Year: 1863

History, ift be not the mersst toy, the idlest pas
...s Of our n: record q sss
there is no belief In such an end, and therefore nt
advance towards it, no stirrinss Of Divine Word II


people: bosom where not .s yet the beasts hear hear
history cannot be said to be- They belong not there
fare to history least OF all to Sacred History, those
Into which BY force and fraud, III. early hunters q
men, the Nlmrods and Sesostrises' dove and com
PEELED thsfr felows and Scripture Is only most true
silence By, while it fingers rather on the plains o
Mamre with the man that 'sbeleved God, and It wal
counted UNTO him for rghteousness," than BY "pop.
but In the blind powers OF Nature and the brute force


The Unity of Scripture.


We have known hitherto, in this country
so little Of the actual realities Of war on q
grand scale, that many are beginning to look
upon the violent opposition to the sovern-
ment, and the slowness Of the progress Of
our arms, as signs Of hopeless discourage
ment This might be abundantly illustra-
ted by many remarkable events in English
History, from the days Of the great Rebel
lion, down through the campaigns Of the
Prince of Orange, and of Marlborough, to the
war which grew out of the events of the
French Revolution. War is Away entered
upon amidst vast deal Of popular enthu.
s,asm, which is utterly unreasoning. 1t is
the universal voice of history. that such en-.
thusiasm is wholly unreliable in supporting
the prolonged and manifold burdens which
are inseperable from every war waged on an
extensive scale, and for long period. The
popular idea of war is speedy and deci
sive victory, and an immediate occupation
of the enemy's capital, followed by treaty
ofpcace, by which the objects of the war
are permanently secured. Nothing is re-
vealed to the excited passions Of the multi
tude, but dazzling visions Of national glory,
purchased by small nriystions, and the ear
" and complete subjugation Of their ene-
mics 1t is, therefore, not unnatural, that
at the first reverses, they should yield at
once to an unmanly depression, and, giving
up all for lost, they should vent upon the
government for its conduct of the war, and
upon the army and its generals for their
failure to make their dreams Of victory re-
alitics, an abuse as unreasoning as was their
original enthusiasm.


Experience has taught the English people
that the progress Of a war never ful6lls the
popular expectations and although victo-
tory may be assured at last, to patient and
untiring yigor and energy in its prosecu-
ton, vet during the continuance Of long
war there can he no well founded hope of a
puifarm and constant series of brilliant tri-
nmphs ia the field, illustrating the profound
wisdom Of the policy of the Cabinet; that,
on the contrary, all gar. that even which is
most successful in the end, consists rather
in checkercd fortunes, Of alterations OF
victory and disaster, and that its conduct
marked by what were evidently, when view
eG in the light of experience, blunders so
glaring in the policy adopted by tine gov
ernment, or in the strategy of its Generals
that the wonder is, that success was achiev-
ed at all. The English have thus been
taught that the true characteristic of public
opinion in it's judgment Of a war should be,
not hopefulness or or impatience Of imme-
date results, but rather stern endurance


That King quality Of heroic constancy
which, rooted deep, in profound convic-
ton of the Justice of the cause, supports a
lofty public spirit equally well In the midst
of temporary disaster, and in the hour Of
assured triumph.


We have had no such experience here
Our people are perhaps more easily excited
by success. and more readily depressed by
rsverses, than the English, and it is, there
fore worth while to consider how they car
ried on war, on grand scale and for a pro
tracted period 1t will be found, if we mis-
lake not, that the denunciations Of the
so common among us Of late,
and the complaints Of the inactivity Of the
army, have their exact counterpart in the
history Of the progress Of all the wars in
which England has been engaged since the
lays Of the great Rebellion. He who draws
from the lessons of the past, will
not, we think, seek comfort in vain when he
discovers that in all those wars in which the
government and the army have been so
bitterly assailed Except that of the Ameri-
can Revolution), England has At last been
1t is worth while Their to look
into English history to understand how war
IL successfully carried on, notwithstanding
the obstacles, which owing to . prsyerted
public opinion, exists within the nation it,
self. These difficulties, although they in
here in the very nature of free government
often prove, IS we shall see, more fruitful
Of embarrassment to the favorable prosecu-
ton OF war than the active operations Of
the enemy.


We propose to illustrate the propositions
which we have advanced by study Of the
series Of campaigns known in English his
tory as the Peninsular War. We select
this particular war because we think that
in many Of its events and in the policy
which sustained it, there are TO be observed
many important, almost startling parallel.
isms with our present struggle. We have,