Year: 1859

'he war should continue between Spain and the new
pubics and those islands should become the object and
the theatre Of H. their fortunes have such connection
with the prosperity Of the United States that they could
not be indifferent spectators and the possible contingent
cta Q, such proacted war might bring upon the gov
ernment OF the United States duties and obligations the
performance of which, however painful il should be they
might not be at liberty to decline"


Mr. Van Buren, writing to Mr., Van Ness our minister
to spain, October 2, 1929 says


. The government of the United States has ALWAYS
looked with the deepest interest upon the fate OF those
Islands, bat particularly OF euta its geographical posi-
ton, witch p'ares 1t almost in sight OF southern
shotes and us IT were, gives il the command OF the Gulf
OF Mexico and the West Inda seas its safe and capacou
harbors lis rich productions the exchange of which for
our surplus agricultural products and manufactures con
SUITES one ot the most extensive and valuable branches
OF our lorolsn trade. render it OF the utmost Importance
TO the United States that change should take place in
Its condition which might inurously affect our political
and commercial standing in that quarter Other consid
efatios connected with certain class of population


make 1T the interest of the southern section the Union
that no attempt should be made in that island to throw
OIL the yoke OF Spanish dependence the rst effect of
winch would be tIc sudden emancipation of
slave population the result OF Which could not hut he
very ssiby felt upon the adjacent shores OF the United
States ON the other hand the wisdom which induced
the Spanish government 10 relax ia It's colonial system
and to adopt with regard To those islands more liberal
policy which opened their ports general commerce. has
pccn 50 M satisfactory ia the view of the United States
rs, in addition to other considerations 10 induce this
government to desire that their possession should not be





10 conformity with this desire the ministers OF the Uni
ted States 1T Madrid have from time to time been in
sucted atentivclg TO watch the course Of events and the
secret springs OF European diplomacy Which, from nfor
nation received from various quarters this government
had reason to suspect had bpen put ia motion to effect
,he transfer OF the Possession Of Cuba to the powerful al
lies of Spain EA


Yon authorized to say that ti,e long established and
well known policy Of the United States which forils
their cntangling themselves the concerns OF other ma
uons aiid which permits their physical force 10 be used
only for the defence Of their political rights and the pro
lection o tue persons and property of their citizens equal
~ torbis their public agents enter into positive en-
ga5emcnts tho performance OF which would require the
employment OF means which the people have retained in
thcir own hands but that this government has every
reason 70 believe that the influence which once
averted the blow ready to fall upon the Spanish islands
would again be found eiectual on the recurrence of SINH
lar events and that The high preponderanec in Amcr
can afiifs of tie United States great naval power
the influence which they must at all times command as a
great commercial nation, in all questions involving in
tcests OF the general commerce OF this hemisphere would
render ther consent an essential preliminary to the
cution OF any project calculated vitality affect the
general concerns of all the nations in any degree engaged
in the commerce OF America The knowledge you posscss
OF the public sentiment OF this country in regard to Cuba
will enable you to speak with confidence aud effect of the
probable consequences that might be expected from the
communication OF that sentiment to Congress, in the
event OF any contemplated change in the present political
condition OF that island. "


Aud again, on the 18th of October 1880 s.Ihs gov
ernment has also been given to understand that if Spain
should perseycre n theasseton of hopeless claim do


nion over her former colonies they will feel 1t to be
their duty we'll their interest attack her colo
nal possessions in our vicinity Cuba and Porto Rico.
Your general instructions full upon the subject of
the interest which the United States take in the fate of
fo that aa we e eeteh 4f at the % nsr they in
it Isl but could not consent to its transfer to any
European power, Motives of reasonable State policy
render it desirable to that it should remain sub
ject Spain rather either the South American
States These motives will readily present themselves to
your mind they principally founded upon appre
hcnsion that ii possessed by the latter it would in the
present state of things be in greater nger of becoming
subject to European power than in its present cond
ton Although such wishes and true interests
the President does not what ground he would be
justified in interfering with attempts which the South
American States might think it for their interest," in the
prosecution of defensive war; to make upon the islands
in question. IT. indeed attempt should be made to
disturb them 10y putting arms in the hands of one por
ton Of their population to destroy another and which in
its influence would en1angcr the peace of portion of
the United States the might be different. Against
such attempt the United States being informed that
It was in contemplation have already protested and
warmly demonstrated in their communications last sum
n,er with the government OF Mexico but the iniorni
ton lately communicated to in this regard was accom-
panied by solemn that such ncasures WILL
in any event. be resorcd TO and that the contest if
forced upon tcn will be carried o their part with
strict reference to the established rules of civilized war
fare"


Mr. Buchanan in his despatch to Mr. r. NJ. Saunders





view the President believes that the crisis has arrived
when effort should be made to purchase the island Of
Cuba from SPAIN and he has determined TO nrust you
with the performance of this most delicate and important
duty The attempt should be made, in the first instance,
confidential conversation with the Spanish minister
for foreign affairs written offer might produce an alb
soIute refusal in writing which would emlarrass here
after in the acquisition of the island Besides from the
ncessan changes in the Spanish cabinet and policy
desire to make the purchase might thus be made known
In official form to foreign governments, and arouse
their jealousy and active opposition Indeed even il the
present cabinet should think favoaby Of the proposition,
they might be greatly embarrassed by having il placed
on record for in that event. it would almost certainly
through channels reach the opposition and become
the subject Of discussion in The Corcs. Such delicate
negotiations at least in their incipcnt stages ought
ayavs conducted In confidential conversation, and
with the utmost secrecy and despatch,


At your interview with the Minister for Foregn AZ
fairs YOU might introduce The subject by referring to the
present distracted condition Of Cuba, and the danger
which exists that the population will make attempt TO
accomplish q revolution This must be well known 70
the Spanish government In order to convince him of
the good faith and friendship towards Spain with which
this government has acted you might read TO him the


first part of my despatch to General Campbell and the
order issued BY the Secretary of War to the commanding
general in Mexico and 20 the officer having charge OF the
ernbarlaon Of troops at Vera Cruz. You may then
touch decatey upon the danger that Spain may lose
Cuba by revolution in the island or that it may he
wrested from her by Great Britain should rupture take
place between the two countries arising ont of the dis
msal of Sir Henry Buwer and be retained to pay the
Spanish debt due to the British bond holders You might
assure him that, whilst this government rs entirely
satisfied that Cuba shall remain under the do'Diuion
OF Spain should in event resist its acquisition by