Year: 1864

sher.a.'s Victory on the Tennessee


Hood's Complete Failure.


The telegraph gives us the meagre announce
ment from Nashville OF the defeat Of Hood,
with considerable loss in the attempt to cross
the Tennessee river on the Sd instant In this
instance the telegraph has for once under
stated fact, and given less than its natural and
proper importance to great event. For even if
the fight thus announced was not in reality the
great battle-f it was merely collision of
Sherman's advance with Hoods advance
fact that there was q battle at all under the
circumstances stated, proves incontestlbly that
Sherman is the master Of the game, and gives
tho assurance that Hoods attempt must end in
great disaster to the rebel army The fact
that battle was fought 10 which Sherman
contested the passage Of the Tennessee with
Hood, proves that Sherman is as usual where
he ought to be--that Hoods whole plan Of
campaign has failed absolutely-and proves
the truth Of the military judgment that con-
sidcred the possession Of the line to Atlanta
as equivalent to tho possession Of tho whole
country south and west of that line.


Hood and Davis projected this last cam
paign to carry the war ense more into Tennes-
see and to force Sherman from Georgia, the
whole northern part Of which he had so mag
nidcently won. They began their campaign
by denying the existence Of their enemy. Davis
aad Hood declared so positively and SO fire.
quently that Sherman had only thirty.ive
thousand men. that they seem finally to have
persuaded even themselves that the statement
was true. They accordingly made their calcu-
lations to combat an army Of that size, and
thus the very basis Of their plan was fatal
error. Hood, with commendable energy,
moved in very short time after the loss of
Atlanta. hood knew the value of Atlanta to
Sherman rather better than certain copperhead
editors do. He knew that with Sherman in
possession of Atlanta, and of the lines Of rail
road that lead to it, any movement of an
army on . parallel line into. Tennessee was
perilous If not impossible. This consideration
divided his campaign into two parasitic first
mans railroads as would cripple Sherman's
army in movement and supplies. To cripple
the movement of Sherman's army was thus
necessary preliminary to the second part of
Hoods plan-the advance into Tennessee. We
need hardly tell our readers how signally the
first part of Hoods plan failed. Notwithstand-
ing the destruction of so many miles of rail-
road and so many bridges, the road was re-
paired and In running order before Sherman
felt its loss. Hood thus went on to accomplish
the second part Of his plan without having ac-
complished the first part, though he had him
self thought the accomplishment Of that first
part an absolute essential to success.


Hoods preliminary operation--the crippling
of Sherman-occupied all the time from his
first passage of the Coosa until about the goth
of October. At that time he had the various
parts Of his army that had been at Allatoona,
Ressacca aud elsewhere on the railroad, massed
near to the Tennessee river, and ready to cross
it. He probably did not know how ineffectu-
ally the work of crippling Sherman had been
done. He supposed that he had Sherman at
his heels, and that he would cross the Ten
nessee, and leave Sherman with the
Union army in wilderness, without
supplies, and that the Union army would then
be compelled to retrace its steps to Dalton to
get rations; but that at Dalton 1t would still be
without supplies and also without railroad to
facilitate its movements-and that then it must
self between him and Nashville. How different
from all this were the real facts. Four or five
days before Hood was ready to cross the river
Sherman relinquished the direct pursuit,
moved back to the line of the railroad and
then, by means of the railroad, moved bis army
around on the other side Of the river and stood
on the north bank ready to dispute the pas
sage when tAe astonshed Hood was ready to
make it. 0Qsd's defeat under these circum-
stances, in ever so small or bloodess battle,
will we'll nighs destroy his army. His Ten
nesseans, Kentuckians, Alabamians and
Georgians have been kept together only by
the hope that one more effort would destroy
Sherman. Seeing now the shipwreck OF that
hope they will disperse. The Tennesseans, who
went forward with light hearts Ito press the
soil Of Tennessee" will not retreat with Hood;
they will set the example Of fsdesertion that
will leave him without an army, and thus
Sherman's present operations on the Ten
nessee will definitely close up the account of
the rebellion in that quarter.


The CANADA RAIDs.-We trust that the
authorities and people Of Canada are fully
sensible Of the consequences Of failure of JUS
tice in the case Of the men who are now under
examination for the late murdsrous raid into
st. Adams II is said that in the event of the
decision Of the Canadian tribunals being ad-
verse to them, they will have it taken before
the English Court Of Appeals. With daily
increasing force OF rebel cutthroats on our
border. openly menacing our peaceful towns
and villages our people will hardly stand this.
The delay interposed by such q concession on
4ho &c