Year: 1860

mAich the whitc mau ras bound to respect
these views being considered an axi-
ON in morals as we'll as in politics which
noo one thought of disputing. Therefore
those views became part and portion of
the Constitution of the United States,
and it should be so construed, as to ex-
clude them from the benefit of any of its
provisions.


3. That the right Of property of the
master iu a slave is guaranteed by the
Constitution, and it is the duty of Con-
gress to guard and protect the owner in
his rights-aud that, therefore, the act
of Congress which prohibited citizen
from holding and owning property of
this kind in the Territory of the United
States, north of SO 30' is unconst,tu-
tional and void


/ make use of the word dictum in con-
tradistinction to the term judgment, be-
lieving as I do, and as presume all Of you
do, that legal jud dgmcnt of the Supreme
Court of the United States is binding on
us all. but that not required to



ions of the Judges on abstract questions
I thiuk l may well say dictum when
Senator Ben amin of Louisiana, prom
inent and leading Democrat, lawyer of
high standing aud eminence, and pro-
slavery advocate of the most intense
character, in a public speech made only
one month since on the floor of Congress,
Gin reply to Clingman of N. c. said, and
/ quote his very words as reported,
"Well, sir, the question did come before
the Surr Court of the United States,
and in the decision of the bred Scott
Case they Determined, gentlemen say 1t
,cas no decision, but Mey determined the
doctrine or opinion, OR IN SOME WAY
DECLARED, that tie Congress of the
United States has no power to destroy
the rights of the people of the South in
slave property in the territories and
he argued that as the Southern DemSc-
racy have agreed with the Dcaglas De-
mocracy that on the question of Slavery
in the territories they would be guided
and bound oy the opinion of the Supreme
Court, aud as the Supreme Court has
rlade the decision, therefore both wings
of the Democratic party were bound by
1.-THE inference being irresistible that
they were bound by their express agree
ment, not because it was legal judg-
ment in a case where they had jurisdic-
ton, but because of the compact. If
Mr.. Benjamin's view of the case is cor
rect, how can these dictums have any
force or binding obligation on persons
outside the Democratic party.


But let US turn to the case itself and
examine the reasonings of the learned
Judges in support or their opinion, and
it will be Observed that in no single in
stance have they pointed out any express
language in the Constitution, declaring
the rights of "A master in a slave, or that
human being can legally be held as
chattcl property: it is true they say 1t
uas so Intended. In other words, they
deprive man of his liberty by intend
/ ment, ignoring one of the articles of that
very Constitution, which expressly de-
clares that no person shall " be deprived
Of life, liberty or property without due
process of law Nor can they shelter
themselves under the fallacious plea that
by the word "persons in that connec-
tion, negroes were not meant, for in re-
ferring in another part of the decision to
that clause of the Constitution which de.
clares that "No person held to service or
labor in one State, under the laws there
of escaping into another, shall by any
law or regulation therein, be discharged
from such service or labor, but shall be
delivered up, on claim of the party to
whom such service or labor may be DUE -
say that by the word person, slave is
meant.


submit to the candid mind whether
if the word person in one part of the
Constitution, includes negro Gas well as
white NAM it will not so include him
when made use of in another part.


The other clause referred to by the
Judges as sanctioning slavery, is the one
in which Congress was forbidden to pass
any law until the year 1903, prohibiting
the mi migration or importation Of such
persons, as any of the States, then exis-
ting should think proper to admit: and
this clause too, distinctly says persons,
although the learned Judges say that il
means stroes ard triumphantly cite it a,
prori"y that the Constitution sanctioned
the African Slave trade.


Can it be possible, that such a view
should be taken by any enlightened
mind, or by any man who possesses the
ordinary reasoning faculties, or even !:
modicum of intellect and common sense
Sanction the African Slave trade "a:
we'll might We say, that when our Legis
lature on the lst of January passes Law
defining Murder and providing for the
punishment of the murderer, and ixes
the time for the law to 60 into effect OF
the lst July following-that therefore
the Legislature sanctioned Murder. Bu
the clause alluded to, is SO plain in itsel
that it cannot be misunderstood by an,
person of ordinary capacity, who will rca,
it carefully. 1t simply restrains Congress
from passing any law on the subject o
importing persons where such act o
Congress should conflict with any Stat
law and that such is the true view of tn
case is I think sufficiently demonstrated
by the fact that in the year l795-(four
teen years before the limited time state,
in the clause - Congress did pass al
act "that no person in the United State
should fit out any vessel for the purpos
OF carrying on any traffic in slaves to an