Year: 1878

could dO no good to our side and no
harm to the other. l would be locked
up. l told Mr.. Lincoln / would con-
slider the plan, and that was the last of
it, The route was an impossible route,
and was never mentioned again by Mr..
Lincoln. That is, as far as | remember,
the exact story of the conference be-
tween Mr.. Lincoln, Mr.. Stanton and
myself when l took command of the
army. The question of my plans and
their wisdom and unwisdOm was never
afterward subject of conversation or
correspondence. If there were blunders
in that campaign, the blunders were
mine, and not those of Lincoln or Stan
ton. They did everything in the world
to assure my success. Upon me and
upon me alone must the whole respOn
sibility fall. In these articles of Welles
and Taylor you note that they not only
assume that the true and proper way TO
have attacked Lee was by the way of
the James River, but that this also was
my opinion. If the whole of my COM
mand had gone by way of James River,
l certainly would have found enough of
Lees force to have retarded my pro-
gress and to fight me, and possibly
enough would have been spared to have
threatened the National capital. AS it
was, 1 confronted Lee, and held him
and all his hosts far from Richmond and
the James, while sent, the same day
of my advance across the Rapidan, a
force by the James River sufficient, as
thought, to have captured all south of
Richmond to Petersburg and hold it.
l believe now that if General Butler
had had two corps commanders such as
/ might have selected had / known the
material of the entire army as well as [
did afterward, he would have done so,
and would have threatened Richmond
itself, so as materially to have aided
me further to the North.


There is another point that these his
torians omit. 1t is said that we over
whelmed the South. In foreign journals
and foreign assemblies it is put this
way, that we overran the South with
the scum of the world-with hirelings
and Hessians. No one would do more
honor to the foreigners who came into
our ranks than myself. They were
brave men and earned our gratitude.
But so far from our armies being
forgeign, l question if more than three
per cent. were aliens. Yet | have no
doubt many well-informed anthors will
tell you that there were only three per
cent. Americans. This is the way pub
lie opinion was made during the war,
and this is the way history is made now.
We never overwhelmed the South, and


am only sorry we could not have done


so and so ended the war and its miseries
What we won from the South we won


by hard fighting, and the odds, when
there were odds, were never decisive
| We had to fight the Southern states


They were a unit and we were divided


Every able bodied male in the Soutl


from fourteen to sixty was in the army


or was supposed to be there. We haC


to depend upon volunteers and the con


scription. The South had 100000 O


negroes. These negroes kept the farms


protected the families, supported th,


armies, and we're really reserve force


most important reserve force in {


fighting nation. Those 1000, 900 of ne


groes did work that white men would


have been compelled to do. Yet they


are never counted in any summary o


the forces of the South. The South was


really an organized army. During the


war in the South all progress, all indus


try came to a halt, and nothing was al.


lowed to interfere with the war. Ever


now the South suffers from war stagna-


tion, from war paralysis. In the NOrtf
| industry was never more brisk all the


arts of peace were cherished society


moved on inventions were discovered
the genius of the country was as keeI


as ever. We supported an army and ;


blockading fleet. We never tagged il


our industry. We kept our place a


a manufacturing commercial power


Cities like Chicago, New York, Sal


Francisco grew and grew, while Savan


nah and New Orleans and Charleston


languished. Remember, as have said


that we had by no means a unite,


North, while the South was a unit. w
had to send troops to suppress riots i
New York we had enemies in Ou
midst. In every Northern state ther


was a strong party against the war
always rejoicing over disaster, alway
voting to paralyze our forces read


for any concession or surrender. Thi
party was strong in every state-stron
enough to carry states like Indian;
Pennsylvania and n. Y. during the wa
Nothing but Morton's courage saved
from making Indiana a rebel state, lik
Kentucky. This was the party thf


voted the war was failure at the tim
, Sherman was setting out on his marc
to the sea, at the very time when thu
great General and his great army wei
about to cover our arms with imperisl
able renOwn. You can imagine til
effect such resolution must have ha
upon the enthusiasm of an army, for
: is a mistake to imagine that such thing
did not affect an army. They did a
feet it, as l know well. During OIL
war there was scarcely a wind tn;
came from the North, from our ow
homes, that did not come laden wit
calumny and disparagement. I'll
Southern generals were models of chiv
: airy and valor; our generals were vena
incompetent, coarse. These were e
sential elements in a war like ours-tl
war of free people. / do not reci
these things to complain especially.
have nothing to complain about. I'll
more foes we conquered, the more in
portant was our victory. Having col
quered, it is not for us to say anythiu
unkind or in disparagement of oil
, enemies.


, Failure of the Women's Hotel.