Year: 1874

wac SEiAS8e SuAI u GTUlY cOlli(


not render more efficient service and affor,


more complete protection to the countr,
than By arousing the apprehensions of tht
authorities at Washington for the safety o
that city.


The advantage which the Confederacy de
rived from its ability to maintain strony
army near the northern and northeastern
border Of Virginia will also appear if W
reflect what would have been the condition
OF affairs had the Confederate army been ex
PEELED from that region, and had it faller
back towards the North Carolina line, as
would have been obliged to do in order t
keep up its connections with the South.


1t is evident that in that case the who'll,
southern border of the United States, in
cluding the city of Washington, would have
been relieved of serious apprehension of dan
ger, and the troops that were occupied ir
providing against an expected invision or
our part would have been left free to be en-
ployed in aggressive movements against us


The effect of the loss of Kentucky and tht
greater part of Tennessee upon military
operations in the West will further illustrate
my meaning. After our troops in the West
had fallen back so far from the northern Dor.
der, and extensive districts OF country prac.
tically in the possession of the enemy iu
terrened between them and the Ohio river
and the States beyond, the enemy bad q
much greater force at his disposal fer use ir
the field than would have been the case had
he been required to guard bis long south
ern border.


Time will not permit me to point out al
the advantages resulting from the tenure
of Northern Virginia by the Confederacy
but have said enough at least to indicate tc
my thoughtful hearers that the great strug
gle Of nearly four years which Was waget
for the possession Of this region involved
consequences to the Conteueracy Of faI
greater importance than the mere loss OF ter
ritory, or Of the recruits and supplies thai
it derived from Northern Virginia.


But while the presence OF our army il
Northern Virginia was Of advantage to tht
Confederacy in many ways, some OF which
have suggested, it is apparent that, to enable
that army TO accomplish its object, it needed
all the strength the Confedcracy could give
it. 1t was near the northern border, il
the presence continually of the most pow
erfui of all the Union armies, and continu
ally exposed TO the attack of superior mum
bers.


With all the important consequence:
which depended upon the ability OF tha
armyto maintain itself, and in view of thu
gigantic task imposed up,n it of meeting
the repeated efforts OF the enemy to force il
further back from the Union frontier and
from the Federal capital, it would seem thai
the army had as much as it could do, anG
that the skill OF ifs leader and the courage 0
his men would find full employment in per
forming the arduous task Immediately DeIor,
them.


You will now understand the ulject tt
which proposed to invite your attention
that is, the influence which tie situa
ton and military importance Of the city o
Richmond eXerted upon the conduct anC
issue Of the war.


Valuable as the possession OF NOrtherr
Virginia was to the Confeteracy, is posses
sion came to depend entirely upon our ability
to defend the city Of Richmond. There were
established the del0ts aud arsenals which
were to supply the army operating in North
ern Virginia, or through Richmond the
army had lis chief means OF access to 1t:
sources of supply further south.


With Richmond in the hands of the enc.
nv, it is evident that no large Confederate
army could have been maintained in North
ern Virginia. There was no other city in
virginia that had railroad connections with
the South sufficient to furnish Transports
ton for the supply OF such an army as II
was important TO maintain in Northern Flr'
ginis:


Lynchburg might have been connected
with railroads in North Carolina, and thus
have had an interior line OF communication
with the South less accessible TO the enemy
than any that Richmond possessed; but nc
such connection was made, nor does II profit
now to inquire whether il could have been
made.


If | have succeeded in impressing you
with q sense Of the Importance OF Northern
Virginia to the prosperous maintenance ol
the war on the part of The Con(ederacy you
cInnot fail to perceive that in addition 10 tue
great toSk which deVolvcd upon that army
in the immediate field OF its operations II
had also 20 assume all the difficulties which
the situation OF Richmond imposed upon
those who undertook TO defend 1t.


Early in tue second year of the war the
was compelled to yield to the
enemy the quiet possession OF the James
river W NlIUlu lew DlI9 VI
From that tine it was always possible tor
the Federal Government TO transport troops
from the North within less than days
march from the city without tne lear or
even the possibility Of interruption oy us.


It is unnecessary to refer 10 the additional
facilities afforded by the York river to the
enemy to approach Richmond.


The city Of Richmond, upon the safety OF
which depeuded the ability of the Coniede-
racv to maintain an efficient army in North
orn Virginia. was in fact almost Is accessible
from The north by water as the city or Alex
andrja. Its distance from the base OF tile
Federal army that could be brought to
onerate against it gave it no advantage II
that army could almost reach its gates by u
safe and rapid water transportation. In at'
tacking the city, situated as it was, the pow
erful flotia of the enemy was aolc 10 CO.
operate efficiently with its land forces, SO
that the defenders OF Richmond had to resist
the combined efforts of the Federal army
and navy. Nor did Richmond possess any
OF the advantages for the purposes oi ue'
fence of an inland town, even, should the
enemy, renounclng the tacl'itieS when hiS
command of the water a1ofueu hilh, al
tempt to approach the city by ano. lus
movement of General Grant in 1864 from
CuIpeper Courthouse TO the james river
illustrate, clearly the Disadvantages WnIcf
the army defending Richmond was forced 70
incur owing to the peculiar situation Of the
city. s c,,,no,o,
Courthouse, abandoning the communication
with Washington by the orange ana Alex
sndria road. But he had no need to care fol
his old communication, for his first halt in
the Wilderness, and bis next at oposyi,
yania Courthouse, afforded him an easy ano
safe access to the Potomac river AZ Aqul.
creek, within lew hours sail OF Nas9ing
ton. by road directly in lhe rear oil ahS
covered by his army. As General Grant aa
,..road f,rtber south from Spotsyllan