Year: 1864

!
southern chivalry and prowess or wholly false
ones, of northern poltroonery; that the indie
pendence of the south was to be won only by
stubborn and united resistance, pcrsevered in
under di faculties and reverses until the exhaus-
ton of the enemy followed by bankruptcy, and
| internal dssensions might compel them to desist,
or produce subversion of their own govern
ment at home. With all such the defeat of any
particular army in the field, or the loss of any
particular city or stron ghold has produced no
dismay. These were to be expected from the
immense numbers and physical resources of the
north. They looked for them as the natural
results of a contest of weaker with a stronger
power, but no more decisive of our fate, than
was the occupation Of ali our large cities by the
British during the revolution in the colonies !;
or the occupation of large portion of the Meth
erlands by the Duke OF Alva, decisive of the fate
of the United States, or the Dutch Republic.-
In revolutions or secessions it is certainly true
that 'the battle is not to the strong" 1t may
be taken as inevitable. that people who remain
united in sentiment, and in action, and perse-
vering in patriotic fortitude, will achieve their
independence of any nation endsAvoring to re-
tain them with four times their strength, and
resources. Four years havo passed away since
the shadows of coming events, forced these re-
Elections upon the minds of large portion of
the statesmen, and thinking people of the south
The course of events has verified the truth of
their expectations, and it has come to pass that
whilst many who expected easy victories over
hosts OF cowardly foes, have become respondent
under successive reverses, this class of thinkers
have generally retained their equanimity, and
unfaltering trust in the ultimate result; and
watching the signs of other coming events can
even now entertain a confident hope of fast
approaching peace, independent of the results
of particular military events in any quarter
Whilst defeats are certain disasters, victories
are scarcely less exhaustive of the enemy, and
have 10 tendency to tighten their burdens at
home, or attune the cords of harmony between
contending parties. Whilst we also retain ar
mics upon our soil, the process continues under
which the enemy must finally succumb.


Paradoxical as it may otherwise seem, in this
light the campaign of Sherman in Georgia is
clearly a failure. 1t most probably closes, for
all aggressive purposes with the capture of At
lanta, aud the attention Of Sherman will be
wholly occupied with efforts to maintain him
self against our army which under the active
and daring genius of Beaurcgard has in turn.
assumed the offensive and threatens his destruc-
ton. Notwithstanding the feigncd rejoicings
over the fall of Atlanta, gotten up for political
effect, throughout the north, they must soon
perceive that it is barren of results, and that all
their hopes based upon the Georgia campaign
have come to naught, and their vast expense Of
mone.y and Of blood has been in vain The
object of the campaign is dead and signal
failure.


Atlanta is not Georgia, nor amongst thc SAY
on people of this continent is any stronghold
the State. Paris is France and the dominant
power in tha city controls the provinces almost
without opposition. 1t is SO with all the CEN
tralized governments Of tho continent. Berlin
is Prussia Vienna, Austria; Madrid, Spain
We derive most of our notions from the histories
of European wars and become accustomed to


think the capital chief town the sea. of life of
any government, which being lost, leaves the
State in subJugation But w it'll us the system
of cenraliz ton is reversed and the powers Of
government emanate from the people TO the
capital The capital is nothing of itself more
than any other military station. We might lose
the capital city of every State, as we have those
of Missouri, Arkansas, Tennessee and Louis
lana, but the States would remain as perfectly
as ever. and competent to carry on the war from
other points upon its soil The loss OF Rich
mond itself would be nothing decisive.


The plan of the Federal campaign last sum
mer was to divide and conquer the south. This
was to be effected by cutting eff the Gulf States
west of Georgia, by plunging an overwhelming
force through her centre, uniting with another
force at Charleston or Mobile, and from a new
base, keeping up their forces and lines Of com
munication. The failure of that intention Is
virtually defeat, although Sherman should be
able to maintain himself at Atlanta during the
winter. Should he be compelled to fall back to
Chattanooga or cut off and destroyed it would
indeed be much more glorious result, but the
failure is already manifest. He is not where he
started to 60. lie has not done what he in
tended to do The vast expedition gotten mp
at the expense of millions has not produced a
remunerative result. The lives of thousands
have been thrown away for triiing position,
barely tenable, if that. The wcarin process
has gone on at home, and the immense debt
piles higher and higher, and the cradit Of the
government sinks lower and lowsr.


In this view also it will be seen that some
injustice may have been done in public opinion
to the President and Gen. Hood in defending
Atlanta to the last. Gen. Hood himself seems
to have had option, and the policy Of President
Davis in ordering its protracted defence, may
have been the best 1t is certainly much that
Gen. Sherman was delayed more than six
weeks before its defences. allowing time for the
organization of forces to operate upon his line
of communications. 1t is In1ch that he was
during that time prevented from prosecuting
the ulterior objects of the campaign with Allan
ia base. Perhaps we owe it to this policy
that we yet retain Montgomery and Macon,
with an uninterrupted line of r4i road cemmu-
nication with the east. 1t may have been the
cause of the failure of the campaign.


However this may be it is too late for harsh
criticisms, and we can better employ minds
in estimating the advantages we have actually
gained than in discords and dissensions about