Year: 1876




is that the Enforcement law is unconstitu-
tional because it mixes up provisions giving
protection to voters in general with provis-
ions relating to race and color. The Court
declared that it had no power to disentangle
and separate the constitutional from the un-
constitutional features of the law and that
the whole is made null and void by the un-
constitutional parts. And yet Mr.. Taft cites
these nullities in defence of his circular !!
If law is void in toto it is, Of
course, void in its application to fed
eral as well as to State elections. After
deciding that Congress has no power to
interfere at all except for the one purpose of
preventing determinations founded on race
or color the Court concludes by saying
"We must, therefore, decide that Congress
has not, as yet, provided by appropriate
Legislation for the punishment of the offence
charged in the Indictment" AS the only
thing it has right to punish in connection
with the suffrage is its denial on the ground
of color it is clear that there is at present no
constitutional law on the subject. The
principle applies equally to all elections,
whether members of Congress are to be chosen
or not.


In conclusion we will subjoin some per-
tinent excerpts from the Supreme Court de-
cision:-"It remains now to consider whether
a statute so general as this in its provisions
can be made available for the punishment Of
those who may be guilty of unlawful dis
elimination against citizens of the United
States while exercising the elective fran
chise, on account of their race, &c. There
is no attempt in the sections now
under consideration to provide spe-
ciGcally for such an offence. If the
case is provided for at oil, it is because it
comes under the general prohibition against
any wrongful act or unlawful obstruction in
this particular. We are, therefore, directly
called upon to decide whether penal stat
ute enacted by Congress with its limited
powers, which provides in general language,
broad enough to cover wrongful acts with
out as we'll as within the constitutional
jurisdiction, can be limited by judicial con-
struction, so as to make it operate only on
that which Congress may rightfully prohibit
and punish. For this purpose we must take
these sections Of the statute rs they nre. We
are not able to reject part which is uncon-
stitutional and retain the remainder, if there
be such, from that which is not"
"The question then is whether we can
introduce words of limitation into a penal
statute so as to make it specific, when, as
expressed, it is general only" "This
would to some exteut substitute the judicial
for the Legislative department of the govern
ment. Within its legitimate sphere Con-
gress is supreme and beyond the control
of the courts but if it steps outside of its
constitutional limitations and attempts that
which is beyond its reach the courts are
authorized to, and when called upon in due
course of legal proceedings must, annul its
encroachments upon the reserved power of
the States and the people. To limit this
statute in the manner now asked for would
be to make O new law, not to enforce ON old
one." The whole was therefore declared
void by reason of repugnance to the consti-
tuition. We wish Attorney General Taft
would tell us how it can be dead for all pur-
poses and yet alive for controlling federal
elections 1t is true that the decision was
not pronounced in case growing out of o
federal election, but the reasoning of the
Court is fatal to the annulled act in every
application.