The debates and discussions among U.S. government officials and outside stakeholders about the use of partnership in support of national security are inchoate, but a number of facets of the debates are discernible, including worldview; goals; effects; priorities; resourcing; assessments; roles and responsibilities; and risk. These issues are variously addressed in recent strategic guidance documents. Key unclassified guidance documents include the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report, and its follow-on Building Partnership Capacity (BPC) roadmap; the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS); the 2010 QDR Report; the 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR); and the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG). In addition, a wealth of internal DOD guidance reportedly addresses partnershipâin particular the Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) as well as planning and programming guidance documents under their various names. Yet the treatment of "partnership" by these documents is both inconsistent and partialânot all documents address all the major facets of strategy; some, such as resourcing, are barely treated; and in many cases the thrust of the guidance has changed over time. This section describes each facet of partnership strategy, analyzes its treatment in recent guidance, and raises questions that may be germane to congressional oversight. In general, a state's national security strategy is likely to derive from some worldviewâa set of assumptions about the nature of the world order and the exercise of power within it, together with a view of that state's role on the world stage. That worldview, in turn, is likely to shape how a state defines its national interests. In any partnership strategy, these starting points are likely to affect what effects are desired, how efforts are prioritized, and how results are assessed. While worldview may not be explicitly stated, identifying its influence on U.S. strategy, including the role of partnership within that strategy, may be helpful to rigorous oversight. Recent strategic guidance documents vary significantly in both the extent to which worldview is explicitly stated, and the nature of their respective worldviews: The 2006 QDR went to great lengths to justify the whole idea of partnership. Partnership was depicted less as a given than as a new necessity, driven by two new realities in the global arena: the urgent threat of terrorism that required actions in new places; and the long-term, large-scale contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan that required more hands. In turn, the 2006 QDR ascribed to partnership a relatively linear causal logic: the United States would help build partners' capabilities, and then those partners would employ those capabilities in accordance with U.S. strategy. A basicâand in some ways remarkableâassumption of the 2006 QDR was that partners' decisions and actions would largely follow U.S. intent. The 2010 QDR adopted the worldview of the 2006 QDR, that partnership as a rule requires a rationale, as well as a similar view of the global security context. As a result it largely echoed the counter-terrorism (CT)-driven rationale for partnership from the 2006 QDR. The 2010 NSS, in contrast, is explicitly based on a worldview in which collective action in the service of common interests is taken as a givenâthe default way of doing business in general, and thus not an approach that needs to be justified in each case. That view, solidly echoed in the 2010 QDDR, may be contrasted with a more instrumental approach to partnership, in which specific partners are recruited, when circumstances so require, to help accomplish specific ends. Furthermore, the 2010 NSS adopts from the institutionalist school of international relations theory the premise that shared norms help shape outcomes in the international system; so part of the causal logic in the 2010 NSS is that the United States fosters shared norms through partnership efforts, and those norms in turn shape choices by other international actors. The 2012 DSG reflects the 2010 NSS worldviewâthat partnership is the default way of doing business. It also reflects a perception of the global security context that is very different from those described by the 2006 and 2010 QDRs. The DSG underscores that the large-scale contingencies in Iraq and Afghanistan are no longer the top U.S. defense priorities, and the sense of urgency about fostering partners with the kinds of capabilities required for those contingencies has disappeared. The DSG's fundamental "shift toward the future" underscores concern with a broad range of security challenges, in contrast to the almost singular focus on CT as a driver for partnership in 2006. With partnership as the default starting point, the DSG indicates that any or all of these challenges might be addressed in part through partnership. Key questions concerning worldview might include the following: What assumptions about the nature of the world order undergird proposed partnership initiatives? How powerful a role does U.S. leadership play in partnership activitiesâto what extent does strategy assume that partners will participate, and then act, based on U.S. intent? Should partnership be the default starting point for engagement on the world stage? Or does the choice to pursue partnershipâgiven its inherent frictions and opportunity costsârequire justification in each case? What role if any do shared norms play in shaping outcomes? And to what extent if any can the U.S. government shape shared norms? In principle, worldview and national interests shape national security strategy, which in turn articulates goals. One fundamental, unresolved tension in the debates about the use of partnership in support of national security concerns the fundamental goal of partnership. One possible logic argues that the global security context today presents a greater or more complex array of challenges than it did in the past, so partnership, including greater participation and contributions by partners, is now essential in order to meet those challenges. Another possible logic argues that partnership generates savingsâas U.S. partners assume greater responsibilities, the United States can do less. Those two logics are not mutually exclusive, but different choices about their respective importance could have different implications for prioritizing and resourcing partnership efforts. Recent strategic guidance has tended to suggest that both logics apply without clarifying their relative importance: In the mid-aughts, both logics were powerfully alive in the Pentagon debates that shaped the 2006 QDR and other decision-making. In the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and amidst attention-grabbing cyber attacks, officials underscored that the 21 st century presented a much broader array of security challenges than ever before. The 2006 QDR called for building international partners' capabilities in order to meet those broader challenges. For example, counter-terrorism (CT) would require new, highly local approachesâand many of themâdesigned to cut off initial manifestations of terrorism, wherever in the world it might take root. The 2006 BPC roadmap argued more pointedly that without partnership at home and abroad, "the nation's strategic objectives are unattainable." In other words, aloneâwe fail. At the same time, the 2006 BPC roadmap, more explicitly than any other guidance, also invoked the idea of savings: "The Department's efforts to build the planning and operational capabilities of partner agencies and international partners have the potential to reduce the length of U.S. force deployments, minimize the range of circumstances in which U.S. forces are called upon, and preserve the Department's financial resources." What the roadmap did not do was square the circle by addressing how partnership could achieve savings in the face of a larger overall requirement. The 2010 QDR echoed the 2006 QDR's concern with an increased span of challenges as well as its premise that partnership was an important tool for addressing them. In addition, the 2010 QDR noted one way in which partnership could generate savingsâby rendering some actions unnecessary or reducing the U.S. share of the burden if action were required. By "strengthening relationships" abroad, it argued, the United States would become better at averting crises altogether orâif neededâat working with others to respond to them. The 2012 DSG, in turn, seems to skew in the direction of savings. It states that partnership "remains important for sharing the costs and responsibilities of global leadership." Also, DOD official communications associated with the DSG have frequently stressed that partnership is one pillar of its plan to mitigate risk in the context of constrained resources. Key questions concerning the fundamental goals of partnership might include the following: What is the fundamental goal of partnership in support of national security? Is the logic to save money, as U.S. investments pay off over time in terms of things the U.S. government no longer has to do? Is the logic to meet a greater array of global security challenges by working by, with, and through partnersâchallenges that the United States would simply not have time or resources to meet on its own? To the extent that both goals applyâmeeting challenges and generating savingsâwhat is the appropriate balance between these goals in driving decisions about prioritization and resourcing? In theory, partnership might be used to help achieve any of a wide array of ends that support national security: enabling partners to do specific things (at home, abroad, or as part of multilateral efforts); giving the United States better situational understanding; ensuring U.S. access; and shaping partners' perceptions and decision-making.