Year: 1879




The tragedy at Cabul proves that one
plan of conouering Afghanistan is not
satisfactory. People who were free to form
their opinions on mature study of the
history of that country knew that this plan
was not a good one, knew that it must fail,
and consequently did not need to have this
proved by he slaughter of body of brave
men forced into the diplomatic forlorn hope
in which Major Cavagnari and his associates
have perished. Unfortunately Her Maj
esty's government would not heed what was
said on this point by the old soldiers and
others of ample Indian experience who
spoke on the subject, and the Viceroy in
India seems to have regarded all criticism
as impertinence. From the outset the in
vasion of Afghanistan involved the military
occupation if it's territory was to be
treated as having strategic relation to the
Indian frontier. If the country was to be
invaded and tie Ameer simply punished
as for an offence then there was an al
Tentative point in the expedition, which
was the absolute abandonment of the
country when the purpose of the in





strategic frontier theory supplied the
only ground on which the expedi-
ton could be justified, and therefore
the country should have been held. We
repeatedly pointed out last autumn what
that would cost, and what an enormous
burden this policy was likely to add to the
already crippled finances of India. Cabul
Jol h. al
places, at least two passes to be fortified
and kept in permanent preparation Tor
hostilities, and Herat to be taken-these
were the military necessities of serious
attempt to hold that difficult country. In
despite, however, Of every rational consid-
Grafton derived from actual experience,
the government went forward in a
light-hearted way, and, having occupied
the capital, made a treaty and pushed the
evacuation OF the country, counting to hold
it morally by resident at the Court of the
Ameer. The practical effects are dis
heartening tragedy, the loss Of all the adj
vantages Of bloodless conquest, the waste
of what the conquest cost, and the need to
spend now three or four times as much
more on conquest almost hopelessly diff
cult. Optimists in England seem dis
posed to go at new invasion in the
same gay mood in which the govern
ment went at the last one, and inclined
to resolutely shut their eyes to all the
obstacles. In fact they will view this diff
ferently in about another month, by which
time, possibly, another advance may be
ready. Only about five thousand men
seem actually available for the movement
out of all the force in India. There are ten
period, and their average strength is five
hundred men. And these are regiments
that suffered least in the late operation, be-
cause they had comparatively little cholera.
Transportation must be entirely reorgan-
lied, and in the month of truce that is
thus given to the revolt what may it
not do in the way of preparation? Already
it is said the Ameer has been forced to Join
his recalcitrant soldiers. 1t has been argued
that the massacre resulted only from q
local fneute in Cabul, and was not wide
spread movement, this inference being
drawn from the fact that the blow was de-
livered before the winter SHOWS made in
vasion impossible. That theory supposes
that invasion is not made impossible except
by the SHOWS. But the evidences are that
the blow finds the British authority in q
crippled and almost helpless condition,
and so far, consequently. it may be inferred
that the event has been deliberately timed.