Year: 1874

SM1l1t0ry Protection" ana "M1iltuTy


Government"


The Inter- Ocean, of Chicago, the administra-
ton organ of the Northwest, says that an
energetic, positive policy on the part of
President Grant will save the whole South
from scenes of blood and carnage" ''What
the South needs now, and must have, is mill.
tary protection, and, if need be, military gov
ernment.' This may be regarded as an ex-
preston of the belief of those who feel, with
Senator Merton, that the whole trouble comes
from the strifes of Southern democrats against
Southern republicans. We have no doubt
this expresses part Of the situation, but only
small part of it. The movement which
overthrow Kellogg's government by touch,
as though it were child's toy house made OF
cards, cannot be called political demonstra-
ton. Nor can it be solved by military pro-
lection" The army of the United States, had
the revolution in Louisiana proceeded to des-
perate measures, could not have captured New
Orleans without great loss Of life and treasure.
New Orleans is a peculiar city, defended on all
sides by nature. A well equipped British
army, composed of soldiers who had been in
arms against Napoleon, and commanded by
officers of experience and renown, was driven
into the swamp and destroyed by small
army of militiamen. A large portion of the
male population Of New Orleans are ex-
perienced soldiers. They served in the armies
of the Confederacy and are perfectly familiar
with the duties and hardships of war. We
have no available army now under arms and
within reach of the President that could have
taken New Orleans had it been properly de-
! Tended by these men and with the peculiar
advantages of its natural position. The
naval vessels might have shelled the town !;
but no one knows better than the President
that shelling does little harm to a large city.
Of course we could have taken New Orleans,
just as the Spanish government took Carta-
gena but Cartagena was only taken after
long siege, and after defence that severely
tested the resources of Spain.


In addition to the material difficulties at
tending the capture of city like New Or
leans we must remember also the moral effect
of an armed and living insurrection in com-
munity like that of Louisiana. and surrounded
by communities like those in the adjacent
Southern States. Such an example would
have been burning, blazing fire, throwing
out sparks and tempting new conhagration.
All the old Confederate spirit would have
found life and whatever we may feel about it,
now that it is over, however tervently we may
condemn 'the sin of rebellion" and treason"
and making war upon the best form of gov
eminent the world ever saw" it is well to
remember the practical fact that it cost
four years of war, the loss of hun
dreds of thousands Of lives and the aggre-
CATION of an enormous debt to suppress this
! spirit when it once assumed the actual front
of war. We do not say that it would cost as
much the second time, but it would cost
enough. We are not much better prepared to
! fight the South, if that is what the Inter-
Ocean means, than we were when Fort
Sumter fell. We have no army, no
navy, no depots of supplies. Time would be
necessary to create them. We may calculate
how long regular army would require to
suppress rebellion, say in the mountains of
Alabama, when we remember how long the
Spanish army has been employed in suppress
ing sporadic, lnconsequental nebulous re-
bellion in the Biscayan mountains. That job
has been forty years doing, and according to
our cable dispatches it is not quite done.


We admit that this is not the high, heroic
way to deal with solemn questions. General
Logan, who is ruler in Inter- Ocean parts.
had better plan. ''The situation in Louisi-
ana" he telegraphs the President, sis such
that in my judgment there can be but one
course pursued. That is to promptly reinstate
the deposed Governor if the whole army and
navy be required to do it, This is, we con-
fess, the heroic tone and it has the merit OF
being easily adopted, Of being popular, of
commencing itself to the average mind.
There is a good deal Of the Fourth of July in
it, and we know how dear this is to the Ameri-
can heart We have read of noted military
heroes and critics, Barry Lyndon, Captain
Jinks, Boabdil, Bombastes Furioso, Captain
Costigan, among others, who would
heartily applaud Logan's plan and disdain
any measures but the severest foi
"dealing with rebellion But the point We
venture to make, with all humility and SUBJ


mission, is, "Can we not rule the South with


out the sword?" Grant that an emergency
may arise compelling us TO move all our avail
able resources in money and men toward the
South tomorrow, and no one would question
the most extreme activity. But is this neces


sary? Does the South really need military
protection" and military government" Have
we exhausted every peaceful remedy? Do W.