Year: 1867

Those who believed that Garibaldi'S advance
upon Rome was the premature act of fanatic,
reckless of means in his desire to obtain his
end. may be otherwise convinced by the news
we print to-day. His invasion of the Papal
States failed, but it precipitated revolution ana
upon revolution Garibaldi must have depended
for success. His arrest reused Italy more than
victory would have done. THE standard OF
revolt raised in Viterbo will be the irallylng
point of people. Garibaldi's appeal to his
countrymen will not be long without an answer.


The revolutionists in ViterbO did not need
victory, though they have it, With them 1t
is simply question of time-of their ability
to hold out. Every day that they succeed IN
maintaining their position, they gam strength.
Volunteers will join them by the hundred, ana
in a week more they will probably have an
army which the Papal army will find 1t
impossible to vanquish and difficult to
repc But they have done more than
maintain their position; they have defeated the
forces sent to drive them from BagnaTea, and
that triumph, at the least secures the move
mcnt from immediate failure. II gains time,
enthusiasm, men. BY this time the Insurgents
have no doubt been so strongly reen-
forced that the Roman Government VIII
hesitate to renew the attack. For 1t IS
not only in Viterbo that it is menaccd. The
revolution is ready to break forth III Civita
Vccchia, in Ncletrl, in Frosinone 1t exists
throughout the Popc's dominions, and is no
where more powerful than in Rome itself.
The garrison cannot be concentrated IN NlterDo
without weakening the defenses of other
districts. and in the capital the pres
ence of an army is Indispensable. The
Garibaldians are therefore secured from
any sudden and overwhelming attack, ami
have, at least, few days to increase and
organize their forces, and prepare the advance
they unqucstionably intend. The only power
that could crush them at once is the Italian
Government and there are other reasons
than the Cable telegram, which announced
his refusal to send troops to the AID OF the
Pope, for believing that Victor Emmanuel Will
not interfere. Without that information we
might assume the neutrality of the Government.
Italy inspires the revolution, and her rulers dare
not oppose force TO nations Will. Inc pubic
meeting held in Turin, the outbreaks ut Genoa,
Milan, Naples, Florence the universal indignation
at the arrest of Garibaldi, and the enthusiasm
which the rebellion aroused. are not to be mis-
understood. From Italy therefore, the Ievo-
Iutionists have nothing to feaL and everything
TO hope Practically we consider the movement
on Rome more than a rebellon-it Is an inya-
sion by the Italian people, which even the Ra-
tazzi Ministry is compelled to permit


But the patriots have one great danger. II
is French interference. France is the only
power that could successfully defend the Papal
throne, and we have yet to learn that LOuis
Napoleon has abandoned his old policy. He
may fulfill his threat of sending troops to
Rome and in that case the reyoutiOnists
may be compelled to abandon their attempt.
Yet interference of this kind ia not as easy as
it was one year ago. Too little is known Of
the relations of France and Prussia and Italy
TO Justify the assertion that Bismarck
would deny the right of the French En-
perOr to send an army into Italy, but such a
protest would be in harmony with the
recent Prussian policy. France is no longer the
dictator to Western Europe, and may consider
that the glory of defending the temporal power
of the Church might not Justify the risk of Prus-
sian interference and the certain alienation of
the Italian people. Unless France sends troops to
Rome there is great reason to believe that
this revolution will be triumphant. Sudden as


it is, it has been long medtatcd, and is too
powerful for the Pope to withstand without
help. The only practical question is whether
help can be found.