Year: 1870

THE GREAT BATTLES AROUND METZ-THE PRUS-


SIAN ACCOUNTS OF HOW BAZAINE WAS


FLANKED AND FORCED INTO TIE FORTRESS.


The StaatSdnseiger of Berlin publishes the
following official refor of the engagements between Ba-
zane and the armies of Prince Frederick Charles and
senmetz east Of Metz at Mars La Tour and Grave
lote, the il4th l6th and 18th of August we have
heretofore given the official reports for Forbach and the
movements Of these two Prussan armies in the pursuit
of Bazane. The report is as follows:


The combats Of the 14th 1oth and 18th Of August
fScS bV their guard at saaTbrucR on the sth
and in consequence of complete dissolution of their
hostile army retreaed on the line Of the MOsee The
fortress Of Thonve and the very important position of
Metz with its intrenched camp, gave extraordinary
strength TO this line direct attack upon 1t would have
se9b SeSa o Mez toward e %ose in order to pass the
river above the fortress and 40 attack the enemy me
considerable breadth of country, had TO be Sc
| Quently, undertook to cover this march.


ATTACK on THE FRENCH REARGUARD.
As the enemy for time seemed disposed TO await an
attack this side Metz, the right bank Of the Mo-
sele in strong position the French side the nearest
divisions Of the Second Army approxmated TO
the First Army as TO be able promptly to support IT,
Meantime the other corps OF the Second Army had al
ready crossed the Mosele The enemy consequently
himself forced, in order not to lose his communications
fore Metz as could venture to attempt attack
movement. The advanced guard of the First
retreat and the encounter Of the 4th Of August threw


itself on the French rearguard forcing 1t forward on
the marching columns OF their main army The enemy
obliged TO move round some OF his divisions to sup
port it, while on our side the entire First ana seyenth
Army Corps Of the Second Army Joined in the engage
ment. The enemy was forced back, and pursued VI
under shelter of the of the Metz forts the
right bank Of the Moselle THIS combat had, moreoyer


this great advantage that il delayed the enemys retreat
This advantage 1t was possible to prOht by.


THE FIGHT AT MARS LA TOUR.


Two roads lead from Metz TO Verdun, the direction
which the French Army hadto take in of retreat
upon Paris Those corps Of the Second Army which had al
ready passed the MOselle Immediately directed
against the southern road the most easily reached
order If possible arrest the enemys flank march
that side. This important task brilliantly accom-
pIshed through bloody and victorious battle The 5th
Corps, which covered the enemys flank, The French
army, with almost all its corps, was gradually engaged
Army Corps, the Tenth Army Corps, a regiment
of the Ninth Corps, and brigade OF the Eighth
took part. Prince Frederick Charles assumed the
command. The ground first won by us in II hours
struggle was VIGOROUSLY held, the south road
eneny's retreat Paris by this road cut of. The
duct Of troops truly heroic loss very
could be seen by examination Of the battlefield Until
the 18th was impossible to bury the French dead and
denced the enormous losses OF that e force. In the
French official account the strength Of our troops is
reckOned at double its actual numbers The EmperOrs
proclamation on leaving Metz, as also other French
official documents, leaves no doubt that the main army
had the certainly quite natural intention Of retreatng
Verdun


The flank march by the north road or by making wide
dtOur further north, still remained possible. Although
such retreat entaed the enemy great dangers II ap
peared possible that he would undertake it, the only
mode OF escape from highly unfayorabe position, since
otherwise the army cut of from Paris and all its
Of assistance On the Prussan side the nth
turned TO account in bringing forward for final struggle
the necessary corps part Of whom already The
Mosele while part had In the night thrown various
bridges over 1t above Metz At the time the
mys movements carefully watched by the cavalry
His Majesty the King remained on the spot until from
the enemy was TO be expected.


on the 18th it was possible that the decisive combat
might come or In directing the troops II had equally TO
be considered that the enemy might try escape by the
north road and that perceiving the great difficulty Of
Metz, with his back turned toward Germany His posi-


0n after the previous operations Of the German ares
left him no other choice.


THE FINAL CONFLICT AT GRAvRLoTTE.


On the morning Of the 18th the First Army with the
Seventh Corps posted south Of Gravelotte, the


Eighth Corps and the First Cavalry Division being south
Of RezOnyle he First Corps OF the Third Cavalry re-
maned on the right bank Of the Moselle before Metz
This army first directed TO cover in the wood of
Vaux and at GrayelOte, the movement Of the Second
Army against any sortie OF the enemy from Metz The
Second Army advanced in the morning by echelons Of
munieaton on the right with the first Armys The
twelfth Corps took the direction by Mars la Tour and
Jadny while the Guards Corps advanced between Mars
Ia Tour and Vionvile Doncour and the Ninth Corps


re crossed .he highway to the west of Rezonve toward
composed the first line, and II assigned points wefe
ItaChou, inc nOfth main road gained. and
Prlssian cavalry preceded the column as skirmishers


AS soon as was found that the enemy did not con-
template retreat and could therefore, only remain
before Metz IL was necessary 20 these three cnrn
considerably 10 the right and 10 bring up both armies
against the enemy. The Tenth and Third Corps foowed


second line, and then the last reserve tbe second
Army Corps which since IN. had been marching from
Ponta- MOuss0n toward BuXieres. About 1880 II was
evident that the enemy had abandoned his retreat and
had taken up position on the last ridges before Metz
The Second Army thereupOn ordered TO carry out i
sweep the right, and keeping up communication with
the FIRST to direct It's center and left wing Verneye
and AmanvieTs The general attack was not to begin
lha unYeInanl entirely oAoCuted aud ILL