Year: 1863




mile and a half of the enemy. The
creek was between me and the enemy.


About two o'clock saw that the rear
Of the enemys line was breaking into
column and marching to the rear, in the
direction of Williamsport, where there
was another ford across the Potomac.
fully expected that they were on the re-
treat | Immediately sent an officer ol
the Engineer corps-Maior Houston-to
ascertain if there were any fords across
Antietam Greek by which could cross,
when the rebel forces should be so much
reduced that it would be safe for me to
attack. / was prevented from crossing
the Antietam Bridge by reason of the
batteries which the rebels had planted to
defend it. Probably not less than six
guns could have swept the bridge had |
attempted to cross there By FIVE clock
that day, l think, the balance of my corps
had arrived, and the other corps were
coming up About that time Gen. Nc
Clellan arrived That was before the
force in front of me had been sufficiently
reduced to justify an attack by me.
When he arrived of course 1 was not at
liberty to make the attack.


We remained in these positions unit
about two o'clock on the 10Th, when
received orders to cross Antietam Creek,
near Cadysville-that is, some three or
four miles above the road leading to
Sharpsburg. Immediately put my corps
in motion, and, after proceeding about
two miles, | fell upon the outposts of the
enemy and drove them in; drove them
ahead of me until dark that night When
night came had as much resistance in
front of me as | could we'll stand up un-
der. As soon as had established my
lines, with view to make my camp Sc
cure during the night, l informed Gen
Mcclellan that should attack the rebel
army at the earliest dawn. / desired to
take the initiative. was aware that the
enemy was already in great strength in
front of me, and that in all probability
they would be reinforced during the
night. When had lett with my corps
to make this attack l had been assured
that, simultaneous with my attack, there
should be an attack upon the rebel army
in the center and upon the left the next
morning. l sent word to Gen. McClel-
Ian when | proposed to attack, in order
that he might direct the other attacks to
be made at the same time. At dawn l
made the attack, and gained the high
ground which commanded the position
which the enemy had taken, and which
they held at the time l commenced the
movement At 9 o'clock that morning
| had advanced steadily but securely to
the point that desired l had at that
time battery of howitzers on this high
ground. l had sent for two additional
batteries to double quick up to that posi-
ton. A number of my infantry regi-
ments were well posted, to protect them
on their arrival. While advancing, on
the morning of the 18th, aud about half
post 9OvUu o clock, Mans4ieIdis eorrrs, at
my request, he'd boo, 60 -ss,a
port, as soon as all my reserves were en-
gagged / ordered him forward, and about
one-half of his command assisted in TAX
ing possession of this commanding posi-
ton. While looking for point at which
to post the batteries [ had sent for, /
was wounded. At that time my troops
were in the finest spirits; they had
whipped Jaceson, and compelled the
enemy to fly, throwing away their arms,
their banners, and saving themselves as
best they could Some of the command
ing officers of the regiments were riding
up and down in front of their men with
the colors captured from the enemy in
their hands; the troops almost rent the
skies with their cheers; there was the
greatest good feeling that l have ever
witnessed on the field of battle.


1t was at that time that | sent word to
General Sumner that had been wound
ed, and that he had better bring his corps
forward. Twas conscious of his arrival,
and the the condition of his advance.
He addressed me, ank passed on. / had
previously tainted, but was in a state of
partial consciousness at the time this
happened. l was then carried off the
field; aud that is about all know of that
battle. We drove the enemy nearly a
mile that morning The enemy l en-
countered on the 10th had been reinforc-
ed during the night by jackson, from
Harper's Ferry. All that party my
troops had filed with panic, and they
were falling back, fleeing upon their
comrades in disordered condition. l
knew thatI had gained enough there, so
that when General Sumner came up
from a conversation had had with Gen
eral Mcclellan the day before, l supposed
would take command-I felt as though
there would be troops enough with me
to drive the rebel army into the Poto-
mac, or to destroy it; and l expected to
be able to do that by o clock that day.
! had started early in order to be able to
do it.


Q-You regarded that battle as won,
only requiring to be followed up to make
the victory decisive one?


A.-As an evidence Of my feelings
when left the field, telegra phed to my
brother-in-law-supposing they would be
anxious about me-that we had won a
great battle. ] did not suppose that any
thing could happen by which any drawn
battle could be made out of it. tele-
graphed that we had won a great battle,
which had been severely contested on
both sides. L had lost almost 5000 men
myself, but supposed that we had every
thing in our own hands. Instead of a
simultaneous attack being made on the
center where Porter was, and on the left,
where Burnside was, there was no at
tack where Porter was; and they told me
afterward that Burnside attacked some
where between one and three o'clock of