Year: 1874

State, but must be introduced into the interior.


And he proceeds to show where the
line is to be found between the State and
Federal jurisdiction. Upon this point he
says:


The genius and character of the whole gov
ernment seem to be, that its action is to be ap-
piled to all the external concerns of the nation,
and to those internal concerns which affect the
States generally but not to those which are
completely within a particular State. The COM
pletely internal commerce of State, may be
considered as reserved for the State itself


No words could make clearer the doc
trine for which the Republican party is
now contending State law for the regu-
lation of that commerce which is "com-
pletely internal within the State" and Ma
tional law to regulate all such commerce
as is "among," that is, ''intermingled
with, the several states.


The whole question was discussed and
decided In a very recent case in Pennsyl-
vania, determined in the Supreme Court
of the United States. [ refer now to
what is known as the State Freight Tax
Case, reported in 18th volume of Wal
laces Reports.


In that case interstate commerce by railroad
was held to be the subject exclusively of con-
gressional control and regulation, and statute
of the State of Pennsylvania was held to be nm
constitutional and void, because it ATTEMPTED to
do that which the court held to be in the nature
of regulation of that commerce.


The regulation attempted by the State was in
the shape of tax upon freight carried by rail-
road or other transportation company "doing
business within the State of Pennsylvania" The
court held that this was a regulation of COM
merce: and being such. in far III anpIia6 tO
Interstate commerce, it was unconstitutional
The opinion in this case is in itself an admirable
and exhaustive treatise upon the very question
we are considering. Its conclusion is that the
State can make no law in the nature of regu-
lation of commerce which can apply to freight
taken up within State and carried out, or tax
en- up in other States and brought within her
limits" N delivering the opinion of the court,
Mr.. Justice Strong said:


beyond all question, the transportation of
freight or of the subjects of commerce, for the
purpose of exchange or sale, is a constituent of
commerce itself. This has never doubted, and
probably the transportation of articles of trade
from one State to another was the prominent
idea in the minds of the trainers of the Constitu-
ton, when to Congress was committed the pow
er to regulate commerce among the several
make any difference whether this interchange
of commodities is by land or water. In either
case, the bringing of the goods from the seller
to the buyer is commerce..


THE POWER OF CONGRESS Is EXCLUSIVE.


In the same case it is distinctly held
that the power of Congress in the premises
is exclusive. Indeed, it was upon this
very point that the Pennsylvania statute
was held to be unconstitutional and void.
Upon this point the court said


The rule has been asserted with great clear
ness, that whenever the subjects over which a
their nature national, or admit of one uniform
system or plan of regulation, they may justly be
said to be Of such nature as to require erclsiUe
legislation by Congress. Surely transportation of
passengers or merchandise through a State or
from one State to another, is Of this nature.


1t follows from these authorities land
many others might be cited to the same
purport) that whatever is in the nature of
a regulation of commerce among the
States must be prescribed by Congress.
And here the question arises, what is the
extent Of this power of regulation?
What may be done, and what may not be
done, under it? [ answer, using again
the language of the Supreme Court of
the United States, "under this power Con-
gress may prescribe anything in the ma
ture of a regulation, and regulation is
simply a rule for the transporter, by
which he is to be controlled in bringing
the. e.subjects Of commerce into the State
and in taking them out" The power is
no doubt very broad Chief Justice Mar
SHALL in Gibbons VS.. Ogden, thus defines
it:


1t is the power to regulate, that is, to pre-
scribe the rule by which commerce is to be gov
erned. This power, like all others vested in Con-
gress, is complete in itself may be exercised to
q no ETni ifu-
tions other than are prescribed in the Constitu-
ton.


These are expressed in plain terms and do not
effect the questions which arise in this case, or
which have been discussed at the bar. If, as
has always been understood, the sovereignty of
Congress, though limited to specified objects, is
plenary as to these objects


Mark the words 'is plenary as to those
objects


the power over commerce with foreign nations,
and among the several States, is vested in Con-
gress absolutely as it would be i'm single gov
ernment having in its constitution the same re-
StrlctiOnS on the exercise of the power as are
found in the Constitution of the United States.


Although the power itself is thus COM
plete and plenary, it should be exercised
with moderation and discretion. In my
judgment it is but reasonable that it be
exercised as proposed by the Republican
platform so as to prohibit under suita-
BILE penalties extortion, unjust discrimina-
ton and other wrong and unjust conduct
on the part of persons or corporations en-
gagged in such commerce"


THE COMMON LAW DUTIES OF A COM


MON CARRIER.


What this platform proposes is in eff
feet to require railroad companies to dis
charge their duty as required by common
law A railroad company is common
carrier, and | say that according to the
common law all common carriers are
bound to carry for all who apply for rea-
sonable compensation and without unjust
discrimination. 1t is not true that the
carrier has an absolute right to charge
what he pleases. He is a public servant,
and as such subject to be controlled by
law as to his compensation. This doc
trine was laid down by the Court of Kings
Bench in England as early as 1903, by a
judge no less distinguished than Lord
Chief Justice Holt. Later than that, in
the same court, the doctrine was laid
down in more emphatic language, at a
time when Lord Mansfield was member
of the bench. In the case of Harris VS.
Packwood, which is reported in 8 Taun
ton, and which was decided, I believe, in
1910, the decision of the court, as an
nounced by Lawrence judge, has these
words:


would not however, have it understood thai
carriers are at liberty by law to charge what
| ever they please. A carrier is bound by law tC
carry everything which is brought to him, for
| reasonable sum to be paid for the same carriage
and not to extort what he will.


This rule has always been followed by
the courts of this country and of England
and no principle in our jurisprudence is
more firmly established. 1t is, however
of little practical value in regulating the
conduct of the great corporations of the
country They disregard it with impuni
ty, and fix and change their rates at pleas
ure, because no citizen can afford to con.
test with them in the courts the question
of their power and duty in the premises
Small carriers are controlled by statute as
to their charges. The proprietors OF
street cars, omnibus lines and of public
carriages of all kinds in our cities are
limited by law to such charges as are
reasonable. The right, the power, to reg
ulate great corporation as to its charges,
is precisely as clear as is the right to do
the same thing with small carrier