Year: 1862

ing all points and places as they advance, until
some great disaster in the West will divert the
public attention from thelate repulse al. Frsde
and Northern Mississippi appear to have in
volved all our combinations against them in
serious difficulties and drawbacks, and we
shall be agreeably disappointed II great VIC
tories instead of disheartening reverses shall be
the results of this winters campaign in the
Southwest, as now conducted.


The Responsibility for the Fredericks.


burg Disaster-RePort OF the Congres.


sional Committee ON the War.


The report of the Congressional Committee
on the War fixes the responsibility for the dis
aster at Fredericksburg beyond the shadow ofa
doubt When General Burnside's whitewash-
ing letter to General Halleck was eagerly pub
lished in anticipation Of this report, the radical
press raised shout of exultation. They cried,
''See here, the War Department, Stanton and
Halleck are as innocent as the child unborn.
Nobody is to blame but Burnside himself; hs
admits it, and every other general ought to fol-
low his noble example," Burnside little thought
when he gave this certificate of character, extort
ed from his generosity when he visited Washing
ton after the battle that so base use would be
made of it by the radical journals, and we
think 1t very unlikely that he or any other gene
raj will ever again write such letter during
the present war. 1t was . trap laid for Burn
side to trip him up end mako him the scapegoat
Of the calamity. II bears internal evidence that
the points in it were suggested by another, and
are not the natural emanation of his own mind
1t is more remarkable for what it omits than what
it contains. There is not . word in it about
the failure to have the pontoons at Falmouth
at the proper time, which all the evidence taken
by the committee shows to have been the prime
cause Of the disaster, and but for which it could
not BY any possibility have happened.


The sworn testimony Of General Burnside
himself corrects the erroneous impression
which his inoeuclusivs letter il calcula-
ted to make on tho superficial reader. That
testimony is fully confirmed by the other gene
rails, and "leaves ne peg whereon to hang .
doubt" What does General Burnside testify
His evidence is explicit on several points, prov
ing the imbecility Of the War Department as
leading inevitably to the result which has now
become history. In the first place, he swsars
that, to his surprise" while on the march to
Richmond and in command Of corps, he was
visited by an officer attached to the War Depart
ment, who brought an order appointing him to
the command of the army, Gin violent snow
storm, with the army in . position that he
knew little of" in fact, he "lmew less than
any other corps commander Of the positions
and relative strength Of the several corps.'
He told General Buckingham, tho bearer of the
order, that he "did not want the command, that
it had been offered to him twice before, and
that he did not feel he could take it," He also
told his staff officers the same thing, and that he
had expressed his opinion to the War Depart
ment "over and over again that he was not COM
petent to command such an army IS this" that
Mcclellan could command the Army of the
Potomac better than any other general in it,"
and that "he (Burnside) did not think there
was any one who could do as much with that
army as General Mcclellan 1t was only on
being assured that, as soldier, he was not at
liberty to disobey that he yielded at last to
the peremptory order from the War Depart
ment.


Here was blunder the first which led to the
catastrophe at Fredericksburg. An able gene
raj, of comprehensive mind and yet atten-
tive to the most minute details--which was the
leading characteristic Of Napoleon and Wash
ington-a general to whom friends and enemies
alike paid the tribute Of praise, the Prince de
Joinville on his staff, and the Prussian officer
who fought against him in the rebel service,
whose narrative we published yesterday, doing
equal homage TO his nasterly skill-a general
who had led the whole Army of the Potomac in
numerous pitched battles, the army which he
had himself created, and who had thus gra-
dually gained by practice the skill necessary
TO move large bodies of men-was removed
without cause from the command Of those troops,
who almost worshipped hlm--removed in the
presence Of the enemy-an act which military
writers, military experience and common
sense agree to condemn. Campaigns have often
been lost by such folly. Ney's failure at
Quatre Bras, preliminary to the battle Of Wa
terloo-a failure which had fatal influence
on the results attributed to his being placed
suddenly In command Of troops Of whom
he knew nothing. In his case 1t was
necessity; in the substitution Of Burnside for
Mcclellan 1t was choice. The American General
was removed when he was rapidly advancing
against the enemy, and another was put in his
place who had proved himself good COM
mander Of twenty thousand men, a. several
other generals in the army had DONE but who
candidly stated that be felt incompetent 10
lead 30 large an army IS McClellAn's. This b