Year: 1873

III the power OF Lne defeated party, WHICH


may happen to have majority in either


house, to defeat an election by the people


and to take the chances of anarchy or OF
a victory by throwing the election into
the House of Representatives. But this
extraordinary provision by which either


house is empowered to reject the vote of
State in the election of President is Gre
ated by joint rule of the two houses.
The Constitution provides that each
house may determine the rules of its own
proceedings is, the mode of conduc-


ting Its business, and doing those things


Which, by the Constitution and laws, it
has right to do. But, surely, this clause
does not give the two houses power by
joint rule to disfranchise States by reject
| ing their electoral votes. The provisions
OF this rule, to have any validity, must be
embraced in q law enacted which has been
submitted to the President for his appro-
va and even as a law it would be the
most fearful enactment on the statue book,
coufering as it does upon either house
power to block the wheels of Govern
II. ;alt and plunge the nation into anarchy
| The proposition that Congress has pow
er 10 sit as a canvassing board upon the
electoral votes of the States, admitting or
ICJCCtIA1 buClu 1JI ICSOlS III It's ON IL, SUI
verts the whole theory by which their ap-
pointment was conferred upon the States,
makes Congress Judge ofihe election and
qualifications of President and Vice-Pres-
ident, and by operation OF the twenty sec
ond joint rule gives that power to each
house separately as in case of its own
members.


There is no such express power given
/ n Gtnn in tho GnosfiflIfinn nor &c
necessary to carry out any express power
tht:vein given, and its exercise would be in
direct conflict with the known purpose of
the trainers TO make the Executive and
Legislative Departments as nearly indie
pendent of each other as possible The
theory Of the Electoral College was that
body of men should be chosen for the
express purpose of electing the President
and Vice president, who would be distin-
guished by their eminent ability and wis
dom, who would be Independent of popu-
lar passion, who would not be influenced
by tumult, cable or intrigue, that i'll their
choice of President they would be left
perfectly free to exercise their own judge


ment in the selection of the proper person,
in short, the idea was that Ii small body
OF select men could be more safely in
trusted with the election of Pre- ,ident and
Vice President than the whole body of
the people. Now that democracy is bet
ter understood, and popular government
has been more thoroughly tested, we have
learned that large electoral bodies can be
more easily trusted than small ones. That
while it may be possible to corrupt small
bodies, it is impossible to corrupt large
ones and that the danger oftumult, which
was ever present in the minds OF the
trainers Of the Constitution, arises chief
ly from the exclusion Of the masses from
pc. crssnd conterring it upon few. That
the candidates for electors should be
pledged in advance to vote for part icular
persons, was not tonly not contemplated by
the trainers OF the Constitution, but was
expressly excluded by their theory. They
were not to be influenced by previous com
initials or engagements, SO that when
they came together they could deliberate
with perfect freedom for the interests CT
the republic How completely this theo-
ry has been overturned in practice for
more than seventy years it is unnecessary
TO recite. The Electoral Colleges have
turned out to be wholly useless. Every
reason given for their original establish
ment has absolutely failed i'll practice, but
while they are powerlesS for good they
may be potent for evil. In their election
errors may easily be committed, and in
very many instances have been. " lille
nobody would mistake the name of Grant
or Greely, change i'll names on Il long list
of electors may occur from errors i'll print
ing or fraud sufficient 70 reverse The vote
of the State.


The present electoral system circum-
scribes the powers and rights of an indi-
vidual voter, and prevents him from vo-
ting for the men Of his choice for Presi-
dent and Vice resident, unless there are
enough of his way of thinking in the
same State to meet in convention and
nominate electors to represent their views.
And the present requirements of the Con
stitution that electors shall meet on the
same day in their respective States and
cast their votes, is liable to accident and
interruption, as in Wisconsin in 1857.
He would prefer that the President should
be elected by the people as one communi-
ty, giving the election to the man who re-
ceived the highest number of votes, with
out regard to State lines or municipal di-
visions, so that the national character
should be fully represented in one de-
partment of the Government. But in as
suming that the smaller States will not
consent to an amendment by which the
President would be elected by the people
of the United States as one community, he
believed they could have no objection to
such change as would bring the election
of a President directly by the people of
the several States, each State to be divi-
ded into as many districts as it has Sena-
tors and Representatives, and each district
to have one vote in the election of Presi


dent and Vice President, and the vote of
that district be counted in favor of the
candidates for President and Vice-Presi-
dent who received the largest number of
votes in it. This would still give to each
State the same number of votes it now
has in the election Of President and Vice
President the votes, however, to be CIV
en- directly for the candidates by the peo-
pie without the intervention of electors.


The speaker then argued the fairness of
the proposed plan, the intrinsic injustice
to States of the present system, and its
peril to the country and opportunities it
affords for corruption, cable and intrigue
when an election is thrown into the
! House of Representatives.


But it will be asked what is the reme-
dy9 He answered he would be glad If