Year: 1878

Germany came into it with some relue.
tanee; the French Government did no,
disguise their aversion from it, giving the
somewhat characteristic reason that thev
would appear there in different position
from that which they held in 1856. Now


my observation is that Conference OF
Congress is a very convenient agency for
putting on record, iG the most formal man.
ner, international decisions which have
already been come to in substance; and in
these days, when we can ask question
and get an answer from the furthest end
of Europe within twenty -four hours, it is
just as easy to ascertain opinion, and al
most as easy to conduct negotiations, out.
side Congress as within IF 1 had to
deal with the matter should endeavor to
keep the Congress alive, saying and doing
nothing to prevent its ultimate meeting
but letting it stand over until the way was
smoothed By private and separate negotia-
tions between the Powers concerned.


ENGLAND PUT IN AN AWKWARD POSITION


Now, my lords, looking at the question
from that point of view, l regret the steps
which the Government have taken. They
put forward series of objections to the
Treaty Of San Stefano, objections of most
comprehensive character, and they CON-
municate these objections not only to other
European Governments, which is perfectly
reasonable, but to tho people of this coun-
try and the entire public of Europe. Now,
my lords, when in addition to that we pro-
coed to arm in such manner as to indi.
cate an expectation of war, the general
impression must be that the English Gov
ernment demands that the Treaty of San
Stefauo should be torn up, and is prepar-
ing to support that demand by force
Hear, hear. This is said to be spir-
tied and decided policy. So it is. But
what is the next step to be taken? There
are only three possible issues; and of these
three, one, am afraid, is hardly within
the range of possibility. 1t is possible
that our demands may be aceeded to,
That would be signal diplomatic triumph


on which / should be the first to congrat-
ulate my noble friend; but that Russia
should give up most of the results of the
war, and that she should undergo what the
public opinion of Europe would pronounce
to be diplomatic humiliation, is a result
which l can hardly conceive can be hoped
for. The second possibility is that we, on
our side, may withdraw or greatly modify
the objections we have taken. But in that
case the diplomatic failure would be ON our
side. 1t would be we'll enough in private
communication between two Powers, or in
a private bargain between individuals, to
ask in the first instance a great deal more
than you meant to get; but after decla-
ration of that kind is made public, and
after you are prepared apparently to sup
port it, to drop it or to recede from the
position you have taken up creates a situa-
tion Of an almost ridiculous character. As
to the circular of my noble friend at the
head of the Foreign Office, if it had been
addressed, as 1 have no doubt it was orig
inally intended to be addressed, to the
British representatives at the Conference
as summary of what the British Govern
ment desired to see accomplished, should
have no criticism to make upon it. But


| am afraid that when the Governmet put
forth its programme to all Europe as that
which they intended to follow, and when
they accompanied that announcement with
military measures, the effect of which will
be enormously exaggerated abroad, they


are making concessions on the part of
Russia much more difficult than before


go SO far as to say that if Russia were
willing to take back her treaty, although
do not contend that operation would not
be beneficial to Europe, it would at least
be strong proof that she is not so aggres-
sive and dangerous a Power as we have
been in the habit of thinking. On the
other hand, Russia, as believe, is not
willing to cancel the treaty; but if, as l
also suppose, she is prepared, in Difference
to European opinion, to consent to lib
eral modification of what she has proposed,
then l think the difficulty has been in
creased in two ways-6rst, by the publi-
cation of these negotiations, and next by
the appearance Of menace which that pub
lication involves We all know how diff
cult it is in private life, when anything
like threat has been used, to yield that
which ifsuch pressure had not been brought
to bear would have been readily yielded.


l may be asked, however, what in the
circumstances would you CO if you we're
consulted? My answer is that l would
not have pressed matters on in such haste.


There is just now great irritation against
us in Russia, and do not think am wrong
in saying that in this country very strong
feeling of irritation against the Russian
Government exists. am speaking of
public opinion in both countries, and not
of their Governments. / do not believe
that there is any very strong ground for
irritation on either side. Hear, hear.
By giving an opportunity for that feeling
to subside, it appears to me that no harm
could be done, while some good might be
effected l should have placed our views
directly before the Russian Government
and discussed them point by point. The
opinions of other Governments would not
have been difficult to obtain; on many
points we have got them already, and l
think that many of the results of Con-
gress might be attained without the rather
cumbrous machinery of Congress itself


No doubt l may be told that while We we're
doing all this we should be losing time.