Year: 1862

THE CONDITION OF THE TROOPS ON SATURDAY.


Such was the condition of the armies at
nightfall after nine hours Of conflict on the
18th instant in which our loss was severe, and
leaving not less than 5000 Of the enemy dead
and wounded on the field. We left upon the
feld nearly all his wounded, because we could
not remsye them. We left his dead unburied
because we could not bury them


Such conflict and courage has, perhaps
never before occurred upon this continent. We
took about three hundred prisoners and large
number Of arms. We had fought this battle
to open the way for our army and relieve us
from an investment which would necessarily
reduce Us and the position by famine. We
had occupied the whole day to accomplish our
object, and before we could prepare to leave,
after taking in the wounded and the dead the
enemy had threwn around US again in the
night an immense force Of fresh troops, and re-
occupied his original position in the line of in
vestment, thus again cutting off our retreat.
We had only about IL 900 troops, all told. Of
these large proportion We had lost in the
three battles The csmm nd had been in the
trenches night and day for FIVE days, exposed
to the snow, sleet, mud, and ice water, without
shelter and without adequate covering, and
without sleep.


THE FAMOUS COUNCIL OF WAR BETWEEN FLOYD,


PILLOW, AND BUCKsER.


In this condition the general officers held





Gen. Buckner gave it as his decided opinion
that be could not hold his position one half an
hour against an assault of the enemy and said
the enemy would attack him next morning at
daylight. The proposition was then IN de by
the undersigned to again fight through the
enemy's line and cut our way out Gen Buck
ner said his command was 90 worn out and cut
to pieces and demoralized, that he could not
make another fight; that it would cost the
command three-quarters Of its present num-
bers to cut its way through, and il was wrong
TO sacrifice three quarters Of a command to
save one quarter; that no effcer had q right
to cause such sacrifice. General Floyd and
Major Ghmer / understood to concur in this
opinion.


then expressed the opinion that we could
hold out another day, and in that time we
could get steamboats, and set the command
over the river, and probably save a large por-
tiOn of it. To this General Buckner replied
that the enemy would certainly attack him at
daylight and that be could not hold his posi-.
ton half an hour. The alternative of the
propositions was a surrender of their position
and command. General Floyd said that he
would neither surrunder the command nor
would he surrender himself prisoner. had
taken the same position. General Buckner
said he was satisfied nothing else could be
done, and that, therefore, he would surrender,
If placed in command General Floyd said
that he would turn over the command to him
if he could he allowed to Withdraw bis com
mand to this General Buckner consented
Thereupon General Floyd turned the command
over to me, / passing it instantly to General
Buckner, saying would neither surrender the
command nor myself a prisoner. directed
Colonel Forrest to cut his way out Under
these circumstances, General Buckner accepted
the command, and sent flag of truce to the
enemy for an armistice of six hours to negotiate
Co. cs1fa ffr.la &c 81 L. a.. a
communication was delivered retired from
the garrison .a