Year: 1872

tude to great and generous people
and high sense of duty, are strong
cords which bind President to
fidelity in the discharge his trust;
yet who that stops moment to
consider the springs Of human ac-
ton will not agree that should he
desire to obtain continuance of
this highest honor among men, and
is not debarred the hope, by legal
prohibition, then will interest and
ambition itself combine to prompt
him, not to corrupt, but to faithful,
honest, earnest administration for
the public benefit, with a sympathy
which will seek .'to enforce no poll
cy against the will of the people?'
| EXECUTIVE AND SENATE.


In addition to this, sir, cireum-
scribed as is the executive power,
less danger is evinced from unau-
thorized action on the part of tn
President than from virtual conrex-
Of that officer by the other bra;


the national Legislature. L.
briefly draw comparison betM
their respective powers. The Pre-.
ident is elected for four years; is
Commander-in- Chief Of Army and
Navy; has the exclusive power Of
nominating Federal officers, but the
concurrence of the Senate is neccs-
sary to their appointment. He has
the power to negotiate treaties, but
two thirds of the Senate is neces-
sary to their ratification. He has n
veto upon legislation, but two thirds
of the national Legislature may
render that imperative.


The Senate is elected for six
years; has the exclusive right Of
trying impeachments, except in
case of impeachment OF the Presi
dent, when the Chief Justice pre-
sides; has equal power with the
other branch in legislation, except
in originating revenue bills; has
concurrent power with the Presi-
dent in appointment ofpublic officers
and the affirmative vote Of two
thirds of the number present is
necessary to render a treaty valid.
1t is permanent body; only one
third Of its membership being liable
to change once in two years. Its
members share largely in recon-
mendations for appointments, and q
majority contribute equally with the
President in comforting the patron
age of the Government.


The President is liable to i'm
peachment, to be tried by the Sen
ate; its members are not liable to
impeachment at all. ThePrcsident
is responsible to the great body Of
the people; the members of the SEN
ate are responsible only to their re-
spective State Legislatures, yet not
even subject 10 be recalled by those
Legislatures. The President may
form our foreign connections, yet
minority of the Senate may embar-
rass negotiations and control the
validity of al treaties with other
nations. The Senate is the superb
or power Of the Constitution. In
that body are wasted legislative, exc
cutive, and judicial powers. Per-
manent in its character, it will eX-
ert its full powers. In his History
of Charles V, DR.. Robertson atfirms
that "history has furnished no in
stance of a REIMBURSEMENT of fpower
by an organized body unless com
PEELED so to do by foreign force"
What security has the country for
the proper exercise of these vast
powers conferred upon the Senate?
Little, beyond the personal char
acter of its members and such rules
as it may adopt for its own honor
and selt-respect.


If it has not already been, dis
position to control the executive
department will be more likely to
show itself from this direction than
from any other. Now, imbed in the
fundamental law that the Executive
no matter what his capabilities or
his deserts, what the circumstances
of the country, or what the desires
of the people, shall be creature Of
a single term, thus decrease the
inducements to good behavior, with
a certain disinclination to hazard
censure or pcrplexity through in
dependent exertion of his proper
powers; how much more easily
might predominant faction of the
Senate debase his fortitude and rem
der him plant to their will? Is it
then strange that we see Senators,
clothed with this vast authority, and
without limitation as to rc-eligibil-
ity themselves, occupying their
seats in that body through consc-
cutivc reflections for nearly quar-
ter of a century, among the foremost
advocates of an unqualified retire
ment of the President at the end of
single term?


STABILITY OF ADMINISTRATION.


Little observation is necessary to
convince one that in very many in
stances the successor seems to deem
it tho very best proof he can offer
of his capability to undo SO far rs
is possible what has been done by
his predecessor. Whether it pro-
cecds from a supposition that a dis
like of the measures of the prede-
cessor on the part Of the constitu-
ency has wrought his own substi-
tuition, and that marked difference
between them will best commend
himself to that constituency, or
whether it proceeds from a self
complaisant desire to give an indi-
viduality to his own administration
of affairs, the result is the same. A
continued change of officers results
in change Of measures. a stability
of administrative measures is, there
fore, hardly to be looked for if we
continually vary the officer of that
department.


The present length of the persi-
Dental term affords a reasonable
time between its commencement and
close for the public to scrutinize
and carefully consider the measures
and administrative policy Of the
incumbent. If it should meet APP
proval and a desire for the continu-