Year: 1864

/ The Richmond Dispatch says
/ An able CORE spondent in Hood ar
my, in his last letter 10 the Mobile
Advertiser, gives what he was informed
was General Hood plan This is in
teresting as part of the history OF the
operations around Jackson and the
evacuation of Atlanta We have not
seen it elsewhere from any other source.
As the correspondent says, the plan
was certainly bold and ambitious
enough in its scope Hood, it seems.
was deceived by false information from
his scouts, and the Yankees state as
much on him We copy from the cor
respondent as follows


l have been informed that the follow.
ing was General Hoods plan Of opera
tions On the 30th of August, Yankee
Howard grand corps of eighteen thous-
and made a forced march of sixteen
miles from Fairburn, on the W est Point
road, to JonesborO on the Macon road.
| They arrived at JOnesborO' on the even
ing of the Both, crossed Flint River. and
took possession between the river and
the town. This is the head of Flint
River, and here il is n mere creek. about
knee deep. Hood sent Hardees corps,
which was only twelve miles from Jones
boro', and Lees, which was fifteen, to
meet this movement


do not know when Hardee moved,
bat presume that he moved during the
day of the 30th. Lee never moved un-
til ten that night, and did not straighten
out and get fairly in motion until days
light Some Yankees had struck his
road and imPeded his movement Thus
it happened that the Yankees reached
Jonesboro from twelve to twenty hours
in advance of as. They had time 10
get position, 70 intrench, and to rest
before we got there. How it happened
that they thus "stole march on us,
and moved over longer distance in a
less time, ! cannot explain We had
the shortest line and the use of 8 rail
road to transport troops, and yet they
beat Us by at least twelve hours in tho
race. .el4-


The object was to attack them while
in motion and unprepared Our Two
corps had an effective strength Of more
than twenty thousand men-an excess
over the enemy. General Hood had
entire confidence in the result, think
ing surely that, with a majority in num-
bers, we would beat the Yankees. He
was informed that Sherman's line was
tWenty-eight miles long While We beat
back Sherman's right, Stewart, with
over twenty thousand men, was to fall
on his left center, cut it, and drive
them down the river, thus cutting of
escape and capturing twO-thirds Of Sher-
mans army. The plan was certainly
bold and ambitious enough in its scope
In attempting too much, he accomplish
ed nothing. Il would have been better
had he been satisfied merely to drive
Sherman back and defeat his campaign.
/ believe he could have done this by
throwing all of his army upon q part
Of Sherman's-the nearest part Of il 10
Atlanta. If, indeed, Sherman did divide
his army and scatter it over line of
twenty-eight miles, Hood followed suit
by dividing his own, with twenty miles
between the fragments. But ] do not
believe that sherman did commit this
blunder His own dispatches state that
his army was between Jonesboro and
Rough and Ready, not over twelve
miles from right 10 left ! believe this
was his position and it follows that
Gen Hood was deceived by false in
formation from his cavalry and scouts.
And they must have been very tardy in
conveying information Of Howard's
march from Fairburn to Jonesboro 10
must have been about night, on the Both,
when Gen Hood was informed of How
ard movement upon Joaesboro and
before night Howard was there.


On the night Of tire 3lst, when Har-
dee informed Hood that our assault up
on the enemy at JOnesboro' had failed,
he was greatly astonished He threw
up his hands, it is said, exclaiming.
Ny God = He had Over-estimated
the courage of his army and the mis-
take had been fatal lie fell into the
opposite extreme Of distrust, and or
dered the evacuation of Atlanta He
still had the Augusta Railroad. which
the enemy could not reach, and which
would have enabled him 10 hold Allan
Ia His army was still but little hurt,
and might still have fought a general
battle on the next day, but he had lost