Year: 1870

THE RESULT OF THE BATTLES NEAR METZ.


The series of cOmbats between the French
and Prussians at Metz, LOngueville, Grave
lOtte. and Mars la Tour, seems to have culmi-
mated on the latter field in the defeat of Ba-
zaine and the disruption of his army. A
Berlin dispatch of August 18 asserts that the
main body of the French had been forced
back on Metz. A Paris dispatch of the nth
inst. claims that the main body had cOneen-
trated at Etain. There is no attempt to deny
that the army is cut in two; there is
only disagreement as to the numbers
which have been shut up in Metz and
the proportion which have retired to Etain.
Accepting these facts as clearly established,
and we see no reason to doubt them, we must
conclude that the battle at Mars la Tour can
hardly fail to prove a crowning disaster to
Bazaine. Pressed on flank and rear, the French
have fought nObly, but in vain. Their hero
ism was worthy a nObler cause, and deserved
a better fate 1t was the great error of Ba-
zaine that he deferred so long the evacuation
of Metz that his boldest tactics could not extri-
cate his brave army from the hold which the
giant one in pursuit has fastened upon it.
The superior generalship of the Prussian COM
mander is proved by the fact that he reached
the field of battle with nearly double the
strength of his opponent. 1t is not the French
soldiers, who withstOOd his attacks for four
successive days, but the Emperor, LebGuf,
Bazaine, and all the rest Of his laundering
generals, who are to blame that the left OF
the French army is broken at Metz as its right
was week before at Worth.


Metz, to which a portion of the army has
been forced, is in no condition to stand a
siege. That its Notifications are complete and
well armed for defense there is little doubt !;
but, unfortunately for the French, it is poorly
proyisioned. The COmmandant of the city re-
fused to admit the peasants who sought refuge
there on the advance of the Prussians, because
of the deficiency of food. This was before com
munication by rail was destroyed, and before
the garrison, always large, was increased by
the enforced return of part OF Bazaine's
army. IL the city is invested and cut off from
supplies, its reduction becomes simple mat
ter of time, and doubtless a very brief time.
The imperfeciOns of the French cOmmissariat
will end in the loss of this important strong
hold.


Marshal Bazaine's dispatch of August II. de-
scribing the battle of Mars Ia Tour, is dated
from Verdun; but as this point could be
reached at that hour from Etain as well as
from the battlefield, it does not entirely dis
prove the previous statement that the rem.
nant of the army had been forced from the
Verdun road upon that point. 1t may be, how
ever, that Bazaine has succeeded in maintain
ing his hold upon the road, and that his
army stretches from it across to Etain. In that
event his final escape to Verdun is not
impossible, but very improbable. The despera-
ton with which he has cOntended for the
possession of this road is partly explained by
the nature of the country through which it
leads. Immediately west of Verdun, and not
dozen miles from its gates, is the principal
pass through the great forest Of ArgOnne,
which extends for fifty miles in a northerly
direction along the plateau on the west bank
of the Meuse. Through this pass leads the one
great highway by which an army can cross
this plateau. 1t is this highway for which the
two armies have contended. If Bazaine can
thrust off his enemy, and escape to Yer
dun, he can control with a comparatively
small force the gateway to the forest.
But to escape this vigilant and overwhelm-
| ing force seems, from the events of the first
half of the week, almost an impossibility.
| And even il he did, it might be to fnd. ON
issuing from the pass ON the western side of
| the forest, the army of the Crown Prince
confronting him. That General has avoided
tho foreaf making a detOur To the south of