Year: 1879

e.


sire!


Napoleon and Moscow.


It had been prophesied that Russia
could not successfully resist Napoleon's
attack, even when a much less over
whelming invasion had been contemplat-
ed than had now taken place. And
those prophecies had come true. The
Russians had given up one position after
another, had been defeated in the field, !
and finally had lost their capital. Only
one anticipation had remained unrealized.
Tha Russians had refused to acknowl-
edge themselves vanquish ed by signing
treaty Of peace. Their armies still
kept the field, and a Landwehr had been
set on foot. So far Napoleon's success
had fallen short of his expectation, as it
had done in Spain, where he had like
wise been unable to quell the national
resistance. It was possibible that this
obstinacy might so far cmbarrass Ma
poleon as to oblige him to give up the
capital again, to repass Smolensk, and
continue the war in position nearer to
his own frontier. But as this frontier
was not, as we are apt to imagine, the
frontier of France, but that of Prussia
and the Duchy of Warsaw, his position
with respect to the enemy would still be
one of enormous superiority. That he
would remain at Moscow too long and
expose his army to Russian winter,
which might no doubt cause him serious
losses, was surely not to
be imagined. A leader of his experience
would be in no danger OF such a mis-
calculation, and even leader accustomed
to strokes of audacity would, when re-
sponsible for so vast an army. be awed
into prudence. And thus the firmness of
the Russian Gar and natien might be
exp eted not only to prolong the war, to give
Napoleon such check as he had received
in Spain, to compel him to adopt other
means for quelling their resistance, but
by no means to cause him any serious
disaster, much less such disaster as
might shake the whole fabric of his
power. It would carry us far into the
history of France if we should try to ex-
plain how it could have happened that
such vast destilies should depend upon
the clearness of judgment Of single
man, so that fit Of rashness and eccen-
tricity in Napoleon should change the


face of the world and doom millions to
death. It is less intricate question how


Napoleon could be capable of making


the mistake he made at Moscow. We are


to consider that the course he took might


have been completely successful. Alex


ander's frmness might have yielded after


little delay to the clamors of his brother


and tie entreaties of his mother. Moth


ing is more characteristic of Napoleon


than his vivid conception of the character


of those with whom he had to deal. We


may imagine that in his mind it was


registered as certainty that Alexander


could not be firm. No doubt anothe.


General would not have dreamed OF


stalking the existence even of an ordinary


army upon the soundness of an impression
of this kind. But Napoleon would not
have been what he was it he
had not over and over again risked every
thing to obtain result that could not be


gained by ordinary methods. Such 8
, calculation as he now acted upon had
succeeded with him many times before
7 He ought, indeed, to have known that he
was not exempt from fsilure. Hi
! Egyptian failure and his blunder in Spain
| must have cost him many moments OF
3 secret chagrin, but the world had been sc
: blind to all this ill-luck and had SO stead
> lily persisted in regarding him as invinci
1 BILE that he may we'll have come to believe
9 himself so. Meanwhile, the scale of hi
i affairs had become so gigantic that a sin
:, gle exception to his usual good fortune
:, might have infinite consequences; tn
e slightest alteration in his mind might be
Y represented by the complete transforma,
n ton of Europe; just as the infinitesima
e displacement of telescope will make
a difference of million of miles in an as
Y Economical calculation. Thus to explai
e the largest and most sudden reverse O
d fortune that the world ever saw we hav
h to put together three conditions each un
is precedented. First, the course of Frenc
e history from Louis XIV, through th
8, Revolution to Napoleon, had produce
K an intense autocracy, unparalleled in th
is history of civilized States; second, tn
= autocracy was welded by one who, by
Of very peculiar course of life, had bee
" trained to hazardous strokes of polio


and strategy, such as are altogether to


hidden to ordinary rulers; thirdly, i
pi affairs were on an unprecedented sea
II, of magnitude Life and Times Of Stei
r j. r. Seeley.