The use of economic sanctions to stem weapons proliferation acquired a new dimension in the 1990s. While earlier legislation required the cutoff of foreign aid to countries engaged in specified nuclear proliferation activities and mentioned other sanctions as a possible mechanism for bringing countries into compliance with goals of treaties or international agreements, it was not until 1990 that Congress enacted explicit guidelines for trade sanctions related to missile proliferation. In that year a requirement for the President to impose sanctions against U.S. persons or foreign persons engaging in trade of items or technology listed in the Missile Technology Control Regime Annex (MTCR Annex) was added to the Arms Export Control Act and to the Export Administration Act of 1979. Subsequently, Congress legislated economic sanctions against countries that contribute to the proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons in a broad array of laws. The use of economic sanctions in furtherance of foreign policy or national security policy fell into disfavor in the mid- to late 1990s, in reaction to reports of the substantial toll paid by civilian populations when sanctions were cast broadly or wielded as a blunt force. At the same time, however, concerns about nuclear weapons proliferation shifted into high gear, fueled by nuclear weapons tests conducted by India and Pakistan (1998), and later by North Korea (2006 and 2009), North Korea's formal withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (2003), multiple missile tests by North Korea, reports of Iraq having weapons of mass production, possibly chemical and biological (leading into war in 2003); Iran's noncompliance with international agreements (which the International Atomic Energy Act began reporting in 2005), and the 2004 discovery that a leading nuclear scientist in Pakistan—A.Q. Khan—had been selling nuclear materials, technology, and knowledge to the highest bidder, including North Korea, Iraq, Iran, and Libya, for more than a decade. The 111 th Congress enacted the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, but some have expressed concern that the executive branch is taking full advantage of flexibility the Act provides in its implementation. The new Congress might revisit this legislation. Unfinished initiatives of the 111 th Congress raise the possibility that Belarus, Burma, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela are supporting proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Events of recent weeks signaling North Korea's and Iran's belligerence, disclosure of classified diplomatic documents that has churned up speculation and conjecture in the policy making and policy analysis communities, and the shift in political power particularly in the House of Representatives, could all have an impact on the 112 th Congress's approach to both sanctions and proliferation concerns. Other foreign policy and national security concerns—terrorism, regional stability, human rights, and the nexus among these issues that shape rogue regimes—could result in increased use of economic sanctions. President Obama has also initiated a scrutiny of U.S. export policy, with an eye toward streamlining licensing procedures and increasing exports. Many statutes that establish an authority or a requirement to impose economic sanctions to deter proliferation are implicated in export controls and thus are likely to be at least impacted by export control reforms, and perhaps will present an obstacle to that reform. This report offers an alphabetic listing and brief description of legal provisions that require or authorize the imposition of some form of economic sanction on countries, companies, or persons who violate U.S. nonproliferation norms. For each provision, information is included on what triggers the imposition of sanctions, their duration, what authority the President has to delay or abstain from imposing sanctions, and what authority the President has to waive the imposition of sanctions. 18 U.S.C. 229-229F (part I, chapter 11) makes it generally unlawful for a person knowingly "(1) to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, transfer directly or indirectly, receive, stockpile, retain, own, possess, or use, or threaten to use, any chemical weapon; or (2) to assist, induce, in any way, any person to violate paragraph (1), or to attempt or conspire to violate paragraph (1)." The sections establish criminal and civil penalties, and terms of criminal forfeiture. Sec. 201 of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 (Division I of P.L. 105-277 ; approved October 21, 1998) enacted these sections to bring the criminal and civil penalties section of United States Code into conformity with the requirements of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Sec. 211 of that Act, furthermore, authorized the President to suspend or revoke export privileges of anyone found in violation of 18 U.S.C. 229. P.L. 109-304 (enacted Oct. 6, 2006) made a technical correction. 18 U.S.C. 832 makes it an offense to attempt to willfully participate in or knowingly provide material support or resources to a nuclear weapons program or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program of a foreign terrorist power. Such an offense is punishable by imprisonment of not more than 20 years. The section also makes it an offense to develop, possess, or attempt or conspire to develop or possess, a radiological weapon, to threaten to use, or use, such a weapon against any person in the United States, and any U.S. national regardless of where he/she may be, or against property owned or used by the United States. Such offense is punishable by imprisonment for "any term of years or for life." Sec. 6803(c) of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Prohibition Improvement Act of 2004 (title VI, subtitle I, of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004; P.L. 108-458 ; approved December 17, 2004) added sec. 832. 18 U.S.C. 2332a makes it an offense to use, threaten to use, attempt or conspire to use WMD against a national of the United States or within the United States. A "weapon of mass destruction" is a destructive device as defined in 18 U.S.C. 921—any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas bomb, grenade, mine, or rocket or missile of a certain size, any type of weapon of a certain size that delivers its projectile by explosion or other propellant—and any weapon that delivers toxic or poisonous chemicals, biological agent, toxin, or vector, radiation, or radioactivity. One found to have used a WMD "shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life, and if death results, shall be punished by death or imprisoned for any term of years or for life." Sec. 60023(a) of P.L. 103-322 (108 Stat. 1980) added sec. 2332a. The section was substantially reworked by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ( P.L. 104-132 ; approved April 24, 1996). The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 (division I of P.L. 105-277 ; approved October 21, 1998) exempted chemical weapons from application of this section of 18 U.S.C., and in its place enacted chapter 11B of part I of 18 U.S.C. (secs. 229 through 229F, above) to establish criminal and civil penalties in conformity with the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Economic Espionage Act of 1996( P.L. 104-294 ; approved October 11, 1996) and the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-188 ; approved June 12, 2002) made technical changes. The Weapons of Mass Destruction Prohibition Improvement Act of 2004 (title VI, subtitle I, of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004; P.L. 108-458 ; approved December 17, 2004) expanded the means of delivering the WMD to include the U.S. mail service and variations on " foreign commerce, " included attacks against property, and changed the section heading from " Use of certain weapons of mass destruction " to " Use of weapons of mass destruction, " consolidating WMD-related offenses in this chapter and section. The Arms Export Control Act (AECA), as amended, authorizes U.S. government military sales, loans, leases, and financing, and licensing of commercial arms sales to other countries. The AECA requires the President to coordinate such actions with other foreign policy considerations, including nonproliferation, and states guidelines by which the President determines eligibility of recipients for military exports, sales, leases, loans, and financing. Section 3(f) (Eligibility; 22 U.S.C. 2753(f)) prohibits U.S. military sales or leases to any country that the President determines is in material breach of binding commitments to the United States under international treaties or agreements regarding nonproliferation of nuclear explosive devices and unsafeguarded special nuclear material. Subsec. (f) was added by sec. 822(a)(1) of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 (title VIII of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995; P.L. 103-236 ; approved April 30, 1994). Section 38 (Control of Arms Exports and Imports; 22 U.S.C. 2778) authorizes the President, "in furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign policy of the United States," to control the import and export of defense articles and services, to provide foreign policy guidelines to U.S. importers/exporters, and to promulgate the United States Munitions List (USML) constituting what defense articles and services are regulated.