Year: 1875




which Is right and honest and0 good
report. The question OF according Oh
OF withdrawing the rights of belliQer-
ency must be judged in every case in
view Of the particular attending facts.
Unless justified by necessity it is al
ways and justly regarded as an un-
friendly act, and a gratuitous demon
stration OF moral support to the rebel
lion. 1t is necessary, and it is required,
when the interests and rights'of an
other government, and of it's people,
are so far affected by pending civil
conflict as to require q definition of its
relation to the parties thereto. But
this conflict must be one which will be
I'm the sense of international
law as belligerence. The mere exist
ence of contending armed bodies, and
their occasional conflicts, do
not constitute war in the sense
referred to. Applying to the existing
condition of affairs in Cuba the tests
recognized by publicists and writer's on
international law, and which have been
observed by nations of dignity, honesty
and power, when free from sensitive,
selfish, or unworthy motives, fail to
find in the inSurrection the existence of
such a substantial political organiza-
tiOn, real, palpable and manifest to the
world, having the forms and capable of
the ordinary functions of government
toward it's own people and to other
States, with the courts for the admin
iStratiOn of justice, with a local habita-
ton, possessing such organization of
force, such material, such occupation
of territory as to take the contest out
of the category of a mere rebelliouS in
or occasional skirmishes,
and place it on the tolerable footing of
war, to which a recognition of bellig-
erency would aim to elevate it. The
contest, moreover, is solely on land.
The insurrectiOn has not possessed
itself Of a single seaport whence it may
send forth it's flag, nor has it any means
of communication with foreign powers,
except through the military lines of its
adversarieS. No apprehension of any
of those sudden and difficult cOmplica-
tOnS which a war upon the ocean is
apt to precipitate upon the vessels,
both commercial and national, and up
on the consular officers of other pow
ers, calls for the definition of their re-
lations to the parties to the contest.
Considered as question OF expediency,
regard the accordance of belligerent
rights still to be as unwise and prema-
ture as regard it to be at present in
defensible as measure of right. Such
recognition entails upon the country
according to the rights which flow from
it, difficult and complicated duties, and
requires the action from the, contend
ing parties of the strict observance of
their rights and obligations. 1t con-
fers the right of search upon the high
seas by vessels of both parties. 1t
would subject the carrying of arms and
of war, which now may be
transported freely and without inter-
ruption in the vessels of the United
States, to detention and possible seiz-
ure. 1t would give rise to countless
veXatious questions; would release the
parent government from responsibility
for acts done by the insurgents, and
would invest Spain with the right to
exercise the supervision recognized by
our treaty of 1895, over our commerce
on the high seas, a very large part of
which, in it's traffic between the Allan
tic and Gulf States, and between all of
them and the States upon the Pacific,
passes through the waters which wash
the shores of Cuba. The exercise of
this supervision could scarce fail to
lead, If not to abuses, certainly to col
lisions, perilOus to the peaceful rela-
tions OF the two States. There can be
little doubt to what result such super
vision would, before long, draw this





United States to inaugurate the possi-
bility of such result by measures of
questionable right or expediency, or by
any indirectiOn.


Apart from any question of theoreti-
cal right, l am satisfied that while the
accordance of belligerent rights to the
In Cuba might give them a
hope and inducement to protract the
struggle, it would be but a delusive
hope, and would not remove the evils
which this government and its people
are experiencing, but would draw the
United States into complications which
it has waited long and already suffered
much to avoid. The recognition of in
or belligerenoy being thus,
in my judgment, equally tnadmtssable,
it remains to consider what course shall
be adopted, should the conflict not soon
be brought to an end by the acts of the
parties themselves, and should the evils
which result therefrom, affecting all
nations, and particularly the United
States, continue. In such event, / am
of the opinion that other nations will
be compelled to assume the RESPONSE
bility which devolves upon them, and to
seriously consider the only remaining
measures pOssible-mediation and in
terventton. 8.a8 a.-,


Owing, perhaps, to the large expanse
of water separating the island from the
the want of harmony, and of
personal sympathy between the inhab-
itants of the colony and those sent
thither to rule them, and want of adap-
tation of the anatent colonial system of
Europe to the present times, and to the
ideas which the events of the past CEN
tury have developed, the contending
parties appear to have within them
selves no depository of common conf
dence, to suggest wisdom when passion
and excitement have their sway, and to
assume the part of peacemaker. In
this view, in the early days of the con-
test, the good Offices of the United
States as mediator We're rendered, in
good faith, without any selfish purpose,
in the interest OF humanity, and in sin
cere friendship for both parties, but
were at the time declined by Spain,
with the declaration, nevertheless, that
at a future time they would be indis-
pensable. No intimation has been re-
ceived that in the opinion Of Spain that
time has been reached; and yet the
strife continues, with its dread horrors
and all it's injuries to the interests of the
United States and of other nations.
Each party seems quite capable of
working great injury and damage to the
other, as well as to all the relations and
interests dependent upon the existence
of peace In the island; but they seem
incapable of reaching any adjustment,
and both have, thus far, failed of achiev-
ing a success whereby one party shall
possess and control the island to the
exclusion of the other. Under these
the agency of others,
either by mediation or Intervention,
seems to be the only alternative which
must, sooner or later, be invoked for the
of the strife At the same
time, while thus Impressed, do not
the adoption of any meas
ure of Intervention. I shall be ready at
all times, and as an equal friend of both
parties, to respond to a suggestion that
the good Offices of the United States
will be acceptable to aid in bringing
about peace honorable to both. It is
due to Spain, SO far as this government
is concerned, that the agency of the
third power to which / have adyerted
shall be adopted only as a last expe-
dent. Had it been the desire of the
United States to interfere in the affairs
of Cuba, repeated opportunities for so
doing have been presented within the
last few years; but we have remained
passive and performed our whole duty,
and all international obligations to
Spain, with friendship, fairness, and fl