In 1997 and 1999, we reported that INS was implementing its border strategy generally as planned. The strategy called for concentrating personnel and technology in a four-phased approach, starting first with the sectors with the highest levels of illegal immigration activity (as measured by apprehensions) and moving to the areas with the least activity. The four phases of the strategy called for allocating additional Border Patrol resources to sectors along the border in the following order: (1) Phase I: San Diego, CA, and El Paso, TX, sectors; (2) Phase II: Tucson, AZ, sector and three sectors in south Texas—Del Rio, Laredo, and McAllen; (3) Phase III: the remaining three sectors along the Southwest border; (4) Phase IV: the Northern border, Gulf Coast, and coastal waterways. The Southwest border, which has been the focus of INS’ buildup in Border Patrol resources to date, represents 9 of the Border Patrol’s 21 sectors nationwide (see fig. 1). The strategy’s objectives are to (1) close off the routes most frequently used by smugglers and illegal aliens (generally through urban areas) and (2) shift traffic to ports of entry, where travelers are inspected, or to areas that are more remote and difficult to cross. With the traditional crossing routes disrupted, INS expected that illegal alien traffic would either be deterred or forced over terrain less suited for crossing, where INS believed it would have the tactical advantage. INS’ Border Patrol is responsible for preventing and detecting illegal entry along the border between the nation’s ports of entry. To carry out the strategy, the Border Patrol was to concentrate personnel and resources in a four-phased approach, starting with the areas of highest illegal alien activity; increase the time Border Patrol agents spend on border control activities; make maximum use of physical barriers; and identify the appropriate quantity and mix of personnel and technology needed to control the border. The Border Patrol’s fiscal year 2001 budget is about $1.2 billion, a 9- percent increase over its fiscal year 2000 budget of about $1.1 billion. As of September 30, 2000, there were 9,096 Border Patrol agents nationwide; 8,475, or 93 percent, were located in the nine sectors along the Southwest border. INS’ phased approach to implementing its strategy has included several operations in which INS allocated additional Border Patrol agents and other resources—such as fencing, lighting, night vision scopes, sensors, cameras, vehicles, and aircraft—to targeted locations along the Southwest border. In October 1994, the Border Patrol launched Operation Gatekeeper in its San Diego sector. Initially, the operation focused enforcement resources along the 5 miles that at that time accounted for nearly 25 percent of all illegal border crossings nationwide. Since then, the sector has expanded Gatekeeper to include the entire 66 miles of border under the sector’s jurisdiction. In 1994, the Border Patrol began Operation Safeguard in the Tucson sector. Initially, the operation focused enforcement resources in the Nogales, AZ, area. Since then, the sector has expanded operations to the Douglas and Naco, AZ, area to respond to the increase in apprehensions in that area. In August 1997, INS launched Operation Rio Grande in the Rio Grande Valley area in south Texas. The Border Patrol focused enhanced resources in the McAllen and Laredo, TX, sectors. In fiscal year 1998, the Border Patrol extended Operation Gatekeeper to the El Centro sector in California’s Imperial Valley, east of San Diego. This was done to respond to the increase in illegal alien traffic in that area and to target the alien smuggling rings that moved there after the Border Patrol increased its presence in San Diego. INS has reported that each of these initiatives reduced the number of alien apprehensions in some of the targeted areas. INS’ apprehension statistics have been its primary quantitative indicator of the results of the strategy. INS anticipated that the following changes, among others, would provide evidence of the interim effectiveness of the strategy: Locations receiving an infusion of resources would experience an initial increase in the number of illegal alien apprehensions, followed by a decrease in apprehensions when a “decisive level of resources” had been achieved. Illegal alien traffic would shift from sectors that traditionally accounted for most illegal immigration activity toward other sectors. One of the major technological initiatives deployed along the Southwest border has been IDENT, INS’ automated biometric identification system, which captures apprehended aliens’ fingerprints, photos, and biographical data, as well as information on the date and location of the apprehension. IDENT was developed to help INS determine whether an apprehended alien is an aggravated felon, smuggler, or repeat illegal crosser. Since fiscal year 1995, INS has deployed the system incrementally along the Southwest border, and it is now deployed in all Border Patrol stations within the nine Southwest border sectors. INS spent about $34 million on IDENT development and deployment through fiscal year 2000. To address our three objectives, we (1) analyzed Border Patrol staffing and workload data; (2) reviewed INS’ strategy, INS planning documents, and reviews of INS’ Annual Performance Plans; (3) interviewed INS officials at Border Patrol headquarters in Washington, D.C., and in the San Diego, El Centro, Yuma, Tucson, and Del Rio sectors; (4) interviewed local officials in Calexico, CA; Yuma, Douglas, Santa Cruz County, and Pima County, AZ; and Cameron County and Eagle Pass, TX; (5) interviewed the Mexican Consuls General in Nogales and Douglas, AZ; and (6) held a group discussion with members of the Citizens Advisory Group to the local Border Patrol station in Douglas, AZ. We chose these locations because, except for San Diego, Border Patrol apprehensions in these areas increased as INS implemented its strategy. We also reviewed statistics on migrant deaths and studies on Operations Gatekeeper and Rio Grande that were prepared by an INS contractor. Finally, we observed border enforcement activities in the El Centro, Yuma, and Tucson sectors. We conducted our work between October 2000 and June 2001 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. As INS continues to implement the second phase of its four-phased strategy, its preliminary estimates show that it may need 3,200 to 5,500 more agents, additional support personnel, and hundreds of millions of dollars in additional technology and infrastructure to fully implement the Southwest border strategy. Since fiscal year 1998, INS has been implementing the second phase of its four-phased approach, which called for primarily increasing resources in the Tucson sector and the three sectors in south Texas—Del Rio, Laredo, and McAllen. In accordance with the strategy, INS allocated 1,140 (80 percent) of the additional 1,430 agent positions authorized in fiscal years 1999 and 2000 to these sectors. The strategy noted that Border Patrol needed to be flexible in responding to changing patterns in illegal traffic. Consequently, INS added some of the additional enhancements in fiscal years 1999 and 2000 to the Yuma and El Centro sectors, scheduled for phase III, in order to respond to the shifts in illegal alien traffic to those sectors. Onboard strength in all nine sectors along the Southwest border increased by 1,183 agents (16 percent) to almost 8,500 between fiscal years 1998 and 2000. As shown in table 1, INS has added over 5,000 agents to sectors along the Southwest border since fiscal year 1993, the year preceding the initial implementation of the strategy. This represents a 150-percent increase between fiscal years 1993 and 2000 in the total number of onboard agents in the nine sectors along the Southwest border. (App. I, table 3, provides additional information on Border Patrol agent enhancements along the Southwest border.) As a result of the increased number of agents along the Southwest border, the amount of time spent on border enforcement activities in these sectors increased by 27 percent, from about 8.5 million hours in fiscal year 1998 to almost 11 million hours in fiscal year 2000. The proportion of time Border Patrol agents spent on border enforcement increased from 66 percent to 69 percent during this time. INS has continued to erect barriers as called for in its strategy. Since fiscal year 1999, INS has completed about 12 miles of fencing and other types of barriers, bringing the total to about 76 miles along the Southwest border as of May 2001. INS had plans to erect an additional 32 miles, some of which was under construction as of May 2001. In addition, in fiscal years 1999 and 2000, INS installed 107 remote video surveillance systems along the Southwest border bringing the total to 130. According to INS’ year-end review of its fiscal year 2000 Annual Performance Plan, INS estimated it may need between 11,700 and 14,000 agents to fully implement the Southwest border strategy. This is between 3,200 and 5,500 more agents than the roughly 8,500 agents INS had on board along the Southwest border at the end of fiscal year 2000. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 mandated that the Attorney General increase the number of agents on board by no less than 1,000 agents per year during each of fiscal years 1997 through 2001. INS was able to meet this goal in fiscal years 1997 and 1998, but not in the following 3 years. We reported that in fiscal year 1999, INS was only able to achieve a net increase of 369 agents out of the goal of 1,000 because INS was unable to recruit enough qualified applicants and retain them through the hiring process. In fiscal year 2000, INS stated that it requested no additional agents because of its concern that the ratio of inexperienced-to-experienced agents was getting too high and law enforcement experts said this was risky. Congress, however, funded 430 additional agents. In fiscal year 2001, INS requested 430 agents. In her March 2000 testimony, the former INS Commissioner stated that the 430 agents represented the level that was achievable in the existing tight labor market.