On April 2-4, 2008, NATO held a summit in Bucharest, Romania. A principal issue was consideration of the candidacies for membership of Albania, Croatia, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). The allies issued invitations to join the alliance to Albania and Croatia. Greece blocked an invitation to Macedonia because of a dispute over Macedonia's name. The invitations initiated the third round of enlargement in the post-Cold War era. In 1997, NATO invited Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to join the alliance; they were admitted in 1999. In 2002, the allies invited Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovenia, and Slovakia to join the alliance; they were admitted in 2004. These last two rounds of enlargement were "strategic" in the sense that the new members' territory lay in regions that Russia once deemed critical to its own national interest, and in the sense that the region had been intensely involved in conflict for much of modern European history. In addition, several of these countries are sizeable, with considerable armed forces and significant resources. Albania and Croatia are small countries, with correspondingly small militaries. Croatia was part of the former Yugoslavia, a communist state that kept the Soviet Union at arms' length and had reasonably friendly relations with the west. Albania, also once a communist state during the Cold War, was for many years the most isolated country in Europe. With the collapse of Yugoslavia and the end of the Cold War, these countries put themselves on the path to democracy and made commitments to join western institutions. The two countries had aspirations to join both the European Union and NATO. Albania and Croatia, in the sense of their military importance and their general resources, would not represent a "strategic" presence in the alliance, although their consistent contributions to NATO operations have been lauded. However, due to the continuing instability in the region, further stirred by Serbia's and Russia's sharply negative reaction to Kosovo's independence, the two countries are a potential factor for stabilization in southeastern Europe. Today, NATO's purpose extends well beyond the mission of collective defense of the Cold War era. Although collective defense remains a core function, the allies now undertake missions against terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. A global military reach is necessary for such missions. The former Bush Administration had pressed the allies to develop more mobile forces, ones able to deploy over long distances and sustain themselves. Some smaller member states, such as Albania and Croatia, as NATO members are expected to develop "niche" capabilities, such as special forces or troops able to contain a chemical weapons attack or to participate in NATO collective security missions, such as its stabilization and peacekeeping operation in Kosovo although both have contributed troops to the NATO mission in Afghanistan. Several allied governments believe that the overall pace of NATO enlargement is too compressed and for the future wish to consider first how to resolve a complex range of issues. These governments tend to argue that other issues—the calming of nationalist emotions in Serbia, an overall improvement in NATO-Russian relations, and coming to grips with the wide-ranging problems in energy security—must first be resolved before considering new countries for membership. The Washington Treaty of 1949, NATO's founding instrument, does not describe detailed qualifications for membership. It does require that member states be democracies and follow the rule of law. It also requires that they take steps to strengthen their militaries and refrain from the use of force in settling disputes outside the treaty framework. Article X of the Treaty leaves the door open to any states able to meet the general qualifications for membership, including a contribution to the security of other member states. The process by which governments interested in membership may join has been refined since the end of the Cold War. In 1994 NATO established the Partnership for Peace (PfP), a program in which non-member states might train with NATO forces, participate in peacekeeping or other allied activities, and seek avenues to draw closer to the alliance. Some countries, such as Austria, participate in the PfP program but are not necessarily interested in membership. In 1995 NATO published a Study on NATO Enlargement . The report remains the most detailed public roadmap for governments wishing to enter NATO. It describes the need for candidate states to develop democratic structures and a market economy, respect human rights and the rights of ethnic minorities, and build a military capable of contributing to collective defense. In the 1995 study, NATO included other requirements, principally the need to settle all disputes, such as border demarcations, with neighboring countries. The Balkan conflicts of the 1990s gave this requirement special significance. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO has also become a collective security as well as a collective defense organization. Prospective members must develop military forces trained for peacekeeping and state-building, as well as for collective defense. After the admission of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary in 1999, the allies, led by the United States, developed a more detailed process for prospective members. This process, called the Membership Action Plan (MAP), lays out in considerable detail specific steps that a government must follow to become a member. Such steps might include laws designating its parliament as having civilian oversight of the military, or the downsizing and professionalization of a large military, or the settlement of a border dispute with a neighbor. Each country's MAP is classified, as is its evaluation by the allies. During the 2003-2004 round of enlargement, the MAP was made available to the United States Senate for review. Some allies have criticized the MAP process. They contend that it is primarily a creation of the United States and that the ultimate decision on whether MAP requirements are met is made principally in Washington. They say, for example, that the full range of qualifications outlined in the MAP in the 2003 round of enlargement was not adequately assessed for several states that became members of the alliance. They contend, therefore, that designation of candidate states as prospective members is above all a political process and that actual accomplishment of requirements is secondary to the will of the alliance's leader. U.S. officials dispute this characterization. For a candidate state to have been invited to join the alliance at Bucharest, consensus among the 26 member governments was necessary to approve an invitation. Each candidate was considered separately. One or more votes against a state would have blocked that state's progress to the next stage in the process of becoming a member. It was Greece's opposition to Macedonia that resulted in Skopje's failure to obtain an invitation. In March 2008, Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis said, "No solution—no invitation." There were other issues under discussion as well. According to some officials in allied states, Albania and Macedonia continued to have problems of governance and issues detrimental to internal political comity. At the same time, the three governments had evidently made considerable progress in military reform, and their populations generally supported NATO membership, although by a somewhat narrow majority in Croatia. After issuing official invitations to Albania and Croatia at the April Bucharest summit, on July 9, 2008, the allies signed accession protocols for their entry into NATO. The protocols outlined NATO's expectations of the two prospective members. The protocols were deposited with each allied government and member governments began their constitutional processes to amend the Washington Treaty and admit a new state or states. In some member states, such as the United Kingdom, the government had the authority to determine whether the executive alone may decide to admit a state nominated for entry, or instead, if issues of broad significance are involved, may send the protocol to parliament for approval. At the other end of the spectrum, the Netherlands has a meticulous, time-consuming process involving a parliamentary study and debate before a final vote is taken. NATO hoped to admit prospective candidate states at its 60 th anniversary summit scheduled to be held on the French-German border on April 4-5, 2009. By the end of March 2009, all 26 member states had ratified the accession protocols. Croatia did have a maritime border dispute with Slovenia and although Slovenia's parliament had ratified the protocols, there had been a movement in the parliament to hold a national referendum on Croatia's accession not only to NATO but also to the EU in response to the unsettled maritime border dispute. That issue was resolved just before the NATO summit. On April 1, 2009, in a ceremony at the Department of State, the Ambassadors of Albania and Croatia deposited the ratified documents with the United States and officially became the 27 th and 28 th members of the Alliance. In a ceremony at the NATO summit in Strasbourg, France on April 4, the two newest members took their seats at the NATO table. The United States Senate has the constitutional authority to give its advice and consent by a two-thirds majority to the amendment of any treaty. In the case of NATO enlargement, it must decide whether to amend the Washington Treaty to commit the United States to defend additional geographic territory. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is the committee that holds the initial authority to consider the issue. For an enlargement of the NATO treaty, both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the full Senate may decide whether to vote on candidate states separately or all together. During the previous two rounds of enlargement, House and Senate committees held hearings on enlargement. One purpose of the hearings is to create more widespread knowledge of possible pending new obligations of the United States government. In the past, committees have also discussed such issues as the costs of enlargement, the qualifications of the candidate states, regional security implications of enlargement, implications for relations with Russia, and new issues in NATO's future, such as the viability of new missions. On September 10, 2008, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on the accession of Albania and Croatia to NATO.