Year: 1861

Who is Responsible for the Defeat


at ManassasP-What Gen. SCOTS


Plan Really Was-The Old Gener-


al Overruled.


TThe New York Times recently con.
tanned an article of great importance,
the material portion of which VIC quote
below. 1t is evidently from the pen of
Mr.. RAYMOND, the editor Of the Times,
who reports his own conversation with
Gen. SColT:]


We have not the slightest desire to
involve the President and Cabinet In
any responsibility that does not belong
to them, but on the other hand, we do
not intend that Gen. Scott shall be
loaded with blame for acts which were
done by others. We kHotg that Gen.
Scott was opposed to this plan Of the
campaign from the beginning; he deem
cd it unwise to make Richmond the
main point of the movement; but after
that had been decided against him, he
was opposed to marching against it by
the longest and most difficult route,
through a country every foot of which
would be obstinately defended, and
which must be held by a strong force
after it had once been taken. This we
know to be truo-and, ia spite Of the
delicacy Of such disclosures, we shall
not hesitate to state the authority for
it. 1t is that of Gen. Scott himself


On the Tuesday preceding the battle,
Gen. Scott, at his own table, in presence
of his and a single guest, discussed the
whole subject Of this war, in all its
parts, aud with the utmost clearness
and accuracy. lie had distinct and
well defined opinion on every point
connected with it; and stated what his
plan would be for bringing it to a close,
il the management of it had been left
in his hands. The main object of the
war, he said, was to briOg the people
of the rebelIious States to feel the press.
ure of the Government; to compel them
to return to their obedience and loyal
ty. And this must DO done with the
least possible expenditure Of life, com
patible with the attainment Of the Ob-
ioct. No Christina nation can be justi-
hed, he said, in waging war in such a
way as shall destroy 5Ul lives, when the
object Of the war eau be attained with
the cost Of 500. Every man killed be-
yond the number absolutely required, is
murdered. Hence, he looked upon all
shooting Of pickets, all scouting forays
not required in order to advance the
general object Of the war, all destruction
of life, on either side, which did not
contribute to the general result, as SO
many acts Of unjustifable homicide


II the matter had been left to him,
ne said, he would have commenced by
a perfect blockade Of every Southern
port on the Atlantic and the Gulf
Then he would have collected a large
force at the capital for defensive Pur.
poses -and another large one at the
Mississippi for offensive operatiOns.--
The summer months, during which it
is madness to take troops south of ST..
Louis, should have been devoted to tao
tical instruction; and with the frst frosts
of autumn he would have takon a col.
umn of $4,000 we'll disciplined troops
down the Mississippi and taken every
important point on that river, New Or,
leans included II could have been
done, ho said, with greater ease, with
less loss of life, and with far more i'm.
portant results than would attend the
marching of an army to Richmond. At
eight points tho river would probably
have been defended, and eight battles
would have been necessary but in ev-
cry one Of them success could have been
made certain for us The Mississippi
and the Atlantic once ours, the Southern
States would have been compelled, by
the natural aud inevitable pressure of
events, to seek, by a return to the Un-
ion, escape from the ruin that would
speedily overwhelm them out Of it,
"Ths said he, twas my plan. But /
am only a subordinate. Il is my bust
Poss to give advice when it is asked,