Year: 1864

70 eottlo QOWu once more lutO the WonotOuOue
bombardment and picket skirmishes by which
they were characterized before the recent
splendid and glorious attempt to take the
eDemy's position. It is certain that grandly
planned attempt that in all ways deserved suc-
cess, has ended in lamentable disaster, through
some ones great blunder; and the question will
inevitably arise, who was that blundersri On
General Burnsdes front there was great loss
of time-a loss of time involving loss of oppor-


tunity not less fatal than occurred on the same
officers front at the battle of Antetam. Upon
the Capture of the enemy's iirst line, which was
of course easily taken, no attempt was made to
take advantage of the surprise and consterna
tion that at that moment absolutely disabled
the enemy's men; but it was an hour after the
capture of that first line before Burnside
pushed forward against the second line.
Whether this was the fault of General. Burn
side or General Meade, 1t was alone enough
to nullify the effect that the mine was likely
rallied his troops and bad time to dispose his
small force of three divisions at the threatened
points and in other ways to get ready for us.


AT the end of the hour thus lost we then


pushed forward against an untried line di-
vision Of the poorest troops in our arIny. We
had loss the advantages that the mine gave us;
we were on our ordinary level With the enc


uiy--that is, we had to move in our usual way
against we'll constructed line, supplied with
artillery and manned by well trained and tried
infantry. Under these very circumstances the
hardy al brave veterans of the Sixth Second
or Fifth corps might not have been successful.


If raw regiments composed of the men Of our


own race had been repulsed under these cir
cumstances 1t would not have been matter
of great surprise. 1t would have been a repe-
tition of what we have seen. But that raw
regiments, composed OF negro troops, should be
stampeded from such a place was what might
have been confidently counted upon, and to
send them on such an errand was madness.
We must, then, partly attribute our failure to
those fanatics who have forced this miserable
material into our armies, and compelled our
generals to rely upon it at times. 1t Is an
error to assume. as is assumed in some quar-


ters, that the conduct of the negroes must have
been good because their losses were heavy.
That is an evidence tlat they were exposed to
severe fro, tiIst they were under it longer than
they ought TO have been or than they would
have been If they bad done their duty.


But why did We fail at the mere repulse Of
q division OF niggers? General Meade, we sup
pose, had charge OF the distribution Of the
several corps for support and reinforcement.
and he, therefore, must answer this ques-
ton. he had The greater part Of four
corps in line OF battle behind the Ninth
corps. and why, therefore. with such 4
splendid force in hand was tne repulse
Of nigger division permitted 10 terminate
the contest, whea lie knew that there was
not large force in his front, and that great
part OF Lees army WAS over at Deep Bottom?


But we must not despord because this At
tempt has not accomplished all that was ex-
pocted Of it. Because an assault has been re-
pulsed we must not argue that the siege is to
fail. Bloody repuses have, on the contrary, al
ways marked the progress Of great aid sue
cessful sieges. Four terrific assaults were re-
pulsed at Badajoz before WELLINGTON got pos
session Of that place Two assaults. made IN





to temporarily raise tie siege. An
other, made in March, 1872, was partially suc-
cessfut, the British troops having token after
4 most desperate and bloody fight. one large
fort But 10 sooner were they established 10
this tan the French coulmsndant opened upon
j. every gun with which he could bit il, and
tic British we're compelled to reiinqush
what they had gained at such dreadful
cost, Just as Burnside was compelled 70
the lire he had taken on Saturday
last. Indeed, il any one desires 10 consider
that our difficulties at Petersburg have been
trivial and that our progress has been all that
we could desire, we recommend him 10 read
a history of the siege of Sebastopol. That
great attempt Of four nations-tvo of them pos
sessed Of great military power--was one coutn-
ued series of disasters frsm its inception till its
final success. Indeed, at one time in that
great operation it was MOI Sebastopol that was
besieged, but the allied army. The army lost
fty thousand men; YET IL was not only not an
initiated, but II was finally triumphant. And
though our progress seems slow, aud our sue
cess to some almost impossible, we have the
same tenacious leader who finally carried
vicksburg in the face OF all possible difficult
ties; we have still splendid army, confident
in bis ability, and we must and viii succeed at
last.


But little has been heard for q few days Of
the operations Of McCausland in Pennsylvania,
or Of the rebel force lately in the valley Of the
Shenandoah. There is probability that we
have not heard the last Of this body; but,
whether we next hear OF IL in Northern State
or on its way to Richmond, there is fair hope
that what we hear may bs satisfactory to ms.
This body has taught us that II is necessary to
have at Washington general competent to or
ganize and command force sufficient to pro-
tect the capital and to guard the great gate