Year: 1863

any definite idea, and that. when begun
he found it too much for him.


Lees advance had reached the Poto-
mac, and still Hooker was marching
North covering Washington. To draw
him forth from his :. base, Lee ordered
Longstreet's corps to march east of Blue
Ridge, and occupy the gaps in Bull Run
Mountains, and a heavy cavalry force
was thrown out beyond This was at
tackled by our cavalry, and after severe
fight driven back. A part of EwelI s
corps entered Maryland, and Jenkin's s
cavalry penetrated to Chambersburg.


1t is interesting to read the statement
of General Lee that these demonstra-
tions did not have the effect to cause our
army to leave Virginia, and that neither
did Hooker seem disposed to advance on
Longstreet Therefore he was with
drawn and the whole army pushed for
ward in pursuance of its undertaking to
draw Hooker out of Virginia and away
from his base


Lee marched to Chambersburg, and
on the 29th was about pushing on to Har-
risburg, when he heard that Hooker had
crossed the Potomac. No sooner had
he accomplished his object of drawing
Hooker from Virginia and farther from
his base, than he found his own base
threatened. He therefore found it ne
cessary to concentrate his forces, and
the various corps took up the march to
Gettysburg. By singular fatality Stu
arts cavalry, which was left behind to
harass our crossing of the Potomac, be-
ing unable to effect anything serious,
marched to join the main body, by such
route that our column was interposed
between it and Lees army, untilit reach
ed Gettysburg, so that Lee derived no
information from that. m =.


Lee knew little of the movements of
our army, and he says his march
towards Gettysburg was more leis-
urely than it would have been had he
known. Two of EwelPs divisions and
two of Hills, came upon the advance of
Howard's corps beyond Gettysburg
That affair is well known to our readers.
On our part it was rare, rash and disas-
trous. Our leading division, coming
suddenly upon the enemy, deployed into
line on the double-quick, and went into
the fight without stopping to find out the
force they had to encounter. The result
was severe and heavy repulse, and a
heavy loss in prisoners; but, as was sup
posed at the time, and as Lee now says,
this success encouraged the enemy to
make the attack which resulted in their
total repulse and the defeat of the whole
campaign.


Lee says: 'It had not been intended
to fight general battle at such dis
tance from our base, unless attacked by
the enemy; but finding ourselves sud-
denly confronted by the Federal army,
it became matter of difficulty to with
draw through the mountains with our
large trains" 1t seems that he was
pushing north to draw Hooker from his
base, so as to attack him, but did not in
tend to attack him so far from his own
base. In short, in marching North to
draw Hooker, he caught Tartar


Lee shows, also, that the anticipations
of drawing unbounded supplies from the
agricultural stores of Pennsylvania,
were disappointed The transferring of
the scene of hostilities north of the Po-
tomac, did not answer the expectations.
He says we were able to restrain his TO-
raging parties by occupying the passes
in the mountains with regular and local
troops, and battle thus became a meas
ure unavoidable 'There were also val
liable results that would ensue from the
defeat of Meades army" The first con-
hict was on the morning of July LII. In
stead of following up that great success,
the attack was not made until the after
noon of the End Lee says of this delay.
90 The attack was not pressed that after
noon, the enemy's force being unknown,
and it being advisable to await the arri-
val of the rest of our troops


This was remarkable prudence on the
heels of such a success. But this ena-
bled our troops to come up also, and to
take up strong position, strengthen it,
and make all its dispositions for pitch
ed battle. The operation was deliberate
rather than Napoleonic All things be-
ing duly prepared, Lee attacked at the
mature hour of the afternoon of the ID
After severe fighting he had some sue
cess on his right, where his plan was to
get hold of a commanding point in our
position, which encouraged him to re-
new the attack next day, in which he ad-
mits decisive repulse He magnani-
mously says, more may have been re-
| quired of his troops than they were able
to perform, and gives the highest praise
to their valor and fortitude.


Lees account of his retreat will not
tend to mitigate the public disappoint-
ment that he was not attacked Nor
will his showing that his campaign was
completely foiled by the movements of
Hooker soften the public contempt for
the carpet generalship that raised diff
ference with him about the adding of the
Harper's Ferry garrison of 10000 men
to his army, after their position had been
rendered of no Importance, and which,
for this, caused a change of commanders
in the face of the enemy, ard then gave
the point up to his successor.