Year: 1861

measures before resort to any strong ones


t sought only to hold the public places and


property not already wrested from the GOV


ernmcnt, and to collect the revenue, relying
tor the rest on time discussion and the ballot


box. It promised a continuance of the mails
at government expense to the very people


who were resisting the governments and it


gave repeated pledges against any disturb
ance to any Of the people, and any Of their
rights, Of all that which a President might
constitutionally and justihaby do in such
case. Every thing wat forborne, without
which it was believed possible to keep the
Government on foot On the fifth of March
the preseut incumhent's first full day in
office, letter Of Major Anderson command


ing at Fort Sumter, written On the 2Sth Of
4 February. and recorded at the War Depart
ment on 18th Of March, was by that Depart
ment placed in his hands This letter ey


pressed the professional opinion Of the writer
thai rentorcements could not be thrown into


that Fort within the time for his relief. rem
dered necessary BY the limited supply of
It


ion of the same with il force Of less than 20
600 good and well Disciplined mon This
opinion was concurred in By all the officers
Of his command and their memoranda on
the subject were made enclosures Of Maj


Anderson letter The whole was inme-
diately laid before Lieut. Gen Scott, who at
once concured with Mai Anderson il opin
ion On reflection, however lie took full


time in consulting with othe officers both Of
the army and navy and at the end ef The
four days, came reluctantly, but decidedly, to
the same conclusion as before He also sta
ted at the same time no such sufficient force
was then at the control Of the Government


Or could be raised and brought to the ground


within the time when the provisions il the
fort would be exhausted LII d purely mill
tary point Of view, this reduced the duty Of
the administration IN the case III the mere


matter Of getting the garrison safely cut Ct the
fort It was believed, however that 70 -
abandon that position, under the e;rculnstan-
ces, would bc utterly ruinou~; that the nect "
sity under which it was to be done, would not
be fully understood; that by many It would
be construed as a part Of voluntary policy:
thar 1t home it would discourage the friends
of the Union, embollen its advcrsaries and
90 Gar to insure the latter recognition abrad:
that III fact it would be national destruction
consunlmated This could not be allowed
Starvation was not yet upon the garrison,
and ere it would be rerched, Fort Pickens
might be reinforced This last would be a
J clear indication Of policy, and would better
enable the country to accept the evacuation
Of Fort Sumter as a military necessity


An order was at once directed to be sent
). for the landing Of the troops from the steam
ship Brooklyn into Fort lickens This order
could not BIZ sent BY land but mnst take the
). longer and slower route by sea. The first re-
turn news from the order was received but one
week before the fall Of Fort Sumter The
news itself was that the officers commanding
the Sabine, to which vessel the troops had
been transferred from the Brooklyn acting
upon some quasi armlstlce Of the late Admin
istration. and of the existence Of which the
present Administration, up to that time. had
only too vague and uncertain rumors to fix at
tention. had refused to land the troops 10
uow reinforce Fort Pcl1enS before 4 crisis
), would be reached at Fort Sumter was inlpos-
sible. rendered 50 by the near exhaustion Of
provisions in the latter named Fort. in pre-
caution against such a conjunction. The
, Government had a few DAYS before. COM
menced preparing an expedition. az well a


daptel is might be. to relieve Fort Sumter
, which expedition was intended ultimately to
. be used or not, according to circumstances. .-
, The strongest anticipated case for using it
was now presented, and it was resolved to no
tifr the Governor Of South Carolina that he
might expect an attempt would be made to
provision the Fort. and that if the attempt
should not be resisted there would be no effort
to throw in men. arms and ammunition,
without further notice or in case Of an attack
upon the Fort This notice was accordingly:
given whereupon the Fort was attacked and
bombarded to the fall without even awaiting
the arrival Of the provision expedition. 1t is
thus seen that the assault upon and the reduc
| tlon OF Fort sumter was III no wise MatIeT
Of self defence on the part Of the assaants


They well knew that the garrison in the fort
could by no possibility commit aggression up
on them. They knew they were expressly
notified that the giving Of bread TO the brave
and hungry men Of the garrison was all which
would be attempted on that occasion, unless
the missiles By resisting 50 much should pro


woke more They knewthat the Government
desired to keep the garrison in the fort, not to
! assail them but merely maintain visible pos