Year: 1870

Prussia-The Chances of Victory or Defeat
Tho Principle of NatiOnalities.


In 1866 the late NJ. Prevost-Paradol published
a work entitled ''La Nouvelle France" in which
he traced the possible destiny of his country
From the closing chapter of this work we take
the following extracts:-


Which Is the result OF the events OF 1856 for
France? Whereto do those events carry us Is
throughout Germany, or shall attempt to stop it
at least to cucumber it, sword in hand? Which


Let US submit these two hypothesis to q rapid sur
vey, and let US begin by that OF war between
ana + @ M may oe Inc or
The only fact that this matter leaves to question
doubt does not forbear to show us how striking have
been the changes that our state OF affairs has UNDER
gone of late years, Not long ago, when there was
question about the military power OF the States of
the Continent, the only question we propounded to
ourselves was whether France would be able to
afront European coalition; but at present. alas
the question Is whether France could resist the single
power of Prussia, and, furthermore, there is one
who does not feel the utmost respect for such trial


Be it as it may we shall either be defeated or we
shall win. Let US take up first the former, and by
far the most pleasant hypotheeis-thet OF victory.
1he principle OF the natenaltties, which theoret-
cally is the main-wheel OF our politics. but OF the
benefit of which we 90 never avail ourselves, while
leaving others to do it, as NJ HERS eoquentIy said
This principle calls for two conditions for making
the annexation OF foreign country legitimate
affair: first, the Identity of OF tongue, and
secondly the consent OF the people thereof Prussia





sections OF her new empire when she embodied
them with it, and as for her retention Of the duke
dEm o posen ana inc Civ Two DGsn sesV sne has


But suppose we are to initiate Prussia and apply
the principle Of the nationaties according to her
own notions. Suppose that England shall not feel
friendly on our attitude towards Belgium aud that
should drop away the consent Of the last to in
corporate 1t TO France. Suppose, furthermore that
we should altogether disregard both the identity and
the consent OF the Rhenish Provinces else that we
(however great might be the blunder should build
n Rhine. which
ways claim to belong to her. and that it would be 30
easy to keep it as an independent State as to keep
1t for ourselves; in every one OF these cases
the use OF the victory would be a most difficult
task for to apply the principle of the natlonalties
after the Prussian fashion is to speak plainly, to
seize and keep important couquests at the sight of
all Europe; and on the other hand to apply 1t faith
conditions OF identity and consent means for to
| withdraw from the battlefield with empty hands,
further ACKNOWLEDGEMENT in Germany, as soon
as she shall get over our first blow. The
ERE %nD IKE he tSs Sne achTai


alties, seem to have never thought that what they
want with 1t is TO throw the world in the arms OF
pilla9e., thus o5erng reasonable preteXt to the
| ambition OF the stronger; and, on the other side,
that II Europe should be reconstructed in consonance
with this principle it is France that will inevitably
| be the greatest loser Indeed, which the
| Two only points OF the European continent to
ciple OF the nahonalities at least in the name
| OF identity, and with or without the consent
Stnougn 4s this would be Striking derogsOn S ss
! of that principle It is Belgium aud the French
sections OF switzerlsnd @ az d. But, then, In exchange
peans speaking the French tongue, we should be
obliged to allow, sooner or later, the union in
mot even including AlsaceJ, and, besides t, the
union OF all slayonic races under the Russian flag
! We are, therefore, obliged to confess that the
principle Of the nationalities, even when applied by
US and turned to eur own benefit does not lessen
| After all, in case OF suocess against Prussia, it
| would seem unnecessary TO throw aside this famous
tor bounded, as oshsrwise, by the general oonve-
Rjehces OF the eautibTium. But, In truth, even 80
considered the victory would not avail US by its
principle Of the nationaltes which we have 80 long
encouraged, would continue to Keep the world in
| ment OF the German unity excited by the victory
| itself, weud follow on its way sooner or later,
pend than stop altogether the march OF events. Be
it, however, that this strife becomes inevitable
troubles OF the victory! Victory may be unfaithful
and we must now consider the hypothesis OF de-
| feat Let US suppose for moment that Prussia,
alone or aided by Russia, should win it. We do not
need to insist long in showing that it would be the
tomb of French grandeur. II is not that France
would be annhilated for there are still in Europe
few notions on the necessity OF q certain equili-
brum and our Inundated condition would not seem
acceptable TO many powers; and IT, on one side, the
jealousy OF all Of them against ourselves should be
fully qualified by our irrepara0le humiliation, the
jealousyof the winners among themselves, or the
jealousy OF the neutrals against our only winner,
would let us live on our own wreck, although with
Alsace and Lorraine would be taken from us at
once; but what would be taken from US also, and
with no hope OF return, 1t would be our means OF
opposing such an encroachment in that day on
which victorious rival should think IL practiea-
BILE and In eonsonance with Its interests, and the
coming OF teat day could not be delayed


Some treaty limiting the number OF our forces
both OF the army and navy, and reducing them "a
the minimum Indispensable for the maintepance OF
domestic peaoe and for the policy OF commerce
the probable giving up OF our colonial empire, In
T Guiding Algeria some ratlhcatons OF fr0ntier8 IN
favor OF PFussa-a sad beginning OF more con
siderable losses-such would be the Immediate 70