OBJECTIVE SELF-AWARENESS THEORY : RECENT PROGRESS AND ENDURING PROBLEMS By :

Objective self-awareness theory has undergone fundamental changes in the 3 decades since Duval and Wicklund's (1972) original formulation. We review new evidence that bears on the basic tenets of the theory. Many of the assumptions of self-awareness theory require revision, particularly how expectancies influence approach and avoidance of self-standard discrepancies; the nature of standards, especially when they are changed; and the role of causal attribution in directing discrepancy reduction. However, several unresolved conceptual issues remain; future theoretical and empirical directions are discussed. Article: The human dilemma is that which arises out of a man's capacity to experience himself as both subject and object at the same time. Both are necessary--for the science of psychology, for therapy, and for gratifying living. (May, 1967, p. 8) Although psychological perspectives on the self have a long history (e.g., Cooley, 1902; James, 1890; Mead, 1934), experimental research on the self has emerged only within the last 40 years. One of the earliest "self theories" was objective self-awareness (OSA) theory (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). OSA theory was concerned with the self-reflexive quality of the consciousness. Just as people can apprehend the existence of environmental stimuli, they can be aware of their own existence: "When attention is directed inward and the individual's consciousness is focused on himself, he is the object of his own consciousness--hence 'objective' self awareness" (Duval & Wicklund, 1972, p. 2). This is contrasted with "subjective self-awareness" that results when attention is directed away from the self and the person "experiences himself as the source of perception and action" (Duval & Wicklund, 1972, p. 3). By this, Duval and Wicklund (1972,chap. 3) meant consciousness of one's existence on an organismic level, in which such existence is undifferentiated as a separate and distinct object in the world. OSA theory has stimulated a lot of research and informed basic issues in social psychology, such as emotion (Scheier & Carver, 1977), attribution (Duval & Wicklund, 1973), attitude--behavior consistency (Gibbons, 1983), self-standard comparison (Duval & Lalwani, 1999), prosocial behavior (Froming, Nasby, & McManus, 1998), deindividuation (Diener, 1979), stereotyping (Macrae, Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1998), self-assessment (Silvia & Gendolla, in press), terror management (Arndt, Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1998; Silvia, 2001), and group dynamics (Duval, 1976; Mullen, 1983). Self-focused attention is also fundamental to a host of clinical and health phenomena (Hull, 1981; Ingram, 1990; Pyszczynski, Hamilton, Greenberg, & Becker, 1991; Wells & Matthews, 1994). The study of self-focused attention continues to be a dynamic and active research area. A lot of research relevant to basic theoretical issues has been conducted since the last maj or review (Gibbons, 1990). Recent research has made progress in understanding links between self-awareness and causal attribution, the effects of expectancies on self-standard discrepancy reduction, and the nature of standards--the dynamics of selfawareness are now viewed quite differently. We review these recent developments[1] and hope that a conceptual integration of new findings will further stimulate research on self-focused attention. However, there is still much conceptual work left to be done, and many basic issues remain murky and controversial. We discuss these unresolved issues and sketch the beginnings of some possible solutions. Original Theory The original statement of OSA theory (Duval & Wicklund, 1972) employed only a few constructs, relations, and processes. The theory assumed that the orientation of conscious attention was the essence of selfevaluation. Focusing attention on the self brought about objective self-awareness, which initiated an automatic comparison of the self against standards. The self was defined very broadly as the person's knowledge of the person. A standard was "defined as a mental representation of correct behavior, attitudes, and traits ... All of the standards of correctness taken together define what a 'correct' person is" (Duval & Wicklund, 1972, pp. 3, 4). This simple system consisting of self, standards, and attentional focus was assumed to operate according to gestalt consistency principles (Heider, 1960). If a discrepancy was found between self and standards, negative affect was said to arise. This aversive state then motivated the restoration of consistency. Two behavioral routes were proposed. People could either actively change their actions, attitudes, or traits to be more congruent with the representations of the standard or could avoid the self-focusing stimuli and circumstances. Avoidance effectively terminates the comparison process and hence all self-evaluation. Early research found solid support for these basic ideas (Carver, 1975; Gibbons & Wicklund, 1976; Wicklund & Duval, 1971). Duval and Wicklund (1972) also assumed that objective self-awareness would generally be an aversive state--the probability that at least one self-standard discrepancy exists is quite high. This was the first assumption to be revised. Later work found that self-awareness can be a positive state when people are congruent with their standards (Greenberg & Musham, 1981; Ickes, Wicklund, & Ferris, 1973). New Developments OSA theory has grown considerably from the original statement (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). Our review focuses primarily on core theoretical developments since the last review (Gibbons, 1990). Other interesting aspects, such as interpersonal processes and interoceptive accuracy, have not changed significantly since previous reviews (Gibbons, 1990; Silvia & Gendolla, in press). We will also overlook the many clinical consequences of self-awareness; these have been exhaustively reviewed elsewhere (Pyszczynski et al., 1991; Wells & Matthews, 1994). Expectancies and Avoiding Self-Awareness Reducing a discrepancy or avoiding self-focus are equally effective ways of reducing the negative affect resulting from a discrepancy. When do people do one or the other? The original theory was not very specific about when approach versus avoidance would occur. Duval and Wicklund (1972) did, however, speculate that two factors should be relevant. The first was whether people felt they could effectively reduce the discrepancy; the second was whether the discrepancy was small or large. In their translation of OSA theory into a "test--operate--test--exit" (TOTE) feedback system, Carver, Blaney, and Scheier (1979a, 1979b) suggested that expectancies regarding outcome favorability determine approach versus avoidance behavior. When a self-standard discrepancy is recognized, people implicitly appraise their likelihood of reducing the discrepancy (cf. Bandura, 1977; Lazarus, 1966). If eventual discrepancy reduction is perceived as likely, people will try to achieve the standard. When expectations regarding improvement are unfavorable, however, people will try to avoid self-focus. Later research and theory (Duval, Duval, & Mulilis, 1992) refined Duval and Wicklund's (1972) speculations and the notion of outcome favorability. Expectancies are not simply and dichotomously favorable or unfavorable--they connote a person's rate of progress in discrepancy reduction relative to the magnitude of the discrepancy. More specifically, people will try to reduce a discrepancy to the extent they believe that their rate of progress is sufficient relative to the magnitude of the problem. Those who believe their rate of progress to be insufficient will avoid. To test this hypothesis, participants were told they were either highly (90%) or mildly (10%) discrepant from an experimental standard (Duval et al., 1992, Study 1). Participants were then given the opportunity to engage in a remedial task that was guaranteed by the experimenter to totally eliminate their deficiency provided that they worked on the task for 2 hr and 10 min. However, the rate at which working on the task would reduce the discrepancy was varied. In the low rate of progress conditions individuals were shown a performance curve indicating no progress until the last 20 min of working on the remedial task. During the last 20 min discrepancy was reduced to zero. In the constant rate of progress condition, participants were shown a performance curve in which progress toward discrepancy reduction began immediately and continued throughout such efforts with 30% of the deficiency being reduced in the first 30 min of activity and totally eliminated after 2 hr and 10 min. Results indicated that persons who believed the discrepancy to be mild and progress to be constant worked on the remedial task; those who perceived the problem to be mild but the rate of progress to be low avoided this activity. However, participants who thought that the discrepancy was substantial and the rate of progress only constant avoided working on the remedial task relative to those in the mild discrepancy and constant rate of progress condition. These results were conceptually replicated in a second experiment (Duval et al., 1992) using participants' time to complete the total 2 hr and 10 min of remedial work as the dependent measure. This pattern suggests that the rate of progress was sufficient relative to the magnitude of the discrepancy in the mild discrepancy and constant rate of progress condition; this in turn promoted approaching the problem. In the high discrepancy and constant rate of progress condition and the high and mild discrepancy and low rate of progress conditions, rate of progress was insufficient and promoted avoiding the problem. In a third experiment (Duval et al., 1992), people were again led to believe that they were either highly or mildly discrepant from a standard on an intellectual dimension and then given the opportunity to reduce that deficiency by working on a remedial task. A