The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...." The language is commonly referred to as the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. The two clauses serve to balance the collective freedom so that the government may neither coerce nor prohibit citizens' participation in religion. The U.S. Supreme Court historically has rendered its decisions on both clauses without applying bright line rules. The Establishment Clause cases, in particular, have used three tests to determine whether a violation has occurred, (1) the Lemon test, (2) the coercion test, and (3) the endorsement test. The Lemon test assesses whether a government action constitutes an establishment of religion via a three-prong approach. The Court considers whether the action has a secular purpose, whether the primary effect of the act is to advance or inhibit religion, and whether the act creates excessive entanglement of religion and government. The Court has also used a coercion test, under which it determines whether an individual would feel coerced to participate in religious activity as a result of a government action. The final test the Court invokes is the endorsement test, which assesses the effect of a person's standing in the community as a result of a government action. Government action cannot be constitutional under this test if it suggests that non-adherents are outsiders and believers are insiders. As is the case in other freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment, the freedom of religion is not absolute. The Court has interpreted the Free Exercise Clause historically to mean that government action alleged to interfere with religious practices could be constitutional only if it were shown to serve some compelling public interest and to be no more restrictive of religious practices than necessary. Government action burdening religious exercise, in short, was deemed to be subject to a constitutional standard of strict scrutiny. Although historically the free exercise of religion has been considered a fundamental right and infractions given this heightened standard of review, the Court curtailed that standard for most cases in 1990. Currently, the strict scrutiny standard does not apply to generally applicable laws that are otherwise valid and neutral. In other words, the government may take actions that infringe on one's free exercise of religion, so long as its action does not specifically target the practice of religion and applies without regard to religion. Since taking office in 2001, President George W. Bush has implemented the Faith-Based Initiative, which has brought several First Amendment issues to the Court. The Faith-Based Initiative, created and developed by Executive Orders, allows non-governmental community organizations, including religious groups, to compete for public funding of social services. The Charitable Choice legislation of the 1990s provides public funding to religious organizations with a social purpose. More recent legislation provides for a voucher program for private schools, including religious schools. Whether these provisions violate the Establishment Clause are core issues that the Court may face in coming terms as similar claims continue to work through the lower courts. Furthermore, the makeup of the Court has changed, with Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito replacing Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor. This may result in a shift in the Court's understanding of the religion clauses. In sum, political events have continued to raise church-state issues in the Court. The trend of fact-specific rulings issued by the Court since 1980 has continued into the 21 st century. This report summarizes and examines the Court's decisions regarding church and state from its October 2002 Term, through the present (i.e., October 2002 through June 2007). In Newdow , the Court considered the constitutionality of a California school district's policy that required each class to recite the Pledge of Allegiance daily. The main issue in the case was whether the school could enforce this mandatory daily Pledge policy. In other words, the case raised the question whether the public school district, by requiring elementary students to recite the Pledge each day, was establishing religion in violation of the First Amendment. The Court held in favor of the school district, 8-0. Five Justices (Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) dismissed the case on the preliminary issue of standing to sue (discussed below) without reaching the merits. Three Justices (Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Thomas) concurred in the judgment after reaching the merits. Justice Scalia did not participate in the case. In Newdow , the father of a child in the school district claimed that requiring his daughter to recite the Pledge, including the phrase "under God," constituted indoctrination of a religion in which he did not believe and did not want his child to be taught. The Court decided that Newdow, as the child's non-custodial parent under California law, did not have the standing required to sue on her behalf. The concept of standing derives mainly from the Constitution's case and controversy requirement. Under Article III, federal courts are permitted to hear only cases that present actual controversies between parties. In order to bring a case in federal court, a person must meet general requirements of standing: a harm must be (1) suffered, (2) caused by the act being challenged, and (3) capable of being remedied in the judicial system. In addition to these constitutional standing requirements, courts have also imposed other limitations, known as prudential standing requirements, on a person seeking to litigate certain issues. One of these is a general prohibition on third-party standing, which arises when one person attempts to sue on behalf of another person. One exception to the prudential standing requirements concerns the rights of minors; the parent of a child generally may sue on the child's behalf. However, under California law, only the parent with sole legal control over the child may bring a suit on her behalf. Three members of the Court-Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Thomas-concurred with the majority's decision in favor of the school district, but wrote opinions that reached the merits of the case. Citing examples dating back to President Washington, Rehnquist found that the phrase "under God" was a variation on references to religion that had been a part of public statements by the nation's leaders for centuries. Rehnquist emphasized that the phrase was part of a patriotic practice, not a religious exercise. O'Connor's opinion interpreted the phrase as an expression of ceremonial deism, something that refers "to the divine without offending the Constitution." She further stated that such references' "history, character, and context prevent them from being constitutional violations at all." Justice Thomas believed that, because students are compelled to attend school by law and because the school mandates that the Pledge of Allegiance be recited, the students are effectively coerced. However, because Thomas believed Lee v. Weisman (the case announcing the coercion test) to be wrongly decided, Thomas voted to uphold the Pledge policy as well. The Court's next case illustrated the tension that may arise between the two clauses. In some cases, in order to comply with a statute that has a valid secular purpose, such as a law prohibiting polygamy, a person may be forced to violate his religious beliefs. In order to avoid such situations, some statutes grant exemptions for violations based on religious beliefs. But these laws granting an exemption to some individuals in order to satisfy the right to free exercise arguably may be read as making an improper accommodation of religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. On the other hand, if Congress does not allow an exemption, the person cannot obey the statute without violating his religion. By not granting the exemption and satisfying the Establishment Clause's requirements of neutrality, the law creates a burden that arguably violates the Free Exercise Clause. Thus, if a statute has an exemption, a person who does not hold religious beliefs that entitle him to the exemption might bring an Establishment Clause challenge, and, if the statute has no exemption, a person who does hold a particular religious belief might bring a Free Exercise challenge. This situation illustrates the complexities of the religion clauses of the Constitution that played out in Locke v. Davey . In Locke v. Davey , Washington offered students state funding for college under its Promise Scholarship Program. The Program offered academic scholarships to college students but required that recipients not use the funds to pursue devotional theological degrees. After receiving a Promise Scholarship from the state, Davey enrolled in Northwest College to pursue a dual major in pastoral ministries and business management and administration. Because Davey's pastoral ministries major was considered devotional and ineligible for funding under the Program, Washington did not provide Davey with the scholarship funds. Davey challenged the Program's limitation for devotional degrees, claiming that the state's refusal to fund his chosen path of education interfered with his Free Exercise rights. In clarifying the issues raised by this challenge, the Court noted that, under federal constitutional law, when a recipient of public funds makes an independent choice to spend those funds on religious training, there is no violation of the federal Establishment Clause. However, state constitutions, such as Washington's in this case, may contain religion clauses that more strictly limit the state's role in religious matters. Washington's Supreme Court interpreted the state constitution's religion provision to prohibit the state from funding religious instruction intended to prepare students for ministry. The issue of the case, thus, was whether Washington, acting pursuant to the anti-establishment provision in its own constitution, could deny students state funding for devotional degrees without violating the federal Constitution's Free Exercise Clause. The majority (Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) held that the withholding of the funds did not improperly infringe on Davey's federal right to free exercise. Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented, finding that the scholarship policy violated Davey's right to freely exercise his religion.