Year: 1879



 without any of the won ted solaces of solid cash. This, 1t seem to us, would be progress backward. The end to which the perfected reign of enlightened law continuously aims Is to make con tracts more sacred and binding, rather than to weaken their sanction. The dis ciples of the new dispensation n demand that betrothal and matrimonial bonds shall be regarded as mere civil con tracts. to be undone as they are done by the parties themselves. But granting this radical demand, we should still have valid ground for objecting to the repeal of these laws, inasmuch as 1t would manifestly give to one party alone the power to break the compact without consent of the other. 1t requires no great stretch of imagination to see that thIs would be placing the lambs in the | jaws of the wolves; would be of the nature of an abdication blythe state of | its prerogativo as arbiter of justice be- tween man and man, and by so much a return toward barbar1sm and the domi- nation of strongest arm and most crafty l wit.

 One of the arguments which Is used in favor of this repeal Is that the law IS powerless to beget love or to preserve It, and that 1t is, therefore, iniquitous l promise in which the existence of love Is implied. But this Is based on an en- | tire misconception of the purpose of the | law. The law has never made any at ] tempt to create or foster sentimental affection. Its more modest ambition

 has been directed to the punishment of a substantial and obvious wrong, which l Is none the less tangible and real be-

 cause 1t is complicated by the assOcia-

 ton of tender feeling. It may be true ] that man who Is anxious to draw back 1 from his engagement Is not likely to be

 a desirable husband, but that Is no

 reason why he should escape the conse- l quences of his conduct By the breach

 of his promise he inficts, in many cases, ! the gravest injury upon woman's | future; and, although 1t may be i'm

 possible to measure that injury by

 money, 1t Is still within the power of a 1 jury to afford a measure of his disgrace. ] Nor are damages which a jury may ! award any more remote than in other actions in which character and reputa- ton are concerned. There are cases in

 which an action for breach of promise | of marriage may be the only means available to woman to Yindicate her fame. So long as no penalty attaches | to his withdrawal from solemn engage

 ment, man Is at liberty to insinuate 1 his own explanation of the circumstance, | and this may often act as a sort of l grievous injustice to the unfortunate 1 creature whom he has wrOnged. With i out going so far as to bring himself

 within the law of slander, 1t Is easy for ! him in such cases to create a strong ! prejudice in his favor; and 1t Is most 1 wholesome, to our thinking, that such l temptation should be subject to the cheek which an action for breach of

 promise affords. If that action Is to be abolished, every sentimental young i scamp will be encouraged to indulge | himself in an engagement without any i thought of carrying 1t to a serious con 1 clusion, and every scoundrel, under the ] guise of sentimentalism, will be free to employ a promise of marriage as an ] easy means of securing his own ends.

 As a further reason why these laws l should be discontinued, It Is alleged 1 that they are resorted to by a common

 class of people, and that they are rarely | called into use by persons In the higher | and more cultivated circles of society ! There may be some truth in this; but its | truth IS rather an argument for the maintenance of the law as it stands. | The action is used by those who most need its use, and to whom the pecuniary | compensation which 1t offers Is most ap- propriate. Long engagements are often a necessity with young men and women who have yet to win the means that will enable them to marry, and 1t Is in the breach of these engagements that the cruelest injury is inflicted. To the woman who is abandoned after years of waiting, such a withdrawal from the contract means often the complete ruin of her future prospects, even where It does not, as Is often the case, imply the4 ruin of her character.

 It is urged against this law, that 1t cannot be justly administered under our present system of jury trials. '.It Is almost impossible say the advocates | of repeal, '' that a man should obtain justice in an action for breach of promise. The facts cannot be brought faifIy before jury. If he attempts to | suggest that the woman IS anything but an angel in temper, a very embodiment | of all the female virtues, so that there would be some reason to justify man in not marrying her, the mere sugges tion is enough to bring down upon him a whole torrent of invective from judge, counsel and jury" This is indeed pitiable state of things. That lament of mans inhumanity to -nan, in which Burns indulged, obviously y needs correction. HeDcefOrth 1t Is woman's inhumanity to man that must be reckoned as the crying evil of the world. But, seriously, this IS q reason, not for abolishing the law, but for modifying the conditions of it's administration. How far the institution of trial by jury may have failed in regard to this par ticular action, we are not prepared to say. Doubtless jurymen occasionally make astounding blunders, both of reason and sentiment, but this is not, to our thinking, a sufficient cause for abandoning our laws in despair. If the errors of juries are to be made the test of the soundness of our legislation, there will be scarcely any branch of law that can be retained.-N. '. Home