Year: 1861

Northern States who have hoped for, and en-
deayored to provoke, either directly or indi-
recty, the interference Of England in our
domestic troubles. One-and that is best
represented by The Ner- York Heraid-from an
earnest desire for tho triumph of the Secession
lists, and the destruction Of the Union; the
other, from the expectation that such an inter-
ference would, either through the additional per-
plexity Of a foreign war, or the dread of
il, compel us to come to terms with the
Rebels. The first class-of which The Herald
is the organ-are downright, though insdous,
enemies of the Union; the other are merely
short sighted and weak and indulge themselves
in the vain bopc that some sort Of a compul-
sorry compromise might prove q lasting peace,
or, at any rate would restore the Sfdsn quo
ante tsiiHm, the condition OF prosperity and
harmony We possessed before rebellion broke
it up. But the anticipations of both classes
are more than likely to be disappointed, and
their labors to come to nought. We are TO
have no war with England on any pretense
whatever, uness, indeed, we shall show such
impotence and want Of energy in suppressing
toe rebellion that both England and France
shall interfere, as sort OF national police
force, TO keep the peace among people no
longer capable Of taking care Of themselves.
But when we reach that point, it doesn't mat
ter much what happens to us.


The tone of the public press in England, US
well as private adyices, assure US that this
danger has passed for the present. II is not
unlikely that the relations Of parties there may
have something to do with this new aspect Of
affairs, as neither Wings nor Tories may feel
strong enough to assume the responsibility Of
war by which nothing could be attained but
the expenditure of an immense sum- that might
better be used in relieving the distress, from
poverty and want Of work, quite certain to be
felt this Winter, even though peace should not
be broken. There are other and stronger
reasons, however, than merely political consid-
erations, by which this change may be ac-
counted for. The war in this country seemed
three months ago to be of importance to West
ern Europe only as related to Cotton. In
England alone, it was argued, 100000 peo-
pie are dependent for their daily bread on
full supply Of that staple, aud the interest of
France in the question was second only to that
of England. The Cotton was here; and the
problem was how, in the face Of o blockade
and the peaceful relations of the three coun-
tries, to take that which was 80 much needed
abroad, but the mere taking thereof was to
extend the aid to the rebels on which they
had relied to insure their success. But event,
have solved and settled it. The Southern crop
is no longer the necessity Of France and
England. What they need is the Northern
market There are good reasons for believing
that, with the cotton on hand and the supply
that may be confidently counted upon from
other countries than the United States,
England has all she will use for many months
to come, if not for the whole year. There is
no need, therefore, on the part Of England and
France, to break the blockade upon our
Southern coast, and involve themselves in a
war with this country. Their only motive in
doing 30 would be to liberate Cotton; and it is
not at all certain as yet, and cannot be for
months, that the Cotton may not as well be,


for any use they have for it, in Charleston
and New.Orleans as in Liverpool and Havre.


But what they do want is markets; and the


question presses home upon them-whether


fighting is likely to restore those they have
lo,t or open new onesi Will forcing the


blockade of Southern ports compel the import


alton of silks, calicOes, hardware, wines, and


various other articles of luxury and necessity


into Northern portsi This is quite as practl-


cal matter, at least, as the expected deartf


of Cotton was supposed to be three months


ago. About one.third Of the export trade, botf


Of Great Britain and France, has been to th'


country. The rebellion has put an end TO 1t