Year: 1867

at the same time the relations of each
to the other should be so strong that


there should be a mutual interest to
sustain and protect each other. There
| should not only be constitutional
encroachments of one or either of the
others. Thus, ambition would be made
to counteract ambition; the desire of
power to check power; and the pressure
of interest to balance an opposing in
terest." 1.-The judiciary is naturally,
and almost necessarily, (as has been
already sRid,l the weake est department.
1t can have no means of influence by
patronage. Its powers can never be
welded for itself. 1t has no command
over the purse or the sword of the ma
ton. 1t can neither lay taxes, nor APP
or appoint to office. 1t is never brought
into contact with the people by constant
appeals and solicitations, and private
intercourse, which belong TO all the
other departments OF the govern
ment. II is seen only in con-
troversies, or in trials and pun
ishments. Its rigid justice and i'm
partiality give il no claims to favor,
however they may to respect. 1t islands
solitary and unsupported, except by
that portion of public opinion which is
interested only in the strict administra-
tioC of justice. 1t can rarely secure the
sympathy or Jealous support either of
the executive or the legislature. If they
are not (as is not unfreq 1entlY the case)
jealous of its prerogatives, the constant
necessity of scrutinizing the acts of
each, upon the application of any pri-
vate person, and the painful duty of
pronounclngj judgment that these acts
are departure from the law or Consti-
tuition, can have no tendency to concil-
fnN Ii RWNaE IL =, Vs
would seem, therefore, that some addi-
tional guards would, under such cir
cumstances, be necessary to protect this
department from the absolute dominion
of the others. Yet rarely have any
such guards been applied; and every
attemptto introduce them has been re-
sisted with pertinacity which demon
strates how slow popular leaders are to
Introduce checks upon their own pow
er, and how slow the people are to be-
lieve that the judiciary is the real bull
wark of their liberties" "If any de-
partment of the Government has undue
influence, or absorbing power, it GER
tainly has not been either the executive
or judiciary"


In addition to what has been said by
these distinguished writers, it may also
be urged that the dominant party in
each House may, by the expulsion of "A
sufficient number of members, or by
the exclusion from representation of n
requisite number of States reduce the
minority to less than one-third. Con-
gress, by these means, might be enabled
TO pass a law, the objections of the
President TO the contrary notwithstand
ing, which would render impoteut the
other two Departments of the Govern
ment, and make imperative the whole
some and restraining power which it
was intended by them. This would be
practical concentration of all power
in the Congress of the United States
this, in the language of the author of
the Declaration ofIndependence, would


be precisely the definition of despotic
Government"


1 have preferred to reproduce these
teachings of the great statesmen and
constitutional lawyers of the early and
later days of the Republic, rather than
to rely simply upon an expression of
my own opinions. We cannot too
often recur to them, especially at "A con-
Juncture like the present. Their uppli-
cation to our actual condition is so APP
parent, that they now come to us as a
living voice, to be listened TO with more
attention than at any previous period
of our history. We have been and are
yet in the midst of popular commotion.
The passions aroused by great civil
war are still dominant. 1t is not time
favorable to that calm and deliberate
judgment which is the only safe guide
when radical changes in our institu-
lions are to be made. The measure
now before me is one of those changes.
1t initiates an untried experiment, for
people who have said, with one voice,
that il is not for their good. This alone
should make us pause; but it is not all.
The experiment has not been tried, or
SO much as demanded by the people o
the several States for themselves. In
but Jew of the States has such an inno-
vation been allowed as giving the ballot
TO the colored population without any
other qualification Than II residence of
one year, and in most of them the denial
of the ballot to this race is absolute, and
by fundamental law placed beyond the
domain of ordinary legislation. In
most of those States the evil of such
suffrage would be partial; but, small as
1t would be, ii is guarded by constitu-
tional barriers. Here the innovation
assumes formidable proportions, which
may easily grow to such an extent as
TO make the white population subor-
dinate element in the body polite.


Alter full deliberation upon this
measure, cannot bring myself TO np-
prove 1t even upon local considerations,
nor yet as the beginning of an expert
ment of larger scale. yield TO no
one in attachment to that rule of gem
eral suffrage which distinguishes our
policy as a nation. But there is limit,
wisely observed hitherto, which makes
the ballot privilege and a trust, and
which requires of some classes time
suitable for probation and preparntion.
To give it indiscriminnteIy to new
class, wholly unprepared, by previous
habits and opportunities, to perform
the trust which IL demands, Is to de-
grade it, and finally to destroy its pow
err for 1t may be safely assumed that
no political truth is better established
than that such iDdiscriminHte and all
embracing extension of popular suf-
frage must end at last in its destruc.
ton. ANDREW JOHNSON.


Washington, January 5, 1867.