Year: 1877

1t is a recognized result of all military
experience that the passage of great river
is an operation that it is we'll nigh impossl-
BILE to prevent. Only o thorough and accu-
rate knowledge on one side the river Of what
is in progress on the other side could ever
enable a defending force to meet the
invaders at the critical point, and this
knowledge can naturally never be had.
In the absence of such knowledge the
insight of great genius will often sue
ceed in embarrassing the operation. But In
ordinary occasions the defending force will
inevitably be divided in the effort to cover
several points of passage ut which the army
on the other side makes demonstrations,
and thus at the point where the army is at
last really thrown over it will encounter an
inferior force and overwhelm it.


There is not a river in Europe of any con-
sequence that has not been crossed repeat
edly in the very presence OF defending
armies. Modern commanders of the highest
order of ofintelligence have, therefore, wasted
but little strength in efforts to prevent the
passage of rivers, but have saved their

against the enemy when he shall get over
The passage Of the Danube by the Russians
illustrates anew the impossibility OF prevent
ing the passage of a river, and exhibits also
the degree to which exploded ideas retain
their hold on the Ottoman mind. AT the
time the Russians put whole corps over at
Ibrail it was reported, with an ostentation
1o1< <hn ~ nf IA
spondents. that the next passage would be
madeat tTurna-Magurelli. In agreement with
that report large force of Russians was
concentrated at that point. Evidently the
Ottoman commander thought he had made
q great discovery, and he concentrated all
the movable force at his disposal behind
Ncopolis and kept it there, encouraged
doubtless by the impression that the bonn
bardment which began so fiercely few
days since was a mere preliminary and
cover for the intended movement at that
point


But with the enemy thus so easily misled
and oncentrated at point where only a feint
was intended, the Russians passed the river
in force at Simnitza only little way down
the stream. There are as yet insufficient
particulars of what the Turk did when he
| found that the Danube had been effectively
crossed at Simnitza, but it is prob
able that he hurried away thither
with all his force to drive the
| enemy into the river, and if he did Of
course all the Russians then concentrated at
Turna- Magurelli were Immediately put over
the river and moved toward o point oppo-
site Simnitza to sustain the force there by
taking part in the intended battle. From
the detail of facts and indication of probabil-
tiles to be found in the news it is evident how
nearly hopeless is the endeavor to which
the Ottoman commander has committed
himself, even if the forces are equal. But
when we reflect that the Russians were in
such numbers that they were able to
demonstrate ut every feasible point, and
that their felnt was in every case made with
force large enough to effect cross
| ing if the ground opposite was
found to be unoccupied, it becomes
plain that the Turk has given his Days
and nights to imbecile activity. Had he
quietly waited for the concentration of q
considerable Russian force at any point on
his own side the river and then thrown On
overwhelming force against it ere it was
really we'll established it is likely he might
have inflicted severe blow, and this he can
scarcely have done with MI his mistaken
activity in the effort to prevent crossing
| Our report from Pera of great battle in
| progress near Sistova indicates that the ac-
| tivity of the Ottoman commander may lead
Immediately to events decisive in their
nature. His activity will, of course, be
called rash if it fails and the intuition of
| genius in the very improbable event
of it's success. But it is proper to
recognize that he will not be en-
titled, whatever the result, to credit or
blame, as the course adopted is no doubt
forced upon him by orders from his govern
ment, which is so dangerously situated that
a Fabian policy or any failure to assail the
Russians Immediately might result in its
overthrow by the jealous softas. From the
phrases used, though they are vague, the
battle referred to is believed at Constanti-
nople to be one involving all the
forces that can be brought to bear ON
either side. 1t is probable that the Russian
force engaged is between the rivers LON
and Jantra, holding the line of the first of
these rivers against any force coming from
! the direction Of Rustchuk or the other
strong places of the so-called quadrilateral,
and the line of the Jantra against the force
that was concentrated behind Nicopols. BY
the bridges which can be made in its rear it
can be reinforced to the extent of the
whole Russian right wing, posted hitherto
on the line of the vede and Aluta. 1t is
not likely that the Turks can Immediately
succeed in their efforts against this position,
whatever may be their force; and if they
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