Year: 1862

0en. MctlcHan, n Hak Snail pe u0ne-t0t-
low up The enemy's retreat, and push
sgainst him with the whole army Of the Po-
tomac, or shall the attack be made from
Yorktownf- On this question there was =
diyisionAhe preponderance being I'M,
mensely in favor Of q rapid march upon the
rear Of the flying foe. Unfortunately for
the interests ofthe country, Gen. McC Clellan,
upon whose word the turn of the question
depended, decided for the small minority,
and the Peninsu1ar campaign was organ
lied On the spot Those who held views
adverse to his, used to him language like
this:


The enemy are routed and flying.
Pushed vigorously they cannot halt until
their inHenchments at Richmond are
reached; and when you have got within
striking distance Of them, you have the
whole Of the army OF the Potomac at your
command, save always the few thousand
necessary for the defense Of Washington
As you advance, you will drive before you
every man from the valley Of the shenan-
doah, and as well as the numerous squads
that for months past have been squatted
on the banks ofthe Potomac. Your forces
will be massed, it is true, but so will be
your attacking force. With the greater
courage, discipline and patriotism Of your
men, with your splendid equipment and
extraordinary supply Of artillery, you can
not fail to win. If the columns under
your command are too cumbersome, it is
easy to Withdraw from actire operations q
reserve Of say $4,000, which, when
the struggle comes, may decide the day.
Again, you with 3 splendid army, will be
between the enemY's front and the point
at which he is aiming-Washington; and
in the event Of disaster, which cannot be
reasonably anticipated. you may have 8
secure base upon which to fall back On
the other hand, if you go by Yorktown,
the army must necessarily be divided.
You cannot hope to strip Washington of
all defenses to aid you in q flank move
ment. The country would cry out against
such q policy; because it is obvious
that with the enemy between you and
Washington, the capital would be in in1mi-
nent danger. The destruction Of the na-
tional archives, the dispersion Of Congress
and the Cabinet and the sack of the city,
are objects Of too much Importance to be
neglected by the shrewd tacticians who do
the rebel thinking, when there is q chance
for their accomplishment. So if you go to
the peninsula be sure that force adequate
to the defense Of the Shenandoah, for the
occupation Of the line Of the Rappalan-
mock, and for the internal quiet Of
Washington, must be left behind you.
Thus this army will be divided, and when
you strike you do so with diminished force,
without adequate reserves and from q
point behind which you have no safe line
Of retreat, in the event Of a serious check
The men left behind you will be virtually
unemployed. While you are toiling in the
swamps, in want Of all the available
strength that can be given you, forty
thousand men between Washington
and Richmond will be sucking
their thumbs in idlenesz, and moth
ing which threatens you will bring
them to your aid, because as soon as they
leave their post, the old difficulty and the
old cry, " Washington is in danger" will
arise again. Soyou are virtually throwing
away a1l that Rapahannock column
throwing 1t away at moment when its
employment is vital to the national cause
Add to these facts others growing out Of
the unhealthfulness Of the Peninsula for
Northern troops, and the certainty that
you will find heavy works to carry By
storm, and you have abundant reasons
why you should hasten on in the line of
the rebels retreat and leave the frogs in
the swamps IN the Peninsular marshes un-
disturbed


unfortun ately, We say, these arguments,
based On the obvious facts of the situation
the eogency Of which any civilian will
recognize BY reference to the map-wcre
without their expected effect. a council
ofwa1, composed Of. the subordinates of the
Commander-in-C Chief, every one Of whom
hoped fer his favor in receiving advance
ment, sustained the decision which
General Mcclellan had already made,
and in spite Of the urgent remon-
stances Of the best minds Of the cap,
ital, the movement upon Yorktown was
undertaken. 1t is now easy to see that the
reasons, a part Of which VIC have briefly
stated, we're sound, and that in not yield
ing to their force great mistake has been
made This, in military circles, is ad
uitted.


We have no desire in pointing out these
facts to blame Gen. Mcclellan for doing a;
he has done, We write only to diminist
public expectation Of speedy results from
the campaign in that quarter, and to abatt
the eagerness of the country for a quick dis
peIsion Of the rebel army. The events fore
told have happened as they were predicted
The contest since Yorktown vas beseiged
has been one waged at great cost Of life
We are not at liberty to say how strong thu
army was with which Gen. Mcclellan
went down the Potomac; but We may sa,
That sickness and the casualties Of the bat
tic field hare weakened it to such degree
That reinfcrcements arc now loudly cal1et
ter. Time has been gwen the rebels tt
call in all their available strength
McDowelfs force vas an inert mass thai
held nothing in cleek-and advanced
nohody's purpose. It protected Washing.
ton, and might as well have been behind
the Garth works which surrounded that
city as where it was. 1t was not strong
enough to strike. twas no support to Nc
Cle1lan, because it was not withing reach
ing distance. If menaced in front, it could
only fall back. Our army in the Shenan
doah, cut up into squads, has thus fal
proved itself capable Of nothing more thar
defeat the weak divisions being
beaten in detail by foe which i:
greatly inferior to our aggregate strength
So our readers will see that the campais1
as ii now stands is only repetition Of tht
old folly Of snbdividing our force when i
might operate as mass Mcclellan i,
under bonds for the observance Of extra
ordinary caution, because if he is beAten
his army, full thirty miles from It's trans
ports, must be in good part destroyed AM
he is right to move slowly. With him on
OF the way, q push would be made 3