Year: 1873

THE ATLANTIC DISASTER
Decision Of the Court of In


quiry.


The Commissioner convened the Cour


of Inquiry into the loss of the Atlantic a


Halifax, on Friday afternoon, and rendered


his decision. The course of Captain vii


liams, in bearing up for Halifax, was con


sidered prudent. The ship had not sufi


cient coal on board at the time of sailing
for ship of her Glass; The coal was OF
inferior quality. of which she consumed x
tons daily, thus giving her less than thirtee1
: days supply when leaving port.


Had all the circumstances of the passage
been favorable, this quantity of coal would
undoubtedly have carried her safely to New
York; but the passage across the Atlantic
without more or less unfgorable weather,
is the exception and not the rule. Favor
able weather during the whole Western pas
sage in the month of March could not be
expected, and contingencies of low ratea Of
speed, resulting from head winds and foul
weather, ought to have been provided for.


Assuming the. position of the vessel, as
stated by Capt Williams, to have been cor
rect, the course steered should have carried
ther well to the eastward of Sambro, had
there been no current. The officer left in
charge did not obey the order given by
Capt. Williams to awaken him by o'clock,
for he slept until awakened by the shock of
the ship striking the shore, from twelve to
seventeen minutes after three. The con-
duct of Capt. Williams and the officers,
after the ship struck, was all that could be
demanded of men in their trying situation,


The management of the ship is con-
demned from the time of changing course,
at P. M. Monday, until the time she be-
came a wreck. Whether or not sufficient
allowance was made by Capt. Williams for
the current in the course he steered, is not
a question of vital Importance, for it is
very probable that the speed of the ship
and lack of vigilance on the part of officers
who we're on duty, which is too apparent,
and the Total neglect to obtain soundings
or use the most ordinary precaution that
ought to be used in approaching the coast,
would have run her ashore, had she been on
the course that Capt Williams supposed her
to be-


The fact of no lights being seen can only
be accounted for by the want of vigilance.
Capt Williams himself states that even land
might have been seen at the distance of two
or three miles. The night was one on which
light might and ought to have been seen
some time before the disaster, if the proper
lookout had been kept.


A gross error must have been made in
estimating the speed of the ship. The
Commissioner says it is well authenticated
fact that during the spring months there is
no continuous northerly set of currents on
this coast; but we have abundant evidence
of the existence of an off-shore current
The error in calculating the ships speed
must have been from incompetency or care
lessness in calculating on the part of those
attending to the log.


The conduct of Capt Williams, in leav-
ing the deck at midnight, is condemned as
imprudent, and calculated to create the i'm
preston in the minds of the officers on duty
that they we're not SO near land as to make
extra vigilance imperative at that time. The
captain believed he was forty-eight miles
from land, and it seems to have been cul-
stances, to order the ship to be run towards
land for three hours at that rate of speed,
without taking the precaution to guard
against any possible error in his estimation
of his position.


Had the very ordinary precaution been
taken of sending the lookout at intervals to-
the masthead, the disaster would, in all
human probability, have been prevented
But the greatest, and may say perhaps the
fatal error, is found in the fact that the lead
was never used, although the ship was in
.soundings for eight hours before she struck.
This is neglect of duty, for which there can
positively be no excuse.


/ So accurately are the soundings laid down
upon the chart, that had the lead been used
at proper intervals the ships safety would
have been guaranteed, even had the night
been one on which the lights could not pos
sibly have been seen. 1t is true that the
frequent use of the lead might have de-
layed her for few hours in reaching port,
but there was nothing to be gained in point
of time in making port before dayight, or
even if there had been, these few hours de-
tention ought not to have been allowed to
weigh against the safety of nearly thou
sand lives that were imperiled, and more
than half of which have been lost by neglect
of this plainly manifest duty.


From a careful review of all the facts of
the case, feel compelled to state my belief
is, that the conduct of Captain Williams, in
the management of his ship during the
twelve OF fourteen hours preceding the dis
aster, was So gravely at variance with what
ought to have been the conduct of man
placed in his responsible position, as to call
for severe censure and to justify me in say
ing that his Certificate as extra master and
master might be cancelled; but in consid-
Grafton of the praiseworthy and energetic
efforts made by him to save life after the
ship struck, the mitigated suspension of
his certificate for two years should be i'm
posed.


also feel it my duty to state that the
conduct of Brown, fourth officer, in pre-
venting the servant from calling Capt. Viii
hams at twenty minutes to 8 o'clock, as or
dered, was, under the. circumstances, an
improper violation of the captains orders
and further, in the fact that as he was one
of the officers of the watch after twelve
o'clock, he ought to have seen the light and
did not see it, there is an implied culpable
neglect and want of vigilance, which con-
sideration for public safety demands should
be marked by censure and moderate pun
ishment. I therefore decide that the GER
tifcate of fourth officer Brown, as master,
should be suspended f or three months.


As matter of course, when clergy
men exchange, they preach old ser
mons. That they may do SO is one
of the reasons for exchanging. 1t
n