Year: 1870

1t 10 laid down by Count Bismarck as the
indispensable essential OF any peace with
France that 1t shall involve some condition OF
conditions that will render such another wal
as the present impossible condition to
impose constant and effective restraint upon
tho aggressive tendencies of France. He
specifies three things as likely to secure this
end first, the erection Of Alsace and Lor-
raine into another neutral nation, to effect on
the upper Rhine what Belgium does on the
lower; second, the direct annexation of these
two States to Germany; third. the holding by
Germany of two important fortresses In
France-namely, Strasbourg and Metz-as the
very palpable and material guarantees OF
French good behavior. Definite preference is
given to the latter of these three as the only
condition that will hold water, and our own
opinion is that this last proposition holds too
much water. Indeed, the whole summary is
such az to suggest the thought that the Prus-
sian Premier does not sit down and disclose
his exact views to every wayfarer.


He, in fact discharges his first proposition
for insufficient reasons. He is reported as
saying, ''It appears to me that neutrality Of
the existing small States is already SO difficult
to protect, and is at every moment capable Of
so many and such dangerous complications,
that do not think it would be worth while to
make more neutral States and with them new
duties and dangers" In other words, such Q
neutral State might preserve the peace too
well. 1t might prove an obstacle to Germany
as well as to France-and what Germany
wants and feels entitled to demand Is an
obstacle that will operate on France but leave
Germany quite free. Belgium, as the war has
shown, was good practical obstacle to the
operations Of both armies, and any strip Of
territory the violation of which must invite
against the offender the interposition of all
Europe cannot but act in that way. That,
therefore. is the only effective guarantee that
will operate equally on both parties. Neither
of these nations, not even Prussia, powerful as
she is, can afford to give combined Europe q
fair case against her.


Bismarck gives upsthe point of the annexa-
ton to Germany of Alsace and Lorraine for
the fair and legitimate reason that those
States are French and would form an uneasy
and hostile part of the common country. In
fact, they would prove comfort to an invader
from that side. His declaration that the hold
ing of Strasbourg and Metz is "what we shall
do" leaves out of view altogether the possi-
billty that the voice of Europe may be called
to the final settlement of terms. Europe can
not thus leave one Power In permanent neces-
sary domination over another, and we do not
believe that the settlement will take that
shape. Undoubtedly the proposition that
Jules Favre Is reported to have made, that
France should abolish the standing army, in
wolves more clearly the true condition of
peace. Let Prussia insist upon that and
even follow it by grand disarmament on her
own part, and the war will not be altogether
without benefit to all Europe. Prussia's best
safety against future aggression is in the fact
of her victory and in her military system, and
the disarmament of France will extend the
influence Of these causes.