Year: 1863

Its CT that whole matter In q clear and con-
vincing light. E


@. What were the reasons that Influenced
the decision in favor of the movement by way
of Yorktown? A. In preference to the direct
movement by way of Manassas? sl


@. Yes. A. I think no one regarded the line
by way of Manassas as practicble one, 1t be-
ing so long, The difficulty of guarding our
communications was almost insuperable, and
it allowedthe enemy to take up position be-
tween Manassas and Richmond. The other
line gave rs the advantage of water transpOrta-
ton. and rendered the largest possible amount
OF the force available for active operations,
there being so few necessary to guard the de-
pots and communications


Q. Was it not serious objection to the
movement by way of the peninsula, that it
did not cover Washington. A. Not in my
judgment.


q. By your answer do yOu mean that the
advantages gained were more than enough to
compensate for the fact that Washington was
covered by that movement? A. I regarded
the defenses of Washington as adequate for its
protection, and that the movement of the army
of the Potomac would necessarily draw from
in front OF Washington the force that had pre-
viously threatened it. My mind had always
been clear and distinct that the moment the
army moved on any line from the Lower
Chesapeake the rebels must necessarily aban-
don Manassas. never doubted that a second
always bearing in mind that the defenses of
Washington were complete.


y. When your army was on the peninsula
could not the enemy have reached Washington
easier and sooner than your army could have
been brought back? A. Yes; but they would
never have come here or if they had, they
never would have got back. If the enemy had
moved on Washington, l not only would have
gained possession of Richmond, but would
have cut OFT the retreat of their army, and they
would never have got back


y. Was it not almost certain beforehand,
that the withdrawal of your army to position
where it did not cover Washington would cause
the enemy at least to make q threat or feint of
an attack upon Washington, which would lead
to panic, and, perhaps, to recall of your
army, or a portion of it?


A. think not l do not think that any
thing occurred prior to the battle of Cedar
Mountain, which should have justified q panic
in Washington. The only advance of the en-
envy, that l remember of at all, was that of
jackson upon Gen. Banks. When heard of
chat telegraphcd to the President that | be-
lieved the intention to be simply to prevent
reinforcements being sent to me. l had no
idea that it meant Il serious threat upon Wash
ingtOn.


The only observation that needs to be
added here is, that the President, in con-
sequence OF his ungrOunded and pusillani-
nous fears for the safety of Washington,
refused to give General Mcclellan an ade-
quate force for his operations before Rich
mond, when he had approached so near
that the place was within his grasp. The
opponents of Gen. Mcclellan pay an un-
intended compliment to the merits of his
plan of moving to Richmond by the way
of the peninsula, in asserting, as they are
SO fond OF doing that there were three
times when he might easily have marched
in triumph into the rebel capital; namely.
after the battle of Williamsburg, after the
battle of Fair Oaks, and after the battle
OF Malvern Hill. This opinion, which
they are SO fond of giving, ought at least
to stop their mouths respecting the folly
of the water route. But it is the misfor-
tune OF these detractors to be always
wrong, Whatever topic of vituperation
they may select. Here is the reason for
not advancing after the battle of Williams
burg:


felt satisfied. from what 1 knew of Han
cocks position, that the battle was won that
he mad occupied the decisive point and gained
possession Ola portion Of the enemy's line,
and that they must make night retreat. or
we would have greatly the advantage of them
III the morning. So fully was [ satisfied of
that ;hatI countermanded orders that had
given in the afternoon for the advance of Rich
ardsOn's and Sedgwick's division to the front,
and sent them back to Yorktown to 90 by wa
ter feeling sure that the battle was won. Du-
ring the night the enemy abandoned their DO
sltlon. We sent the cavalry in pursuit; took
few prisoners and few guns. The condition
OF the roads were such that we could not
promptly advance the army. We could not
for more than forty-eight hours after the battle
tha voNat tt,n
stood we could not get the supplies to them


How General Hooker, or anybody else,
could have marched straight into Rich
mond, when the condition of the roads was
such that the men could not be fed on the
ground where they stood, from the impos-
sib'lity of bringing up supplies, does not
very clearly appear. If General Hooker
was at that time possessed of any incan "a
tlon for drying up or defying muddy roads,
his tedious delays this year prove that he
must have lost it.


And so in regard to the alleged feasibili-
ty, so often and confidently asserted, of
marching Immediately into Richmond after
Fair Oaks. a simple statement Of facts
etfectually disposes of that notion. We
quote again from General McClellan's tes--
timony:


Q. Was the result of the battle of Fair Oaks
and Seven Pines defeat to the enemy? A.
Yes / think it was.


@. After that defeat could not that point in
front of New Bridge have been carried by an
attack made, as have before indicated. by
both wings of your army? A. The condition
of the ground and of the Chickahominy. in INV
opinion, rendered such movement impossible
at that time.


Q. Immediately after the battle of Fair Oaks
could you not have advanced on Richmond IF
not why not? A. do not think it would
have been possible at that time to have taken
our artillery with us. The result of which in
dependently of all other considerations. would
have been to have brought us in front of the
enemy's works at Richmond without artillery.
where they had heavy guns. That and the con.