Year: 1873




therefor, or removal of encumbrances there.
on"


The first section of the act Of the Sd Octo
ber, 1868, is in the same terms.


1t may well be doubted whether both these
provisions were not intended to be wholly
prospective in their effect.


But as we understand the supreme court Of
the State has come to a different conclusion
we shall not consider the question.


The statute in force when the judgment
was rendered declared that the following
property belonging to debtor who was the
head of family should be exempt from levy
and sale Ito witt: FIFTY acres of land and
FIVE additional ones for each Of his children
under the age of sixteen years, the land to in
clude the dwelling house, if the same and i'm
provements do not exceed two hundred dol.
lars and farm horse or mule, one COW and
calf, ten head of hogs, and fifty dollars worth
of provisions and five dollars worth addition
al for each child; beds bedding and common
bedsteads sufficient for the family; one loom,
one spinning wheel, and two pairs Of cards,
and one hundred pounds of lint cotton; COM
mon tools of trade for himself and his wife
equipments and arms of militia soldier and
troopers horse; ordinary cooking utensils
and table crockery; wearing apparel Of him
self and family family Bible, religious works
and school books family portraits the IL
brary of professional man in actual practice
or business, not exceeding three hundred dol
lars in value, to be selected by himself"


No one can cast his eyes over the former
and latter exemptions, without being struck
by the greatly increased magnitude of the
latter.


Section 10 of Articles 1 of the Constitution
of the United States declares that "no state
shall pass any law impairing the obligation of
contracts"


If the remedy is part of the obligation of
the contract, clearer case of impairment can
hardly occur than is presented in the record
before US.


The effect of the act in question, under the
circumstances of this judgment, does not in
deed merely impair, it annibilates the remedy.
There is none left. But the act reaches still
further. 1t withdraws the land from the lien
of the judgment, and thus destroys vested
right of property which the creditor had ac-
quired in the pursuit of the remedy to which
he was entitled by the law as it stood when
the judgment was recovered. 1t is in effect
taking one persons property and giving it to
another without compensation. This is con-
trary to reason and justice, and to the funda-
mental principles of the social compact. Cal
der vs.. Bull, DALI, 1888. But we must con-
fine ourselves to the constitutional aspect of
the case A few further remarks will Ie suf-
fcient to dispose Of it.


1t involves no question which has not been
more than once fully considered by this court.


Georgia, since she came into the Union as
one of the original thirteen States, has never
been State out of the Union. Her constitu'
tional rights we're, for time, necessarily put in
allegiance, but her constitutional disabilities
and obligations were in nowise affected by her
rebellion. The same view is to be taken of
the provision in her organic law and of the
statute in question, as if she had been in full
communion with her sister States when she
gave them being


Though her constitution was sanctioned by
Congress, this provision can in no sense be
considered an act ofthat body. The sanction
was only permissive as part Of the process
of her rehabilitation, and involved nothing
affirmative or negative beyond that event. If
it were express and unequivocal, the result
would be the same. Congress cannot, by au-
thorization or ratification give the slightest
effect to State law or constitution in conflict
with the Constitution of the United States.
That instrument is above and beyond the
power of Congress and the States, and is alike
obligatory upon both.


A State can no more impair an existing
contract by constitutional provision, than
by legislative act both are within the pro-
hibition of the National Constitution.


The legal remedies for the enforcement of
a contract, which belong to it at the time and
place where it is made, are part of its obli.
cation. A State may change them, provided
the change involve no impairment of sub
stantial right.


If the provision of the constitution, or the
legislative act ola State, fall within the cate.
cory last mentioned, they are to that extent
utterly void. They are, for all the purposes
of the contract which they impair, as if they
had never existed.


The constitutional provision and statute
here in question, are clearly within that cate
CORY, and are, therefore, void.


The jurisdictional prohibition which they
contain in respect to courts Of the State, can,
therefore, form no impediment to the plaintiff
in error in the enforcement of his rights touch
ing this judgment, as those rights are recog-
nized by this court. White vs.. Hart, 13
Wall, 646; Won Hoffman vs. The City of
Quincy, 535.


The judgment of the Supreme Court of
Georgia is reversed and the cause will be re-
manded to that court with directions to enter
judgment of reversal, to reverse the judg-
ment of the Superior Court of Randolph coun-
ty, and thereafter to proceed in conformity to
this opinion. D. W. MIDDLETON,
G.. S. G.. u. S.
THE CAPTURE OF OSCEOLA.
Tho rooont ocoo o,ino tion ne Gonnro1 Cophv