Year: 1862

caused me to decide that ought not to make
the attack had contemplated, and besides, jim
asmuch as the President of the United
States had told me not to be in hurry in max
ing this attack, that he would give me all the
support he could, but he did not want the ar
my of the Potomac destroyed, / felt that
could not take the responsibility of ordering
the attack, Notwithstanding my own belief at
the time that the works of the enemy could
be carried


In the afternoon of that day again saw the
officers and told them that / had decided to
withdraw to this side of the river all our for
ces, except enough to hold the town and the
bridge heads, but should keep the bridges
there for further operations i'm case we wanted
to cross again. / accordingly ordered the
withdrawal, leaving Gen. Hooker to conduct
the withdrawal of our forces from the town and
Gen. Franklin to conduct on'our left.


During that evening received note from
Gen. Hooker, and about ten o'clock that night
! Gen. Butterfeld came over with message
| from Gen. Hooker stating that he (Gen. Hook
er) felt it his duty to represent to me the con-
dition in which was leaving the town and
troops in it. After a long conversation on the
subject with Gen. Butterfeld felt that the
troops proposed to leave behind would not
be able to hold the town. l then partially de-
cided to withdraw the whole command, still
more perilous operation.


Ii commenced raining, which to some extent
! was an assistance to MS. but was very bad
thing in the moving OF the troops.


| thought over the matter for about two
hours, and about one O'Clock sent over an or
| der to withdraw the whole force, which was
| successfully accomplished.
There had been a great deal of division of
| opinion among the corps commanders as to
the place of crossing, but after all the discus
sion upon the subject the decision to cross
over the river here was well received, l un-
derstood, by all of them.


Question. What reason do you assign for
the failure Of your attack here?
Answer. 1t was found to be impossible to
get the men up to the works, the enemys fire
was too hot for them. The whole command
fought most gallantly; the enemy themselves
say they never saw our men fight as hard as
on that day.


Question. Were the enemy's works very
strong?


Answer. Their works are not strong works.
but occupy strong positions. 1t is possible
that the points of attack were wrongly order
ed. If such is the case, l can only say that l
did to the best of my ability. 1t is also posi-
BILE that we would have done better to have
crossed at SINNERS Neck: but for what / sup
posed good reasons felt / had better cross
here, that we would have a more decisive en-
gagementhere, and that five succeeded in de-
feating the enemy here we would break up the
whole of their army here, which l think is
now the most desirable thing. not even second
to the taking of Richmond, for if this army
was broken up, though they might defend
Richmond for while, they could not make
any protracted defense here.


Question by Mr.. Couch Do / understand
you to say that il was your understanding that
Gen. Halleck aud Gen. Meigs, while at your
headquarters in Warrenton, and before you
commenced the movement of your army, sent
orders to Washington for the pontoons to be
Immediately forwarded to Falmouth?


Answer. That was my understanding GER
tanly.


Question. In your judgment could the pom
toons have been forwarded in time for you to
have crossed the Rappahannock when you ex-
pected, ifall possible efforts had been made by
those charged with that duty?


Answer. Yes, sir, if they had received their
orders in time.


Question. Did the non-arrival of these pom
toons at the time you expected, prevent your
crossing when you expected to cross, and in
terfere with the success of your plan?


Answer. Yes, sir.


Question. Since you have assumed the
command OF the army of the Potomac, have all
its movements been made by you accordingto
your own judgment, or have some of them
been directed by the General-n-C Chief, the Sec
retary of the War, or the President of the
United States?


Answer. They have all been made in ac-
cordance with my own judgment. In some
cases have submitted, my views, which have
peen approved.


Question. Who did you understand was re-
sponsbe for the forwarding of the pontoons
to Falmouth?


Answer. / understood that Gen. Haleck
was TO give the necessary orders, and then the
officers who should receive the orders were
the ones responsible for the pontoons coming
here. could have carried out that part of
my plan through officers of my own, but hav-
ing just taken command of an army with
which was but little acquainted, it was evil
dent that il was as much as / could attend to-
with the assistance of all my officers, to change
its position from Warrenton to Fredericks-
burg, and felt-indeed | expected-that all
the parts of the plan which were to be execut-
ed in Washington would be attended to by the
officers of that place, under the direction of
the Adutant's department, to which those
parts of the plan appertained.


Question. Did you or not understand that
you were 10 be responsible for seeing that
their orders were carried out?


Answer. / did not. / never for moment
imagined that had to carry out ANYTHING
that required to be done in Washington. Gen.
Meigs told Inc distinctly several days ago in
Washington that he never saw my plan Of op-
erations until / showed it to him on that day
Question. Do / understand you to say in
your statement tnat you expected Gen. Frank
lin to carry the point at the extreme left of
the ridge in the rear of the town, and thereby
enable our troops TO storm and carry the for
tifications?


Answer. l did expect him to carry that
point, which being done, would have placed
our forces in the rear of their extreme left. and
which thought at the time would shake their
forces on the ridge to such an extent that the
position in front could be easily stormed and
carried.


Question. To what do you attribute his
failure to accomplish that?


Answer. To the great strength of the posi-
tlon, aud the accumulation of the enemy's
force there. / expected the bridges would be
built in two or three hours after they were
unloaded, which was about daylight. In
stead OF that those on the right were not built
until o clock in the afternoon, and had no.
ly the means of getting across one division
over the bridges on the right. Gen. Frank
Inns bridges were built about noon. and
were held by our troops on the opposite bank
This gave the enemy time TO accumulate their
forces. which were stretched along the river
from Port Royal up to the battlefield, before
l was able TO order the attack.
| Whilst the men here were unloading the
bridges and putting them into the water, the
enemy's sharpshooters~ opened very heavy
/ fire from the town, and our batteries opened
upon the town with view of sencing them.
In this manner the bridges were built about
two-thirds of their length, at which time the
bridge builders were driven Off, and had to
take shelter on the bank. Repeated efforts
1 l.. ~