Congressional authority to discipline Members is found in Article I, Section 5, clause 2 of the Constitution, which provides that "Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member." Through the years, disorderly behavior has been interpreted as improper conduct and included support of rebellion, disloyalty, corruption, and financial wrongdoing. Only since the 1960s has each chamber systematically undertaken self-discipline related to conduct. This report examines the creation and evolution of the House and Senate ethics committees and the formalization of the House and Senate ethics processes. It also describes some of the recent changes, implemented or proposed, in congressional enforcement of rules of conduct. It does not deal with changes to federal or state criminal law or with criminal prosecutions of Members of Congress. Prior to the 1960s, neither the House nor the Senate had a mechanism to consistently exercise disciplinary powers against Members. When allegations of misconduct were investigated, it was often by an ad hoc or select committee created for that purpose. In addition, allegations were sometimes considered by the whole House or Senate without prior committee action. During this time, publicity and reelection were considered the major forms of redress for allegedly unethical behavior in Congress. Historically, Congress did not have a formal ethics process. "For nearly two centuries," former Senate historian Richard Baker observed, "a simple and informal code of behavior existed. Prevailing norms of general decency served as the chief determinants of proper legislative conduct." During that time, Congress chose "to deal, on a case-by-case basis, only with the most obvious acts of wrongdoing, those clearly 'inconsistent with the trust and duty of a member.'" Perceptions of wrongdoing or conflicts of interest by Members of Congress have changed over time. What might be viewed today as blatant impropriety could have been an accepted norm or simply ignored years ago. For example, when Daniel Webster was chair of the Senate Finance Committee (1833-1837), he was also on the payroll of the Bank of the United States. Very few colleagues, however, criticized him for being a bank official or for his practice of going from the Senate to the Supreme Court, which was then housed in the Capitol, to argue cases in which he had a legislative or financial interest. According to Dr. Baker, Webster made no effort to keep his business ties a secret. Not until the 1940s were concerns raised over the lack of specific standards of conduct and requirements for financial disclosure for government officials, and about the potential impact outside income might have on Members' decision making and behavior. For example, in 1946, during the 79 th Congress (1945-1946), Senator Wayne Morse introduced S.Res. 306, to require Senators to disclose sources of outside income. His resolution, which was not adopted, was predicated on the idea that Members' behavior should be above suspicion and that the disclosure of income would dispel rumors of impropriety. In 1951, criticism of congressional investigative procedures began to increase with some commentators claiming that Members were abdicating responsibility for their behavior by relying on voters to "punish" misbehavior. Voters, however, might not possess adequate knowledge of their Member's behavior and were often quick to "forgive" Members disciplined by the chamber in which they served. The 85 th Congress (1957-1958) adopted a general Code of Ethics for Government Service covering officials and employees in the three branches of government. Initially proposed in 1951 by Representative Charles Bennett, the Code of Ethics was adopted following a House investigation of presidential chief of staff Sherman Adams, who was alleged to have received valuable gifts from an industrialist being investigated by the Federal Trade Commission. The standards included in the Code of Ethics for Government Service are still recognized as continuing ethical guidance in the House and Senate. They are, however, not legally binding because the code was adopted by congressional resolution, not by public law. The existence of a "club spirit" and reliance on unwritten norms of conduct continued in Congress until the 1960s. In 1966, political scientist Robert Getz observed that "the combination of historical precedent, the fear of partisan motivations, and the requirement of functioning in an atmosphere of mutual respect and cooperation has given rise to the view that Congress is not the forum before which the membership should be disciplined." In the 1960s, investigations of alleged misconduct by Bobby Baker, secretary to the Senate majority, and Representative Adam Clayton Powell drew attention to the lack of specific congressional standards of conduct and a means of enforcing congressional self-discipline. Subsequently, the Senate created the Select Committee on Standards and Conduct in 1964, and the House established the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct in 1967. Each committee was given the authority to investigate allegations of wrongdoing by Members, officers, and employees; to adjudicate evidence of misconduct; to recommend penalties, when appropriate; and to provide advice on actions permissible under congressional rules and law. In seeking to be fair to Members, and not to prejudice the consideration of an allegation, the House and Senate ethics committees have operated quietly over the years. They often have been perceived, however, to be slow or reluctant to investigate and discipline colleagues and have been criticized on the basis of that perception. Subsequently, numerous proposals have been introduced in the Senate and the House to create an "independent" ethics organization. In the 110 th Congress (2007-2009), the House, for the first time, created the Office of Congressional Ethics, an independent ethics review body. The Senate has not established a comparable office. During the 82 nd Congress (1951-1953), Senator J. William Fulbright introduced S.Con.Res. 21 to create an ethics commission of private citizens appointed by the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate. While not adopted by the Senate, S.Con.Res. 21 was favorably reported by a subcommittee of the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee. In addition, the subcommittee, chaired by Senator Paul Douglas, recommended government-wide ethics changes including financial disclosure, restrictions on lobbying by former Members of Congress, regulation of campaign costs, restrictions on honoraria, and guidelines for representing constituent concerns before executive agencies. In the 96 th Congress (1979-1981), Senator William Roth introduced S.J.Res. 144 to "establish an Independent Investigating Commission on Ethics to conduct investigations of allegations of improper conduct by Members of Congress arising out of the FBI investigation known as 'ABSCAM.'" The commission would have establish[ed] a five-person independent commission of senior statesman to assist the Ethics Committees in both the Senate and the House by conducting investigations and making reports concerning the serious allegations of wrongdoing that have been made. These senior statesmen would have [had] the right to independently receive complaints and initiate investigations only of those matters directly related to the FBI investigation known as "ABSCAM." The Ethics Committees, would [have] retained the right to review any findings and to recommend any appropriate action to the full Senate and House. S.J.Res. 144 was referred to the Committee on Governmental Affairs and did not receive further consideration. The next discussion of a non-congressional ethics entity occurred during the 103 rd Congress (1993-1994), when the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress held hearings on the congressional ethics process. Sitting and former Members of Congress, as well as congressional scholars, discussed the pros and cons of entities outside Congress assisting the ethics committees in the enforcement of congressional rules of conduct. Subsequently, the House Members on the committee recommended that "the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct should be authorized to use, on a discretionary basis, a panel of non-Members in ethics cases." No further action was taken. During the 105 th Congress (1997-1998), the House Ethics Reform Task Force, co-chaired by Representatives Robert Livingston and Benjamin Cardin, considered the use of "distinguished private citizens" (including former Members of the House and judges) in the ethics process. Some witnesses before the task force had suggested the participation of "outsiders" would enhance public trust and confidence and minimize partisanship. Task force members, however, feared that the use of private citizens would interfere with the constitutional responsibility of each House to discipline its Members. A majority of the task force also believed that incumbent House Members better understand the practices of the House, and that Members accused of misconduct should be judged by their peers. Accordingly, the task force recommended, and the House adopted, a policy of appointing a bipartisan reserve "pool" of House Members to serve on any House Committee on Ethics investigative subcommittees if needed. This is still the practice in the House. There was a high level of interest in an independent ethics authority in the 109 th Congress (2005-2006) when numerous bills were introduced. Nonetheless, in March 2006, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs voted against a proposal to establish an independent office to enforce congressional ethics and lobbying laws. Subsequently, the Senate defeated a similar amendment to a pending gift and lobbying reform measure ( S. 2349 ). In the 110 th Congress, on January 18, 2007, during consideration of the Legislative Transparency and Accountability Act of 2007 ( S. 1 ), the Senate again rejected an amendment to establish a Senate Office of Public Integrity. Outside enforcement of conduct or anti-corruption provisions against Members of the House and Senate is potentially complicated by Article I, Section 6, clause 1 of the Constitution, which provides Member protection from prosecution and questioning by outside law enforcement for certain official, legislative conduct. The Constitution states, "for any Speech or Debate in either House, they [Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other place." The Constitution's "Speech or Debate" clause may provide a practical necessity for internal congressional investigations and punishment of Members who violate chamber rules, federal law, or state law.