Year: 1860

Kansas should be dependent upon the will of the Territorial legislature. If 1t had been intended to give the Territorial legis- lature the right to determine this question, why is provision made for taking it to the Supreme Court! By the very terms ol the organic act, if single shareholder were deprived of his right to hold slaves in Kansas by the action of the Territorial Legislature, he would have a right to ap- peal to the Federal Courts, and the deci- sion of that tribunal would be final, irre- spective of the action of the Territorial legislature. If the slaveholder were de- prived of his right to his property, 1t would not be in virtue of the hostile legislation of the Territorial legislature, but in conse- quence of the adverse decision of the Ju- dietary. to which tribunal, acting under the general principles of the Constitution and American public law, exclusive and origi- nal jurisdiction over the subject has been assigned. The idea of appealing from the decision of a constitutional convention of a State-the highest embodiment of sovereignty known to our forms of law to the Supreme Court of the United States to determine whether slave property shall be admitted or prohibited, is an absurdi,y. And yet Judge Douglas construction of the Kansas bill involves this very absurdi- ty, for i, places the power of State, and that of Territory on this subject, on an equal footing. The organic act goes fur ther, and declares that when legal ma l ljority of the residents of either Territory form Constitution, then they may either recognize or exclude slavery, as they may elect It gives the people the ultimate power to decide this question, and fixes the period and defines the time when they may exercise this right In the mean time, it places the rights of shareholders in both Territories subject, as we have al. ready observed, not to the Territorial leg islature--not to the Lynch law of the grab game of squatter sovereignty, but to the courts, acting under the general principles of the Constitution and American public law.

 The contemporaneous history of this measure shows that this was the construc- ton assigned to it at the time of its pass age by it's supporters. Almost every sup porter of this measure who participated in it's discussion, avowed 'that the extent of the limit imposed by the constitution on the Territorial Legislature" and per consequences the right to hold Slaves during it's Territorial condition, was made depen- dant. not upon the Legislature, but was explicitly made subject of Judicial de- cision. go further and assert that every Southern man who supported this measure declared that if such unlimited power was intended to be conferred on the Territorial Legislature as Judge Douglas now assigns to it; it could not receive his sup port. Gov Brown, of Mississippi, in the discussion pending this measure declared: :" If thought that in voting for this Bill as it now stands. was conceding the right of the people of the Territory, during their Territorial condition to exclude slavery, would withhold my vote." MT. Barksdale, of the same State, warm supporter of the Bill, in the same discuss sion declares Il deem it proper here to declare that if non-ntervention means, as some here contend, the abandonment of any duty by the Federal Government, to avoid the hazard of performing it, ] scorn and utterly reject the doctrine. H IS only acceptable 10 me and there repre- sent as principle ayhich is 10 contne the Federal Gopernment to the great object for phich it was instituted not to fetter ats arm, so that H cannot hold its protecting shield over epery citizen of the United States, aohether found within the Territory subject 10 Federal jurisdiction, or upon tte high seas, schere federal jurisdiction alone could avaI him. With this interpretation of the doctrine of intervention 1 &C., cept it.

 ~ * x But if on the other hand the doctrine of squatter sovereignty be the true one, that is to say if the terri tories belong to the few or many who chance first to reach it, we have nothing to delegate" MT. Butler, of South Car oina, says, II am perfectly willing to

 leave it under the constitution to be deci- ded by the law tribunals of the country. | If in the process of settlement the people of these Territories shall be prepared tc take upon themselves the attributes of a sovereign State, they can then certainly either admit or exclude slavery. l pre-. sume that will not be denied by any one

 During their growth and before they be- come State, can they assume to exercise power which Congress itself cannot confer upon them? They can have nc deriyitive power on the subject from any act of ours k | Congress has no constitutional competency to legislate one way or another-eilhe

 to introduce or prohibit slavery in tht Territories. Territorial government ha! no deriviiive authority 10 do so from any act which Congress can pass. MT. Daw' son, of Georgia. says: "I am perfectly willing 10 leave this subject to the Court: under the constitution" Gen. Cass says 1" The power of the people to leglslalt upon their internal concerns IS clearl, given in this bill, if the constitution per 1aifs it. If the Con. \ stiiution does not permit it hey have no got it." MT. Hunter, of Virginia, says The bill provides that the legislatures Q these territories shall have the power tt

 legislate on all rightful subjects of legis