Year: 1863

rising hopes Of the conservative 1t was an
nounced that General Mcclellan had been dis-
missed from tie command of the Army Of the
Potomac. and ordered to repair to his home; that
he had, in fact, been removed altogether from
active service. The General had been regarded
as the representative of conservative principle in
the army. Support of him had been made one of
the articles of the conservative electoral pro-
gramme. His dismissal was taken as a sign that
the President had thrown himself entirely into
the arms Of the extreme radical party, and that
the attempt to carry out the policy of that party
would be persisted in. The irritation of the con-
servatives in New York was certainly very great;
it seemed, however, to be not uh mixed with con-
sternaton and dependency.


Several of the leaders of the Democratic party
sought interviews with me, both before and after
the arrival of the intelligence of General McClel
lan's dismissal. The subject uppermost in their
minds. whilst they were speaking to me, was
naturally that CT foreign mediation between the
North and the South. Many of them seemed to
think that this mediation must come at last; but
they appeared very much afraid of its coming too
soon. IL was very evident they apprehended that
a premature proposal of foreign Intervention
would afford tie radical party the means of revi-
wing the violent war spirit, and of thus defeating
the peaceful plans of the conservatives. They
appeared to regard the present moment as pecu-
liarly unfavorable for such an offer, and, indeed





of any proposal from abroad that it should be
deferred until the control of the executive govern
,ment should be in the hands of the conservative
party.


gave no opinion on the subject / did not
say whether not myself thought foreign in
terventlOn probable or advisable; but listened
with attention to the accounts given me of the
plans and hopes of the conservative party At
the bottom. thought perceived desire to put
ouI fr of fho rtck nf lncir tba
Southern States altogether; but it was plain that
it was not thought prudent to avow this desire
Indeed some hints of it dropped before the elec-
tions, i'll received. that a strong declara
ton TO the contrary deemed necessary by the
Democratic leaders.


At the present moment, therefore, the chiefs of
the conservative party call loudly for more
vigorous prosecution Of the war, and reproach
the Government with slackness as we'll as with
want OF success in its military measures. But
they repudiate all idea of interfering with the in
stitutions of the Southern people, or of wagng a
war Of exterminaton or subjugation, They
maintain that the ect Of the military operations
should be to place the North in a position to de-
nland an armistce with honor and with effect.
The armiStice should (they hold) be followed by
a convention in which such changes of the Con
stitutiOn should be proposed az would give the
South ample security on the subject of its slave
property, and would enaUle the North and the
South to re-unite and to live together in peace
and harmony. The conservatives profess to
think that the South might be induced to take
part in such convention, and that restor alton
of the Union would be the result The moIe sa-
gacous members of the party must however,
look upon the proposal of convention merely as
a last experiment to test the possibility of re.
union. They are, no doubt. well aware that the
more probable consequence OF an armstice would
be the establishment of Southern independence;
but they perceive that if the South is so utterly
alienated that possible concessions will induce
il to return voluntarily to the Union, it is wiser
to agree to separation than to prosecute a cruel
and hopeless


1t is with reference to such an armistice as
they desire to attain that the leaders of the con-
servative party regard the question of foreign
mediation. They think that the offer of media
tion, if made to a radical administration, would
be rejected; that if made at an unp-optious mo-
ment. il might increase the vrulence with which
the war is prosecuted. If their own party were
in power, or virtually controlled the Administra-
ton, they would rather, if possible, obtain an
armistce without the aid of foreign governments;
but they would be disposed to accept an offer of
mediation it it appeared to be the only means of
putting stop to hostlities They would desire
that the offer should come from the great Pow
ers of Europe conformity, and in particular that
as little prominence as possible should be given
to Great Britain.


At Washin <on | have had fewer opportunities
than bad at New York Of ascertaining the pres
ent views OF the chiefs of the political parties
AT the interview which h,d with 'lr. Seward
the day after my arrival he showed no DISPOSE
ton to enter upon political matters He did not
appear TO expect or to desire to receive from me
any special communication from her Maesty's
Government The President, when | waited up
on him, talked to me only on ordinary topics l.
for my part, gladly stunned all aluSion to for
eign intervention, INV principal object being to
avoid saying anything which might embarrass
me in carrying out any Instructions on the sub.
ject which may receive from your lordship.


All things considered, my own opinion Ger
tainly is that the present mo rent is not iavOra
BILE one for mnSng offer Of mediation. 1t
might embarass the peace party, and even oblige
them, in order to maintain their popularity, to
make some public declarations against il, and
tins might make it difficult for hem to accept a
similar offer at more proptious time. Ii would
in all probability be rejected by the President
who appears to have thrown himself into the arms
of the extreme radical party. The views OF that
party clear and definite They declare that
there is no hope of reconciliation with the South
ern people; that the war must he pursued per
fas am nefas, until the dsloyal men of the South



that not an inch of the old territory or the Re
public must be given up; that foreign interven-
ton, in any shape, must be rejected and resented.
This party would desire 10 turn AN offer OF me-
datiation to account. for the purpose of infaming
the war spirit and producing a reaction against
the conservatives.


1t is probable too, that the Government would
urge. in answer to an offer Of mediation, that il
has by no mems abandoned the hope of putting
down the rebellion within reasonable time; that,
at all events this is not moment at which it can
reasonably be called upon to put stop to hos
tilites. 1t would observe that the armies of the
Uuited States are everywhere advancing, and
that expeditions are prepared against Texas. as
well against Charleston, Mobile and other
points on the coast. 1t would point out that it
had equipped n considerable number of war yes
sells, iron clads as we'll as Others at a vast ex
pense; that the season had just arrived wi en- the
autumn rains would render the rivers nayigable
by armed vessels. and when the Southern coast
would be free from epidemic diseases. 1t
might even represent an advance OF the Army
of the Potomac to Richmond as a probable
event.


The experience Of the past is certainly not cal
culated TO inspire any great confidence in the re-
suits of these warlike preparations; but the polit
ical interests of the party now in power render a
continuance ofthe war a necessity to IT, Its only
chance of regaining its lost popularity lies in sue
cessfu military operations. Unless it can OBJ
tain much higher plscein public estimation than
il now occupies not only viii its tenure of power
become extremely precarious, but some Of its
leading members be called to a severe account for
their extra legal proceedings During the session
of Congress which begins next month the present
Administration has indeed reason to expect an
uncompromising support from a majority of both
Houses OF Congress But on tie 4th Of March
next the existing House of Representatives is