Year: 1862




forces a full account Of the causes which led to
it, copied from the army correspondence of The
Savannah Republican, win be found interesting:


/ endeavored to prepare your readers for this
movement by an intimation thrown out in the con-
cluding paragraph of my last letter. 1 refer to
the subject again merely to say, that the eyacua-
tion of Coriath, under the circumstances which
environed the army, was both wise and necessary,
brief statement will suffice to demonstrate.


The soil around Corinth is of that peculiar
character which is very wet in winter, and very
dry in summer. AS was stated in former letter,
saw a mule drowned in small branch near the
town, where, two weeks afterwards, there was not
drop of water to be seen. The consequence was,
at the time of my departure, both the troops and
horses suffering for water to an extent you
can harady imagine The chief supply was OBJ
tanned from the standing pools in the beds or ex-
hausted streams. Steps had been taken to bore
number of wells, but it was ascertained that there
was no rope or tools to be had in the town, and
that it would be necessary to send to Column
bus, Miss for the particular kind of rope desired.
The rope had not been received up to the 10th,
and but for timely showers which renewed the
supply in the water courses, and the wells dug by
the men in low, damp places, the army could not
have remained there as long it has. The citizens
use rain water caught in cisterns from the lst of
October to the Ist of May; but the supply in the
cisterns was not sufficient to last the army one
week.


But it was not want of an ample supply of wa
ter alone that rendered it proper for our army to
retire from Corinth. Our encampment was bound
ed on three sides by Bridge creek and a dense
swamp-in front, on the right, and in the rear
and our breast works were just behind the swamp
and ran parallel to it for considerable distance.
The swamp was crossed by four or FIVE roads, near
which we had planted formidable batteries to cut
off all approaches by the roads. 1t would now
appear that the same thing has been done by the
enemy, who has advanced up the swamp on
the other side, thrown up breastworks, and posted
heavy siege guns, which not only command tho
roads leading from out side, but are of sut-
icient calibre to shell nearly every part Of our en-
campment. lie has also thrown up strong works
near Pennington and Pea Ridge, and erected
heavy batteries at commanding points along the
several routes to the rear Indeed, the Federal
works are superior to ours, and their position
equally strong, if not stronger, while their force is
ne-fourth, if not one-third, greater.


1t was hoped and expected that HalIeck would
attack US in our position; but this he too SEN
sibe to do, for defeat would lave been the certain
result. Could we expect a different result, if we
should attack him behind his formidable works
and with his superior force 1t was never inten-
ded to allow him to approach SO near ant to got
into position without first offering him battle.
This we did at Pennington, when he declined to
pick up the gauntlet thrown down to him; and
this we sought to do on the 23d, when it was found
impossible, because the ground had not been pro-
perly reconnoitered and mapped to get our right
wing, which was to lead the attack, into position
Had we encountered the enemy on that day, in
accordance with the order Of battle agreed upon
by our officers | do not see how we could have fail
ed to win the greatest and most decisive victory
thus far achieved in the war. That night, how
ever, and the next day, the enemy moved up and
got into position, where it would be as great mad
ness for us to make the attack as it would be for
him to attack US.


Why, then it may be asked, should we, and
not Haileck, retire? Because Halleck is provided
with ms of long range and heavy calibre, with
| which he can throw shot and shell into almost
every part of our encampment every two or three
minutes, day and night as long as he pleases, and
| because he has better water and more abundant
supply than we have.


The chief advantage the Federals will gain by
| the change will be the use of the entire line OF
the Memphis and Charleston railroad from Steven
son to Memphis. They are good workers and will
soon rebuild the bridges over the Tennessee river
and Bear creek, and those over the Hatchie and
other streams west of Corinth, which the Confcd-
crates will doubtless destroy. As soon as these
| lost bridges can be rebuilt, Memphis and Fort
Pillow will be occupied, we'll as those sections
of the Mobile and Ohio and Tennessee and Ohio
railroad which lie north of the Memphis and
| Charleston road.


Tho withdrawal down the Mobile and Ohio
road will diminish our transportation and bring
the army into a more healthv section of country,
where all kinds of supplies more abundant and
the water much better. The enemy, on the con-
trary, should be follow us up, will have to march
sixty five or seventy miles into the INTERIOR where,
in case OF disaster, he would be cut to pieces and
destroyed


A BADLY MANAGED RAILRoAD.--It is get
ting to be as much as ones life is worth lsays the


Raleigh Register) to travel ON the u hailroad:
Smashes-up are getting to be the general rule,
and safe traDsits upon it the exception. We take


the following from the Salisbury Watchran:


c,,.nurn ITp-A frichtfnl Railroad collision