Year: 1862

giving an account of his operations against
the retel army intrenched on the heights
of Fredericksburg, and taking upon him


self the whole responsibility Of "the
failure in the attack" 'sas the extreme gal
lantry, courage and endurance shown by the
officers and soldiers were never exceeded, and


would have carried the point had it been pos
sible." General Burnside, good natured to q


fault, exonerates the Secretary Of War and the


General-in-Chief frem all responsibility for


changing the base from Warrenton to Fall


month"; and for the whole movement, which


Haleck left in his hands without giving him


orders.


All this is very good as between General


Burnside and the government and is q


matter solely for the consideration Of Mr..


Lincoln and his Cabinet Ii does not ex-


onerate from responsibility to the people


those who appointed General Burnside.
They had no proof that he was capable of
leading in battle IN army Of 10000 men.


Napols0n declared that none of his brilliant
marshals, with all the training they received at


his hands were fit to command even Io0,O00


men. General Burnside lad been in the artii-


!ery Of the United States for six years from


lS47 to 1853, having risen'to the rank Of first


lieutenant when he retired INTO private life


without seeing any active service. AT the bat


Of Bull run he commanded Rhode Island
regiment, and subsequently was appointed q
brgadier general of volunteers from the same
State when Mcclellan WAS Organizing the Army
Of the Potomac He was entrusted with the
command of the expeditions against Roanoke
Island, Newbern and Beaufort, all Of which
were successful. But the highest number Of
men under his command was 20 1000, and II
does not follow that he would be equally for
tunate with an army numbering fifty or seventy
five thousand men, much less that hc would be
equal to the task of commanding so large an
army as that which he hurled against the
enemy's intrenchments at fredericksburg ii is


true ne commanded wing Of the same army at
the battle of Antietam. But he did not there
particularly distinguish himself, and if he had
done SO it would still be no proof that he was
competent to manoeuyre the whole Of such an
army on another field against the ablest gene
rails of the South, much less that he was gifted
with that genius which could compel the enemy
TO fight under disadvantageous circumstances.
and render his defeat overwhelming and de-
cisive. Yet he was appointed to the command
of the whole army in place Of general who
had proved his skill in handling large armies
on many bloody field, and who, under the
most discouraging circumstances, had taken
hold of a demorallzed army just vanquishsd
under other gcneralship, and, without orders
led it to victory in two battles against the
lately triumphant foe. confident and flushed
with success, thus achieving the grand result Of
saving the capital from capture when Gene
raj Halleck supposed it az good as lost;
saving Maryland and Pennsylvania from
invasion. and compelling the rebels to
recross the Potomac, as the rebels have
now compelled Burnside to recross the
Rappahannock. Are not the Secretary Of War,
Secretary Chase, General HaIleck and other
advisers Of the President responsible for thia
hazardous change of generals which, in despite
Of the prestige Of q glorious victory, has re-
suited in disastrous defeat?


For the change Of base the War Department
and General Hallcck are equally responsible.
1t appears they had no plans of their own, and
it is stated by Burnside that they objected to
his plan, but yet allowed him TO carry il out
This was convenient arrangement. Ii Burn
side waS victorious they could take all the
credit: IL he was defeated they could make it
appear that they condemned his plan before
hand. Now this viii not do. When general
in-cbief removes general at the head Of an
army In the field he ought TO have a plan of
campaign ready for his successor: and if he
has not, and permits that OF the new gene
raj to be acted npon against his own judg-
meni. he cannot afterwards repudiate il and
escape responsibility. lie must share the
blows OF failure az well as the praise of sue
cess.


A. to the mode of fighting particular bat.
tie, that must be determined BY ihe general in
the field according t. circumstances But in
this particular case II 80 happens that the
Gencral-iuIhicf and the War Department
were az we'll acquainted ~ General Burn
side with the relative strength Of the two
coDtendng armies, and The nature Of the al
most impreguable Notifications which the neg.
lcct and delay at IIalieck aud Stanton In send
ing the ponfoons had permitted the rebels de-
libeyatcly TO erect. General Burnside visited
them al Washington Immediately before the
battle. and if they saw great danger in the at
tack upon the enemy in front they ought to
have given him caution against il. But there
is no evidence that they cautioned him on the
contrary. Judging from the peculiar military
ideas OF Mr.. Stanton. who despises all strategy
in planning battles and skill in fighting them,
IL s highly probable that he encouraged Burn
side 70 move upon The encIny's works.r If
Iialleck did not advise Burnside against at
tempting what the latter describes as "impossi-
bic then i is clear thai some other general
in-chief is needed IS Washington. If. on the
other hand. Halleck did caution burnside. then
some other general is wanted for The Army of