Year: 1868

Our news from day to day is full of strange
contradictions as to the condition and relations
OF the various nations of Europe On every
great public occasion we have from imperial
royal or ministerial lips assurances of peace ::
but on all hands and in every nation on the
Continent war preparations are being conducted
on scale of magnifcence and with a rapidity
which are almost, II not entirely, without prece-
dent even in warlke times. 1t is true that since
the close Of the late Continental war, which
ended so unsatisfactory both for France and
Austria, the war alarm has often been very
unnecessarily raised. Somehow the public
seem to have felt convinced that another more
general and more conclusive war was neces-
sary before the nations could settle down into
condition of permanent quiet War was
bound to break out in the spring of 1867 but
spring has come and gone, summer, autumn
and winter have followed, and now. in the
summer of 1868, European war seems
just as probable and just as improbable
as it has been at any time these last
twelve months. The two nations of Europe
between whom war is most likely to break out
are France and Prussia. France and Prussia


however, are ostensibly on the best of terms.
That they are jealous and watchful of each
other no one can deny. Still, their present re-
latons are friendly, and it is difficult to see on
what pretext war could be got up. We are
quite satisfied that had Napoleon been younger
the difficulty of finding decent pretext would
have been easily got over. But Napoleon is
not so young as he once was, and that makes
the difference. The mind of the Emperor is
more bent on making the succession of his son
a certainty and success, than on winning
laures on the field of battle. He is arming
France to the teeth, but this is less for the
purpose of carrying war into the territories of
his neighbors than for the purpose of having
France fully prepared for any emergency.
France was not prepared to encounter Prussia
at the time of the Luxembourg difficulty.
France is better prepared now but it is not to
be forgotten that Prussia, too, has waxed
mightier and more powerful in the inter
val. 1t is our decided conviction that
Prussia will not court war, for the simple reason
OIdt suc mas uotuluS w gam eVcH Ill tue oNcue
of success and much to lose in the event of
defeat. What Prussia does want is to make
Germany unit, and time and peace, as Count
Bismarck limited few days ago, are more
likely to secure this result than war. 1t is
equally our conviction that France will not
court war, for the reason that war would be
more damaging than otherwise to Napoleon's
succession plans. The truth is that the future
of the French throne, involving as it does the
chances of Napoleon's son, the chances Of the
now united Bourbons, the chances of the re-
publicans, is already becoming in France and
throughout Europe much more important
question than that of peace or war. The vast
war preparations may be turned to terrible
account in the future but in the meantime,
expensive and unjustiiable as they are, they
do not threaten war. There is nothing in the
condition of any of the other nations of Eu-
rope to encourage us to modify this opinion.