Year: 1862

s'ou- Inc Catn0lic people OF ircsauu haso 'ohS
cried to Heaven and mankind.against the in
Justice of paying tithe or tsnth of all their
produce to the Protestant Episcopal clergy.
What is that oppression compared with this
war tax upon people Boosting Of democratic
institutions II they can stand that they can
stand anything


General Mcclellan and tho Boastings OF


the Richmond Press.


General McClellan's report of the battle Of
Antietam, which we published yesterday, dis
poses Of the boastings Of the rebel papers Of
Richmond-the Enquirer. Examiner, Whig and
Dispatch-which affect, one and all, to
be very jubilant over the. result. They
claim it as a victory, won with loss Of
only five to eight thousand men, and say
that General Mcclellan retreated on Wednes-
day night or Thursday morning, and that Lee
held the battle field oil day Thursday, and then
crossed the Potomac, two miles distant, un-
molested and unresisted, and took up posi-
tion, on the other side, at Shepherdstown, and
drove back, with great slaughter, the van Of
McClsllans force, numbering ten thousand
men, who had crossed on Saturday in
pursuit They claim, in fact, that they won
this third campaign, whose object was the
capture of Harper's Ferry, with all the men
and spoils that it contained That by the first
campaign they drove Mcclellan to the shelter
Of the gunboats at Harrson's Landing; by the
second they drove Pope to the Notifications
at Washington, and by the third they captured
Harper's Ferry, their advance into Maryland
and the threatening of Pennsylvania being nero
fents to draw McClellan's army out of Wash
ington on the north side Of tho Potomac and to
hold him at bay in.the Maryland mountains
with part Of the rebel force, while the remain
der, in the rear, was investing and securing the
stronghold Of HArper's Ferry; whereas, if it
had been approached directly from the southern
side, the force holding it would have retreated,
carrying off or destroying the cannon and ammu-
nition, or General Mcclellan could have rein
forced it in such time a. to prevent its capture


So, then, the rebel army crossed the Potomac
aud made circuit around by way Of Frederick
and Hagerstown to capture Harper's Ferry.
which was abandoned almost as soon rs
it was taken; and General Lee fought
two battles--one at South Mountain, in
which he was defeated, and another on
Antietam creek, in which he was defeated,
with the loss Of probably twenty thousand men
and their arms--all for sake of the advantage Of
capturing Harper's Ferry, which he never
meant to hold. This is to win campaign.
And then he recrosses the Potomac, not because
he was defeated. but for strategical reasons, in
order to win another campaign in some equally
roundabout way. If the Southern people will
swallow all this, their powers Of crcdulity are
without parallel. 1t is evident that the Rich
mond papers give this version Of the story in
order to cover disaster to their arms of which
they are painfully conscious. Their loss at the
battle of Sharpsburg turns out to be about
twenty thousand, instead of from five to eight
thousand, the latter being the highest figure at
which they have placed it. Besides, the pro-
gramme proclaimed by themselves was tho
invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania. The
lame and impotent conclusion upon which they
fall back will not do


But it cannot be denied that the capture Of
Harper's Ferry was triumph and a great I'd
vantage to the rebels. It gave them / 500
prisoners, and ammunition for the great battle
of Wednesday, while it secured retreat fe /.
their fugitive army and prevented its capture
or total destruction. 1t was the key of the
the desperation of their defeat and fight, and
not in consequence of any prearranged stra-
tegic plan. Were it not for that event the sue
cess of Mcclellan would have been complete,
and the whole rebel army would have been
bagged. Its temporary possession served their
purpose.


Now the question is, who is responsible for
the loss Of Harper's Ferry! Not General Nc
Clellan; for he had no control over the position.
1t was not in his department., and the officer in
command was not under his control We hap
pen to know upon excellent authority that
when Gen. Mcclellan was setting out with his
army from Washington to give battle to Lee and
Jackson, be impressed on the proper authorities
at the capital the Importance Of either rcinforc-
ing or evacuating it, destroying the railroad
bridge and pontoon, and strongly fortifying
Maryland Heights; otherwise calamity would
be the result. His military eye at once
saw that this was o vital point. His advice
and remonstrances, however, were treated with
neglect, and he was subsequently compelled
to send away portion Of his own force to
succor the besieged, though It did not reach
them in time, and he was obliged, also, to alter
his plans and TO fight battle at Champions
Gap, which would otherwise have been un-
necessary. He had to deprive himself of
Franklins corps in the beginning of the fight
at Antietam creek in order to send the desired
succor to Harpers Ferry, and at the same
time, by that route, to get in the rear Of the
rebel army and cut il of; but, to his morti-
hcstion, he found that the place had been sur
rendered, owing to the incompetence Of the Of
fcer in command, and the passage cut of from
his own troops, while the rebels hastsned to