MDA’s BMDS is being designed to counter ballistic missiles of all rang short, medium, intermediate, and long. Since ballistic missiles have different ranges, speeds, sizes, and performance characteristics, MDA is employing an integrated and layered architecture to provide multiple opportunities to destroy ballistic missiles before they can reach their targets. The system’s architecture includes networked space-based sensors as well as ground- and sea-based radars, ground- and sea-based interceptor missiles, and a command and control, battle management, and communications network providing the warfighter with the necessary communication links to the sensors and interceptor missiles. A possible engagement scenario to defend against an intercontinental ballistic missile would occur as follows: Infrared sensors aboard early-warning satellites detect the hot plume of a missile launch and alert the command authority of a possible attack. Upon receiving the alert, land- or sea-based radars are directed to track the various objects released from the missile and, if so designed, to identify the warhead from among spent rocket motors, countermeasures, and debris. When the trajectory of the missile’s warhead has been adequately established, an interceptor—consisting of a kill vehicle mounted atop a booster—is launched to engage the threat. The interceptor boosts itself toward a predicted intercept point and releases the kill vehicle. The kill vehicle uses its onboard sensors and divert thrusters to detect ead. With a combined closing identify, and steer itself into the warh speed of approximately 10 kilometers per second (22,000 miles per hour), the warhead is destroyed above the atmosphere through a to kill” collision with the kill vehicle. Some interceptors use sensors to steer themselves into the inbound ballistic missile. Inside the atmosphere, weapon systems kill the ballistic missile using a range of mechanisms, such as direct collision between the interceptor missile and the inbound ballistic missile, or using the combined effects of a blast fragmentation warhead (heat, pressure, and shrapnel) in cases where a direct hit does not occur. In the August 2009 BMDS Accountability Report, MDA presents the BMD performance from the perspectives of homeland defense and regional/theater capabilities. Homeland defense uses the capabilities of s Ground-based Interceptors (GBI), Aegis BMD assets, and BMDS radar against the threat from intercontinental and intermediate-range ballist ic missiles, while regional and theater defense use Aegis BMD Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) and THAAD interceptors with mobile radars against threats from medium-range missiles and short-range ballistic missiles. Table 1 provides a brief description of eight BMDS elements that are currently under development by MDA. The new administration proposed significant changes to the BMDS program in 2009 including program terminations and changes to some of the BMDS elements we reported on in the past, as well as changes to plans for missile defense in Europe. Administration proposals culminated in reductions of approximately $1 billion from MDA’s budget request for fiscal year 2010. In the spring of 2009, the Secretary of Defense recommended termination of the Multiple Kill Vehicle element. Originally designed as an optional warhead for all midcourse interceptors, MDA terminated the Multiple Kill Vehicle element because of feasibility issues raised about this technology, which was still in its early stages of development, as well as a decision to refocus MDA’s resources on new technologies aimed at early intercept of ballistic missiles. MDA also terminated its Kinetic Energy Interceptor element because of technical issues, its incompatibility with operational infrastructures, and delays during development. It was originally designed as a mobile land-based missile defense system to destroy medium, intermediate, and intercontinental ballistic missiles during the boost and midcourse phases of their flight. The ABL program was also significantly affected by the Secretary of Defense’s proposal to designate it as a technology program and cancel the plans for the purchase of a second aircraft that would have provided an operational capability. In addition, MDA requested increased funding for the Aegis BMD and THAAD programs for fiscal year 2010 following administration recommendations. MDA plans to use these funds to move both elements toward meeting full funding policies, to increase production for Aegis BMD and THAAD interceptors, to increase the interceptor production rate and number of THAAD batteries, and to increase the number of Aegis BMD ships. MDA is also responding to the new administration’s shift in its approach to European missile defense. In September 2009, DOD altered its approach to European defense, which originally focused on GBIs from the GMD element and a large fixed radar as well as transportable X-Band radars, and is now focusing on providing defenses against long-range threats to the United States and short-, medium-, and intermediate-range Iranian threats to Europe. This new “Phased, Adaptive Approach” consists primarily of Aegis BMD sea-based and land-based systems and interceptors, as well as various sensors to be deployed over time as the various capabilities are matured. According to DOD, this new approach offers a number of improvements over the previous architecture, such as providing missile defenses sooner with greater flexibility to meet evolving threats, providing more opportunities to involve close allies, and delivering greater capability to defend against a large number of threat missiles. In addition, during fiscal year 2009, MDA transitioned to a new Director and the agency’s development effort was rebalanced to focus more on regional/theater missile defense. This rebalancing included shifting technology development efforts from boost-phase intercept technologies to early intercept technologies (or ascent phase). MDA officials state that because early intercept technology initiates intercept as early as possible to execute a shoot-look-shoot tactic and defeat a threat before countermeasures are deployed, it will ultimately reduce the number of interceptors required to defeat a raid of threat missiles and save on the costs of maintaining a significant number of expensive interceptors to destroy advanced countermeasures in a later phase of a threat missile’s flight. According to the MDA Director, this technology will force the deployment of countermeasures early in flight where they are less effective. In June 2009, MDA also began to change its acquisition management strategy. From its inception in 2002 to December 2007, MDA managed the acquisition of missile defense capabilities by organizing the development effort into 2-year increments known as blocks. Each block was intended to provide the BMDS with capabilities that enhanced the development and overall performance of the system. The first 2-year block—Block 2004— fielded a limited initial capability that included early versions of the GMD, Aegis BMD, Patriot Advanced Capability-3, and C2BMC elements as well as various sensors. The agency’s second 2-year block—Block 2006— culminated on December 31, 2007, and fielded additional BMDS assets. On December 7, 2007, according to MDA in response to recommendations from GAO, MDA’s Director announced a new acquisition management strategy to better communicate its plans and goals to Congress. The agency’s new approach was based on fielding capabilities that address particular threats as opposed to a biennial time period. This approach divided fielding capabilities into five blocks. The capabilities-based five-block approach included several positive changes, including the commitment by DOD to establish total acquisition costs and unit cost for selected block assets, including in a block only those elements or components that will be fielded during the block, and abandoning the practice of deferring work from one block to another. MDA was still transitioning to this new capabilities-based block approach when the MDA Director terminated it in June 2009—a year and a half after it was created. According to MDA, the agency terminated the capability- based block structure to address the explanatory statement accompanying the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2009, which stated that MDA’s “justification materials should no longer be presented in the Block format, but rather by fiscal year for each activity within the program element.” The agency has decided that it will manage the BMDS as a single integrated program and is in the process of determining how it will implement changes to its acquisition management strategy. In fiscal year 2009, MDA achieved several noteworthy accomplishments. For example, MDA revised its testing approach to better align tests with modeling and simulation needs and is undertaking a new targets development effort to resolve long-standing problems supplying sufficient and reliable targets. The agency also demonstrated increased levels of performance for some of its BMDS elements through flight and ground testing. MDA testing achievements during the year indicate an increased level of interoperability among multiple elements, improving both system- level performance and advancing the validation of BMDS models and simulations needed to predict performance. In addition, the agency delivered most of the assets as planned by the end of fiscal year 2009. In fiscal year 2009, MDA revised its testing approach in response to GAO and DOD concerns. In March 2009 we reported that MDA’s Integrated Master Test Plan—its test baseline—was not effective for management and oversight because it was revised frequently, only extended through the following fiscal year and was not well integrated with other key aspects of testing such as target acquisitions. Most of the annual revisions to the test baseline were occurring either because MDA changed the substance of tests, changed the timing of tests, or added tests to the baseline. In other instances, MDA canceled planned tests which also affected the test baseline. In addition, the BMDS Operational Test Agency identified several limitations in the previous BMDS test program, including unaccredited models and simulations, flight test artificialities, and inadequate modeling of some environmental conditions. Members of Congress also expressed concern with MDA’s test approach. For example, in the fiscal year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act conference report, conferees noted that MDA failed to ensure an adequate testing program and that its test and targets program needed to be managed in a way that fully supported high-priority near-term programs.