Year: 1868

take my brigades to the rear to enable
them TO get rations and rest, preparatory
10 their taking position on the front line
for the mex. day, which was not able to
do because no troops came to my relief.
About midnight another order came for
Jackson's old division, then under Brig
adler General Talisferro, and since, to
relieve A. P. Hills division, on the front
line. at moonrise, which was then after
middle of the night, as the moon was In
it's last quarter. Talisferro did move up
my brigades being already in front
and our Armer position on the second
line was taken by d. 81. Hill, while A.
p. Hill retired to the rear to rest
and recruit his men. There was no
order to make the men strip to the
waist for an attack, or for any attack, but
our orders were to await the renewal OF
the enemy's attack next day. The first
l have ever heard of the proposal your
correspondent mentions is his statement
oft. / think that if there had been any
order for the men to strip would GER
taiuly have heard of that There was q
silly story published in some OF the
papers that at 3 council of war held that
night General jackson fell into doEe,
and when walked up and asked what his
opinion was, he replied, Drive EN- In
the river; drive 'em in the river" But
no one who knew the Generals exem-
plsry piety and very temperate habits,
it is to be presumed, gave particle OF
credence to that story. / heard OF no
council of war at all, either then or after
ward, except from the foolish report
alluded to.


1t is morally impossible that the state
ment of your correspondent can be cor
rect, for these reasons: Burnside's army
consisted Of three grand divisions. each
an army Of itself, under Sumner, Frank
liu, and Hooker, respectively. Frank
Inns grsnd division had attacked our
right, and Summers our left, while Hook
ers remained comparatively inactive.
After Summers repulse the whole OF
Hooker's grand division crossed over to
the support, and though small part OF
it made another advance against Msryes 9
Hill the greater part remained intact to
cover the reformation OF the troops that
had been eugs ged. Franklin still re-
mained confronting our right, aHd in
such strong force and position as to have
compelled General Jackson to deslst
from his attempted attack from
that flank. The Second corps
would have had to march more
than five miles to get to Fredericksburg,
by any route open to it, and there was not
the first preparation made for such q
march. To have moved that corps from
the right would have been the abandon
ment to the enemy of all that part OF the
line to stake everything on the proposed
attack, for if that failed the left was un-
tenable with the enemy in possession OF
the right. The difficulties of advancing
upen the enemy in Fredericksburg from
the hills in rear were even greater tnan
on the right, because of the lmpracticabie
character of the ground. There was no
such evidence of the Generalization OF
the enemy as that mentioned; for Though
his assaulting columns were repuised
with great slaughter they always had
many reserves 10 fall back on. The ex-
pedient of stripping to the waist would
have been shallow one, as the night
was yery dark in the fore part, and
in the latter part, when the moon rose,
heavy fog overhung the river
bottoms, including the town, while our
men did not wear white shirts, and in the
dark, at a little distance, it would have
been impossible to tell man without
jacket from one with d jacket. 1t this
had furnished the means of telling the
men apart, the advantage would have
been all with the enemy, who would have
awaited the attack in compact form, while
our men would have had to separate into
innumerable parties to get through the
streets. In an attack Of this sort it would
have been impossible 20 preserve any
control of our men, and they would have
gotten into inextricable confusion. A
large portion of our men (more than @
third had no bsyonets, as the greater
part Of their arms had been picked up on
previous battle-6elds without bsyonets.
Our men always dreaded night attacks
from the fear of encountering each other,
and none knew this better than General
Jackson.


/ do not believe that General jackson
made the proposal, and am perfectly
satisfied that the attack, If attempted,
would have resulted in terrible disaster
to us--grester, perhaps, than would have
attended an sttack from our right.
General Jackson's staff at that time, with
the exception of bis aids, was afterward
my own staff for q considerable period,
snd never heard an iutimation from
any member Of it that the proposal had
been made. Burnside's army was in
such condition that be did propose =
renewal of the attack next day, and was
only induced TO desist from it BY the
earnest protest OF his oficers-not be-
cause Of the Decentralization of the army,
but because Of the strength Of our posi-
ton. To have abandoned that position
would have bsen to yield our advantage.


There is another reason. which to me
is . most potent one, and thu. is because
| know that the boldesi man in his strate-
gie movements and bis facts on the 6eld
Of battle 10 sll the Army Of Northern
Virginia, Stonewall Jackson not ex-
cepted, vas Gen. Robert E. Lee. Yes,
under that calm and dignifed exterior
there beat one Of the boldest hearts and
dvelt o0e Of The most daring minds that
ever irsDirediihe eouusuder OF an aruy.
He required ns council Of var % urge
him 70 deeds Of boldnssL snd / never
h..rd .of a eonnrfi of war durinr H.