Year: 1859

]


montese and the corps of Gen. Benedek. As far a


our side is concerned the engagement at San Marti


no must be looked at entirely separate affair


not entering into the general plan Of the battle


was only toward noon, short time before tn
taking of SOleIinO that their cooperation as


said before, was demanded. Having two division
and half already engaged against for supe
riOr enemy, and having likewise to apprehend al
advance OF the Austrians from Peschiera toward
DesenZano, it was impossible to make the move
ment in the direction of SOlferino which was wanted
On the side of the AustriaGs on the contrary the
movement all along the line was according to one
plan. The great difficulty was, however, to give tC
the movements the necessary ensemble a line o.
from twelve to fifteen miles in length. Until the
orders from Cavrana could arrive, the situation
was very often entirely changed; and to choose
the opportune moment for movement is lust one
OF the most important conditions for the success o
battle. As 1t was, the right wing at PoZzoengo
was entirely isolated from the rest while the move
ments of the left wing could likewise only be imper-
iectly controlled. The length of the line made the
employment of the reserves equally difficult and
caused want of cohesion in the whole, which
might have been far more fatal than it really was
had the Austrians not thought so early of their re-
treat. All these great mistakes were up to a GER
tain point counterbaanced by the number of lines
OF retreat which the Austrians possessed. But
this advantage told only toward the end and saved
them from what otherwise would probably have
been a complete rout.


During the battle it was curious to watch the eff
tects OF the too great length of the line and its cor
responding weakness The French with their first
lmpetuoslty, invariably succeeded in breaking
through or pressing back the part of the line which
they attacked, and before the reserves came up
they had usually succeeded in throwing themselves
into the flank of the Austriaus, who still maintained
their ground, thus forcing them likewise to retreat
In spite of their numerical superiority the Austrians
found themselves almost always too few at the de
cisve minute They were thus pressed back step
by step. The more they retired the greater be-
the leDpth of tho line and ha d;r,
disadvantage for the road to Goito which was the
line of retreat for their left wing and at the same
time OF vital Importance, Of the chief passa-
ges of the Mincio, off diagonav toward the
river. This was, of course, a disadvantage whic h
they could not help, but they ought evidently not
to have chosen a line of battle which exposed them
to it.


They have six passages the Mincio-at Pes
chlera, Salionge, MonZambanO, BOrghettO, Valleg-
gio and GoitO. They wanted to use, and had conse-
quently to protect, them all. Like the hen with
her numerous chickens, they stretched out their
wings to embrace them ALL They were probably
very confident in their success, and thought that
the more they advanced, the shorter their line
would become which was quite true for Tomato
and Castiglione, the two places where all the Min
clio passages lead to, not more than four or five
miles distant from each other, and in pushing back
the enemy, they might hope to envelope his riubt
wing. This was evidently their calculation, only
it was wrong, and therefore failed If one is GER
tain of victory, then one is justified in choosing an
order of battle which will make that victory the
most decisive and the enemy's defeat the most com
plete; but the events which have occurred hitherto
in this campaign scarcely justified the Austrans in
seckonmg, even with a superiority in numbers, on
a certain victory; it would have been, therefore,
wiser to be more moderate in their plans.


In attempting too much thev weakened their
forces at the decisive point, and while they tried
their offensive movement on their left they lost
the key Of their position of SoferinO One can,
indeed, forgive them, for thinking this latter i'm
prCgnable, fortified it was; but in warfare there
exist only greater or lesser probabilities, ard no
absolute certantics.


After the loss Of Solerino, nothing remained but
to think of retreat. The plain on both sides of the
road to Goito became untenable, for it could be
taken in flank from the spurs of the hills: and if the
resistance was too long continued there was the
danger of its being also taken in flank from Me
dole, and so lose the road to Goto. The center
could not assist it, for if it did move toward the
right, it exposed its own line of retreat which was
toward Nallegeio.


As it was, the line of retreat to Goto could only
be kept with the greatest sacrifices, and it is but
jnstice to say that the Austrians somewhat re
deemed the mistakes which they made in their ad
vance by the mastery way in which they managed
their retreat uader very unav orable circumstances
have spoken already of the Campo d Medole
but must go back to it, for it PLAYED prominent
part in the retreat of the Austrian left wing.


This Campo is an open piece of ground entirely
devoid of trees. 1t forms almost a parallelouram
of which San CassianO, the foot of the hills of Ca
vriana. MedOle. and Piure, form the four angles;
it is about miles in width and 2I miles in length
and is nersected in its width by the road to Goio
which passes through Guidizzolo this, in its turn
is intersected by the road from Mpdole to San Cas-
siano, which runs just at the beginning of the
Campo This open ground is mostly filled with
scanty crops of corn and fields of Indian corn as
yet not full grown. The borders of it are planted
with rows of vines, trained up like low trees and
large numbers of mulberrv-trees.


When the Austrians had to withdraw from their
first line they took up their position the border
beyond this plain, in the front of the village of
GuidizZOlo which lies about oue-third of a mile
beyond the Ouen Campo. They were n cherdI on
the road to GOto. Here they had to sustain in the
afternoon, from o'clock till nightraIl most for
midable combined attack. The lSt and I'd Corps
and the Guards began just about that time to scale
the nights Of Cavrana, and advance on the lower
spur of the hills toward the Campo. The 4th Corps
(Niel's), which had abStained from the offensive
until the position of Solterno taken, began to
debOuCh from the woods on the CastgliOne side of
the Campo, and from the crossroad which leads
from Piure to GuidiZZolO. The cavalry of the
Guard and several regiments of Chasseurs Afriuue
were coming out from the main road of Castiglione
to Goito. The Austrian position was thus attacked
from three sides. The superiority of the French
artillery told no where more than at this point
Its great range and precision were really marvel
ous for, while every shell and shrapne of the rfed
cannon could be seen striking and bursting in the
midst of the infantry lines of the enemy, and





but little harm.


This was most striking in the beginning when
the distance between the two lines was still great
You saw the shot and shell fall short the shell,
fired evidently at a very high elevation, burst in
the air befre the French lines In spite of this dis
advantage the Austrians brought up gun after gun,
and it was interesting to watch how soon most of
them silenced. What seemed to me surpris-
ing was that the Austrians did not try to make up
in numbers what they wanted in range and precis-
ion. They never brought up more than three or
four guns at time, and those kept almost always
on the road, although the open "Campo" was well
adapted for evoutions ofartillery. can only think
that they were not much inclined to lose them and
had therefore their artillery dispatched toward the
MinciO, keeping only the most necessary part of it
with them-rather false economy, it seemed to u.s.
for what they saved in cannon they lost in men,
The fields both sides of the road in front of Gui-
dizzolo were strewn with dead and wounded


Another thing which remains to be explained is
that they did not take advantage of the large mass
of cavalry-twclve regiments-which they had
brought over, and which, ably employed, might
have been of considerable use in protecting their
treat. Here the reason seems likewise to have been
economy. or else that they could not bring up al
their cavalry on the road, ncumbered by the retreat
of the enemy. At any rate, there seemed to me
nothing like twelve regiments Of cavalry in the
field every one Of which ought to have above 900
horses in war time. There were but two small
charges of a few squadrons of Lancers against the
ChasSeurs dAfrique, which looked very warlike,
but which did not contribute very much toward the
success of either side 1t was the Austrian infantry
which had all the shock to bear, and their resist
ance unquestonably great.


If | have been clear enough in explaining the re-
spectivC positions OF the two armies you must have
seen that, leaving aside the Piedmontese engage
ment, which had no connection with the operations
on this side, our whole attack was made by two
large columns, the first to the left consisting Of the
lst and I'd corps and of the Infantry Of the Guard:
and the other, to the right, of the 4th corps with
the Sd echelOnned to the right of it. Both these
columns advanced from the plain, and had for the
object OF their operations Cavrana, which was the
centre of the Austrian position. They to
reach this point by two great flank movements, in
order to gain the range of heights the left, and
to break through the Austrian line, separating the
centre at Cavriana from the left wing at Guidzzoo
and CereSale. Accordingly, the lst corps, which
was on the left, and supported by the Guards. ad-
vanced at the base OF the hills far as the road of
and then passed to the left and scaled the
position. Having done so, 1t took again its Origi-
nal direction, and went the crest of the hills
toward Cavriana. The I'd corps which was to the
right OF it, cont inued to sweep the plain and the
hillside far San Cassiano, hen likewise faced
to the left, and went up the heights, which were at
the same time attacked by the lett column which
had already gained the hills The 4th cor ps kept
its original direction to the left of the Goito road
until il came in front of Gudzzolo. 1t threaten
ed the extreme left of the enemy and the line of re-
treat of this wing from Medole, and then took like
wise the direction toward the hills, so as to throw
Itself between the centre of the enemy's army and
separate it from the left wing,


The taking Of Solferino and this movement of our
right column, to throw itself between the centre
and lett wing Of the Austrians, are the two great
phases of the Gav. Until O'Clock this second phase
was still undecided. just about that time heavy
came down, which lasted for more
than half an hour, and became the turning point |
hiln tha A. rs on MIR