Year: 1867

The practical operation of the caucus sys-
tenn involves politicians In as much perplexi-
ty as the derivation of the word always has
the etymolgists. We habitually speak Of
caucus in disparagement, while, at the same
time, man who viii not bow to Its decree
becomes in popular estimation politically In
famous, If not morally corrupt We call this
peculiar American device sKing Caucus" In
pure derislon, and then invest it with an the
attributes of legitimate sovereignty In down.
right earnest. To be an active participant In
one of these preliminary meetings is to be
"wirepuller;"-to repudiate its action Is to be
"bolter.n Between both difficulties the
well-meaning individual finds it difficult to
discover the true way of political safety. It
would be great relief II we could have
some authoritative adjudication of
the question how far a man Is
justified in refusing to be bound by the de-
cision of a caucus which he attends.


The debate In the Senate in Sum-
ner's substitute for Anthony's restrictive res
olution does not quite meet the case. Fror
the vote taken at the conclusion OF that de-
bate it appears that majority Of the Senate
thought Mr.. Sumner, shaving gone into
onsultation"- Washingtoness for caucas-
on the subject of limiting the action of the
Senate to single question, was morally
bound to abide by the decision Of the majCri-
ty. But 1t is to be observed that Mr.. Fessen-
den, who was very active In urging this view,
of the case, based his conclusions upon the
ground that there Is an implied promise
raised by that honorable understanding,
with which every man is supposed to go into
a consultation, according to the usage
of the Senate and parties on both
sides Of the Senate" Where there Is
a well defined usage for this kind.
sufficiently notorious to be presumed to be
within the knowledge of all, the question be-
comes identical with one OF TIE plainest de-
ductions of moral science one, which Is so far
recognized by the general sense Of mankind
that it has been incorporated into every civil
lied system of jurisprudence. A man COM
nlits moral and often legal wrong, who
acts in such way that his neighbor is au-
thorlzed to suppose he will pursue certain
line Of action, according to uniform and we'll
established usage in such cases, and then dis
closes an intent to take different course, af-
ter having led his associates to take steps
having reference to his anticipated conduct.
Hence the views ofthe Maine Senator appear
to have been dictated by nicer sense Of
right than those of Mr.. Sumner, and to have
met the approval of the greater number of
his hearers.


But this only settles the question so far as the
consultations Of single body are concern
ed. Does man make this implied promise
when he goes into a nominating caucus
or a State Conventions Is thsrS any
thing in the nature of q caucus aside
from the character impressed upon it by local
or ger eral usage that gives it this tyrannical
power to commit an individual to the sup
post Of its nominees and resolutions? Here
the doctors are so fatally at variance that 1t Is
impossible to reconcile their conflicting dicta.
There seems to be, however, preponderancs
of opinion in favor of the binding force of the
determinations of the caucuses This being
the case, while they are oftener than other
wise controlled by "rings" which resemble the
"round table" only in a circulaiity that Is
purely supposititious, and not by any means In
the purity and dSinterestedness Of the parties
forming the constituent elements, one can but
hail with delight the action of the Philadel-
phia Loyal League in offering prizes for the
best essays on the subject Of legally organized
primary meetings Of the people. Meanwhile
we can only avail ourselves of the unquestion-
ed right to "bolt" when the proceedings are
clearly vitlated by fraud, or when subsequent
events Of great importance essentially change
the aspect Of the question discussed at the
caucus