Year: 1866




War In Europe now appears to be inevitable.
The efforts, or pretended efforts, Of diplomacy
to prevent It were nipped in the bud. The
conference OF tho great Powers which was
called for this purpose could not do anything,
because the basis Of conditions laid down was
inadmissible to one Of the Beliigerents at least
In fact, 1t must have been evident to the prime
mover, Napoleon, in proposing the conference
that 1t never could accomplish anything under
such conditions. The movement was mere
pretext in order to mako show Of moderation
and to cover up the deep political schcme Of
the bottom.


In the letter Of the Emperor Napoleon to the
Of what were the motives and objects Of his
Majesty. If Austria would cede venetia to
Italy, II Prussia could be made stronger at the
North-that is, II she could appropriate Hol-
stein without resistance from Austria-and II
other concessions should be made 10 strengthen
Prussia and Italy directly, and France indi-
rectly, at the expense of Austria, there might
be no war. In word if Austria would give
up all she has been contending for, and much
more, and would consentto be made the second
Power in Germany and second rate Power in
Europe, peace might be preserved. That is
the substance of Napoleon's proposition. Did
the French Emperor believe this possible!
No; he is too sagacious for that The
proposed conference was q sham. Looking at
all the circumstances, we cannot resist the
natural conclusion that Napoleon has been an
active and secret agent in fomenting the diff
culties that exist in Europe. He detess the
treaties of 1915, and consequently favors war
that may destroy them and rearrange the map
of Europe. What more natural? What more
logical3.


Austria, confident in her own strength, or at
least being convinced that sho can lose no
interests Of peace, accep's the alternative of
the sword The whole element arrayed against
her is revolutionary-a desire for change; and
she expects the conservative sentiment Of Eu-
rope will support her. How far this conscrva-
tism can be made available to give her moral
or material aid has yet TO he seen. We do not
now enter into the question whether con-
servatsm or revolution Is best for the Old
World; we simply refer to tho facts Of the case.


On the side Of Austria we find the Pspacy,
the temporal power of which would be de-
stroycd by the success Of the Italian-Prussi an
alliance and the dynastic conservatism Of all
Europe, embracing, probably Russia, most Of
the German States. Sweden, Norway and Den
mark, as well as England. We mean ON The
side of Austria in moral sense; but in the
event of general European war these Powers,
or most ofthem, would naturally take the field
with her. On the side of Italy and Prussia
would be the mighty military power of
France, IT, indeed, in such general war rs il
possible Prussia dare separate herself from the
declared sentiment of the middle German
States


The whole question as presented just now is
full Of complications, and no one can see the
ultimate result II is possible the intrigues Of
Napoleon may end In his own ruin and in the
success Of the old dynastic power Of Europe,
as the ambition of the first Napoleon ended;
but ii is more likely that the democratic element
may seize the opportunity for general revo-
luton and extort those concessions of liberty
which the masses anxlously desire, We shall
watch with the greatest care events as they
transpire and present them to our readers; for
the people OF this country will necessarily feel
the deepest interest in these great movements
on the other side of the Atlantic.