Year: 1863

might appropriate it. Such change
: use would be violation of the trust fc'
} which it was originally granted would be
a fraud upon the grantor, would exceed
: the powers of the grantee, and would be
null and void The principle of law reg


ulatlng this subject IS u very wise and
just one. 1t is that whenever an estat c


is granted for any particular public use,


and the public use ceases the estate re-


verts to the grantor This estate was


granted for the public use Of the county,
if it was grsnted at all. The commission
ers had no power to take for any other
use or purpose Whenever this public
use of the county ceases, the estate re-
verts to the grantor-the United States.
Again, if the county acquired any title
to this tract Of land by virtue Of the pur-
chase by the county commissioners, they
have parted with that title by dedica-
ton to the public.


The law upon this subject is thus laid
down in Kents commentaries, Vol 3, ..
| 250:


( 'Dedications of land for public puTpo-
| ses, as for charitable and religious uses,
and for public highways and village sq..,
are as grants, and may be valid without
any specific grantee in esse at the time, to
whom the fee could be conveyed But it
has been an unsettled question what length
of time was requisite to create the pre-
sumption of valid dedication of high
way to the public In the case Of the
trustees of Ruby Charity VS. Merrywea
ther East 375 n eight years free use
of q way by the public, with permission
of the owner was deemed quite sufficient
time for presuming deriliction of the
way to the public; and Lord Kenyon re-
ferred to case in which years had been
held sufficient. In the case of State vs.
Trask 6 d r. 1851 it was held that If
land be laid ont as public common for
the purpose ola court house, and the pub
| lie acquire an interest in it as such, it is
deemed dedication to the public use, and
! it cannot be reclaimed though the use be
discontinued The true principle on the
subject to be deduced from the authori-
ties, (the learned chancellor continues)-
Il apprehend to be, that if there be no
other evidence of a grant or dedication
than the presumption arising from the
fact of acquiescence on the part of the
owner, In the free use and enj joyment Of
the way as public road Cor public square)
for the period Of twenty years applicable
to I.corporal rights, would be required as
being the usual and analogous period Of
limitation. But if there were clear, une-
| quivocal, and decisive rights of the owner
amounting to an explicit manifestation Of
his will to make permanent abandon
ment of the road those acts would be suf
ticient to establish the dedication, without
any intermediate period.


IL g questionable whether under the
laws of this State the "usual and anala-
gous period Of limitation, would not be
ten years instead Of twenty as in the state
of New York and in England In this
case however, period of more than 20
years (ever since July Goth, 1S4O) of free
use and enjoyment Of this public square
for public use, by the public. with the
acquiescence of the county commission
ers, and their SUCCESSORS has elapsed
which according to the authority quoted,
| would furnish a sufficient presumption of
such a grant or dedication, if there was
no other evidence Of it. But it is not nee
essary to resort to presumptions to estab-
ilsh the fact of dedication The "clear
unequiyocal and decisive acts and decla-
rations Of the county commissioners at
the time of the puret ase in July $780,
and of them and their successors repeat
edly since is such ''other evidence, and
amounts "to an explicit manifestation OF
! their will to make permanent abandon
ment of any exclusive claim of title to
the county as a corporation in this public
square, and are Sufficient to establish the
dedication" of it to the public for p1olic
use without regard to the period over
which the use had extended; and such
use and enjoyment is important not as es-
tablishing presumption, but only ;onff-
ming the fact of dedication l therefore
conclude as | promised, that IT the eoun-
ty commissioners ever had any title to this
public square they have parted with it,
by dedication to the public, and that
the public now holds whatever title the
county commissioners ever had.


l have attempted to show: 1st That
the County Commissioners never had any
title to the tract of land in question.


2nd If they had, that it was only title
in trust for the public use of the County;
and that whensthat public use--ceased the
title reverted to the United States. And /;


3rd. That Whatever title the County
had has been dedicated to the public.


The question then arises: if the County


never had any title to.this tract of land,
who had 2


The act, of Congress of July 2de1S36 so
often referred to furnishes ready an swer.
Ifthe county commissioners never acqulr-
ed any title. it was because the tract was
a public square If it was public square


the act of Congress imperatively required
that it should be reserved from sale for
public use and remain forever for public
use as, a pubHeshighway, and for other
public uses


This language embodied in all the SOL
emnity of an act of Congress, is.a 'olear
uneauivocal and decisive act of the owner


amounting to an explicit manifestation Of
its will to make a permanent abandon
ms ent' of whatever tracts of land the Sur
veyor General shall lay off into Public
Squares, and it il sufficient to establish
the dedication OF the tract for public use.
1t is one of these ''dedications of land for