Year: 1877

It accounts for the Russian failure in
Asia Minor in some degree to find that it is
the result of o surprise-though, of course,


this does not justify the Russian COM
mander; for, as an attempt to surprise is
always to be apprehended and is always to
be provided against, defeat of that sort
convicts the officer of want of ordinary
vigilance, and is therefore rather more
disgraceful than defeat OF any other
sort. Perhaps, however, if an officer
in command of an important ex-
pedition is ever excusable in case in
which he has been surprised, it is when,
as in the present case, the hostile column
falls upon his rear from the frontier OF q
neutral Power upon which he rested with
unquestioning confidence. But the Turk
ish column that moved from Lake Van to
fall on the rear of o Russian force
at Bajazid had need only to violate
the Persian neutrality to secure
strip of unobserved country as cur
tain to its movements. Fer Russian
officer to assume that Turkish commander
would in such a case respect the Persian
territory was to entirely overlook the char
acter of his adversary. If the Ottoman
even knew that he had passed the frontier
he was indifferent to any circumstance OF
that nature as compared with his anxiety to
overcome the enemy. He is practically
justified, moreover; for his success, COM
paratively trivial if it had been
an isolated event. has SO far de-
ranged and thrown out the whole
Russian scheme for the conquest OF Ar
menia that it is equivalent to the gaining OF
a great battle, while if the Sultan is ever
compelled to make reparation to the Shah
his damage will be small by comparison
with what he has gained by this offence.
Evidently Bajazid can be retaken and the
plan for the conquest of Armenia be
once more put in progress but an
important period of time has been lost, the
confidence of the Turks in themselves has
been raised, and an expedition is perma-
nently imperilled that, previous to this
miscarriage, needed only reasonable care to
insure it's absolute success. In the opera
tions on the Danube the Russian concentra-
ton on the southern side of the river
is continued, and it is still doubtful
whether the Turks will venture battle
north of the mountains or will endeavor to
take their enemy at disadvantage on the
southern slope, where they may hope to find
him exhausted by his efforts and at the
wrong end Of very difficult line of commu-
nications. But the Russians are scarcely
inferior to the Turks themselves in the char
acteristic of moving toward desired object
with O kind of calm stolidity that, if it
has no enthusiasm in it, has at least
no impatience. They will not throw
away any chance of success by an
over hasty attempt to grasp what
is before them; and if the Turks believe
they will catch the Russians south of the
Balkans before they have established and
fortified an enormous depot of supplies
within reach Of that advance they mis-
calculate the case before them. Bjela is re-
ported to have been occupied by the Rus
SLAMS. At present the operations on the
Danube go forward slowly because of the
very necessity the Russians are under OF
accommodating supplies on the southern
bank-a necessity that will retard their
operations for some time.