Year: 1861




the same benefit, the sum required would proba-
bly, reach 175, 100000.


The amount called for by the other plan of ma
king an advance would depend upon the pro-
portion of that advance Few of the advocates
of this plan have put il lower than FIVE cents
per pound on cotton, and at the same rate on
other produce. 1t may, therefore, be very fairly
set down atabout 100000 600.


If we consider first the least Objectionable of
these plans, it is certainly that which requires
the smaller sum, and if this be found imPractI-
cable, the larger must, of necessity, be rejected.
Our inquiry, then, may be narrowed down to
proposal that the government should issue one
hundred millions of treasury notes, to be dis
tributed among the planting community upon
the pledge Of the forthcoming crop.


The first remarkable feature in this scheme IS,
that it proposes that a new government. yet
struggling for existence, should reject ali the
lessons of experience, and undertake that which
no government however long established, has
yet succeeded in ehecting. The organization
oflabor" has caledforth many ingenious attempts,
both speculative and practical, among well
established governments, but always with dis
astrous failure. With us, however, the expert
ment is proposed to a new government which is
engaged IN a gigantic war, and which must rely
on credit to furnish means 10 carry on that war.
Our enemies are IN possession of all the NUM-
tons and workshops that have been collected
during tortytive years Of peace; their fleets have
been built up at our Joint expense. With all
these on hand, they yet are obliged to eXpend
nearly ten millions of dollars per week to carry
on the war. Can we expect 10 contend with
them at less than half that expenditure Sup
posing that it may require two hundred millions
Of dollars, then the proposal is that, at time
llrN, la-
for the support of the government, we shall raise
a further sum Of one hundred millions for the
benefit Of the planting interest.


For it must be observed, FIRST that the govern
ment receives no benefit whatever from this adj
vance The money is paid to each individual
planter; and, in exchange, the government re-
eeives only his bond or note-or, if the cotton be
purchased, the government receives only certain
bales OF cotton. That is to say, the government
pays out money which is needful to its very ex-
istence, and receives in exchange planters notes
or produce, which it does not need, and cannot,
in any way, make use Of


Ii must be observed in the next place, that
treasury notes have now become the currency of
the country. They are, therefore, the measures
Of value In this view il is the duty of the
government to limit their issue as far as prac-
ticable, to that amount which is the limit of its
currency. Every person acquainted with this
branch o. political science is aware that, if the
currency passes this point, il not only becomes
deprecated, but it disturbs the just relations of
society, precisely as though an arbitrary authoT-
~ should change the weights and measures Of "A
country. Ii the currency Of q country should
be suddenly extended from one hundred to two
hundred millions OF dollars, that which was
measured by one dollar is now measured by 1--WE,
and every article must be paid for at double its
fo
sites Of war, Is the largest Of all purchasers,
and thus, by a kind Of suicidal act compels it.
self to pay two dollars for what one would for
mcrly purchased. And, at this rate Of advance
two hundred millions of dollars can effect no
more than one hundred millions of dollars would
have effected before; or, in other words, one
hundred millions Of dollars are actually sunk in
the operation.


Such a condition of the currency the govern
meut has anxiously eudeavored to guard
against The war tax was laid for the purpose
OF creating demand for treasury notes, and
security for treasury notes, and a security for
their redemption. Their redundancy has been
carefully guarded against by allowing them to
be funded in eight per cent. bonds. II necessity
shall compel the government to issue for the
defense of the country, and TO keep out two
hundred millions, it is plain that every acces-
sion must impair and may defeat all the precau-
tons


If the government should undertake, for the
sake of private interests, so large an increase of
issues, it may hazard its entire credit and stabili-
ty. The experiment is too dangerous, and re-
lief for the planters must be sought in some
other direction. And may not that remedy be
found


in the first place, let the planters Immediately
take measures for .wintef crops, 70 relieve the
demand for grain and provisions Let them
proceed TO divert part of their labor from cotton
and make their own clothing and dsupplies. Then
let them apply to the great resource presented by
the money capital in banks and private hands
Let this capital come forward and assist the ag-
ricultmal interest. Heretofore the banks have
employed large part of their capital in the
purchase Of northern exchange. Let them ap-
ply this portion to factors aceeptances of plan
teTs' drafts secured by pledge Of the produce in
the planters hands An extension of the time
usually allowed on these drafts would overcome
most of the difficulties Tris extension could
safely reach the probable time Of sale of the
crops, inasmuch as the suspension of specie pay
ments throughon the entire Confederacvrelieyes
each bank from calls for coin. The banks are
accustomed TO manage loans Of this character,
and will conduct the operation with such skill
as viii make them mutually advantageous The
amount OF advance asked from the banks would
be greatly less than If advances were offered by
the government, and all the abuses incident TO
government agencies would be avoided


Il seems to me, therefore, that it is neither ne
cessary nor expedient that the government
should embark upon this dangerous experiment.
Il is far better that each class of the community
should endeavor to secure its own existence bv
its own eXertions, and, if an effort be at. once
made by so intelligent class as the planters, it
win result in relief Delay in these efforts, oc-
casioned by vague expectations of relief from
government, which cannot be realized, may de-
feat that which is yet practicable


Respectfully, your obt serv't


C.. G. MEMMINGER.


Secretary of the Treasury