Year: 1863

In Banco.-On appeal, from the Po-
1OSEpH noOTu lice Court of Honolulu.


Judgment of the full Court ROBERTSON, Justice:


Chapter 42d OF the Penal Code and pleads guilty. lie ad
that the 29th October, 1s62 he sold imported sprtu
liquors TO Natives OF this Kingdom IN the town OF Homo
| lulu.


British subject licensed sell liquors under the Act of 23d
1862 and that he importer OF sPruOus liquors


The appeal this the decision of the court be-
low, has heen taken purely upon points of law which have
submitted by defendants counsel with much labor and
in printed brief of great length accompanied and en-
| forced by oral argument.


Upon examination, think the points made by the
defence be comprised in few general grounds which
will embrace the whole subject In giving opinion upon
the case therefore, do not propose to take up the points OF
Defendants brief t but TO advert in what to be
the natural and order the general grounds
which comprise the whole defence.


And st it is argued that section ls chapter 42d of the
Penal Code under which the defendant charged has been
repealed by implications the
shall take notice of the that the
Article of the Constitution because that pOat TO be
comprised in the general ground of relied
upon by defendant But il cOnended that lt chap


42d of the Penal Code which prohibits the OF splrtu
liquors. by person, 10 native of the Kingdom, Is


radically inconsistent with the provisions of the Act of the 3d
August 1852 regulating the sale of pirtuOus liquors. and
der which the defendant obtained his license 1t is argued


the embraces fully the subject of
| the former, which has thereby become superseded.


of Rex Ella, decided AT the July term, ls6 In that


the defendant indicted before the Circuit Court at Kauai
having sold spiruous liquors without license,
ventOn the law of 1916, which regulated the sale of spirit
liquors previous the of the OF 1862
The prosecution proved that the defendant who was not IL
cened had sold sptuous liquors natives and his counsel





fendan could only prosecuted chapter
Penal Code. The Circuit Court Overmed the
ton and appeal to this court the judgment of the lower
affirmed the ground that both statutes
and the District Attorney might elect the
defendant under either the other In opinion
the decision of the in Rex Ella sound for the
stated the and the of 1862 has merely
place that of 1884, regulate the vending
spruOus liquors. branch Ofnernal commerce. the
visions of that statute to implied repeal
st chapter 42d of the Penal Code which special
penal enactment tor e suppression of drunkenness among
the natives How the statute of 1862 be SAID embrace
The subject matter of section chapter 2 of the Penal Code
when that statute the defendant contends contains
whatever touching the selling of liquors To natives:


The later statute could only have the matter OF the
former either by expressly repeating, modifying reenact
ing the penal PROVISION Ie penal law IS e untouche Tor
silence of the OF 1862 the subject of
the penal iaw affect that law The penal statute be-
ing force presume Legislature deemed
cesary repeat the Revenue Law of 1862 the general


prohibition against the sale OF liquors TO natives but the sub
b vep"r, bond Of condor him t r., nanaItv
he violates any lac of the Kingdom. both
alive aud in full force the vendor by ubecting himself
the particular liability OF his ella under the Revenue Law
does become released from the ordinary liability which
all under the provisions of the penal aw
that his nfractun of that law he the


on of the Government be prosecuted either erimnaly
der the Penal Code his bond under the Revenue
Law.


The defendant argues further t under the law of 1902


licenses to sell spirtuou liquors may be granted to natives
and vendor would be prevented by section
chapter AZ of the Penal Code from purchasing liquors to sell
again. the provision of the Penal Code radically inconsistent
with the law OF 1862 and the orme law must therefore be
regarded repealed by implication But the of the
statute OF 1867 has made no change IN the law touching this
subject What up radical inconsistency be-
the Penal Code and the Act of 1862 equally existed





fbid ali ,andr1s frnm seIIing Tn n,rye T Sfa,uTa
lS5 is same and the law of 1862, while it does
dnrs from selling 10 natives by binding them nor 10 violate
any 1 of the land in the exercise of their trade The aTg
men hen amounts this that the provisions Of the license
themselves radically inconsistent and that there
fore the prohibition against selling natives void But
this sound The circumstance that, under the law
stands native vendor would labor under the disadvantage
Inconvenience Of having to import his liquors. saccdenta
AT least but an indirect consequence of the law see
Inconsistency m the provisions oi the law winch while
grants the privilege of vending liquors who fls
certain requirements and binds himself comply with
tain conditions prohIbits as one OF those conditions tie sell
ing 1fquors o native subjects The point involved in this
merely branch OF the larger argument against
consutionaiIy of the statutory prohibitions for unless
the Legislature has exceeded its in enactng that poh
dIvdual nothing Again the license laws, which
regulate particular branch of internal traffic, must be
suborinaton general law of land The
general contained in the Penal Code that person
shall sell spiruous liquors native subject and
unless the license law, which particular law contains
provision amounting declaration that vendors
may sell native subjects, the laws be
radically If provision existed partic-
ular law would prevail the general but the permission
to sell liquors to natives cannot now IN the face of positive
prohibition, be given by or derived FROM negative impica
;On.


But the Defendant contends that section chapter 42d OF
the Penal Code Inconsistent illogical contradictory and alb
sud upon its face and therefore void That section reads
olows Whoever shall SELL give purchase, or procure for
and in behalf Of native of this Kingdom for his
sPnuous liquor other intoxicating drink substance
shall be punished by fine exceeding hundred dol
lars; and in default of the of such fne BY mprsOn
ment at hard labor for term not exceeding two years. 1t Is
vab ~ AMI SGe ,ba, pbose ysT mnt he Connected win
proposition tor, prohibit only
the selling giving, purchasing or procuring for native but
the selling giving TO him. This certainly strained
and hyperccal reading the language the The
meaning OF that language when read and construed in tile
ordinary manner, is obvious that surprised AT the
labor and ingenuity expended by counsel in she
deavOr build up construction which, upon examination,
will be found To destroy ITSELF by rendering the law almost
gaO practice; and will adopt such construction
when the language the plainly susceptible of
that will give purpose law makers
the declared object Of the law Did the words used by
the Legislature when construed according their natural
connection in which they stand result
aburdy and fail to effect the declared object of the law,
would not be within the province of the court by supplying
words which the Legislature had used Obvate that ab
srdty aud eectuae the supposed intention OF the law max


construction will express their ntenton or that intention
cannot be enforced But where the Legislature has used Ian
enage susceptible reasonable
which defeat the declared object OF the law,


while the other would eectuate that object is the dnty Of
adopt latter for that be presumed
the intention OF the Legislature do not admit that
the construction the defendant
reasonable practicable but merely what
would be obligatory rule upon the Court supposng
the defendant To stand IN good case Again, admitting
that the wording of the law might have been improved its
meaning placed beyond the possibility of Doubt by the
proposition to- that circumstance cannot be pressed be-
yond its legitimate weight In the case OF Boxam r Eisee
BarnwelI Cresswe, ia, the said: " The ard
spirit of an Act scope and Intention are prim


y be regarded the construction and matters that
the terms used by the Legislature IN delivering It's commands
the express meaning provided the OBJ
jeci PLAN aud inelgibe expressed with sufficient
the Act The object understood Judges are so TO
the suppress the mischief and advance the
remedy" In the of Rex Ramsgate, Barnwell &
Cresswe 72, the held the following language Whea
the Legislature has used words of plain and definite import
would veIydangerous put upon construction
which would amount to holding that the Legislature did not
what it has eXpressed''


The language of the before ambiguous. The
words used by the legislature taken ia their usual gnca
and proper Connection clear and unnsakahe
meaning thus: Whoever shall sell any native of this King
dom, his use sprnous liquor &C., whoever shall
give native Of this Kingdom, for his spITitu
liquor &c whoever shall purchase or procure for and IN
behalf of native of this Kingdom for his pir
ituou liquor &c. shall be punished by hne &C. see no
necessity for the Of the proposition in order to make
clear intention of the Legislature prohibit all
from selling giving spirtuous liquors native for
his and from purchasing or procuring fer and in behalf OF
native, for his spruOus liquor To conclude
this point let look the reading cOntened for by the de-
Whoever shall sell for This Kingdom
for his spruous liquor Sc whoever shall give for
native of this Kingdom, for his spirituous
half Of any native of this Kingdom, for his pu
liquor" sc. cannot hesitate moment 10 that
this construction altogether unreasonable, and
thai be rejected unsonnd But doubt
upon the of English of the statute,