Year: 1875

AS stated last week, after our account of the Supreme Courts proceedings was in type, we received much better report which is herewith given. A full bench was present, Hon. E. F. Dunne, Chief Justice, presiding with Honorables c. A. Tweed and DeForest Porter, Associate Justices

 Miller vs. Fisher. Unanimous opinion. Judgment reversed. Demurrer improper ly sustained. Plea of infancy could not be raised on demurrer but must be specially pleaded. Also that under the act of 1871, it is not necessary that certificate of &C., knOwledgment of a conveyance by a married woman shall state that 1t was done separate and apart from her hus- band.

 Grounds vs. Ralph. Unanimous opin- ion. Judgment affirmed. Appell liant asked to have the judgment reversed on the ground that the evidence was insuffi- cient to sustain the verdict. Held, that the court could not inquire as to whether the evidence was insufficient because the ap- pellant had not made such a statement on appeal or brought the evidence before the court tor consideration.

 Rush & Davis vs. Linn & French. The majority of the court, Judge Porter dissent ing, were of the opinion that the judg- ment should be reversed. Reasons to be stated in opinion to be filed.

 Davis ct al vs. BreOn. Unanimous opin- ion. Judgment affirmed. Com plaint al- legged that defendant occupied plaintiffs house, by permission of defendant, certain months, that the use of the same was reasonably worth $75 a month that he had not paid the same or any part thereof. Held, complaint insufficient, because it did not allege that defendant had promised to pay anything for this permission or that he was indebted in any amount to plain tiff on account of such use of said house, and that the court would not presume that such was the case where the plaintiff did not assert it.

 Judgment affirmed. Bowers told Thorn that man would give him S1O foot for some mining ground provided he could get all that Thorn & Bowers and some others owned in a certain mine, at said figure. Bowers owning in said mine but not a tenantin common with Thorn. Sale was made for Sl0 foot, Bowers negotiating the sale, and got more than Sl0 a foot from the purchaser. Thorn claimed that he was entitled to all that Bowers got. Judg- ment below, that he was entitled simply to what he sold fOr-Sl9 foot. Held, that the judgment was right, because Bowers did not act as agent for Thorn in the sale, and that if Bowers defrauded anybody 1t was the purchaser and not Thorn.

 Ford vS. Hayes. Unanimous opinion. Judgment affirmed. Ford owing a great many persons and being unable to pay them all, assigned his property to pay cer-

 

 ing themselves left out, sued and attached the property assigned, claiming that the assignments were void under the general bankrupt jaw of the United States. Held, that it not being charged that he did not honestly owe the creditors he preferred, a sum equal to the value of the arrange ment, the only way the assignments could be set aside was by moving to have all the property brought back into a common fund for equal distribution among all the creditors by making him bankrupt un- der the bankrupt act that in such pro- ceeding the assignment might perhaps be set aside. but that as the attaching creditor in this case, simply proposed to take the same property himself for his own benefit, and let the other creditors go, he could not do it.

 Eldred vs. Warner. Eldred and one Newsome signed an agreement that the survivor should have all the property the other died possessed of NeWsOme died. Warner as public administrator had pos session of the property. Eldred filed bill in equity to compel Warner to deliver him the property. Demurrer to. The court be- low ruled that as this instrument was a direction as to what should be done with property after death, and as no estate therein attached or was to attach during the life of the party making it, it was a will that the court could not act upon it as contract at all and could not act on it as will because it was not proved as a will, under the probate law. On appeal the nldJOrlJy or tue court, the Cnle1 justice dissenting, held that it was a contract, as to which court of equity might decree specific performance.

 MandamuS to compel the Pima county | board of supervisors to allow certain juror fees. At the last term of the Pima district court, there were four indictments for mur- der before the court, chief justice Dunne presiding ordered venire to issue sum- mOning sixty jurors from the body of the | county to appear for the term and act as | jurors. The jurors laying aside all other selves to the court. When after much 1 difficulty jury was finally obtained ia 1 the panel of the murder cases, the court 1 being satisfied that the trial of the case | would occupy three or four days, and not | wishing to be delayed with the useless | formality of consuming time each morn- ing by calling the roll of the jurymen, ex- cuSed them until such day as it thought | it might need them, and so acted in each | of the four indictments. Jurors are allow ed by statute s day for serving as jurors When the term came to close, the queS- ton arose on the objection of the district | attorney, whether the jurors so excused by the court were entitled to pay for the days they were ready to appear, but did not ap pear because they were excused by the court. The judge ruled they were entitled to pay for those days, but in order that his action might be reviewed, ordered that separate certificates should be issued, so that an issue might be raised as to the days in dispute. The supervisors admitted all the facts but refused to allow payment for the excused days on the ground that it was not legal charge, thus taking issue with the court on a question of law.

 The jurors appealed to the supreme court for mandamus to compel the Su- f<Do 11,NVrr fllO n1o oitN1