Year: 1867

il, for instance the Legislative Department


should pass an act. even through al the


forms Of law, to abolish q coordinate de.


partnent Of the government, in such casa


tho President must take the high responsi.


biities ofhis Office, aud save the lita Of the


nation at all hazard.


The so,called Reconstruction acts, though


as plainly unconstitutional as any that can he


imagined, were not believed to be within the


class last mentioned. Tho people were not


wholly disarmed Of tho power Of fself.defence.


In all the Northern States they still held in


their hands the sacred rights of the ballot


and it was safe to believe that in due time


they would come to the rescue Of their own


institutions. 1t gives me pleasure to add


that the appeal to our common constituencv


was not taken In vain, and that my conf.


dence in their wisdom and virtue seems not


TO have been misplaced.


1t is vel! and publicly. known that enor.


nous frauds have been perpetrated on tha


Treasury, and that colossal fortunes have


been made at the public expence this spe.


cies Of corruption has increased, is increasing


and if not diminished, will soon bring US into


total ruin and disgrace. The public credit.


ors and the taxpayers are alike interested


in an honest administration OF the finances,


and neither class will long endure the high.


handed robberies that have recently occur.


red. For this discreditable state Of things
there are several causes. Some Of the taxes
are 30 laid as ia. present m irresistible
temptation to evade payment. The great


sums which officers may win by connivanos
at fraud, create a pressure which is mora


than the virtue Of many can withstand, and


there can be no doubt that the open disre-


gard Of constitutional obligations avowed hy


some Of the highest and most influential


men III the country, has greatly weakened


the moral sense Of these who serve in sub0r.


dinatc places.


The expenses Of the United States, In.


c!uding interest on the public debt, arc moro


than six times as much as they wore seven
years ago. To collect and disburse thisvast
amount requires careful supervision as we'll


as systematic vigilance. The system, never


perfected, was much disorganized BY tho


''Tcnure of Office bill" which has almost
destroyed official accountability. The Pres.
ident may bo thoroughly convinced that an
officer il incapable dishonest and unfaith.
tul to the Constitution, but, under tho law
which l have named, the utmost he can do
is to complain to the Senate, and ask tbs
privilege of supplying his place with bet.
ter man. If the Senate be regarded as par.
sonally or politically hostile to the President,
it is natural and not altogether unreasonable
tor the officer to expect that il will take his
part as far as possible, restore him to hia
place, and give him triumph over his Ex.
ecutive superior.


The officer has other chances Of ;mpunity
arising from accidental defects of evidence,
the mode of investigating it and the secresy
Of the hearing. 1t is not wonderful that
official malfeasancc should become bold in
proportion as the delinquents learn to think
themselves safe. ] am entirely. persuaded
that under such rule the President canuot
perform the great duty assigned to him Of
seeing the laws faithfully executed, and that
it disables him most especially from entorc-
ing that rigid accountability which is neces-
sary to the due execution Of the Revenue
laws.


The Constitution invests the President
with authority to decide whether removal
should be made in any given case; the act
Of Congress declares in substance that he
shall only accuse such as he supposes to be
Of their trust. The Constitution
makes him the sole Judge in the premises;
but the statute takes away his jurisdiction,
transfers II TO the Senate, and leaves him
nothing but the odious, and sometimes i'm.
practicable, duty Of becoming prosecutor.
The prosecution is to bo conducted before
tribunal whose members arc not, like him,
responsible to the whole people, but to sepa-
rate constituent bodies, and who may hear
his ACQUISITION with great disfavor. The
Senate is absolutely without any known
standard of decision applicable to such q
case. Its Judgment cannot be anticipated,
tor 1t is not governed by any rule.


The law does not define what shall be
deemed good cause for removal; it is i'm
possible even to conjecture what may or
may not be so considered by the Senate.
The nature of the subject forbids clear proof.
If the charge be incapacity, what evidence
will support it? Fidelity to the Constitu-
ton may be understood or misunderstood in
a thousand different ways; and by violent
party men, in violent party times, unfaith.
funess TO the Constitution may even
come to be considered meritorious II tho
officer be accused of dishonesty, how shall
il be made out? Will it be inferred from
acts unconnectei with public duty, from
private history, or from general reputation
DR. must the President await the commits
sion Of an actual misdemeanor in office?
Shall he, in the meantime, risk the charac.
Ter AMI interest Of the nation in the hands Of
men to whom he cannot give his confidence?
Must no torbear his complaint until the
mischief is done and cannot be prevented
II his zeal in the public service should impel
lin to anticipate the overt act, must he
move at the peril of being tried himself for
he offence Of slandering his subordinate?
In the present circumstances Of the country,
omc one must be held responsible for off.
ial delinquency of every kind. 1t is ex-
remely difficult to say where that respons.
,ility should be- thrown, if 1t be not lefS
where it has been placed by the Constitu-
ion. But all Just men will admit that tho
resident ought to be entirely relieved from
uch responsibility, If he cannot meet it by
eason Of restrictions placed by law upon his
ction.


The unrestricted power Of removal from
'fiice is very great one to be trusted even
o a Magistrate chosen by the general suf-
age of tho whole people, and accountable
lircctly to them for his acts. 1t is undoubt-
dly liable to abuse, and at some periods Of
'ur history perhaps has been abused, Fin
,e thought desirable and constitutional that
t should be 80 limited as to make the Pres
dent merely common informer againseoth.
n public agents, he should ut least be per.
nitted to act in that capacity before some