Adaptation and the SetPoint Model of Subjective Well-Being Does Happiness Change After Major Life Events ?

Hedonic adaptation refers to the process by which individuals return to baseline levels of happiness following a change in life circumstances. Dominant models of subjective well-being (SWB) suggest that people can adapt to almost any life event and that happiness levels fluctuate around a biologically determined set point that rarely changes. Recent evidence from large-scale panel studies challenges aspects of this conclusion. Although inborn factors certainly matter and some adaptation does occur, events such as divorce, death of a spouse, unemployment, and disability are associated with lasting changes in SWB. These recent studies also show that there are considerable individual differences in the extent to which people adapt. Thus, happiness levels do change, and adaptation is not inevitable. KEYWORDS—happiness; subjective well-being; adaptation; set-point theory People’s greatest hopes and fears often center on the possible occurrence of rare but important life events. People may dread the possibility of losing a loved one or becoming disabled, and they may go to great lengths to find true love or to increase their chances of winning the lottery. In many cases, people strive to attain or avoid these outcomes because of the outcomes’ presumed effect on happiness. But do these major life events really affect long-term levels of subjective well-being (SWB)? Dominant models of SWB suggest that after experiencing major life events, people inevitably adapt. More specifically, set-point theorists posit that inborn personality factors cause an inevitable return to genetically determined happiness set points. However, recent evidence from large-scale longitudinal studies challenges some of the stronger conclusions from these models. ADAPTATION RESEARCH AND THEORY Although the thought that levels of happiness cannot change may distress some people, researchers believe that adaptation processes serve important functions (Frederick & Loewenstein, 1999). For one thing, these processes protect people from potentially dangerous psychological and physiological consequences of prolonged emotional states. In addition, because adaptation processes allow unchanging stimuli to fade into the attentional background, these processes ensure that change in the environment receives extra attention. Attention to environmental change is advantageous because threats that have existed for prolonged periods of time are likely to be less dangerous than novel threats. Similarly, because rewards that have persisted are less likely to disappear quickly than are novel rewards, it will often be advantageous to attend and react more strongly to these novel rewards. Finally, by reducing emotional reactions over time, adaptation processes allow individuals to disengage from goals that have little chance of success. Thus, adaptation can be beneficial, and some amount of adaptation to life circumstances surely occurs. Yet many questions about the strength and ubiquity of adaptation effects remain, partly because of the types of evidence that have been used to support adaptation theories. In many cases, adaptation is not directly observed. Instead, it must be inferred from indirect evidence. For instance, psychologists often cite the low correlation between happiness and life circumstances as evidence for adaptation effects. Factors such as income, age, health, marital status, and number of friends account for only a small percentage of the variance in SWB (Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999). One explanation that has been offered for this counterintuitive finding is that these factors initially have an impact but that people adapt over time. However, the weak associations between life circumstances and SWB themselves provide only suggestive evidence for this explanation. Additional indirect support for the set-point model comes from research that takes a personality perspective on SWB. Address correspondence to Richard E. Lucas, Department of Psychology, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48823; e-mail: lucasri@msu.edu. CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE Volume 16—Number 2 75 Copyright r 2007 Association for Psychological Science Three pieces of evidence are relevant (Lucas, in press-b). First, SWB exhibits moderate stability even over very long periods of time and even in the face of changing life circumstances. Recent reviews suggest that approximately 30 to 40% of the variance in life-satisfaction measures is stable over periods as long as 20 years. Second, a number of studies have shown that well-being variables are about 40 to 50% heritable. These heritability estimates appear to be even higher (about 80%) for long-term levels of happiness (Lykken & Tellegen, 1996). Finally, personality variables like extroversion and neuroticism are relatively strong predictors of happiness, at least when compared to the predictive power of external factors. The explanation for this set of findings is that events can influence short-term levels of happiness, but personality-based adaptation processes inevitably move people back to their genetically determined set point after a relatively short period of time. More direct evidence for hedonic adaptation comes from studies that examine the well-being of individuals who have experienced important life events. However, even these studies can be somewhat equivocal. For instance, one of the most famous studies is that of Brickman, Coates, and Janoff-Bulman (1978) comparing lottery winners and patients with spinal-cord injuries to people in a control group. Brickman et al. showed that lottery winners were not significantly happier than the control-group participants and that individuals with spinal-cord injuries ‘‘did not appear nearly as unhappy as might be expected’’ (p. 921). This study appears to show adaptation to even the most extreme events imaginable. What is often not mentioned, however, is that although the participants with spinal-cord injuries were above neutral on the happiness scale (which is what led Brickman et al. to conclude that they were happier than might be expected), they were significantly less happy than the people in the control group, and the difference between the groups was actually quite large. Individuals with spinal-cord injuries were more than three quarters of a standard deviation below the mean of the control group. This means that the average participant from the control group was happier than approximately 78% of participants with spinal-cord injuries. This result has now been replicated quite often—most existing studies show relatively large differences between individuals with spinal-cord injuries and healthy participants in control groups (Dijkers, 1997). In addition to problems that result from the interpretation of effect sizes, methodological limitations restrict the conclusions that can be drawn from many existing studies of adaptation. Most studies are not longitudinal, and even fewer are prospective (though there are some notable exceptions; see e.g., Bonanno, 2004; Caspi et al., 2003). Because participants’ pre-event levels of SWB are not known, it is always possible that individuals who experienced an event were more or less happy than average before the event occurred. Certain people may be predisposed to experience life events, and these predisposing factors may be responsible for their happiness levels being lower than average. For instance, in a review of the literature examining the well-being of children who had lost limbs from various causes, Tyc (1992) suggested that those who lost limbs due to accidents tended to have higher levels of premorbid psychological disorders than did those who lost limbs due to disease. Thus, simply comparing the well-being of children who lost limbs to those who did not might overestimate the effect of the injury. Psychologists have demonstrated that level of happiness predicts the occurrence of a variety of events and outcomes (Lyubomirsky, King, & Diener, 2005), and therefore, studies that compare individuals who have experienced a particular event with those who have not but that do not take into account previous happiness level must be interpreted cautiously. A second methodological concern relates to what are known as demand characteristics. When researchers recruit participants specifically because they have experienced a given life event, participants may overor underreport SWB. These reports may occur because people believe the life event should have an impact, because they want to appear well-adjusted, or simply because the context of the study makes the event more salient. For instance, Smith, Schwarz, Roberts, and Ubel (2006) showed that patients with Parkinson’s disease reported lower life satisfaction when the study instructions indicated that Parkinson’s disease was a focus than when the instructions indicated that the study focused on the general population. USING LARGE-SCALE PANEL STUDIES TO ASSESS ADAPTATION TO LIFE EVENTS Recently, my colleagues and I have turned to archival data analysis using large, nationally representative panel studies to address questions about adaptation to life events. These studies have a number of advantages over alternative designs. First, they are prospective, which means that pre-event levels of SWB are known. Second, they are longitudinal, which means that change over time can be accurately modeled. Third, very large samples are often involved, which means that even rare events are sampled. Finally, because designers of these studies often recruit nationally representative samples, and because the questionnaires often focus on a variety of issues, demand characteristics are unlikely to have much of an effect. We have used two such panel studies—the German Socioeconomic Panel Study (GSOEP) and the British Household Panel Study (BHPS)—to examine the amount of adaptation that occurs following major life events. The GSOEP includes almost 40,000 individuals living in Germ