Year: 1863

Whatever may be the policy resolved upon
by the administration for the further prosecu-
tion of the war, the programme which should
be adopted, looking at the present situation Of
things in the South, appears SO plain and intel
ligible that che who runs may read it." A
very brief review of the general field of our
military operations will sufficiently disclose the
weak and the strong places of the rebellion to
indicate the point at which the heaviest blows
of the government should now be directed.


One month ago the Mississippi river was
blockaded between vicksburg and Port Hud-
son; the army of Bragg, in Middle Tennessee,
threatened the expulsion Of Rosecrans and the
reoccupation of Nashville. while it was difficult
to determine whether the army of General Lee,
moving about in Pennsylvania would first
march against Philadelphia, Baltimore or Wash
ington. This was on the 1st of July; but since
that day vicksburg and Port Hudson have
been captured; the Mississippi river has been
completely reopened; Bragg has been precipi-
lately driven out Of Tennessee; Lee. In the
grandest battle of the war, has been beaten, and
has been ignominiously driven again behind the
Rappahannock, while we have gained solid
foothold in front of Charleston, which gives us
the key that will unlock all its iron doors and
carry us into the city.


The army of General Banks, with the capture
of Port Hudson, was liberated for the compile
ton Of its unfinished work in Western Lou
isiana and Texas, and in this department we
may leave General Banks for the present, with
the fullest confidence of the best results.
With the capture Of Vicksburg the powerful
army of General Grant was released for
active operations elsewhere; and, promptly
availing himself Of his advantages, he puts .
portion of his forces at once on the trail Of Joe
Johnston. They pursue him into his fort6ca-
tions at Jackson, they shell him out, they drive
him off into Alabama. and the State of Mssis-
sppi is clear Of the last of its rebel armies. It
is now generally believed that Joe Johnston is
endeavoring to form a junction with Bragg;
but should Grant attempt to pursue Johnston's
broken columns across the State Alabama it
is probable that the chase would occupy him
all the summer without any profitable result.


Nor can we imagine that the great army Of
General Grant is to be wasted upon any such





cooperating feet of Admiral Farragut, will be
sufficient for Mobile, while the other half
might be moved up to the army Of Rosecrans,
or to the Richmond peninsula in support of the
army Of Meade. We rely upon General Rose
Grams to liberate East Tennessee completely
and permanently, and whether he shall then
advance into Georgia, South or North Carolina,
or into Virginia, we are willing to leave to
his sound judgment and discretion.


We have not the same faith in the wise heads
Of the War Office. The malign radical influences
which, since the beginning Of the war, have
been so fruitful Of disappointments and disas-
ters, are still in full play at Washington. But
for these evil counsels General Mcdowell
would not have been pushed forward to our
first great disaster at Bull run; nor wonld the
Army of the Potomac have been divided into
three or four widely scattered armies with
General McClellan's advance upon Richmond;
nor should we have had the disastrous cam
paign of General Pope, nor the terrible blunder
Of Burnside, nor the miserable failure of
Hooker. In fact, from the beginning Of the
war down to this day, the only serious defeats
we have suffered have been within the charmed
circle of the War Office Immediately around
Washington. 1t has become familiar proverb
that the Union general who is the most remote
from Washington is the most certain of success,
while he who is directly under the eyes and
noses of the War Office is the most likely to fail.


We appeal from the War Office to the Presi-
dent. We look to him, ~ the responsible Com.
mander-in-Chief OF the armies and navy of the
United States, to bring this war to an end.
There is horde of jobbers, contractors and
shoddy men at Washington whose interests de-
pend upon an indefinite prolongation Of the
war. Whatever may be their influence at the
War Office, their counsels should be always dis
trusted and rejected by the President. We
would accordingly admonish him that, while
these selfish and reckless hucksters are arrang-
ing series Of military combinations which will
carry the war into the year 1864, the war by
very simple programme, may be ended in 1868.


u. 'nolsh the rebel Army of Virginia and the
war is A. an end Demolish that army, and
Richmond, Cn,>.rleston, Savannah, Mobile-all
the remaining stfons. holds of the rebellion
are ours without further fgnIng Of any conse-
quence To secure, therefore, without loss of
time, this paramount object-a complete over
throw of the army of Lee-we think that from
our victorious regions In the West and from
cur new levies an army OF one hundred thou
sand men might be speedily mustered on the
Richmond peninsula for direct movement on
that city from the East, in support of General
Meade from the North. Thus between two
armies, each as strong as LIS own, Lee must be
beaten. and Richmond must fall into our hands.
including perhaps JEFF. Davis and his Cabinet,
dying in the last ditch"


We earnestly hope that President Lincolns
attention will be properly drawn to this i'm
portant subject. The radical abolition faction
may contend that II is yet too soon to bring
this war 20 a close; that the fatal blow has not
yet been given TO Southern slavery, and the