In 2007, the Bush Administration requested about $310 million in the FY2008 defense budget to begin the design, construction, and deployment of a ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) element of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) in Europe. This program followed several years of discussions between the United States and Poland and the Czech Republic. The proposed system would have included 10 silo-based interceptor missiles to be deployed in Poland, a fixed radar installation in the Czech Republic, and another transportable radar to be deployed in a country closer to Iran (which was never publicly identified). Deployment of the GMD European capability was scheduled to be completed by 2013 at an official estimated cost of at least $4 billion (including fielding and Operation and Support). The Bush proposal raised a number of issues within Europe and encountered strong opposition in Russia. The United States signed agreements with Poland and Czech Republic in summer 2008. Polish and Czech ratification of those agreements stalled for various reasons. On September 17, 2009, the Obama Administration announced it would cancel the Bush Administration's proposed European 3 rd site. Instead, Defense Secretary Gates announced U.S. plans to develop and deploy a regional BMD capability that could be surged on relatively short notice during crises or as the situation may demand called the PAA (Phased Adaptive Approach). Gates argued this new capability, based initially on expanding existing BMD sensors, communication systems, and interceptors into Europe, would be more responsive and adaptable to the growing threat from short- and medium-range Iranian ballistic missiles. This capability would continue to evolve and expand over the next decade. Eventually, this regional BMD capability could cover all of Europe, according to Secretary Gates, and defend against medium and prospective long-range Iranian ballistic missiles. More specifically, the Obama Administration has described the PAA in four phases: Phase 1 (2011 timeframe): Use existing/maturing BMD systems against short- and medium-range Iranian ballistic missile threats. Sea-based and other existing BMD capabilities will be used as necessary to defend parts of southern Europe, and a forward-based sensor would be deployed to Europe. Phase 2 (2015 timeframe): Deploy enhanced BMD capabilities against short- and medium-range Iranian ballistic missile threats. This would include advanced sensors and an improved version of the Aegis BMD (SM-3 IB interceptor), including a combination of sea- and land-based configurations. Phase 3 (2018 timeframe): Deploy improved area coverage in Europe against medium- and intermediate-range Iranian ballistic missile threats. This would include more capable Aegis BMD interceptors (SM-3 IIA) in a combination of sea- and land-based configurations. Phase 4 (2020 timeframe): Deploy BMD capabilities against potential Iranian ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) threats. If an Iranian ICBM threat emerges, more advanced Aegis BMD capabilities might be deployed (SM-3 IIB) to provide some capability against a regional ICBM threat. Once proven and tested, this capability could be made available for deployment to NATO Europe. Secretary Gates argued this new direction is needed to address growing concerns over the pace and direction of Iranian short- and medium-range ballistic missile proliferation in a manner that can be deployed more quickly and effectively than the Bush-proposed European site. President Obama pointed out that his decision came after extensive consultations with U.S. allies in 2009. Some critics argued the Obama Administration's decision was meant to appease Russia or garner Russian support for other issues because of its strong opposition to the Bush plan. They also said that the Obama Administration harmed relations with Poland and the Czech Republic by cancelling agreements reached with those two countries. Some critics also charged that the Obama Administration was ignoring the growing nuclear and ballistic missile threat from Iran. The response throughout Europe appears to have been largely positive. The leaders of Germany, France, the UK, Austria, and Slovakia, for example, all praised the policy reversal. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated that the decision was a "positive step" that would "not weaken the defense of any ally." The alliance chief suggested further that a joint NATO-U.S.-Russia missile defense system be taken into consideration. Reaction in Poland and the Czech Republic was mixed. Although Polish and Czech leaders were not publically critical of the Obama Administration's announcement, some Polish tabloids spoke of "betrayal," while former Polish President Lech Walesa and former Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek criticized the Obama administration's policy toward the region. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk claimed that the shift "should not affect the security of Poland" and would not undermine relations with the United States. Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski stated that, even though the interceptors would not be emplaced in Poland, the United States would still transfer a Patriot air- and missile defense battery with a complement of about 100 U.S. troops, as had been promised under an agreement the two governments signed in August 2008. In addition, the Obama Administration left open the door to the possibility of basing missile defense facilities on Czech and Polish soil in the future—possibly by date 2015. The Polish government subsequently stated its willingness to host more advanced SM-3 (Standard Missile 3) missile defenses. Czech President Vaclav Klaus pronounced himself unsurprised by the announcement, and assured that he was "100 percent convinced that this decision ... does not signal a cooling of relations" between the two countries. However, a group of ruling party senators expressed concern over the "somersault in the U.S. foreign policy." In addition, Agence France Presse reported that Czech Foreign Minister Jan Kohout "called for the United States to 'fill the empty space' left by the scrapped missile plan 'with concrete projects.'" Some Polish and Czech elected officials are likely displeased with the decision because they believe that they needlessly expended considerable political capital in supporting the Bush Administration plan—which had significant popular opposition in both countries. U.S. analysts, however, counter that the Czechs and Poles have dragged their heels on agreeing to host the facilities. Although formal negotiations over the interceptor and radar bases began in January 2007, and discussions were initiated years before, final agreements were not struck until July and August of 2008, and parliamentary ratification of the accords—a U.S. congressional precondition for site construction and deployment of the missile defense complexes—was still pending at the time of the plan's cancellation. In Russia, President Dmitry Medvedev initially called the decision "a responsible move," adding that "we value the responsible approach of the U.S. President to our agreement. I am ready to continue our dialogue." However, Moscow eventually found reason to object to the Obama Administration's PAA, and sought unsuccessfully to oppose the plan as a bargaining chip in arms treaty negotiations with the United States. Most of this report that follows is designed to retain background information and analysis of the Bush-proposed European BMD initiative up to the Obama Administration's decision to cancel it. This report will be available primarily for historical purposes. It will not be updated. When it first requested funding in 2007, the Bush Administration argued that the proposed GMD European capability would help defend U.S. forces stationed in Europe, U.S. friends and allies in the region, as well as to defend the United States against long-range ballistic missile threats from Iran. In its last budget request for FY2009, the Bush Administration requested $712 million for development, fielding, and military construction of the European GMD element. Some $618 million was available from the FY2009 defense budget for the European 3 rd site, had Polish and Czech ratification gone forward. In its first budget request, the Obama Administration proposed an additional $50.5 million for FY2010, before announcing its decision to cancel the program in September 2009. The prospect of a fixed, silo-based GMD capability based in Europe raised a number of significant international security and foreign policy questions. Central to the debate for many was how the proposed U.S. system might affect U.S.-European-Russian relations. In FY2008, Congress eliminated funding to start construction of the European site pending final approval of international agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic and receipt of an independent study of alternative missile defense options for Europe. Congress largely supported the Administration's request for FY2009, but restricted funding for site construction until after the Polish and Czech Parliaments ratified the agreements reached with the Bush Administration. Congress continued to withhold funding for deployment of the ground-based interceptor missiles themselves until after the Secretary of Defense certified to Congress that those interceptor missiles would work effectively. Congress also supported a relatively small request for the European 3 rd site in FY2010. During the 2008 presidential campaign, Senator Obama said he supported the deployment of ballistic missile defenses that were operationally effective. In her January 2009 nomination hearings for Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Michele Flournoy said the Obama Administration would review plans to deploy elements of a missile defense system in Europe. Flournoy said the plans should be reviewed as part of the QDR (Quadrennial Defense Review) and "in the broader security context of Europe, including our relations with Russia," noting that any final policy decision should consider it in the interest of the United States if Washington and Moscow could agree to cooperate on missile defense. Flournoy also said the final contours of any decision would require close consultations between the Administration and Congress. At his nomination hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee for Deputy Secretary of Defense, William Lynn responded to a question suggesting he would support making the MDA's budgetary, acquisition, testing, and policy processes more open and similar to the military services. "I think that all our military programs should be managed through those regular processes," he said, and "that would include missile defense.