Year: 1864




generals, have now been in close contact for
weeks, and even months together, without
any achievement which can be regarded as
decisive. The fighting has been desperate;
but though each particular battle may bring
a repulse to one side or the other, there is
nothing like absolute discontinue. # we
look a little more closely at the. accounts
received, we shall discover a circumstance
which will explain the position of affairs.
The truth is that both in Virginia and Geor
gia both armies are intrenched alike. 1t is
not that Grant and Sherman keep the field
while Lee and Hood are shut up in their
lines, for the Federals have thrown up EARTH
works as well as the Confederates. AS soon
as Grant arrived at point where he could
make no more flank movements" but must
Richmond of his own, and was presently
found SO strongly intrenched that Lee de
cred the cost Of assauItiDg him in his posi-
ton Exactly the same thing took place at
Atlanta. Sherman marched after Johnston
n resoute pursuit until he reached the city
he wished to capture, when he Immediately
threw up feldworks and ensconced himself
in his lines. The result is, that in Georgia
as well as Virginia the main body Of each
army holds secure position, and they only
fight each other, as it were by sor'ies. This
is probably one consequence of the improve
ments 10 fle~arms. Breech-oaders and
earhwoks. appear to form the strongest
com mbiuaton Of offensive and defensive powl
er, and it is somewhat remarkable that the
result is directly opposed to the theories for
al . ,c
tary science that earthworks could never
stop good Infantry; the meaning that the
slope at which such works are necessarily
constructed could always be ascendei by SOL
ders brave enough to face the fire of the
defenders But it now seems that the dead,
illness and rapidty Of the fire maintained by
breech.loading rifles is more than can be
endured Grants heaviest losses have been
encountered in his attempts to storm the
earthworks of the Confederates and Lee
foresaw a similar danger so clearly that he
refused to run the risk Of it, and left Grant
undisturbed within his lines. That this is
the true history of affairs is plain from the
incident reported of the battle of Cold Harl
bor-tbat the attack lasted scarcely ten
minutes. 1t was much the same after the
explosion of the mine at Petersburg A
quarter Of an hour Of such fire as good troops
well armed can now maintain is enough to
stretch whole divisions on the ground. Grant,
in one of bis assaults on the Confederate
lines, must have lost 1000 men minute
There is nothing like this in former times
though Our own attack upon New Orleans
did foreshadOw these modern tactics to some
extent. In fact, the Americans in their civil
war appear to have been perfeclng the orig
inal tactics >of their countrymen. They
were the first people to discern the value of
scientific musketry aided by defensive works,
aud they have now carried both principles to
an extent never known before. The essence
Of this strategy consists in sheteriug your
self as far as possible while you keep the
enemy within reach Of your fire, and it is
just as applicable to naval as to military
tactics.


At Charleston the booms, chains, stakes,
and torpedoes, represented on the water
what earlhworks and mines would be on
land. Admiral Dahlgren could not get
through these works, and though the armor
of modern frigates protects them from the
destruction to which they would otherwise
be exposed, vet the losses of the attacking
squadron we're occasionally serious, and the
expedition proved failure. Whether the
attack upon Mobile will be more successful
is what remains to be seen, but the character
of the impending conflict is discerpibe al.
ready. Admiral Farragut has proven bm
self resoue seaman; in fact, he seems as
obstinateIy bent upon winning as Gen. Grant
himself, but his proceedings are very slow
now that he has entered the harbor. Aided,
it seems, by treachery or incompetence on
the part of an officer in command Of fort,
he did succeed in running between the en-
trance batteries without much loss. One of
his iron clads were blown up by a torpedo
the first complete success Of such machine;
and the wooden vessels Of his squadron, in
cuding bis own flagship, were seriously dam
aged by Confederate iron-clad in the har-
Dor; but be accomplished bis first step, and
entered the port. Here, however. be is de-
ayed by one defense after another, and it
depends upon the combination of ornaments
and distractions at the command of the Con-
federates whether he wins or loses. If he
can be kept long enough under the fire of
good artillery, even his fotilla of monitors
may be forced to retreat.


1t must not be forgotten that though for.
tifcations enter thus largely into the machin
cry of this desperate war, they must, in most
instances, have been extempaised. America
was the one country in the whole world
without strong places and fortified towns,
except on the sea coast Even Richmond
and Washington have been fortified since
the war began, and probably we may learn
by and by, something more of system
which Todeben introduced, but which Beau
regard and bis colleagues have developed.
We are assured that Richmond-as open
town four years ago as Brentford or Croydon
is now one of the strongest places in the
world. We know that Vicksburg, hastily
encircled with defensive works, resisted every
LonA;lo nitnnl, nnA uiolIoA only 10 famina