Year: 1874

are divided. One class maintain that
the drinking of alcohol, in its many
combinations, as a beverage, is not
morally wrong. This class can be
for license logically. 1t will be hard
to show that it is wrong to sell what
it is right to use, and it is, perhaps,
within the just scope of government
to regulate legitimate trade. But is
it good policy? If the sale of whis-
ky, in every way, is fair trade, why
give monopolies in that trade, more
than in any other? Because the use
of whisky can be abused? So can
the use of opium, and the use of to-
bacco. We should have, then, Ii
censed places where these things,
and any others liable to abuse, can
be bought. 1t will be admitted,
perhaps, that the best thinkers on
such subjects are more and more
tending toward the position, that all
legitimate trade should be left to
regulate itself.


The other class says: ''The drink
ing of alcohol, in any form, as bev-
erage, is wrong, but is an evil which
from its nature cannot be eradicated.
Prohibitory law cannot be enforced.
Since, then, the evil must exist, it is
better to regulate it in such way as
to lessen its extent, and this. can be
done by judicious License Law"


The position goes to this extent: Any
evil that cannot be eradicated by law,
and that can be regulated and there
by lessened, should not be prohib-
tied, but should be regulated. It is
necessary, then, to say, that all evils
that cannot be rooted out can be
regulated, or that drunkenness is a
peculiar evil, in that it can be lessened
by regulation, but cannot be prohib-
tied If the former is true, then this
license remedy should not be SO re-
stricted. Men, since the time of
Noah, at least, have drank to excess.
It is argued that it is fair to presume
they always will. Since we cannot
prevent, let us modify. Men, since
the time of Cain, have been breakers
of the peace. 1t is fair to presume
that assaults will always OCCUR
Therefore, by analogy, let US make
laws permitting personal violence,
under the rules of the code of honor,
or those of the prize ring, and thus
regulate out of existence these street
brawls, these sudden affrays.


':But, says the license advocate,
''the evil Of drunkenness is peculiar.
There is no analogy between the
case you put and the liquor trade
The law against breaking the peace
is enforced in the main. Experience
teaches that the prohibitory laws
can be enforced only in exceptional
cases" If experience teaches that
prohibition is a failure, what is it
that proves that license would be a
success?


The difficulty, it is said, grows out
of the nature of the thing. Men
will not willingly help bring others
to punishment for what their own
moral sense does not condemn. If
their moral sense does not condemn
drinking at any place, to be drank
where sold, (Which is now illegally
will it condemn drinking at the un-
licensed bar? If they refuse to con-
vict by their testimony men who sell
in violation Of the existing law, what
is it that will induce them to convict
by their testimony of a violation of
the license law, and thus subject the
illegal vender to heavier penalty, in
the latter case, than in the former? {?
And is there any less temptation to
the vender to sell Illegally in the one
case than in the other? When it is
seen that men can pay heavy license
fees, and still make money, will there
be no inducement to the illicit sale?


We are told, however, that every
licensed vender will, by force of self
interest, become a detective, to hunt
down the unlicensed vender. Whisky
can be sold now, without violation of
law, and much gain would accrue
thereby, if the illegal selling could be
put down. Why does not this self
interest induce those who are selling
legally to become spies and inform
ers noao?


Granted that there is a great diff
ference between such a wrong as
breaking the peace and dram drink
ing. We are arguing from the stand
point that both are morally wrong.
Then the difference is in degree and
not in kind. But for arguments
sake admit that there is a moral diff
ference;-that, by reason of the ven-
ial nature of the offense, the law is
enforced only now and then. There
is law against swearing. From the
venial nature of the offense, and the
state of public morality, it is en-
forced only in exceptional cases.
Should we, for that reason, repeal
the law against swearing, and try to
regulate it? So with the Sunday
laws, and many others.


1t may be that when public senti-
ment does not sustain a law, and
thereby its enforcement is made diff