Year: 1871




To clearly understand the recent operations in the
vicinity OF lie Mans it is necessary go back to the
situation OF both armies a fortnight ago. Al this
time the forces under Prince Ere lenck Charles oc-
cuped line stretching from the vicinity OF Dreux,
passing before Cnartres to Vend me. Detached corps
at Orleans and along the Loire protected the German
left wing while the German Army OF the Loire in the
vicinity Of Glen kept watch upon the French Army Of
Bordeaux. which was reported advancing from
Bourges. +


Undoubtedly at this time the French had the ad.
vantage in the situation. Their line was shorter and
more compact than that Of the Germans. Chanzy's
army occupied Q line extending fr0m Nogent.le-
Retron to point south Of LIE Mans, completely
ering all the railway lines OF communication with
the sea. The northward movement made by Chanzy
after the French defeat al Orleans had thrown the
Germans completely on the defensive. 1t had COM
PEELED them to extend their line Immensely,
thereby necessarily weakening it at all points,
When Chanzy, after most fatal delay, determined
upon taking the offensive, he had one Of two move
ments to select from. The hrst was TO extend his
right wing and take Vend6me in nank, and by FORM
ing junction with the Army of Bordeaux at or
near Blois force the Germans to evacuate vendome
ana Orleans and retire northward. This would
have necessitated their forming a new line which
would extend from Dreux to Chartres and Pithi-
vers.


The next movement was to continue, or rather re-
sumo, the nank march northward, flank Chartres
and advance on Versailles. This as will ~ seen at
glance on the map involved the abandonment or
LIE Mans and Its railroad facilities and the compul-
sorry dependence upon the single railroad line to
Cherbourg for supplying Chanzy's large army with
food and ammunition In addition, 1t must be admit
ted that nank march upon Versailles In the face OF
awaCchful enemy rendered possible the isolation ana
subsequent capture OF the nanking column by o
sudden advance on the Freneh centre from Chateau.
dun. Still, 1t must be borne In mind that all great
flank movements are full OF danger. MacMahon's
flank march to Metz was badly executed, but ts
conception was admirable generalshp. II the
French army had succeeded in crossing the Meuse
river 1t would have been impossible for the Ger.
mans to have prevented the escape Of Bazaine's
army. In fact every military movement promising
great results is attended with great risks


Thus we consider that Chanzy's movement should
have been northward Once north OF Chartres the
chances would have been ten to one in favor OF his
raising siege OF Paris Prince Frederick Charles
failing in piercing the French centre, would have
been unable to give battle except most decided
disadvantage. Besides which rhe great length 0
his line would have prevented his concentration be.
tween Chartres and Dreux IN time to foil the French
lanking column.


Chanzy, however, adopted the plan of advance on
srhe left flank Of the German army. He threw for
ward flying columns to occupy the attention Of his
enemy along their whole line, while his right wing
pushed on through st. Calais in the direction OF
vendome. Had he began the advance ten days
earlier he might have been successful but the result
could only have been the withdrawal OF the Ger
man left and the concentration OF the en-.
tire German army on shorter line and
one which more enectualy covered the
besiegng army before Paris Practically but little
immediate benefit would have been derived from the
success. Ultimately much good might nave followed;
for II s reasonable to suppose that had the first
flank movement succeeded Chanzy would have