Year: 1863

=
land line, and he too might be expected to
arrive at some future period. The hope Of
such important reinforcements undoubted-
y had their influence on the minds of Gen.
Neade's ill-timed council Of war, if not on
the mind Of the Commander himself


Yet this amounts to nothing but saying
that if Lee would only wait, We would
undertake 10 swallow him scientifically.
Of course he would not wait, He expect
cd to be attacked before reaching the river,
because he ought to have been, because
the established principles Of military sci
ence demanded that he should be. BE put
his forces in the best line Of defense which
the face Of the country afforded, and issued
an address to his troops exhorting them to
be equal to their renown, and to be mind
fnl that the fate Of the Confederacy was in
their hands. Finding that he was not at
tackled he made the best use Of his time,
while his adversaries were haranguing
each other In the war council, to put the
Potomac between himself and them. He
Is now on his own soil, among the inhos-
pitab1e forests and dedles Of Virginia, with
his communications restored, and in the
reach Of such re1nforcements rs the last
desperate CONSUMPTION Of the rebel govern
mcnt may afford him.


General Meade is too good soldier to
believe that any treatment short of fight
ing and destroying the army opposed to
him will answer the. emergency, and it is
gratifying to the country to know that
hts voice in the council was for immediate
attack. The argument that reintorcements
we're coming, and that the next day and
the next would make Us stronger, was not
logically an argument for delay. Many Of
the most important engagements Of the
war have been Of from two to fire days
duration. Donelson, Pea Ridge, Shiloh,
Seven Pines and Fair Oaks, Connth, were
each protracted through two days. The
Army of the Potomac itself had just been
victorious in three days encounter, and
if other examples were needed, the iron
will Of Rosccrnns and his heroes at Stone
River, driving the enemy in confusion on
the evening Of the fifth day, furnished
memorable precept. It might have been
assumed as certain that the sound Of can
non would hasten the steps Of the ap:
preaching columns, and equally so that
their appearance on the field, while the
battle was in progress, would prove Of
greater moral and material advantage to
us than at any other time. 1t is difficult
. see how any council Of war could yote
against an attack under such circumstan-
ces, or how any General, to whom such
council is only advisory, could hesitate to
oyerrule their vote, if it happened to be in
conflict with his OWN Judgment.


A noble opportunity was lost, and such
opportunities do not repeat themselves.
Yet the country owes General Meade too
much for the rapidity Of movement, the
skill and obstinacy, which he displayed at
Gettysburg, to condemn him, or even to
think hardly Of him for this error. It will
be remembered also that at the cruel re-
pulse Of Fredericksburg, General Meade,
with only four thousand FIVE hundred men
Of the left grand division, drove the enemy
half mile, completely pierced his lines,
and occupied the heights which were re.
garded by General Burnside as the key Of
the whole position. Why he was not sup
ported, why the 50, 900 men at the disposal
Of General Franklin, failed to prevent the
enemy from getting on both his danizs and
wrestling from him his well-earned VIC
tory, General Franklin has not sat1sfac-
tori1y explained in the labored defense
which he has seen fit to publish. General
Meade is entitled to the confidence as well
as the gratitude Of his country, which,
nevertheless, must pronounce his failure
to attack the rebel army at Williamsport
signal misfortune.