Year: 1863

tnplr decks that the Admiral had given up


1t is now asserted by those who are in The
confidence of the Admiral that, after duiy
weighing the reports of the commanders, ana
taking into consideration the fact that most OF
the vessels injured reported that they Were
partially disabled by the time they Were under
FIRE forty minutes, he determined of his own
volifion not to rer ew the assault. The danfer
Of any OF the vessels becoming disabled and
falling into the hands Of the enemy, also had
great weight with him, as well as the opinion
OF SCme OF the commanders that there was a
great probability that in undergoing another
fire of similar fury and force, some of our ves-
sells would be unable to return to their an
Chorage.


As far as can ascertain, the subject of forcing
through the obstructons and making dash on
the city, leaving the great fortificstions behind
them, was not entertained. What was the
character of the invisible obstructions is only
known by statements and intImations of block
ade runners and other parties who had an
interest in deceiring u.s. They had represented
torredoes manufactured out of steam boilers
twenty fet long, filled with powder, acres and
tons OF fls nets, and all manner and variety OF
Iieyillsh C. ltrivances, which were TO blow our
lron-cladf cut of water-sharp- pointed stakes
which we e TO pierce their hulls, and a rain of
bomb-shei : TO crush their decks. Indeed, there
is no doubt that the authorities of Charles ton
relied as much on the fear of distractions as
they did on the Instructions themselves and
the imaginary torpedoes have done their work
most effectually.


Another cause of the want OF success in This
movement has been the antipathy existing
among the high tunctionaries of the navy to
Ericsson and his Monitors. They look upon
these vessels as destined, if successful, TO do
away with quarter deck grandeur and the dig
nifty of high rank. They were opposed to gain
ing victories through engineering skill and by
Yankee inventions. Ericsson and his Monitors
are spoken of as curses to the navy, and not.
withstandlng the impr"gnablity and success
OF these vessels, l have heard them constantly
denounced at time when the YER existence OF
the nation almost depended npon them. True
they are not very pleasant places OF abode
either for officers or men, but a vast deal de-
pends on them at the present time-the sum
preston OF the rebellion, and the securing to
our nation proper degree of respect from for
elgn government at this critical period III our
history.


Presuming that an attempt would be made
10 take Charleston as well a 10 reduce sum
Ter, the Navy Department had provided
appliances TO fit on their bows, and push
before them. that were calculated TO remove
any obstructiontthat could be placed in their
way. These contriYances We're condemned by
the authorities here without trial, and deter
mination was evinced from the first not to us.
them. The first objection was thar a vessel
would not steer with such an appendage. ir.r
ther had been here for a month a tria! vas
made as TO the steering qualities of Monitor
with one OF them, and this Oblection' fell
through, the vessel obeying the rudder in q
heavy sea way as well with il as without it,
This being settled, proposition to drive
some piles in Port Royal harbor TO test the
torpedo was talked about, but nothing more
done with il. When the fleet approached
Fort Sumter one of these apparatuses,
tchhont q tryr1O. was attached to the WeehaW-
ken, and 6 number et grapnels suspended from
it, The " eehawken took it up past Sumter
and layed for two hours alongside OF the OBJ
structons. If q torpedo had been attached
what 4 magnificent opportunity there would
have been to test il TO the discontinue of The
enemy.


After the attack on SImtera proposition was
made TO use it TO destroy the keokuk. Several
days were consumed in talking about and as
Sening TO 1t, but ii was finally abandoned. anu
the raft and torpedo ordered hack 10 Fortress
MSnrOr. lis successful use in iesrroying the
keokuk would have been an unans Werabl.,
condemnation of the failure TO use il against
the rebels They were all, however, afraid
of it although it was as harmless in hand
ling as loaded gun without Il lock. and
every danger guarded against Il was
condemned without examination. NOT a
man IN the squadron, from the Admiral down.
having scarcely deigned to look at il, the dis
like of Ericsson and his naval innovations
proving too great 10 be overcome, even in such
Il dreadful emergency that soon TO be en-
COnnteTed.


WHAT SHOULD Re DONE.


If there is another Farragut III the navy he
should be sent here al once To lead the gallant
officers and men of this squadron to their long
and anNlousiy expected victory. Whoever he
may be he viii find them ready and anxious
In cooperate with him in securing this grea.
national retrihutiOn. Above all do not trust
lis execution TO those who have been frightened
by rebel phantoms, expect defeat, and do NOT
believe that success is possible