Year: 1875




has scarcely abated, suggests many things,
but among them the most important is
the question of defence Being a COM
mercial people many of our most i'm
portant cities are built on the sea coast
and within tho sphere of naval opera
tions in the event of a foreign war. To pro-
tect these rich and populous centres of com
morce from the destructive malice Of an en-
emy who would not hesitate to lombard
where he could not capture, we have three
elements of defence. The first Of these is
what we might term the natural element,
the second the geographical, and the third
the artificial or military. The natural de-
fences to our coasts and harbors consist of
the shoals and currents that combine to rem
der nearly all our harbor entrances difficult
of navigation except under the direction Of
expert pilots and the prevailing winds and
storms on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts,
which are extremely dangerous to ships en-
gagged so near land as to maintain anything
like blockade of our ports. The necessa-
rily exposed position of a hostile feet, or the
effort to modify it, will subject the enemy's





Of the causes named.


The geographical element of our defence
lies in the distance q European enemy
would be compelled to move from
his base of supplies before reaching
the sphere of his operations against our
coasts. There are three bases from which
European fleets could move on our Atlantic
and Gulf coast line--namely, New Brunswick
and Nova Scotia on the north, the Bermuda
Islands on the centre, and Cuba or the West
India Islands on the south. Even these, and
especially the latter two, should first be sup
piled from Europe and in the face of our
swarming gunboats and cruisers. modern
naval fleet must be steam fleet. The use
of immense quantities of coal is as necessary
to effectiveness as that of food and other sup
plies. The character of the natural defences
already named as well as the exigencies of
war, compels the continuous maintenance of
steam at working pressure on every hostile
vessel sent to our coasts. Therefore,
whether cruising fighting or blockading
the consumption of coal goes on just the
same, and unless the supply is maintained
equal to the demand the offensive value of
the fleet or ship falls to zero. She must re-
tire or run the risk of capture. Few steam
vessels, even the largest war ships, can carry
more than from fourteen to twenty days
coal in active service.


We can readily conceive, then, the diff
Guilty of supplying fleet that has con-
sumed part of the coal allowance in reach
ing our shores and is compelled to keep
constantly under steam when there. The
artificial or military element of our defence
combines three features, more or less de-
pendent on each other for effectiveness.
These are the fortifcation of our harbor en-
frances, the torpedo system of defending
and obstructing the channels and bays, and
the fleets of the United States, which have
so often proved equal to the greatest
emergencies of war. With regard to the two
former factors of the military element of de-
fence we must remember that active
enemy can employ them against u.s.
even on our own territory. The outer
islands of Boston Harbor Sandy Hook and
the similar peninsulas that command the
navigable entrances of nearly all our At
lantic ports can be suddenly seized and
fortified and the channels torpedoed
against us. Here is really our only weak
point, and we need have but little fear of
foreign fleets, provided we do not permit
them to take the advantage we have sug-
gested by occupying our own defensive posi-
tions. Let us, then, abandon the useless
and costly Notifications that an enemy will
where he can iniure us most by prolonged
occupation and blockade