Year: 1874

In the Chancery Court of Richmond yes
terday morning. Judge Fitzhugh delivered
the opinion Of the Court in the case Of The
Broad street Association, or Miller anC
others, versus the Richmond, Fredericks
burg and Potomac Railroad Company, "A!
follows: ..m


When this case was before me on an appli
cation for IN injunction in June last, after
mature deliberation | decided, for reason:
set forth in written opinion, that the mo-
ton for an injunction should stand over unit
the question Of right should be established
at law in the case of the city of Richmond
against the railroad company then pending
in the Circuit Court of Richmond.


Since that opinion was rendered the case
at law has been decided. And it appears
that the Circuit Court has affirmed the
judgment below. See copy of the judgment,
dated June 90. 1874, and another order
of the same court, in the same case, made
July ., 1874. The judgment Of affirmance
was suspended for ninety days at the in
stance of the railroad company in order to
enable it TO apply for writ of superseded,
to the judgment. The plaintiffs in this case
present copy Of the judgment and renew
the motion for an Injunction.


After the best consideration l have been
able TO give to this motion, L am Of opinion
that the reasons which Influenced me to de.
cline to grant the injunction, as / did wher
it was originally asked for, still exist in al
their force.


do not think this court should interfere
while the judgment settling the legal right
is suspended. 1t ought not to regard 9
judgment which is suspended by the court
that rendered it, and which the plaintiff that
obtained it cannot enforce, as 4 judgment
concIuSivcly settling the legal right. That
is equally suspended with the judgment
which is relied upon Us the evidence Of its
establishment.


The jurisdiction of equity in cases of nui
sance is not coordinate with that Of the com
mon law; but, as / have already shown, tho
jurisdiction Of the former is only in aid of the
latter, and, therefore, to justify the interier
cuce OF equity the right at law must be fully
established or clearly shown to exist, and il
must be shown in addition that the equitable
power of this court is necessary to protec
the party complaining from an injury fol
which no adequate redress can be obtained
1T law.


To set in motion the extraordinary RENE
dies of this court in this case, if the plain
tifrs here had been the plaintiffs in the case
at law they would have been required tc
have clearly established the right AT law by
a judgment capable OF being enforced, and
in addition to this, TO have shown that the
legal remedy was inadequate to remove the
nuisance. But though these plaintiffs are
not the plaintiffs in the case at law, the city
of Richmond, their common representative
is litigating the very question they would
otherwise have been required to do. Sc
that the efficacy Of the legal remedy
can be as fully tested by the case
of the city as it could have been had the
Judgment at law been obtained by these
plaintiffs. AS the city cannot enforce it:
Judgment, aud it cannot be known whether
the common law remedy will not be suffi
cicnt to abate the nuisance when one shal
bave been clearly established ut law, it would
be premature to grant the injunction. The
conditions upon which | think it should be
granted do not exist.


For these reasons at present refuse the
Injunction. The motion may stand over un
til the right at law is finally established.


Several motions made by the counsel fol
the Broad-Street Association were cyerruled
aud decree was entered in accordance with
this opinion.