Year: 1863

DA OhAN " NV y


Mcclellan and His Assaila nts-Thc Hitch


ssck Lcster.


One Of the most extraordinary documents
that has been put forth in connection with
any judicial or military investigation is the let
ter from General Hitchcock which we publish
ed yesterday. The impropriety Of such COM
munication to public journal, pending the re-
suit Of an inquiry, whose decision, it is to DO
assumed would set to rights any errors com
mitted by newspaper reporters, Is SO evident
that II needs no comment. The inference to
which it must lead in every unbiased mind Is
that the writer seeks to anticipate by 1t the con-
illusions to be deduced from the evidence.


But there is another point Of view from
which this letter is TO be regarded and which
renders its impropriety still more marked.
Judged from military standard, the assump-
tions Of the writer are not defensible for mo-
meat Although implicit obedience is the 6rst
duty of the colder. L s mot arbitrarily the duty
Of the general. The commander who does not
know how 70 disobey his Instructions, whore
the safety Of his army is concerned, or great
advantages are to be gained by his aisresard
Of them. q unit for his position Even Napo-
leon, whose Ysst military genius and sieeploss
vigilance left but little to the discretion of his
generals, did not pretend 70 80 wholly control
circumstances as to deny them q certain lati-
tude of judgment. Wellington gained some Of
his most important military successes by disre-
garding the orders Of the English War Office, and
Nelson won ono Of his greatest naval triumphs
by pretending not to see the signal Of the Ad-
miral under whose command he was placed.


To assume, then. that general in McClsl-
lan's position, and with the responsibility that
he owed the country, should have stopped short
in his movements on technical scruples, and
after complying substantially with the require
meats Of the President, is simply ridiculous.
The evidence given before the Mcdowell Court
Of Inquiry shows that both in regard to men
and artillery he had every reason to conclude
that the defence of Washington had been
abundantly provided for. 1t is owing to such
pettifogging soldiership as that displayed in
General Hitchcock's lettcr that the war has
been carried on up to the present time with
such unsatisfactory results, and that it now
leaves US almost without hope of speedy or
successful termination.


Let US just glance back at the facts ofits man
agement from the period when, after his brilliant
campaign in Western Virginia, Mcclellan was
first called to Washington, and We shall see
how unfounded are the assumptions that any
Of the failures that have attended our arms are
attributable to his bad generalship or want of
foresight. On his arrival in the capital, where
he was summoned by the advice of General
Scott, he was asked to give in bis plans for the
suppression of tho rebellion. He did 80, and
stated it as his opinion that it would require an
army of at least $50, 600 men, with proportion
ate naval force, to bring the war to speedy and
successful conclusion. He was laughed at for
this estimate, and his views disregarded He
was again consulted in October, and his reply
was that not only would the full amount Of the
force previously stated be required, but that
certain other plans Of organization would have
to be adopted. These conditions fulfilled, he
confidently counted on being able to Garry the
enemys position at Manassas, and to reduce
the rebels to submission by the lst, or at all
events, by the end of December. These views
were overruled in the Cabinet, and more time
lost. The radicals now induced the President
to take the direction Of the military operations
into his own hands. Under pressure from them,
he gave orders for simultaneous advance
of the federal armies on the 22d Of
February. Then the military plans Of Nc
Clellan, which had been arranged with the
federal commanders oil over the country, we're
attempted to be carried out under the orders of
the President; but, as was to be expected, from
their premature development and from the
want Of sufficient force to put them in execu-
ton simultaneously, defect that Mcclellan
did his best to guard against, they were at.
tended with but partial success. We gained, it
is true, series of victories out West; bat they
were Of small account from not being under
taken in accordance with the general plan of
operations, which was botched and defeated by
the interference of the President and the Secre-
tary of War. The modification and disappoint-
ment caused by this failure eliminated in a
grand smashing up of the plans of Mcclellan,
who has ever since been made scapegoat by
the radicals for the consequences Of their own
incapacity and blundering.


1t was the endeavors to prevent a similar in
reference with and Illustration of his plans on
the occasion of his setting out for the peninsula
that furnished to the radical clique Of which
General Hitchcock is such subservient instru-
ment, the opportunity for this fresh attack upon
hin, Coparal McClallan's owu avidapca and
that of General Barry, have disposed Of the as
sertions of both Hitchcock and Wadsworth as
to the insuficiency Of the defences Of Washing
ton on that occasion. II is impossible to mis-
take the animus by which these two latter Of
icers and those with whom they are associated
are actuated. Hatred Of Mcclellan, and de-
termination to-ruin him, are the influences by
which they have been guided throughout the
whole of this inquiry. They could not have