Year: 1876

headwaters of Rosebud Greek in wyoming
Territory. Our correspondent, who has a
quick eye, a clear head and steady nerves,
was sent to General Crooks camp as soon
as it was known that the expedition had
been planned. He accompanied it in its
march, was present in the thick of the battle,
became himself a combatant by the force
of circumstances in one stage Of the en-
gagement, and has furnished the first in
telligible account of the antecedents, cir
cumstances and consequences of that unfor-
tunate encounter. The fitness of the epi-
thet unfortunate will appear further on as
a deduction from the facts reported by our
correspondent. He does not assume to be
critic of the movements which he de-
scribes; he merely presents, with the strict
fidelity of q photograph, lively picture Of
the events which fell under his observation,
leaving his readers to draw their own infer
ences But the Interpretation lies so OBJ
vious on the surface of the facts that readers
will need little assistance in reaching cor
rect conclusions.


1t is too apparent that General Crook has
won no laurels as the commander Of an ex-
pedition against the Indians The battle
was a surprise, and the one thing which the
whole history of Indian warfare proves that
it is the supreme duty of a commander to
guard against is surprise. After more
than hundred years experience in fighting
these willy warriors, and after the many sig
nal disasters which have been suffered by
sudden surprises, it would seem that
commanders Of such expeditions should
by this time be sufficiently on their
guard against this chief source of
danger in Indian wars. General Crook
had no idea of fighting a battle until
the enemy were unexpectedly upon him in
full force. He started out with the inten-
ton of making an undiscovered march and
falling unawares on the village of the Sioux,
routing and destroying it by sudden onset.
But on the morning of the second day after
leaving his camp he found that the Sioux
were perfectly informed of his movements,
that they had come forth to meet him, that
they lay in ambush at point selected by
themselves, and that they were strong
enough to intercept his march, give him a
check, infict serious losses, compel him to
retreat to the camp from which he had set
out, and await reinforcements before at
tempting new advance against the cunning
and stealthy foe.


The pretence that he seriously crippled
the Sioux in the engagement is too fimsy to
be accepted He crippled them only to the
extent of their losses in the battle, which
were small in proportion to their whole
numbers. General Crook was acting on the
offensive, Sitting Bull on the defensive.
The offensive movement was a failure and
the defensive movement success. To be
sure, the Sioux did not pursue General
Crook in his retreat but this only proves
that they preferred to fight with the advan-
tage of ground selected by themselves with
reference to their peculiar mode of warfare.
They preferred to trust to new ambush if
he should make second advance. But he
concluded after his unexpected check and
forced retreat to retire to his camp,
some forty or fifty miles distant, and
call for reinforcements. The inevitable
effect of battle with such results
is to embolden the Sioux and to
shake the confidence Of the Crows and our
other Indian allies. The fact that they re-
fused to accompany him in further ad-
vance after the battle shows pretty clearly
what kind of impression the events of the
day made on the minds Of Indian warriors
They had evidently lost faith in General
Crook and his army, or they would not
have made excuses and left him without
guides


The description of the battle proves that
it was not only surprise at the beginning,
but that it was badly managed in its prog
ress. Owing sometimes to misinformation,
sometimes to q lack of quick military per-
ception, General Crook kept giving the
most unlucky orders The following pas
sage from the narrative Of our correspond
ent exhibits one of these unfortunate
blunders Colonel Royal was circum-
scribed by orders in every one Of his move
ments. and the disaster attending the retreat
would have been much greater had it not
been so skilfully directed by him. On the
left of his line was lofty, crescent-shaped
palisade toward which, early in the morn
ing, he deployed his skirmishers. Had the
order to fall back been little later this
would have been occupied. 1t would then
have been impossible for the Sioux to have
circled around to the rear, and fire could
have been turned upon the last high point
held by them, which would have compelled
them to hide behind it, while the cavalry
could have charged up the hollows and
reached them before they could have realized
their predicament. Then the soldiers could
have dismounted and fired snch voleys as
would have ended the fight and made it n
chase" Such was the bad effect of an ill
Judged and mistimed order to retreat.