Year: 1872




eralship.


sIndecision and timidity' were the
sole charge urged against Washington
by his enemies and his would-be rivals
during the war. 1t was then believed
in, even by some of his friends, and is
still believed in great extent at the
present day.


Seen In the full light which history
now sheds upon all the events of the
war, the only substantial basis for this
charge appears to be his uniform prac-
tice of referring every Important move
ment to the decision of council of
war, to whose opinion he generally
thought not always, deferred, however
much it differed from his own.
The fact is beyond question; and it
must be admitted to derogate somewhat
from that independence of Judgment
which is an important element Of gen.
eralship. But it is only just to state, in
explanation, that in regard to councils
of war, he simply followed the practice
of the age; that if he had been selfish
ly ambitious he would easily have been
tempted to bold venture OF every
thing for the glory he might chance to
obtain; but that his pure and lofty con-
science as patriot, which increasingly
oppressed him with the deepest feeling
of responsibility, forbade him to risk
his small force, upon the preservation
of which his country's cause seemed to
depend, except in the most urgent
cases. We must add undoubtedly to this
the natural modesty of the man, and
especially his conscious want of tech
nical knowledge of the art of war with
out which even Napoleon could not
feel entire confidence in his own judg-
ment.


Of his audacity when opportunity Of
fered, and of that true military audaci-
ty which is not rashness, Trenton and
Princeton gave sufficient proof.
liC uuOcb CdutlOuo VI
his little force to be found on record and
compare it with MeClellan's hesitation
and delay at Yorktown with a well-ap-
pointed army of one hundred thousand
men, and calling forty thousand more;
and if Washington's conduct was timid
and undecided, what language will fur
nish word expressive enough to char
acterize the conduct of McClellan?





Of Washington's strategy there is not
much to be said; simply because, apart
from the difficulty of achieving any i'm
portant strategic success with so small
4 force, the enemy scarcely ever ventur-
ed take the field; and as,with their COM
mand of the water, their lines of sup
ply and of reinforcement could never
be even threatened, they rarely gave
him an opportunity of practising that
wonderful art which teaches how to
win campaigns, sometimes without even
fighting battle. When such an op-
portunity, however, was actually offered,
we have seen how promptly and boldly
he availed himself of it. The little
campaign of Princeton was strategical-
ly as brilliant, though on smaller
scale, as the famous campaign of Mar
engo: and would have been as decisive
in its results, had Washington had
force large enough to await the enemy
at Princeton, and there beat him in bat
tile, as Napoleon was able to do at
Marengo. The decisive movement in
both campaigns was the same,-the
sudden massing of the principal force
on the enemy's rear, thereby threaten
ing his communications with his base.
The attack at Princeton made Corn
wallis fall back to Brunswick; and the
admirably strategic position that Wash
ington so promptly took up on Norris
town Heights completed the success OF
the campaign, by compelling the enemy
to abandon their march upon Phila-
delphia.


To the question, what did Washing
ton accomplish the answer is, that
from 1775 to 17sl, with force always
inferior to the enemy in numbers, and
still more so in efficiency, he succeeded
in keeping them shut up in cities and
in prolonging the war until the French
re-enforcements enabled him to end it
by the capture of their principal army;
and that during all this time the enemy
had the great strategic advantage Of
a numerous fleet which gave them the
command of all the water communica-
tions.


The inference we venture to draw
from the facts stated is this: Weighing
the results obtained by him, in connec-
ton with the means at his control,
Washington loses nothing in compari-
son with the most illustrious command
ers in history; and if the true test of
generalship be wise choice of objects,
and the use of the best means to effect
them, he may be justly ranked among
the great generals of the world.-Old