Year: 1864

Ml1NlN., w UDlN LODA L
yond Fairfax Court House, five hundred


men are required to protect the rear: An
entire corps is now occupied in doing this
from the Rappahannock to Manassaa, and
the troops Of the Department OF Washing,
ton protect the track from that locality to,
Alexandria. How great is: the train Of an
army for such service can be easily esti~
mated. After passing the Rapidan, if rail


road communication is to be relied on for
supplies, strong force must be constantly
kept it the rear ;-svery train will even then
be exposed TO the Capture by bands sweep
ing down from the mountains.


The leaders of the rebels of course, fully
understand all the circumstance, and are
ALWAYS ready to take advantage of them.-


They are fully aware that they can hold in
check, with three-tift Of it's force, the Al.
my Of the Potomac meantime. They pur-
sue the Fabian policy-the policy Of wash
ington on the mountains Of the Hudson
River. They are not foolish enough to-
stake everything on the risk Of battle, ex-
'cept where involunerable fortified. They
will not attack nor will they accept bat
tie in the field. Their own rear needs no
protection They have two railroad routes,
besides all the ordinary roads. Thus they
have all the advantages Of position on their
sido.


But we are, in view of these difficulties,


to expect nothing from the Army of the
Potomac No, it may overcome them in
two Or three or four ways. First, with a
sufficient force to cover its farks, it may
compel the enemy to retreat,an Richmond
to be Abandoned Socond,it may be able to
bring on an engagement, which will prove
decisive. Third, by cutting it loose from


Washington aad making it a movable col


umn, it may go at any time to the rear O.
the rebel army, and open new base for


itself on the Pamunky or York Rivers, or


by the railroad from Fredericksburg. We


risk nothing in saying that the army at any
time can so to Richmond, if relieved from
the necessity Of protecting its rear. This
|coud have been done last fall, when Gen.
Meade crossed the Rappidan and was stop
ped by the rebel works on Mine Run. The
army can transport fifteen days subss ence
and forage, and with this it can be moved to
Hanover Court House where it can operate
on NV base CT, if successful in forcing
the rebel lines, can even enter Richmond at
once.


Fifteen days is the period usually assign


ed in Europe as the length Of march from


one base Of operations 70 another, except
the country traversed be able to support the
army, In Virgi,ia our army can derive no
advantage from the country. l! could not
subsist itsel for the most lni ed period


The portion Of the State which has been
the scene Of war, is exhausted. Eyen
among the fertile farms OF the Peninsula it


was difficult to obtain small supplies OF for


age; OF subsistence for the men there vas
absolutely nothing. The necessity Of "ba'
Sis is, therefore, evident. At the South


west our armies have had the advantage Of
operating along navlgabie rivers, so that
their supplies could proceed with them


Such ah expedition as that Of SAcrman's
would be impossible IN Virginia; it would


starve before it could accomplish anything


With its competent leaders, its brave and


we'll disciplined troops, its superior organi.
z,ton, we are confident the Army of the


Potomac, supported as is generally expect.
ed it will be, by the full force Of the govern


ment, will achieve worthy success durin,
the coming season. The importance Of
|capturing Richmond has been underrated
in some quarters, but We believe the people
are far from concurring in such view, and
that they would consider as the most i'm :
pertant achievement of the coming cam
paign the occupation of the rebel capital by
the Army Of the Potomac.