Year: 1873

of 1857 SubSlded with the suspension OF the DankS
of New YORK on the 18th OF October of that year.
Comparative comfort followed and was enjoyed
especially by those who had successfully main
tained the struggle up to that time. Money-that
Is, bank credits-became easy and the immediate
future was radiant with promise. Mercantile fall
ures ceased almost entirely and the new business
was done on q sounder basis than had existed for
years. The winter OF 1s57-5s proved to be dull but
1T was hopefully expected that the ensuing spring
would witness a thorough revival OF trade and the
disappearance Of


THE LAST vESTIGE


or the crisis AS events proved, however, these
hopes were destined to have little or no frutioD
Business firms who had sacrificed every thing to
sustain themselves during the panic and had been
successful, found themselves in 1858 obliged to
succumb to a species OF dry rot Dry rot prevailed
everywhere. 1t advanced at rate OF compound
interest that was lncalculabIe The whole struc-
ture OF trade became infected with 1t. The banks
. OF New York afforded an Illustration Of the stua
tion in their gross clearngs for the three years Of
1856, 1857 and 1885, We compile the figures from
the reports OF the New York Clearing House, as
follows. The clearings


In 1856 amounted So 9O6, 2l3 32s
In 1857 amounted to............... 1888, 2267 us
In 1858 amounted 4,756, 664,3S6
From the foregoing it Will be seen that the trade
or this city, as represented by the banks, showed
falling of for the year 1858 OF nearly one-half
when compared with 1857, and one-tnird compared
with 1856; and it was not until


AFTER TIE WAR


. commenced and the government began its i'm
mense expenditure for merchandise and the at
tendant imitation Of currency that the cearngs
again reached the figures OF 1857. similar condl-
ton existed in the stock market Of that day.
Prices continued to decline from the suspension OF
rha ;fa Trps tha
sion of the banks. Then the tide of reaction tenn
porarily set in. strong and upward movement
Followed, and reasons were as plenty as Dackber-
ries why prices should at once return to former
figures. But they did not. The speculation
hausted itself and collapsed


THE TRADE THE COUNTRY


diminished to degree that prevented the railroads
from earning enough to pay dividends on their
stocks, and In some cases, they were unable to
pay even the interest their bonded debt Hence
we nnd that in 1859, two years after the panic,
prices were as low, and even lower, than during
the panic itself. New York Central, for instance,
sold at Co. Hudson River at 80, Erie at 4, Michigan
Southern at 4, Reading at 354, and Chicago and
Rock Island at 55s. 1t is also to be remembered in
this connection that the policy of railroads. pror to
1857 was not unlike that winch has been enforced
during the past few years. TO wit: issues OF stock
.were made to represent real or supposed surplus
and bonds were issued for construction,
tensions, &C., until then, as now, the stocks and
debt represented


AS MUCH WATER AS REAL PROPERTY.


Is there no lesson here for the presentS Is not
the condltion Of affairs we have described similar
in It's chief aspects to that which exists at this
timer Is the promise of recuperation greater now
than then2 Nay. VIII the trade OF the country
however sound it may be, equal for years t. come
the amount or volume OF that which has passed
aways Every prudent man will answer these
questions for himself, and his own experience will
teach him that In the face OF all the msiortunes
that beset the country-the failures, contraction
of currency, decline in trade, suspension OF mills
and workshops and labor unemployed-it is folly
to be drawn into the vortex OF speculation, and
nope that in the general madness of the hour he
will be one OF the lucky few who extricate them
selves in time to escape the crash Of disaster.
The stock market Is undoubtedly Duoyant
and tempting. Fortunes have been made and lost
in the recent sharp advance, and possibly stlll
others may be made ana lost; but 1T is unsafe to
repose confidence in market that depends Tor it's
strength on the manipulations of the hour and not
upon inherent values consistent with the outside
situation The chemists in


THAT LABORATORY OF BRAINS AND BUNCoMBE--
'Congress-got fairly at work during the past
week, and have already begun to show us the con-
tents OF their financial crucibles. A number OF
propositions have been made having for their OBJ
iect speedy resumption on the one hand and on
the other imitation to any extent that the people
desire. 1t is useless to discuss these until they
have reached maturity, and there is reason to
believe that one or more of them may become laws.
Nothing, however, canbe truer in theory than the
principle that banking is trade, and only trade;
and nothing can be more surely established by
larger experience than that government which
interferes with any trade Injuries that trade. The
best thing that a government can do with the
money market is to let 1t take OF ITSELF except
in so far as it may be necessary to


STRENGTHEN THE PUBLIC CREDIT


and enhance the value OF the currency which now
constitutes our circulation. As was wisely said by
,one OF the United states Senators in recent
conversation, .'The people who have lost by this
panic are either those who have dangerously ex
tended their business upon the money OF others
or those who have voluntarily lent their money to
such persons. If you examine all the failures you
VIII find tnat they are included within these
classes. This Is matter beyond legislative relief.
All that the law can do is to secure the currency.
IL cannot say who shall or who shall not receive
-deposlts, or who shall make them or to whom they
shall be lent. All Congress can do IS to require
ample security for all currency issued to maintain
1t at par with gold; to guard against artificial
scarcity In times OF panic, and then to leave all
persons tree to buy SELL barter, exchange bank,
borrow, lend or deposit as they will at
their own risk" This Is the whole ques.
:ion In nutshell. We cannot return to


SPECIE PAYMENTS


without gold. On the 1st OF January, after the
payment by the government OF its $4,000 900 loan
OF 1850 and 500, 100000 OF interest then due on
the pubic debt, the Treasury VIII contain only be-
tween six and seven millions OF gold In excess OF
what Is due to the public and represented by
$3o,2o0,ooo or certificates. IT. as has been sug-
gcstcd, we attempt TO borrow IN the markets OF
the Ola World $2oooOoooo OF gold, 1t would be fol-
lowed by monetary crisis abroad, from which
every productive interest in America would suffer.
Regarded from every point of view, indeed, such a
plan is impracticabc. what We require is some