Year: 1867

once, ana save the lie OF the natlon at all


hazards.


The so.called reconstruction acts, though


as plainly unconstitutional a. any that can


be imagined, were not believed to be within


the class last mentioned. The people were


not wholly disarmed of the power of self.


defense. In all the northern states, they


still hold in their hands the sacred right Of


the ballot, and it was safe to believe that,


in due time, they would come to the rescue


Of their own institutions. 1t gives me


pleasure to add that the appeal to our
common institutions was not taken in vain.


and that my confidence in their wisdom


and virtue seems not to have been mis-
placed.


1t is we'll and publicly known that enor-


nous frauds have been perpetrated on the
treasury, and that considerable fortsnes
have been made at the public expense
This species of corruption has increased,
is increasing, and, if not diminished, will
soon bring US into total ruin and disgrace.
The public creditors and tax payers are
alike interested in an honest administration
of the finances, and neither class will long
| endure the large-handed roberies of the re-
cent PAST. For this discreditable state of
| things there are several causes Some of
the taxes are so laid as to present an ire
sistible temptation to evade payment.
The great sums which officers NAV OBJ
tain, by connivance and fraud, create a
! pressure which is more than the virtues of,
many can withstand and there can be no
doubt that the open disregard Of constitu-
tional obligations avowed by some of the
highest and most influential men in the
country, has greatly weakened the moral
sense Of those who served in subordinate
places. The expenses of the United States,
including interest on the public debt, are
more than six times as much as they were
seven years ago. To collect and disburse
this vast amount, requires careful super
vision, as we'll as systematic vigilance
Our system, never perfected, was much dis.
organized by the tenure-of-ofice bill, which
has almost destroyed official accountable
ty. The president may be thoroughly con-
vinced that an officer is incapable, dishon-
est, or unfaithful to the constitution but,
under the law which have named, his ut
most power is to complain to the senate,
and ask the privilege of supplying his
place with some better man. If the SEN
ate be regarded US personally or politically
hostile to the president, it is natural, and
not altogether unreasonable, for that off,
Ger to expect that it will take his part as
far as possible, restore him to his place,
and give him q triumph over his executive
superior officer. He has other chances Of
impunity, arising from accidental defects
of evidence, the mode of investigating.
and the secrecy Of the hearing.


1t is not wonderful that official malfeas-
ance should become bold in proportion as
delinquents learn to think themselves safe.
am entirely persuaded that, under such
rule, the president cannot perform the
great duty assigned to him of seeing the
laws faithfully executed and that it disa-
| bles him most especially from enforcing
| thst rigid accountability which is necessa-
ry to the due execution of the revenue
| laws. The constitution invests the presi-
dent with authority to decide whether
| removal shall be made in any given case
| the act of congress declares in substance
that he shall only suspend such as he sup
poses to be unworthy of their trust. The
| constitution makes him the sole judge in
the premises but the statute takes away
his Jurisdiction, transfers it to the senate,
and leaves him nothing hut the odious,
and sometimes impractical, duty of becom-
ing prosecutor. The prosecution is to he
conducted before tribunal whose men,
bers are not, like him, responsible to the
whole people, but to separate constituent
bodies, and may hear his accusations with
great disfavor. The senate is absolutely
without any known standard of decision
applicable to such case. Its judgment
cannot be anticipated for it is not gov
| erned by any rule.


The law does not define what shall be
deemed good cause for removal. It is
impossible even to conjecture what may
or may not be so considered by the senate.
The nature of the subject forbids clear
proof. If the charge be incapability, what
| evidence will support it Fidelity to the
constitution may be understood or misun-
derstood in a thousand different ways and
by violent party men, in violent party
times, unfaithfuluess to the constitution
may even come to be considered meritori-
GUS. If an oficerAe accused of dishones-
| ty, how shall it be made cut Will it be
| inferred from acts unconnected with pub
lie duty, from private history, or from gen.
eral reputation or must the president
await the commission of an actual misde-
meanor? Shall he, in the meantime, rsk
the character and interests-of the nation
in the hands Of men to whom he cannot
give his confidence Must he forbear his
complaint until mischief in done and cam
not be prevented ? If his zeal in the pub
lie service should impel him to anticipate
an overt act, must he move at the peril of
being tried himself for the offence Of Sian.
ing his subordinates


In the present circumstances Of the
country, some one must be held responsible
for official delinquency of every kind. 1t
is extremely difficult to say where the re-
sponsibility should be thrown, if it be not
left where it has been placed by the con.
stitution. But all just men will admit
that the president ought to be relieved
from such responsibility, if he cannot meet
it by reason Of restrictions, placed by law
upon his actions. Unrestricted power Of
| removal from Office is o very great one to
be trusted even to magistrate chosen by
general suffrage of the whole people, and
accountable to them directly for his acts.
1t is undoubtedly liable to abuse, and at
some periods Of our history, perhaps has
been abused. If it be thought desirable
and constitutional that it should be 80
limited as to make the president merely q
common informer against other public
agents, he should at least be permitted to
act in that capacity before some open
tribunal, independent Of party politics,
ready to investigate the merits Of every
case, furnished with means of taking evi-
dence, and bound to decide according to
an established rule. This would guarantee
the safety Of the accuser when he acts in
good faith, and at the same time secure
the rights of the other party. speak, Of
course, with ell proper respect for tie
present senate. But it does not seem to
me that any legislative body can be SO
constructed as to insure its fitness for these