Year: 1868

Tenure Bili.


We give below extracts from the debates
upon the tenure OF. f.ofhce bill, published in
the globe Of Jan. lth and Fcby. 7th and
10th 1867. They arc interesting, as they
show tho course these radicals took then
who are now so loudly demanding tho re-
moval of the "govcrnment'-one of their
own making) president for his wckedncss
in refusing to let Stanton control the war
Office in his own peculiar Nay:


Mr.. Edmonds, Of Vermont, a member of
tho committee having the bill in charge,
said


1t did seem to the committee, after a
great deal Of consultation and reflection,
that it was right and just that the chief
| executive of the nation in selecting these
named secretaries who, by law and by the
practice OF the country, and officers analo-
sous to whom by the practice Of all other
countries, are the confidential advisers OF
the executive respecting the administration
Of all his departments, should be persons
who were personally agreeable to him; in
whom he could place entire confidence and
| reliance, and that, whoncver it should
seem that the state Of relations between
him and any one Of them had become SO
IL; to render this relation of confidence and
trust and personal esteem inharmonious,
| he should in such case be allowed te dis
pense with the services Of that officer in
vacation and have some other person act
| in his stead.


Mr.. Williams, who prepared the original
| bill, said:


prepared the original bill in this case,
| which contains in different words the ex-
cepti0n contained in the amendment re-
ported by the committee. do not regard
the exception rs of any great practical
consequence, because l suppose if the
president aud any head Of department
should disagree SO as to make their reln-
tions unpleasant, and the presidcn: should
signify desire that that head of depart
ment should retire from the cabinet, that
would follow wthsut any positive act of
removal on the part of the president.


The heads of the departments arc part
of the executive power Of the country
According to the theory of the constitu-
ton the executive power is vested in the
president Of the United States, and these
heals Of departments arc subordinate Off
GERS OF the president, Immediately under
his supervision. They are persons under
his immediate direction, except so far as
their specific duties may be provided by


law. But the president consults with
these heads Of departments as to all meas
ures of his administration. They are re-
garded rs his confidential advisers; and
certainly the lac uchich created that relation
bet,ceen the president and the heads Of de-
partments contempiates that there shall be
a state Of harmony bet,ceen all Of tkem; !;
that there shalt not be state Of ,rdr IN the
erecutire department Of the government,
that it shall not be dirided against itself;
bit that tie subordinotes or heads Of the
different departments shall be an harmony
or practicai agreement wiM the president
| by whom they are appointed. The chief
reason that influenced me to make the cx-
ception was, that thought something was
due to the president of the United States
to that ollice. This lill undertakes to
reverse what has heretofore been the adj
mittcd practice of the government and it
seemed to nc that it was due to the exalt-
ed Office Of the president of the United
States, the chief magistrate of the nation,
that he should exercise this power; that
he should be icf To choose his orn cabinct.
and that he should be held responsible, as
he will be, to the country for whatever
acts that cabinet may perform.


Mr.. Fesscndcn said:


1t seems to me very obvious that with
reference to the transaction Of business
which is peculiarly executive, the conf
Dental advisers that we put about the
president should always be men who, for
the greater part, are satisfactory to him.
1t is exceedingly important that there
should be a cordiality of feeling and an
agreement upon important matters OF state
policy and state conduct between the pres
ident and those who are his confidential
advisers. The president naturally would
not want il man in his councils who was
unfriendly to him, upon whose discretion
he could not rely in the first place, and
upon whose good faith in keeping the Sc
crets of the executive government he could
not rely in the second place; and if he
was uniriendly. the president might natu-
rally be in fear Of consulting him and
taking his advice.


A man who is the head Of departing ent
naturally wants the control Of that depart
ment. He wants the control of his subor-
dinatcs that they should be subject to him





move them from Office in ease they are in
subordinate and are such as he cannot
comfortably get along with, and to remove
them upon the instant, at the moment, if
it be necessary. In my judgment, in order
to the good and proper administration of
department, it is necessary that that
power should exist in the head of it, and
quite as necessary that the power should
exist in the president with reference to the
few men who are placed about him to
share his councils, be his friends and his
agents.


Mr.. Sherman said


Now, | say that if II cabinet officer sh cd
attempt to hold his Office for a moment be-
yond the time when he retains the entire
confidence of the president, would not
vote to retain him, nor would compel a
president to have about him in these high
positions man in whom he did not en-
tircly trust, both personally and political
ly. 1t would be unwise to require him to
administer the government without agents
of his own choosing.


There is no public exigency requiring
such rule. What is n cabinet officer, af- !
ter all ? The presidents mere clerk, be-
cause, although these cabinet officers are
considered as high officers of the govern
ment, they are the mere clerks or record
ing gents of the president, having scarce
ly any power except that which is given
to them as part Of the executive authori-
ty. 1t seems to me that when there is any
unpleasant relation, any unpleasant diff
fercnces, arising between the president and
any Of these officers, he ought to have the
power to discharge him. would as soon
think Of imposing upon the president
private secretary with whom he had no
kindly relations, personal and political, as
to impose on him IA cabinet minister with