Sex trafficking is a state crime. Nevertheless, it is also a federal crime when it involves conducting the activities of a sex trafficking enterprise in a way that affects interstate or foreign commerce or that involves travel in interstate or foreign commerce. Section 1591 of Title 18 of the United States Code outlaws the activities of sex trafficking enterprise that affects interstate or foreign commerce, including patronizing such an enterprise. The Mann Act outlaws sex trafficking activities that involve travel in interstate or foreign commerce. Section 1591 makes criminal several of the activities associated with the creation or operation of a commercial sex trafficking enterprise which uses children or coerced or deceived adults. It also proscribes profiting from such an enterprise or obstructing investigation of its activities. A subsequent section prohibits attempting or conspiring to violate §1591. Divided into elements, §1591(a)(1) declares that (1) Whoever (2) knowingly (3) (a) in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or (b) within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, (4)(a) recruits, (b) entices, (c) harbors, (d) transports, (e) provides, (f) obtains, (g) advertises , (h) maintains, (i) patronizes , or (j) solicits by any means (5) a person; (6) (a) knowing, or (b) in reckless disregard of the fact, (7) (a) that (A) (i) means of force, (ii) threats of force, (iii) fraud, (iv) coercion ... , or (v) any combination of such means (B) will be used to cause the person to (C) engage in a commercial sex act, or (b) that (A) the person has not attained the age of 18 years and (B) will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act, (8) shall be punished as provided in subsection (b). Subsection (b) makes violations punishable by imprisonment for any term of years not less than 15 years or for life (not less than 10 years imprisonment, if the victim is 14 years of age or older and the offender is less than 18 years of age, provided neither force nor deception were used). Offenders also face a fine of not more than $250,000 (not more than $500,000 when the offender is an organization); and unless indigent, to a special assessment of $5,000. In addition, offenders are subject to a term of supervised release of not less than five years. An offender may also be subject to a restitution order. Moreover, property derived from a violation or used to facilitate a violation may be forfeited. Finally, unless they are indigent, offenders are subject to a $5,000 special assessment upon conviction. The courts have construed the offense's elements as follows: Whoever : When used in an act of Congress and unless the context demands another interpretation, the word "'whoever' include[s] corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals." Thus, corporations and other legal entities may be held criminally liable for the misconduct of their employees, officers, or agents within the scope of their authority and committed at least in part for the benefit of the entity. Knowing ly : Knowingly ordinarily means that the individual was aware of the fact that he was engaging in the conduct proscribed. In this case, it means that he knew he was recruiting, enticing, harboring, transporting, providing, obtaining, or maintaining a person. The prosecution, however, need not prove that he knew his conduct occurred in United States territory or that it occurred in, or affected, interstate or foreign commerce. In or affecting interstate or foreign commerce : Congress enjoys only those legislative powers that may be traced to the Constitution. One such power is the power "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States." The Supreme Court has explained that Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause embodies "the power to regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce," including "purely local activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce." Various appellate courts have explained that the "substantial effect" test judges the impact of a category of regulated activity, for example, sex trafficking. Individual instances need have no more than a de minimis impact on interstate commerce. The government has shown that the defendant's commercial sex trafficking had such an effect on interstate commerce when the defendant used the facilities of an interstate hotel chain, or when he used advertising that reached across state lines, or when he used products that had traveled in interstate commerce or the instrumentalities of interstate communications, for example, cell phones. Within the special maritime or territorial jurisdiction of the United States : The Constitution also vests Congress with the power to "define and punish ... Felonies committed on the high Seas," and to exercise legislative jurisdiction retained or acquired over federal territories and enclaves. Congress has exercised this authority to claim federal criminal jurisdiction over sex trafficking and other crimes when committed on American vessels, within national parks or national forests, and other places "within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States." Recruits , ... obtains , advertises, maintains, patronizes, or solicits : Prior to enactment of the Victims Justice Act in 2015, each of the verbs in §1591(a)(1)'s action element—recruits, entices, harbors, transports, supplies, obtains, maintains—seemed to refer to activities on the supply side of a prostitution operation. At least one federal appellate court held, however, that the verbs applied to the demand side as well. That is, the section applied to the customers, the Johns, of a prostitution operation. The Victims Justice Act confirmed the court's understanding by adding "patroniz[ing]" and "solicit[ing]" as alternatives in the section's action element. At the same time, it inserted "advertis[ing]" as another potential action element. A person : Its sweeping terms notwithstanding, it appears unlikely that the courts will always read §1591 literally. For example, on its face, the section appears to criminalize minors who engage in "survival sex." Runaway juveniles who use sex to secure food, shelter, or the other necessities of life could be said to have "maintained ... a person," themselves, knowing they have "not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act." No prosecutor is likely to bring, no jury is likely to convict, and no judge is likely to sustain, such a case. Knowing or i n reckless disregard of the fact : This element of the offense requires proof that the defendant knew, or recklessly disregarded, either (A) the fact that an (i) underage child (ii) would be caused to engage in a commercial sex act or (B) the fact that an adult victim (i) had been threatened, deceived, or coerced (ii) in order to cause the victim to engage in a commercial sex act. Subsection 1591(c), however, mitigates the government's burden with respect to knowledge of the age of a child victim: "In a prosecution under subsection (a)(1) in which the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the person so recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained or maintained, the Government need not prove that the defendant knew that the person had not attained the age of 18 years." Otherwise, the prosecution must prove that the defendant knew, or recklessly disregarded, the fact that the victim would be caused to engage in a commercial sex act, and in the case of an adult victim, that "force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion" had been used to cause the victim to engage in such an act. As a practical matter, the distinction between knowledge and reckless disregard of the facts may be more technical than real. One speaks of efforts to avoid discovery of a fact and the other to indifference as to the existence of a fact. In most instances, evidence of one will implicate the other. More specifically, in a criminal context, a defendant who claims a lack of guilty knowledge may be convicted when the evidence presented to the jury supports an inference that his ignorance was deliberate, a matter of conscious avoidance or willful blindness. In a civil context, "[r]eckless disregard ... is an extreme version of ordinary negligence;" it encompasses those instances of gross negligence where the defendant fails to seek out the facts that would be reasonable and prudent under the circumstances. Similarly, in a criminal context, "[t]o act with 'regardless disregard' means to be aware of, but consciously and carelessly ignore, [clearly guilty] facts and circumstances." Means of force ... coercion : Section 1591 expands the reach that the words "force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion" might ordinarily convey, with a definition of "coercion" that envelops threats of physical harm, abuse of legal process, as well as "psychological, financial, or reputational harm." Will be c ause d : The courts have concluded that the "will be caused" element of the offense indicates that the Congress intended the section to apply regardless of whether any commercial sex act ever occurs and regardless of whether the victim previously engaged in commercial sex acts unrelated to the defendant's involvement. Commercial sex act : Section 1591(e)(3) defines the "commercial" component of the commercial sex act element as "any sex act on account of which anything of value is given to or received by any person." The terms "thing of value" or "anything of value" appear with some regularity in federal criminal law, and are often understood to include both tangible and intangible remuneration.