Year: 1862




equal step, for he was too ignorant to


know that the Greeks aud Romans had


used it; and he introduced the principle


Of equal subdivisions occupying, whether


by flank OF in column, spaces always
eqnal to their front in the line of battle.
This was precisely what Marshal de SAKE
had advocated in his "Rsvwiss" in his
ludicrously pathetic style. The Prussiau
army was instructed upon this principle,
and became q fit instrument for the
genius of Frederick the Great, who i'm
proved upon the evolutions which he
found in use. The French adopted the
system and improved upon it also, during
the long wars Of Napoleon and now we
have it in its utmost perfection. What
is one of the great principles upon which
it rests? To substitute the action of
masses in the place of the action of the
individual soldier; aud we will show that
this principle has been carried to disas-
trous extent. ~


We have already seen how arduous
was the education of the soldier in
ancient times, and in the middle ages
Long, long indeed must have been the
training required to fit the man of war
for all the duties of his profession. But
all this has been changed. In one month
you can make soldier of a very awls-
ward clod-hopper. Let US see, however,
what he can do. He can face to the
right and left. He can keep time and
dress in marching; he can perform the
manual of the musket, which is no doubt
very pretty when executed simultane-
ously by battalion of a thousand men.
If he is attack ed, he can stand still with
his musket and bsyonet straight before
him. If it is he that attacks, he can
march forward with his weapon in the
same position. And above all, he can
fire! (God save the markD he can fire
with the certainty of hitting the enemy
taking the highest average), once in a
thousand shots y Remember, he can do
all this in the ranks. But suppose that
the ranks are broken and he is isolated,
what eau he do then? Alas, tactics does
not say, for it does not consider an iso-
lated soldier worth paragraph. 1t con-
siders masses only. 1t has never taught
him the art Of offence or defence. He
may fire his shot, which will most proba-
bly, miss, and then what? The manual of
the musket will not save him, and very
moderate swordsman will push aside his
bayonet and cut him down in twink
ling. There is but one thing left for
him. He may, according to the instruc-
tion which he has receiye ed from the drill
sergeant, "face to right about" by "turn-
ing on his left heel" and then stepping
off with his left foot" march off "in
double quick time," (which may be in-
creased to q run"


The great fault Of this Prussian sys-
TEN is to have made of the soldier mere
machine. 1t has taught him to march,
to pull trigger aud to hold inertly his
bayonet in front of his body, all at the
word of command, supplying this def
cheney of the means of attack aud de-
fence, by the numbers and the regularity
of the ranks. As long as it was en-
ployed against an enemy that used it
also. its defects were less perceptible.-
But when from various cil cumstsnces, a
different mode of attack was used, how
useless became the discipline Of the
"regulars." Look at our own history
What advantage did the system give to
the troops of the unfortunate Braddock
whe: the concealed Indians opened their
fire upon him? What could they do?-
Their firing was a mere waste of powder.
Could they break ranks and attack hand
to hand? There was not one of those
British regulars that would have been
able, out of ranks, to contend, with his
musket and bayonet, against the toma-
hawk and scalping knife. Had it not
been for Washington's Virginia riflemen,
who had weapons in which they could
trust, and no tactics to cucumber them,
perhaps not one man would have escaped
from that field of blood. 1t was the
same thing at st. Clair's defeat; and we
have seen it repeated twenty times on a
smaller scale in our Indian wars. When
Major Pitcairn's grenadiers, marching
back from Lexington and Concord, found
the country rising upon them, and q
calling fire was poured into them from
every hedge, what were they to do p
Skirmishcrs were not then used in the
British service. They were in column of
march upon the road. If they had seen
an enemy drawn up in battle array, the
case would have been clear. But here
was foe who retreated when pressed,
only to return moment after This foe
was sheltered by various obstacles, and
moreover, scattered in such open order
that while it seemed to be every where in
his power to indict injury, he was no
where in particular when it was neces-
sary to attack him; and the bewildered
greuadiers knew not what to fire at
How many thousand shots were fired by
the 500 grcnadiers who went to Lexing-
ton, and the 900 who joined them at Con-
cord on their return, in order to kill and
wound eighty-four Americans Suppose
that instead Of being in one days march
of their garrison, they had been three,
how many Of them would probably have
reached il? And who drove them back,
brave as they were undoubtedly, who
drove them back with shame and grievous
loss! A handful Of ploughmen, mcchsn-
les, citizens who had no arms but a few