DOD defines “UAS” as systems whose components include the necessary equipment, networks, and personnel to control unmanned aircraft—that is, aircraft that do not carry human operators and are capable of flight under remote control or autonomous programming. The components of a UAS include an unmanned aircraft ground control station from which a UAS pilot flies an aircraft, a communications terminal that receives signals from the aircraft and relays these signals to the ground control station, sensors installed on the aircraft that collect data and images that are then sent to the ground control station, and weapons that are attached to some unmanned aircraft. DOD classifies its UAS into five groups on the basis of their weight and capabilities, including airspeed and operating altitude. For example, group one UAS weigh fewer than 20 pounds, whereas group five UAS weigh more than 1,320 pounds. The Air Force UAS pilots fly three types of UAS in groups four and five5: the MQ-1 Predator, the MQ-9 Reaper, and the larger RQ-4 Global Hawk. The Army UAS pilots fly two types of UAS in groups three and four: the RQ-7B Shadow and the MQ-1C Gray Eagle. Servicemembers in the Air Force and the Army who operate the larger and more capable UAS in group three or above are either manned- aircraft pilots or pilots specializing in flying UAS. In contrast, personnel who operate the less capable UAS that are classified in groups one and two generally operate UAS as an additional duty. The Air Force and the Army use different strategies to assign personnel to this position. The Air Force assigns four different types of officers to this position: (1) temporarily re-assigned manned-aircraft pilots, (2) manned-aircraft pilots and other Air Force aviation officers who have converted to this career field permanently, (3) graduates of manned-aircraft pilot training on their first assignment, and (4) pilots who specialize in flying UAS with limited manned-aircraft experience. The Army assigns enlisted personnel to this position and they receive no training on how to fly a manned-aircraft. Over the past decade, the size, sophistication, and cost of DOD’s UAS have grown to rival DOD’s portfolio of traditional manned-aircraft systems and UAS have become integral to warfighter operations. However, the demand for UAS has outpaced the Air Force’s ability to produce UAS pilots using the existing training pipeline. To meet the demand for UAS pilots, the Air Force has relied on support from the Air National Guard and has pursued efforts to increase the number of UAS pilots. For example, the Air Force trained traditional manned-aircraft pilots to fly UAS and placed graduates of manned-aircraft pilot training into UAS training rather than in advanced manned-aircraft training. In 2010, the Air Force created a dedicated UAS pilot career field and developed a training program for pilots who specialize in flying UAS. As of 2015, the Secretary of Defense had tasked the Air Force to provide 60 “combat lines” to combatant commanders, which is the measure of the capability to provide near- continuous 24-hour presence of a UAS over a specific region on Earth. At the same time, in March 2016, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force testified that the DOD-wide requirement is 90 combat lines and in addition to the Air Force, DOD is relying on the Army and private sector contractors, among others, to help meet this increased requirement. Various offices within the Air Force, the Army, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense have roles and responsibilities to evaluate the UAS pilot “workforce mix,” which is the mix of military, federal civilian, and contractors that might be used to fill UAS pilot positions. Air Force and Army: Section 129a of title 10 establishes that the Secretaries of the Air Force and the Army have overall responsibility for the requirements determination, planning, programming, and budgeting for policies and procedures for determining their most appropriate and cost-effective mix of personnel. DOD Directive 1100.4 directs the services to designate an individual with full authority for manpower management, and DOD Instruction 1100.22 directs the heads of DOD components to require their designated manpower authority to issue implementing guidance requiring the use of the instruction when determining the workforce mix for current, new, or expanded missions. DOD Instruction 7041.04 requires the component heads to use the business rules in the instruction when estimating the full costs of a workforce in support of force structure decisions and when performing a cost benefit analysis, an economic analysis, or a business analysis in support of workforce mix decisions—including when determining the workforce mix of new and expanding mission requirements not exempt from private-sector performance and when deciding whether to use federal civilians to perform functions that are being performed by contractors. Office of the Secretary of Defense: According to Section 129a of Title 10 of the United States Code, which governs DOD’s general policy for total force management, the Secretary of Defense is required to establish policies and procedures for determining the most appropriate and cost efficient mix of military, federal civilian, and contractor personnel to perform the missions of the department. The statute also requires that, within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness has overall responsibility for guidance to implement such policies and procedures. DOD policies also establish roles and responsibilities for the Office of the Secretary of Defense: DOD Directive 1100.4 establishes DOD policy concerning manpower management. The directive also establishes multiple responsibilities for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, including that the office review the personnel management guidelines and practices of DOD components for compliance with established policies and guidance. DOD Instruction 1100.22 implements policy set forth under DOD Directive 1100.4 and establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for determining the appropriate mix of military, federal civilian, and contractor personnel. The instruction assigns to the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness the responsibility for overseeing programs that implement the instruction for working with the heads of DOD components to ensure that they establish policies and procedures consistent with this instruction. DOD Instruction 7041.04 states that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Comptroller, and with the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation are responsible for developing a cost model applicable DOD-wide to employ business rules for estimating and comparing the full costs of DOD manpower and contract support. The Air Force and the Army have not fully applied four of the five key principles for effective strategic human capital planning in the actions taken to resolve the challenges that each faces in managing its UAS pilot workforce (see table 1 for a summary of our assessment). The Air Force has continued to experience challenges staffing its UAS pilot career field, and the Army has continued to experience challenges ensuring that units that operate the RQ-7B Shadow UAS conduct homestation training to address UAS unit readiness concerns. One key principle for effective strategic human capital planning is that organizations can benefit from ensuring that top leadership sets the overall direction and goals of human capital planning and that organizations can also benefit from including employees and stakeholders in developing and implementing human capital plans. Air Force—applied. We determined that the Air Force applied this principle in the actions taken to address UAS pilot shortages because the Air Force has involved top senior Air Force leaders, stakeholder offices, and UAS pilots in UAS units to develop a strategy (i.e., the Get Well Plan) to address UAS pilot shortages. In documentation of the Get Well Plan the Air Force describes its UAS pilot shortage, the plan’s goals, and initiatives to address the shortages, such as by reassigning some of the UAS workload to Air National Guard units and by supporting training and operations through the use of contractors. According to Air Force headquarters officials, in 2015 top senior Air Force leaders developed the Get Well Plan, and the Secretary of the Air Force and other top senior leadership helped develop the plan’s two goals to staff 100 percent of the positions for (1) instructors at the UAS pilot school and (2) combat UAS pilots. Further, stakeholder offices such as the Air Combat Command and the Air Force Special Operations Command participated in developing the plan, according to headquarters Air Force officials. In addition, the Air Combat Command’s Culture and Process Improvement Program Office surveyed and interviewed UAS pilots in UAS units from August 2015 through September 2015 to identify any challenges the pilots and units faced and subsequently developed over 150 initiatives to address these challenges. For example, according to a draft report of this effort, UAS pilots reported that their morale was low and some attributed this to the isolated locations of UAS bases. In response, the Air Force announced that it would establish new UAS units at up to two existing Air Force bases in possible locations that include Arizona, Georgia, and Idaho. Army—partially applied. Top senior Army leaders and stakeholders developed a strategy to address UAS unit training shortfalls and UAS unit readiness issues including UAS mishaps that the Army identified in 2015, but we determined that the Army had partially addressed this principle because the Army did not involve UAS pilots serving in UAS units in this effort. According to senior officials from the Army Aviation Center of Excellence, the Army’s top senior leaders, stakeholders from the Army Combat Readiness Center, and other organizations prepared a briefing in March 2015 that documented findings about UAS training shortfalls, UAS mishaps, and an Army strategy to address UAS training shortfalls.