In 1984, Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act (CCCA ) . The act, in the words of the Senate Judiciary Committee report that accompanied the legislation, was "the product of a decade long bipartisan effort . . . to make major comprehensive improvements to the federal criminal laws." In an effort to achieve that goal, the CCCA established new bail procedures, imposed mandatory minimum sentences for many criminal offenses, increased the penalties for drug offenses and violent crimes, and created additional federal criminal offenses. Various provisions of the CCCA employ the term "crime of violence" in reference to the elements of certain offenses, the conditions for the issuance of bail, and the circumstances where enhanced prison sentences are required. For example, the CCCA requires a judge to consider, among other things, the nature and circumstances of a criminal defendant's offense, including whether the offense is a crime of violence, when assessing whether conditions permit the defendant's release from custody while awaiting trial. In addition, the CCCA directs the United States Sentencing Commission to ensure that the Sentencing Guidelines specify a term of imprisonment "at or near the maximum term" authorized by the federal criminal code for adult criminal defendants convicted of a crime of violence. A number of federal statutes have been enacted that employ the CCCA's crime of violence definition (COV definition) to describe proscribed conduct, including in both the criminal and immigration context. In addition, courts have sometimes looked to the COV definition (and jurisprudence interpreting that provision) for guidance in interpreting similarly worded provisions found elsewhere in the federal criminal code, such as those statutory provisions referencing a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" or "violent felony." The Supreme Court has found the COV definition relevant in interpreting some of these provisions, while finding the definition inapposite in other cases. The COV definition contains two prongs. In its 2018 ruling in Sessions v. Dimaya , the Supreme Court struck down on vagueness grounds the second prong of the COV definition, as incorporated into the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which covers any felony offense that, "by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force . . . may be used in the course of committing the offense." The ruling narrows the scope of the offenses covered by the COV definition and may have consequences for the application of a number of laws that incorporate the COV definition or employ similar language as the "residual clause" struck down by the Court. Nonetheless, the first prong of the COV definition remains in effect, covering any offense "that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another." This report examines the statutory definition of a crime of violence and notable judicial developments concerning the definition's scope, including the Court's ruling in Dimaya narrowing the application of the COV definition. In particular, this report examines how the courts have interpreted the elements of the COV definition found in 18 U.S.C. § 16 and similarly worded provisions in the federal criminal code. The report concludes by considering the implications of these legal issues and judicial developments for Congress. Prior to the CCCA, some federal statutes employed the term "crime of violence" in setting forth the elements of a criminal offense or the conditions of confinement. Although there was no uniform definition of a crime of violence, Congress typically provided definitions of that term when they appeared in a federal law. For example, in the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966, Congress included a definition of a crime of violence that was limited to specific criminal offenses: voluntary manslaughter, murder, rape, mayhem, kidnaping, robbery, burglary or housebreaking in the nighttime, extortion accompanied by threats of violence, assault with a dangerous weapon or assault with intent to commit any offense punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, arson punishable as a felony, or an attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing offenses. Eventually, in an effort to provide a universal and broader definition of a crime of violence, Congress created a two-pronged COV definition in the CCCA. That definition, which is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 16, covers each of the following: (a) [A]n offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or (b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing any offense. Following passage of the CCCA, Congress incorporated the COV definition into a number of other federal statutory provisions . For example, under the INA, a non-U.S. national who commits a crime of violence for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year may face significant immigration consequences, including being subject to removal from the United States, subject to mandatory detention pending removal proceedings, ineligible for certain forms of relief from removal, barred from naturalization, and generally barred for readmission into the United States. In the criminal context, other examples include a statutory provision that imposes increased prison sentences on a person who intentionally uses a minor to commit a crime of violence, and a provision that makes it unlawful to receive anything of pecuniary value from an enterprise engaged in racketeering activity in exchange for threatening to commit a crime of violence. Despite Congress's attempt to provide a uniform definition of a crime of violence, courts have struggled to assess the scope of that definition. And on multiple occasions, the Supreme Court has intervened to clarify the meaning of a crime of violence and similarly worded phrases found elsewhere in the federal criminal code. The following section briefly discusses three major issues the courts have considered in assessing the scope of activities covered by the COV definition: (1) whether to examine either the underlying conduct of a criminal offense, the statutory elements of the offense, or some combination in order to determine whether a person has been convicted of a crime of violence; (2) the degree of force necessary for an act to satisfy the "physical force" element of the COV definition; and (3) whether a crime of violence requires a specific mental state. Following the enactment of the CCCA, reviewing courts were confronted with the issue of how to determine whether a criminal conviction fell within the COV definition. In particular, courts considered whether a conviction under a criminal statute that covered a broader range of conduct than the COV definition could nonetheless be deemed a conviction for a crime of violence. This issue typically arose when the underlying conduct that gave rise to the criminal conviction was the type covered by the COV definition, but the statute of conviction also covered conduct that would not meet the COV definition. This debate was part of a broader disagreement among courts as to how to determine whether a criminal conviction falls within the definition of a predicate crime—that is, a generic crime defined in statute (e.g., a crime of violence or a violent felony) for purposes of imposing enhancements and other penalties. Ultimately, in Taylor v. United States , which addressed the meaning of the term "burglary" under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), the Supreme Court adopted a "categorical approach" analysis where courts may look only to the statutory elements of a criminal conviction, rather than the particular facts underlying that conviction, to determine whether the criminal offense fits within the definition of a predicate crime. In applying this analysis, reviewing courts must presume that the conviction was based on the least culpable conduct under the criminal statute. If the crime of conviction "sweeps more broadly" than the generic offense, the criminal conviction does not fit within that predicate offense. Where statutes have multiple alternative elements of a crime, only some of which correspond to the generic offense, courts may employ a "modified categorical approach" and examine a limited set of documents relating to the conviction (such as charging papers, jury instructions, and plea agreements) to determine which elements a defendant was convicted of, and compare those elements to the predicate crime definition. The Supreme Court has strictly confined this analysis to "divisible" statutes that define multiple crimes with different elements, rather than statutes that contain a "single, indivisible set of elements" that cover more conduct than the predicate offense, or merely list the alternate means of committing a crime. The Supreme Court's elements-based approach to determining whether a criminal offense meets the definition of a predicate crime may have consequences for assessing whether a criminal offense is considered a crime of violence. For example, even if a criminal defendant was convicted of a crime that involved the use of physical force—as the COV definition requires—courts have found that the conviction will not be considered a crime of violence if the statute that formed the basis for his conviction proscribes additional conduct that does not involve physical force. Under both prongs of the COV definition found in 18 U.S.C. § 16, a crime of violence is predicated on the use of (or the risk of using) "physical force." In interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 16 and related, similarly worded statutory provisions, courts have differed over the degree of physical force that a criminal offense must entail to satisfy this definitional element. With respect to 18 U.S.C. § 16, courts of appeals for the majority of federal circuits have held that "physical force" must be violent or destructive in nature, distinguishing such force from mere physical contact—however rude or offensive—with a property or person, or any act that intentionally causes physical injury. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (Eleventh Circuit ), on the other hand, has rejected the notion that a statute must require violent force to qualify as a crime of violence.