Year: 1862

maps cripple u.s. had recommended that some suppfes
snsuld be sent 10 the mouth Of the Rappahannock,
with view Of establishing . depot at Port
Royal, after We had advanced to Fredericksburg.
AFTER the first delay In starting the pontoons think
they were sent quickly they could have been and
the supplies and quartermasters stores have always
been In as great abundance could have expected
for after the 10th November weather and the roads
were particularly bad. Horses, mules, &C., were sent
down TO u.s. 20 that cavalry and teams were in very
good condition. After ascertaned that there must
be delay and that the enemy had concentrated In such
force az TO mako il very difficult to cross except BY
number Of bridges, we commenced bringing up from
Aqua creek oil the pOntoons could. After enough O.
them had been brought up to build the bridges,
called several councils Of to decide about crossing tina
Rappahannock. Il was first decided TO cross down At
sknners Neck about twelve miles below here but our
demonstration simply for the purpose Of drawing
down there as large force Of the enemy possible.
then decided to here because the first place.
lett satisfied that they did not expect US TO cross hers
but down below. In the next place felt satisfied that
this was the place to fight the most decisive battle
because If we could divide their forces by piercing their
lines at one or two POINTS, separating their
left from their right, then q vigorous attack
with the whole army would succeed in breaking their
army in pieces The efemy had road along the
Of the line Of heights whero made attack, by
means Of which they connected the two ungs Of their
army, and avoided long detour round through bad
country obtained from colored man from the other
side OF the town information In regard to this road
which proved TO be correct wanted to obtain posses
sion Of that new road and that was my reason for
making attack the extreme left did not intend
to make the attack on the right until that
position had been taken which supposed would stagger
the enemy cutting their line in two and then proposed
fbat.F
out Of their works. succeeded in building six bridges
and taking the whole army across The two attacks were


made and wo were repulsed still holding portion Of the
ground had fought upon but no, extreme advance
That night all the field right; in fact,
was with the officers and until nearly daylight.
found tho feeling to be rather against an attack.
In fAct IL decidedly against II. returned to my
Headquarters and after conversation with Cen Sumner
told him that wanted him to order the Ninth army
corps, which was the corps originally commanded, TO
form tho next ming column Of attack by regiments
consisted Of some eighteen old regiments and some
new ones and desired the column to make direct attack
upon the enmys works. thought that thesc regiments
by arriving quickly up after each other would be
able to carry the stoncwall and the batteries front,
forcing the enemy into their next lne and by going in
with them they would not be able TO fire upon any
great extent left General Sumner with that UNDER
standing and directed Linn 10 give the orders The order
was given, and the order Of attick formed. The
next morning just before the column 10 have started
Gene al Sumner came 10 me and sad:"General, hope
you will dcsst from this attack. do not know OF any
general officer who approves Of II, and think II will
prove disastrous to tie army" Advice Of that kind from
Gen. Sumner has always been In favor Of advance
Whenever II was possible, caused me to hesitate kept
the column o. attack formed and sent over for the dv
sion and corps commanders AMI consulted with them



over TO see other officers Of the command the other
side and found that the same opinion prevailed among
them then for General Frauklio who then
the left and he was Of exactly the opinion. This
Caused me decide that ought not TO make the at
'ack had contemplated; and besides, inasmnch
as the President Of the United States had tod
mo not TO be In haste IN making this attack,
that he would give me all the support he could;
but he did not want the Army Of the Potomac destroyed
felt that could not take the responsibility Of ordering
the attack notwithstanding my own belief al the time
that tho works OF the enemy could be carried In tho
af ernoon Of that day again the officers and told
them that had decided TO withdraw 10 this side Of the
river all forces except enosgh TO hold the town and
the bridge heads, but should keep the bridges there
FOR future operations, in case We wanted TO cross
again. accordingly ordered the withdrawal, leaving
Cen. Hooker to condrct the withdrawal of our forces
from tho town. and Gen. Franklin TO conduct il our


e.t During that evening received note from General
Hooker; and about ten O'Clock at night Gen. Butterneld
came over with message from Gen. Hooker stating that
he (Gen. Hooer) felt II his duy to represent to tho
condition in which leaving the and the troops


In IT, After q long conversation the subject with
Gen. Butterneld, felt that the troops I proposed
to leave behind would not be able 10 hold the
town. I then partially decided TO withdraw the
whole command, slill more perilous operation
II commenced raining. which, . some extent, was an
assistance TO but very bad thing the moving
for the troops. thought over the matter for about
two hours and about one O'Clock sent order
withdrew the whole foroe which was successfully &C.
compshed There had been great deal OF division o.
opinion among the corps commanders TO the place
CROSSING but after oil the discussion npon the subject
the dscison TO cross over here was well TO-
ceived, / understood, by oil OF them, While on
his way here General Hooker the morning OF The goth
OF November wrote q note, which received on the
2st which he suggeste ha, he should his force
over the Rappahannock at the ford the town
Richards ford and move rapidly down 10 saztcns sta
tion and take position hcrc He stated that he had three
days provisions and thought he could meet any force OF
the enemy In front Of him. replied 70 him that was
alwayp very glad TO take the asice Of my general on
cers and should always be 10th to make move without
consulting them but could not approve Of the move DO





% march some thirty-six miles to get 10 saxton's
Station. I. Hss raining and hs would have to ford two
rivers which NIGH rise and s.. h@ oY from the main
o0ay enc rmmxd; and as had no means Of crossing
at foder cktburg would be prevented from sending
hin, supplies and assistance; ana although he might
reach saxons Station and not meet any force Of the ene
my at that time, yet IL woad be very hazardous
ment to throw column like th beyond the reach OF its
proper support This reply sent 10 Gen. Hooker by aid
de-camp BE tbauke me and said he had only made Il
as suggestion, aud the weather, ~ was then raining
or course rendered IL impossible to make the
hs had suggested.


Questou--what reasons q you assign for the failure
OF your attack her,f


Answer III was found ts be impossible TO got the men
up 10 the works. The onemy's nre no, Tor them
Tho who.e command fought most sailausy. The enemy
themselves say they never saw sur men asht as bard
on that day.


ouesticn.--were the enomy's works very Hrsngs