Year: 1872




HEAVY VERDICT AGAINST A RAIL


ROAD COMPANY.


The Old Suit Against the Camden and
Amb0y Railroad In the Court Of Conn
mon Plcas-Cott0n Destroyed at the
Burning Eight Years Ago or Their
Pier and Warehouses In This City
Another Trial and Verdict for the Full
Amount Claimed-ImpOrtant Charge OF
Judge LarremOre.


few days ago there was given in the HERALD
detailed account OF the suit brought against the
Camden and AmbOy Railroad Company by Messrs.
Lamb & Eastman of this city, to recover for the
loss of cotton bales destroyed at the burning OF the
wharf and warehouses Of the company at pier No.
North River, the Goth OF July 1864 said lire, as
will be remembered, having originated on the
steamer John Potter, belonging to the CON-
pany, and at the time moored at the wharf.
The cotton burned QS7 bales altogether)
was part Of consignment sent from
Cairo, Ill. At the time OF shipment written con.
tract was signed excepting the transporting lines
from losses by fire. The company fell back on this
contract and refused TO make good the loss on the
cotton 1t was claimed in opposition and as not
covered by the terms OF the contract that the fire
was the result OF the


NEGLIGENCE OF THE RAILROAD COMPANY.


The latter refused to the matter In this light,
and the result was seeking through the channel or
the courts to compel payment. After some two
years Of preliminary legal sparring the case was
brought to trial before Judge Cardozo at that
time one Of the Justices OF the Court OF Common
Pleas. The result OF the trial was verdict for the
plaintiffs. An appeal was taken from this verdict
to the General Term, who affirmed the verdict. 1t
was carried then to the Court OF Appeals, which
ordered new trial. All this, OF course, has taken
tme it now being eight years, as stated above, since
the fire.


commenced on last Wednesday. In case OF such
magnitude eminent counsel were employment
Mr.. Luther II. Marsh and Mr.. Shepperd appearing
for the plaintiffs, ana Mr. Thomas Cuyer of the
Philadelphia bar and ex-Judge Fullerton and Mr.
Sandord OF this city representing the railroad com
pany. The evidence was mainly repetition OF
that at the previous trial and so was the summing
up OF counsel, all OF which was fully reported in
the HERALD at the time. feature Of special in
terest, however, was the


CHARGE OF JUDGE LARREMORE


OF the Court OF Common Pleas, before whom the
case was tried. This charge is not only specially
interesting, as defining the legal liabilities OF COM
this suit depends host OF other similar suits by
other parties sustaining loss by the same fire.
Another fact enhancing the public interest In the
defining of the law in this case is the applicability
OF the same rules of law to the late burning Of the
warehouses in Brooklynthat is to say, II, despite
contracts exempting liability through loss by 1re
negligence can be proven. The following is the
CHARGE


for hire to transport from place to place the
goods Of such as choose to- employ him. He
not oecasopeq BY the act 0 God or the puSc sge eH
emies. But this general liability may be limited
by express agreement, and 1t is Tor you to say,
fr0m the facts In this case, whether the legal re-
sponsiblty OF the defendant is general or limited
in its character There are two theories that arise
upon the evidence to which shall! briefly direct
your attention The one is that maintained by the
deendant-that the bill OF ladng issued by the
Illinois Central Railroad Company was the contract
cotton trauSDOrtcu. IL.
You will remember, II is provided that the through
rate should be g per 100 pounds, M & and that the the
by nre. Although this sut is not brought
against the company with whom this contract
who undertook the carriage Of this cotton and in
whose custody it was lost or destroyed, Is subject
to the same liabilities and entitled to the benefit OF
the same exemptions as were Imposed and con-
tanned In the first bill OF lading This bill of lading
is evidence of the contract made by the parties,
and is presumed TO embody all that was agreed
upon the testimony, that the plaintiffs either Of
them authorized or assented to the issuing Of this
bill OF lading, either personally or by their
agent, then the defendant is entitled to the
benefit Of the .s, exemption ,Sd clause in respect
effect OF this would be to relieve it
OF its common law liability as COM
tween 1t and the plantins as bailee for him. In
this relation they would only be liable for the loss
Upon this branch OF the case charge YOU iirst as
a general proposition, that the defendant is not
liable for the loss unless It appear that the fire
defendant or its servants. 1t is incumbent upon
the plaintins to establish this fact before they can
ask verdict in their favor It is for you to deter
mine upon the evidence offered whether there
was such want of care on the part Of
have prevented the loss. In reaching conclusion
upon this point you Will take into consideration
the situation OF the premises where the injury oc.
condition OF the pier and the goods thereon, the
means that were employed for safety and protec-
a nf IA m fhnn
whether that degree OF care was used which the
circumstances OF the case demanded. The care
such circumstances. If you believe that such
y care was exercised % then the plaintiffs cannot
bin of lading discharges defendant from
liability IT. on the contrary, you believe that the
or It's servants you Will then find or the plaintiffs
The other theory OF the case is that which the
plaintiffs rely upon as a ground of recovery. They
claim that the agreement for the transportation
OF this property was verbal, that it was made with
the duly authorized agent OF the lllineis Central
Railroad, that the cotton to be carried from
Cairo to New York by all RAIL- and that no exemp
tion for loss by fire was agreed to or even spoken
oil. The plaintiffs have sworn positively upon this
point and corroborated as to the fact OF exemp
tion for loss by fire by the agent OF the Illinois Gen.
made to contradict this evidence, except by the
production OF the bills OF ladng, which, 1t Is
conditions OF Shipment II you and that plaintiffs
authorized or assented to such an exemption as
condition Of the transportation OF the cotton-if
these bills OF lading fully express the agreement
made-then they are conclusive upon the parties.
But If such exemption clause was inserted without
the authority or assent OF the plaintiffs, they would
not be bound by its terms. The platntirrs nave
testified that they did not see the bills OF lading
until after the fire occurred and upon this point
they have not been contradicted. If you believe,
therefore, that the goods delivered to the Iii.
nois Central Railroad Company or its agent, under
the verbal agreement sworn to by the plain
tiffs and that such agreement had been
acted on then the defendant tbeing the carrier in
curred) is liable, whether such loss was the result
OF its negligence or not. Under this agreement
the defendant Is responsible as a common carrier
for the loss OF the cotton, unless, as have already
stated, such loss was occasoned by the act OF God
on the public enemies Loss by fire then, In this
view OF the case, would be excuse for monde
livery of the cotton and defendant would be liable
Iaaa