Year: 1864

THIS as on all other subjects, the weight to which
they were entitled, we must refuse to believe that
Gen. Grant formed his decision in favor of the over
land march from any such unworthy motives of
oticisl complacency.


second reason in support of this decision
has been found by some In the fact that Gen
0rant expected to weaken and demoralize
the forces of Gen. Lee in the battle. which
should precede the final assault against Richmond
that on arriving under the defences of that city il
would fall an easy prey Ito our victorious forces
Ii this consideration had any influence in deter
mining the mind Of Gen. Grant, it is only Just to
say, In the light of subsequent events that he mis-
calculated his own power of aggression or the
enemy's power of resistance. 1t was his own army
which, on arriving in front of Richmond, was found
too much exhausted to storm the enemy's works
on the north side of the James river. ~


A third reason in defence of the overland route
and that most commonly alleged by its patrons, is
the assertion that such line of advance was
military necessity in order that the Army of the
Potomac might cover the National Capital while
marching against the capital of the enemy. If
this were any reason it only remains to say that
for the last six or eight weeks Gen Grant has
been acting in most singular contempt of this
military hypothesis; for, since the 18th day of
June, his army, instead of being interposed be-
tween the enemy and the city of Washington, has
been so placed that it is the army of Gen. Lee which
is interposed between him and the National Capt.
tai. Washington has been left uncovered by the
Army of the Potomac, which, on the south side of
the James, proceeded foot the slow operations
OF siege, In apparent unconscousness that by SO
doing the safety of Washington was endangered
And if the presence of Gen Grants exhausted
and depleted army at this point has been
found compatible with the safety of Washington
since the l4th of June, is it very likely that our
safety would have been more compromised if he
had transferred to the south bank of the James in
transports the same numbef of troops which he
succeeded in placing there by his toilsome and
bloody march, Would the same number of troops
have been any less effective for commencing their
operations at the objective point OF attack without
the exhaustion and distress entailed by six weeks
of antccedent fighting against an enemy who every
where shielded himself by breastworks and defences
which our troops had to storm Orwould the national
capital havs been any insecure if the myriads
who were sacrificed In the overland march had been
left behind for its defence, while their comrades
proceeded by water to effect descent on tine banks
Of the James fa- the purposes Of there opening the
campaign Thus, in any light in which we may view
q t.aix IL
men who were killed and disabled by the overland
march were killed and disabled in vain For if
Gen Grant proposed to himself the destruction of
Lees army ly hard pounding, so that tie fall e
Richmond would fcciIi, we now see that he weak
ened the aggressive power of bis hammer even
more than he damaged the resisting strength of
the anvil, for he was compelled in the end to in
termt bis blows and resort to the slow processes
of the mine and the siege. And as the course of
events finally turned him from the line of the over
land march to TIE limo of the James-leaving the
Confederate army unbroken as resisting power
it follows that BY pursuing the former line he need
lessly sacrificed all the men who were killed and
wounded 10 excess over the Confederate killed and
wounded, and that he forfeited by 1t at the vital
point of his operations all the strength and energy
which had been wasted in the terrible but fruitless
battles which intervened between the Sd of Nav
and the 14th of June.


La our preceding summary Of these battles we
have not attempted to measure the comparative
losses Of the two armies. The Army and NAVY
Journal has the following observation, under this
head:


"The wide detOurs in hankng movements the exhaust
ing marches and changes Of position and, above all the
necessity Of sssaug prepared defences with repeated and
hitherto uess shocks have been attended with losses
proportonae 10 the enemy certainly a three to two p
sby Eve 10 three Some toeraby accurats tabuaon Of
our osses it might be easy, il wise compile For the
widely different estimates Of authorities who should be-
trustworthy may sometimes be reconciled by observing
hat the lesser often denotes the number ot


the army, while the other includes all who are taupora
rly hors de coba-straggers exhausted men sick msp
slightly wounded men. With either enumeration the
total kea loss larger perhaps than bad been anticpatd
by toe Government tor the prologue to the Richmond
drama"


We shall not undertake to estimate the losses Of
Gen. Grant in the overland expedition. We shall
perhaps never know them with authenticity or ex-
scdtude. Mr. Senator Wilson, speaking in the
Senate in his capacity as Chairman Of the Commit
tee Military Affairs, characterized them as "im-
mense." We at least know they we're without
precedent in the history Of our war, and, let it be
remembered, they were losses which robbed n, of