In recent years, controversies regarding the federal advisory committee system have included concerns about the appointment of specific individuals to committees and agency decisions to create or terminate some committees. Although a variety of concerns have been raised, the overarching concern was that ideological bias was influencing the selection of experts for scientific and health advisory panels. Publications such as Science, The Lancet, and Chemical and Engineering News have published editorials and articles containing criticisms of decisions seen as injecting ideology into a committee system that should be nonideological. Further, some current and potential federal advisory committee members reported being asked about their political views in the context of decisions regarding their appointment or reappointment to committees. A number of recent articles and editorials identified specific concerns about HHS committees that address controversial scientific and technical issues. Observers have alleged that some appointees either were unqualified for the position, had extreme views that were outside the mainstream of scientific thinking, or had personal conflicts of interest that should have disqualified them from serving on particular committees. Further, observers alleged that HHS has replaced large portions of the membership of ongoing committees as a way of obtaining committees that shared the administration’s viewpoint about particular issues. Finally, concerns were raised that HHS had terminated some advisory committees with which the administration allegedly had ideological differences and replaced them with committees that had different charters and a largely new membership. In 2003, the National Academy of Sciences issued a report on organizational issues within NIH that included a discussion of the perceived politicization of the advisory committee appointment process. The report noted that these concerns had recently arisen within the scientific and health advocacy communities and were similar to concerns that were raised in the early 1970s. In response to the most recent concerns, the academy recommended, among other things, that appointments to NIH advisory committees be based solely on a person’s scientific or clinical expertise or his or her commitment to and involvement in issues of relevance to the mission of the institute. Also in 2003, the Center for Science in the Public Interest sent a letter to the director of OGE about its concerns that conflicts of interest were introducing biases into the federal advisory committee process at HHS, Interior, and other agencies. The center’s letter, signed by 21 individuals, including public health advocates and members of academia, made a number of recommendations to OGE aimed at strengthening independence, transparency, and public trust in the federal advisory committee process. Further, the National Academies is examining the selection of scientists, engineers, and health professionals to federal advisory committees addressing science-based policy or reviewing research proposals. This study stems from its regular review of senior scientific technical appointments in the federal government as well as from concerns that scientists and others have raised to the academies about some federal advisory committee appointments and the appointment practices used by some agencies. A report is planned for November 2004. The Congress enacted FACA in 1972 in response to two principal concerns: (1) that federal advisory committees were proliferating without adequate review, oversight, or accountability and (2) that certain special interests had too much influence over federal agency decision makers. In this act, the Congress articulated certain principles regarding advisory committees, including broad requirements for balance, independence, and transparency. Specifically, as previously discussed, FACA requires that the membership of committees be fairly balanced in terms of points of view and functions to be performed. Further, FACA requires that any legislation or agency action that creates a committee contain provisions to ensure that the advice and recommendations of the committee will be independent and not inappropriately influenced by the appointing authority (the agency) or any special interest. Finally, FACA generally requires that agencies announce committee meetings ahead of time and give notice to interested parties about such meetings. With some exceptions, the meetings are to be open to the public, and agencies are to prepare meeting minutes and make them available to interested parties. FACA also set broad guidelines for the creation and management of federal advisory committees, most of which are created or authorized by the Congress. Agencies also establish committees using general statutory authority, and some are created by presidential directives (see app. II). Further, the act requires that all committees have a charter, and that each charter contain specific information, including the committee’s scope and objectives, a description of duties, the period of time necessary to carry out its purposes, the estimated operating costs, and the number and frequency of meetings. As required by FACA, the advisory committee charters generally expire at the end of 2 years unless renewed by the agency or by the Congress. The requirement encourages agencies to periodically reexamine their need for committees. GSA, through its Committee Management Secretariat, is responsible for prescribing administrative guidelines and management controls applicable to advisory committees governmentwide. However, GSA does not have the authority to approve or deny agency decisions regarding the creation or management of advisory committees. To fulfill its responsibilities, GSA has developed regulations and other guidance to assist agencies in implementing FACA requirements, provides training to agency officials, and was instrumental in creating the Interagency Committee on Federal Advisory Committee Management. GSA also has created and maintains an on-line FACA database (available to the public at www.fido.gov/facadatabase) for which the agencies provide and verify the data, including committee charters, membership rosters, budgets, and in many cases links to committee meeting schedules, minutes, and reports. The database also includes information about a committee’s classification (i.e., scientific and technical or national policy issue). According to the database, 208 committees with 7,910 members were classified as scientific and technical committees. In addition, 131 committees with over 41,000 members were classified as grant review committees—a category that also often addresses scientific and technical issues. Appendix II provides data on the classifications of the federal advisory committees in fiscal year 2003. While the GSA’s Committee Management Secretariat provides FACA guidance to federal agencies, each agency also develops its own policies and procedures for following FACA requirements. Under FACA, agency heads are responsible for issuing administrative guidelines and management controls applicable to their agency’s advisory committees. Generally, federal agencies have a reasonable amount of discretion with regards to creating committees, drafting their charters, establishing their scope and objectives, classifying the committee type, determining what type of advice they are to provide, and appointing members to serve on committees. However, when the Congress authorizes an agency to establish a particular committee or a President establishes a committee, the agency may have less flexibility in establishing and managing the committee because such things as the committee’s objectives, the types of expertise and backgrounds of members, and even the type of advice that is to be provided may be specified by the Congress or the President. Finally, to assist with the management of their federal advisory committees, agency heads are required to appoint a committee management officer to oversee the agency’s compliance with FACA requirements, including recordkeeping. Agency heads must also appoint a designated federal official for each committee to oversee the committee’s activities. Among other things, the designated federal official must approve or call the meetings of the committee, approve the agendas (except for presidential advisory committees), and attend the meetings. OGE is responsible for issuing regulations and guidance for agencies to follow in complying with the statutory conflict-of-interest provisions that apply to all federal employees, including special government employees serving on federal advisory committees. A special government employee is statutorily defined as an officer or employee who is retained, designated, appointed, or employed by the government to perform temporary duties, with or without compensation, for not more than 130 days during any period of 365 consecutive days. Many agencies use special government employees, either as advisory committee members or as individual experts or consultants. Special government employees, like regular federal employees, are to provide their own best judgment in a manner that is free from conflicts of interest and without acting as a stakeholder to represent any particular point of view. Accordingly, special government employees appointed to federal advisory committees are hired for their expertise and skills and are expected to provide advice on behalf of the government on the basis of their own best judgment. Special government employees are subject to the federal financial conflict-of-interest requirements, although ones that are somewhat less restrictive than those for regular federal government employees. The criminal financial conflict-of-interest statute (18 U.S.C. § 208) and related OGE regulations prohibit federal employees, including special government employees, from participating in “particular matters” that may have a direct and predictable effect on their financial interests or those interests of a spouse, minor child, or general partner. A particular matter is defined as one involving a deliberation, decision, or action that is focused on the interests of specific people or an identifiable class of people. Special government employees serving on federal advisory committees thus are prohibited from participating when the subjects they consider are particular matters in which the member has a financial interest. However, special government employees serving on federal advisory committees are provided with an exemption that allows them to participate in particular matters that have a direct and predictable effect on their financial interest if the interest arises from their nonfederal employment and the matter will not have a special or distinct effect on the employee or employer other than as part of a class. This exemption does not extend to the committee member’s personal financial and other interests in the matter, such as stock ownership in the employer. If a committee member has a potential financial conflict of interest that is not covered under this or other exemptions, a waiver of the conflict-of-interest provisions may be granted if the appointing official determines that the need for the special government employee’s services outweighs the potential for conflict of interest or that the conflict is not significant. This standard for granting waivers is less stringent than the standard for regular government employees. The principal tool that agencies use to assess whether nominees or members of advisory committees have conflicts of interest is the OGE Form 450, Executive Branch Confidential Financial Disclosure Report, which special government employees are required to submit annually.