Year: 1876




The reciprocity treaty with the King of the
Sandwich Islands, providing for the free adj
mission of certain products of each country
into the ports of the other, requires an act of
Congress to carry it into effect, inasmuch as
it would modify the revenue laws. The ques-
ton of giving it the necessary legislative
sanction has been considered by sub-com-
mittee of Ways and Means, and it is under
stood that they will report in favor of the
treaty. On purely revenue grounds we in
cline to agree with Mr. David A. Wells, that
the treaty is of doubtful utility; but, as we
understand the question, its effect on the
revenue is subordinate consideration.
In that view it is of small consequence
which way it is decided; but it has
larger and more controlling aspects.
The real state of the question may
be illustrated by comparison with Cuba.
There has been no time within the last fifty
years when the United States would not
have gone to war to prevent the acquisition
of Cuba by any other European Power than
Spain. We have similar though not quite
so strong motive for resisting the transfer
of the Hawaiian Islands to any European gov
eminent. In point of fact they are the one ac-
QUESTION which Great Britain wishes to make
for strengthening her interests in the Pacific
Ocean. If she had possession of the Ha-
waiian harbors as naval and coaling stations
she could do us great mischief in the
event of war; She would then have an
unbroken line of naval stations from
Australia to British Columbia, and the
Sandwich Islands would be her chief
base of operations against our States on the
Pacific. 1t would be an inexcusable neglect
of great national interests to allow England
to gain foothold in the Hawaiian Islands,
and we can easily prevent it by cementing
ties which already exist and attaching their
inhabitants by making their prosperity de-
pend on our favor and friendship. By grant
ing them commercial advantages we can
secure their market for our own productions,
and, what is altogether more important, we
can forestall the efforts of England to make
those islands the ultimate centre of her naval
power in the Pacific Ocean.


1t is on this broad ground, and not as
question of trade, that the reciprocity treaty
is not merely defensible but a measure of
national importance. Admiral Porter and
General Schofeld, who is now serving on the
Pacific coast, have expressed themselves
very strongly in favor of the treaty as tend
ing to exclude Great Britain from strategic
advantages which might operate to our
injury The strong majority by which the
Senate ratified the treaty shows how fully
this order of considerations was appreciated,
and Mr.. Fernando Wood, who is chairman
of the subcommittee to which the treaty was
referred, recognizes the full force of the
reasons for giving effect to the treaty. 1t is
to be hoped that the comparatively petty
question of revenue will not thwart o
measure of so much national impor-
tance. The fact that our Pacific States
strongly favor the treaty should have some
weight since we have so many motives for
strengthening their attachment to the
Union The great barrier of the Rocky
Mountains would make it comparatively
easy for them to assert their independence
with the assistance of foreign Power, and
the same motives which have caused the
government to refrain from enforcing the
Legal Tender law on the Pacific coast should
cause us to be very indulgent to the reason
able wishes of that section. The reciprocity
treaty will give them cheaper sugar, enlarge
the market for their productions and stimu-
late their trade without any perceptible
effect on the prosperity of the sugar plant
ers of Louisiana or any serious diminution
of the public revenue. We hope, therefore,
that the necessary legislation for carrying
the treaty into effect may be adopted by
Congress without opposition.