Year: 1867

 the Constitution, but will certainly, if carried out, produce immediate and irreparable in- jury to the organic structure of the Govern ment, and if there be neither judicial remedy for the wrongs it inflicts nor power in the people to protect themselves without the off cial aid of their elected defender; if for n- stance, the legislative department should pass an act, even through all the forms of law, to abolish coordinate department of the Gov ernment, in such case the President must take the high responsibilities of his office and save the life of the nation at all hazards. The so-called reconstruction acts, though as plainly unconstitutional as any that can be imagined, were not believed to be within the class last mentioned The people were not wholly dis armed of the power of self defense in all the Northern States they still held in their hands the sacred right of the ballot, and it was safe to believe that in due time they would come to the rescue of their own institutions. It gives me pleasure to add that the appeal to our common constituents was not taken in vain, and that my confidence in their wisdom and virtue seems not to have been misplaced

 THE TENURE OF OFFICE LAW.

 It is well and publicly known that enor- nous frauds have been perpetrated on the treasury, and colossal fortunes have been made at the public expense. This species of corruption has increased, is increasing. and if not diminished, will soon bring us into to- tal ruin and disgrace. The public creditors and taxpayers are alike interested in an honest administration of the finances, and neither class will long endure the high landed rob- berries of the recent past. For this disrredi- table state of things there are several causes Some Of the taxes are so laid as to present an irresistible temptation tO eyade payment. The great sums which officers may win by conniyalce at fraud, create pressure which is more than the virtue of many can with stand, and there can be no doubt that the open disregard of constitutional obligations arowed by some of the highest and most in- iiuental men in the country has greatly weakened the moral sense of those who serve in subordinate places. The expenses of the United States, including interest on the pub lic debt, arc more than six times as much as they were seven years ago. To collect and disburse this vast amount requires careful supervision as well as systematic vigilance. This system, never perfected. was much dis organized by the Tenure of Office Bill, which hds almost entirely destroyed official account ability. The President may be thoroughly convinced that an officer may be incapable, dishonest, or unfaithful to the Constitution.

 but under the law which have named the utmost he can do is to complain to the Sen ate and ask the privilege of supplying his

 place with better man. If the Senate be regarded as personally or politically hostile

 to the President it IS natural and not alto getber unreasonable for the officer to expect

 that ii will take his par1 as far as possible,

 restore him to his place, and give him triumph

 over bis Executive superior. The officer has

 other chances of iinpunity arising from acci-

 dental defeat Of evidence, the mode of inves- tigating it, and the secrecy of the hearing

 IL is not wonderful tEa; official maifeasance should become bold in proportion as the de- linqueHts learn t5 think themselves safe. I am entirely persuaded that under such rule the President cannot perform the great duty assigned to him of seeing the laws faithfully executed, and that # disabcs him most espe- cially from enforcing that rigid accountability which Is necessary tO the due execution of the revenue laws. The Constitution invests the President with authority 10 decide whether a removal should be made in any z vep case; the act of Congress declares in

 Nssstapec that he shall only accuse such as

 a enapoee@ ts be unworthy of their trust

 fils ttsassiitlti0n makes him sole judge f the pKenliseS hst the stssssts takes away his iu- risdictan- traa4.css ]; i5 the Senate, and leaves him nothing bun tle Ndious and some times impracticabie dl.y oi becoming a pros ecutcr; the prosecution to be conducted be- fore a tribunal whose members are not like him, responsible to the whole people. but 10 separate constituent bodies. and who may hear bis accusation with great disiavor The Senate Is absolutely without any known standard of decision applicable te ssi.i, ease. Its judgment cannot be anticipated. for it is not governed by any Fgie. The law does not define what shall be deemed good cause for removal; j. is impossible even to coniectvre what may or may not be so considered bv the Senate. Tine nature of the subject forbids clear proofs. If the charge be incapacity

 what evidence shall support it Fidelity to the Constitution may be understood or Ins. understood in q thousand different ways. and by violent party men in violent party times, uHfaithinlneSs to the Consultation may even come 10 be considered :neritorious. If the officer be accused of dishonesty, how shall it be made out Will it be inferred froE. as is unconnecied with public duty, from private history, or from general reputation or must the President await the commission of an actual misdemeanor in office Shall he in the meantime risk the character. aud interest of the nation in the hands of men to whom be cannot give his confidence Must he for bear the complaint until the mischief is done and cannot be prevented If his zeal in the public service should compel him to antici- pate the overt act, must he move at the point of being tried himself for the offense of slan- dering his subordinate In the present cir cumstances of the country some one must be held responsible for official delinoueucv of