Year: 1868

the reconstruction acts of the I'd and 23d
March, 1867, "upon which Mr.. Stanton stood
| alone in the cabinet. and the difference of
opinion could not be reconciled."


These are the "public considerations of
high character" stated in the note of August
D, which was a request for the resignation of
the secretary, and which led to his suspension
auG subsequent removal, to prevent his re-
sumlng the duties of his Office after the action
| of the Senate.


When before in the history of the govern
| ment did President hold that difference of
opinion" of cabinet officer as to the policy of
a law of Congress, or its constitutionalitV
or the propriety of its enforcement. were
"publc considerations of high character"
which not only constrained" him to request
his resignation of Office" but to suspend him
and defeated in that by the adverse action OF
the Senate, ito renlOUe him, to prevent him
from resuming the duties of the office" 1t is
certain that differences of opinion lin the cab
met" are not unknown in our history, as to
the expedIeney, the policy, and the inteEpreta-
ton of laws; that they were marked in the
cabinet of Washington, and that they were not
supposed and were not held to be "publc con-
siderations" of a character demanding removal
from office.


The present case is especially noticeable, from
the fact, of public notoriety as well a. declar-
ed in the Presidents answer and message, that
the"difierenee OfOpinion" complained OF Wasthat
views of the Secretary of War were in harmony
WIFI JuOSt Vi COIBTtsS upon tut dCto ulChblOh-
ed, while those of the President were opposed,
as had been expressed in his veto message, and
the I'd faculties" from arising such differences
OF opinion" and which could only be solved by
suspension and removal from office, were such
are publicly known to have arisen on the
question of the execution of the reconstruction
acts of March and %.


1t is'observable that no public exigency is
stated by the President to have arisen de-
manding action in Mr.. StantoDs case; no mall
Off
ence of, or refusal or neglect to obey orders OF
the President if alleged or suggested. Besides,
the Senate had been recently In session, since
the relation and difference of opinion had de-
veloped, in two different periods affording
ample opportunity for the appointment Of
his successor, if the public interests demanded
u change Of that officer and were of charac-
ter to commend themselves to that body.


Some stress has been laid upon the want Of
confidence" in the Secretary, which would
not permit a resort to him for advice, and
rendered it unsafe that the President should
be responsible for his official conduct.


1t is difficult to appreciate the importance
which seems to be attached to this statement.
The Secretary of War is certainly not the con-
stitutional adviser of the President in his gen.
eral administration, nor is the President enti-
tied TO his opinion, except in the case contem-
platon OF the Constitution, and that upon af-
fairs arising in his own department. and in re-
lation thereto.


Nor is it obvious what il intended by the
statement in the answer about being responsible
for his conduct of the affairs Of the Depart
ment of War.


What is the nature of this supposed respon-
sibllity, and how imposed? We are not in
formed in the answer No such responsibility
is understood to be imposed by the Constitu-
tion, and none is believed to exist in the laws
creating the Department OF War and defining
the duties of the Secretary of War.


By no proVisiCn of the Constitution or laws
is it believed that the President is chargeable
with the consequences of any misconduct or
neglect of duty of that officer with which he
himself is not connected.


The Secretary and he alone must answer TO
the violated law for his misconduct and neg
lect OF duty, and the assumption that the Pres
ident is responsible for them is to assume that
the War Department is under the direction
and at the discretion of the President and not
under the statute creating it, and by@which it
is conducted.


1t is difficult to believe that in the suspen-
sion and consequent removal of Mr.. STAN
ton the President was actuated solely by pub
lie considerations" and especially does he fail
to make it clear that he was acting on the
pressure of Il state necessity or public exigen-
cy which justified him in first experimenting
with a law Of Congress by suspending pub
liza officer under it, and falling of his declared
purpose in that, namely, "to cause him TO sur
render his" Office, then TO defy its authority by
disregarding it altogether, and remove the Of
ficer SO suspended contessedy to prevent his





verse action of the Senate upon the case sub
mitted to it for its consideration.


The doubts which are invoked to shield the
President fail to protect him, as he fails to
to show any cause or public necessity for the
exercise of a doubtful power under the Consti-
tuition and laws, while his official conduct
plainly shows spirit of hostility to the whole
series of acts of Congress designed for the re-
construction Of the late insurrectionary States
and the pacificatOn of the country, and an
intent TO obstruct rather than faithfully to ex-
ecute these laws.


II, therefore, doubts arise on the record, they
belong to the country and to the violated
laws, and presumption OF innocence cannot
obtain where the sinister purpose is apparent.
1t is impossible to withhold conviction of the
Presidents guilt under the articles presented
by the House of Representatives for usurpa-
tions of power not delegated by the Constitu-
ton and tor violation and obstruction of the
laws of the land, and that he is guilty OF high
crimesand misdemeanors in Office, which, as
remedy for the present disorders which afiict
the nation consequent upon them, and for the
future security against the abuse of executive
authority, demand, in harmony with the pro-
visions of the Constitution, his removal from
office