Year: 1869

on the throne of France. He has never been
forgetfal, since he became Emperor, at
least, of the fate of the first Caesar.
1t has been his ambition to initiate the role OF
the second. Augustus, without his weak
nesses, has been bis model. Rome was not
sick Of Cesar because so-called patriots
murdered him. Augustus had great sue
cess; his name is associated with the palmiest
days of the empire; he had the honor Of
establishing the dynasty, and the name OF
Caesar remained power until the empire fell.
If this view be correct, no one must for
moment imagine that Napoleon will give up
the fight. OF all living men he knows, per-
haps, the most about the requirements Of the
times. He has his plans and his purposes,
and, what is better, he knows the standards
and conditions according to which these plans
and purposes must be fashioned. He wishes
to leave his son his successor, and so long as
brain remains to him he will labor at any cost
and any sacrifice to this end. From this point
of view, and from no other, can the situation
In France at the present moment be properly
looked at or correctly understood.


What, then, is Napoleon most likely to do? /?
He may not refuse to grant further reform.
Very probably he will not. But reform, in
the shape of increased liberty, will not be
granted to the French people on any other
principle than that which we have mentioned.
1t must first of all have relation to the secu-
rty of his own position, and secondly, to the
welfare of his dynasty. 1t must admit the ne
cessity of Napoleon the Third and it must make
plain the way to the succession of Napoleon
the Fourth.


We are not, therefore, unwilling to believe
that the immediate result Of the elections will
be gentle and agreeable humoring of French
feeling and desire. But concession will not be
allowed to wear about 1t the garb of timidity.
The Emperor must not seem to yield to COM
pulsion. There may be allowed little larger
license to the press the right Of public meeting
may be less restrained; but it will not be per-
mitted that these reforms be abused. If how
ever, these should not tell and tell Immediately,
1t may be taken for granted that Napoleon will,
without delay, give an outward direction to
French discomfort. His popularity of late years
has waned, and he knows it, largely, because
he has not been sufficiently willing to fight. He
has shown himself lover of peace even in
circumstances of great provocation. But he
is not the man to allow any desire, any opinion,
any theory to stand between him and the
object of his life. France is unquestionably
sore because France has been taught to be-
lieve that Prussia has become powerful and
dangerous rival, chiefly through the mistaken
policy of the Emperor. Prussia has become
somewhat arrogant. The humbling of Prussia,
especially if that humbling would imply the
restoration of the boundaries of 1914, would
be qualification to the entire French people.
war with Prussia is the way of escape out
of great difficulty. If no other way Of escape
can be found and no other such way at the
moment seems possible, war with Prussia may
be considered certain. It is terrible ex-
tremity to be reduced to; but it is a strong
hold to which the Emperor will flee as a
prisoner Of hope when all other refugees fail.
Bismarck knows this, and Bismarck is now
ready