Year: 1861




raj, ii it is abolition which is municipaI and local


then, upon the avowed doctrines of our onnononts


two things follow: lst. That slavery goes Of rrbt


and matter of course, into every terrifory


from which it is not excluded by positive statute


and, I'd. That Congress is competent to forbid the
Northern States from impressing their local pecu


liarity of non slaveholding upon the common soil


of the Union. II the Republican argument is good


for anything, it goes the whole length of excluding


for ever any additional non slaveholdng States


from the Union. What would they think, if the
South had taken any such extravagant ground as


thlsY What would they have done, if the South


had taken advantage of a numerical majority, to


egisate them and their institutions for ever out of
the common territory? Would they have submit
ted! Would they have glorifed the Union, and
Yielded to the triumph of slavery? We know that
they would not. They would have scorned the
crotchet about municipal and local laws which di-
vested them OF their dearest rights. Let them
give the same measure to others which they
expect from others. 1t is a noble maxim,
done by.


! The South has neither asked for, nor does she
desire, any exclusive benefits. All she demands is,
that as South, as slaveholding she shall be put
| upon the same footing with the North, as non
| slavehoding-that the Government shall not un-
dertake to say, kind of States is better than the
| other-that it shall have preference as to the
character, in this respect, of any future States to
| be added 10 the Union. Non-slaveholding may be
superior to slavehodng, but it is not the place of
the Government to say so; much less to assume the
right OF saying so upon principle which, proper
| ly applied, requires it to say the very reverse.
| There is another sense in which municipal is OPP
posed to international, and in this sense, slavery is
said to be municipal because there is no obligation


by the law of nations, on the part of States in
which slavery is prohibited, to respect within the


limits of their own territory the rights of the for
eign Shareholder This is the doctrine laid down
| by Judge Story. No nation is bound to accord to
stranger right of property which it refuses to
| its own subjects. We can not, therefore, demand
! from the Governments of France or England, or
| any other foreign power, whose policy and inter
ests are opposed to slavery, the restoration of
our fugitives from bondage. We willing to
| concede, tor the sake of the argument, that the
principle in question is admitted principle of in
ternational law, though we quite persuaded
that 1t is contrary 10 the whole current of CONT
| mental authorities, and is intensely English. We
doubt whether, even in England, it can be traced
| beyond the famous decision of Lord Mansfield, in
the case ot Somerset But let US admit the prin-
| cple. What then? Tho Constitution of the Uni.
ted States has expressly provided that this prin-
epie shall not apply within the limits of
Federal Jurisdiction With reference to this coun-
try, it has abrogaed the law; every State is bound
to respect the right of the Southern master to his
| slave. The Constitution covers the whole territory
| OF the Union, and throughout that territory has
taken slavery, under the protection of law. Hew-
ever foreign nations NAY treat fugitive slaves,
| the States of this Conederacy are bound to treat
! them as property, and to give them back to their
| lawful owners. How idle, therefore, to plead a
| principle of international law, which in reference
to the relations of the States of this Union, is for
mally abolished Slavery is clearly part of the
municipal law of the United States and the whole
argument from the local character of the institu-
ton, falls to the ground. Slaveholding and non
slavehoiding are both equally sectional, and both
equally national.


(2.) As to the allegation that the Constitution no
where recognizes the right of property in slaves.
that is equally unfounded We shall say nothing
here of the decision of the Supreme Court, though
that, would think, is entitled to consider
alton. We shall appeal to the Constitution ITSELF
and if there is force in logic, we shall be able to
make it appear that the right is not only recognized
but recognized with philosophical accuracy and
precision that seize only the essential, and omit
the variable and accidental. The subject, in the
language of the Constitution, is transferred from
the technicaties of law to the higher sphere of ab
stract and speculative morality. Morally consid-
cred, to what class does the slave belong? To the
class of persons held to service. The two ideas that
he is person. and as person, held to service,
stitute the generic conception of slavery. How is
his obligation to service fundam entally derenced
from that of other laborers? By this, as one es-
sential circumstance that it is Independent of the
formalities of contract. Add the circumstance that
it is for life, and you have complete conception
of the thing. You have the very definition, almost
| in his own words which celebrated English phi
losopher gives of slavery 81 define slavery" says
Dr. Paley, s'to be an obligation to labor for the
benefit of the master, without the contract or con-
sent of the servant"


Now, is such obligation recognized in the Con-
stitution of the United States Are there persons
spoken ofin it, who are held to service by a claim
| so sacred that the Government allows them, how
ever anxious they may be to do so, to dissolve it
| neithersby stratagem nor force? If they away,
! they must be remanded to those who entitled
to their labor, even if they escape to a territory
whose local laws would otherwise protect them. If
| they appeal to force the whole power of the Union
may be brought to crush them. Can any say
| that the Constitution does not here recognize a
! right to the labor and service Of men, of persons
which springs from no stipulatons of their own, is
| eLitrey independent OF their OWE CONSENT, and
which can never be annulled by efforts whether
ciandestine or open, their part? This IS sidUery
it is the very essence and core of the institution
| That upon which the right of property terminates
in the slave, is bis service labor. 1t is not his
SOUL not his person, not his moral and intellectual
nature-t is his labor. This is the thing which is
bought and sold in the market, and it is in conse-
quence of the right to regulate, control and direct
this, that the person comes under obligation to
| obey. The ideas of right on one side and duty
the other, show that the slave, in this relation
| is truly person his master. The Constitu-
ti0n therefore, does recognize and protect slavery,
in every moral and ethical feature of it. The thing
| which, under that name, has commanded the ap-
| probation of mankind, is the very thing, among
others analogous to it, included in the third clause
| of the second section of the fourth chapter of
! the Constitution. We see way of getting round
this argument. 1t is idle to say that slaves
not referred tot is equally idle to saw that
the right their labor is not respected and guard
! ed. Let this right be acknowledged in the terri
| tories, and we not disposed to ring changes
! upon words. Let the Government permit the
South to carry her persons held to service, with
out their consent, into the territories and let the
right to their labor be protected, and there would
| be no quarrel about slavery. 1t is unworthy of
statesmen, in matter of this sort, to quibble
about legal technicalites. That the law of slave
| holding States classes slaves among chatteIs and
| speaks of them marketable commodities does
not imply that morally and ethically, they are not
persons, nor that the property is in them, rather
than in their toll. These same laws treat them in
| other respects persons, and speak of their SER
vice as obedience or duty. The meaning Of chat
tel is relative, and it is to be restricted to the rela
| tiOn which it implies.


! We are happy to find that the Supreme Court of
the United States has fully confirmed the interpre-
tation which we have given to this clause of the
| Constitution. In the case of Prigg the Com
| monwealth of Pennsylvania, it was asserted by
every Judge upon the Bench, that the design of
the provision "to to the citizens of the
slayeholdng States the complete right and title of
ownership in their slaves, as property, in every
! State in the Union into which they might escape
| from the State where they were held in servitude"
| These the very words of Mr.. Justice Story in
| delivering the opinion of the Court. He went on
to add: '"rhe full recognition of this right and
title was indispensable to the security of this spe-
ces of property in all the saveholding States; and,
indeed was so vital to the preservation of the do
mestic interests and institutions that it cannot be
doubted that it constituted fundamental article


without the adoption of which the Union could
not have been formed" Again: "We have said
that the clause contains positive and unqualified
recognition of the right of the owner in the slave"
| Chief Justice fancy held that ''by the national
compact this right of property is recognized as an
existing right in every State OF the Union" Judge
| Thompson said the Constitution ''affirms, in the
| most unequivocal manner, the right of the master
to the service of his slave according to the laws of
the State under which he is so held" Judge
Wayne affirmed that all the Judges concurred Gin
the declaration that the provision in the Constitu-
tion a compromise between the slaveholding
and the non-slavehoding States, to secure to the
former fugitive slaves as property" ''The para
mount authority of this clause in the Constitution.
| says Judge Daniel ''to guarantee to the owner the
right of property in his slave, and the absolute nul
| hty of any State power, directly or indirectly,
openly coyertly, aimed to impair that right, or
to Obstruct its enjoyment, admit nay, insist upon,
| to the fullest extent"


If now, the Constitution recognizes slaves IS
| property, that is, persons to whose labor and
service the master has right, then, upon what
principle shall Congress undertake to abolish this
right upon territory, of which it is the local Leg


slature? 1t will not permit the slave to cancel it,


because the service is due. Upon what ground can
self interpose between and bis dues Con
gress is as much the agent of the slavehOlding as


it is OF the non-saveholding States; and, equal
ly bound to protect both, and to hold the scales OF


justice even between them, it must guard the prop


erty of the with the same care with which 1t


guards the property of the other.


We have now refuted the postulates upon which


the recent revolution in the government is attempt
| ed to be justified. We have shown that slavery is
| not the creature of local and municipal law, and


that the Constitution distinctly recognizes the


right of the master to the labor service of the


slave; that is the right of property in slaves.


There is no conceivable pretext then, for ayng
, that the Government should resist the circulation
of this kind of property, more than any other.
| That question it must leave to the providence of
| n I'D t,a ol and 1ayuS hr,, ,L