Year: 1861

ucei letter from Mai. Anderson, command
ing at Fort Sumter, written on the 2Sth o


February and received at the War Depart


ment on the 4th of March, was by that De
partment placed in his hands This letter


expressed the professional opinion of Lhe
writer that reinforcements could not have
been thrown into that fort in time for his
relief, rendered necessary by the limited sup.
| ply OF provisions, Il with view of holding
possession of the same with force of less
then 20, 600 well disciplined men This opin.
Ion was concurred in by all the officers of his
command, and their memoranda on the sub
Ject were made in Enclosures of Major And


ersons letter. The whole was Immediately


lald before Lieut. Gen. Scott, who at once


concurred with Major Anderson in his opin.


ion. pm


oh reflection, however, he took full time


IN consulting with other officers. both of the


army and navy, and at the end of four davs


came reluctantly, but decidedly, to the same


conclusion as before He also stated at the


same time that no such sufficient force was


'nen AT the control of the government. or


could be raised and brought to the ground


WITHIN the time when the provisions in the


fort would be exhausted In a military
point OF view, this reduced the duty of the
Administration to the mere matter Of gett.
ing the garrison safely out of the fort.


1t was believed, however, that to so aban.
don that position, under the circumstances,
would be utterly ruinous that the necessity
under which it was to be done would not be
lully understood; that by many it would be
construed as part Of voluntary policy
mat at home it would discourage the friends
OF the Union, embolden its adyersares, and
go Tar to insure to the latter a recognition
abroad that, in fact, it would be our ma.
uonal destruction consumaled. This could
not be allowed. Starvation was not yet
upon the garrison, and ere it would be reach
ed Fort Pickens might be reinforced. This
last would be clear indication of policy,
and would better enable the country to ac.
cept the evacuation OF Fort Sumter as


military necessity. Then an order was at


once directed to be sent for the landing Of


the troops from the steamship Brooklyn, in


70 Fort PickenS. This order could not 90


oy land, but must take the longer and slow.
er route by sea. The first return news from
the order was received Just one week before
the fall Of Sumter. The news itself was,
that the officer commanding the Sabine, to
which vessel the troops had been transferred
from the Brooklyn, acting upon some quasi
armlStlce of the late Administration and of
the existence of which the present Admin
lstration up to the time the order was dis
patched had only too vague and uncerta in
rumors to fix attention, had refused to land
the troops. To now reinforce Fort Pickens
before a crisis would be reached at Fort
Sumter was impossible rendered so by the
mere exhaustion of provisions in the latter
named fort In precaution of such con.
juncture, the Government had few days
before commenced preparing an expedition
as we'll adapted as might be, to relieve Fort
Sumter, which expedition was intended to
be ultimately used or not according to cir
cumstances.


The strongest anticipated case for using
it was not presented, and it was resolved to
notify the Governor of South Carolina that
be might expect an attempt would be made
to provision the fort, and that if the attempt
should not be resisted, there would be no
attempt to throw in men arms or ammuni-
tion without further notice or in case of an
attack upon the fort. This notice was given
accordingly, whereupon the fort was bonn.
barded TO its fall, not even awaiting the ar
rival OF the provisioning expedition. 1t is
thus seen that the aassut upon and reduc-
tion of Fort Sumter was in no sense a mat.
ter of self defense on the part of the assai.
ants. They well knew that the garrison in
the fort could by no possibility commit ag
gression upon them. They knew they were
expressly notified that the giving of bread
to the few brave and hungry men Of the
garrison was all that would on that occa-
sion be attempted, unless themselves by re-
sisting so much, should provoke more.
They knew that this Government desired to
keep the garrison in the fort not to assail
them, but merely to maintain visible pos
session, and thus to prevent the Union from
actual and immediate dissolution, trusting
as hereinbefore stated, to time, discussion
and the ballot box for final adjustment, and
they assailed reduced the fort for precisely
the reverse obiect-to drive out the visible
authority Of the Federal Union and thus
force it to immediate dissolution. That this
was their object the Executive well under
stood, and having said to them in the In.
augural, "you can have no conflict without
being yourselves the aggressors, he took
pains not only to keep this declaration good,
but also to keep the case so far from ingen-
ious sophistry that the world should not
misunderstood it.


BY the affair at Fort Sumter, with its
surrounding circumstances, that point was
reached. Then and there, by the assailants
Of the government began the conflict with
out gun in sight, or expectancy to retHrn
their firing, save only the few in the fort
sent to that harbor years before for their
own protection, and still ready to give that
protection in whatever was loyal In this
act, discarding all else, they have forced
upon the country the distinct issue of i'm.
mediate dissolution or blood, and this issue
embraces more than the fate of these u. S.
1t presents to the whole family of man the
question whether o constitutional republic
or democracy, a government of the people
can, or cannot maintain its territorial in
tegrity against its own domestic foes 1t
presents the question whether discontented
persons, too few in numbers to control the
administration according to the organic law
in any case, can always, upon the pretences
made in this case, or any other pretences,
or arbitrarily withOnt ony nratanca hraak