Year: 1866

THE DEBATE IN THE HOUSE OF CoMMoNs.


From the London Times, March o.


If the speech of the Acknowledgement in the
debate OF FRIDAY last was not conclusive, it was
only because the argument admitted OF no abso-
lutte conclusion. We are asked by Mr.. Gregory
and his friends to surrender what has been
hitherto considered most powerful instrument
of war in British hands, The only reason for
now stand we should be gamers rather
than losers by the TRANSACTION. 1t is
somewhat obvious to remark that if such
were really the case, the losers-that is
to say, other countres-woud not be eager TO
assent TO the proposal; but the fact is, that no
body can possibly say what, under the present
condition OF navigation and commerce. would be
the course or incidents OF great naval war. All
we can 40 is to examine the question as care
fully as possible, and weigh without prejudice
the considerations which are presented to us in
favor of the proposed revolution. This the At
torney-General did, and with a result which, in
our opinion, established their lightness in the
balance.


The real question to be considered in the inte-
rests OF the State is the probable balance between
our loss and our gain in the event contemplated
by the advocates of change. If we agree and
undertake in all future wars to abstain from in.
teTrupting or destroying the commerce of our
enemy. it must also be agreed and undertaken
on the part OF other powers to abstain from in
terrupting or destroying the commerce of this
country and the assumption is that as ours l. the
greatest commerce in the world, we must need
be gamers by such a bargain. That assump-
uon it is impossible either absolutely to sustain
or absolutely 10 retute, and Sir Roundell Palmer
said all that could be said when be distinguished
class interests from public interests in the ques-
ftion, and showed what peculiar and incalCula-
BILE element of national strength we were re-
quested to surrender. 1t is true that we have
the greatest commerce III the world but it is
also true that we have the most powerful
navy in the world. We could unques ionably
sweep the merchantmen of any enemy
from the, seas. II is not so sure, on the
other hand, that any enemy could do as much tor
us. TOO much has been made out OF the exam
pie OF the Atdbdnd and her cOnsorts. Those
vessels could never have done what they did
but for The complete diversion to other purposes
OF the cruisers which should have pursued them.
Ihe naval strength OF the United States was
concentrated upon an enormous blockade,
which for some time absorbed, either directly or
indirectly, almost every vessel of their marine.
Besides this the Federas commenced operations
with very weak and inconsiderable fleet, a
position in which we are not likely 10 be found.
We maintain in constant efficiency such a naval
force as would give us at any moment the adyan-
tage OF immediate superiority at sea.


That advantage, which is our chief and pecu-
liar advantage, we should, to a great extent
foergo by asserting to the proposed surrender
while we should obtain in return only pro-
lection from certain partial injuries which we
have known how to sustain before, and which,
in some degree at any rate, we could avert by
our own power without any such sacrifice. Our
losses, in short, by the proposed transaction





should 90 to war with one arm crippled. Our
gains would be Uncertain and partial, for we
should merely see particular interests exempted
from disturbances, and that at the cost of leaV-
ing particular classes without any motive for
desiring peace or avoiding war.


The Attorney y-General appealed to the example
of the late war in America, and it would indeed
be difficult to find lesson more abounding with
direct and pertinent instruction. II would be
no eXaggeration to say that the United States
Government brought that war TO a successful
conclusion by discardng all the considerations
which we are now pressed to Observe and strain
ing to the very utmost all the rights which we
are now urged to surrender. The very first ope-
ratlons Of the Federas were directed against
the private property and commerce Of the
insurgent States. Before all things they in
terposed to prevent the cotton planters of the
South from selling their property to the manu-
tactuTers of Lancashire. In doing so they did
exactly what we might do by maintaining the
present rights of war-that is, they exposed their
own commerce to attacks. In point OF fact, it
was for the moment absolutely destroyed, but to
thls IN comparison with the ehectual prosecu-
lion OF the war, they paid no heed whatever
IDeY deliberately let their commerce 90, satisfied
II they could only ruin the trade of their
enemy. And that this was the most important
point OF the war both bellgeIents well knew
The one idea which haunted the North was
the dread OF 'interVention"-ln other words
OF such an interference as would release the
private property Of the enemy, and allow it to