Year: 1870




THE REvERsEs-THE NAVY TO FIGHT TO


THE END.


IRON OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT


COPENHAGEN, Sept. 3.-Nothing is more diff
cult than to give an account Of what the French
squadron has done since its arrival in the Baltic and
especially to foretell what ITS commander, RearAdmral
Bouet-Wilaumez, proposes TO do in the future. His
action up this time has been confined TO blOckadDg
the coasts of Prussia, and making that blockade so
effective as not TO allow single port the coast any
communication by II must not be supposed that
this is an easy task for feet composed like the French
squadron large vessels of great draught Of water 1t
Is sufficient to glance map Of the Baltic Sea to per-
ceye the numberess difficulties in the way Of its navi-
CATION especially since the lights on the Prussian coast
have been put out and false lights erected to deceive
the enemy and attract him TO shallow water or over
tOrpedOes.


1t requires at practical experience and great pru-
the part of the Commander not to be caught in
the snares which constantly laid for him. Thus the
Danish sailors who the best acquainted with these
shores. agreed regarding this expedition as lcOn
ceyed and are the less able TO for il, the
French expedition Of 1854 and 1855 against Russia the
same should have taught the French better. The
plan Of campaign adopted defective in several respects
After the experienced by the French army and
the invasion of Asace and Lorraine by the Prussian 1t
ought not be regretted that the squadron Of Admiral
BOuet did not make military demonstration against
the open the Prussan coast for an attak on





prisas in the provinces occupied by the soldiers Of King
william But it is very much TO be regretted that the
chiefs charged with organizing the French marate ex
pedOn have not studied and understood its object bet
ter in the first place. and next the nature Of the sea on
which the feet was to operate.


The first thing to be done to become masters Of
one OF the small islands upon the coasts Of Hosten or
scheswg, Of many which have secure anchorage
and which not defended. 1t would have been base
OF operations and place Of retreamatters indispensable
for squadron especially when, as in the case Of Adm
raj BOuet fleet cannot cast anchor in safety except by
retiring into the waters OF neighboring neutral power
In fact the French squadron anchors. II is sub
iect to continual surprises in the night from the small
Prussan orisOs which, coming out Of the darkness from
small harbors known only TO themselves boldly advance
into the midst Of the French feet either to reconnoter
blow them up by topedoes These Prussan vessels
risk but little themselves. They rapidly and have
but q small crew, and the taking Of one Of them would
be Insignificant loss; whereas if one Of their
tempts crowned with success, 1t would be al
reparable loss TO the French feet II therefore, ev
dent that the occupation Of OF the isles the
would have been Of the greatest importance TO France
in negectng the French vessels have been forced to
take in coal the open from vessels which bring
from France, and only when the weather permits. Now
the French feet must from time to time approach the
Danish coast compromising that nation, whose devotion
10 France has been suspected and for which Prussia will
certainly make 1t pay later, probably as soon
as IL can Another fault Is the in which the
squadron Of the Northern Sea and the Baltic scOmpOsed
Ihe Prusan feet being shut Jadhe France should
nave sent some plated fgate oppose sortie Of the
enemy ana 1t was especially necessary TO effect the
oockAde IN way less costly and active 10 have
kept Also light dispatchboats and gunboats Of small
drdusht 10 pursue in the shalowest waters the small
RUSSIAN Doats which find therein certain refuge and
come out with impunity to harrass the French feet


In the Baltic the obligation WAS sin mora e,i
GENT Whatever may be their rapidty ulsted frgatos