Year: 1867

it, especially in times eff high party excite ment, would be likely to produce violent CO.,. lission between the respective adhercnts of the two branches of the GoAsrnment. This would be simply civil war, and civil war must be resorted to only as Q last remedy for the worst of evils.

 Whatever might tend to provoke it should be most carefully avoided A faithful and conscientious magistrate will concede very much to honest error. and something even to perverse malice. before he will endanger the public peace and he will not adopt forcible measures; or such as might lead to force, ss long as the chances which are peaceable remain open to him, or to his constituents It is true that cases may occur in which the executive would be compelled to stand on it's rights and maintain them regardlss of conse- quences.

 wHEN THE EXECUTIVE MAT RESIST AN ACT os

 CONGRESS.

 If Congress should pass an act which is not only in palpsble conflict with the Con- situation but will certainly, if carried out, produce immediate and irreparable injury to the organic structure of the Govern mcnf, and if there be neither judicial remedy for the wrongs it inficts, no power in tqe people l to pratect themselves without the official aid to their elected defenders; if, for instance, the legislative department should pass an act. even through all the forms of law, to abolish coordinate department in such 8 case the President must take the high re- responsibilities of his office and save the life of the nation at all hazards.

 The so-called reconstruction acts, though as plainly unconstitutional as any that can be imagined, were not believed to be within the class last mentioned. The people were not wholly disarmed of the power of self-de. fense, In all the Northern States they still hold in their hands the sacred right of the ballot, and it was safe to believe that in due time they would come to the rescue of their own institutions. It gives me pleasure to add that the appeal to our common constitu- ents was not taken in vain, and that my con 1 fdence ;n their wisdom and virtue seems not to have been misplaced.

 It is we'll and publicly known that cnor nous frauds have been perpetrated on the treasury, and that colossal fortunes have been made at public expense. This species of corruption has increased and is increasing l and if not diminished will soon bring us into | total ruin and disgrace

 The public creditors and tax payers are alike interested in an honest administration of the finances, and neither class will long endure the high handed robberies recently exposed. For this discreditable state or iulitSS tucIC dTc scNtIhi CuuseSs SOuic VI tAt | taxes are so laid as to present an irresistible temptation to evade payment. The grea, sums officers are rendered for connivance at fraud create a pressure which is more than the virtue of many can withstand, and there can be no doubt that open disregard of con stitutional obligations avowed by some of the 1 highest and most influential men in the coun- try has greatly weakened the moral sense of those who serve in subordinate places The expenses of the United States, includ. ing the interest on the public debt, are more than six times as much as they were seven years ago. To collect and dsburse this vast amount, requires careful supervision, ss well as systematic vigilance. The system has never been perfected and was much disor- ganzed by the tenure of office bill, which has almost destroyed official accountability. The President may be thoroughly convinced that an officer is incapable, dishonest, or unfaith- full to the Constitution, but under the law which have named, his utmost endcavors to complain to the Senate and ask the privilege of supplying his place with better man (if the Senate be regarded personally hostile to the Presdent), it is na.ural and not alto- gether unreasonable for the officer to expect that it will take his part as far as possible to restore him to his place and give him tri- umph over his executive superior officer; and he has other chances of impunity arising from accidental defects of evidence made in investigating it and secrecy of hearing it, and it is not wonderful that official malfeas- ance should become bold in proportion as de- linquents learn to think themselves safe. am entirely persuaded that under such a rule she President cannot perform the great duty assigned to him of seeing the laws faithfully executed, and thst it disables him most espe- cially from enforcing that rigid accountabili- rrht tnh So tof fho A,.A z revenue laws.

 Tho Constitution invests the President with authority to decide whether removal shall be made in any given case. The act of Con gress declares in substance that he shall only accuse snch as he supposes unworthy of their confidence. The Constitution makes him sole judge in the premises, but the statute takes away his jurisdiction and transfers it to tho Senate, and leaves him nothing but the odi~ ous and sometimes imprscticable duty of be- coming prosecutor.

 The prosecution is to be conducted before tribunal whose members are not like him responsible to the whole people, but to separate constituent bodies, and who may hear his accusation with great disfavor. The senate is absolutely without any known standard of decision aplicable to such case. Its judgment cannot be anticipated, for it is not governed by any rule. The law does not define what shall be deemed good cause for removal. It is impossible even to conjecture what may or may not be SO considered by tho Senate. The nature of subject forbids clear proof; if the charge be incapacity, what evil dence will support it ? Fidelity to tho Con stitution may be understood or misunderstood in thousand different ways, and by violent party men in violent party times, unfaithful- ness to the Constitution may even come to bc considered meritorious. If an officer be &C., cused of dishonesty, how shall it be made out Will it be inferred from acts unconnected with public duty, from private history or from general reputation, or must the Presi- dent await the commission of an actual mis- demeanor in office, and shall he in the mean time risk character and the interest of the nation in the hands of men to whom he can not give his confidence, and must he forbear his complaint until the mischief is done and cannot be prevented If his zeal in the pub lie service should impel him to anticipate an overt act, must he move at the peril of being tried himself for the osfense of slsndering his subordinstes In the present. circumstances of the country some one must be held re- sponsible for oficial delinquency of every kind. It is extremely difficult to say where responsibility should be thrown if it be not left where it has been placed by the Constitu- ton. But all just men will admit that the President ought to be entirely relieved from such responsibility if he cannot meet it by reason of restrictions placed by law upon his actions Unrestricted power ofremoval from office is a very great one to be trusted even to magistrate chosen by general suffrage of the whole people, aud accountable directly to them for his acts. It is undoubtedly liable to abuse, and at somo periods of our history has been abused. fit be thought desirable and constitutional that it should be so limited Az to make the President merely a common in- former agaiiast other paoiic agents he should at least be permitted to act in that capacity hefnre soma Nnan IriLunnl iudnrcr ia.,4 eta