Year: 1872

We had not expected to again consider, editor
tally, the circumstances Of the recent collision,
or the responsibility for it's occurrence. few
to be really called for, at the hands Of the in
dependent press.


AS We have already emphaticaly said there is
no valid excuse for railway collision. It is al
ways caused, either by failure to have, or the
failure to observe proper railroad rules 1t il
either the fault Of the management. or the fault
Of its employees.


In this case the Rules of the Philadelphia
Wilmington and Baltimore management, are
clear and emphatic. Had they been followed
there would have been no accident. These
Rules, 1--WE write with copy before u.s. require
that "dt least" ten minutes space must be kept
between trains, and even then, the precantion
is necessary that the following train shall ''see
that curves are passed, and stations approached
with cAution."


Now, the fatal error lay in the departure Of the
Wilmington train from Chester. 1t left that
place, the witnesses declare, nine minutes, only,
ahead Of the New York train This was terrible
mistake. The interval Of time between the
trains was already less than the permitted min
imum, with the additional elements Of danger,
in making the departure, that the train was very
heavy, (ten cars, one or more being the ponder
Gus sleeping coaehes) and that the locomotive
was one inst secured for the service, whose en-
gineer and fireman were not accustomed to the
train they had to drive. Subsequent cirIumstAn-
ces when the fireman deadened his fire with
coal, and carried down the steam from 30 pounds
to 30, In i've minutes, and thus utterly disabled
the train, showed how serious this last element
Of danger was


Under such circumstances the train should
not have left Chester 1t is useless to say the
conductor Thought" he could keep ahead Of
the Express; the facts are that the Rules of the
Road and his experience as a railroad man for
bade him to think such a course was safe, and
the Rules, themselves declare TO him, with most
positive distinctness that "dH unnecessary risks
must be apo6led IN oAsEs OF DOUBT, TIE SAFE
COURSE MusT ALWAYS BE ADOPTED" He should
have allowed the express train TO pass him, al
Chester, or he should have had it signalled
when it passed that point, and advised to follow
his train with the caution required by the Rules


After the Wilmington train came away from
Chester, it caue into danger. The accident
commenced its history, at that moment It il
true, that when steam failed and speed slacken
cd, in the neghborhood Of Bellevue there Wal
second warning to the conductor of the ne
cessity for signalling the New York train, a
once and it seems true that there was fats
waste Of time, by somebody at Elerslie, wkeI
the brakeman got only $50 or 200 yards (accord
ing to his own testimony North Of that Station
although there was actually four minutes from
the time the train stopped out Of steam, till i
was struck, to say nothing Of the minutes con
sumed in slowly starting away from Elersle
and moving to the place Of the accident. stil
again, it is true that the engine-man ought t
have notified the conductor, as far back as Belle
vue, that steam was failing, and that he coul
not make speed enough to keep out Of the way
He actually moved of from the Ellerslie plat
form, by the force Of gravity, with scarcel
enough steam to run his locomotive, although
he had train Of ten cars, and an adverse grad
was only two hundred yards ahead Of him
Who can explain this


But, after al, we conclude as we began, that th
train should not have come away from Chester
ahead Of the New York train, and the conduc
tor is responsible for this, because his eontrc
of the movements Of q train is undivided b
any one. After this fatal mistake, the othe
blunders merely precipitated the disaster, an
no one Of them can be charged with its terr
BILE consequences.