Year: 1870

re-tecide the 1egal-tender gues-


tion in the Supreme Court is


whether Congress is omnipotent


or not. The courts decision that
legal tenders are not a constitu-
tional medium for the payment


of debts contracted in gold, be-
fore the legal-tender act was pass
ed, did indeed cause some hard
ship, and create some dissatisfac-
tion-but not more than a CONTRA
ry decision would have produced.
Any absolute settlement OF the
question will inflict hardships;
but for all that it must be settled;
for the harrassing uncertainties,
fluctuations and losses which at
tend suspense of it, are infinite
ly greater than the aggregate of
individual hardships that would
follow Il decision on either side.
The point of most Importance is
that a decision must be made one
way or the .ther. The court had
no choice. 1T was bound to de-
eide that the legal-tender act was
constitutional as to debts pre-ex-
istent at the time of it's passage,
or that it was not. 1t decided
that it was not, and in doing so
necessarily declared limit to the
authority of Congress. It declar-
ed that there are some things
that Congress may not do-one
of those things being an impair
ing of the obligation of contracts
by forcing a creditor to accept
infn fnI
a debt contracted in gold and
silver. This is what excited the
resentment of Congress, and this
is what has led to the movement
now going on to force the court
into a humiliating retraction of
its solemnly avowed opinion.


Attorney General Hoar present
ed the case in behalf Of Congress
with great adroitness. Tho res
ignation Of Judge Grier, he ar
gued, left a majority of only one
vote in the court in favor of the
decision rendered-so that one
mans voice availed to overthrow
an act which the supreme legis-'
lative council of the nation. had
enacted,- the supreme executive
head of the nation had approved,
and the nation itself had acquies-
ced in. This is a terse statement
of the whole. argument against
the decision, and in favor Of the
constitutionality Of the. act. But
it is not legal argument; it is
simply a popular appeal, outside
and above the law. That Con-
gress and the President esteem a
thing necessary. and that the
people accept it, does not prove
that Congress has. a right to, do it.
The constitution is above Con


gress and the President, and the
constitution -forhids Congress to


do certain acts. Yet Congress has
passed acts which it's most intel
ligent members admitted at the
time were unconstitutional, and
which the majority of its men,
bers must have believed we're un-
constitutional. The excuse was
that they were demanded by an
urgent necessity. But the court
cannot recognize any necessity
above or beyond the constitution.
That is the limit of it's view. It's
duty is, not to decide whether an
act of Congress was needed or
not, but whether it was constitu-
tional or not. What are called.
necessities are frequently mere
partisan considerations, and the
court cannot entertain them, ev-
en- though they represent thewill
of q majority of the people; for
the constitution was formed for
the protection Of the minority,
and the court has no choice but,
to interpose it sternly and reso-
lutely before the minority when
its rights are assailed. If the fact
that Congress passes and the
President approves a law is, as
Attorney General Hoar implies,
conclusive proof that Congress
has a right to pass it, then all lin
it's to the power of Congress van-
ish forever. If the court hassno
right to declare invalid a,ay act
that Congress may deliberately
pass and the President deliberate
w nnnrova then indeed is Com