Year: 1874




The course of things at the South
shows how strong is the sentiment of
secession in in that section, and that
the force which fought the national
armies so long and SO brayeiy and 40
ably is disbanded. only, not extinct.
The celebration OF Gen. Lees birtbdav'
the election to high offices of men he.
cause they We're distinguished in the
civil war, the refusal to admit the col.
ored population to the full enjoyment
OF civil rights, and other facts that
might be mentioned, clearly prove
that the SOulhrons have in view a re,
newai oi the conflict, first in politics,
! and then in arms in the fieii. They
submitted to the event of wsr in 1865.
but they did SO with the moral reser-
walton that they would rise again at
ire hrst opportunity for rising that
should present itself with fair chance
OF success. They re. y much on the in
ability OF the Republican party to keep
up us organization, and their confident
belief III such want of lasting union
among their former foes is based on
the many qusrrels that take place be-
tween our lea ling men, who seem to
think that The Republican party exists
only for the promotion of their per
sonal purposes. They rely also ON that
total want OF fixed policy in regard to
great questions that cfaracterizes the
Republican party, and which has kept
almost every matter that was in dis
pute eight years ago in dispute till
now, with Small prospect of a change
for the better. They expect to see the
character OF the Government changed
at the next national election. and q
Democratic Administration set up in
washington. Such a change made,
half their work for the organization of
rebellion would be done, and they
would proceed to take just such meas
ures to secede al the end of the next
Presidential term that they took in
lo5l-6l, when the Buchanan admins
tratlOn was nothing but machine for
the advancement OF treason, and a very
useful one too, in the hands of traitors.
The defeat of the Democrats at Presi-
dental election would be the signal for
revolt, az the defeat of the same party
was a signal for the revolt of 1850; and [
rather than not have that signal given. |
the Southrons would help defeat the
Democrats, as they did in 1860. Them
we should have our old work to dol
over again, and under circumstances
less favorable to us than existed thir-
teen years ago, and more favorable to
the Southrons than they knew ut that1
time. We should have load to carryI
that we had not in 1856, Ia great debt,
that would weigh heavily upon oar
strength; and they would be free from
load that lay heavily upon them att
that time, and greatly lesseped their
chances of success-that of slavery. |
Nothing did the rebels SO much mis-
chief as the worlds knowledge that
they were lighting for slayery's suprem-
acy. Many men who wished them |
success could not advise that they
should be helped, SO long as they were
the champions OF most odious wrong,
and hence Victories that, under otherl
conditions, wO'd have led to their being
acknowledged as nation, were barren
OF anything but barren laurels. Eng
land would not acknowledge. as a ma
tion community that was undoing a /
work thai she had taken the lead in |
doing in both the East and the West;
and while England would rot act,
France could not stir. There could be
no allies for the cause of avowed op-
pressors. But while such was the state
Of things in the late war, the South in
another war would not be weighted /
with slavery, and We could not become
the champions of emancipation; and so
there would be no doubt of foreign aid /
for the enemies of the American
nation. -v .-'