Year: 1878

Gettysburg, and there has seldom been a
contest where details were so thoroughly
known over which there has been SO
much dispute. The reports of the two
commanding generals are not expected
to agree as to the reasons and resources
for defeat and victory, each making his
estimate from different point OF view,
and mentally influenced to cxaggerate
his enemy's forces; and they do not in


this case, although they were made by
men of unblenished personal honor as
Gen. Meade and Gen. Lee. But not only
is there conflict between the views Of
the Union and rebel authorities, but the
subordinate commanders on both sides
have been engaged in discussion as to
their relative shares of the victory and
defeat Gems. Hancock and Howard,
Generals Eweli and Hill have all had
their say in magazines or newspapers,
and the controversial history of the battle
has been greater almost than that of
Waterloo The latest contribution is
that Of General James Longstrcet, the
veteran confederate commander, VINO
was one Of the seundest and best of the
southern officers, and who, after General
Lee, had the most important share in the
battle. lie wrote to defend himself f:om
the charge OF tar6iness, made not by his
commander n-chief bnt by some of bis
suboroinates, who very likely wished to
involve in still farther obloquy one whose
manly and sensible course in politics
after the war earned him the hatred of
the inveterate rebels.


General Longstreet's article is very
interesting one. Perfectly loyal in his
admiration of General Lee, he yet makes
it known as General Lee acknowledged
himself, that the rebel defeat was due to
violation of the plan of the campaign
which was to be offensive in strategy,
but purely defensive in tactics; that is to
say, while invading the enemy's territory
to take up positions that would compel
attack, when they came into contact. In
the absence of his cavalry, Gen. Lee was
advancing into Pennsylvania like one
walking in the dark, and the encounter
with the Federal troops on the first Of
July was almost entirely accidental The
next day and on the third day Gen. Lee
committed the capital error OF attacking
a superior any attempt to defeat his
enemy in detail, and from that attack
the cofederate legions were hurled back
shattered and broken, and from that time
never could be made to charge as an
army, whatever they might do in divis-
ions and brigades. From the terrific
lesson poured with shot and shell from
Cemetry Heights on the third day of the
battle they never fully recovered. Gen.
Longstreet gives the key to the mystery
Of Gen. Lees attack hy saying that he
was under the influence of subdued ex
citement, which sometimes took posses
sion OF him, 'when the hlDt was up"
and threatened his superb equipose. Lee
had not the supreme imperturbility Of
Grant, which never yielded under any
circumstances, and this time he fairly
lost his head in the furor Of fight.


Gen LOngstreet to all appearance fully
vindicates himself against any charge of
tardiness In the second days fight, but
admits chat the differed with Gen. Lee
as to the advisabihty of the attack, which
perhaps, to some extent, did unconsci-
ously affect the vgor of his movements.
Still the charges Of his corps on that day
were among the most desperate OF the
war, and as has been said, his commander
never intimated any fault with his
promptness. Whatever hope there might
have been of victory from the second
days attack, there was none from that
of the third Gen. Longstreet relates
that be met Lee in the morning, and
fearing that he still might have the dis
position to attack, suggested plan of
manGuvres that would compel Meade to
take the offensive Lee replied, pointing
his haAd to Cemetery Ridge, "the enemy
is there and | am going to strike him."
Longstreet demonstrated strongly, but
without avail. The fatal charge was
made by Pickett's division of fifteen
thousand men. Longstreet was SO over
come when Pickett asked at the appoin-
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