Year: 1877

It was through misadventure on the part


of the Russians that Osman Pacha first got
foothold in Plevna, and through gross
mismanagement that he was not driven out in
the first battle fought for that purpose No
one would have been so hardy then, even if
he had seen SO far, as to congratulate the
Russian commander on those miscarriages OF
his plan Of invasion yet it bids fair to prove,
as events now shape themselves, o great
piece Of good fortune to the Russians that
Osman Pacha surprised Russian force there
and that he has held on thus far with successful
tenacity. For the most evident conse-
quence is that events likely to be decisive
are grouping themselves about Plevna
when they might have been grouped about
Shumla, or when the Russians might have
been put in the dilemma Of being unable to
pass that place and equally unable to take it.
In their first strategic schemes the great inn
portance of the fortresses OF the quadrilat-
eral was recognized, and the difficulty pre-
sonted by their relation to the mountains
and to the Russian communications was
proposed to be overcome by the use of two
armies-one to guarantee the commune
cations against an Ottoman army resting on
the quadrilateral, the other to advance di-
rectly against the Turkish capital. That
scheme has not been acted On, because Rus
sia has been unable to put in the field the
number of troops its execution called for.
But that plan recognized the hopelessness
If getting battle from an Ottoman army in
open country in any conditions not hope
less to its adversary. If the presence of the
Turks in the quadfilateral rendered q Rus
sian march on Constantinople SO perilous
that with the forces actually in the field
it could not be ventured upon, and
If these Turks were unassailable at
Shumla and could not be forced to come
out, the Russian strategy would be caught
in position Of almost ludicrous difficulty.
And all that is what was on the cards and
what would have occurred but for the acci-
dent In virtue of which tho campaign has
taken shape with Plevna as the initial
point Of its events With the possession Of
Plevna by Osman Pacha posed as a first
fact obviously advantageous to his cause
and threatening to the enemy great efforts
on the part of the Russians to take
the place follow, and this leads up to
the movement of Ottoman armies to
the support of Osman, the formation
of lines of contravallation against these
and great general action between the re-
lieving and the besieging armies. All the
war will turn on these events and every bat
talon that either side can assemble will be
put into that action, and thus the advantage
the Russians secure from what has hap
pened at Plevna will be the fighting de-
cisive battle on ground chosen by them
selves and greatly in their favor whereas
otherwise they could not have brought the
enemy to battle or could have found him
only where circumstances SO favored him
as to give absolute assurance of victory.
One OF the most familiar instances of o
campaign with the same outline as the
present is that which involves the recent
history Of Metz and Sedan. As Bazaine was
caught in Metz and MacMahon went to his
rescue. SO Osman Pacha is shut in Plevna
and Mehemet Ali is moving in the hope
to crush, between his own and Os-
mans lines, the Leleaguering force But
the similarity is in the outline only. Osman


fights, and Bazaine did not and Mehemet
Ali has not MucMahon's notions of strategy
and will not fall into any Sedan on his way.
But the Germans who fell on MacMahon
had three hundred thousand men and Mac
Mahon had but little more than one hun
dred thousand. There is not such dis
parity of numbers in this campaign, and
Osman and Mehemet Ali between them will
give good account of themselves; but we
do not see that they can possibly win.