Year: 1878

side of the Khyber Pass, right up to Cabul,
is q distance of one hundred and ninety
two miles, in which several difficult passes
have to be surmounted, and along the whole
way, to the right and left, the country is OF
an exceedingly rugged character, abound
ing with a warlil1e and fanatical population,
whom it would be no easy task to reach and
still more difficult to subjugate perma-
nently. These people would for all time be
our open or secret enemies probably both.
II would be extremely difficult to
hold by force of arms for SO con-
siderable distance such q success
sion OF defles, and nearly impossible
to do so if any disasters attended our troops
in the country further west" Our latest
news from the British column which in
vaded Afghanistan by way Of the khyber
Pass lends peculiar interest to this succinct
description +; tor if, as there seems reason to
believe, the comm unications of that column
are effectively cut that is the country in
which the troops have got to face the diff
cult problems of short supplies and the
changed aspect of that Astounding warlike
and tanatical population.


Nobody, of course, can be surprised to
learn that the Independent savages of those
mountains, who kept very civil tongues in
their heads when the well appointed Brit
ish force was near BY, assumed their more
natural demeanor as the rear guard passed
out of sight, nor that they have closed in
behind the British force, as the waters of
the sea behind passing steamer, nor that
they are animated with the savage's instinc-
tive hunger and thirst for any sort of devil
try that the occasion may open the way to.
But there will be legitimate occasion for
surprise if it shall prove that the soldiers
who planned this advance as part of
more extensive operation, and who have
had the experience Of lifetime in Indian
operations, did not foresee and provide
against the very obvious contingency Of a
disturbance Of communications by the
mountaineers. No fact could have been
more certainly counted upon than that they
would rise behind the column either of
their own impulse or under the incitement
Of emissaries OF the Ameer or q. the instiga-
ton of chiefs in his interest. If this was
not contemplated as the inevitable course
Of events by the British commanders and
we cannot yet believe that it was not so con-
templated-if it shall prove that they have
not delved tar below the enemies mines in
that sort OF frontier tactics, then there has
been exhibited an ignorance of Oriental
craft not to be expected in such circum-
stances, and kind OF valorous bravado alto
gether out of place, but nevertheless char
acteristic of British commanders on all oc-
casions.


But how could they provide against the
obvious difficulties in regard to their
rear involved in the very nature Of that ad-
vance? Not, it is clear, by al attempt to
hold their line in force. For as it needed the
very presence of the invading army to give
the mountaineers smiling and friendly
manently in awe by the retention at every
important point of force sufficiently large
to be seIf-sustaining against all efforts for a
period long enough to give the force at ad-
jacent posts time enough to come to the
rescue BY well supported chain Of
posts the line could be held; but it would
require force at least as large as
the whole Khyber column to occupy
those posts. Indeed, TO attempt to hold
such chain of posts would be to enter
upon that labor which Lord Lawrence re-
garded as extremely difficult in the most
favorable conditions and nearly impossible
in adverse circumstances and the addi-
tional force thus required and the heavy
additional supplies it would make neces-
sary were perhaps all considered from
money point of view, and rejected
out of consideration for the al
ready distressed finances of the Indian
government Therefore, as it was decided
not to hold the line with force sufficient to
guarantee it against all possibilities and
as il would be imbecile to put any conf
dence in the good will of the country the
column must have been supplied with a
view to the loss of the communications
behind it and the opening Of new line
dependent upon the protection OF the
column whose base is at Quettah. 1t is
possible, therefore, that in cutting the line
in the defle the mountaineers hurt the
column no more than one would hurt
serpent by hostile operations against the
skin he drew himself out of last year. But
this remains to be seen.


Several incidents Of the rst stages of the
advance by the khyber Pass implied on the
part of the Afghans plan the essential
element of which was to draw the British
column the greatest distance into the coun-
try in the shortest time. Every supposed
obstacle gave way the instant they touched
it, as readily as the green branches with
which the hunter covers pitfall in the
forest Perhaps it would be too much to
say that all that wes a far-away projected
and accurately executed plan Of the Ameer
to entrap the invader but there was in it