Year: 1861

element In w ellington actions was In general
forced upon him by circumstances; the instant
readiness in which his forces were kept for the
return blow were peculiarly his own.


A CAUTION. s."


One point we must allude to by way of eau
ton to the young military student, namely:
the apparent, but only apparent, denial in the
introduction to the work, Of all military sci
ence whatever. Its general tenor, indeed, is
a sufficient corrective to this error, if error it
be, which probably is merely the expression of
q nervous, rapid train of ideas. The author
protests strongly against what may be termed
the geometrical theories of military science;
those theories which would reduce every mill
tary operation to q mere question Of scale and
compass. And certainly, so far as the writings
Of JOmini and his followers have this tendency
We readily coincide in the criticism. That they
possess it to certain extent there can be little
doubt. 1t will be well, however, to consider
the question more generally-in what science
war can be looked upon q science!


THE ISSUE OF WAR NOT DECIDED BY CHANCE


Let us put n case, impossible in itself, yet to
q certain degree attainable in many instances,
and suppose that We were fully acquainted
with the moral and military qualities of the
generals Of two opposing armies, with the skill
and energy of their staff, commisssriat, medi-
cal and all other departments, with the char
acteristics both of officers and men, with the
number and composition of each arm, with all
the antecedents and with the resources at the
disposal of both armies; further, that we knew
well the country in which they were about to
act, its physical and local peculiarities and
the habits ef its people; then we may safely
say that the result Of the war would be, if not
absolutely, at least to the highest decree Of
moral certainty, predictabls. Now what does
this fact, which will hardly be disputed, imply.
1t implies that the issue of toar is not a
Il
humanity speaking, upon combination of
qualities and resources in the opposing forces,
and that these qualities must be exercised, and
these resources developed, according to prin-
ciples which, whether known or unknown to
US, are beyond doubt equally fixed and real
The fact that the game of war is frequently
found to be the most uncertain of all games,
proves nothing to the contrary. 1t only shows
that the true apprehension of the above ele-
ments OF the calculation is excessively difficult
In practice. Experience in war is universally
acknowledged as the best teacher; and the
precise knowledge which experience brings of
the data before mentioned, and of the princi-
pies of action which spring from them, proves
that there is in war sufficient sequence of
cause and effect to constitute a science


PRINCIPLES OF WAR.


There are, then, principles of war, fixed and
real; and if principles, then there is a science





nature, then, is this science? Napoleon gives
US the best clue to the answer by telling us in
what respect war is NOT science. We must
not expect, with the limited knowledge which
under the best of circumstances We can hope
to acquire of the data above mentioned, to
attain to anything resembling demonstrative
certainty. Nothing" says the great warrior,
g Is absolute in war" Accordingly we find
that principles which in some wars are unuues-
tinDahla mot applioa hla . oil 10 4.
instance, the principles on which wars against
Independent chiefs Of half-sayage peoples
should be conducted are totally different from
those which should govern military operations
against regular armies.


If any one doubts this, we will ask him to
take one of the first principles laid down in all
scientific military works, from JOmini down.
wards-viz., that OF destroying your enemy in
detail by opposing masses of yoar forces to
fractions of his. Now in a war such as we are
considering, 80 far from this being the object
to be attained, the real object is to induce the
enemy to unto his forces, in order that you
may destroy them once and for all. Again, the
frst Of all principles Of war 10 said to be to
concentrate superior forces upon the decisive
point. But, as in the illustration Just given,
there is in many cases no decisive point what
ever. 1t Is OF little consequence where the
enemy is. There may be q decisive object to
be attained, and this object may be to provoke
him to concentrate in order that he NAV be
the more easily annihilated. But the use of
the term point evidently Introduces geomet-
rical or at least typographical idea into the
axiom, which had best be avoided.


But although the real science of war, rs de-
duced from historic fact, has been sadly over
loaded with definitions and aIioms, it would
be unsafe to neglect on that account the study
Of the principal writer's of strategy and tao
tics. ORe writer, indeed, is almost absolutely
exempt from this fault, and, which strongly
confirms the truth of our position, that writer
is the only one who ever commanded large
armies in the field. We aliude of course to
the admirable work of the Archduke Charles
on the Principles of War" OF tactical works
we know scarcely any that can compare with
Frederic's Instructions to his Generals and
Crawford's standing Orders ~ But the best
Of all studies is that which the student caryes
out for himself by collating the historical &C.
count Of military events with the dispatches
Of the chief actors. D..