Year: 1868

high crime" or misdemeanor OF re-
moving Mr.. Il. NJ Stanton, there will be
a fundamental question, namely, whetaer
the President holds constitutional
power to remove any executive civil OH
Ger, Notwithstanding an attempted legls-
lative restraint Of that power.


This is argued at length, with great
ability, and the unconstituionality Of the
Tenure-ofofice law placed beyond a
doubt or question. In summing up, Mr.
Curtis gives the following views:


The Constitution has divided the Gov
ernment into three departments, to each
of which it assigns duties very distinct in
their nature. These duties are marked, in
the case of each OF them, not only by
denomination of the department, but also
by express definitions of its powers
These departments are called, respec'
lively, the Legislative power" the "Ex.
ecutiye power, and the Judicial power.


No one can mistake the separate nature
of these functions, and no one can be
ignorant that the legislative department
has no relation whatever to the execu'
tive offices which may become necessary
to be established, excepting to create
them and to define their duties by law.
BY an exceptional rule, one OF the
branches of the Legislature is authorized
to hold a negative on the Presidents
appointment of officers, and this is
all. 1t can be matter of no doubt
full inference that the executive power
must control, because it must direct
those who are appointed to aid it in the
duty of executing the laws, and that
their responsibility is a responsibility to
the Executive in all things that are
within the official discretion of the Ex'
ecutive. Now, without making a single
exception among all the thousands of ex-
ecutive officers, from the higher to the
| lowest, and without single saving in
regard to the Presidents official discre-
ton, this Tenure-of Office act at once
annihilates the Ultimate responsibility of
all executive offices to the President,
and transfers that ultimate responsibility
to the Senate. 1t begins by having them
in their places until their successors
have been appointed, thus rendering a
removal of an improper person impossl-
BILE until successor has been appointed
and qualified, whatever may be the ur'
gency of the case. 1t next regulates the
power of removal in such q way that the
| President can only suspend, and he is
even allowed to suspend only for certain
causes. These are misconduct in Office,
crime, incapacity, or legal disqualiGca'
| ton. No other causes are allowed.


1t may have become impossible for the
President to transact the public business
with particular oficer-that officer may
be in secret personal or political hostility
TO the President-yet the President must
endure him; for the act expressly for
bids the President even to, suspend him
for any other cause than the causes
above enumerated. No regard is paid TO
harmony of administration, no thought
is bestowed on unity in the public coun-
ellis, no provision is made for all that
vast interest of the public which depends
on the cordial fidelity of its inferior SER
wants to the executive head of the State.
AS if the very genius of discord and die
organization had handled the pen that
drafted this law, the President is tied
down to act with, aye, and 10 be respon-
sible for, men who can utterly thwart his
policy and nulliiy his measures, if they
are cunning enough to keep within
the letter of the law. And
after having thus reduced the
Presidents control over Inferior OIL
GERS to the mere power Of suspension for
causes which do-not include tho which
are often more frequent, and always as
important, as those which are allowed By
the act, the ultimate decision is t'ans-
ferred to the Senate, who may re.ns ate
the officer without incurring .he slight t
responsibility for factious, corfupS, or
a weak refusal to give effect to the Presi
dents reasons. Now let the people con-
slider the case of Cabinet minist,r with
whom the President cannot act, and yet
in regard to whom it is impot otsible to sub
iect the reasons that demand his removal
to anything like process Of invest'ga-
ton to be conducted and decided by such
body as the Senate and then let then'
see that it is TO such body, and not to his
own independent judgment, that the Pres
ident must submit his reasons for dcslr-
ing the dismission of such minister, and
that those reasons can only be such as he
can establish by the letter of the written
law. Who believes that when the Consti-
tuition created President of the United
States, and conferred upon him the whole
executive power, it meant to authorize
the creation Of hosts of inferior execu-
tive officers, who could hold their places
in defiance of his will, if they could gain
the protection of Senate that might
desire to annihiate, practically, his whole
discretionary executive power without
abolishing it by statute, and openly as
suming it to themselves


Mr.. Curtis quotes what was foretold by
Fisher Ames in 1883, as consequences
likely to follow the subjecting removals
from office to assent Of the Senate. We
give the quotation:


1t is very proper to guard the intro
duetion of a man into Office by every
check that can properly be applied but
after he is appointed, there can be no
usei in exercisinga judgment upon events
which have heretofore taken place. II
the Senate are to possess the power OF
removal, they will be enabled to hold the
person in office, let the circumstances be
what they may that point out the neces-
sity or proprieiy Of his removal IL
creates permanent connection 1t will
nurse faction; it will promote intrigue
to obtain protectors, and to shelter tools.
Sir. il is infusing poison into the Con-
s,itution; it is an impure and unchsste
connection; there is ruin in it; it is
tempting the Senate with forbidden |
fruit; it Ought not to be possible for a
branch Of the Legislature even TO hope |
for A share Of the executive power; for !
they may be tempted to increase Il BY
hope to share the exercise OF IL People
are seldom jealous Of their own power;
aud il the Senate become part Of the
Ex.cut;xo thev will be very improper