Year: 1865

view, John Van Buren, in recognizing the col
lapse of the Chicago democracy, has pointed to
one OF the heroes Of the war, whose achieve
ments furnish the required popularity and
whose stalesmanlike letters supply the neces-
sary platform for a new and powerful opposi-
tion party. The events of Me next six months,
we suspect, will go far to determine The saga
city Of this proposition and the shaping Of tho
momentous campaign for the succession.


The situation In North Carolina-sher-


man, Schofield and Johnston.


Shermans army was encamped ct Fayette-
vile, North Carolina, on the llth inst, resting,
preparatory to another northward march; and
the latest news from Schofeld leaves him in
possession Of Kinston. Sherman and Schofeld
were in communication by way Of Wilmington
and Newbern, even II they had no more direct
route; so that thoy certainly understand each
other, and the two forces are already moved
by one will. Sherman, when he moves, will,
from all appearance, move towards Goldsboro,
and SchoHeld in the same direction; and Colds
boro is the point at which the two forces should
concentrate, in view Of the presence Of heavy
force of the enemy to contend against Bat
Goldsboro itself is in the hands of that force,
and thus the enemy apparently has the oppor-
tunity, II he has the will or the power, to
fight the forces separately before junction is
possible. Has he the power to do 80, and, If he
has, is It probable that he will use it in that
ways


From all appearance the enemy has between
twenty and thirty thousand men near Colds
boro. This force ls made up from what Bragg
had at Wilmington and Of the rebel Army of
the Tennessee, now under Johnston. Doubtless
the force that was in Charleston Is there also.
Altogether this is very good body Of troops,
and will make tough fight. An attempt has
already been made with portion Of this force
to check Schofeld's advance That attempt
failed, and was very dear one for the enemy.
But, considering what temptation this
situation offers to the enemy, and how
much 1t would help their resistance
of Sherman If they could annihilate Scho-
field, it seems hardly possible that they
will abandon that attempt without another
battle. The blow already given by the enemy
with this view was precipitate and badly de-
livered one, and was not even given with the
enemy's whole power. They will argue from
that that better result is possible with the
means at hand even, and will try 1t again if
there is time. Bragg has doubtless been with
drawn from Kinston to consolidate the whole
force on some good field nearer to Goldsboro,
and if that field is chosen by Johnston, and an
offensive battle is given by the enemy under
Johnston's direction, II will be much more
considerable affair than the recent attempt
on Cox's lines by Hoke's division. It seems as
if there could be no great disparity between
the two forces; and the enemy have great
deal to gain by victory.


On the other hand, they have very great deal
to lose by staying at Goldsboro, If any awkward
event should chance to keep them there little
over their time; for then Sherman would be on
them, as well as on the only lines by which
the army under Johnston could ever join the
army under Lee; and even victory over Scho-
field would be dearly purchased by the defeat
that Sherman would give Johnston, or even by
Johnston's being forced so far from his true line
Of retreat that he would be separated from Lee
by the army under Grant Johnston and Bragg
will stay at Goldsboro, in the hope to get sat
isfactory battle out of Scho6eld, as q prelimi-
nary step to operations against Sherman
as a sine qua non, indeed, Of any possible
resistance of Shermsn's advance; for, il
Sherman and Schofeld should form their juno
ton safely, any attempt Of the enemy to keep
the field In North Carolina will be worse than
hopeless. But while they stay to fight
schofeld they will keep very keen
eye on Sherman, and If he should stride too
rapidly up from Fayetteville, 80 as to give any
chance that he would be in at the battle or if
he should stretch threatening left too near to
Raleigh, then Ae rebel heroes who now, in the
language Of the rebel papers, "prevent" the
junction Of Schofeld and Sherman, will hurry
away from Goldsboro with the most reckless
haste.


They will do this, because the great, para
mount and ultimate issue is necessarily of more
Importance than any lesser one can be, and
simply to save 80 many men from useless
slaughter for q final chance by battle. II the
junction Of Sherman and Schoneld cannot be
prevented without risking the loss Of the now
important force under Johnston, then that juno
ton will be permitted to take place the enemy
will abandon North Carolina entirely, as they
have already done South Carolina, and every
man that they now have in North Carolina will
be concentrated in virginia-perhaps on the
Roanoke river-to swell the force that the
enemy expects to concentrate for last grand
trial by battle. For to keep themselves in
condition to fight one more great battle, and to
keep enough men in the field to give them
reasonable hope for success in that battle, is
now the sole idea of the rebel leaders. Hence
all minor chances will be thrown away when
they appear to imperil that chance. If the con-
cenration Of Lee, Johnston, Bragg, Hardee and
all others will give the enemy one hundred
thousand veteran troops, and If those troops
can, as the enemy hope, be concentrated at any