Year: 1864

The GampaiG In Georg avg


The InvasiOn oT the North.


Our successes in Georgia amply balance the


acknowledgements Of the struggle at other
points. We may now consider the destruction
Of the rebel army Of Tennessee as something
that hardly less than a miracle can prevent.


The map we give to-day illustrates the ex-
tremity to which Hood has been driven, de-
spite his desperate attempts and dreadful
losses Of the Goth and 22d ultimo. His third
line for the defence Of Atlanta is drawn within
and across the streets of that city Upon the


passage Of Peachtree creek by our army the


rebel army was posted in an admirable posi-


ton few miles north Of the city, that had


doubtless been chosen by Johnston. II was q


position from which it could advance to battle


with the ground greatly in its favor Had il,


moreover, been successful in an advance from
that point, the reverse would have been very
destructive to US, as it would have been almost
impossible for our line to have withdrawn in
good order over the difficult ground near the
stream. But the enemy's advance on the 20th


ult was repulsed, his position turned, and he
retired to second line in the outskirts of the
city. From that position he advanced for the
assault on our left on the 22d ult., and that
position he was compelled to relinquish
by the result of that battle His present posi-
ton Of course does not protect Atlanta, since


Sherman can she'll that city. Neither does it


prevent our operations now in progress for


complete investment Every line by which
Hood could get away is occupied or rendered


impracticabe. Retreat is impossible; supply
equally SO, and battle is no doubt hopeless.
Hood must surrender at discretion before many
days 60 by, or utterly destroy his army in
| one great final attempt to cut his way through.
Considerable modification and chagrin ap-
pear to be felt in the Army Of the Potomac
over the failure Of the recent attempt to carry


the enemy's lines by storm. II is very natural


and proper that this should be so. No one ven-


lures to deny that we had on that occasion four
corps massed against position held by three
divisions, and the army may naturally wonder
whether it will ever succeed again If it is to


fail with such odds in It's favor. No stratagem


to gain an advantage in numbers at the point
Of contact was ever more admirably contrived
or more successful than that by which General
Grant got the bulk Of Lees army over at
Deer Bottom at the time when this assault
was to be made; but it was great failure not
to seize resolutely what this advantage placed
within our reach. Whispers that the army did
not fight well are absurd, as applied to this
event; for not enough OF the army was put in


to give ii chance TO win. We're our generals
over sanguine Of the result? Were they SO


certain OF success that they did not employ
men enough to secure it! Were they saving
the troops for great days work after Peters
burg had been taken Praiseworhy as such
calculations might be under certain circura-


stances, we must yet hope that they did not


stand in the way Of our success in the late at
| tempt.


10 view Of what appears now to be In pro-


gress 10 Maryland, Pennsylvania and the She


naadoah valley, II is sn unpleasant truth that


the Late attempt by the Army OF the Potomac


has served General Lee ia the light Of an ex-
| pertinent. 1t seems to haSe given him great
| aud valuable piece OF Information az 10 how
| few men ran hold 'he Petersburg derenees
Three divisions hsld those lines when sbe as-
sailants bad the assistance Of niue that lad
cost months labor, and IL follows that
Lee could have reinforced Early with great


many men II be had only known 1t. H. knows
AZ nA,w and IL Ia not too late to act unon the