Year: 1873

HALIFAX, April Is.-The commits
siJu convened as a court Of inquiry into


the loss of the Atlantic this afternoon


aud rendered its decision. The course
OF Captain Williams in bearing up for
Halifax is commended as prudent. The
ship had not sufficient cCal on board at
the time of sailing for ship of her
class. The coal was Of inferior quality,
of which she consumed seventy tons
per day, thus giving her less than thir-
teen days supply when leaving port.
Had ali the circumstances of passage
been favorable this quantity Of coal
would undoubtedly have carried the
ship and passengers safely to New York.
But passage across the Atlantic in win
ter without more or less unfavorable
weather is an exception and not a rule


Favorable weather during the whole of
q western passage, in the month of
March, could not reasonably be expect
ed, and contingencies Of a low rate Of
speed resulting from head winds and
foul weather ought to have been provi-
ded for. Assuming the position Of the
vessel, as stated by Captain Williams,
10 have been correct, the course
steered should have carried her
well to the eastward Of Sambro
had there been no current.
The officer left in charge did not obey
the order given by Captain Williams to
awake him at three o'clock, for he slept
until awakened by the shock of the ship
striking the shore, from twelve to sew
enteen minutes after three. The con-
duct OF Captain Williams and the Off
GERS after the ship struck was all that
could be demanded Of men in their try
e -


ship is condemned from the time OF
changing its course at one o'clock in the
afternoon of Monday until the time she
became wreck. Whether OF not suffi-


cient allowance was made by Captain
Williams for the current in the course
he steered, does not seem to be a ques-
question Of vital importance, for it is
very probable that the same error as 70
the speed Of the ship and lack of vigil
lance on the part Of the officers who
were on duty, which Is too apparent,
and a total neglect to obtain sOundings.
or use the most ordinary precautiOn that
ought to be used IN approaching the
coast, would have run her ashore had
she been on the course that Captain
Williams supposed her to be. The
fact that no lights were seen, can only
he accounted for By want Of vigilance


Captain Williams himself states that
even land might have been seen st a
distance Of two or three miles. The
night was one on which light might
and ought 10 have been seen some time
before the disaster If proper lookout
had been kept. A gross error must
have been made IN estimating the speed
Of the ship. The commissioner says il
is a well authenticated fact that during
the spTiug months there Is no contin.
uOus northeTly set OF currents on
this coast, and We have abundant
evidence Of the existence Of an Of-shore
current. The error in calculating the
ships speed must have been from in.
competency or carelessness in ealculat-
ing on the part of those attending TO the
log. The conduct Of Captain Williams
in leaving the deck AZ midnight is con-
demned as imprudent, and calculated e
create the impression in the minds Ol
the officers on duty that they were moi
50 near the land ss to make extra vigi-
lance imperative at that time. The
captain believed he was forty-eight
miles from land, and it seems tc
have been culpable rashness foI
him under the circumstances TO order
the ship to be ran toward land for three
hours at a rate of speed without taking
the precautiOn TO guard against any pos.
sibie error in his estimation of his posi-.
ton, a. in the event Of the light, which


ought to have been seen at eighteen ol
twenty miles distance not becoming
visible in that time, had the very 0rdi


nary precautiOn been taken Of send


ing q lookout st Intervals to the
masthead, the disaster would in all hu


man probability have been prevented


But the greatest and perhaps fatal errol
is found in the fact that the lead wa
never used, although the ship was n
sounding for eight hours before she
struck. This Is neglect Of duty lol
which there can be positively no excuse


So accurately are the s0undings laii
down on the chart that had the lead
been used at proper intervals the ships
safety would have been guaranteed


even had the night been one on
which the lights could not pOssfhly
have been seen. II is true that fre.
quent use of the lead might have de.
layed her q few hours ia reaching port


but there was nothing to be gained In
point Of time ID making port before
daylight, OF even # theBe had been


these few hours % detention ought no
10 have been allowed 10 weigh agains