Year: 1875

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 It is hard for nation of forty millions, \ that has seen battlefelds on which two hundred thousand men contested the vic l tory and on which the slain and wounded l lay by tens of thousands, to appreciate the

 importance of the battle fought for the possession of Boston one hundred years ago to day. Lexington and Concord were the first skirmish of our war of Indepen- dence. Bunker Hill was it's first battle. few undisciplined farmers, without suit able arms and with little ammunition, l ventured to occupy position that, if maintained. would have rendered Boston untenable to British army of ten thou sand men. The result is familiar to every school boy. We have read over and over again how the three thousand splendid English troops marched bravely up to drive some ], ,500 rebels from their hastily constructed works how, as they came within easy range, deadly fire twice sent them to the right-about and how it was only when the ammunition ran low that a third attack proved successful and Great Britain, at cost of some 1900 men, won 8 barren victory and America scored the first of many glorious defeats.

 The political consequences of this bat tie may not have been as important as those of Lexington and Concord. The people of the several provinces and their delegates assembled in the Continental Congress had already accepted the issue of war, and George Washington was on his way to take command of the army about Boston when Bunker Hill was fought. Still this battle afforded the first sure indication of the severity of the con- fict. It showed that British army of ten thousand men could barely hold it's own against united New England A sin gle 'victory" so crippled Cages army as to completely destroy all his plans for an advance. From that time till the evac- uation of Boston the invading army was on the defensive. The first demonstration against her revolted colonies was failure, and England had to hire an army of He's sians before she could make another. Nearly year passed, in fact, before the attack recommended in earnest with the defeat of the American army on Long Is- land and the capture of New York.

 The military results of Bunker Hill were more important than it's political. The first requisite of the soldier is, of course, a sufficient acquaintance with tactics to enable him to take proper position for fighting. When in position, however, he must know how shoot, in order to make his fighting effective. The American of a century since was vastly inferior ma neuvering machine to the British; but when in line of battle he could shoot

 Thackeray says that the slaughter at Bun ker Hill infected the British commanders of armies in America with the vice of over- caution during the whole war that followed. Repeatedly, the dread of American marks manship saved American armies from complete overthrow. Nor was the Ameri- can soldier of 1775 entirely ignorant of tactics. About fifteen years had passed since the colonies had seen military ser vice under such commanders as Wolfe. Were America to go to war in 1880. the veterans of 1865 would furnish the back bone of her armies. The veterans of 1760 gave steadiness to the American militia of 1775. Unluckily for England. however, the first contest of the war was contest of craftsmanship rather than of tactics, and clearly demonstrated her inferiority in that important respect. During the years of war that followed, at least until Steuben gave some frmness to our disci- pline, the English soldier could always out-maneuver the American the Ameri- can could always out-shoot the English. Burgovne proved that an invading army, entangled in our woods, was lost. Bunker Hill was an omen of barren victory to England, and of constant but not actually disastrous defeat to America.