Year: 1863




half dozen tardy letters from its beated
Charleston correspondent which profess to
sketch the attack on Fort Sumter, but which
in fact are mainly devoted to attacks on Adj
miral Du Pont. Not satisfied with attempting
TO describe q fight which he did not witness
or witnessed q. safe distance which made
accurate observation impossble-this CORES
pondent undertakes 10 criticse the con-
duct of it, and not content with assailing
the judgment of Admiral Du POnt, is shameless
enough to question his courage and impeach
his loyalty. The bitterness of the abuse is its
own antidote. No intelligent reader will give
any credit to opinions and misstatementJ so
obviously springng from personal malice. The
public may be at q loss TO imagine the motives
of their author, but he may be assured that
here they are well understood.


No man in bis senses will think Of offering q
defense OF Admiral Du Points bravery or loyalty
His chivalrous courage is the pride of the
Navy and both that and his generous devotion
to the cause of the Republic are remembered
/
Nor is it necessary to discuss at length the
criticism, if il can be called such, of The
Ameriean's correspondent. lie was in posses.
sion Of neither tho facts nor the technical
knowledge necessary to correct opinion, and
if he had had both his temper would have
blinded him 10 their value. 1t is enough to
state bis assertions on two or three material
points, and to state the facts which contradict
them.


lie alleges in substance that the Monitors
were so slightly injured that they could have
been taken into action next day; that their
officers we're in favor OF resuming the fight;
that Fort Sumter was so badly damaged that
another bombardment would have caused its
surrender; and that, therefore, the decision of
Admiral Du Pont TO withdraw was premature,
and the failure of the attack owing wholly to
him. Not one of these statements is true-not
even colorably or plausibly so.


The injured iron-clads were not and could
not sbe repaired the spot, Washington
telegram to the contrary having no better au-
thority than this which we dsprove. Every one
of their commanders-with possibly one e1cep-
tion-was of opinion, and so stated on board
the New Ironsides, that it was hopeless to re-
new the engagement. The extent of the dam.
! age 10 Fort Sumter could not be ascertained,
4 but there is no evidence whatever that it was
serious; that the strength of tho fort was appre.
ciably weakened by the bombardmeht One Off
Ger thought he saw two portfolios knocked
into one and that is all. Even The American's
correspondent, apparently forgetting for the
moment that he has a case TO make out, says
in one place that nothing is known as to the
amount OF injury to the Inferior, but several"
tilte.n.inch shot are "beeyed" 10 have en-.
tered the embrasures.


IA sto the officers opinions, his statements
are equally inconsistent. He declares in one
letter that all the officers Of the different ves-
sells were in readiness and most of them anxious
to renew the conflict, but in a paragraph
written three days later can only allcge that
from the reserved manner OF the captains he
is inclined 10 doubt whether all of them advised
the abandonment of the attempt The truth
ia that there was ust one commander
who hcsitated to declare positively against
another bombardment. The decision oil Ad-
miral Du Pont was sustained by the
opinions OF at least eight out of nine
of his captains-oficers who were chosen as
tho flower OF their profession to command
these irOn.clads-and by that of Capt. e. II. p.
Rodgers, his Fleet Captaia, than whom there
is no ADLER or brayer officer Of bis rank, or
perhaps any rank, in the Navy. When such
men as these decide that tho battle is hope.
less, it would seem as if even the libeluus
mouth of Tae american correspondent might
have been closed.


Aside from their opinions it is, unfortunately.
too plain case for argument. The heat OF
this fight lasted about three-quarters of an
hour and in that period five out of the nine
! irOn.ceds were so seriously disabled as TO be
unable to continue the conflict. They could
not penetrate the obstructions to the channel,
aud could not be steered into the entrance be.
tween them. Still less was it possible to have
used the RATS and torpedoes. With the raft
alone the Weehawken was almost unnanagea-
bic. If Fort Sumter had not fred d shot it
mhy be doubted whether the iron. clads could
have made their way into the harbor.


It is no pleasure to recur to this subject
still less to expose the character of The Amcri-
cans account. But this country owes debt
Of gratitude to Admiral Du Pont and TO the
other gallant officers who carried these un.
certain ironc clads under the terrible fire of
those Rebel forts, not merely for their services
IN that 1au. and rra do NOT haliaua thaI "A Z.