Among its responsibilities for aviation safety, FAA issues certificates that approve the design and production of new aircraft and equipment before they are introduced into service; these certificates demonstrate that the aircraft and equipment meet FAA’s airworthiness requirements. FAA also grants approvals for such things as changes to air operations and equipment. Certificates indicate that the aircraft, equipment, and new air operators are safe for use or flight in the NAS. While industry stakeholders have expressed concerns about variation in FAA’s interpretation of standards for certification and approval decisions, stakeholders and experts that we interviewed for our 2010 report indicated that serious problems occur infrequently. In addition, in September 2011 we reported that FAA did a good job following its certification processes in assessing the composite fuselage and wings of Boeing’s 787 against its airworthiness standards. The certification process also provides an example of how FAA is attempting to use a more proactive approach in finding solutions to a potential problem. In the case of flammability regulations that govern transport type aircraft, FAA has primarily developed its regulations on a reactive basis. That is, as accidents and incidents have occurred, their causes have been investigated, and the findings used to develop regulations designed to prevent the future occurrence of similar incidents or accidents. To supplement this oversight method, FAA has proposed a new, threat-based approach for flammability regulations that will base the flammability performance for different parts of the aircraft upon realistic threats that could occur in-flight or in a post-crash environment. FAA recognizes the value of certification as a safety tool, however the agency faces some significant challenges, including resources and maintaining up-to-date knowledge of industry changes. According to a report from the Aircraft Certification Process Review and Reform Aviation Rulemaking Committee, these certification challenges will become increasingly difficult to overcome, as industry activity is expected to continue growing and government spending for certification resources remains relatively flat. As one means of responding to its certification workload, FAA relies on designees, however, our prior work has shown that there are concerns that designee oversight is lacking, particularly with the new organizational designation authorities in which companies rather than individuals are granted designee status. There are also concerns that, when faced with certification of new aircraft or equipment, FAA staff have not been able to keep pace with industry changes and, thus, may struggle to understand the aircraft or equipment they are tasked with certificating. SMS implementation within FAA should reduce certification delays and increase available resources to facilitate the introduction of advanced technologies. In response to a provision in the 2012 FAA Reauthorization, FAA is assessing the certification process and identifying opportunities to streamline the process. As we stated above, FAA plans to continue using data reactively to understand the causes of accidents and incidents, and is implementing a proactive approach—called an SMS approach—in which it analyzes data to identify and mitigate risks before they result in accidents. FAA is also overseeing SMS implementation throughout the aviation industry. Safety management systems are intended to continually monitor all aspects of aviation operations and collect appropriate data to identify emerging safety problems before they result in death, injury, or significant property damage. Under SMS, which FAA began implementing in 2005, the agency will analyze the aviation safety data it collects to identify conditions that could lead to aviation accidents or incidents and to address such conditions through changes to FAA’s organization, processes, management, and culture. As we reported in September 2012, according to FAA, the overarching goal of SMS is to improve safety by helping ensure that the outcomes of any management or system activity incorporate informed, risk-based decision making. FAA’s business lines, such as the Air Traffic Organization and the Aviation Safety Organization, are currently at different stages of SMS implementation and it is likely that full SMS implementation will take many more years. SMS relies heavily on data analysis and, while FAA has put in place various data quality controls, it continues to experience data challenges including limitations with some of its analyses and limitations to or the absence of data in some areas. Data limitations and the lack of data may inhibit FAA’s ability to manage safety risks. For example, we found that some FAA data used in risk assessments may not be complete, meaningful, or available to decision makers. We have also reported that the agency currently does not have comprehensive risk-based data, sophisticated databases to perform queries and model data, methods of reporting that capture all incidents, or a level of coordination that facilitates the comparison of incidents across data systems. Furthermore, technologies aimed at improving reporting have not been fully implemented. As a result, aviation officials managing risk using SMS have limited access to robust FAA incident data. Implementing systems and processes that capture accurate and complete data are critical for FAA to determine the magnitude of safety issues, assess their potential impacts, identify their root causes, and effectively address and mitigate them. Our recent work on aviation safety and FAA oversight issues has identified a number of specific areas where FAA’s risk-based oversight could be improved through improved data collection and analysis, including: runway and ramp safety, airborne operational errors, general aviation, pilot training, unmanned aircraft systems, and commercial space. FAA has taken steps to address safety oversight issues in many of these areas, including making changes to or committing to make changes to its data collection practices in response to our recommendations in most of these areas. Nonetheless, sustained FAA attention will be necessary to ensure that the agency’s ability to comprehensively and accurately assess and manage risk is not impaired. Runway and ramp safety. Takeoffs, landings, and movement around the surface areas of airports (the terminal area) are critical to the safe and efficient movement of air traffic. In a June 2011 incident at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York, for example, a jumbo jet carrying 286 passengers and crew almost collided with another jumbo jet, which reportedly missed a turn and failed to stop where it should have to avoid the occupied runway. Safety in the terminal area could be improved by additional information about surface incidents, which is currently limited to certain types of incidents, notably runway incursions and certain airborne incidents, but does not include runway overruns or incidents in ramp areas. Without a process to track and assess these overruns or ramp area incidents, FAA cannot assess trends in those areas and the risks posed to aircraft or passengers in the terminal area. FAA is planning to develop a program to collect and analyze data on runway overruns, something we recommended in 2011, but it will be several years before FAA has obtained sufficient information about these incidents to be able to assess risks.still collects no comprehensive data on ramp area incidents and NTSB does not routinely collect data on ramp accidents unless they result in serious injury or substantial aircraft damage. In 2011, we recommended that FAA extend its oversight to ramp safety and FAA concurred. Airborne operational errors. Operational errors –also referred to as losses of separation—occur when two aircraft fly closer together than safety standards permit due to an air traffic controller error. We reported that FAA’s risk-based process for assessing airborne losses of separation is too narrow to account for all potential risk and changes in how errors are reported affect FAA’s ability to identify trends. For example, FAA’s current process for analyzing losses of separation assesses only those incidents that occur between two or more radar-tracked aircraft. By excluding incidents such as those that occur between aircraft and terrain or aircraft and protected airspace, FAA is not considering the systemic risks that may be associated with many other airborne incidents. FAA has stated that it is planning to include these incidents in its risk assessment process before the end of 2013, something we recommended in 2011.changes to reporting policies affect its ability to accurately determine safety trends. For instance, we reported in October 2011 that the rate and number of reported airborne operational errors in the terminal In addition, FAA’s area increased considerably since 2007.to reporting policies and processes in 2009 and 2010 make it difficult to know the extent to which the recent increases in reported operational errors are due to more accurate data, an actual increase in the occurrence of incidents, or both. General aviation. General aviation is characterized by a diverse fleet of aircraft flown for a variety of purposes. In 2010, FAA estimated that there were more than 220,000 aircraft in the active general aviation fleet, comprising more than 90 percent of the U.S. civil aircraft fleet. The number of nonfatal and fatal general aviation accidents decreased from 1999 through 2011; however, more than 200 fatal accidents occurred in each of those years. In October 2012, we reported that general aviation flight activity data limitations impede FAA’s ability to assess general aviation safety and thereby target risk mitigation efforts. For example, FAA estimates of annual general aviation flight hours may not be reliable because of methodological and conceptual limitations with the survey upon which flight activity estimates are based. These limitations include survey response rates below 50 percent. Without more comprehensive reporting of general aviation flight activity, such as requiring the reporting of flight hours at certain intervals, FAA lacks assurance that it is basing its policy decisions on an accurate measure of general aviation trends, and NTSB lacks assurance that its calculations of accident and fatality rates accurately represent the state of general aviation safety. Lack of comprehensive flight hour data is an issue we have also identified in other segments of the aviation industry, including helicopter emergency medical services (HEMS) and air cargo transportation. We recommended in 2007 and 2009 respectively that FAA take action to collect comprehensive and accurate data for HEMS and general aviation operations. In 2011, we confirmed that FAA now annually surveys all helicopter operators and requests, among other things, information on the total flying hours and the percentage of hours that were flown in air ambulance operations. Our recommendations to FAA for air cargo and general aviation data remain unaddressed. See GAO, Initial Pilot Training: Better Management Controls Are Needed to Improve FAA Oversight, GAO-12-117 (Washington, D.C.: November 4, 2011).