Year: 1861

ed with Maj. Anderson's decision. y
reflection. however, he took full tin
, in consulting with other officers, both
the army and Navy, and at the end


four DAYS came reluctantly to the sam


conclusion as before. He also state


at the same time that no such sutficier


force was then at the control of tn


government, or could be raised an


brought to the ground within the tim


when the provisions in the fort woul


be exhausted.


In a purely military point OF view


this confined the Administration to tn


mere matter of getting the garrison safe
" out of the fort. 1t was believed
however, that to so abandon that situa
ton under the circumstances, would b.
utterly ruinous-that the necessity un
] der which it was to be done would b.
construed as part ola voluntary poll
cv: that, hence, it would discourage the
friends Of the Union, ,embolden its adver
sarics, and 90 far to insure the latter
recognition abroad, and that in fact
it would be our national destruction
This could not be allowed. Starvation
was not vet upon the garrison, and ere
it would be reached Fort Pickcns might
be reinforced. This last would be =
clear indication of policy, and would
better enable tho country 20 accept the
evacuation Of Sumter, military nccess.
ity then. An order was at once directed
10 be sent for the troops thrown from
the steamship Brooklyn into Fort Pick
enc.


THIS order could not 90 bv land, but
must take the surer and slower route
hv sea. The first returning news from
the order was received Just one week
before the fall Of Sumter. The news
itself VAS that the officers commanding
the Sabine, to which vessel the troops
had been transferred from the Brooklyn
act;ne rnon some armistic of the late
Administration. of the existence Of
which the present 4 administration, up
TO the time The order was dispatched,
had only two varnc and uncertain ru-
mors to fix attention, had refused to land
the troops.


To now reinforce Fort Pick ems be-
fore the crisis would be reached at Fort
Snmter, was impossible. rendered SO by
the mere exhaustion ofp,isoners i'll the
latter named fort. I'll precaution against
such contingency. the Government
had a few DAYS before commenced pre-
parinr an expedition as well adapted as
might be to relieve Fort Sumter, which
was intended to ultimately
used or not, according to circumstances


The strongest anticipated case for
using it was now presented, and it was
resolved to send it forward as had
been intended.


In this contingency it was also re-
solved to notify the Governor Of South
Carolina thathc might expect an attempt
would be made to provision the fort,
and that if the attempt should be resist
ed there would be no attempt to throw
in men. arms, or ammunition without fur
ther notice, or in case or an attack up
no the fort. This II ,tice was according
II given, Nhcrenpon the fort was attack
cd and bombarded to its fall, without
even awaiting the arrival of the provis-
ion expedition.


It is thus seen that tho assault up
on and reduction of Fort Sumter, was
in no sense a matter of self-defence
on the part of the assailants. They well
knew that the garrison in the Fort could
by no possibility commit aggression up
on them. They knew they were express
" notified that giving bread to tn.
few brave and hungry men Of the gar
rison would on that occasion be attempt
ed. unless themselves, by resisting 81
much should provoke more.


They knew that the government de
sired to keep the garrison in the fort
not to assail them, but merely to main
tain visible possession, and thus to pre-
serve the Union from actual and in,me
diate dissolution, trusting as hcreinbe
fore stated, to time, dicussion and tn
ballot boxfor final adjustment, and the.
assailed and reduced the fort for pre-
cisely the reverse object, to drive on
the visible authority Of the federal I'M
ion. and thus force it to immeditc dis
solution.


| That this was their object the Execu


tive we'll understood, and having sai'