Year: 1864

The eampaia IN Gsorg


The InvasiOn Of the North.


Our successes in Georgia amply balance the
unsatisfactory'state Of the struggle at other
points. We may now consider the destruction
Of the rebel army Of Tennessee as something
that hardly less than miracle can prevent.
tremity to which Hood has been driven, de-
spite his desperate attempts and dreadful
losses Of the goth and 22d ultmo. His third
line for the defence OF Atlanta is drawn within
and across the streets of that city. Upon the
passage of Peachtree creek by our army the
rebel army was posted in an admirable posi-
ton few miles north Of the city, that had
doubtless been chosen by Johnston. Il was q
position from which it could advance to battle
with the ground greatly in its favor. Had it,
moreover, been successful in an advance from
that point, the reverse would have been very
destructive to US, as it would have been almost
impossible for our line to have withdrawn in
good order over the difficult ground near the
stream. But the enemy's advance on the goth
ult. was repulsed, his position turned, and he
retired to second line in the outskirts of the
city. From that position be advanced for the
assault on our left on the 22d ult., and that
position he was compelled to relinquish
by the result Of that battle. His present posi-
ton Of course does not protect Atlanta, since
Sherman can she'll that city. Neither does it
prevent our operations now in progress for
complete investment Every line by which
Hood could get away Is occupied or rendered
impracticable. Retreat is impossible; supply
equally SO, and battle is no doubt hopeless.
Hood must surrender at discretion before many
days 60 by, or utterly destroy his army in
one great final attempt to cut his way through.


Considerable modification and chagrin ap-
pear to be felt in the Army Of the Potomac
over the failure of the recent attempt to carry
the enemy's lines by storm. 1t is very natural
and proper that this should be so. No one ven-
lures to deny that we had on that occasion four
corps massed against position held by three
divisions, and the army may naturally wonder
whether 1t will ever succeed again If it Is to
fail with such odds In It's favor. No stratagem
to gain an advantage in numbers at the point
OF contact was ever more admirably contrived
or more successful than that by which General
Grant got the bulk Of Lees army over at
Deep Bottom ut the time when this assault
was to be made; but it was a great failure not
to seize resolutely what this advantage placed
within our reach Whispers that the army did
not fight well are absurd, rs applied TO this
event; for not enough OF the army was put in
to give ii a chance 10 win. We're our generals
over sanguine Of the result! Were they so
certain OF success that they did not employ
men enough to secure It? Were thoy saving
the troops FOR great days work after Peters
burg had been taken Praiseworthy as such
calculations might be under certain circura-
stances, We must yet hope that they did moi.
stand in tue way Of our success in the late at
tempt.


10 view Of what appears now to be In pro-
gress in Maryland, Pennsylvania and the She
nandoah valley, II is an unpleasant truth that
the late attempt BY the Army OF the Potomac
has served General Lee in the light Of an ex-
pertinent. 1t seems to haSe given him great
aud valuable piece OF Information az 10 how
few men ran hold the Petersburg defeness.
Three divisions hsld those lines when Ehe as
sailants bad ths assistance Of niue that b ad
cost months labor, and 1t follows that
Lee could have reinforced E4rly With great
mary men II be had only known IL. H. knows
1t now aud ii Is not too late to act upon the