Year: 1875

country from the results of that crush


ingly rapid campaign have been SO
great that they have blotted out the


sense of soreness that sprapg from the


defeats which the Austrian army suf-
fered. But though antagonism against


Germany has ceased among the people
composing the Austro- Hungarian en-
pire, it still turks between the cabinets


and governments Of the two countries,


and on the Austrian side not only does


there appear to be feeling of personal


resentment against the cabinet of Ber-


lin among some of the advieers of the


crown, but it is almost universally be-


lieved that the head of the state has q


deep personal and individual grudge


against his northern neighbor, and re-


fuses to meet even half way, or perhaps,


in any way, the advances which have


often been made to him from Berlin.


This fact, if not clearly ascertained, is


at least thoroughly believed north of


the Giant Mountains, and the belief


leads to feeling of distrust on the


part of northern Ge many towards
Austria. It is this attitude of the Aus


trian court which is one of the prime
reasons why Germany keeps up her
great and expensive armament. But
this state of things cannot always en-
dure. Throughout the Fagherland
there is feeling that it must come to
an end, and that the only way to reduce
these enormous armaments to footing
proportionate to the capabilities OF the
people is to force on events, and some
how or other disarm those ON account
of whom these military preparations
are necessary.


ENe1AND's POLICY.


What role would England take in
case of great European contest? The
general answer will doubtless be-that
of neutrality. But is it possible that
neutrality can always be maintained ?
II the British realm were confined to
the two small islands which constitute
its heart, it might be true that
it could keep out of war, but with
spreading colonies and foreign
entanglements it would be almost i'm
possible for England to avoid taking
part, sooner or later in the struggle.
How, then. is she prepared for the
emergency that is almost sure to arise? !?
The navy is apparently in good order.
The numerical strength of the British
feet is larger than that of any other
power, and English sailors have not
deteriorated. But large part of the
navy is composed of vessels built since
was engaged In great naval |
war. Their construction, to a great
extent, has been experimental. Sup
pose on going TO war it should be dis |
covered that the navy had been built |
ON faulty principles The result might |
be to nullify that arm of the national
defense, and uncover the coast of Eng
land to any powerful nation intent upon
the country and laying it un-
der tribute. The enormous wealth &C.
sumulated in London is bait to aver
ice which must not be ignored in con
sideration of the possibilities of hostile |
invasion. Suppose the coast should be
1efenseless, what kind of an army |
,ould England oppos to the magnifi- |
,ent troops of the continent? The |
militia ard volunteers wonld be useless. |
The regular army would be effective as
ar as il goes, but at most it would be /
30, O00sstrong. What could this hand
ul do against the tremendous hosts of |
Germany, Russia or France. IL Eng
and will save herself she must be
Wiling 10 spend her money freely to
o maintain large and efficient regular
lrmy. If Englishmen will not serve
heir country in person they must be
to pay the price for that i'm
nunity as for any other luxury. That
,rice is not 30 great as that which
night be assessed by committee of
continental bankers, in session in cap
ured London.