In 2002, Congress passed legislation renewing the President’s ability to enter into certain trade agreements and submit implementing bills on an expedited legislative track without possibility of amendment. The bill granting this “fast track” authority, renamed TPA, passed the House by one vote amid contentious debate, with a noticeable split along party lines. Although delegation of the constitutional authority to “regulate commerce with foreign nations” dates back to 1934 and some form of fast track authority was granted by Congress to every president since 1974, the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 restored this authority after an 8-year hiatus. Congress accompanied this grant with statutorily defined objectives for the trade negotiations and requirements that the administration consult with Congress and other stakeholders before, during, and after the negotiations. If Congress decided that the President hadn’t satisfied his or her obligations to consult under TPA, the implementing legislation could be treated like any other bill. Congress has applied TPA procedures to every implementing bill submitted under the Trade Act, according to USTR. Additional information about the history of the consultation requirements can be found in appendix II. TPA also requires the administration to consult with private sector advisory committees. It continues the advisory committee system established under the Trade Act of 1974, which was intended to ensure that representatives from private business and other groups with a stake in trade policy could provide input before, during, and after negotiations. The system has a three-tier structure of committees to advise the President on (1) overall trade policy, (2) general policy areas, and (3) technical aspects of trade agreements. The law requires the President to consult with these committees on a continuing and timely basis. Each advisory committee must submit a report to Congress and the President on each trade agreement negotiated under TPA no later than 30 days after the President notifies Congress of his or her intent to enter into the agreement. The system comprises about 700 advisors across 28 committees broadly representative of the U.S. economy and various trade policy interests. The Trade Act of 1974 also requires USTR to provide an opportunity to private organizations or groups outside the advisory committee system to present their views on trade issues. To comply with this requirement, USTR publishes a Federal Register notice and the Trade Policy Staff Committee conducts a hearing. The public can comment on any matter relevant to the proposed agreement in response to the Federal Register notice, either in writing or at the public hearing. USTR also consults with groups outside of these mechanisms; sometimes USTR is contacted, and sometimes USTR seeks out comments. We reported on the trade advisory committee system in 2002 and found that it has made valuable contributions to U.S. trade policy and agreements. We also found, however, that consultations were not always timely or useful and that the process needed greater accountability. Furthermore, we found that committee structure and composition had not been updated to reflect changes in the U.S. economy and trade policy. In response to these findings, USTR and the other managing agencies have taken several actions, including the installation of a secure Web site for viewing draft agreement text; reconfiguration of the committee system; introduction of a monthly teleconference of chairs; and introduction of periodic plenary sessions for the third tier technical committees. TPA was actively used by the President. In addition to pursuing numerous FTAs, a global round of trade liberalization talks at the WTO launched in November 2001 was subsequently notified under TPA. WTO talks made some progress, but they were not concluded by the July 1, 2007, deadline TPA set for an agreement to qualify. The President has called on Congress to renew TPA, in part to continue pursuit of WTO talks in hopes of achieving fundamental global agriculture reform and meaningful reduction in trade barriers to goods and services worldwide. Some in Congress are supportive, but others are skeptical, making an examination of recent experience under TPA timely. Meanwhile, FTA negotiations with Malaysia have continued despite the lapse in TPA. Congress must also decide whether to approve the last four FTAs concluded under TPA—with Peru, Colombia, Panama, and South Korea. Since the passage of TPA in 2002, the United States has pursued negotiations towards 17 comprehensive FTAs covering 47 countries. FTA partner countries were selected for a variety of foreign and economic policy reasons. The United States followed a strategy of competitive liberalization, which entails simultaneously pursuing bilateral, multilateral, and global trade agreements. Furthermore, the United States only pursued comprehensive FTAs, but a number of large trading partners were unwilling to negotiate on sensitive topics such as agriculture in FTAs. In the 5-year period that TPA was granted to the President, from 2002- 2007, the administration pursued negotiations toward 17 FTAs with 47 countries. These 47 countries extend from North America to South America to the Pacific Rim to the Middle East. (See table 1.) Six FTAs have been approved and are in force. An additional 4 FTAs with 4 countries have been signed but not yet approved, and FTAs with Costa Rica and Oman have been signed and approved by the U.S. Congress but are not yet in force. Furthermore, an FTA with Malaysia is currently under negotiation, and negotiations for the remaining 5 FTAs are not yet concluded. The United States has negotiated comprehensive FTAs for a variety of foreign and economic policy reasons. Agency officials confirmed that since mid-2004, FTA partners have been judged on six criteria outlined by the National Security Council, as GAO reported in 2004. These criteria are as follows: benefits to the broader trade liberalization strategy, compatibility with U.S. interests, congressional/private sector support, and U.S. government resource constraints. According to officials we interviewed, these criteria are broad and, as a result, the administration has considerable discretion in choosing potential FTA partners. Among the foreign policy considerations for selecting FTA partners are the strengthening of strategic relationships and the promotion of reform in partner countries. In addition to the first two criteria mentioned above of assessing country readiness as well as the economic/commercial benefit, forming regional trading blocks and replacing trade preference programs were among the economic policy factors. Agency officials told us that establishing trading relationships with strategic friends and allies was a key factor in deciding with whom to enter into FTA negotiations. Particularly following the September 11 terrorist attacks and the onset of the Iraq war, pursuing FTAs with moderate Muslim countries became a significant policy goal. In May 2003, the President announced a Middle East Free Trade Initiative, which lays out a plan of graduated steps for Middle Eastern nations to increase trade and investment with the United States. Under this initiative, the United States has entered into FTAs with Morocco and Bahrain and has approved an FTA with Oman. This is in addition to the FTAs the United States already had with Israel and Jordan. USTR indicated in its November 2004 letter of intent to enter into an FTA with Oman, for example, that Oman, as a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council, will “continue to be an important strategic colleague on a broad array of foreign and national security issues.” The United States has sought to strengthen strategic relationships through FTAs in other regions as well. For example, the November 2003 letter of intent to enter into an FTA with Panama indicated that “an FTA will serve to strengthen not only economic ties but also political and security ones.” Another foreign policy goal in selecting FTA partners was promoting economic and political reform in partner countries. Public statements regarding the FTA with Morocco, for example, suggest that it would add momentum to political reform already under way there. USTR also stated that the Central America—Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) will strengthen “free-market reforms” in Central America, adding that “the growth stimulated by trade and the openness of an agreement will help deepen democracy, the rule of law, and sustainable development.” Public documents related to the Andean FTA initiative state that an Andean FTA would “enhance our efforts to strengthen democracy and support for fundamental values in the region” such as rule of law, sustainable development, transparency, anti- corruption, and good governance. USTR also indicated that an FTA with South Korea would promote enhanced regulatory transparency in a top U.S. trade partner. Beyond assessing a country’s readiness and potential economic/commercial benefits, USTR publications and interviews with senior agency officials suggest that sequencing from previous FTAs and building toward larger regional initiatives were considerations for entering into negotiations with a number of countries. For example, as the U.S.- Chile FTA negotiations were drawing to a close, the United States announced its intent to enter into FTA negotiations with the Central American countries of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua under CAFTA and later announced its intent to include the Dominican Republic in those negotiations. USTR also submitted a letter of intent to enter into FTA negotiations with the Andean countries of Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia under the Andean FTA. The individual letters of intent to enter in FTA negotiations with these ten countries cited the complementary nature of these negotiations, which would lend momentum to concluding the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Agency officials explained that when the United States pursues individual bilateral FTAs, one goal is to enable them to be woven into regional agreements under the mantle of broader integration. The individual letters of intent to enter into FTA negotiations with Thailand and Malaysia also cited the Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative as a factor in the selection process, building upon the U.S.-Singapore FTA. The administration envisioned similar regional or subregional trading groups for the Middle East (the Middle East Free Trade Area) and South Africa (SACU, Southern African Customs Union). (See fig. 1.) For certain developing country FTA partners, one motivation in U.S. selection was converting one-way U.S. trade preference programs into two-way reciprocal agreements.