Year: 1861




Time is always necessary TO disclose the
r.al significance and effect of any act or
event An apparent misfortune may he far
from being one while success is often a pre-
lude to disastrous defeat Our present
strength is the result of the Bull Run ,isas-
trr-the unfortunate position of the rebels
the result of their victory. Upon every prin
ciple of war they should have been in Wash
ington a week after the battle To delay the
assault till we recovered our losses and ae-
canulated such force as TO render attack,
not only upon that city, but any movement
with view of crossing the Potomac too haz
ardous to be attempted, was to lose crown
ing advantage, and to suffer all the conse-
quences, of a disastrous defeat


Such, in its results, have the rebels already
sustained. They have accumulated a vast
army upon the Potomac, with no other pur-
pose, hereafter but to act on the defensive.
We presume all idea of an advance, either
against Washington or into Maryland, has
been definitely abandoned. Either movement
would. in all probability, end in an over
whelming defeat. Such a conviction, on the
part of the rebels We regard as the turning
point in the war.


In the first place, they proclaim their in
ability to realize the great expectation OF the
South-the capture and destruction of our
capital-an achievement believed to be easily
accomplished, which was the the great object
Of the campaign, and which, as a display of
power, would end the war and secure their
independence To abandon such a purpose
will be fatal confession of their weakness,
and triumphant testimony to the strength
of the enemy. Results more palpable, Tut
really no more decisive, must follow. To
accomplish their great purpose they accu-
mulated their whole available strength upon
the banks of the Potomac. To what earthly
use is this army now to be put? Its only
alternatives are to remain qrietly in camp,
or to retreat southwark Either choice would
please us equally well. In case the rebels
remain in camp at Manassas, they are a thou
sand miles from the point Were we are pre-
pariag to strike decisive blows. An expedi-
ton will meet with but comparatively slight
resistance. Only a small number of able
bodied men remain in the extreme South, and
these must be without the training or equip
ment necessary to constitute an effective
army. We could not, consequently, desire
matters to be in a better position. If the
Virginia army remains in camp in front of
Washington, the Southern sea coast falls an
easy conquest. If it retreats, it will have in
its rear General Mcclellan with at least 50-
600 troops in the finest condition and spirits,
and amply provided Tor rapid pursuit. To
retreat hefere such an army would be little
better than destruction. TO await its attack
at Manassas junction would be to leave the
greater portion of the rebel States almost en-
tirely undefended and the flank of the rebels
completely turned. They have in their zeal
fallen into a trap from which we can see no
escape. With our fleet we can now antci
pate any movement southwark, and achieve
our successes before any relief can be eX-
tended. In effect, the rebel strength has
been allured by phantom into the extreme
corner of their widely extended territory,
where it is equally powerless for offensive or
defensive operations, leaving the most vul-
nerable points naked to our blows We are
steadily pushing southwark upon the west,
as well as upon the seacoast. We shall soon
be in the rear of Virginia, East Tennessee,
as well as upon the Albermarle and Pamlico
Sounds, and cut off the great Fine Of coIamu-
nication in that State as well as that through
North Carolina, which is already seri-
ously threatened. An army situated as is that
of the rebels in Virginia, upon the very apex
of the triangle that forms their territory,
must be soon put out of fighting condition
from the very apprehension of disaster.


Such is the aspect of military affairs in the
East. Assuming for the rebels all they claim
in numbers, and that in its comniissariat and
munitions of war their army is equal to our
own, they have Outgcneraed themselves.
They have rushed madly to their frontier,
where they are powerless for advance Or for
self-defense. A greater military blunder
could not have been committed. But the
rebel army on the Potomac has really but one
alternative, which is eventually to retreat
towards Richmond, however disastrous such
movement may be. 1t cannot long be main
taned in its presest position in sufficient
strength to resist an attack from our own
forces which will remain in their intrench-
snents only till they are fully prepared for
offensive operations. When we consider the
time required, will all cur means, to properly
EQUIP cur own forces. it is perfectly evident,
that in absence ofall such means, the rebels
must soon be in most pitiable plight AL
ready are they suffering what an unprovided
army always sufers-dsease in all its shapes,
and, as a consequence, discomfort and de-
moralzation. 1t was the want Of suitable
equipment that robbed the rebels Iof all ad
vantage of their victory, and which has since
s,araiyzed all their action. There has never
been time when they were not really de-
fea ed with any adequate preparations on
our part. These are now nearly completed,
end we shall not be long in seeing the most
satisfactory proof of our superiority.