Year: 1868

Our Steam Navy.


The Introduction of steam as motive
power In our navy marked new era in Its
history, and In no way did lis value become
more evident than in the maintenance of the
extended blockade OF the Southern coast dur
ing the late rebellion. Without steam we
should have been helpless; with it wc were
enabled to close, az nearly hermetically a.
possible, every port in the Southern States,
and to materially aid in bringing the conflict
to close. While our authorities haye lively
appreciation OF the value Of steam a. Q motive
power, we approhend that they are inclined
to carry their ideas to an extreme that re-
suits will not Justify No one will deny the
necessity Of sufficient motive power to secure
speed in our ships; but every thoughtful. well
informed person would hesitate to approve Of
ship in which every other thing
is sacrificed to speed. There are
other elements besides that entering into
the construction Of an efficient man-otwar.
She must be built In such manner as to give
battery, ample stowage for provisions and
water, as we'll as coal, for at least three
months cruise. With few exceptions can
our navy be said to fulfil these impor-
tant c0nditionsf We think not, because
1t consists in greater part Of lot of ships
loaded down with immense engines calculated
TO have enormous power and to drive the ships
at the highest speed. Everything has been
sacrificed to this one idea but results have by
no means shown that success has waited on
the effort The ships are so deeply immersed
by machinery that they are unable to carry q
suitable battery, and their holds are so cut up
that they can neither berth their crews comforta-
bly, nor stow away sufficient supplies in provi-
-sions, water and coal to keep them at sea for
six consecutive weeks, and. worse, even space
is lacking for ammunition for half an ordinary
cruise. Our fast cruisers are the most COM
splete failures possible TO imagine. They can
neither take the open sea for an ordinary
cruise nor safely fight an enemy off our coast.
And this class OF vessels, constructed or in
course Of building, is to mako up our navy. It
is high time, we think, that this ruinous policy
OF making every power of u mln-oEwar subor-





more sensible We should hereafter conGne
ourselves to building vessels with a maximum
speed of twelve knots an hour, which can carry
heavy battery, have plenty of room for the
crew, large stOrerOoms and magazines, besides
carrying coal enough for three months cruise,
the engines being used as auxiliary to the
sails. Engines are constantly getting out of
order journals become heated, valves are
deranged, cylinders leak, end crank pins
break, and any one Of these accidents renders
the engines useless for a greater or less time,
and then recourse must be had to the sails.
With sails and rigging the danger is not SO
great, and is more readily guarded against,
and therefore they should hereafter become
more prominent part in the motive power of
ship than they have been for few years past
We must return TO the models OF tho Colorado.
Franklin, Brooklyn, Hartford and vessels Of
their class, which, if they are not so fast rs the
Wampanoag and Madawaska can fight if they
cannot run. Ii we can combine fine model,
good spars, sufficient sails and heavy battery
with a moderate degree of steam power, and
abundant room for ammunition, provisions,
water and coal, we shall have obtained a
true mln-ofwar that will steam fast enough
to reach an enemy and fight well enough TO
conquer him, when alongside and that is all
we have right to ask. But we must not here
after sacrifice battery, quarters, stowage and
half our motive power by reducing our masts
aud sails Tor the possible attainment Of speed
by steam. We shall gain everything by wise
and we'll considered Return 20 old principles,
and our navy will again take its place-where
il always should have beea-in the front rank
of the fleets OF the world.