Year: 1863

Grant at tytcksburg-Hookcr ON His way


90 Richmond.


Grants three weeks brilliant campaign


against yicksburg proves him to be general
of no common order He ia the only Union
general now in the field the celeritysef whose
operations can bear comparison with the
achievements Of Napoleon in his campaigns In
Italy and Germany.


The Southern journals generally attribute
bis success to the incompetence of Pemberton,
while it is whispered in Richmond and else
where in the contederacy that the rebel gene
raj has sold himself to Grant. and deliberate
ly and wilfully made such disposition Of his
troops as enabled the Union general to defeat
the rebel armies in series of battles. The
same stories were told of Tighlman at Fort
Henry, and Buckner at Fort Donelson. But
the true secret is the superiority of Grants
generalship, which combines pluck, energy and
skill. Some generals possess one Of these quail
ties, while they are wanting in the other two.
1t is the combination of them that consti-
tutes a good general. From the time that
Grant landed on the eastern bank Of the
Mississippi, covering period OF three
weeks he has fought five battles, in all Of
which he has been victorious, capturing the
capital of the State of Mississippi and closely
investing its great strategic stronghold on the
river, after first reducing the key thereof-the
formidable Notifications Of Haines' Bluff Con.
trast with this success the failure Of Sherman in
the vicinity Of the same city. and the failure of
Hooker in his attempt to get within striking dis
tance Of Richmond, and it will be seen that
both suffer severely by the comparison, whatever
may be the reputation they have gained for their
campaigns against newspapers. .,s.o


Hooker has had command OF an army three or
four times the size of Grants for the last five
months--an army doubling in numbers that Of
Lee. With far fewer and less formidable OBJ
stacles in the way than were presented to
Grant, he has not been able during this period
to gain an inch in advance of the point at which
he assumed the command at the close Of the last
year. His first attempt to 60 forward has re-
suited in the loss Of great battle from sheer


lack of generalship and ignorance Of the art of
war; He divided his strength, left his right
flank unprotected and unsupported, allowing it
to be turned and driven in, and his whole army
routed and forced back behind the Rappahan-
mock, suffering such loss as appears to have
postponed indefinitely renewal of the onward
movement to Richmond. So ashamed is Hooker
OF his case that he deems it indefensble, and to
this day he has made no official report Of his
operations. According to Secretary Stanton, he
did not bring into the fight with Lee more than
one-third Of his men, This was worse than the
conduct OF Moreau at Hohenlinden. who with
twelve divisions managed TO bring into action
six, and would have lost the battle but for the
unexampled carelessness with which the Aus
trians manuuvered, and the courage and talent
Of one Of his subordinate generals, Richepanse,
who, finding himself surrounded, possessed HIM
self, by bold movement, of one hundred
pieces Of Austrian cannon while passing over
causeway. Hooker fights with one-third his
force; Grant fights with the whole. One of the
FIRST principles Of generalship is to bring all
your force to bear against the enemy,
and, If possible, against portion Of his
force, or against the point q. which he is


weakest In the late battle on the Rappahan-
mock the generalsbip was all on the side of the
rebels. ss ,4i .ia va aaaSso1i ~ he


While Hooker played the part Of the Austrian
General Alvinzy, at Rivoli. Lee played the
role of Napoleon on the same field Napoleon
had Wurmser, another Austrian general, be-
sieged in Mantua with garrison of twenty
thousand men, of whom at least twelve thou-'
sand were armed. At Rivoli. on the Upper
Adige he had Joubert, with ten thousand men,
watching the enemy. On the Lower Adige he
left ten thousand for the same purpose and to
guard the approaches to Mantua in that direc-
| ton. He was at Verona himself when he
learned that Alvinzy was marching against


Rivoli with sixty thousand men, and Provera
was at the same time moving on the Lower


Adge, with nearly twenty thousand men, to
effect q junction with Alvinzy and raise the
siege. If Napoleon had waited till those armies


united. they would have numbered nearly one
hundred thousand--two or three to his one.
He had only twenty thousand at Verona. With


part Of these he fastened to the aid Of


Joubert at Rivoli and the balance he disposed
| in strategic positions In the vicinity, so as to


render the approaching battle with the larger
| force decisive. The enemy divided his force
| into three bodies. One Of them had little or


no connection with the main battle. and was


posted on the opposite side Of the river, play


ing at long taw against the French troops, but


doing little damage. With the remainder


Alvinzy attempted TO surround and bag Napo-


Icons force, on the anaconda principle. Bona


parte. posted on plateau, very quietly await


ed the development of the cncmy's plan, and


permitted him to divide his force and surround


him. In this position Napoleon saw lie could


prevent junction of the cncmy's divisions.


and, though numbering only sixteen thousand,


aud surrounded by a foe of forty-Gve thousand,


larad hoix Of ixa<>,sa axad