Year: 1859

VICTORIOUS army pressing nearer and nearer to
nef own detences. To be prepared for war with
rance at moments notice would have been i'm
pefalVe, and experience shows that troops kept on
the lookout for an excuse for hostties soon con-
trlVe 10 make one. To hare necessitated the pIacing
o. a Fr"ss'Gn army al alony the line of the French
tronier, and to haae pushed the French army forrard
TO the rery borders of the frontier of Ausfrn royyi
hare mtttedtbe chances of hoqfiities ritb German,
housdndfold. And though if circumstances re-
quired these risks, Napoleon is not the man to
shrink from them yet when the fortune of war has
not laid that necessity upon him, he is not so fool
ish as to create it, rather when he sees the op-
portunity of relieving all parties from the mseries
of war actual or prospective, he has the and
sefdenial to embrace it,


The greatness of the monarch has overcome the
just pride and ambition of the soldier The love of
human kind has reached further than the love of
conquest or the love of self In the course now
taken the Emperor has given a splendid nonplus to
his numerous detractors. He has been charged with
the lust OF ambition, the greed of power, and a
recklessneSs of the lives and happiness of men. His
object, said many English publications. was to "set
Europe in blaze''-''to find work for his army
ITO help despotism'-and "to crush libertv." Let
facts answer. Were these bis objects nothing could
be easier. He never had, and probably never will
have SO good an opportunity of accomplishing such
netariOus designs


Europe might easily be set in blaze at the pre-
sent moment. shot from a French gun-b at off
Trieste, razzia of a French detachment into the
TyroI, would light up the fame. The mine is ready
all the combustible elements are there 1t needs
but the hand of the incendiary, and the gigantic
mischief will be perpetrated as certainly as a maya
zine may be exploded by single spark. But what
does Napoleon at such moment? What is his
course when, il his designs are so wicked every
thing is in his favor? He offers peace He saws
to Austria: "You have proof enough of the
strength OF our will and the capabilities of our
armies. If you are wise you will now give in. If
you refuse go on" The logic is irresistible and
so we trust that peace is now possible.


1t is now that the other powers in Europe will be
called IN to assist The bases Of negotiation must
OF course be in substance those which We're declared
beforehand to be essential to the regeneration of
Italy France in offering peace can contemplate
no other terms. These imply the extension of Sar-
dina to the dimensions of powerful kingdom by
the annexation of such other territory as NAV be
deemed proper; the disposal of Venetia in such a
manner as shall secure itsnationaty and independ-
ence; the reform of the Roman States so az to pre-
clude the necessity Of any revolutionary action on
the part CT the people; and such reforms in Naples
as shall raise that depressed kingdom to the
improved level OF the rest of Italy, as she will be
when the forthcoming counsels have taken effect
This done, the mission IF France in Italy will be
ended the long standing danger to the peace of
Europe will have been removed. The Emperor of
the French will then have only to return to his
grateful subjects exalted in their eyes by his signal
triumph, laden with the gratitude of all Italian
patriots, entitled to the thanks of Europe the con-
idence of England, and the respect of the great
military power whose position in Europe he never
allOWeu himself 10 forget, even in those moments
OF victory when he had the strongest reasons for
being proud of his own.


THE ARMsTICE.


From the London Saturday Rerie,u.I


Of all the many surprising events of the present
year the armistice is the most unexpected Whether
it proceeds from the pressure of England or from
the overtures of Prussia the announcement is mys.
terious aud, it may be added, unwelcome. 1t is
one OF the unfortunate results of lawless war that
even the suspension of bloodshed involves new
grounds for confusion and for alarm. The termi-
nation OF victorious campaign, before France has
seriously felt the burden of the war, suggests the
certainty OF new encroachments on the independ-
ence of Europe. The interruption of hostities,
like every other part of the recent transactions,
takes place at the moment which is obviously most
favorable to the aggressor.


Uniformly successful in the field, Napoleon III
was about to enter on the most difficult and uncer-
tain operation of the war. 1t universally felt
that the campaign had reached its most serious
Crisis, and that the success of the invading army
was but provisional and uncertain until Verona
and Mantua reduced. The reinforcement un-
der Prince Napoleon somewhat more than suf-
Ecent to make good the losses on the bloody day
OF Soterino and although it is impossible to obtain
correct in ormaton, the French and Picdmontese
must probably by this time outnumber the Austri-
ans in Italy. The question whether their prepOn-
derance was sufficient for the purpose of three or
four great sieges could only have been solved by
experience. 1t is necessary that in every
instance the bcleaguering force should be
stronger than the garrison, while the main army is
at the time ready to protect the siege against
relief from without Experience seems to show
that fortress is really impre enable and that the
most elaborate works only represent the necessity
OF a certain expenditure by the besiegers in men
and material. When, as in the present instance,
defenders are in communication with great army
In the field, the advantage Of strong positions is
brought to its highest point. BY pausing on the
eve of the decisive struggle, the French Emperor
will avoid great risk, and at the anne time hc
will reap many of the advantages which would have
attended complete victory Austria will be uni
verSalIy held to have acknowledged defeat, and
the credit of moderation will perhaps be added to
the splendor which attends the display of rresisti
bic invincible strength.


ANY difficulties which may have affected the
prosecution of the war will be kept secret or soor
orgotten and if its osensble object is imperfectly
achieved, the partial settlement of the question il
dispute VIII leave convenient opportunities for fu
ture interference. The urgency of neutral power.
will serve excuse for escaping from embar.
RAISING questions to the Interpretation of Italian
independence and unity. 1t is even possible that
the complications which have arisen with respect to
the Holy See NAV have brought on a premature
termination of the conflict with Austria. The Pope
while he preserves a significant silence toward
France, has lately denounced Sardinia with all the
pious Indignation in his copious vocabulary; and it
has been plainly ntmated that the allied sovereigns
will find in the successor of st. Peter an adversary
as disagreeable as prayers and patience can make
him.


The arrnistice may possibly be intended, on one
side or on both, as mere preparation for further
military operations The Emperor of the French
may possibly wish to bring up his reinforcements,
or to give Russia time to take the field, and the
Austrians may hope that any attempt at negOtia-
ton will end in declaration of war by the Ger
man Confederation. In 1913, the campaign of
Leipsic was preceded by an armstice of considera-
BILE duration, and although the Austrian armies
were during the whole interval 10 pidlv concentrate
ing in Bohemia, it is still uncertain whether Napo-
leon might, even at the last moment have formed
an alliance with Metternich. In the present in
stance, the Emperor of the French has probably
made up his mind the ultimate decision of peace
or of war. If he really intends to make terms with
Austria, 1t becomes important to consider the ar
rangements which will probably be proposed by
the neutral powers, and more especially urged by
Prussia.


1t is evident that the smallest sacrifice which can
be made by Austria will be the final cession of LOm-
hardy. The proposals which lately attribu-
ted to the court of Berlin will be, to a great
extent, answered by reference to the visible
fortune of war; for it is impossible to pretend that
a costly and successful campaign should be termi-
mated without any material result. If the German
federation had determined to maintain Austrian
sovereignty in Lombardy, the proper time for in
reference would have been at the commencement
of the war. Neutrality involves the admission that
the appeal to arms, if not morally justtable, vio-
lates rights except those of the principals in the
dispute.


On the other hand, it is clear that the fortresses
in the northeast WILL If peace is to be made with
out a further struggle, remain either inte-
gral part OF the empire or, under Austrian arch
duke. part OF the military possessions OF the EN-
plre. 1t Is difficult to suppose that such
rangement can be permanent, when its very exist
ence has under the new code of international law,
been accepted the justification of an unprovoked
invasion. The fate OF Tuscany, of Modena and of
Parma, will furnish abundant employment for diplo-
matte skill; but it may be hoped that the neutral
powers will not be unnecessarily solictous to re-
thn Lnr.c
Pope observes, expelled to make room for the bit
terest enemies of the Church


The solictude of established governments to pre-
vent the aggrandizement of Sardinia is at the
time perfectly Ineligible and extremely
short-sighted. Count Cavour's policy, to have had
any reasonable purpose must, far northern
Italy is concerned, have been in a certain sense
revolutionary. 1t utterly absurd to attempt
the expulsion of Austria from the peninsula with
out providing an alternative and it necessary
to create power capable ofdefending the new ar
rangements which might be made. Any attempt
to split up the evacuated territory into duchies and
vicerOyaties only result in the multiplication
OF French dependencies. With ten millions of sub
jectS, Victor Emanuel would have a difficulty in
resisting the encroachment of his formidable pro-
tector and if his kingdom were to retain its for
mer limits his gallant little army would perma-
nently become a French contingent. It is also ut
terly unjust to treat the sympathy of Italian for
his countrymen as an outrage against the moral
principles which are at the bottom of the law of
nations. The Sandman cause NAV be easily distin-
guished from the pretensiOns of French ambition
Count Cavour's schemes would be unacceptable to
NanOlnOD III