Year: 1859

only this part of the battlefield and would be in


complete were l not to tell you what happened on


the other side, at the village of Magenta itself As


L explained before, while the Division of the Gren-


adlers OF the Guard and Zouaves attacked the front


OF the position at Ponte di Magenta and Buffalora


General McMahon, now Due de Magenta and Mare
t" oe france, received the order to advance, with


Ine DIVISIONS Esplnasse, La Motterouge, and the


al'lslon OF the Chasseurs Pied and Fusiliers de
la Garde from Turbigo, and take the Austrians


Posted at Magenta in their right flank and rear.


ln support OF TINS force was the Sandman army of


Whlch several divisions had already passed the I'll


emo at Turbigo. From this latter place to Maren-


Ia there are on the shortest road more than -


miles. 1t is only by-road branching off from the


nam road leading from Turbigo toward the latter.


on most places not more than sufficient to allow


two carriages to pass each other. The country on


both sides of it is much more thicklv wooded Than
the other side of the Tcino, and extensively plant


ed with Vineyards. was obliged to draw your at
tentlon to this, in order to show the Gificultv
which existed for body of men like the division
OF the Guards, from 27,000 to &c, 900 stronp. to
march II miles the battle field You will now


better understand this difficulty, if tell you that


the division of the Fusileers and Chasseurs of the


Guard, which formed the reserve started at 7 A. M.
from Turbigo, and could not take part in the bat


tie before r NJ, while the arant- garde of the Sar-
dlnlan army, formed of the Division Fanti did not


reach the battlefield till P. NJ, too late to take


any part IN the action. 1t was noon before a
sufhelent number of troops had come I'D to emo ore
the enemy As you know, the attack on the other
W Wag
ordered for 10 A. NJ, but could not take place till
noon, when the guns were heard toward the left
front, in the direction of Marcello.


81 spoke with an Austrian field officer who took
Appointment part in the action, was wounded and
taken prisoner. He says the Austrians had no idea
OF an attack on their right flank from Turbipo -
In general, during the whole campaign, the great
difficulty they had to contend with was want Of in
telllgence OF the movements of the Allies. Meth
er money nor threats could induce the country peo
pie to divulge anything, while, on the other side
such was the vigilance of the Allies that spies were
almost of no use. Thus it came that they never
could make out where the chief force of the Allies
was, and how far they had advanced with their
preparations. This explains, likewise, the vague
lncertltude which puzzled all Europe so much
Ihey mad nothing to go upon, and were obliged To
feel their way about like blind men-irst toward
lurin, and then toward the Po and beyond it. The
result was, that while they complained of the ride
ulous inactivity of the Allies, these latter concen-
trated their forces the left of their ne and the
Austrans knew only where the danger threatened
when they saw the Allies enter Novara and appear
on the llclno Then 1T too late. They left
indeed, their position fast as they could evacua
ted Mortara, and abandoned the Pc line; but they
could no longer concentrate their army in time to
defend the line of the Tcino and keep the Allies out
OF LHmDardy. They brought up in all haste what
ever they could collect, and posted it at Magenta
and the canal, which forms a second and almost
more formidable line of defence than the Ticino it.
self.





most, and although they almost killed their soldiers
with marching, they could only bring up a portion
of the lst (Clam). Sd (Schwarzenberg), I'd Lich-
tensteinl and the 7th (Zobel) corps d'araee How
great this portion was it is impossible to saw with
certainty; it is estimated here at 100 900 men and
certainly, from the number of regiments which are
represented among the prisoners one must be in
clined to think that from TO- 900 to So 900 men must
nave been in the neighborhood of Magenta They
were commanded by Gen. Clam whose CORPS had
lately come from Bohemia but had not entirely ar
rived; for instance of the ~ guns which it ought
to have, not more than eighteen were there. But
ths was not OF much Importance because the ground
admits only very limited use of artillery There
was likewise division of cavalry present but il
never appeared ON the foreground But Gvulai
and Hess were present, but had nothing TO do with
the command. The precipitation with which the
troops were brought up did not admit of their be-
ing properly taken care of; so that, besides the
faflgue, they had to endure hunger, which was an
additional source of weakness to them And it was
TINS last circumstance which must have told most.
Tor, as regards marching, the French and Sardi-
mans have done surely more in the last ten days
and the very corps of the Due de Magenta had to
make long march in the scorching sun before ar
irving on the field of battle


In complete ignorance of the movements of the
Allies, and doubly deceived by the inactivity toward
IurbIgo, and the demonstration toward Buffalora
the Austrans prepared for the attack on this latter
side When the thing came to the test, it was
louho that the tete de Pont formed the Sandman



structed that attempting to hold it would have
merely led to the sacrifice of the troops encased
there 1t was, therefore, determined to abandon it,
and blow up the stone bridge of BuffaIora Tbn
hve battalions which occupied the ete de pont were
Withdrawn on the night of the 1st-2d and an at
tempt was made to blow up the bridge, which, as
you know, failed. The solid blocks of granite re-
sisted the small quantity of powder. This seems
not TO have been the fault of the engineers so much
as OF the general direction of the whole campaion
the Austrlans seem to have been so sure of their
success that they never thought of retreat and did
not prepare themselves for the continpencv of hav
ing to blow up the bridges. There was no blasting
powder at hand, and so little ammunition to spare
that II the whole amount which was found had been
taken out OF the cartridges, it would not have
to six cwt.


''The commander teepraphed to Milan for blastinp
powder, which might have been sent up from Milan
and the answer returned was that there was none.
ms was the reason that the stone bridge over the
Ticino could only be shaken and the two bridres
over the canal at Ponte NuovO di Magenta are not
injured at all. The chambers were prepared bu.
there was no powder to put into them. As the DO
siton in front Of the bridge was of great strength
1T was determined to defend it, and not DREAMING
OF an attack from the right the line of battle of the
Austrians went from Buffalora through Ponce d
Magenta toward Robecco, as nearly as possible
parallel to the Ticino and the caaal with the re-
serves in the village Of Magenta. The only force
toward the road coming from Turbigo was battal-
ion which occupied of the large isolated cascines
or farms to the right of the road, behind the village
OF Marcello. This was more with the view of obser-
valon than OF resistance. The advance of the Gren-
adlers from Ponte di Buffaora at TO- or about two
hours before the column of Marshal Mcmahon
showed itself on the road from Turbgo was calcu-
lated to leave them in their original error and tbey
massed their troops so as to meet this column and
crush 1t. After showing ITSELF this column as vou |
will remember received orders to halt in order to
give time to the other column to arrive and it was
only when the of the latter was heard that it
defnitivey advanced.


In ta of its
have succeeded in taking this formidable position |
on the canal had not the advance of the thanking
column obliged the Austrans to make front against |
this unexpected enemy. They had to lead back
their right wing so that their left wing rested at
Robecco; the village of Magenta formed their GEN.
tire, and Corbetto their right wing. The troops
which had been ordered forward to defend the DO
sition at the canal had to go back and take up
position In front and to the right of the village of
Magenta


"ln order to have clear idea of this new dispo-
'ltion, you must keep in mind the three roads
hat from Buffalora to Magenta running nearly due
east, the man road to Milan, coming from Ponte
Nuovo dl Magenta to Magenta and the railway
Inc, which. after having passed the canal leads to
The left, and intersecting the two roads, passes to
the western side of the village Magenta The rail
way line plays even greater part in this part of
The battle than on the other; it was the line on
which the Austrians received Marshal McMahon's
attack. The station-house a considerable building
and the village ITSELF formed the point dappui for
'ue AustTlan centre, Wnlcn extended along the rail
way far the point of intersection of this latter
With the high road The right wing was based on
he advanced post of the farmhouse, to the
light OF the road from Turbigo, which mentioned
before.


Gas soon as the Due de Magenta's corps had come
he formed it in line of BATTLE far as the ground
placing the first division to the left aud
the second to the right some artillery on the mar
row road, and the Fusileers and Chasseurs de la
Garde as reserves, he advanced boldly against the
position. a pama
within sight of the enemy. had to extend itself
through the fields and vineyards. The ground is
so full of these latter and trees that the line could
not advance in compact order, but had to take to
more loose formation between the skirmisbinr line
and the regular order of BATTLE The farmhouse in
advance became the object of murderous fight
The enemy had concentrated a considerable mass of
troops around and in it, and against this the 2nd
Regiment OF the FOREIGN Legion was sent who at
.acked it with great elan. The enemy, who saw |
himself In danger of losing this point d appui for
1is right wing, sent column to the right to out
1ank tins body and, if possible, to cut it off The
oardnans were to have been to the left as reserve,
as well as to guard against any such movement and
then likewise to try and envelope the Austrian
right wing and rear, and thus to it off from its
line of retreat. Owing as said before, to the diff
iculties of the narrow road they had not been
able to come up in time, and the result that |
the I'd Regiment of the Foreign Legion suffered a
good deal.


at was however, ,extrcated from this position by
a timely advance of reserve. As soon as this was
done, the whole line advanced, pressing back the
enemys troops step by step, 1t was all along a |
hand-to-hand fight with rife and bayonet. Except |