Year: 1872

of the nation until it has become an alarming
source of corruption, threatening to eradicate
all patriotic sentiment from the breasts of the
people and to sap the foundations of the
republic. With millions within his gift, the
President is looked up to more as the dispenser
of Office than as the Chief Magistrate of the
republic Strip him of the power of welding
oil the enormous patronage now pertaining to
his position, and there would be but little
excitement and strife over his election, despite
the high character of the Office.


1t will not be denied that this overgrown
federal patronage is public evil. It destroys
in great measure the independence of Con-
gress, and enables the Executive to exercise
an unwholesome influence over the legis-
lative branch Of the government. 1t
tempts to undue and unworthy efforts
to obtain through its means a second
and probably q third term of office.
1t chokes the voice of the less Independent
press, and not infrequently destroys the purity
of the ballot box. There are two ways of rem
edying the evil-one by appointing the main
body Of government officials during good be-
havior, as in England, retiring them on half
pay after certain period of service; the other
by curtailing the patronage of the Presidential
Office The former method would probably be
impracticable with the American people; the
latter presents curious problem well worthy
of consideration. The real power of the Amer
lean government is in the hands of Congress-
and not of the Executive. The President can
do little without Congress; Congress, with q
two-third vote, can do almost anything despite
the President. The experience of Andrew
Johnson's administration proves how impo-
tent the Chief Magistrate may become in
the hands of hostile Senate and House
of Representatives. The Johnson Clarendon
Alabama Treaty, approved by the President
and Secretary of State, was overthrown by the
Senate The fate of all treaties with foreign
Powers is in the hands of the Senate; why,
then, should not that body appoint all our dip
lomatic and consular force, Independently of
the President ? AT present the Senate bears
the responsibility for the acts of our foreign
representatives without the power to do more
than approve Presidents nominations. In
the recent negotiations growing out of the
Treaty of Washington the administration
shifted the odium of the acceptance of the
English Supplemental Article on to the shoul-
ders of the Senate, because it was evident that
the controversy that had arisen between the
two governments was destined to prove dis
creditable to America; but if we had come out
of the difficulty with honor the glory
would have been claimed for the admins
tration, and not for the Senate Congress has
the power to raise revenue aud to expend the
public treasure why should not Congress have
the right Of appointment Of all custom house
and internal revenue officers? The present
constitution of the United States has lasted us
a long time, and it is by no means certain that
the country has not outgrown many Of its pro-
visions. An entire remodelling of our govern
ment may become absolutely necessary before
long to preserve the spirit of the constitution
and to prevent the republic from becoming
Presidential autocracy.


The objections that naturally occur to the
mind to which these suggestions are presented
are-frst, that the President, as the chief ex-
ecutive officer Of the nation, should possess
such power Of appointment and removal
as will enable him to insure the proper
enforcement of the laws and, next,
that Congress has enough to do without being
distracted and corrupted by the exercise of
patronage. The President at present knows
but little about the manner in which the
practical duties of the government are dis
charged, and the offices are invariably distrib-
uted in return for political favors There is
greater danger of a neglect Of the public
business by men on whose political influence
the President relies than there would be by
men dependent upon such body as Congress
for their positions. In our general elections
the corrupting influence of patronage would
be less injuriously felt with the appointing
power vested in q large representative body,
whose members are scattered all over the
Union, than it is at present, when one man
holds the distribution of millions in his
own hands. Such reform would contemplate
the appointment by Congress of the heads of
departments only, while the President would
be left to select his own State council of ad-
visers, and hence the exercise of the power
could not prove any serious obstruction to the
business of Congress. At all events, whether
these suggestions are practicable or mpract-
cable desirable or undesirable, it is certain
that the enormous and increasing patronage of
the Presidential Office, larger now than could
ever have been contemplated by the trainers OF
the constitution, is a fruitful source of danger
to the republic, and deserves the serious
consideration of all patriotic and thoughtful
citizens. ,~.~ :i.-s- =. ,--..e.-


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