Year: 1874

ENJOYING, that there be the means of
gratifying desire: for example, 1t is a
fearful thing 20 desire water and not
be able to get any.


Now so long as these two things re-
main desires, and the objects shat
viii satisfy them there viii ever be
the temptation to seek what will s,stis- :
ty the strongest present desire, at no
matter what cost to others or even to
ourselves.


1t is plain, however. that these two
things desires, and the power to graf
ify them, are not enough to make US
moral beings-srbjects OF moral law
Of whom it may be said they ought,
or they ought not. For the lower ami
mails have desires, and the power to
crafty them. Clearly however, they
cannot sin, for they lack the sense Uf
obligation that is, they lack that in
telligence which perceives the difference
between good and evil-between right
action and wrong: They lack that
moral sense called conscience We
may say therefore that these animals
are tempted but cannot SIN, When
they yield to the strongest temptation,
as they always do, they perceive no
reason why they should not. They
have no knowledge of anything better
than to act as by the strongest impulse.


But, in addition to the desires, and
the power of gratifying them, which
we have in common with all animals,
we have intelligence, reason, by which
we perceive that the qualification of
present desire is not always the best
way tc secure either our own good or
that of others that often much more
good will come from refusing or resist
ing Our desires-self- denial that is
than by yielding to them.


Along with this intelligence we have
what is called conscience, which bids
us always seek what our intel5igSnce
points out as the greatest good. We
have thus the sense of obligation, of
duty. We know we ought to obey our
intelligence, rather than to follow our
feelings or desires. But the desires
pash US, while the Intelligence simply
points us to the right way We are
ever tempted therefore, to yietd to de-
sire rather than to 80 as our reason
directs.


1t is Impossible therefore to live, as
moral beings, in this world, and not be
tempted Whatever we may think of
a future state, we cannot be free from
temptation here, and be here at all
1t is therefore no more desirable to be
free from temptation; than it is to be
freed from existence here altogether.
! For the one cannot be without the
other.


Let US not forget however that while
intelligence ana conscience, joined with
natural desires, Which desires it IS some
times best to listen TO, and sometimes
not best that while these things meant
temptation, they inean also the posi-
bility Of character and of bie$5edneSs;
a blessedness too of an infinitely high
er sort than were possible Oh any other
condition


Temptation means the possibility of
manhood.


IF we could not be tempted, it were
simply because we could not be men at
all.


Temptation too is condition of all
assurance of virtue, even if it lie not a
condition of virtue ITSELF as l believe
it is. No one could guarantee the vir-
tue of being who had never been
tempted. | mean Of course not any
! particular virtue, but virtue in the
broad sense Of character.


If person has been tempted in va
rious ways and has learned to overcome
in them all, we might perhaps be able
to warrant him, in some particular
case where he had not been tried, but
our assurance even then would grow
out Of the fact that in other things he
had been tempted and had overcome.


None of us who reach the heavenly
Paradise, will ever regret that the tree
of knowledge of good and evil was
planted in the earthly one, for We
shall surely see that the stability and
beauty and glory of holiness there is
due to its testing by means of the
temptings here,


/ Even now none Of US can wish, in
/ any case wherein we were victorious,
that we had not been tempted.
When we yielded and were defeated