Is Verbal Irony Special?

The way we speak can reveal much about what we intend to communicate, but the words we use often only indirectly relate to the meanings we wish to convey. Verbal irony is a commonly studied form of indirect speech in which a speaker produces an explicit evaluative utterance that implicates an unstated, opposing evaluation. Producing and understanding ironic language, as well as many other types of indirect speech, requires the ability to recognize mental states in others, sometimes described as a capacity for metarepresentation. This article aims to connect common elements between the major theoretical approaches to verbal irony to recent psycholinguistic, developmental, and neuropsychological research demonstrating the necessity for metarepresentation in the effective use of verbal irony in social interaction. Here I will argue that verbal irony is one emergent, strategic possibility given the interface between people’s ability to infer mental states, and use language. Rather than think of ironic communication as a specialized cognitive ability, I will claim that it arises from the same set of abilities that underlie a wide range of inferential communicative behaviors. Language interaction involves a complex interplay of many cognitive abilities. Theorists across many disciplines struggle with questions of how to carve up these abilities, and whether they can be carved up in the first place (e.g., Christiansen and Chater 2008). Among the most difficult questions to address are those that involve how people recognize intentions in others’ behavior, and how that is achieved through language in the context of many other sources of information. The way we speak can reveal much about what we intend to communicate, but the words we use are often quite different from the meanings we wish to convey. People often speak indirectly for a variety of strategic reasons, and these strategies rely intrinsically on social cognition. One well-researched example of this is the phenomenon of verbal irony – a type of indirect speech in which a speaker produces an explicit evaluative utterance that implicates an unstated, opposing evaluation. As described below, this trope has been traditionally defined in rather vague terms, but has generated a great deal of research as a phenomenon in need of special theoretical explanation. Here I will argue that verbal irony is one emergent, strategic possibility given the interface between people’s ability to infer the mental states of others, and use language. Rather than think of ironic communication as a unique skill or specialized cognitive ability, I suggest that it arises from the same set of abilities that underlie a wide range of inferential communicative behaviors. The study of verbal irony production and comprehension has been a multidisciplinary effort lacking extensive interdisciplinary exchange. There have been various taxonomies and definitions of what constitutes irony, both verbal and situational – a struggling enterprise to say the least (Colston and Gibbs 2007). The traditional notion of verbal irony dates back at least to the Roman rhetorician Quintilian, who described irony as a kind of allegory expressing the opposite of what one means, often for mocking Language and Linguistics Compass 6/11 (2012): 673–685, 10.1002/lnc3.364 a 2012 The Author Language and Linguistics Compass a 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd communicative effects. Some of the assumptions of this early categorization have carried over into modern psycholinguistic research without proper consideration of underlying communicative functions (Kreuz 2000). Many scholars have linked verbal irony to situational irony – particularly in how both forms seem to involve, at some level, a contradiction between what is expected, and what occurs. While verbal irony often points to unexpected or unfortunate outcomes in people’s actions (Kumon-Nakamura, Glucksberg, and Brown 1995; Pexman 2008), it does not do so necessarily. At present, most contemporary researchers of figurative language and inferential communication have settled on some version of the basic claim that verbal irony is a class of indirect language use where explicit sentence meanings are conceptually contradictory to a network of related implied propositions. Many other tropes, however, are not obviously distinct (e.g., parody, pretense, double entendre, litotes, etc). One common thread between many theoretical and empirical approaches to verbal irony is the distinction language users must make between layers of meaning. This could be the difference between actual and attributed beliefs (Kreuz and Glucksberg 1989; Sperber and Wilson 1986, 1995), real and imagined discourse acts (Clark and Gerrig 1984), relevant or inappropriate to a particular context (Attardo 2000), what is negated and what is implicated (Giora 1995), or failed expectations and attitudes toward those failures (Kumon-Nakamura, Glucksberg, and Brown 1995). Speakers implicitly highlight the contrasts between these different levels of meaning, and in doing so communicate an attitude toward an attributed belief (Sperber and Wilson 1986, 1995). This attitudinal dissociation is typically considered a hallmark of ironic communication, and necessarily requires an implicit understanding of others’ mental states. Consider the following exchange: John: I got another virus on my laptop. Mary: Aren’t you glad you didn’t switch to Mac? In this example John and Mary are discussing John’s computer problems. John reports that he got a virus on his computer – not his first. Mary asks an ironic rhetorical question expressing her negative opinion of Windows PCs. The literal question is in particular opposition to the implied evaluation – the essence of irony. In this example, the irony is largely contained in a single lexical opposition – ‘‘glad’’ instead of, for example, ‘‘sad,’’ but is also communicated by the rhetorical aspect of the question. The question form is one format speakers use to express ironic intentions, but ironic forms can manifest themselves in various ways linguistically, and in a variety of media including television, music, and visual art (Bryant 2011; El Refaie 2005; Ettema and Glasser 1994; Nuolijarvi and Tiittula 2010; Scott 2003). Figurative language devices such as verbal irony can be quite powerful communicative tools. The sentences we speak are often produced in a manner that will allow our audience to derive certain unstated meanings, and the way we put them is often particularly economical because of our heavy reliance on others’ inferential abilities. These meanings are not just efficient, but unique to indirect communication (Gibbs 2000a). The combination of affect directed toward some attributed belief, along with a direct utterance, makes ironic meanings difficult, if not impossible, to precisely capture. But this is due to inferential processes associated with mindreading and linguistic communication, not some distinct process of irony understanding. Similarly, it is difficult to capture, in linguistic terms, many kinds of inferences regarding others’ intentions that people generate in social contexts. In our example, Mary, of course, communicates much more than a negative opinion of PCs. For instance, she implicitly reminds John of previous interactions, some being debates, when their differences of opinion about computer platforms were discussed (i.e., 674 Gregory A. Bryant a 2012 The Author Language and Linguistics Compass 6/11 (2012): 673–685, 10.1002/lnc3.364 Language and Linguistics Compass a 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd she echoes previous opinions expressed, perhaps even through literal quotations) (Kreuz and Glucksberg 1989; Sperber and Wilson 1986, 1995). In doing so she reiterates her claim that John’s decision was a mistake, and that he would regret it. By using an ironic rhetorical question, Mary efficiently conveys a complex set of implied meanings that are relevant to John. The irony is not necessarily obvious to an outsider, as is the case with most occurrences of irony in everyday conversations (Gibbs 2000b), but John understands Mary immediately, and Mary knew he would. In the process, Mary potentially reduces John’s perception that she is being critical, and makes him laugh (while actually criticizing him) (Dews and Winner 1995). Alternatively, Mary might be accentuating her criticism by highlighting a contrast between John’s current situation and his earlier stated preference (Colston 1997). Speakers attempt to fulfill particular communicative goals by using indirect language such as verbal irony, and different forms can result in quite different emotional reactions – we should expect it to be used strategically and variably (Bryant 2011; Bryant and Fox Tree 2005; Leggitt and Gibbs 2000). Scholars have suggested many functions for irony in discourse, including speakers’ attempts to be humorous, create solidarity, appear clever, increase memorability, save face, be polite, or alter the valence of an attack or praise (Gibbs 1994; Roberts and Kreuz 1994; Toplak and Katz 2000). The pragmatic uses of ironic speech are far-reaching – ‘‘what can’t irony do?’’ might be a better question. One reason that irony can fulfill so many discourse goals is that includable tokens in the category need only satisfy a couple conditions; thus, an enormous variety of speech acts can qualify. Burgers, van Mulken, and Schellens (2011) recently proposed a procedure for identifying ironies in discourse, and for a basic definition, they looked at the commonalities between different contemporary theories. In their view, verbal irony involves an expressed evaluative utterance that implies an opposing evaluative appraisal. This implied meaning does not need to be the opposite of the stated meaning, but just differ in a scalar manner. For instance, an understatement might still be negative, but less negative than the intended meaning (e.g., when asked about a personal experience with a