Year: 1862



 my opinion, the Legislature performed It

 duty, and left nothing undone to make tp' grant complete. The duty of the Cover

 nor, under the act to subscribe fol the stock, and to make deed to the lands instead of being conditions precedent to bf performed before any right vested III tht company, were but plain duties imposed on him by the constitution to take caIe thai the laws be faithfully executed. But the decision of the supreme court, of this State in the case of Fletcher, ct al vs. Ford, 2oth Ark, upon a case almost analogous IS con- elusive upon the question. The question therein decided, was as to the time when the act of Congress, Sept. 2Sth, looO, took effect. The first section of the act granted to the State of Arkansas, all the swamp and overflowed lands, made thereby unit for cultivation, within her limits for cer- tain purposes mentioned in the act. The second section provided that the secretary of the interior should make out an accu- rate list and plats of the lands described, and transmit the same to the Governor ot the State, and at the request ot the Cover nor, cause patent to be issued to the State therefor, and that on that patent the fee simple to the lands should vest in the State, subject to the disposal of the legisla- ture. Certainly by the terms of this act, the grant to the State was not so clear and explicit as in that of the act granting the lands to this company. There 1t provides that when the Governor should request a deed, and the deed should be made, Men tue fee simple title of the lands should vest in the State. Yet the court in that case says that the act was present grant vest ing in the State, proprio 0igore from the day of its date title to the lands ofthe par ticular description therein designated.- Wanted nothing but the definition ofbound- aries, to make it perfect, no doubt can be entertained, etc.

 The object of the second section was not to postpone the vestiturc of title in the State, until patentsh ould issue, but was to provide for the entertainment of boun- daries, and to prevent a premature interier- ence with the lands by the State legislature, before they were so designated, as to avoid mistake and confusion. Where land Is granted by legislative enactment, and the grantee is authorized to demand patent for the land, his title is as much vested as if he had the patent, which Is but evidence of his title'.

 His excellency was a member of the court that pronounced the opinion from which the foregoing is quoted, but in the responsibilities now surrounding all of the executives of the Confederate States, must have overlooked the fact that such decis- ion had ever been rendered by the highest judicial tribune of the State, when he de- clared that a subscription of stock by the Governor, was a condition precedent be- fore even an inchoate title or equity vested in the rail road company, the legal title still remaining in the State. But the supreme court declares that legislative grant con veys the full title, as much as if the compa ny had deed or patent, and that a deed or patent would convey nothing, but would simply be an evidence of title. No failure on the part of the Governor to per form his duty under the act can defeat the grant. There is but one modeby which he could have defeated 1t, that isby the veto of the bill. Neglect on his part to enforce its provisions, certainly cannot destroy it's validity. In my opinion, the title of the rail road company to all the swamp lands, confirmed to the State, in the Champagnolle swamp land district-iS clear and indisputable-good both in law and equity, and in all laws, human and di- vine, and that the company possesses an equitable title to all the swamp lands in in said district, uncOntirmed, which be- comes perfect title to all the swamp lands in said district, unconfrmed upon the ascer- tainment, and the definition of their bound aries. If the grant is a perfect one, and of which there can be no question, and the title of the rail road company good one of which there is no doubt, could the convention re- peal the law, and divest the company ofits rights? I might content myself upon this branch of the question; by simply quoting from Gov. Rector's recent message to the legislature, at its called session. In speak ing of the powers of that body he says:

 ''The powers delegated to that body was to take the State out of the Union, annex 1t to the Confederate States, leaving the State government intact, all else was usur- patton. Any legislation consequent upon the change of government, belonged to the houses of the general assembly, and to the executive"

 In this view of the case, any other action of that body exercising legislative functions was necessarily void, and certainly could afford the executive no pretext to refuse to enforce plain statutory law of the State. But put it upon broader ground concede that the convention was clothed with full powers to change the constitution of the State, remodel the government, and exer- else full legislative powers, would 1t have possessed the power to have deprived the railroad company of its rights in these lands without its consent? Most certainly not. By our "bill of rights" (and which is un- changeable) no law impairing the obliga- tion of contracts shall ever be made. No argument is necessary to show that this grant Is, and partakes of all the nature and incidents of contract between the State and the railroad company, as much so as the selling of any portion of the State lands, to any citizen of the State, making to him deed therefor, is a contract. The decision of the suprme court, of this State of Ark ansas, vs. county court of Crittenden, coun- ty 18th Ark.-360, conclusively establish 1 es this position, In that case the point | was, whether the State could levy tax or