Year: 1867

Il





one Of these States, and as such to admin
lister the proper laws of the State. Where
is the authority TO be found in the Consti-
tuition for vesting in military or an exc
cutive officer ctjudicial functions, to be
exercised under State law ? 1t has been
again and again decided by the Supreme
Court Of the United States that acts of
Congress which have attempted to vest
executive powers in the judicial courts or
Judges Of the United States are not war
ranted by the Constitution. If Congress
cannot clo.he a judge with merely
executive duties, how can they clothe
an officer or soldier Of the army
with judicial duties over citizens of
the United States who are not in the
military or naval service So, too, it has
been repeatedly decided that Congress
cannot require a State officer, executive
or judicial, to perform any duty enjoined
upon him by a law of the United States.
How, then, can Congress confer power upon
an executive officer of the United States
TO perform such duties in State If
Congress could not vest in a judge Of one
Of these States any judicial authority un-
der the United States by direct enactment,
how can it accomplish the same thing in
directly by removing the State Judge and
putting an officer of the United States in
his place?


To me these considerations are concu-
sive OF the unconstitutionality of this part
Of the bill now before me, and | earnestly
commend their consideration to the de-
liberate judgment Of Congress-.


Within period of less than year the
legislation of Congress has attempted to
strip the Executive Department of the
Government Of some Of its essential pow
ers. The Constitution and the oath pro-
vidcd in it dcvolvc upon the President the
power and the duty TO sec that the laws
arc faithfully executed. The Constitu-
ton, in order to carry out this power, gives
him the choice Of the agents, and makes
them subject to his control and supervi-
sion but in the execution of these laws
the constitutional obligation upon the
President remains, but the power to ex-
ercise that constitutional duty is cifectually
taken away. The military commander is,
as to the power of appointment, made to
take the place Of the President, and the
General Of the army the place of the Sc
nate and any attempt on tho part Of the
President to assert his own constitutional
power may, under pretcnce Of law, be met
by official insubordination. It is to be
feared that these military officers, looking
to the authority given by these laws rather
than to the letter of the Constitution, will
recognize no authority but the commander
of the district and the general Of the army.


If there were no other objection than
this to this proposed legislation it would
be sufficient. Whilst | hold the chief
executive authority Of the United States,
whilst the obligation rests upon me to see
that all the laws are faithfully executed,
I can never willingly surrender that trust
or the powers given for its execution.


lean never gire my assent to be made
responsible for the faithful execution Of
laws, and at the same time surrender that
trust, and the powers which accompany
it, TO any other executive officer, high or
low, or to any number of executive Of
iicers. If this executive trust, vested by
the Constitution in the President Of the
United States, is to be taken from him
and vested in Il subordinate officer, the re-
Spcnsbi!ty will be with Congress in
clothing the subordinate with unconstitu-
tional power, and with the officer who
assumes its exercise.


This interference with the constitutional
authority Of the Executive Department is
an evil that will inevitably sap the fonuda-
tiors of our Federal system but il is.not
the worst evil Of this legislation.
1t is 4 great public wrong to take
from the President powers conferred upon
him alone by the Constitution; but the
wrong is more Nagrart and more dangerous
when The powers so taken from the PrcSi-
dent are conferred upon subordinate exc
cutivc officers, and especially upon military
officers. Over nearly one third ofthe States
of the Union military power, regulated by
no fixed law, rules supreme.


Each one of these five district command
crs, though not chosen by the people
or responsible to them, exercises at this
hour more executive power, military
and civil, than the people have ever
been willing TO confer upon the head
of the Executive Department, though
chosen by and responsible to themselves.
The remedy must come from the people
themselves. They know what it is, and
how it is to be applied. AT the present time
they cannot, according to the Consti-
tuition, repeal these laws. They can
not remove or control this military des-
potism. The remedy is, nevertheless, in
their hands. 1t is TO be found in the
ballot, and is sure one if not con-
trolled by fraud, overawed by arbi-
trary power, or from apathy on their part
too long delayed. With abiding confidence
in their patriotism, wisdom, and integ-
rity, am still hopeful Of the future, and
that in the end the rod Of despotism will
be broken, tue armed rule Of power be
lifted from the necks Of the people, and the
principles Of q violated Constitution pre-
served. ANDREW JOHNSON.


Washington, D. C., July 10, 1867.