Year: 1863

President fo-ebore all mention Of military mat
ters in his annual message rather than allude
to so notifying a topic, and the Secretary of
War, equally tender Of coming TO particulars
in relation to that disastrous exhibition of in
competent Generalship, deputed to Gen. Hal
leek the task of apoogizing for that most dis
credtable part of the history of the war The
whole thing was such palpable and gigantic
blunder that any defence OF it by non-military
men, like Mr. Lincoln or Mr.. Stanton, would
have made little impression on the public. So
bad a case required a good advocate, and TO
Gen Halleck was committed the task of de-
tending the Pope campaign. Gen. Mcclellan
had considered that campaign great military
error from its inception he had protested
against it with great earnestness and argumen-
tative force and so Gen. Haleek, reapsing
into the habits of the San Francisco bar-of
which he is member-attempts to strengthen
his defence Of weak cause By casting impu-
tatious on the counsel for the prosecution.


A careful examination of Gen Haleck's
elaborate apology will show that he had better
have initiated the discreet retcence of Presi-
dent Lincoln and Secretary Stanton. Passing
over the mass of subordinate details by which
Gen Haleck attempts to confuse the percep
tions of his readers, and coming at once to the
pith of the subject, we shall make it evident
that the controlling reason for Withdrawing
the army from Harrisons Landing against
Gen. McClellan's earnest remOnstrances is a
reason which reflects the highest discredit on
the Administration. BE- the showing of Gen


Haeck himself, the controlling reason why
Gen. McClellal was withdrawn was that the
administration could not furnish him the rein
forcemenis he required for the execution of
his own plans If Gen. Mcclellan would have
advanced against Richmond with a reinforce
ments of twenty thousand, his wishes would
have been acceded to; but as be would not
undertake the capture of that city from Har-
rison's Landing without fifty thousand or at
least thirty FIVE thousand his judgment was
overruled and his army withdrawn. "All of
your plans" wrote Gen. Halleck to him, ere
qnire reinforcements which it is impossible TO
give you. 1t is very easy to ask for reinforce
ments, but it is not so easy to give them when
you have no diSpoSable forces at your com,
mand' The consideration on which the army
was withdrawn was merely question Of l5,-
600 men; the President Offering 10000, and
Gen. Mcclellan requiring $4,000 as the mini
mum with which he was willing to undertake
the capture of Richmond. Now 1riose .fduit
lras it that these $4,000 troops could not be
added to an army in a strong position within
twenty five miles Of the rebel capital-nearer
than any Union army seems likely to be again
for great while to come? How did it hap
pen that so petty matter as a difference of
10000 men was the controlling reason which
broke up the wellconsidered plan Of Gen Nc
Clellan, and substituted another in which be
had no confidence and which proved in fact so
disastrous that full employment is low found,
not for $4,000 more men, but for forty times
15,000-that being the amount of the two
new leyies? Who is responsible for the ina
bility to furnish the reinforcements which
would have rendered McClellan's campaign
against Richmond a success? Not Gen. Nc
Clellan himself most certainly, who has never
moderated the enemys power Of resistance,
and who. at the very outset of his campaign,
early in the spring, was deprived of portion
of the men be though necessary TO success
About this time total stop was put to the
enlistments, on the ground that our army was
large enough. Nobody has ever claimed that
this biud and fatal step was taken at the in
stance Of Gen. Mcclellan it was the act of
those who withheld from him the corps of Nc
Dowel, which be thought essential to the sue
cess of his plan in the Peninsula; it was the
act Of those who continued to deny his requests
for reinforcements from that day till the date
of the order for his withdrawal from Harri-
sons Landing. 1t is the height OF absurdity
for the administration to excuse itself from
furnishing confessedly needed reinforcements on
the ground that they had not the men to give
when the lack was owing to nothing but their
own folly in stopping enlistments an act Of
which they afterwards were so ashamed that
they burst not encounter the public derison
they were conscious Of deserving in calling for
vast armies 50 soon afterwards, and resorted TO
the trick of getting the State Governors to ad-
rise them to make q call.


Gen. Halleck thinks the Pope campaign was
the next best thing to complete success, mas
much as the enemy did not actually capture the
national capital. His precise language is
" Although this short and active campaign was
from causes already referred to. less successful
than We had reason to expect, it had accom-
plished the great and important object of COW
ering the capital till troops could be collected
for its defence But was it not owing to this
short aad active campaign that the capital