Year: 1878

| 1t has, indeed, been oftener 'tacit" thar
expressed, owing to the unwillingness o.
doubling minds to disturb the faith o.
others. The chief ground of doubt has
never been better formulated than by the
celebrated DR.. Paley while lie was yet q
member of the University of Cambridge.
Bishop Watson-best remembered at present
for his answers to the infidel writings OF
Gibbon and Paine relates in his memoirs
that when he was Moderator at Cambridge,
Paley, then about to graduate, brought to
him as the thesis he proposed to
discuss, Eternitas p9narstm contradict
diviais attydbutis. Bishop Watson says
that he accepted it. as he never
refused question either as Moderator or
professor of divinity. But the Master of
Christ Church, Paley's college, sent for
Paley and ''insisted on his not harping on
such question" Watson readily per-
mitted him to change it, but told him that
he might remove the objection Of DR..
Thomas by putting non before contradict,
which Paley did. Dr. Watson, however,
could see no ground for a charge OF heresy,
after what Archbishop Tilloston had pub
lished on the same subject many years be-
fore .r


Paley's question hit the very pith of the
difficulty, which is to reconcile eternal pun
ishment with the divine attributes. As
God is all powerful and all good why
should He permit any of His creatures to
suffer everlasting misery? Why not, at
least, mercifully blot them out of existence! |!
These are, indeed, staggering questions.
They are fitted to take strong hold on
minds not trained in theological dogmas.
The natural sentiments Of the human heart
on such subject are aptly expressed by
the Scottish poet, in his humane though
somewhat comical "Address to the DELI


Pm sure sma pleasure II can gle,


E'en to dell,


To skclp an scaud poor dogs like me,


An near us squeal


And if it can "gie sma' pleasure cen to
"a dell" how much less to an all merciful
Being? But whatever force there may be
in such an argument it is by no means con-
elusive. 1t is impossible to reconcile the
existence of evil at all with the attributes
Of the Deity; but we know too well that
this is no proof that evil does not exist.
Had it been our fortune to live on n
planet where misery is unknown we
might have argued with the most
undoubting confidence that there can be
no misery in the universe. We should have
maintained with great logical force that as
God is omnipotent He has the power, and
as He is infinitely benevolent He has the
will, to prevent suffering in every part of
His creation. But logic must yield
to facts. The existence Of evil is mys-
terry which will always remain insoluble by
the human understanding. The argument
from the divine attributes proves too much,
and therefore nothing for it is equally
cogent against the existence OF misery nj
all and against its eternal duration. We
know of no reason why divine benevolence
may not continue to permit forever what
we know it has always heretofore permitted
since the beginning Of the world; nor any
reason why God may not as consistently
allow evil to enter other worlds as to exist
in this. Why may not souls that sin in
this life continue to sin forever, and be
punished forever for their unceasing wick
edness? It seems to us that the argument
from the divine attributes breaks down.
We have not space at present to examine
those drawn from the Scriptures