Year: 1879

1t had been prophesied that Russia could not


successfully resist Nspolson's attack, even


when much less overwhelming invasion had


been contemplated than had now taken place.


Aud these prophecies had come true. The


hass;sns had given up one position after an.
other, had been defeated in the field, and fnal-


ly had lost their capital. Only one anticipation


mad remained unrealized. The Russians had


refused to acknowledge themselves vanu uished


by signing treaty of peace. The armies still
kept the field, and a Lasdwehr had been set
on foot. So far Napoleon's success had fallen
short of his expectations, as it had likewise
been unable to quell the national resistance. II
was possible that this obstinscy might so far
embarrsss Napoleon as to oblige him to give up


toe capital again, to repass Smolensk and COD.


tinue the war in a position nearer to his own


rontier. Bat as this frontier was not, as we are


apt to imagine, the frontier of France. bat that


OF Prussia and the Duchy OF Wasaw, his posi-


tion with respect to the enemy would still be


one OF enormous superiority. That be would


remain at Moscow too long and expose bis


army to Russian winter, which might no


doubt cause him serious losses, was surely not


to be imagined. A leader of his experience


would bs in no danger of such misca alton


and even leader accustomed to strokes of


audscity would, when responsible for so vast


an army, be awed into prudence. And thus


the drmness Of the Russian Gear and nation


might bs expe cted only to prolong the war. to


give Napoleon such q check as he had received
10 Spain to compel him to adopt other


means for quelling their resistance but by no
i'm
much less snch q disaster as might shake


the whole fabric of his power. It would


carry US far into the history of France
il we should try to explain hsw


it could have happened that such vast destinies


should depend upon the clearness of judgment
of q single man, SO that fit of rashness and


eccentricity in Napoleon should change the


face of the world and doom millions to death.
1t is less Intricate question how Napoleon


could be capable of making the mistake hs
made at Moscow We are to consider that the
course he took might have been completely


successful. Alexander's hrmness might have


yielded after little delay TO the clamors of his


brother and the entresties Of his mother.


Nothing 10 more characteristic of Napoleon


than his vivid conception of the character Of


those with whom he bad to deal. We may


imagine that in his mind it was registered as q


certainty that Alexanfer could not bs firm.
No doubt another General would not hays
uIoauou OI etaklng the eXlstenc0 even OF
ordinary army upon the sound ness of an i'm
preston of this kind. But Napoleon would
not have been what be was If he had not over
and over again rsked everything to obtain Q
result that could not be gained by ordinary
methods. Such calculation as he now acted
upon had succeeded with him many times be-
fore. He ought, indeed, to have known that
he was not exempt from failure. His Egyp-
tian failure and his blnnder In Spain must
have cost him many moments of secret chagrn,


but the world had been so blind to all this i'll


luck and had so steadily persisted in regarding


him as invincible that he may we'll have come to


believe himself so. Meanwhile the scale Of his


affairs had become so gigantic thst single ex-


cepti0n to his usual good fortune might have


Infinite consequences; the slightest absrra-
ton in his mind might be represented by the
complete transformation of Europe, Just as the
intinitesmal displacement of telescope will
make difference of millions Of miles in an as
Economical calculation. Thus to exolain the
largest and most sudden reverse of fortune
that the world ever saw we have to put togeth-
or three conditions each unprecedeuted First,
the course of French history from Louis XIV,
through the Revolution to Napoleon, had pro-
duced an intense aut0cracy, unparalleled in
the history of civilized States; second this
autocracy was welded BY one who, by very
peculiar course of life, had been trained to
hazardous strokes of policy and strategy, such
as are altogether forbidden to ordinary rulers;
thirdly, its affairs were on an unprecedented
scale of magnitude.-L and Times Of Stein,
j. r. Seely.