Year: 1869

It has been evident for some time past to
men of thought and foresight that terrific
conflict of arms in Europe is inevitable at
no distant day. The words of peace that
are constantly reiterated by the Emperor
Napoleon and the other ruling statesmen of
Europe amount to nothiug. They are in
tended to cover up warlike designs. They
only show the necessity for holding in check
the universal apprehension of war, 80 as to
enable the governments to complete their
stupendous preparations. The thunderbolt of
war is suspended by slender thread and is
ready to fall at any moment. The hollow
pretence Of keeping five millions or more of
men under arms in Europe to preserve the
peace-to call this state of things an armed
peace-is absurd and can deceive no thought
full person. No; it means war, and war very
soon.


But the tone of the press of Europe is not
less significant of the coming conflict An in
fluential Austrian journal speaks of triple
alliance of France Italy and Austria against
Prussia. If so, Of course Napoleon is the
prime mover in this, and he holds out sufficient
inducement to Italy and Austria for such a
combination of the Latin and Catholic nations
of Southern Europe against the Hohenzollern
hegemony and It's ambitious strides in Gen.
trail and Northern Europe We know that
the extraordinary success Of Prussia in her
war with Austria, her rapid consolidation of
great German empire, and her vast military
nd
lousy and hatred OF France. The French
people, always warlike and ambitious, chafe
under the extraordinary growth of Prussian
power, and the Emperor Napoleon is under
the necessity of yielding to national vanity
and feeding public sentiment with the prospect
of glory. His power and dynasty rest on
this. war with Prussia would suit his
policy and the ambition and feelings Of the
French people If such war could be made by
alliances or combinations that would
promise success. Austria still smarts under
the defeat of Koniggrttz and her humiliation
by Prussia, and would hail, doubtless, any
good opportunity to retaliate upon her con-
queror, and, above all, to check the growing
power OF great adjoining empire Then the
German States, particularly those Of the
southern border, which were 80 mercilessy
gobbed up or subjugated by Prussia, hate
that Power, and Austria might hope to secure
| their aid in war. With regard to Italy, it
might be supposed she would not enter into an
offensive alliance against Prussia, which was
lately her ally, and which enabled her to
drive the Austrians from Italian territory but
nations are governed by selfinterest and not
| by gratitude. Italy is far more under the


influence Of the Emperor Napoleon than of
Prussia, and undoubtedly he can secure the
offensive alliance of Italy through operating


upon the fears of the Italian government or
by promised advantages to IL. We see.
therefore, that such triple alliance as is


mentioned of these Latin and Catholic Powers
of Southern Europe against Prussia Ia quite
probable


The object of Napoleon and all his mannu-
vres, of the same time he may be strenrt
ing himself by alliances in the south. IA TO
isolate Prussia at the north, and TO keep Rus
sia neutral and England out of the quarrel.
| As 10 England, we suppose there would be No