Year: 1861

1t IS not IN our estimation evil quite un-
mixed and uufalhonable. Black as the
storm IS we believe there is a promise
Of light through II. Let US take the
worst feature first; and the worst fea-
lure about the war undoubtedly IS. that
the eventual victory Of the North can
scarcely carry with II eventual success.
We speak of the Northern victory as
Ultimately certain. because a wealthy
aad free popuation OF twenty millions
cannot but conquer in the long run in
contest with poor free population Of
the same race, numbering al most seven
millions, even If we give the South the
whole Of the border States. That the
North may be beaten al first we regard
as exceedIngIy Iy probable But that a
defeat Will only animate tie Northern
States to greater and greater exertion
We consider absolutely ecertain. And
~ the long run no doubt wealth and
numbers must decide this fatal strife.
But suppose the war ended ov the de-
feat of the Southern Confederation, will
victory mean success? We think not.
1t may bring back one or two doubtful
districts, or even doubtful States within
the Umon. Il may restore Western
Virginia, Missouri and Kentuckv
possibly even Norh Carolina TO the
Cuued States; but in the Gulf States al
least victory would be CONC and con-
quest only.


No one doubts that in these States
the secessloniSt party has always had
an enormous majority, which Is likely
70 be increased by civil war into feel
ing Of feroclou5 unannnily. Those
States may be conquered, may be held
IN military possession, but they can
scarcely again be expected to take a
voluntary part IN the political institu-
ions Of The United States. Unless the
Issue of civil war were a slave insur
lecuon which should pulan end to the
institution Of slavery altogether 90 tilt.
result OF tram of events which t is
utterly Impossible to measure or fore
shadow-the Gulf States can never
again be reasonably expected TO act in
pollucai concert with the North. What
ever result, therefore, northern viclo-
~ might have-it could not e a poIti-
cal recovery Of the Gulf States. 1t
seems as certain as ary human event
can be that 10y them at least the step
taken can never be retraced. |, fol-
lows, therefore, that the war, bloody
aud perhaps long as it may be, viii be
IN this respect a fruilIess war. The
shedding Of blood Of Americans, with
out any hope Of achieving the end which
IS apparently the only legitimate end Of
such a war. After the conflict is over
The rival parties wlII be poorer and
more vludlctive than at the outset. The
North will beat the South IN the end,
but when it has done 50, we do not see
Wnat the government can do, except
leave the South TO follow It's own dew
ceS at the last as 1t might Go al this mo-
ment. Surely nothing can well be
bIacker than prospect Of a war at once
vindlcliye, bloody and fruitless.


THE coon.


This is the dark side of the pros
pect, and very dark side indeed il
seems. There IS, however, not Iitle
TO be SAID on he other side. And The
main consideration appears to Us to be
That the war viii draw together the
Northern States as they have never
been drawn together vet-wllI teach
them The aiIImportant character Of the
slavery Issue-wiii sweep the political
horizon Of those petty political contro-
versjes which have Ionr friued arav
The attention OF statesmen and diverted
them from the really great issues which
were slowly maturing beneath the sur
face OF ety-aud finally will impress
them WIKI the absolute necessity of q
closer union, stronger central power.
suppression Of those repulsive forces
which keep State and STATE iealou>lv
apar;-ln one word, with the duty Of
turning the Federal Government INTO
really supreme power. Such we
think, may, and most probably viii be.
cne result Of the disastrous conAic, in
which he United Sta!es are now en-
gagged.


Asa secondary and casual advantage,
the struggle VIII iberate from the au-
lhorI;y Of the border States, all those
sections which are already prepared
and anxious 10 extinguish slavery
This would be difficult 10 effect without