Year: 1867

hazards. The so-called reconstruction
acts, though as plainly unconstitutional
as any that can be imagined, were not
believed to be within the class
last mentioned. The people were
not wholly disarmcd of the
power of self-defenc7. In all
the Northern States they still held in
their hands the sacred right of the bal
lot, and it was safe to believe that in
due time they would come to the rescue
of their own institutions. 1t gives me
pleasure TO add that the appeal to our
common constituents was not, taken in
vain, and that my confidence in their
wisdom and virtue seems not to have
been misplaced.


FRAUDS on TIE TREASURY.


1t is we'll and publicly known that
enormous frauds have been perpetrated
on the Treasury, and shat colossal for
tunes have been made at the public
expense. This species of corruption
has increased, is increasing, and if not
diminished will soon bring ms into tctal
ruin and disgrace. The public credit
ors and the Taxpayers are alike inter
ested in an honest administration of
| the finances, and neither class will long
endure the . large-handed robberies
of the recent past. For this discredIt-
able state of things there are several
causes. Some of the taxes are so laid
as to present an irresistible temptation
to evade payment. The great sums
which officers may win by connivance
ut fraud create pressure which is more
than the virtue of many can withstand;
and there can be no doubt that the open
disregard of constitutional obligations
ayowed by some of the highest and
most influential men in the country has
greatly weakened the moral sense OF
those who serve in subordinate places.
The expenses of the United States, in
cluding interest on the public debt, are
more than six times as much
as they were seven years ago.
To collect and disburse this vast
amount requires careful super
vision as we'll as systematic
vigilance. The system, never per-
perfected, was much disorganized by the
TENURE of Office Bill" which has al
most destroyed official accountability.
The President may be thoroughly con-
vinced that an officer is incapable, dis
honest, or unfaithful to the Constitu-
ton, but, under the law which have
named, the utmost he can do is To com
plain TO the Senate, aud ask the privi.
lege of supplying his place with bet
ter man. If the Senate be regarded as
personally or politically hostile to the
President, it is natural, and not alto
gether unreasonable, for the officer to
expect that it will take his part rs far
as possible, restore him TO his place, and
give him n triumph over his Executive
superior. The officer has other chances
of impunity arising from accidental
defects of evidence, the mode OF
investigating it, and the secrecy OF
the hearing. 1t is not wonderful that
official malfeasance should become bold
in proportion rs the deliDqucnts learn
to think themselves safe, | am entire
ly persuaded that under such Il rule the
President cannot perform the great
duty assigned to him of seeing the laws
faithfully executed, and that it disables
him most especially from enforcing that
rigid accountability which is necessary
to the due execution of the revenue
laws.


THE POWER OF REMOVAL. FROM OFFICE.


The Constitution invests the Prcsi-
dent with authority to decide whether n
removal should be made in any given
case; the acts of Congress declares, in
substance, that he shall only accuse
snch as he supposes to be unworthy OF
I Al hn Tnnafi4nfin. l. na
| him sole Judge in the premises; but the
statute takes away his jurisdiction,
transfers it to the SeTate, and
leaves him nothing but the odious
and sometimes impracticable duty
of becoming n prosecutor. The pros
ecution is TO be conducted be.
! fore n tribunal whose members are not,
like him, responsible to the whole peo-
pie, but to separate constituent bodies,
and who may hear his accusation with
great disfayOr. The Senate is absolute
| " without any known standard Of de
cision applicable to such case. It's
Judgment cannot he anticipated, for it
is not governed by any rule. The law
does not define what shall DO deemed
good cause for removal. Ii is impOs-
sible even to conjecture what may or
may not be so considered by the
Senate. The nature of the sub
ject forbids clear proof. If the
charge be incapacity, what evil
dence will support it'll Fidelity
to the Constitution may be under
stood or misunderstood in n Thousand
different ways, and by violent party
men, in violent party times, unfaithfnl-
ness 20 the Constitution may even come
to be considered meritori0us. II the
officer be accused of dishonesty, Eow
shall it be made out 7 Will it be infer
red from acts unconnected with public
duty, from private history, or frsm gen
eral reputation Or must the Presi-
dent await the commission of an actual
misdemeauOr in office Shall he, ia the


meantime, risk the character and inter
est of the Nation in the hands of men TO
whom he cannot give his confidence
Must he foTbear his complaint until the
mischief is done and cannot be prevent
ed If his zeal in the public service
in the public service should iDpel him
to anticipate the overt act, must he
move at the peril of being tried himself
for the offence Of slandering his sub
Ordinatef In the present circumstan-
ces of the country, some one must be
held responsible for official delinquency
ofevery kind 1t is extreiAslydif1icule 10
say where that responsibility should
be thrown, if il be not left where ii has
been placed by the Constitution. Bat
all just men will admit that the Presi-
dent ought TO be entirely relieved from
such responsibility, if he cannot meet
it by reason Of restrictions placed by
law upon his action.


The unrestricted power Of removal
from office is very great one 10 be
trusted even to a Magistrate chosen by
the general suffrage of the whole peo-
pie, and accountable directly to then
for his acts. 1t is undoubtedly liable to
abuse, and at some periods of our histo-
~ perhaps has been abused. II il be
thought desirable aud constitutional
that it should be so limited as 10 make
the President merely common
informer against other public
agents, ne should at least
be permitted to act iD that ca
pacity before some open tribunal, in
dspend of party politics, ready to
investigate the merits Of every case,
furnished with the means of taking ey-
idence, and bound to decide according
to established rules. This would guar-