily provide a level of security that isappropriate given the larger external risk to society as a whole. (8) Others challenge the voluntary security plans as vague, inappropriately focused on physical security,and difficult to verify. (9) Some analysts likewise believe that current security at chemical facilities would not stop adetermined, armed attacker. (10) Supporters of voluntary efforts cite the large investment made in site security since 2001 andother efforts to reduce risk as signs of their effectiveness. The ACC, for example, notes that itsmember companies invested over $2 billion in security enhancements since 2001. (11) Additionally, somefacilities voluntarily switched chemicals, changed manufacturing processes, or reduced the amountof chemicals on-site. (12) As one industry trade association representative testified, "Our efforts show that industry does notneed to be prodded by government mandates to take aggressive and effective steps to secure itsfacilities." (13) Several states have safety or environmental laws applying to chemical facilities, but three,New Jersey, Maryland, and New York, have enacted security laws that specifically target chemicalfacilities. Under New Jersey's Domestic Security Preparedness Act of 2001, the New JerseyDomestic Security Preparedness Task Force is authorized to adopt and enforce security standardson the public and private sector, following review and approval by the Governor. (14) In November, 2005, theTask Force mandated chemical facilities to comply with previously voluntary best practices,including reviewing existing processes for inherently safer alternatives at specific facilities. Facilities must report to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection. (15) Under Maryland's Hazardous Material Security Act, facilities that are required to fileEnvironmental Protection Agency (EPA) risk management plans (RMPs) must perform vulnerabilityassessments and implement plans to address those vulnerabilities. The Hazardous Material SecurityAct excludes agricultural fertilizer retailers from this requirement. The facilities must report to theMaryland Department of the Environment and the Maryland State Police. (16) Under New York's Anti-Terrorism Preparedness Act of 2004, the New York Office ofHomeland Security is charged with reviewing the vulnerability of chemical plants, following whichit can recommend security improvements at particular plants. The Anti-Terrorism Preparedness Actof 2004 also allows the state Office of Homeland Security, in consultation with stakeholders, toidentify chemical facilities covered by the law. It excludes facilities holding fuel for retail sale andfacilities that are water suppliers. The Department of Environmental Conservation enforces thelaw. (17) Policymakers who believe that states are better suited to assess local threats and vulnerabilities may prefer chemical facility security measures to be developed locally. A potentialconcern of industry about such state laws is that a patchwork of regulations could develop, withdifferent standards applying to facilities located in different states. Consequently, facilities in somestates might be more secure than in others, or a facility's out-of-state competitors might face verydifferent security costs. Policymakers who believe such an approach does not provide sufficientsecurity to the population at large, or places an uneven burden on industry may prefer a nationalstandard. Also, some chemical facilities located near state borders may pose risks across state lines,supporting efforts for a national standard. Congress has passed many environmental and safety statutes which may provide ancillarysecurity benefits. Congress has also enacted legislation providing security requirements for somespecific types of chemical facilities, but these requirements vary among different statutes. Also, thefederal government, through the Department of Homeland Security and other agencies, engages theprivate sector in a public/private partnership, raising the profile of chemical facility security andproviding first responders with federal funding to secure critical infrastructure, including chemicalfacilities. Congressional Actions.