Year: 1861

SksAAVs " shO "IltCIs lu8t rem
t, forcements could not be thrown into that
fort within the time for his relief render.
cd necessary by the limited supply of pro.
visions, and with a view of holding posses.
+, sion of the same, with force of not less
than 10000 good and well discipl;ned
men. This opinion was concurred in bv
All The officers of his command, and their
memoranda on the subject were made in
closures OF Major Anderson's letter.
: Inc whole was Immediately laid be-
, fore Lieut.. General Scott, who at oncs


concurred with Maj. Anderson in on;n;a. 80
On reflection. however, he took fnIl ,;m.
/. and consultation with other officers. bo,h
: OF the army and navy, and at the end Of
four days came reluctantly but decidedly


to the same conclusion as before. He al.
SO stated at the same time, that such suf
hcient iorce 'as not at the control of tbs
Government, or could be raised and
brought to the ground within the time


when the provisions IN the fort wonld hs


exhausted. In a purely mil;,arv 80,


of view, this reduced the duty of the Ad.


ministration in the case to the mere mat.


ter OF taking the garrison safely ont of
the fort. 1t was believed, however. to


abandon that position under the circum-


stances would be utterly ruinous; tha, the
| necessity under which it was to be done


would not be fully understood ; that bv


this means it wonM be construed as


part Of voluntary policy; that at homo


it would discourage the friends of the


Union. embOlden its adversaries, and 20


far to insure to the latter a recoenition


abroad that in fact it wonld be our


national destruction consummated. This


could not be allowed. Starvation was


not yet upon the garrison, and ere it


would be reached Fort Pickens might be


reinforced. This last would be a clear


indication OF policy and would better en-.


able the country to accept the evacuation


OF Fort Sumter as military necessity.


An order was at once directed to be sent


for the landing Of the troops from the


steamship Brooklyn into Fort Pickens.
This order could not go by land, but must


take the longer and slower route by sea


the first return news from the order was


read but one week before the fall of Fort


Sumter. The news itself was that the


officer commanding the Sabine, to which


vessel the troops had been transferred


from the Brooklyn. acting upon some


quasi armistice of the late Administration.


and OF the existence of which the late Ad-


mimistration up to the time the order was


dispatched had only too vague and uncer-


tain rumors to fix attention, had refused


to land the troops to reinforce Fort Pick


ems before crisis would be reached at


Fort Sumter was mpossible-rendered


so by the near exhaustion of provisions in


the latter named fort.


In precaution against such coniunc-


ture the Government had few days be-


fore commenced preparing an expedition


as well adapted as nigh. be, to relieve


Fort Sumter, which expedition was in


tended to be ultimately used or not, ac-


cording to circumstances. The strongest


anticipated case for using it was now pre-


sented, and it was resolved to send it
forward as had been intended. In this
| contingency it was also resolved to notify
the Governor Of South Carolina that he
might expect an attempt would be made
to provision ths + IT. cad tbat-if the at
tempt should not be resisted there would
be no effort to throw in men, arms or
ammunition without further notice, or in
case of an attack upon the Fort This
notice was accordingly given. whereupon
the Fort was attacked and bombarded to
its fall, without even awaiting the arrival
ofthe provisioning expedition. 1t is thus
seen that the assault upon and the reduction
of Fort Sumter, was IN no sense mat
ter of self defence on the part of the assail-
ants. They well knew that the garrison
in the foIt could by no possibility com
nit aggression upon them. They knew
they were expressly notified that the Civ
ing of bread to the few brave and hungry
men of the garrison was all which would
on that occasion he attempted, unless
themselves by resisting SO much should
provoke more. They Knew that the Gov
eminent desired to keep the garrison in
the Fort, not to assail them, but to nero.
ly maintain visible possession, and thus to
preserve the Union from actual and i'm
mediate dissolution, trusting as herein be-
fore stated, to time, discussion, and the
ballot box, for final adjustment, and they
assailed and reduced the fort for precisely
the reverse object-to drive ont the visi-
bic authority of the Federal Union, and
thus force it to immediate dissolution.
That this was their object, the Executive
well understood, and having said to them
in the inaugural address. you can hare no
conflict without being yourselves the ag-
gressors, be took pains not only to keep
this declaration good, but also to keep
the issue so free from the power of in
genious sophistry as that the world should
not be able to misunderstood it by the
affair at Fort Sumter with its surround
ing circumstances.


That point was reached. Then and
there by the assailants of the Government
began the conflict of arms. without any
thing in right or in expectancy to return
their fire, save only the few in fort sent
to that har6or years before for ths;r own
protection. and still ready to give that
protection in whatever was lawful. In
this act, discsrding all else. they have
forced upon the country the destructive
issue, immediate dissolution or blood, and
this issue embraces more than the fate of
these United States. 1t presents to the
whole family of man the question, whsth-
er q Constitutional Republic or Democ-