Year: 1871

0csW8 SS9U9AJ - ASU1osos


The speech OF Bismarck in the Reichstag,
on the occasion of the debats on the War Fund
bill, scarcely surprised those who have closely
followed the course Of European politics for
the last few years. 1t was unavoidable that
the same uneasinsss and dissatisfaction should


be felt in Russia at the series Of Prussian vic
tories which eliminated in the capitulation of
Paris ~ had been manifested in France after
the battle of Sadowa; and though the Rus
sian government carefully refrained from giving
expression 10 any unfriendly sentiment, public
opinion was more outspokeu in Its hostility 20
the Germans. Every one saw that fatal
| blunder had been committed in allowing
| France to be overwhelmed; but 1t was then too
| late to remedy the mistake, for Russia was to-
tally unprepared for war. The reorganization
Of the army has been vigorously pushed
forward, so as to place Russia in
. position to dispute with Germany the su-
premacy of Europe. No one has been de-


ceived by the friendly professions Of the two


Courts, which are simply meant to gain time,
for the conflict of interests is too irreconclable
to permit lasting or sincere friendship between
the Northern Powers; and Bismarcks speech
shows that the Prussian government is re-
solved to take advantage of the present help
less condition Of France to crush the only
Power that could endanger the permanence Of
German unity. Russia has always been .
serious danger to Prussia, and is now alone
among the nations able to dispute with her the


mastership Of Europe. Every day that is
allowed her to gather together her forces and


organize her strength endangers the newly
acquired power Of Germany. Bismarck knows


this, and is resolved to strike fort ct cite. The
pretence of Germany being menaced, put for


ward in bis speech on the War Fund bill, is


too trivial for serious attention. Germany


has no need to fear attack, for 1t is the inter-
est of Russia to postpone all warlike opera


tions until France has completely reorganized
her forces. Nothing but fatuity equal to
that exhibited by the man Of Sedan could lead
Russia to make war at moment when she
could not ind an ally in Europe capable Of
helping her effectively; and her statesmen
are far too shrewd to risk an attack which
would place Russia face to face with the most
powerful combination which Europe has seen
terest Of Russia to preserve the peace and
pursue the work of preparation it is the in
terest Of Germany to seize the present favor
able opportunity to crush the only enemy that
she really fears. -, Y.


Sadowa not only drove Austria out of the
Cd - 4 -
all hope of extending her empire westward.
1t modified all the traditions of her govern
ment, and by moving her centre Of gravity to
the East and giving importance to the hth-
crto subject races, opened new future
to conglomerate nations united under the
Austrian crown. To prevent the advance Of
Russia southwark became q matter Of vital
Importance to the Austro- Hungarian kingdom,
aud Bismarck adroitly made this necessity the
basis Of his negotiations with the Austr ian
government after Sadowa. During the war
with France he held Austria In check by
al the price Of Constantinople, should Austria
attempt to take the field; and now, on the
ground Of q common danger, he Is assured Of
the active aid Of Austria and Turkey in case
of war with Russia. Such Q combination
would prove too much for the Northern Power,
even though aided by France. The project,
with which Bismarck is credited, Of rails
ing up Polish kingdom as barrier between
Russia and Germany, would be the most mas
terly stroke of policy which he has yet made.
It would relegate Russia to the position
Of q second rate Power and completely
destroy her chance Of ever attaining supreme
power In Europe. There never was Q moment
more favorable to the curbing Of this immense
Power, which overshadows Europe and
threatens to overthrow her free institutions;
for, in spite Of the rapid advance Of the Rus
sian nation In power and wealth, the mass Of
the people are sunk in ignorance and live in
q state Of society little more advanced than
that which existed in Southern Europe during
the feudal times. In war against Russia
Germany could depend on the hearty support


Of the Austro- Hungarian kingdom, whose very
existence is threatened by the Muscovite ad-
vance southwards. Besides, It is in the east


of Europe that the Austrian empire must seek


compensation for the loss Of material power


and prestige sustained in the campaign of '66.


And it Is not unreasonable TO suppose that


Bismarck is prepared to allow Austria to in


demnify herself for the surrender Of Galicia
and tie entry 81 German Austria into the
German Confederation by allowing her to
seize on the Principalities, with the prospect
of eventually possessing Constantinople.


The great want Of the Austrian empire
is . sufficient seaboard and uninterrupted


communication with the sea, which the posses


sion Of the Principalities and the control of


the Danube would give. The interests Of
South German commerce also demand that