The sunset concept provides for programs and agencies to terminate automatically accordingto a predetermined schedule unless explicitly renewed by law. As developed in the 1970s by theorganization Common Cause, a sunset law contains two requisite components: an "action-forcing"mechanism and a framework for the systematic review and evaluation of past performance. Undersunset, agencies "fade into the sunset," unless, following oversight review, the legislature actsaffirmatively to continue their existence. For more than three decades sunset bills have been introduced in every Congress. (1) Since 1997, RepresentativeKevin Brady and others have supported the creation of a federal sunset commission, modeled on thesunset commission in Texas. He reintroduced his bill in the 109th Congress as H.R. 3282 . (2) In May 2006 the House leadership announced plans to bring sunset legislation quickly to theHouse floor, along with other budget process reforms favored by the Republican Study Committee(RSC), in return for RSC backing of the FY2007 budget resolution. In the effort to craft a consensusbill, attention came to focus on H.R. 3282 (Brady bill) and on H.R. 2470 ,sponsored by Representative Todd Tiahrt, which would create a "Commission on the Accountabilityand Review of Federal Agencies (CARFA)," modeled on the Base Realignment and ClosureCommission (BRAC) approach. (3) On July 14, 2006, Representative Tiahrt introduced a revisedversion of H.R. 2470 as H.R. 5766 , the Government Efficiency Act, "toprovide for the establishment of Federal Review Commissions (FRCs) to review and makerecommendations on improving the operations, effectiveness, and efficiency of Federal programsand agencies, and to require a schedule for such reviews of all Federal agencies and programs." Although the CARFA and FRCs would address concerns similar to those envisaged for the FederalAgency Sunset Commission in H.R. 3282, H.R. 2470 and H.R. 5766are not true sunset measures, because they lack an action-forcing mechanism whereby agencies andprograms would terminate automatically absent congressional action, as would occur under H.R.3282. Although technically inaccurate, both bills are often referred to as sunset measures,however. (4) On July 19, 2006, the House Government Reform Committee held a hearing on H.R. 3282 and H.R. 5766 . (5) Both bills went to markup the following day, and the committeevoted 15-14 to report H.R. 3282 favorably to the House. H.R. 5766, as amended,was favorably reported by a vote of 15-12. Both votes were largely along party lines. All Democratsvoted against both bills. One Republican voted with the minority on each bill: Representative ChrisShays voted with the minority on H.R. 5766, and Representative Todd Platts did likewiseon H.R. 3282. (6) Supporters of the measures suggest that there are too many overlapping and ineffectivefederal programs that contribute to the growing federal deficit, that Congress lacks time for thoroughoversight of all existing agencies and programs, and that the commissions would assist Congress inperforming its oversight function, thereby reducing fraud, waste, and abuse. Critics of the measurescounter that the bills would cede too much power to the executive branch and the majority politicalparty, would burden Congress with a tremendous workload with mandatory reauthorization of everyagency and program, and would facilitate elimination of federal programs that provide a safety netfor the most vulnerable in society. H.R. 3282 would create a Federal Agency Sunset Commission (FASC) toreview the efficiency of and public need for federal agencies and provide for the abolishment ofagencies for which a public need does not exist. The FASC would consist of 12 members appointedby the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader. Of the six members appointed by theleaders of the respective chambers, four would be Members of Congress, with not more than twofrom the same political party. Within one year after its establishment, the commission would submitto Congress a schedule for the review of all federal agencies and advisory committees by thecommission, at least once every 12 years, and for the abolishment of each agency following thereview absent congressional reauthorization. Agencies performing similar or related functions wouldbe scheduled for review at the same time. Then the commission would commence its annual reviews,utilizing the 19 criteria specified in the bill in reviewing and evaluating the efficiency and publicneed for each agency. By September 1 of each subsequent year, the commission would report to the President andCongress, and recommend whether each agency reviewed that year should be abolished orreorganized and whether functions of other agencies should be consolidated, transferred, orreorganized. The FASC would also submit draft legislation to carry out the recommendations. Under the sunset provisions in the bill, an agency would be abolished within one year of theCommission's review, unless the agency received statutory extension. This means that followingcongressional approval of a reauthorization bill, the measure would have to go to the President inorder to be signed into law. If the President were to veto the bill, a two-thirds majority in bothchambers would be necessary to override the veto and extend the life of the program or agency. Thepossibility of a popular program or agency being eliminated by a President, with the support of onethird of the House and Senate, arguably represents a significant transfer of power from Congress tothe executive branch. The bill would allow the deadline for abolishing an agency to be extended for an additionaltwo years by legislation enacted by a super majority of the House of Representatives and the Senate.The commission also would report to Congress on all legislation introduced that would establisha new agency or a new program to be carried out by an existing agency. H.R. 3282 would direct the Comptroller General of the GovernmentAccountability Office and the Director of the Congressional Budget Office, in cooperation with theDirector of the Congressional Research Service, to prepare an inventory of Federal programs withineach agency for the purpose of advising and assisting Congress and the commission in carrying outthe requirements of the act. Although constitutional concerns appear not to have played a major role in consideration of H.R. 3282 , in prior Congresses similar sunset commission bills have been questionedon constitutional grounds. For example, an advisory opinion from the Department of Justiceprovided for the hearing record in 1998 suggested that unless Congress were to enact the schedulefor review and termination recommended by the commission, the bill would violate separation ofpowers. (7) An advisoryopinion from the Justice Department in 2002 referred to the same issue, as well as other possibleconstitutional concerns. (8) H.R. 5766 , as approved with an amendment in the nature of a substitute andordered reported favorably by the House Committee on Government Reform on July 20, 2006,would add a new chapter 10 to part I of Title 5 of the U.S. Code ; part I pertains to the agenciesgenerally and chapter 9 is titled "Executive Reorganization." A Federal Review Commission mightbe established through the issuance of an executive order or enactment of a joint resolution thatspecifies the federal programs and agencies to be reviewed by the commission. Each review commission would have seven members appointed by the President, four ofwhom would be selected after consultation with designated congressional leaders. Up to fourMembers of Congress might be appointed to serve as nonvoting ex officio members. The billspecifies qualifications for all commission members: each person "shall have expertise andexperience in the particular programmatic area" to be reviewed by the commission. H.R. 5766 provides that, within one year of enactment, the President would submit toCongress a schedule under which additional federal review commissions would be establishedsubsequently to review all federal agencies and programs. In developing the review schedule, thePresident would provide that agencies performing similar or related functions would be reviewedat or near the same time. In its review work each commission would consider "whether the missions and goals of theprograms and agencies studied by the Commission are being carried out as effectively and efficientlyas possible," the extent to which the programs and agencies duplicate or conflict with other ongoingactivities, and whether reorganization of the programs and agencies "would better enable the Federalgovernment to accomplish its missions and goals." The committee substitute offered by theChairman of the Government Reform Committee added agency rule making to the list of factors tobe considered in the FRC's review: whether existing rules promulgated by the agencies to carry outthe programs derive from specific legislative authority, are being carried out as efficiently aspossible, or duplicate or conflict with rules promulgated by other federal agencies, and whether anyagency or program being reviewed in any manner violates the constitutional separation of powers. Within one year after being established, the commission would report to the President onits assessment of operations, effectiveness, and efficiency of the programs and agencies which werereviewed. The commission might also submit to the President a legislative proposal to reorganize,consolidate, abolish, expand, or transfer any of the programs and agencies just reviewed. Within 30days after the commission reports, the President would transmit to Congress the assessment and anylegislative proposal submitted by the commission, along with the President's recommendationsregarding the assessment and proposal. H.R. 5766 mandates that congressional consideration of legislationimplementing a commission's recommendations occur under special "fast track" legislativeprocedures. Congress sometimes chooses to apply expedited legislative procedures of this type toits consideration of specific measures because the regular legislative procedures of the House andSenate are time-consuming, and do not guarantee that a given measure or type of measure will beconsidered in a timely fashion or at all. It is noteworthy, however, that as introduced, amended incommittee, and ordered reported favorably, H.R.