American voters elect the President and Vice President of the United States under a complex arrangement of constitutional provisions, federal and state laws, and political party practices known as the electoral college system. Despite occasional close elections, this system has delivered uncontested results in 47 of 51 elections since adoption of the 12 th Amendment, effective in 1804. In three elections, the electoral college awarded the presidency to candidates who won fewer popular votes than their principal opponents, but a majority of electoral votes. In a fourth, the House of Representatives decided the contest by contingent election, in this case electing a candidate who won fewer popular and electoral votes than his principal opponent. The most recent instance in which the popular vote runner up received a majority in the electoral college occurred in 2000, when George W. Bush was elected President over his opponent, Al Gore, Jr., despite having won fewer popular votes than Gore nationwide. Extremely close and highly contested results in the pivotal state of Florida led to a bitter and protracted struggle that continued for over a month following election day. A Supreme Court decision ended further recounts, leading to certification of Bush electors in Florida, and the Republican candidate's subsequent election. Following the 2000 presidential election, both the electoral college system and the shortcomings of election administration and voting technology, particularly in Florida, were widely criticized. While no substantive action was taken on electoral college proposals, Congress addressed the latter issue with the enactment of the Help America Vote Act, "HAVA" ( P.L. 107-252 , 116 Stat. 1666), in 2002. This act established national standards for voting systems and certain election procedures, and included a program of grants to assist state and local governments in meeting the act's goals. The successful passage of HAVA contrasted with almost complete lack of legislative activity in recent Congresses on proposed constitutional amendments that would eliminate or reform the electoral college system, and served to highlight the comparative difficulties faced by would-be electoral college reformers. The fundamentals of the electoral college system were established by the Constitution, and can only be altered by the much more difficult process of constitutional amendment, rather than by legislation. Moreover, HAVA's prospects for enactment were boosted by the fact that, while few would defend the failures in voting administration and technology that helped promote the act, the electoral college would arguably be enthusiastically supported in Congress and the public forum by its various advocates and defenders. Notwithstanding these hurdles, however, amendments have been proposed to alter or eliminate the electoral college in almost every Congress since 1789. This report examines and analyzes alternative proposals for change, presents pro and con arguments, and identifies and analyzes related proposals introduced in the 109 th Congress. A wide range of proposals to reform presidential election procedures have been introduced over time. In recent decades, they have fallen into two categories: (1) those that seek to eliminate the electoral college system entirely, and replace it with direct popular election; and (2) those that seek to repair perceived defects of the existing system. The direct election alternative would abolish the electoral college, substituting a single, nationwide count of popular votes. The candidates winning a plurality of votes would be elected President and Vice President. Most direct election proposals would constitutionally mandate the joint tickets of presidential/vice presidential candidates already adopted in state law. Some would require simply that the candidates winning the most popular votes would win. Others, however, would set a minimum number of votes necessary to win election—generally at 40% of those cast, but in some cases, a majority. In the event no presidential-vice presidential ticket were to attain the 40% or majority threshold, these direct election measures generally require the two tickets that received the most votes to compete in a subsequent runoff election. Alternatively, some versions would provide that Congress, meeting in joint session, elect the President and Vice President if no ticket received 40% of the vote. Proponents of direct popular election cite a number of factors in support of their proposal. At the core of their arguments, they assert that their process would be simple, national, and democratic: They assert that direct popular election would provide for a single, democratic, choice in which all the nation's voters would directly elect the two highest-ranking officials in the United States government, the President and Vice President. Further, the candidates who won the most popular votes would always win the election. Under some direct election proposals, if no one received at least 40% of the vote, the voters would be able to choose between the two tickets who gained the most votes in a runoff election. (Other direct election proposals would substitute election by joint session of Congress for a runoff if no ticket received at least 40% of the vote.) Every vote would carry the same weight in the election, no matter where in the nation it was cast. Direct election would eliminate the potential complications that could arise under the current system in the event of a presidential candidate's death between election day and the date on which electoral vote results are declared, since the winning candidates would become President- and Vice President-elect as soon as the popular returns were certified. All the various and complex mechanisms of the existing system, such as provisions in law for certifying the electoral vote in the states and the contingent election process, would be supplanted by these simple requirements. Electoral college defenders attempt to refute these arguments, pointing to what they assert are flaws in direct election: Direct election proponents claim their plan is more democratic, and provides for "majority rule," yet some direct election proposals require that victorious candidates gain as little as 40% of the vote in order to be elected. Others, moreover, include no minimum vote threshold at all. How, ask its critics, could such plurality Presidents be reconciled with the concept of strict "majority rule" enshrined by direct election's proponents? Further, they assert that direct election would foster acrimonious and protracted post-election struggles, rather than eliminate them. For instance, as the presidential election of 2000 demonstrated, close results in a single state in a close election are likely to be bitterly contested. Under direct election, those favoring an electoral college claim, every close election might resemble the post-election contests in 2000, not just in one state, but also on a nationwide basis, as both parties seek to gain every vote. Such rancorous disputes could have profound negative effects on political comity in the nation, and, in the worst case, might undermine the stability and legitimacy of the federal government. To those who suggest that the struggle over Florida's popular vote returns in 2000 was unique, they could cite the example of Ohio in 2004, where multiple legal actions were pursued even though the popular vote margin for the winning candidates exceeded 118, 000. Reform measures that would retain the electoral college in some form have included a range of different proposals, the most popular of which are listed below. Most versions of these plans would eliminate the office of elector, and award electoral votes directly to the candidates, and would retain the requirement that a majority of electoral votes is necessary to win the presidency. In common with direct election, most would also require joint tickets of presidential-vice presidential candidates, a practice which is currently provided under state ballot laws. This reform proposal would award all electoral votes in each state directly to the winning candidates who obtained the most votes statewide; in almost all versions, a plurality would be sufficient in individual states to win the state's electoral votes, while most versions provide for some form of contingent election in Congress in the event no candidate wins a nationwide majority of electoral votes. This alternative would constitutionally mandate the "general ticket" or "winner-take-all system" currently used to award electoral votes in 48 states and the District of Columbia. Proponents of the automatic plan argue that it would maintain the present electoral college system's balance between federal and state power, and between large and small states. Proponents note that the automatic plan would eliminate the possibility of "faithless electors." Further, the automatic plan would help preserve the present two-party system, under a state-by-state, winner-take-all method of allocating electoral votes. This, they assert, is a strength of the existing arrangement, because it tends to reward parties that incorporate a broad range of viewpoints, and embrace large areas of the nation. Opponents, on the other hand, note presidential elections are still indirect under the automatic system. They further assert that "minority" Presidents could still be elected under the automatic system, and it still provides no electoral vote recognition of the views and opinions of voters who chose the losing candidates. This reform proposal would continue the current allocation of electoral votes by state, and, in common with most reform plans, would eliminate the office of presidential elector. It would award one electoral vote to the winning candidates in each congressional district (or other, ad hoc, presidential election district) of each state. The additional two electoral votes, reflecting the two "constant" or "senatorial" electoral votes assigned to each state, would be awarded to the statewide vote winners. This alternative would constitutionally mandate the system currently used to award electoral votes in Maine and Nebraska. Proponents of the district plan argue that it would more accurately reflect the popular vote results for presidential and vice presidential candidates than the winner-take-all method, or the automatic plan, because, by allocating electoral votes according to popular vote results in congressional districts, it would take into account political differences within states. They also suggest that in states dominated by one party, the district plan might provide an incentive for greater voter involvement and party vitality, because it would be possible for the less dominant party to win electoral votes in districts where it enjoys a higher level of support, e.g. "Upstate" New York versus the New York City metropolitan area, or northern California vs. the Los Angeles and San Francisco metropolitan areas.