Year: 1876



 by the People. .a Discussing the eleetoral vote question | in the United States, the New York He9'1td says the simple, direct and popular method of electing the Presi- dent by popular vote is impraoticable, and will never be ratified by Congress. It's reasons are as follows: If the Pres dent were to be elected by direct popu lar suffrage, the vote of each citiaen counting one, the influence of State would be in exact proportion to the number of it's voters, and very nearly in proportion to it's Representatives in Congress. States like Delaware, Ore gon, Nebraska, Nevada and Colorado, which have only one Representative, would lose two thirds; and States like Rhode Island and Florida, which have but two Representatives, would lose one-half of their weight in the Presiden- tial election. The Very smallest States would lose in a still greater ratio, there being several whose population does not entitle them to even one Represen- tative, the Constitution providing that each State shail have at least one, be it's population what it msy.as It is certain that, the small States will not consent to change whic h would strip them of the greater part of their importance, leaving five of them with less than one-third, two of them with only one half ard five others with barely two-fifths of their weight in the Presidential elections. These thirteen States which have one, two or three Repres entatives are more than sufficient to defeat an amendment of the Constitution. It requires three fourths of the States to ratify an amend ment, and it is pretty certain that every State having but six Representatives or less (twenty in alb would oppose the election of the President by direct popular vote, to be counted and aggre- gated like the vote for governor.

 Thesplan which Senator Morton has been urging for the last two years-that of voting by Congressional districts-is even more complex than the present system. By MT. Morton's plan each Congressional district is separate unit, entitled to but one vote in the final count. The people of each district would vote directly for the candidates they preferred, and the candidate re- celvlng the greatest number of votes in that district would have it scored for him in the national result. Every Con- gressional district would vote in the same way, scoring one for the candidate who got it's majority. But, as each State would continue to have two more votes than the number of it's Congress sional districts, MT. Morton proposes that in each State the vote of tho people at largo shall be counted in the aggre- gate, and the candidate receiving the highest number in the whole State be entitled to two votes. Such a plan would be the present system in new dress.

 Nothing practical would be accom- plished by it which might not be at tained with greater ease and simplicity by merely requiring each Congressional district to elect one Presidential elector and each State to choose two electors at large. ---

 This plan would as certainly encounter the opposition of the large States as that of simple, direct vote by the whole people would of the small States. New York would undoubtedly object to 1t. Horatio Seymour and Roscoe Conkling have within few days ex- pressed their disapproval but neither of them thought fit to express the real reason why the large States will oppose the district system. It is because the large States will not consent to have their importance diminished by divi- sion of their Presidential vote. Under MT. Morton's system New York or Pennsylvania would have no more real weight in Presidential election than Florida. The Democratic and Re publican Congressional districts would pretty nearly nullify each other, and the two votes at large and one or two districts is about all the net strength either party could expect. Both parties in the large States will prefer to play for higher stake and take their chance of winning the whole number of their votes rather than reduce their States to the insignifcance of Rhode Island or Delaware. The large States might be unable to defeat the ratification of MT. Morton's amendment, but they can easily prevent its submission. It re- quires two-thirds of both branches of Congress to propose an amendment, and the four largest States-New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio and Illinois-have moro than one-third of the House. These four States can and will defeat the district system under whatever form 1t may be presented. In such matter they will be governed by sense of State importance and State pride, and other large States will share their views.