Year: 1863

the time we ordered the column OF attack "a
be formed on the morning after the battle,
thought tho enemy's works could be carried
ard adhered to that opinion through the day
| afterwards became convinced that that cod
not have been done, owing to the great
strength Of the enemv, the time given them
for reinforcing, and the belief also Of our ofh
GERS that il could not DO done.


accordingly tolegraphed to the President
Of the United States, at Washington, that
withdrew our army because felt the enemy's
position could not be carried.


Gen. Burnside's testimony here closed.


II commenced raining and the river Segan
to rise; did not know how much it might
rise; there was no means Of crossing except
going up to the fords, and it would be imLos.
sible to do that. because of inability TO sup
ply the troops after they should have crossed
General Sumner arrived bere with his troops
in advance. H. sent to me asking me If hs
should cross the river; did not think il advi-
sable that he should at that time.


1t was first decided 10 cross at Skinner's
Neck, about twelve miles below here, but our
demonstration was simply for the purpose Of
drawing there as large forcs Of tie enemy
as possible. then decided to cross here, be
cause in the first place l felt satisfied tn
they did not expect us TO cross here but be-
low. In the next place 1 felt satisfied that
this was the place to fight the most decisive
battle, because il we could divide their forces
by piercing their line at ore or two points,
separating their left from their right, then a
vigorous attack with the whole army would
succeed in breaking their army TO pieces.


Two attacks were made and we were re.
pulsed, still holding portion Of tho ground
we had fought upon, but not our extreme ad'
vance.


That nic hit I vent over the fold on our
right; and 10 fact / was with the officers and
en- ill nearly daylight; 1 found the feeling
against an attack.


| hastened to ny headquarters, and after a
conversation with Sumner told him wanted
him to order the ninth army corp, which l
originally commanded, to form the next
morning column of attack by regiments; !;
it consisted of some eighteen old regiments
and some new ones, and desired the column
to make direct attack upon the ememy's
works.


/ Thought that these regiments BY running
quickly after each other would be able to
carry the stone wall end batteries in front,
forcing the enemy on their mex, line, and by
going in with them they would not be able to
fire upon US to any great extent.


left Sumner with that understanding and
directed him 10 give the orde' the order was
given and the order of attack was formed; !;
the next morning just before the column was
to have started, Sumner came TO me and said !:
{" hope you will desst from this atteck; !
do not know Of any general officer who ap
proves Of il, and think it will prove dIsa4
trous to the army" Advice OF that od
from Sumner, who has always been in favor
of our advance whenever it was possible, caus.
ell me to hesitate; kept the column of at
tack formed and sent over for the division and
corps commanders, and then consulted with
them.


They unanimously voted against the attack.
then went owe. to SEQ tho other officers OF
the command on the other side, and found
that the same opinion prevailed among them.
then sent for Gen. franklin, who was on the
left, and he was Of the same opinion. This
caused me to decide that ought not to make
the attack bad contemplated; aud besides,
the Presdenr had told me not To be in haste
about making this attack; that he would give
me all the support he could, but he did not
want the army Of the Potomac lie troyed.


felt that could not take the responsible
ty Of ordering the attack, notwithstanding y y
own telief at he time that the works OF the
enemy could be carried.


While on his way here, Hooker, on the
morning of the Goth Of November. wrote me
n note, which received on the 2lst, 10 which
he sugges'ed that he would cross his force over
the Rappabannock at the ford nearest the
town, Richards Ford, and move rapidly dowL
to Saxton's Station, and take possession there.
He stated that he had three days provisions,
and that bs could meet any force Of tho enc
my in front Of him.


l replied that was always very glad to
take the advice OF 10y general officers, and
should be 10th to move without consulting
them; but could not approve o: the move
he hal suggested, because ia the fret place he
would have to march some thirty six miles to
Saxton's Station.


II WAS raining and lie would have to ford
two rivers which might rise and cut him off
from the main body Of the command, and as
had no means Of crossing at Fredericksburg,
would be prevented from sending him sup
plies and assistance, and although to might
reach Saxton's Station and not meet any force
Of the enemy at that time, yet il woull he a
very hazardous movement to throw column
like that beyond the reach of its proper sup
port.


Gen. Hooker thanked me and said he made
il AS suggestion. and tho weather as il was
raining, rendered it, Of course, impossible to
make the movement.


O. What reason do you assign for the fail
ure Of your attack


Alt was found impossible to got the men
up TO tho works-the enemy's fire was Too
hot. The whole of the command fought most
gallan,ly. The enemy themselves, say they
never saw our men fight 80 hard as on tha,
day.


Q-Were the enemy's works very strongi


A Their works we're not so strong works,
but they held strong positions. 1t is possible
tie points of attack were wrongly ordered. II
such is the case can only say did it to The
best Of my ability. It is also possible that We
would have done better to have crossed at
SINNERS Neck, but for what / supposed 10
1