Year: 1864

The Valley of the Shenandoah has more than
once been the valley of our national humiliation.
After more than three years of gigantic war, our
military administration has not learned to appre-
hend the relation of this valley to the defence Of
Washington, and the enemy, safely presuming on
the ignorance and shiftlessness Of that admin
istration, has learned to practise in this quarter
wearisome monotony Of movement which only
serves to show that he deems it safe at any time
to hope for success by counting on our official
stolidity rs standing substitute for his poverty
of invention.


Talleyrand was won't to say that it is always
better to rely on the folly of your antagonist
than on your own sagacity, and it is certain
that the enemy, in the he periodically makes
of the Valley of the Shenandoah, has shown
his own sagscity only in presuming always on our
official want Of that quality in the conduct of the
war. Physical geography has ordained that the
occlusion, or at least the vigiant observation, of
this side approach to the city of Washington, shall
be prime element in any campaign which, start
ing from Washington, has the city of Richmond
for its objective point. And yet, with want of





motive for the wilfu betrayal of grave public
trust, confounds the Of ordinary mortals by
its magnitude and by its inveteracy, our military
authorities have for four successive summers per-
mitted this valley t. be used by the enemy at his
pleasure for the purpose of bringing confusion on
the well-laid plans of all our Generals operating
against Richmond. Whether it be at one time
from failing to station in this valleya capable
mandiDg officer; or at another from not retaining
q sufficient force under his command or at still
another from not occupying the proper points of
observation to descry the approach of danger in
time to guard against positive mischief; whether
IS at some times, it be from committing all these
blunders at once certain it is that the military ad
ministration, in giving the country much sad ex.
perienoe of ineficiency, has no where made that
inef6ciency more egregiOus and deplorable than in
this quarter.


The first battle of Bull Run was turned from
victory into disaster by the failure of Gen. Patter
ston, through this GALLEY, with Gen. Beauregard in
the very crisis of that conflict failure which,
whether resulting from the incompetency of Gen.
Patterson, as some charge, or frsm the inadequacy
of his aggressive force, others represent, is one
Of which the responsibility must equally rest on
the central power which appoints our commanders
and directs the operations of the war


The campaign of Gen. Mcclellan was arrested
and frustrated by the ncursion of Gen. jackson into
this valley in the latter part of May 1862 compel
ing the abrupt retreat of Gen. Banks, throwing our
military authorities here into most abject panic,
and preventing the contemplated junction of Gen.
Mcdowell with Gen Mcclellan by the Fredericks-
burg railroad-he being diverted from this line
of march to engage in what he knew to be the
impossible chase of jackson; and jackson, in the
mean time, after distracting all our combinations,
succeeded in hurting his whole column against Gen.
McClellan's forces around Richmond at the very
moment when our military authorities, relying on
the reports of Gen. Fremont after the battle Of
Cross Keys on the 9Th Of June, supposed him still
to be detained in the valley by the threatening pre-
sence of that officer.


Then came the brief campaign of Gen. Pope, in
which, after having his flank repeatedly turned and
his communications with Washington broken by
attack in his rear, he was badly repused, and
driven into the defences Of Washington, while the
enemy, with leisurely composure, turned from the
pursuit of bis broken and mishandled forces to-
proceed through this same valley, and make the for
midable irruption into Maryland which was re-
PEELED by Gen. Mcclellan in the battle Of Antie-
tam on the 18th of September, 1862


We need not pause to describe the dsgraceful
events which preceded the occupation of Winches-
ter by the enemy at this time, or which attended
the surrender of Harpers Ferry-results all due
to the incapacity which placed incompetent officers
in important positions; and which, in the case of
Harper's Ferry, was made doubly conspicuous on
this occasion by the retention of COL Miles at that
post, under orders from Gen. Halleck,i after the
military availability Of the position was entirely
neutralized by the turn which events had taken.
Official incapacity in Washington thus combined
with military incompetency at the post to erect
anew at the entrance Of this valley tho Caudinc
forks of an uDspeakable humiliation, which largely
modified the exultation justly produced by the vic
tory Of Antietam and which, in all generous minds
was intensified by the attempt to throw on Gen
Mcclellan the responsibility for the unoward events
which he had the .agacity to foresee, but not th,