Year: 1861

suggesting the means on which I think the best and the most permanent settlement can be made; and I do not believe that any permanent peace can be secured, unless we provide some guarantees of power, as well as of principle.

 In regard to this guarantee of power, in the first place, I would resort to the dual executive, as proposed by Mr. Calhoun, not in the shape in which he recommended it, but in another form, which, think, is not obnoxious to the objection that may be fairly taken against his plan Iwould pro- vide that each section should elect Presi- dent to be called first and second Pre- sldent; the first to serve for four years as President, the next to succeed him at the end of four years, and to govern for four other years, and afterwards to be ineligible. l would provide that. during the term of service of the first President, the second should be President of the Senate, with casting vote in case of tie; and that no l treaty should be valid which did not have | the signature of both Presidents, and the assent of two-thirds of the Senate; that no law should be valid which did not have the assent of both Presidents, or in the event ot veto by one of them, the assent of | .rro s+z<s From which he came; that no pGrson shonld be appointed to q local office in the section from which the second President was elect ed unless the appointment had the assent of that President, or in the event of his veto, the assent of majority of the Sena- tors from the section from which he came.

 And, sir, if I had the power, I would change the mode of electing these Presi- dents. l would provide that each State should be divided into presidential electora districts; that each district should elect one man, and that these representatives from the whole United States should meet in one chamber, and that the two men who, after a certain number of ballots, received the highest number of votes should be submit. ted as the candidates to the people, and he should be declared as President who receiv- ed majority of the. .distrcts-the districts each voting singly. I would do this to de- stroy the opportunities which are given un- der our present system of nomination to the formation of corrupt combinations for purposes of plunder and of patronage. I would substitute this, instead of the na- tional conventions, which have already done so much harm in our system

 l would also diminish the temptation to such corrupt combinations for spells and l patronage, by the fact that the President, after the first election, would be elected four years before he commenced his service as President, and in the meantime he would be training as a second President at the head of the Senate, and exercising the veto power. The fact that he was elected four years beforehand would do much to prevent such combinations; but, further than this, the effect of such division of the executive power would be to destroy, to a great ex- tent, the miserable system of rotation in office, which exists at present, and to make merit the test of the fitness for office and guarantee for permanence in place; for, as the second President would probably keep those in office during his term of President whom he had protected by his veto power before, if they were worthy of the place, the effect would be, at least, if this system were introduced, that the rotation principle would be applied, if at all, not once in four years, but once in eight years.

 But this plan would have another good effect It would save us from most of those agitations attending presidential election which disturb the country, l "HtCH uiiotttic pupilC alIalrS, and Wl i.h arc doing So much to ele,iioraifze and coffn npt the people The election would ike place once in four years, but in one section at a time; it would take place in each section alternately, and but once in eight years and in this way we should escape those disturbances which are now dividing and destroying us.

 MT. President, I do not believe that under this system the objection would apply which has been urged against the common dual executive l have no idea that it would get up two parties, each concentrated around the different Presidents; because the second President would exercise his veto power only for the protection of his section, and would not wish to offend the other section, whose good will would be valuable to him hereafter; nor would he wish to impair and injure the influence of the office to which he was to succeed after his predecessor had passed through his term of service. The rule between them would be the rule of justice; and the probability is, that whenever there was q dispute, it would be apt to end in adopting that course which either was just or which seemed to be just, to both sections.

 Neither, sir, would it operate to retard or delay the operations of the government to too great an extent In time of war, the operation would be quick enough. In time of peace, the delay would only occur where there was dispute between the sec- tions and there the movements of govern ment ought to be slow until some means are found for.concliating and adjusting the difficulty.

 But, Mir. President, will go further. believe, putting out of consideration these sectional questions, that the working of the present executive system of our govern. ment will destroy it in the end, and lead either to disunion or despotisn, if some amendment be not made. 1 believe 1t will do so because the working of our executive system is now such as to beget and bring up party whose existence and foundation depend upon spells and plunder. I have often heard Mir. Calhoun say that most ot the conflicts in every government woulc be found at last to result in the contests between two parties, which he denominated the tax-consuming and the tax-paying parties. The tax-consuming party, he said, was that which fed upon the revenues of the government, the spells of office, the pOhoh'o oi uhcqoal anu ciass leSiSlallon the tax-paying party was that which made the contributions to the government by which it was supported, and expected nothing in return but the general benefit of it's protection and legislation; and h. said, and said wisely, in my opinion, tha whenever this tax-consuming party, as h called 1t, got possession of the government , the people must decline, and the govern ment must either go 10 pieces or assum

 another and different form.

 Now, sir, l say that.the working of ou present exclusive system is such as to pro ! duce party of that descrintion in in