Year: 1879

spite of the enthusiasm of the eX-President's reception in California, we see little as yet that indicates any overwhelming strength for the Grant bloom" No doubt as he comes East, the pressure in his favor will be more sensibly felt, but we see no reason as yet to expect that | 1t will become irresistible.

 The 'boom" derives it's strength from two sources: from those people who demand strong president, to enforce the laws; and from the politicians, who want weak presi- dent, entirely subservient to their bidding It would seem absurd that requirements so in- consistent could be satisfied by any one man :; yet Gen. Grant seems to do so. His military record is that of firm, strong man, persistent to the point of obssinacy; his civil record is that of man more completely ruled by the politicians around him than any President of the United States slnce James Buchanan. h. consistent as this may seem, the combination of strength in military capacity with weak ness in a civil capacity is by no means uncom- inon. Without referring to the failure of the l Duke of Wellington as a statesman, we need only call to mind the career of Andrew Jack son as an apt illustration. This mans genius was essentially military, not civil. His won- 1 derful pluck, political daring and personal honesty, endeared him to the people; but there never was president more open to evil influ- | ence by cunning politicians than he. It is to the soldierly simplicity and the soldierly bold ness of Jackson that we owe the inauguration of the spoils system. Like Grant he stuck at l nothing to serve friend or to defeat an ene- my. Hence it happened that during his long term the independent civil service organized under Washington, and continued for forty years thereafter, gave place to to the dependent civil service which has prevailed ever since. Grant made feeble effort for an independent civil service at the outset but failing in that, allowed himself to become the mere tool of clique of Republican politicians except 80 far as he insisted on the advancement of his per sonal friends or of the members of his own family.

 The explanation of this double phase of character-the one strong in the soldler, and the other weak in the civllian-is obvious. The soldier knows his trade. He has the apti- tudes and genius of the military man and de- serves the distinction he acquires. This was the case with Wellington, with Grant, and probably with Jackson. As soldiers such men are honored and respected by the people; and they are seized upon by politicians, because of the just popularity they have attained. Placed in high office, they no longer rely on their own judgment; they become the mere tools of more or less able advisers. More particularly clique of Republican Senators, first among whom was Roscoe Conkling, really controlled the Grant administration. It was their jeal- ously which brought all the best and most ln- dependent portion of the Republican party in-, to disfavor with the president; which drove Bristow out of his Cabinet, and brought Came ron into it.

 There is another and more serious difficult ty with Grant, which is that of the man and not of the soldier We refer to the moral ob- tuseness which has surrounded him with personal following that is justly obnoxious to all honest men. Relknap and Babcoek were types of this personal following. We do not believe that he was personally corrupt himself, but we cannot but see that he was surrounded by corrupt and tainted men.

 Were there great war impending, there would be strong reasons for favoring Grant, In the conduct of military affairs he would no longer consult Conk ling, Cameron or Chandler, he would consult his own genius; but no one l seriously expects war. If he administers the government for four years from 1881, it will be as civil and not as military officer Can any one fairly maintain that he has shown strength in that capacity? It was under his rule that the Yazoo plan converted Mississippi into Democratic State. It was he who first refused to lend the military force for the SUD- port of Republicanism in South Carolina and Louisiana. It was his two months of inaction which demonstrated the utter weakness of the Chamberlain regime in the former State, and of the Packard government in the latter. | The truth is that the Grant movement is another of those dodges for cheating the people | in which the politician is so fertile. It is his character so weak on the side that will be used, 80 strong on the side that will remain unused, that favors the deception. In the meantime the country: is represented to be in such a strait as to need the most desperate ate energy of a great soldier like Grant can save us from another rebellion. This is an- other politicians preteuce. Undoubtedly the F grand blunder of the extra session, and the abundant evidence of Democratic fraud in South Caro lina and Democratic force in Miss issippi, have started a reaction against that party which bids fair to sweep to the North. Is that any such emergency as demands re- turn to the civil service methods of Belknap, a Robeson and Babcock at Washington, and to the thieveries of Moses and a Yarmouth at the South?

 | Absurd as such statement may seem to the politician, Hayes has proved himself a vastly stronger man than Grant in the administration of civil government. He has had the pluck to

 fight the Senate clique, in the interests of civil

 service reform, and to offer fair treatment to

 the South in defiance of the Stalwarts. He

 has made enemies in both parties because he

 would yield to the unjust demands of neither

 He maintained the principles. of his platform against all the Stalwarts of the Senate, and he refused to yield up the election laws to the demand of the Solid South.

 What we need for our next president IS man like Hayes rather than man like Grant.

 We want civil service reform, fair elections and fair play at the South, and no reaction into

 Belknapery and Carpet Baggery. A Stalwart

 revival m 80 leads as surely to the eventual

 defeat of Republicanism, as the Bourbon revi-

 val of '79 led to the defeat of Democracy

 The politicians of both parties seem determin-

 ed upon forcing obnoxious candidates upon the

 people, and upon making the election of 1880

 mere choice of evils. The duty of the peo-

 ple is to defeat their designs, and to force the

 nomination of the best candidates on the best