Year: 1876

posed chanBe, 10 prevent 5ucn mystlncA-
ton would justify it. But there are other
reasons, among which one strikes us as very
important-the localization and easier pre-
vention of frauds. At present successful
frauds in the New York, Philadelphia or New
Orleans city elections might give the whole
electoral vote of New York, Pennsylvania or
Louisiana to the guilty party; under the
proposed amendment such frauds would
affect only the district in which they
occurred; the temptation to commit them
would, therefore, be less; the temptation to
connive at and conceal them in counting the
electoral vote would also be less.


AS to the twenty joint rule" that
ought in any case to be at once either abol-
ished or changed. 1t is not we'll that one house
shall have the right, without debate or scru-
tiny, and simply on the motion of member,
to throw out the electoral vote of State. At
least the consent of both houses should be
required to so momentous an interference
with the right of the people of q whole State
to have their vote for President counted.
Under the present rule the presumption is
actually against the vote of any State being
counted. Any member of either house may
object to its reception thereupon the two
houses separate and vote yea or nay, not upon
the objection but upon the question, Shall
the electoral vote of the State of - be
received? And the rule absurdly and mis-
chievously requires that mo vote OBJ
jected to shall be received, except by the
~
is no constitutional warrant for making Con-
gress returning board" or giving it
power to scrutinize the returns The two
houses are 10 be witnesses, and no more, to
the counting of the electoral vote. The
twenty joint rule, adopted by the re-
publicans in 1865, is undoubtedly unconsti-
tutional; but there does not appear to be
any method of testing the question without
the most serious disturbance of the regular
order of the government. AS it stands it
may be easily made the means of upsetting
the popular verdict at the next election and
that in n very dangerous manner. When the
electoral vote comes to be counted in the
presence of the two houses democrat may
object upon some technical point to the
counting of republican State; if he
is supported by the democratic majority
in the House of Representatives the vote
of that State under the rule, would be
thrown ont Thereupon, again on some
technicality, republican might object to
democratic State, and the republican Senate
might throw that out This pairing down of
the electoral vote might go on until no cam
didate could receive what the constitution
requires, "a majority of the whole number
Of electors appointed" and the election
stntatives, where, the vote being by States,
il is possible that nineteen States, with only
forty-fve members, out of the total of two
hundred and ninety-two, and representing
less than fifth of the total population of
the Union, should impose President upon
the country. Evidently such course would
be very unsatisfactory to the people, and
very unjust as we'll, for it would impose
upon them a policy to. which the majority
might be utterly opposed.


The constitutional amendment proposed
in the Senate would prevent all such possi-
bilities as we have mentioned, and would
remand the election of President to 'those
who are furthest removed from the'infuence
of his patronage-that is, to the whole body of
American citizens" as Mr.. Benton once said.