Year: 1861




A FRESH IMPETUS.


Apart from all questions Of the merits or de-
merits of Frederic 9 strategy there cannot be
a question that he gave fresh impetus to
military science. He was the first in modern
times to appreciate the value of thoroughly
educated staff. And here we may observe
that in the Peninsular war, especially towards
equally appreciated in our own army; and SO
high was the opinion the French entertained
of our Quartermsster-Gene staff that they
carefully studied after the peace the system OF
military instruction at the Staff College of that
day, and ultimately founded upon it the Ecsie
d'Efat Major We may rest assured that
what Alexander and Frederic found necessary
for their armies, and what Wellington encour-
aged in his, must be a matter Of the greatest
Importance to the well being and skilful direc-
tion of the troops; and hence the necessity of
carefully watching the effect Of the present
STAFF College, which has been established en-
the broadest possible basis for the instruction
of future staff officers, at the public expense,
and which we believe is well adapted to the
purpose for which it is destined. -s.


THIN RANKS.


Another great advance in military scienceis is
due to Frederic-in the lightness and rapidity,
as compared with the tactics of the times be-
fore him, which he infused into the movements
of his troops of every arm. His infantry was
formed in three ranks, thus presenting astrik-
ing contrast to the formation of Gustsvus
Adelptus q century before in six ranks, which
vas itself an innovation upon the usual order
ef that time in ten ranks. The change is due
to the gradual increase in the number Of mus
keteers with the extinction of the pikemen,
and to the necessity which was at once felt of
developing to the fullest extent the line of fire;
while there was no longer the same reason for
the deep mass of ancient times, for mere weight


- u. -
instances be now brought into play.


The British army, ss is well known, has for
many years adopted still thinner formation,
that of two ranks; and it would appear that
the French army, since the Italian campsign,
has followed our example. In point Of fact,
another element has made its appearance in
the question since the time Of Frederic, and
even Of the first Napoleon-namely, the tre-
mendous force and accuracy of modern fire.
arms OF the accuracy, however, We can at
present say little in regard to its practical ef
feet on war, saving that in the recent Italian
battles the improvement in this respect does
not appear to have rendered the contest shorter
than were general actions in the days Of good
old Brown Bess. Nor were the lists Of killed
and wounded greater; though in point of fact
it was not to be expected that they should be,
since one of the most certain lessons taught us
in military history is that the more formida-
BILE the weapons the less will be the carnage.
The reason il that the affair is in nearly all
cases decided before it becomes hand to- hand
conflict, and the more accurate the firearms
the greater will be the distance between the
adverse lines at which this decision takes
place. and consequently the facility afforded
TO the beaten party OF making good its retreat.
But the increased force Of penetration of mod
ern firearms may not improperly give rise to
the question Of formation in three or even in
two lines, since 1t is certain that the same bull
let will in very many, perhaps in the majority
of cases, prove the destruction Of both front
and rear rank man together.


We see, then, that the order of formation
has become more and more shallow from the
time of Gustavus to the present day; and the
question is, has it reached its limit There is
much to be said on both sides in the reply;
but upon the whole it seems not improbable
that the ultimate formation is not yet attained
and that the next great change in tactics will
be the advancing TO attack in single rank, fol-
lowed by . second, and possibly by a third
rank, sufficiently near to replace the first in
case Of disaster, or at the critical moment to
Join with it in the contest; thus presenting a
succession of waves Of attack, each light in it.
self, and easily stemmed, yet in their accumu-
lston irresistible. But this question merits far
more space and time than we have at present
to give TO it, and We merely suggest it for the
consideration of those interested in such spec
ulations. ...
.~ 60. ---.... ARTILLERY.


When to what We have already said of the
increased lightness and activity given by Fred
eric to bis infantry and cavalry we add that be
adopted the same view with respect to artil-
Jerry, by Organizing horse artillery batteries, it
will be evident that this principle with the H.
lustration afforded to it by his actions, is the
legacy that great warrior has left to military
science.


RAW IEyuys


From the military era inaugurated by the
Great Frederic, the elementary tactics of which b
have in great part survived to our own day,
we descend through the American and French
revolutionary eras to the times of Napoleon
and Wellington. The wars, however, of those
revolutions must not be altogether passed by.
Indeed, as paving the way to the more regular
wars Of the nineteenth century, they could not
be neglected without manifest detriment to
military history. Both showed what could be
effected by raw levies properly directed with
reference to the circumstances in which they
were placed-ths Americans in a thickly
wooded country, acting in light skin mishing
order, and depending on the natural instinct
Of the individual marksman; the French fight
ing IN masses, yet not trusting their undiscip-
lined hOrdes TO the assault in line Of regular
trOops, advancing in dense columns, and over
throwing the com paratively thin lines Of enc
mics who we're not possessed Of sufficient moral
force to meet such an attack. Both were in
stances Of Paixhsn's remarkable saying, that
''the strength Of nations is no longer in their
barracks" Both we're, after severe struggle
eminently successful.


NAPOLEON AND WELLINGTON.


Seldom was there a greater contrast pre-
sented by two generals in the same aga than
between Napoleon and Wellington. Each rep
resented somewhat to excess the peculiar char
aeteristies Of his nation; Napoleon the fHria
FraHesss, Wellington the English sOIidarite
When they met il was q battle of giants. If
We were required to compare their modes of
action we might say that never was attack like
that Of Napoleon, never was defence like that
Of Wellington. Yet this would not by any
means exhaust the subject for while, on the
other hand, the attack Of the Asesye. the pas
sage Of the Douro, the onset at Salamanca, and
the ssrategieal advance upon and battle Of
Vittoria, prove the English generals capacity
for attack the battle Of Dresden and the cam
paign of 1914 prove the French Emperors tai
ent for defensive war. ... ..t


ha hiatt Of Wallin uer mostly oh ~