Year: 1870

Crittenden. Then I christened the
whole the Army of the Cumberland


/ now come to what l consider
THE GREATEST HEROIC EFFORT OF THE


Two elements of greatness enter
into human action-the moral and
physical and those are greatest in
which these components enter in
their largest measure.


1t was a great moral action of the
Army, unmoved by popular clamor
unmoved by official impatience, un.
moved by the natural prompt ngs
of soldierly ambition, to stand and
hold Bragg's command in Middle
Tennessee until it was too late for
him to help Joe Johnston interfere
with the capture Of Vicksburg.


's 1t was a great physical action
when that Army, in ten days, drove
Bragg from two strongly fortified
camps, over the Cumberland noun
tains and across the Tennessee, los.
ing less Il 900 men, and only fail
ing to destroy the rebel army in
consequence Of unprecedented and
continuous rains, which rendered
the roads impossible for artillery
and subsistence trains.


Neither of these nor any of its
subsequent actions compares in
moral grandeur or material great
ness with the s-


CAMPAIGN OF CHATTANOOGA.


Driven across the Tennessee
whittier we could not pursue until
means could be provided for the
transportation of our ammunition
and supplies, Bragg's command held
Chattanooga, the key of East Ten
nessee and of the South. Covered
by the great mountain ranges and
intervening river, and able to gel
reinforcements by rail from Virgin
ia and the South, he coolly and con-
fidently watched us, knowing that
we could not reach him in less than
ten or fifteen days march over a
barren, uninhabited country, in
which we should be obliged to cross
three ranges of mountains and a
great river, from four hundred to
nine hundred yards wide


No sooner had the rebels been
driven from Middle Tennessee than
we began our preparation for the
gigantic wolk of Wrestling Chatta-
nooga from the enemy.


The first thing was to repair the
Nashville and Chattanooga railroad,
without which we could not live
even in the valley of the Tennessee
River.


But it was equally necessary to
deceive the enemy as to our points
of crossing, until it would be too
late for him to meet and oppose us.


Next, it was necessary to wait un
til corn was ripe enough for horse
feed, because once across the river
and wholly dependent on our wag-
ons we could never possibly carry
more than our ammunition and ra.
tions. ....


1t was obvious, even to our in
telligent Western press, that when
we did attempt our work the enemy
would have the interest and the
means of concentrating every avail
able man to fall upon and destroy
US.


Nor did your Commander neglect
to call the attention of the Govern.
ment to these aAd other conditions
and dangers in the road of success
That his advice was appreciated by
the President, his autograph lettel
to me testifies. That it was other
wise with the War Department, wei
appears from the telegrapaic Order
Ireceived on the 4th of August to
move you over the mountains
Your corps commanders saw thi:
Order and the commanding Gener
ais reply: "That the Government
could not be more sincerely anxious
for a successful advance of the Army
of the Cumberland than himself
That no effort had been omitted to
make ready for it. but that it would
be yet ten days before preparation
were completed for the movement
That should a movement by the 14tl
be deemed a compliance with tn
departments order it would b
obeyed, but if not the Governmen
was respectfully requested to nam'
some other Commander for tn
Army" .- a.s.


Our noble comrade, faitEfu
Thomas. first spoke and said "Gen
eral, you are perfectly right, and W
will stand by you"


But comrades, our movement be
] gan on the 14th of August, and o
the 2st of September, thirty-thre
days from that time, we had crosse
the Cumberland mountains, crosse
the Tennessee on pontoon bridge:
the shortest of which was three hur
dred and eighteen and the longes
nine hundred yards in length, bui
by our improvised pioneers. w
had scaled the Sand mountains, W
bad passed over the Lookout rang
in the presence of an imposing arm
heavily reinforced and waiting t
destroy us We had met the enem
on ground new to us but well know
to him, and fighting more than ono
and half our numbers. had fOile
him in his efforts to destroy US G


wrest from US the coveted "Key {
the South" and we held it with
| grasp that death only could ha,


unlocked. - .Esr.


IF The moral greatness of this can
, paign consists in the facts that tt
. immense difficulties and danger