Year: 1865

mand of the armies of the United States,
has been given to the public. 1t is quite
lengthy and would fill about three pages of
our paper Not being able to give it entire,
and finding the following review in New
York cotemporary, VIC transfer 1t to our
columns;-


General Grant writes as he fights. The
difference between his report and the other
reports that have recently been laid before
the public is as broad and clear as between
his battles and the battles Of any of the gen
erals who preceded him in the command OF
our armies He is equally uncompromising
in the field and on paper. lie goes slralght
10 the point He states the particulars OF q
battle In half dozen sentences that leave US
nothing to desire. He tells the truth lear
lessly and openly. He praises with most
generous freedom all whose actions he can
approve, but ifany unlucky delinquent comes
in the way OF his curt, brusk narrative, so
much the worse for that delinquent. lie
has, in short, in his report added TO military
literature document that is impressed
through and through with the qualities OF
his own mind-that is, bold, free, simple,
incisive, and direct in the extreme--a docu-
ment that is as superior to oil other mere
formal official reports as his achievements
WCAG W SNNA ehAhb NAeS AZ NhA AhAAsNAJ AA9
tory.


Grants report shows how magnidcently
the drama of war will go ahead when all its
parts are under the direction OF master
mind, and when the purpose is TO carry on
war in real earnest and annihilate the armed
force of the enemy. 1t quite inyoluntarily
puts in the broadest and clearest light the
distinction between the conduct OF the war
in the year when Grant wac Lieutenant
4 s.l Ill a
the way in which il was conducted in the
years before he rose to that high position
The country remembers very well how we
blundered on through all those early years
how our operations languished until il often
seemed that the result would be against US
by default; how often our generals marched
up hill only to march down again. But in
this report 1t is called to mind again how
different the style was in Grants year; with
what directness and purpose everything went
forward; how promptly blow followed blow
and how grand was the progress of events
from his starting point at Chattanooga TO the
final scenes when the history of the war be
came ''the record of the successive surren
ders" of rebel generals. "FrOm the first,
says the hero, II was firm in the conviction
that no peace could be had that would bt
stable and conducive to the happiness Of thu
people, both North and South, until the mil
itary power of the rebellion was entirely
broken" That was the key note. 1t wa!
waste of time TO parley, utterly useless tC
stand with folded hands and wait to see i
may be some one could not patch up the
quarrel. There was nothing to do but tC
ght-hght-fghtl to "hammer continuous
ly," to pound away until the enemy shoult
be so exhausted by the power we could ar
ray against him that he should not have thu
strength to raise hand against the govern
ment. With what wonderful persistency
and effect Grant carried on the war in thi
way his report tells, and no other historian
will ever equal the force, lucidity and poin
with which he tells ii.


Some of the best parts Of the report ar,
its references to other generals, and we SCI
their exact value given at once to the goot
and the bad, as if they were weighed in tn
very scales of justice.


Grants references to Butler put that dough
ty parsonage before the country in the prope
light for the first time They show how
practical, sincere man regards such an empty
blatant pretender, and justly hold him up Il
contempt Butler was instructed from tn
hrst in the campaign against Richmond tina
that city was his objective point, and tina
he was to cooperate with the Army Of tn
Potomac, and to seize or invest the rebe
capital while Meade engaged Lee on til
Rapidan. The plan was perfect and n
person with less ingenuity than Butler woul
have found 1t possible to spoil it. Butler
however, managed wonderfully not TO d
what was requisite. He was shown tha
Richmond could not be reinforced from tn
south or from Lees army, and was at hi
me.cy; but instead of seizing ii he sat dow
at Bermuda Hundred and wrote despatche
and ''sutiered the enemy to as completed
shut him off from further operations againi
Richmond as if he had been in a bottl
strongly corkedn Such is Grants COZ
temptuous disposal of Buffers cooperate
against the rebel capital. Subsequently
when Grant was crossing the James, til
enemy left the road from Richmond TO p,
tersburg on Buffers front undefended, an
Butler seized 1t. Grant, seeing the adval
tage, sent the Sixth corps to enable ButlC
to hold what he had taken, and Butler kel
the Sixth corps in idleness, while the enem
recaptured the road. Nothing but Butler
Fort Fisher failure could have put china
10 these achievements. Grant shows ho
the order Tor Wetzel to act againt Whining
ton was smothered by Butler; how Butlt
went where he was not sent and came ava
when there was no reason; and then no
Terry, with nearly the same force, accon
plished what Butler had declared impossibl
As the sequel to this Grant merely says
'At my request Major General Is. +. Butt
was relieved, and Major General L. o.
Ord assigned to the command of the Depal
tnent of Virginia and North Carolina" Blu
Ter In this report and Butler before the Cor
Enittee on the Conduct of the War-or ma
ing speeches at Lowell-are very diifere
persons


AS contrast to Grants picture of Butt
we may put his picture of Sheridan TIL
soldier was always doing exactly what W
wanted, at exactly the right time and in u
neatest possible way. When he commando
in the Shenandoah valley and Early lay


his front, Grant, seeing the danger to us oi
defeat there, feared TO order battle witho
an exact knowledge of the position.
started, therefore, to see II with his own eye
He met Sheridan, however, at CharlestO
and he pointed out so distinctly how ca
army lay; what he could do the moment


was authorized, and expressed such cor
dence of success, that there were but II
words of instruction necessary-"Go inr'
The victory at Opequan was the result. B
Ter had to be hedged round and bolstered


with page on page of minute instructiC
and even then could always find reas
why he should not do the thing he ought
For Sheridan two words were enough, a
the victory came. Grant tells plainly Il
he did not like Thomas delay to strike He
as soon as the latter reached Nashville;
he adds, with grand sense OF justice, ~
final defeat of Hood was so complete tina
will be accepted as vindication of that
singuished officers judgment" But he


iimS.es an opinion that Hoods back v
weakened before he got to Nashville Spe
ing Of the battle at Franklin he says:-"T
syas the iFst serious opposition the enc


met with. and am satisfied was the fl
blow TO all his expectations" Of Hoo


movement past Sherman s right TO Nashv


that grand piece of strategy concocted


Davis-we have the simple declaration, II