Year: 1864

The Round Table, an able New YORK
weekly, which sustains the administration,
the war, and emancipation, contains a just
and caudid article in relation to the great
captain who created the Army of the Po
mac; beat johnson and Lee with it at Fair
Oaks; kept their army at bay for seven
days while on the retreat to HarrisOn's Land.
ing; drove them back from Malvern; sub
sequently defeated Lee at South Mountain
aud Antietam, and saved the City Of Wash
ington--for which services he was retired
from command by an imbecile and jealous
admins tration. We republish the article,
and bespeak for it calm perusal.


GEN. MCCLELLAN IN HISTORY.


(From the Round Table.) tr


1t is quite time that full justice be done
to Gen. Mcclellan. His own report of his
military operations, from his assumption of
command in Western Virginia to his reno
val from the leadership of the Army of the
Potomac after the victory of Antietam, is
in the hands of the public printer, and will
soon be given to the public. fair, tenn
perate review of his military career has
never vet been written, but IT is time that
it be attempted by some one competent
to make an unbiased Judgement His own
statements, in connection with the rtports
of the Committee on the Conduct of the
War, furnish sufficient data upon which to
form an estimate of his military ability and
services.


1t is idle at ttisiat day to arra,sn either
the Administration or the Republican party
for their conduct toward Gen. Mcclellan
We are among those who believe that Mr..
Lincoln and his advisers have ever been de-
sirous of doing what was best in all their
movements to put down the rebellion
They have been i'll advised and mistaken
many times, but never once deliberately
and consciously in the wrong Nor are we
disposed to blame the testy Impatient,
egostistic temper of the American people
during the early history Of the war, which
was taken advantage of to bring really
great military leader into disrepute. We
must take men as we do events-as we find
them. But Justice should be done some
i..e or other, and the Administration must
accept the verdict if public op pnlon decides
that it acted wrongly and UNIV sely IN the
case of Gen. Mcclellan.


It>was charged against that officer that,
when he held the position of General in
Chief, ne really had no plans adequate to
the occasion, and this belief more than any
thing else, led to the acquiesence OF tae
county in his removal from the Supreme
control of military affairs. Subsequent
revelations have proved that he had cen
tinental scheme equal to the occasion, aud
which would in all probability have ended
the rebellion, or, at the worst, the close of
the year 1862 would have found US where
We now are at the close OF 1865.


General Mcclellan in the military policy
he had marked out for himself, determined
to strike at five strategic points, or rather,
he had in view five separate campaigns, any
one of which would have inflicted a heavy
blow upon the rebellion, but which COM
bined aud successful, could hardly have
failed to end it. He first equipped an army
with the object Of Capturing the rebel cap"
ital, not because of its strategic importance,
but from the moral effec. such capture
would have produced botn in the Confeder'
acy and abroad. He next designed and
prepared for an expedition to capture
Charleston. not on account of It's strategic
importance, but also for the moral effect
which would result from the possession by
the Union forces of that point where the
rebellion originated. In his Instructions to
General BnrIl, it. will be found that ne
early apptec d the Importance of imme-
diately occupying East Tennessee, with
view of isolating the South Atlantic from
the Gulf States, ahd getting possession of
the range of mountains that jut into the
rebel territory, and permanently divide that
region living between the Atlantic and the
Mississippi. All his instructions and orders
to General Buell. had this object clearly in
views The capture Of the Tennessee Valley,


,h;cb mas snhsnuantIy made was no part