Year: 1867

ne eApeub6b VI Jn6 OHlltu DIdl6ht lu'
cluding the interest on the public debt,
are more than six times as much as they
were seven years ago. To collect and
disburse this vast amount, requires care
full supervision, as well as systematic
vigilance The system has never been
perfected and was much disorganized by
the tenure of office bill, which has almost
destroyed official accountability. HThe
President may be thoroughly convinced
that an officer is incapable, dishonest or
unfaithful to the Constitution, but under
the law which have named, his utmost
endeavors to complain to the Senate and
ask the privilege of supplying his place
with better man, (f the Senate he re-
garded as personally hostile to the Presi-
dent it is natural and not altogether
unreasonable for the officer to expect
that it will take his part as far as possi-
BILE to restore him to his place and give
him a triumph over his executive supe-
rior officer; and he has other chances Of
impunity arising from accidental de-
fects of evidence made in investigating
it and secrecy of hearing it, and it is not
wonderful that official malfeasance should
become bold in proportion as delinquents
learn to think themselves safe. / am
entirely persuaded that under such a
rule the President cannot perform the
great duty assigned to him Of seeing the
laws faithfully executed, and that it dis.
abes him most especially from enforcing
that rigid accountability which is neces-
sary to the due execution of revenue
laws.


The Constitution invests the President
with authority to decide whether a
removal shall be made in any given case
The act of Congress declares in substance
that he shall only accuse such as he sup.
poses to be unworthy of their confidence.
The Constitution makes him sole judge
ia the premises, but the statute takes
away his jurisdiction and transfers it to
the Senate, and leaves him nothing but
the odious and sometimes impracticable
duty of becoming prosecutor.


The prosecution is to be conducted
before q tribunal whose members are not
like him responsible to the whole people,
but to separate constituent bodies, and
who may hear his accusation with great
disfavor. The Senate is absolutely with
out any known standard of decision
applicable to such case Its Judgment
canhot be anticipated, for it is not gov
erned by any rule. The law does not
define what shall be deemed good cause
for removal. 1t is impossible even to
conjecture what may or may not be so
considered by the Senate. The nature of
the subject forbids clear proof; if the
charge be incapacity, what evidence will
support it2 Fidelity to the Constitution
may be understood or misunderstood in
thousand different ways, and by vio-
lent party men in violent party
times, unfaithfulness to the Constitu.
ton may even come to be considered
meritorious If an officer be accused of
dishonesty, how shall it be made outY Will
L be inferred from acts unconnected
with public duty, from private history or
from general reputation, or must the
President await the commission of an
actual misdemeanor in Office, and shall
he in the meantime risk character and
the interest of the nation in the hands Of
men to whom he cannot give his conf
dence, and must he forbear his com.
plaint until the mischief is done aud
cannot be prevented 1t his zeal in the
public service should impel him to antici.
nate an overt act, must he move at the peril
of being tried himself for the offense OF
slandsring his subordinates y In the pre-
sent circumstances of the country some
one must be held responsible for official
delinquency Of every kind. 1t is ex-
tremely difficult to say where that re-
snonsibility should be thrown If 1t
he not left where it has been
nIaced by the Constitution. But all
lust men will admit that the President
ought to be entirely relieved from such
responsibility if be cannot meet 1t by
reason of restrictions placed by law upon
bis actions Unrestricted power OF re-
moval from Office is a very great one to
be trusted even to a magistrate chosen oy
general suffrage ofthe whole people, and
accountable directly to them Tor his acts;
1t is undoubtedly liabN to abuse, ana
at some periods Of our history has been
abused. IL it be thought desirable and
constitutional that it should be so limited
as TO make the President merely CON-
moninformer against other public agents,
he SHOULD at least be permitted 10
act in that capacity before some open
tribunal, ready to investigate the
merits Of every case, furnished with
means Of taking evidence and bound TO
decide according to an established rule.
This would guarantee the safety Of the
aceuser when he acts in good faith, and
AZ the same time secure the rights Of the
other party. i speak, Of course, with all