Year: 1868

casual way, the working of our internal
revenue system without having been
forced to the conclusion that the great


est present evil under which we labor,
and that which contributes most to de-
feat the collection Of our taxes, is the
dishonest character of the officials en-


ploy ed; and when remedies for these
are sought the impossibility of finding
nybody responsible for the appointment
of such agents or for their conduct. In
short, there is no head to the establish
ment, or perhaps it would be more true
to say that, worse than that, it is trip


pie headed monster. We have the Pres
ident, Secretary of the Treasury and the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue to
look to; all and each, in fact-neither
of them acknowledging full response
bility. What is the consequence? Tax
PAYERS commit frauds; officers connive
at them; often they even give actual as


sistance in the stealing that is going on;
complaints are made; the Commissioners
replies that he has no power over these
officers to remove the thieves and ap


point honest men, because selections are
made through the Secretary of the Trea


sury and the President. The Secretary,
if appealed to, explains that he can do
nothing but advise the President, and
shelters himself in that way. The Pres


ident interposes both the Secretary and
the Commissioner between himself and
the people, and the simple result of it
all is that the whole country is looking
on, the stealing is not stopped, but pro-
ceeds, growing worse and worse. and


the scoundrels bolde: and bolder from


day to day, until the whole aggregate of
evil is appalling, and it has become
question who rules the country-whether


its proper constitutional authorities or


gangs of tobacco thieves and whisky


ring p Mr.. Schenck went on to say
that a writer in the New York Evening


Post had charged that the Committee
on Ways and Means and its chairman


were assuming to be king makers in
giving such great powers to the Com
missioner OF Internal Revenue. The
writer illustrated his argument by refer,
ence to section ten. That was an un
fortunate illustration, for it SO happened


that that was one Of the sections copied
from the existing law. If the House
should refuse to confer this power on


the Commissioned. then he would ask
the House to confer it on the Secretary
OF the Treasury without the intervention


of tue Commissioner, or on the Presi
dent without the Intervention Of either
| the Secretary or the Commissioner, or
somebody who would be held to account
for what is done and for what is omitted
in matter SO vital as the raising of
revenue honestly, fairly and without
fraud and robbery. There was, in fact,
no head now; there was triple headed


monster-the President the Secretary of
/ A.
And another element of division of pow
er was the necessity of procuring con
firm atoms by the Senate of officers of
the revenue. Between the President,


the Secretary of tue Treasury and the
| Commissioner there was such division
, OF responsibility that nothing was done.


If the President, the Secretary and the
Commissioner were all right, then there


was another body in the Senate, where
| fault might exist or not, acting on the
/ recomme endation made through the pro.


per channels He did not say it was SO;
| but he said that from the divided re-


sponsibility and want of accord between
them there were no proper officers to
collect the revenue, and therefore steal
| ing went ON. These facts tended to il


lustrate the proposition that the country


had an establishment without respon-


siblc head, and that the law would never
/ be executed or the taxes collected until
| the system was reduced to a concentra-
| ted responsibility. The committee had
settled down on the conclusion that the
! true way to get the taxes collected was


to impose responsibility on one officer


strongly empowered and armed for the
purpose, and to hold him to the strictest


account for everything lie shall do under


such circumstances, that all public OBJ


servations and all watchfnlness Of the


law may be concentrated upon him. He


admitted that great power was conferred
| by the bill on the executive officer, not


much greater, however, IAN is now ex-


ercised by the Collector Of Customs at


New York. It was great power to be


conferred on any officer, and yet it would
be found that in the different provisions


of the bill the committee had taken


great care to hold the Commissioner to


closest accountability. Mr. Schenck


proceeded to show what effect the bill
would have on the cost of collection,


and stated that the bill proposed to abol-


ish the system of tobacco and whisky


inspectors. paid by the distillers and


manufacturers, and to have their duty


performed by storckeepers to be paid


by the Government. The saving in the


aggregate cost of collection he estima
| ted S6S9,970 The committee had


matured system of supervision In
! stead of special agents, the com mittee


proposed that in every Judicial district


there should be a supervisor of internal


revenue. But instead of being wan


dering officer he should be responsi


BILE man, properly paid by the Govern


ment. having fixed Office. and whose


duty it should be to supervise, look af


ter, attend to and report upon the con-


duct of all local revenue officers in the


district Even he, however, would have


to refer the case for final action to the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue; and


thus the system of responsibility, from
tho hoaI nf tho 6ono RI m nf 6ov MI ri