Year: 1863

to have pontoons enough for four bridges
IA in all, | believe-at the appointed
spot by daylight on Wednesday morning.
He had but 8 or 9 miles to go, and there
was no reason why he should not have had
them there before the rain. He spent a
good deal of time on Tuesday in demon
strating that the chances of failure were
l9 out of 20; on Wednesday morning he
had 'l5 pontoons placed IN open visao Of
the enemy and the rest were stuck in the
mud from 2 to miles back. He GER
tainly had done nothing to disturb his
own calculation of chances, and can now
refer to IL as proof of his own sagacity.
Another general was unreserved in the ex-
expression of his opinion against the
movement, and did everything in his pow
er, even after the march of his troops had
begun, to have it arrested.


1t may seem severe Judgment, but |
cannot help believing, from what saw
and heard that each of the generals allud-
ed to, and several of their subordinates,
who naturally take their cue from them,
reoiced IN the failure Of the increment.


If this were the first instance in which
the willingness of certain officers to behold,
with entire equanimity, the defeat of
Burnsides plans could be traced in their
language and conduct, should hesitate
in attributing the failure of this move
ment to that cause. But it is not. This
is the fourth active movement which Burn
side has made against the enemy during
the short time that has elapsed since he
superseded Mcclellan. Let US see what
happened in each.


|. His plan was to throw his army rap
idly upon Falmouth, cross over instantly,
take possession of the heights of Fred
ericksburgh, and thus compel the enemy
either to fight him in that strong position,
or fall back rapidly upon Richm nd The
one thing absolutely essential to its sue
cess was the prompt arrival of the pom
toon train. This was under the direction
of Gen. Woodbury., and no satisfactory
explanation of his delay has ever yet
been made. But that delay defeated the
execution of the plan.


2. Next came the crossing and the bat
tie at Fredericksburgh-which was GER
tainly failure, and which the country
generally brands as blunder. | think
it was in Gen. Burnsde's power to have
corrected that opinion in his testimony
before the Congressional Committee. He
did not avail himself of that opportunity,
but said that the country would never
know how near the movement came to be-
ing a success. | see no reason why the
country should not know it--and l can
not help believing that when the official
reports of that battle are permitted to see
the light, tie grounds of Gen. Burnside S
opinion will be evident to all 1t is gen.
orally assumed that the main attack on
that occasion was against the rebel front,
posted and entrenched on the crests iu
rear of Fredericksburgh. This is mis-.
take which Was corrected by the General
in his testimony. The main attack aoas
designed to be upon the rebel right, and
the object of it was to break their line
there, where it was weakest, turn them,
and then-with the cooperation Of Sum-
ner attacking in front--to complete the
victory and convert it into a rout. Gen.
Franklin led the main attack with his
own Grand Division and two small corps
from Hooker's. His orders were to attack
with at least one corps vigorously and
then to follow up the attack with prompt
and heavy supports. He sent Gen. Meade
to the attack, commanding the smallest
corps of all Gen. Meade attacked with
great vigor, broke the rebel line, and ac-
t1ally pushed the enemy into the midst Of
the ammunition ,oagons and Jaggage-train
IN their rear. He had completely sue
ceeded in the appointed work; the forces
opposed to him we're utterly routed, and
all he needed was prompt and effective
support. This he did not receive. Gen.
FRANKLIN sent another small co,,Ds TO his