Year: 1877

The Secretary Of War might have beer
spared his mission to Iowa. What would
have happened had the Republican Conven-
ton of that State been under less sagacioui
leadership than that of Mr.. James F. Viii


son or his successor in the Chair, it were idle
to conjecture. We may assume, however,
that Mr.. McCrary's visit 10 the State had
some other object than the repression of the
verdict condemnatory Of the Southern policy
of the Administration which the preliminary
announcement seemed to indicate. Silence ID
q sorry Endorsement. When as in this in
stance, the silence represents 9 compromise
acquicscea in by three>fourths majority a.
the alternative of positive censure, the Ad-
mlnistration must realize how completely ita
Southern action has failed to enlist sympathy,
or even to receive the sanction, of the Repub-
iican Party in a State in which its supremacy
is complete. Phers, if anywhere, the party
could afford to consider the sabject on its
merits, and to declare its judgment without
reference 10 contingencies which in more
doubtful States are always present TO the
minds of the managers. Tbs Iowa Republi-
cans have no need Of recruits. They have
but to preserve party unity to remain masters
Of the situation. And the condition of unity,
as we have seen, is a studied avoidance of the
methods employed by the President to con-
ciliate the Southern Democracy. The lesson
will not be in vain il it teach the party man
ayers in other Northern and Western States
the hopelessness Of any attempt TO extort .
formal approval of the policy which may be
quietly submitted to so far as it tells OF &C.
complished facts, but which on its merits
does not commend itself to the judgement or
feeling of the party.


There is no reason for supposing that lows
is exceptional in this regard, or that by more
careful manipulation q different result may be
elsewhere obtained. Il is only necessary to
follow the discussion in the editorial columns
Of the Republican press, and as it appears in
speeches and published correspondence, to
perceive that . broad dividing line has been
drawn upon the Southern question between
the Administration ands large portion Of the
party. Unwelcomee eas the fact is, we shall
lose more than We can gain by ignoring it, or
by acting on the supposition that it will quick
ly disappear The outlook would have been
different had Abe South responded more gen.
erously to the overtures of the President Its
ungracious resolve to take all it can get and
to give nothing in return, suggests grave
biunder in his calculations. BE assumed, un-
doubtedly, that his own superiority to the
traditions and passions of party would call
forth evidence Of kindred spirit on the side
Of the South. Experience has not verified bis
expectations. The South receives his con-
cessions as matter Of course, and employs
them to consolidate the strength Of the De


mocracy. Prom this source, therefore, he
obtains ne help whatever The consequence
is that's tie Republicans throughout the North
fndthemselves Knocked by a surrender which
brings not ssingle countervaling advantage.
They have been deprived Of strong position
without any prospect Of obtaining an equiva-
lent. This view Of the subject may not be Q
very lofty one, bat 1t ID view entertained by
the great body Of the rarty, including ito
most active workers, and In State like Iowa
its most ihhsshtS men. Their politics are
practicsls and they care very little for sensi-
ment which benefits only their opponents.


But the common sense which keeps the