Year: 1869

that the action was precipitated unknown to each
commander-it was in fact, the accidental meeting
Of two heads of columns The enemy was success.
ful on the first days attack, and it seems to have
been only after Lee came on the field, after this
flush of victory, that he seriously entertained the


idea of giving battle, for he had promised his corps
commanders that he would not assume tactical
offensive, but would so maneuvre as to compel the
Union army to attack him. He says:


1T had not been intended to deliver general
battle so far from our base unless attacked; but,
coming Unexpectedly upon the whole Federal ar
my, to withdraw through the mountains, with our
extensive trains, would have been difficult and
dangerous. At the same time, we were unable to
await an attack as the country was unfavorable for
collecting supplies in the presence Of the enemy,
who could restrain our foraging parties by holding
the mountain passes with local and other troops
A battle had, therefore. become in measure un-
avoidable; and the success already gained gave
hope of a favorable ISSUE"


Lees plan.of battle for the I'd Of July stands
thus, in his own words:


ut was determined to make the principal at
tack upon the enemys left, and endeavor to gain
position from which it was thought our artillery
could be brought to bear with effect. Longstreet
was directed to place the divisions of McLaws and
Hood on the right Of Hil partially enveloping the
enemy's left, which he was to drive in. Gen. Hill
was ordered to threaten the enemy centre, to pre-
vent reinforcement being drawn to either wing,
and cooperate with his right division on Long
streets attack. Gen. Ewell was instructed to
make simultaneous demonstration upon the enc
ny's right, to be converted into real attack,
should opportunity offer.'


The manner in which this plan was carried into
execution is well known; but this report reveals
multitude of facts which throw new light on the
events of the day. Thus the failure of Early to car
ry the position on the Union right (Culp's Hl) is
accounted for by the failure ofexpected support on
his right. "Gen. Ewell," says he, 'had directed
Gen. Rodes to attack in concert with Gen. Early,
covering his right, and had requested Gen. Lane,
then commanding Pender's division, to cooperate
on the right of Rodes. When the time to attack
arrived, Gen. Rodes not having his troops in posi-
tion was unprepared to cooperate with General
Early, and before be could get in readiness, the
latter had been obliged to retire from want of ex-
pected support on his right


This second day action was, on the whole favor
able to the Cenfederates or at least it seemed 80,
for they had succeeded in disrupting and driving
from its position the entire right wing the Union
army. Anyhow, the result was such that Lee re-
solved to make another attack on the morrow.


1.-THE result of this days operation induced the
belief that with proper concert of action and with
the increased support that the positions gained on
the right would enable the artillery to render the
assauhing columns we should ultimately succeed ;
and it was accordingly determined to continue the
attack.


'oThe general plan was unchanged. Longstreet,
reinforced by Pickett's three brigades, which ar
rived near the battle field during the afternoon of
the I'd, was ordered to attack the next morning
and Gen. Ewell was ordered to assail the enemy 8
right at the same time. The latter, during the
night, reinforced Gen. johnson with two brigades
and one from Early's division" "


The grand attack Of the third day (July 81 is
given with great mnuteness of tactical detail and
this description, taken in consideration with the
official reports Of our own officers, renders the
whole course of the battle unusually Ineligible
We have room, however, for no more than the fol-
lowing concise account Of Pckett's famous charge
on Hancock line:


''The troops moved steadily on under a heavy
fire of musketry and artillery the main attack be-
ing directed against the enemy's left centre. His
batteries re-opened as soon as they appeared. Our
own, having nearly exhausted their ammunition
in the protracted cannonade that preceded tht -
vance of the infantry, were unable to reply or ren
der the necessary support to the attacking party.
Owing to this fact, which was unknown to me
when the assault took place, the enemy was enabled
to throw strong force of infantry against our left
already wavering under concentrated fire Of arti-
lery from the ridge in front, and from Cemetery
Hill on the left. 1t finally gave way; and the right
after penetrating the enemy's lines, entering his
advanced works and capturing some of his artillery
was attacked simultaneously in front and on both
aanks and driven back with heavy loss. The troops
were rallied and reformed, but the enemy did not
pursue. y


Lee does not seek to refine away the magnitude
and thoroughness of the defeat that befell him at
Gettysburg. He, however, refrains from giving
his losses, simply stating that "the army sustained
severe loss. The report is remarkably candid and
impartial, and will form very valuable contribu'
ton to the sum of evidence from which the histo-
rian of the war will finally make up his record.


PRIsONERs AND TOBACCO.