Year: 1869

Having quoted Dr. Bairds statement, let
us now examine it's merits.


We think that Presbyterians will not be
satisfied with such disposition of question
that has become one of almost startling mo-
ment. We at least, until we get more light
on this subject, must call in question the
value of the guarantee on the part of the
policy holder, whether the company consist
of six or six hundred thounsand. Let us see
if We can ascertain it's true value. We will
use DR.. BIS figures. A man holds policy
for $4,000, to be paid to his family at his
death. The pecuniary consideration given
for this policy is the premium of $16O paid
on its reception, and the conditional promise
to pay the same amount annually for thirty
four years more. Now, the value of this
consideration, with the exception of the
$3.50 paid, depends entirely on chance
in the only sense in which there is
any such thing as chance-the chance of his
livingl Here then, in the first place, is the
same principle of chance in the case of each
individual policy holder, that underEes gamb.
ling. But this is not all. Let us look at
the value of the consideration and see if it
is an equivalent. The first year it consists
of $3.50 paid, and a conditional promise to
pay the same amount annually for thirty
four years more; The second year it con-
sists of double this amount paid, and the
same conditional promise for thirty-three
years. So each year that the assured lives
this amount is paid, with the same promise
for one year less. We have taken the case
of the same man for different years, but
the case is the same as if we had taken
different men who died respectively in
the first, second, &c. years. Now this is the
only consideration and the only guarantee on
the part of the individual, and how any one
can think these considerations equivalent
and equal, and therefore restively adequate"
we cannot conceive, unless he considers a
conditional promise equivalent to money &C
tually paid. The man who lives to pay the
society as much money as his family receives
back at his death; does give an equivalent.
But the man who dies during the first year
pays for the $4,000 which his family re-
ceives at his death, $3.50, and gives prom
ise which becomes entirely worthless, or
rather is shown to be SO, the moment his
family is entitled to the benefit And just
here lies what we conceive to be the fallacy
of the whole defence of life assurance
This conditional promise may be worth moth.
ing, or it may be worth $4,000 Tor more;)
its value depends on the chance of his living.
If it is worth nothing, the $4,000 are paid at
once to his family; if it lis worth $4,000, the
same amount is paid thirty-four years later!
The same principle applies to intermediate
times. The less the consideration, the great.
er the benefit (by being paid earlier;) and
the same principle Of chance is involved on
the part of each individual that exists in
game of hazard. We know that, according
to the doctrine of probabilities, it can be
shown to be a safe business transaction on
the part of large company, but we cannot
see that this renders it less game of chance
to the policy holder, or shows that his pay
ing the premium for one year, is an equiva-
lent for what his family receives. If we
mistake not the doctrine of probabilities is
applied very extensively to gaming at the
billiard table. We have endeavored in our
figures to be only sufficiently accurate to
show the nature of our argument.


This subject, in its moral bearings, should
be thoroughly sifted Has an angel of light
appeared? or is it Satan transformed into
one ? Will some discerner of spirits show
us which it is? And We would here call
upon the editors of our religious newspapers,
welding such vast influence as they do,
either to set forth the moral propriety of life
assurance in clear and convicing manner,
or else cease to advocate it and advertise it
in their columns. for one, shall endeavor
to hold myself open to conviction.


S. B. G.