Year: 1870

| the United States, Are they capacltles
merely? Are they not also rights?
In the case before US the citizen mas
chosen a lawful and useful employment;
He has been brought up to it aud educated
in it. He has invested property in it. He
is willing to comply with all police regula'
tions. properly such, in the exercises
of it, He will not offend In any
particular the regulations which the
legislative or the municipal authorities may
adopt. He will observe times, seasons,
places, localities. Bnt all is not enough.
He is required to land his cattle on prlvil-
eyed persons landing; to keep them IN that
PERSONS yard or pen; to slaughter them in
that PERSONS house, and to pay burden
some toll for these restrictions. He may
construct landing, yard, slaughter
house equally as good within the prescribed
limits of locality, and subject to all the ne
cessary regulations, but that will not do.
He must go to the privileged person and use
his premises, and pay for their use.
This is not because the privileged person
is the inventor Of such accommodation,
nor because the use OF them is franchise
lying only in the public grant, nor because
the privileged person is qualified by superior
education and license, nor because he has
received municipal license as a herdsman
or q butcher, but because he has obtained
the exclusive privilege granted by the act.
The ipse Dirt of the Legislature assigns q
lawful and ordinary employment to one set
Of men, and denies and forbids it to another.
The Injustice perpetrated under acts of ire
sponsiDle legislation, has become crying
evil in our country. And while it must
generally be without redress, except through
the action of the elective body or the local
courts, yet in those instances where the
Federal constitution has provided remedy.
we ought not to shrink from granting the
appropriate relief. We do not give any
weight to imputations upon the honesty or
integrity of the Legislature, the courts or
the Executive of the State.


We are not authorized TO do so. We are
bound to presume, and do presume, that
they have severally acted in good faith, and
with an honest purpose not to transcend the
limits of their constitutional powers. They
have their duties to perform; we have ours.
And while we feel it due to them to ex-
anime their acts with great caution and due
respect, we nevertheless feel bound to ex-
ercise an independent judgment.


Unless this be done by all who have
public duties to perform, there will be no
certain foundation to stand upon.


In the exercise of that judgment, we feel
compelled to decide that the act in ques
ton is violation of one of the fundamental
privileges ofthe citizen, and that an lDjunc-
ton wou d have to be granted substantially
as prayed for, but for one of the technical
objections raised by the answer of the de-
PENDANTS.


The defendants to the bill had filed an
answer, in the form of demurrer, object
ing first to the jurisdiction of the court,
because all the parties resided in Louis
lana, and the Circuit Court of the United
States could not enjoin proceedings in the
State courts.


Secondly, That the bill sets up the same
s., %ko ,nf,
filed by the plaintiffs, in the State court,
upon which a decision was rendered, and
from which writ of error had been granted.


Thirdly, Because the statute referred to
was constitutional and valid, containing only
police regulations, in no manner cOntilctlp g
with the constitution of the United States
and the fourteenth amendment.


The objection that the Circuit Court of
the United States could not enjoin proceed
ings in the State court, WAS an objection
which could not be surmounted.


The fourteenth amendment authorized
Congress by appropriate legislation to carry
the provisions of the amen 1ment into effect.
Congress, in the exercise Of the power thus
given. would undoubtedly have the right to
authorize the Federal courts to take juris-
diction of cases of this sort and to eDjoin
proceedings in the State courts. as well as
proceedings in the Federal courts.


bub congress utu uOt dS you dccuhCu tIot
jurisdiction; Congress had not as yet passed
any such law, and therefore the courts were
left to the provisions regulating the pro.
ceedings Of the United States courts passed
seventy or eighty years ago. The third
section of the act of 1898 declares that no
writ of injunction shall be granted to stay
proceedings in any court Of State.


This act had never been repealed. The
court, therefore, felt compelled BY the want
of the ordinary power to issue the requisite
process to refuse the. Injunction prayed for,
to restrain the defendants from proceeding
with the legal remedy which they had insti-
tuted in the State courts.


The court could not interfere with those
proceedings.


The remedy of the parties was to allow
the proceedings to pass to judgment, and if
the highest court of the State should decree
against the construction of the fourteenth
amendment, which was claimed by them,
and which this court had assented to, then
they could carry the case up by writ Of
error to the Supreme Court Of the United
States, and have the whole case reviewed.


For reasons orally assigned, considering
that this court is without power to enjoin
process from the State court and other OBJ
iections raised to the jurisdiction, it is or.
dered and decreed that the injunction ap-
piled for by the complainants be denied
with