Year: 1872

statute.


The practice, however, of the
courts has been to exclude in Grim


inal cases from the jury box all per-


sons WHO have formed any opinion
as to the guilt or innocence Of the


accused. It is a rule of procedure


having no other authority than that
of judicial usage. The object Of
MIR. Judd's bill is to abrogate this
usage, and require judges on the
bench to act like sensible men. The
bill ought to be passed at once, and
60 into effect Immediately.


No man who is fit to be Juror,
upon reading a detailed statement
Of the circumstances attending the
commission of crime, and assum-
ing the substantial correctness
thereof, can help forming some
opinion as to the guilt or innocence
of the party alleged to have perpe-
trated the deed. The opinion is a
private one, growing out of the
very constitution of human nature,
and having no official relation or
responsibility. 1t is also hypothet-
ical, being built upon the assump-
tion Of a certain set of facts; and it
may have various degrees of COM
pleteness, from loose general i'm
preston. to a decided conviction,
provided always that the facts are
as stated. In this age of newspa-
pers and ample facilities for the
circulation of information all per-
sons of ordinary intelligence are
compelled to form such opinions in
respect to crimes which excite the
public attention. They cannot
avoid the result, except by abjuring
the means of knowledge; and this
they certainly should not do.


Now, does such a fact render any
man Intellectually or morally in
competent to be sworn as Juror,
to listen carefully to the evidence
submitted, to hear the arguments
Of the counsel, and also an exposi-
ton of the law from the lips of the
Judge, and then retire, and with his
associates weigh the evidence, and
at last come to a conclusion solely
in the light of that evidence? Not
at all. His previous off-hand and
unstudied impression or opinion,
entertained without any public re-
sponsibility, is no obstacle whatever
to righteous determination of the
question of fact, provided he is an
honest man; and if he is not such,
then he is not very likely to confine
his verdict to the evidence, whether
he has any previous opinion or not.
A mere opinion, formed without
legal evidence. and with no personal
interests to influence it, is not such
a bias in its own direction as to i'm
pair the power of the evidence or to
weaken the judgment in it's consid
Grafton. The rule adopted by the
courts on this subject is, hence,
philosophically absurd; and almost
all judges know it to be so, except
when they sit IN the bench. Then
their judicial sense gets the better
of their common sense.


The practical consequence of an
plying the rule is the exclusion from
juries of the most intelligent and
competent men in the community,
and the commission of criminal |
verdicts to the adjudication of stupid
ignorance. This is one of the |
reasons why, in murder trials, those
who deserve to be hung so fire.
quently escape the Just award of
law. Take the case of Cole, tried a
few years since at Albany. The
evidence showed a clear and palpa-
BILE case of murder in the first de-
gree; and yet the jury, under the
plea OF insanity in behalf Of the ac-
cused, found that Cole, though sane
up to the moment of the crime, and
sane Immediately afterward, COM
mitted the deed under "an uncon-
.rollable impulse" and on this
ground brought in a verdict of not
guilty. The verdict in the case of
Mcfarland was no better. In both
Eases it was contrary to evidence
md contrary to justice. The law
allied of its end in the hands of its
sworn ministers. Such failures
lave become so numerous that men
If murderous passions are begin
hing to think that changing is
bout played out" lilling the jury
'ox with asses, instead of intelligent
nd sensible men, who are not to be
deceived by the artifces of criminal
awyers, tends directly to promote
he crime of murder, by the hope
# impunity to those who com
nit il.


The trial of Stokes, the assassin
t James Fisk, commences this ]