Year: 1878

ASS PSSe1oiC hiGu W cOlue near nlul. In
these circumstances he, as an absolute SOW
ereign, no doubt thought it wise policy
to sacrifice 100, 900 French lives in order
to secure the prestige and respect which
he expected would accrue, and which un-
doubtedly did accrue to him from an al
lance with this country. That regime has
however, collapsed, as everybody knew
that 1t would sooner or later, and in the
present political situation of France it
seems to me that there is little prospect of
her joining US in policy of war. From
France | pass to Italy. There, no doubt
the circumstances are extremely different,
but the result is, I am afraid, the same.
Sardinia, in 1854, Joined the allies in a
most gallant and spirited manner. Sar-
DINA in 1854 was just in that position in
which an adventurous policy was popular.
She wanted great deal; but she is now
absorbed in Italy. Italy is complete and
in content; her finances have been restored;
and l am sure neither my noble friend at
the head of the Foreign Office nor any
one else entertains much hope of common
military action with us in the case of Italy.
There remains, no doubt, one great Power,
and that is Austria. fully admit that
if you are to seek with chance of success
for an ally anywhere on the Continent,
Vienna is the quarter to which you must
look. But it is, think, fairly open to
doubt whether it would be safe for us to RELY
much on Austrian cooperation. THear,
hear 1 am only stating that which
every one knows when 1 say that there are
very close and intimate ties between the
three Emperors. In the next place stu
ated as Austria is, she would hesitate be-
fore embarking on anything which might
be regarded as a rash policy, and would
hardly come to rupture with Russia un-
less she were previously assured Of the
support, or at least the neutrality, of Ger
many. Her population, too, is divided
into great many races, and, in fact, Aus
tria is a country which single unsuccess-
ful campaign might not impossibly break
up. Then you have to look to the inter
nal divisions of the Empire. No doubt,
the Magyars have strong sympathies with
Turkey, but a directly opposite view is
taken by the Slavs. Then you have the
Austro-Germans, who want only peace.
With two independent nations pulling DIFF
ferent ways, with an army which could
not be trusted to fight against the Slavs,
with finances in such a state that | un
derstand she had considerable difficulty in
raising the FIVE or six millions required
for the first mobilization of her troops;
with all these elements of weakness. Aus
tria, it seems to me, is a country on whose
efficient aid we cannot fairly count. Then.
my lords, admitting, as undoubtedly do,
that the Austrian Government are sincere
IN their professions; assuming, If you
please, that she is strong as a military
power, the wide divergence between Aus
trian interests and those which we consid
er ours are such that, even if she we're to
enter into alliance with us, a compromise
might at any time be effected between her



and Russia by which we would lose that
alliance. You cannot be sure that if Aus
tria comes into the field as an ally we may
not have to 90 out Of the field without
her."


WHAT Is ENGLAND TO FIGHT FOR ?


"Such is the state of things; and in the
circumstances l am compelled to ask, if
we are rushing into war, what it is we are
going to fight for? [Hear, hear. What
is to be the result of the war, assum-
ing it to be successful? | know at
least what it viii not do. One class in
this country, and it is rather a numerous
class, will be sure to be equally disappointed
whatever happens. Those who profess
admiration for Turkey, those who lament
the fall of the Turkish Empire, are out of
court You might have kept that Empire
alive for time, but you cannot now re-
store it. My noble friend the Secretary
for Foreign Affairs would be the last per-
son to wish to do so. England would
not allow it, and all Europe would be
against it. If, then, you cannot restore
the Turkish Empire, what are you to do?
Are you to 60 to war to cut off something
from the pecuniary indemnity which Tur-
key has to pay to Russia, or to make va
rious notifications in the details of the
Treaty of San Stefano? Those are the
results which may be fairly attained BY
means of diplomatic negotiations, but the
objects, it seems to me, are not of such
transcendent magnitude to justify the
Government in calling out at the present
moment our military reserves. We know,
however, that there is a good deal more
behind than any notifications of the
treaty. Consult the public, ask the first
man you meet, and he will tell you nine
times out Of ten, "0h we have lost infu.
ence in Europe, aud we must fight to
regain it" If it is any satisfaction to us
to know it, from one end of Europe to the
other Englaud's movements are watched
with intense anxiety. That is a satisfac-
tion which we may enjoy at the present,
whatever anybody may think of the trans
actions of the last two years. Whether
they think we have done too much,
or too little, or not done all we ought.
there is one thing certain-that, during
these two years, England has not in any
question been regarded or treated as a
feeble power. l own that individually
this is not satisfaction care very much
for but, such as tits, you have it. Iwould
say more than that; if it were true in any
respect that English influence in the East
were diminished, l should say it was d.