Year: 1868

-
extensive prerogatives are placed in th


hands of an hereditary monarch, the ex
ecutive department is very justly regarded
as the source of danger, aud watched will
all the jealousy which zeal for libert,
ought to inspire. In democracy, wher'
multitude Of people exercise in person
the legislative functions, and are continu
ally exposed by the incapacity for regular
deliberation and concerted measures tc
the ambitious intrigues Of their executive
magistrates, tyranny may well be appre
hended. on some favorable emergency, t.
start up in the same quarter. But in {
representative republic, where tho execu-
tive magisracy is carefully limited, both
in the extent and duration of its power
and where the legislative power is exer-
cised by an assembly which is inspired by
a supposed influence over tie people, with
an intrepid confidence in its own strength
which is sufficiently numerous to feel all
the passions which actuate multitude
yet not so numerous as to be incapable of
pursuing the objects of its passions by
means which reason prescribes, it is against
the enterprising ambition of this depart
ment that the people ought to indulge all
their jealousy and exhaust all their pre-
cautions.


The legislative department derives its
superiority in our government from other
circumstances. It's constitutional powers
being at once more extensive and less sus-
ceptible Of precise limits, it can with great
er facility mask under complicated and in
direct measures the encroachments which
it makes on the coordinate departments.
1t is not unfrequeutly question Of real
nicely in legislative bodies, whether the
operation of a particular measure will or
will not extend beyond the legislative
sphere. On the other side the executive
power being restrained within a narrower
compass, and being more simple in its ma
ture, and the judiciary being described
by landmarks still less uncertain, projects
of uSrpation by either of these depart
ments would Immediately betray and de-
feat themselves. Nor is this ALL AS the
legislative department alone has access to
the pockets of the people, and has in some
constitutions full discretion, and in all a
prevailing influence over the pecunary
rewards of those who fill the other depart
ments, dependence is thus created in the
latter which gives still greater facility to
encroachnents of the former


L have appealed to our own experience
for the truth of what | advance OH this
subject. Were it necessary to verify this
experience by particular proofs, they
might be multiplied without end. l mi ght
collect vouchers in abundance from the
records and archives of every state in the
union. But as more concise and at the
same time equally satisfactory evidence, /
will refer to the example of two states, at
tested by two unexceptional authorities.


The first example is that of Virginia, a
state, which, as we have seen, has express
ly declared in its constitution that the
three great departments ought not to be
iutermixed. The authority in support of
it is Mr.. Jefferson, who, besides his other
advantages Tor rcmarking the operations
of the government, was himself the chief
magistrate of the state. In order to con-
vey fully the ideas which his experience
had impressed him on this subject it
will be necessary to quote a passage of
some length from his very interesting
+" notes on the state Of Virginia" page
1876:


Gall the power of governmcnt-legis-
lative, executive and Judiciary, result to
the legislative body. The concentrating
of these in the same hands is precisely the
definition Of despotic government. 1t
will be no alleviation that these powers
will be exercised by a plurality of hands
and not by single one. One hundred
and venty-three despots would certainly
be as oppressive as one. Let those who
doubt it turn their eyes On the republic of
Venice. AS little will it avail US that
they are chosen by ourselves. An elective
despotism is not the government we fought
for; but one which should not only be
founded on free principles but in which
the power of government should be so di-
vided and balanced among several bodies
of the magistracy as that no one could
transcend their legal limits without being
effectually checked and restrained by the
others. For this reason that convention
which passed the ordinance of government.
laid its foundation on this basis, that the
legislative, executive and judiciary de-
partments should be separate and distinct,
SO that no person should exercise the pow
ers Of more than one of them at the same
time. But no barrier was provided be-
tween these several powers. The judi
ciary and executive members were left de-
pendent on the legislative for their sub
sistence in Office, and some of them for
continuance in it. If, therefore, the leg
islative assumes executive and judiciary


powers, no opposition is likely to be made


nor if made can be effectual, because il


that case they may put their proceedings


into the form of an &C. Of assembly, which


will render them obligatory on the other


branches. They have, accordingly, il


many instances decided rights which


should have been left to Judiciary contro


versy, and the direction Of the executive


during the whole time of their session il


becoming habitual and familiar"


| The other state which / shall take fol