Year: 1867




Office Bill, which has almost destroyed Of
hclal accountability. The President may be
thoroughly convinced that an officer Is inca
pable, dishonest, or uniaithtul to the Con-
stitution, but under the law which have
named, the utmost he can do is to compliant
to the Senate and ask the privilege OF SUP
plying his place with better man. Ii the
Senate be regarded as personally or politl-
cally hostile to the President, it is natural,
and not altogether unreasonable, for the Of
fieer to expect that it will take his part as
far as possible, restore him to his place, and
give him triumph over his Executive su-
perior The officer has other chances Oflm-
punlty arising from accidental defects OF ev-
idencc, the mode of investigating it,. and
the secrecy OF the hearing. 1t is wonderful
that official mafeasance should become bold
in proportion as the delinquents learn to
think themselves safe. | am entirely pur-
suaded that under such a rule the President
cannot perform the great duty assigned TO
him of seeing the laws faithfully executed,
and that it disables him most especially
from enforcing that rigid accountability
which is necessary to the due execution OF
the revenue laws. r ~.


The Constitution invests the President
with authority to decide whether a removal
should be made in any given case the act
of Congress declares, in substance, that he
shall only accuse such as he supposes to be
unworthy of trust The Constitution makes
him sole Judge in the premises; but the
statute takes away his jurisdiction, transfers
it to the Senate, and leaves him nothing
but the odious and sometimes impractical
bic duty of becoming prosecutor. The
prosecution Is to be conducted before tri-
bunal whose members are not, like him, re-
sponslble to the whole people, but to sepa-
rate constituent bodies, and who may hear
his accusation with great disfavor. The
Senate is absolutely without any known
standard CT decision applicable to such a
case. Its Judgment cannot be anticipated,
for it is not governed by any rule. The law
does not define what shall be deemed good
cause for removal. 1t is impossible even to
conjecture what may or what may not be 50
considered by the Senate. The nature of the
subject forbids clear proof. 1t the charge be
incapacity, what evidence Will support it2
Fidelity to The Constitution may be under
stood or misunderstood In thousand differ
ent ways, and by violent party men, in vio-
lent party times, unfalthfulness to the Con-
stltutlon may even come to be considered
meritorious. If the officer be accused of
dishonesty, how shall it be made out? Will
it be inferred from acts unconnected with
public duty, from private history, or from
general reputation? Or must the President
await the commission of an actual misde-
neanor in Office? Shall he, in the mean
time, risk the character and interest of the
Nation in the hands OF men to whom he
cannot give his confidence? Must he FOR
bear his complaint until the mischief is
done and cannot be prevented? If his zeal
in the public service should impel him to an
ticipate the overt act, must he move at the
peril of being tried himself for the offense
of slandering his subordinate? In the pres
ent circumstance Of the country, some one
must be held responsible for official delin-
quency of every kind. 1t is extremely diff
cult to say where that responsibility should
be thrown, if it be not left where 1t has been
placed by the Constitution. But all Just
men will admit that the President ought to
be entirely relieved from such responsible
ity, if he cannot meet it by reason of re-
strictions placed by law upon his action.


The unrestricted power of removal from
office is a very great one to be trusted even
to a Magistrate chosen by the general SUIT
frage of the whole people, and accountable
directly to them for his acts. It's undoubt.
edy liable to abuse. and at some periods OF
our history perhaps has been abused. If 1t
be thought desirable and constitutional that
it should be so limited as to make the Pres
ident merel: a common informer against
other public agents, he should at least be
permitted to act in that capacity before
some open tribunal, independent of party
politics, ready to investigate the merits of
every case, furnished with the means of tax
ing evidence, and bound to decide accor-
ding to established rules. This would guar
antee the safety of the accuser when he acts
in good faith, and at the same secure the
rights of the other party. / speak OF course
with all proper respect tor the present Sen
ate, but it does not seem to me that any
legislative body can be SO constituted as to
insure its fitness for these functions.


1t is not the theory of this Govern ment
that public offices are the property of those
who hold them They are given merely as
a trust for the public benefit, sometimes for
a fixed period, sometimes during good be-
havior, but generally they are liable to be
terminated at the pleasure of the appoint
ing power, which represents the collective
majesty and speaks the will of the people,


The forced retention in office Of a single
dishonest person may work injury to the
public interests. The danger to the public
comes not from the power to remove, but
from the power to appoint. Therefore 1t
was that the trainers of the Constitution
left the power of removal unrestricted, while
thev gave the Senate right TO reject all
appointnients which, In its opinion, We're
not fit to be made


A little reflection on this subject will prob
ably satisfy all who have the good of the
country at heart that our best course is to
take the Constitution for our guide, walk in
in the path marked out by the founders Of
the Republic, and obey the rules made sa-
cred by the observance of our great prede-
cessors.


The present condition of our finances and
circulating medium is one to which your ear
ly oopSidara finn invited