Year: 1862

--'A W AASw Vi ~ pIScchs "no - ~~sS ~
,ope with him. General Scott indicated him a.
he best commander for the whole army,
and It 10 the rsshest presumption on
he part Of mere oivilians--third rate law
vers-to remove him from 1t, and put in his
place generals untried upon q large scale. 1t
b true that the greatest generals the world ever
,aw took command of armies without ever hav-
ing led regiment against the enemy. Peter
The Great, Conde, Frederick and Napoleon are
But these are exceptions to the
general rule, and we would be wofully deceived |
by following the exceptions instead Of the rule.
Even Napoleon-a general of such surprising
genius-did not suddenly assume command Of
large armies. 1t was only by degrees that he
acquired the skill to WELD vast masses of men.


Mcclellan, with his larger experience and
greater military knowledge, would not have as
sailed so strong position as that of the enemy
behind fredericksburg. If he had decided to
move by that route he would have turned the
position above or below. Burnside, after this
lesson, will perhaps do better next time, and
he may yet prove himself able to lead to vic
tory an army Of one hundred and fifty thousand
men. There can be no doubt that the removal
of Mcclellan and the substitution of Burnside
in the middle of winter campaign, while the
army was on the march, was one main cause Of
the disaster which followed. 1t is pretended
that he was removed for disobedience Of Or
ders. It is yet to be proved that he ever dis
obeyed any positive orders it was in his
power to fulfil. If he did so, why has he not
been court martialed? And docs it not seem
strange to every one that the abler general
should be hampered by orders while the less
experienced, we are told, had a carte blanche


The more immediate cause Of the disaster is
proved to be the delay on the part Of the War
Department in sending forward the pontoons as
agreed to by General Halleck. With his usual
foresight, General Mcclellan, on the 9th Of
November had despatched IN order to have
the pontoons in the vicinity Of Harper's Ferry
sent to Washington, with a view to their being
taken thence to Falmouth in the event Of his
deciding upon change Of base. On the 7th or


9Th Burnside received the order investing him


with the command. Halleck and Meigs went


down to Warrenton and on the nights of the


llth and 18th of November discussed with


Burnside the plan he proposed, and part of


that plan was that Halleck should send down


pontoons Immediately to Falmouth for the


purpose Of crossing the river. So important was


haste that he then and there sent despatch to


General Woodbury., commanding the Engineer


brigade, to transport all the pontoons and


bridge materials to Aqua Creek. On the l4th


Burnside, feeling uneasy that he had received


no intelligence that the pontoons had started


telegraphed to General Woodbury. and Major
Spaulding. 1t turned out that this was the nrst


time they had ever heard of the pontoons! AL


though Burnside had sent his plan to the


authorities at Washington on the 9th, it was


not till the 10th that the pontoons started, and


they did not arrive till the 22d or 23d of


November-ten days too late, and when Lee


had ample time to concentrate his troops and
fortify his position.


General Woodbury. testi6es that he did not
receive information in time as to the move
mont which was about to be made. "The
Quartermaster's Department was almost totally
destitute of means. With the very short notice
given him, there was only one possible way OF
supplying the army with a pontoon train in
time. Had the emergency been made known
to him in any manner he would have disregard
ed the forms Of the service, and seized teams,
teamstsrs and wagon masters for instant service
warrant for such course, which, after all,
could only have been carried out by the au-
thorty Of the Generaln Chief"


General Meigs, Quartermaster, testifes that he
did his best to forward the pontoons; that the
time was too short in which to send them
General Halleck, being examined, declared that
he did not hold himself responsible for any
thing more than to give the order. He did not
consider it his business to see It carried out,
but thought it was General Burnsdes busi-
ness to look after the pontoons in Washington.
This is cool Burnside was suddenly placed in
command Of large army, and was to leave it \
and 60 to Washington to look after pontoons,
which Hallcck and Meigs had already under
taken to send him, and when the Secretary of
War, too, WAS there to sec the the matter at
tended to Burnside indeed says that If he had
thought the authorities would have neglected
it he would have sent his own officers for the
pontoons. But Halleck deceived him. and
never informed him that he would not or could
not do what he promised.


General Burnside positively swears that "the
of the pontoons at the time he ex-
pected prevented his crossing at the time he
expected to cross, and interfered with the sue
cess Of his plan" General Sumner swears that
he "could have taken Fredericksburg and the
heights on the other side Of 1t at any time within
three days after his arrival If the pontoons had
been there" General Sumner adds that the
army was "dsmoralzsd" In consequence Of the
battle, and that "there was a great deal TOO
much croaking and not sufficient confidence" |
General Franklin testifes that If the pontoons
had been ready at the time of the arrival OF the