Year: 1865

exchanged or nnetoon hundred rebel prisoners recently
at Camp Norton Indianapolis only onsosrth consented
TO be exchanged.


The stock market was dull yesterday Governments
steady. Gold quiet, and closed down town a'
1ssK. At the evening board 1t closed at 1921 .


There but little change in the position Of com
mercal affairs Saturday though everything was
quiet usual the last day Of the week Holders
Of merchandise anxiously watch tho gold quotations
a-days and 1t 10 pretty evident that with the con
tnuous OF Union general collapse Is
apprehended. Business vcry moderate both on and
or Change On Change -four declined &c. while wheat
was tribe or Corn was quiet, but Shade nrmer,
while oats hsc. higher Pork In moderate do
mand At lower ratea Bssf was activs and arm. Lard
was easier. Whiskoy duh and depressed. Freghts
very quiet and rates nominal.


The Certainty OF Oar Triumph-The


Effect OF Our Success In Enrope.


The absolute certainty Of our success is the
present feature Of the military situation. Do
what be may there b mot the least chance that
the enemy can change the result Every pos
sibility Of the military situation leads to the
Same end-rebel ruin and national triumph.
No. manipulation Of the pieces can show any
other close for the grand game Four develop
mens Of the struggle are regarded as possible.
Lee may stand still, concentrate on his present
position the forces under Beauregard, Hardee
and Bragg, and fight II out in the last ditch
style where he is. He may concentrate all the
for es In North Carolina at Raleigh, reinforce
them with column from his immediate COM
mand, and strike ut Sherman. He may con-
centrate his three detached columns at Lynch
burg, join them there and endeavor to prolong
the struggle at that point, embarrassing us by
the necessity of . long line. He may concen-
trate at Richmond, and bide his time for an ad-
vance down the valley. The first development
is the most probable. Lee is chained to Rich
mond, as Prometheus was to his rock Moral
and physical reasons of the most imperative
nature forbid him to give it up. 1t is his last
arsenal, his last workshop, his last foundry,
and it is the last home and hope Of his cause.
He cannot even risk it to reinforce the troops
in front Of Sherman; for, il II is bad to leave it,
it would be worse to lose 1t by force of arms


But il he stays there to make his final fight, let
him make it as stubbornly as he will, he must
inevitably be beaten, as Grant, Sherman, Sheri-
dan and Schofeld close in on his lines, cut off
his supplies and overwhelm him with numbers.
This, like all similar operations, is question
Of time. II he concentrates near Raleigh q
force Of sixty, eighty, or hundred thousand
men-n he puts his whole available force in
front Of Sherman-Sherman, reinforced by
Many regard this development asprobable, and
hold that . large part Of Lees army Is In readi-
ness to move for this purpose. If Lee goes to
Lynchburg he increases the decentralization Of
his army and exposes himself to all the chances
Of an open campaign on new theatre. In that
campaign he viii be matched against two Of
the greatest masters Of strategy that have arisen
in this age, and there win be against him an
overwhelming preponderance Of numbers. Both
reasons are also against movement down the
valley and against that toward Sherman. Either
would be sufficient Lee cannot cope with
Grant and Sherman II even he had equal force.
But the disparity Of force is inevitably fatal.
The great Napoleon maintained with the ut
most positiveness that, though chance, audacity
or genius might enable an inferior force to
triumph on the field Of battle, II was never SO
in extended strategic operations. In these, in
a whole campaign, numbers handled with any
thing like equal skill win always prevail. We
may with perfect safety accept that opinion as
definitive in the present case.


This absolute certainty Of success is due in
the greatest measure to our many recent
triumphs. II would have been premature to
argue such success against all contingencies be-
fore we had taken Wilmington and shut out the
possibility of foreign assistance, or before 1t had
been demonstrated that Sherman could sweep
across South Carolina as easily as he did across
Georgia. But now it is seen that there is only
Lee to face both our great leaders, and Fort
Fisher, Wilmington, Charleston, Branchyjlle
and Columbia are so many pieces Of hand
writing on the wall that tell the enemy's doom.
Those victories have shown us the certainty Of
our triumph but what will be their effect in
Europei What will Napoleon say to these de-
monstrations Of our power What will be their
press has, through four years, attempted to
"write us down." and insisted upon the foolish
absurdity Of supposing that we could succeed
We believe that the result will be hardly less
than revolutionary in both countries. In France
our victories viii announce the doom Of tina,
Mexican empire that Napoleon is committed
to, and in England they will cause an immense
reaction In public sentiment Every lie told
against us in the last four years will help thai
reaction. What view II win give Of popular
government II one so weak ~ ours has beer
pictured can put down Q rebellion Of such ar
unoonquerable and powerful people a. south
ern sympathisers have declared the rebel
to BET And II such q fighting race u
these Southern men-so numerous, 30 spirited
30 ably commanded-eannot make heat
against our power, who cant These are III
questions thst already float In the ElropeAl
mind, and that Europe yet cannot answer. W,