Year: 1860

then slave territory. The trainers of the Cousli-I
tuition had no conception of this 'normal condi-
tom. When they willed that the Northwestern
territory should 5e free, it was so declared by The
adoption of the ordinance of 1857 with its proho-
i!ory clause as binding under the Constitution
The South-Western Territory was left to Slavery,
just where the laws of North Carolina and Geor-
gia had held it. The ships sailing under the fng
and carrying papers under the seal Of the United
States, attestng their nationality, are wherever
they may sail on the high seas, part and parcel o:
the territories of the United States, and under the
dominion, pure and uumiGed, of her Constitution
and laws.


Now who would he bold e,Tough TO contend that
prior 20 the year 1903. while the Constitution for
bade the abolition of the Slave trade, that the
normal condition" Of the ships which bore the
slaves was "that of freedom?


Surely they had no condition lUhateyer except
that which the Constitution, and the laws passed
under it, created. feel it clear to domonstra-
tion that the proposition as to the "normal condi
tipn" Of the territories of the United States in its
most general or more restricted sense cannot be
maintained. The other branch Of the resolution,
namely, the proposition, that Congress has but
limited power over Slavery in the Territories,
though advanced by tho Chicago Convention in
this eighth resolution, by the Breckenridge Con-
venton in their second resolution, and sustained
by the Supreme Court of the United States in the
of Dred Scott vs. Sanford. does not command
the assent Of my judgment. But if the PROPOSE
tion that the power of the United States over the
Territories is limited in that particular be true, the
Rrnp uriI IUn inp nd fhn
of the United States have the best of the argu-
ment, to say no hing of authority. But with all
any habitual Difference and respect for that Court,
and | think it second none in the world for the
qualities which give weigat and dignity to JUDI
dcial tribunal, cannot divesi myself OF the opiu-
ION that it erred this point, which was quite
unnecessary to the decision of the case.


Their error, in my judgment, consists in con-
sidering slaves property merely instead Of
considering master and slave as relations, "hch
in artificial systems man holds to man. The
latter is the view taken of it in the Constitution of
the United States Slaves. in that instrument are
not treated as property, any more than minor
children, apprentices, or men bound by contract
to perform a labor. Under The Constitution, prop
erty is not representcd-personsc ewing service are
in this their laws treat them not as property. If
ptoperty escape from one State and 20 into anoth-
er the Constitution does not direct that it shall be
delivered up. If persons owing service, it
does SO direct Congress is empowered to
regulate commerce between the States---
Commerce has to do with Property. The States
exercise the sole power Of admitting or prohibit
ing The importation from other States Of persons
owing service. Congress has the express power
to regulate foreign commerce, but is denied the
power until the year 1908 to prohibit the immigra-
tion or importation into any OF the States ex-
sting, of such persons the said State shall think
proper to admit. This implies the power to pro-
hbt their importation into any new State or into
any Territory; and the argument also involves
this dilemma; if slaves are property merely under
the Constitution, Congress prohibit their in
pOrtation into any Territory by virtue Of It's power
to regulate commercs between the States ri
they be not property but persons, the power of the
sovereign (which the Supreme Court says Con-
gress is) to regulate and fix the relations Of man
to man in the Territory is without any limitation
expressed or implied. Congress has in this point
of view, the same power to prohibit slavery, far
as property exists in the labor Of the slave, as i,
would have to make the free at twenty instead
of twenty zone, thus depriving the father of one
year of his labor. And have 50 much confidence
liz the high character and elevated feeling and
sense of justice of the Court, that do not doubt
the question will be reconsidered when case
arises if it ever do arise which shall require is
application.


But, if we admit, with the eight resolution of
the Chicago Convention, that the power of Con-
gress is limited in the Territories over that-our
special sui ject matter-I know not where to find
an argument potent enough to resist the cGnou-
sion OF the Supreme Court, sustained as it is by
it's high Judicial authority.


No vague generalites will avail anything on
either side. No general purpose of gradual eman
cipation strong enough to affect the question can
be found written down in the constituion-none
to satisfy the legal mind that they were intended
to deny Congress the power to admit slavery in
the Territories when such genera ivy, if any bear
that aspect is found side by side with that clause
forbidding Congress to prohibit the slave trade for
twenty years. Nor do think it safe to infer from
other gensraities equally vague, touching the
rights of property, which, in the language Of the
constitution, slaves are not, that Congress is de-
nied the power to exclude slavery from the terri
tories, when such generality is found side by side
with an implication quite as potent as direct le-
gal enactment, which authorizes Ctngress at once
10 prohibit the importation Of slaves anywhere ez
cept into States existing at the time OF the lorna
tion of tho Constitution would, therefore, that
the eighth resolution of the Chicago Convention
were not in its platform. 1t seems to be there for
no other purpose than 10 give opponents advantage
in the argument. 1t il an abstraction. useless in
every practical sense, as it is false in logic.


HENRY CLAY.


When Clay was living he was bitterly hostile
TO the Anti Slavery cause and abolitionists oppos