Year: 1877

The meaning of the late elections in
France is gradually forcing itself on Mar
shall MacMahon. The first thought with
him after the 14th inst. was that it was not
the deluge Gambetta had prophesied, and
the next that it was ssnot much of shower
after all" His Ministers, De Broglie and
De Fourtou, were not, however, deceived in
this pleasant way, but it suited their pur-
pose admirably to keep the old soldier in
such a state of glee that he might be
tempted at any moment to adopt "vigor-.
ous'' measures in the belief that he was
saving the nation from the effects Of o mo-
mentary folly. He has known all along
that he would have to face a hos
tile Chamber, but then he had the
Senate to teach it manners or dissolve it;
he had the proclamation of "a state of
siege" in his pocket, and he had the army to
back him if the foolish people became
physically recalcitrant. All this suited his
amour propre as soldier, and it looked so
neat and complete that he, very likely,
believed it was craftsmanship. If he had
the means OF crushing the republicans it
was sign that they were wrong, and, there
fore. ought to be crushed. As o remarkable
case of self-delusion this reasoning is note
worthy. But, alas! for the ingenuity of De
Broglie and the bold intrigue of De Fourtou,
circumstances have been conspiring TO un-
deceive the Marshal.


We are willing to believe that MacAIahon
innocently thought that all these measures
were to be used for one end-namely. the
consolidation Of his own power directed
after his desires; but nobody about him or
on his side in France thought so. The
Bonapartists knew they had gained nearly
hundred seats in the elections, and that
another dissolution under state of siege
would probably give them more, and that
then they would be able to give MacMahon
furlough and their little pocket prince a
throne, around which all the Rouhers and
Olliviers, and even the Cassagnacs and
Duvals, would sit in snug fat places, and
that army contracts and stock jobs would
be mines of wealth as Of yore. The Orlean-
lists, who can live under republic, but can
not under parvenu empire, saw this, too,
and took alarm. The legitimists, although
they are not the most acute people in
the world, perceived that amid all the
rejoicings over conservative gains," the
Bonapartists had the most to brag about.
They believe in crown, but it is q crown
placed upon kings brow by divine right,
and not crown put on by an adventurer
as he would billycock hat. The religious
| zealot holds most in hate that man who
parodies his ritual, and hence the Bourbon
hates the Donaparte more than all other
political breeds OF Frenchmen. Therefore
the lcgitimists take alarm ut the Marshal's
course. Doubtless they would be glad to
make a coup dttat and put the virtuously
reluctant man Of Frohsdorf on the throne
of Charles ", but, failing that, they would
prefer the Republic, like the English SWELL


who, not finding room in first class railroad
carriage, said he would travel in the third


where he could pity himself, rather than pay
extra for the privilege of being taken for a
bagman. A coup dftat in the interest of
Napoleon Nv. might be temporarily success
ful, but one for Henri v. would not succeed
| IOf u Wcck.


Thus the Marshal is having his eyes
opened. True, he has the clergy still, but
they are like women and children in a be-
sieged town-only so many mouths to feed.
1t comes then to this, that the faction in the
Senate on whom he relied for o second dis
solution will, in all human probability, re-
fuse if called upon. This would leave him
the Gambetta alternatives, 'to submit or
resign" or, If he had the backbone of q
Cromwell or the unscrupulousness of q
Louis Napoleon, bold resort to brute
force We do not think he has enough of
either, or rather we believe he has too much
patriotism to seek this brutal and criminal
! last resort to hold on to power.