Year: 1878

The work which Secretary Thompson and
the House Naval Committee have undertaken
is one that ought to have been done long ago.
The condition of the American Navy is dis
grace TO a maritime and commercial people;
it has been recognized "a disTacetul for
great many years; and though frequent at
tennis have been made at reform, and im-
mense sums of money have been spent in the
experiments, no substantial improvement has
thus far been effected. All previous schemes
for the reorganization of the naval force have
been defective in principle. They have con-
sisted of little more than Il series of expensive
repairs to huls that were not worth repairing
and the construction now and then OF few
sloops upon plans adjusted rather to the
wishes of shipwrights than the wants Of the
public service. As n consequence our yards
are numbered with costly hulks that would be
utterly useless in time of war, and our flag il
carried to foreign ports by slow, antquatcd,
and rotten vessels which excite the derision of
third rate European powers. II is not long since
an American man -ol-war, ordered home from
the coast of Africa, sent all her guns as freight
by a merchant vessel because she was not
strong enough to carry them herself.


The system Of perpetual repairs serves to
give employment to laborers at election time
indeed, there are old vessels on the stocks
which have never noated, never will feat, and
for years have been reserved for no other purpose
than the manufacture of votes. But besides its
wastcfulness the system has many serious dis
advantages. 1t helps to inAamc the ignorant
prejudice against a navy as useless and
costly branch of the National service, and 1t
dcceives the country as to our real maritime
strength. The average Congressman is indis-
posed to vote for additions to a fleet which
already numbers, on paper, something like
$50 vessels, and he can hardly be made to
realize that most of these phantom ships are
incapable OF going to sea, and nearly all of
them incapable of fighting. The Secretary
gives the actual strength of the navy as 20
cruisers, and few monitors for harbOr de-
fence. But even this short roll probably pre-
scnts q more favorable idea of the state
of our squadrons than the facts war
rant. Hardly twenty out of the twenty
nine can really be called good vessels; none
are heavily armed; none are ironclad; the new
est of them are the very worst description of
ships for warlike operations, namely, thin iron
hulls which, once penetrated by shot, are beyond
repair. n NOOutu NtS5cl ulhJ w plSIStu ONcT
and over again below the water line, and the
perforatlons can be plugged; but what is to
be done with hole in an iron potY Cruisers
of the Huron pattern are well enough for sci
entiic and ceremonial voyages, or for shellng
village of South Pacific Islanders who may
have been guilty of an excessive consumption
of missionaries; but no sailor would wish to take
them into action against ships or batteries armed
with rihed cannon. Then there are old wooden
vessels on the list which may still he rated as
effective, although they will certainly have to
be condemned in q very few years.


All the rubbish of our yards and squadrons
ought to be cleared away at once. Let the
worthless ships be sold for what they will
fetch, and then let us have a well-considered
system of replacing them by the best men-of-
war that can be built, on patterns suited to our