Year: 1876

The Dangers Of Presidential Election.


An old salt has no fear of the sea even in
its angry moods. Working men become so
much accustomed to dangerous explosives
that they make joke of dynamite and sleep
peacefully with can of nitroglycerine as
pillow. So the American people, having
passed through twenty-five of our quadren-
nial revolutions since 1889, are approaching
the twenty-third with no other feelings than
eager curiosity or strong apprehension of
harm to the nation if the administration be
entrusted to the opposite party. Fear of any
difficulty in the processes Of election is no
more an element of the case than if there
were plans for gigantic campmeeting on the
seventh of November. This confidence is no
doubt well founded, especially since the gov
ernment has not only passed through this
periodical crisis great number of times with
out damage, but has been thrice tested by
the still greater strain of the transfer OF
power without an election on account of the
death, in one case by violence, of the Presi-
dent. But it is only custom after all that
blinds US to the possibilities of great danger.
When an unquestionabe peril has been es-
capped many times chance may still prolong
indefinitely the period of impunity, but the
probability is that the number of happy
escapes has only brought nearer the period
of disaster. At any rate the favors of fortune
or good luck furnish no excuse for neglecting
to remove known dangers to the public peace
and to the perpetuity of the government.


There is one peril in particular to which
attention cannot be too often called on ac.
count of its obviousness, its magnitude, and
the ease with which it might be removed.
This is the system of electing President and
Vice President by means of electors instead
of by direct vote of the people. This
awkward part of our governmental machin-
cry not only has dangers peculiar to itself but
aggravates those arising from other causes.
The risk OF trouble ON account of the partial
suppression by violence of the Southern vote
and the consequent possible doubt as to the
really successful candidate for President, has
already been noticed. 1t is worth while to
notice here how much this risk is increased
by the electoral system. Suppose then that
the State of South Carolina should chance
to turn the scale one way or the other in the
November struggle, as easily might happen.
Fits seven electoral votes are given to Hayes,
Hayes is President; if to Tilden, then Tilden
is President If the state is close the unlaw-
ful suppression of even score of votes might
determine the board of electors, that is, of
two per cent. of the whole electoral college.
But these twenty votes which might change
the whole result of national election under
the present system, would constitute less
than one three hundred thousandth of the
probable popular vote, and in no imaginable
case would so small fraction of the total
change the result. In this case, be the
danger greater or less, it is increased many
thousand times by the indirect method of
voting.


Take the case of possible, nay of probable
frauds in the city of New York. Here the
illegal polling OF score of votes in the sixth
ward slums might change the direction of
thirty-fve electoral votes, or more than nine
per cent. of the whole college. This is, of
course, stating an extreme case, but neither
this nor the case previously stated is beyond
the bounds of possibility. But between this
extreme limit, where the present system
would allow small fraudulent vote to make
a difference of nine per cent. in the second
hand electors, whereas it would make only
a difference of third of one thousandth
of one per cent. in the real electorS,-be-
tween this extreme limit and such cases as
actually occur there is plenty of room for
great difficulty and danger.


A third case in which the electoral system
might prove source of difficulty is where,
there being no fraud or violence whose effects
are increased in mighty ratio by indirect
voting, a small minority of the popular vote
is found to have elected majority of the
electoral college. If it should ever chance
that candidate received a mere nominal
majority in the states where he was success
tul while his defeated opponent received sub
stantially unanimous vote III all the rest of
the states, a computation will show that a
fourth OF the people might elect President.
This, again, is an extreme hypothesis, and
such concurrence of happy circumstances,
all in favor of one side, could never occur.
But the past has shown that minority
larger than one half the majority need not
despair.


The chief objection ordinarily urged
against the abolition of system which
from theavery first failed to do that for which
it was created is that the small states would
lose that part of their weight which results
from their disproportionate representation in
the electoral college. As Rhode Island and
Delaware have two electors each for their
two Senators, as much as New York
and Pennsylvania, it has always been
thought that they would of course combine


with other states adversely interested to de-


feat constitutional amendment for remov-
ing this dangerous anomaly from our system.


But the advantages to the small states are so


indirect, uncertain and dangerous and withal
so likely to be null6ed by the same advan-
tages ON TIE part of other small states of DIFF
erent political or material interests that it is


not really worth while for them to cling
to their electors. fparty geographical or
social lines were drawn between small states
and large states,-if the interests or wishes OF
small states were ever all one way and those
of the large states the other,-some risk
might be run for the sake of undue weight in
the election of President. But this is noto-
riously not the case. The states of all sizes
and eOnaitinpa ara ,,;.olal