In a criminal law context, bail is most often thought of as the posting of security to ensure the presence of an accused at subsequent judicial proceedings—that is, "[t]o obtain the release of (oneself or another) by providing security for future appearance." The term itself is less frequently used now, however, due in part to the practice of release on personal recognizance, which consists of permitting an individual to pledge his word, rather than his property, for his future appearance. Moreover, today, an individual's release pending subsequent criminal proceedings is often predicated on conditions other than, or in addition to, the posting of an appearance bond, secured or unsecured. As a consequence, rather than speaking of bail, existing federal law refers to release or detention pending trial, to release or detention pending sentencing or appeal, and to release or detention of a material witness. This report provides an overview of federal law in each of these areas, as well as in the area of extradition from the United States to another country. American bail law has its origins in England, where it was said that "the right to be bailed ... is as old as the law of England itself." Blackstone wrote that "by the ancient common law, before and since the conquest, all felonies were bailable, till murder was excepted by statute: so that persons might be admitted to bail before conviction almost in every case." In the beginning, however, officials enjoyed considerable discretion over the circumstances under which bail might be granted or denied. The First Statute of Westminister of 1275 limited that discretion when it listed the criminal offenses which were bailable and those which were not. Yet, if an individual was imprisoned without charge, the question of whether the crime charged was bailable never arose. If an individual was imprisoned without bail and his jailer failed to make a timely return on his writ of habeas corpus, the right to bail would become meaningless. (A writ of habeas corpus instructed the sheriff or other custodian to whom it was addressed to return to the court which issued the writ and to justify the prisoner's detention.) The same was true if an individual was imprisoned and his bail set at an exorbitant amount. At the dawn of the American colonial period, Parliament had occasion to visit each of these concerns. First in the Petition of Right, it precluded pretrial imprisonment without a criminal charge and confirmed the availability of habeas corpus relief for those who were held without charge. Then in the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, it imposed a three-day deadline for return on a habeas writ, thus eliminating a custodian's use of delay to frustrate a pretrial prisoner's right to bail. Finally, in the Bill of Rights of 1689, it prohibited excessive bail. In this country, the right to bail appears to have been widely recognized during the colonial period and in the early years of the Republic. The 1641 Massachusetts Body of Liberties included a right to bail section: No mans person shall be restrained or imprisoned by any authority whatsoever, before the law hath sentenced him thereto, if he can put in sufficient securitie, bayle or mainprise, for his appearance, and good behaviour in the meane time, unless it be in Crimes Capitall, and Contempts in open Court, and in such cases where some expresse act of [the General] Court doth allow it. The U.S. Bill of Rights and many of the constitutions of the original states featured excessive bail clauses, and less often, right to bail clauses. The Continental Congress made a right to bail part of the Northwest Ordinance ("... All persons shall be bailable, unless for capital offences, where the proof shall be evident, or the presumption great ..."), and the First Congress added a similar clause to the first Judiciary Act ("And upon all arrests in criminal cases, bail shall be admitted, except where the punishment may be death, in which cases it shall not be admitted but by the supreme or a circuit court, or by justice of the supreme court, or a judge of a district court, who shall exercise this discretion thereto, regarding the nature and circumstances of the offence, and of the evidence, and usage of law ..."). The Revised Statutes of 1878 mirrored the provisions of the Judiciary Act. The Revised Statutes included additional provisions relating to bail for habeas petitioners, and the arrest and subsequent proceedings concerning individuals previously admitted to bail. These continued in place with little substantive revision until the Bail Reform Act of 1966. In the mid-1960s, the state of federal bail troubled Congress for two reasons. First, Congress believed that, in spite of the presumption of innocence, an accused's prospects of pretrial release turned primarily on his wealth. "Every witness before the subcommittees agreed that, at least in noncapital cases, the principal purpose of bail is to assure that the accused will appear in court for his trial. There is no doubt, however, that each year thousands of citizens accused of crimes are confined before their innocence or guilt has been determined by a court of law, not because there is any substantial doubt that they will appear for trial but merely because they cannot afford money bail. There is little disagreement that this system is indefensible." It further believed that a poor defendant suffered considerable disadvantages as a consequence. "There was widespread agreement among witnesses that the accused who is unable to post bond, and consequently is held in pretrial detention, is severely handicapped in preparing his defense. He cannot locate witnesses, cannot consult his lawyer in private, and enters the courtroom—not in the company of an attorney—but from a cell block in the company of a marshal. Furthermore, being in detention, he is often unable to retain his job and support his family, and is made to suffer the public stigma of incarceration even though he may later be found not guilty." Second, it feared that the existing bail system permit had no real means of holding those charged with a crime whose release would pose a danger to the community or someone in the community. Congress addressed the first concern in the Bail Reform Act of 1966, but was unable to reach consensus on the second, preventive detention, until several years later. "This legislation does not deal with the problem of the prevention detention of the accused because of the possibility that his liberty might endanger the public, either because of the possibility of the commission of further acts of violence by the accused during the pretrial period, or because of the fact that he is at large might result in the intimidation of witnesses or the destruction of evidence.... Obviously, the problem of preventive detention is closely related to the problem of bail reform. A solution goes beyond the scope of the present proposal and involves many difficult and complex problems which require deep study and analysis. The present problem of reform of existing bail procedures demands an immediate solution. It should not be delayed by consideration of the question of preventive detention." The 1966 Bail Reform Act amended federal law to require the pretrial release of an individual charged with a noncapital federal offense upon personal recognizance or an unsecured appearance bond, unless the court determined they were likely to be insufficient to assure the appearance of the accused at trial. The court was to assess the risk of flight by considering the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of the evidence against the accused, the accused's family ties, employment, financial resources, character and mental condition, the length of his residence in the community, his record of convictions, and his record of appearance at court proceedings or of flight to avoid prosecution or failure to appear at court proceedings. Should the court conclude that an accused would otherwise pose a risk of flight, it was to impose the least restrictive of a series of conditions that included first, third-party custody; then, travel and associational limitations; then, cash or secured bail; and, finally, nighttime incarceration. The accused was given an explicit right to appeal the imposition of any such conditions. Release was also required in capital cases and following conviction, unless the court concluded that no condition or series of conditions could overcome the risk of flight or danger to the community posed by the defendant. For several years thereafter, debate continued over the wisdom and constitutionality of pretrial preventive detention in noncapital cases. Some found preventive detention incompatible with the right to bail they considered implicit in either the Eighth Amendment's excessive bail clause or the Fifth Amendment's due process clause or in both. Others felt the right was subject to reasonable legislative regulation. History seemed to provide support for either view. On one hand, the excessive bail clause in the English Bill of Rights was clearly enacted to prevent judges from frustrating the right to bail by requiring excessive bail. ("Unfortunately, the [Habeas Corpus] Act closed one loophole and opened another. The acknowledgment of discretion in clause III allowed bail to be set at prohibitively high amounts.... The Bill of Rights corrected the practice of setting excessive bail in criminal cases ..."). Moreover, until the mid-20 th century, Congress and the vast majority of state constitutions had consistently recognized a right to bail in noncapital cases save only when the accused posed a risk of flight. On the other hand, both the English and the federal right to bail had always been a matter of statute—that is, a matter subject to reasonable legislative regulation. Dicta in various Supreme Court cases seemed equally conflicted. In Stack v. Boyle , the Court noted that "this traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the unhampered preparation of a defense, and serves to prevent the infliction of punishment prior to conviction.... Unless this right to bail before trial is preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning." Yet shortly thereafter it observed in Carlson v. Landon that the [excessive] bail clause was lifted with slight changes from the English Bill of Rights Act.