Year: 1866

ment of cur troops his lines had been ex-
tended ina large eireuit 10 the left, thus
fanking ours on the only road of retreat.
1t now became plain that General Grant had
outgeneraled General Pemberton, and hay
ing. largely superior numbers probably
thought to capture or annihilate our whole
army. At this moment the attack began
seemingly to recover possession of the roads.
and sharp and fierce did the fight continue.


Brigade after brigade was hurled precip-
itately upon the large forces of the enemy
beating them back only to be beaten back
themselves by overwhelming numbers. No
troops ever fought more gallantly than the
Confederates on that ill-fated day. Alas,
for the fate of such brave men. Although
successful ia recovering. the road and driv!--
ing the enemy of, It soon became too evident
that the day was. lost, and further success
was impossible The battle had ragged fuiriill
ousiy for three hours our. army became
separated, General Bowen drawing off bis
division toward Vicksburg and General Lor-
ing cutting his way through the enemy s
line toward Jackson. Thus situated, there
seemed 'f no power to shield the brave and
the heart of the bra7est sunk in his bosom
Not to any want Of courage or daring could
be attributed this painful disaster, Each man
felt his duey performed, but likewise each
man felt that some deficiency in the plan Of
battle, or want of proper skin in maneuY-
ering our troops, was the evident cause of
this Iucklcss plight =


d 1t does not become a soldier to murmur
at the very strange dispensations Of Prov
idence which sometimes befall him; nor Is it
the part Of. subordinate to question the
ability of his superior officer. Much less
does it become the truthful narrator of
events to color with false glare, or conceal
with wei eonceited pretexts the deficiencies
of a commanding officer Nor shall any
such false notion of policy debar the VIZ tier
from expressing an unfavorable opinion Of
his genius on this memorable field. Some
palliation may be offered for not knowing
the exact position and strength of the enc
my, want of cavalry force, and disparity of
numbers may excuse this NEGLECT, but the
same cannot be plead in extendation
of subsequent events. Nothing but erini-
nal neglect, and want of sagacity, in our com
mander would have permitted the enemy to
surround our little army almost before a gun
was fired, or at least before such aresult-
was apprehended Nothing save a shame
full want of judgement could ever have in
daced him to hurl his slender brigades





ing to think Of the disadvantages In this
mode Of warfare. Nothing but the indonl-
table courage Of the troops and efficiency
of brigade and division commanders saved
US from captures Not so was the plan and
execution of the great battle of Shiloh. Not
such the triple lines that sprang into beau
tiful being under the towering genius Of an
Albert Sydney Johnston Unlike that great
military genius, whose gigantic intellect col
lected at a glance all points of Importance
upona battlefield, and whose skill turned
every movement into success, our COM
m ander seemed dispossessed of what is so
requisite ina leader, and unable to direct
which way to turn or where to go. Retreat
even seemed only possible by fighting our
way, and this the troops gallantly attempted
and successfully accomplished Thus ended
one of the most complete failures during the
war, to Confederate arms, and viii be rec
objected by all who participated therein, as
a blot and shame upon Our history. TO such
hardihood perhaps, may be traced too many
Of our own disasters, and such folly aud in
fatuatiOn lead likewise to successive misfor-
tunes in the subsequent part Of this cam
paign. u arsal a.sr far


TO BE. CONTINUED.