Year: 1869




Other War vesscls-Probable Results Of a
ae~ . LoSpos, May 81, 1862
Although there are no doubt exceptions to this as
to every other rule IN the world all thinking men
must agree that the great mass OF Englishmen are
IN all that concerns their own government and theiI
relations with foreign Powers, the most unthinkine
and the most unreasoning Of mortals At the pres
time, when o rupture with the United States might
occur, there are really, even among the educated
classes in this country, not nve people in hundred
who seem really to have any interest whatever
In what may be one OF the most serious disputes
that ever arose between two giant nations
And OF these five-if there are so many-persons
chere really not two who understand the strength
OF the United States or the weakness Of England.
They-that is, all my countrymen-put their faith in
other OF the different arms OF the service.
Some believe that England can never be invaded
because Other militia others that she can with her
present regular army meet any foe in any part OF
the world third class put their faith In that utterly
broken reed the volunteers; but the most numerous
OF all trust implicitly to the navy, and think that so
long have ships to sail or to steam we should
be able to hold our own and even to have the best
of the quarrel, in any sea where vessels can float
or in any port which had TO be bockaded or de-
Tended, on either side OF the Atlantic.


So much for fiction; now for fact.


1t must be allowed tnat the naval officers OF Eng
land the persons most likely to know the capa-
blites OF our navy. l have very extensive ac-
qualntance with those who bear commissions In that
service. and have hesitation in saying that they
look upon the present condition OF both our ships
and most unsatisfactory. 1t is true that
they are both quite equal TO the duties they have
now to perform, and that England could be de-
Tended by feet as 1t at present exists; should
ba oth ri m fear of Wit
our navy, as with every other Institution we nave,
we halt between two opinions. We not national;
the service IS not popular as with you, and on the
other hand, do not the heavy hand OF govern
ment TO force men TO take up arms as they do upon
the Continent or Europe The service Is too ree and
yet free enough too popular to be effective
the French navy, and yet not popular enough-not
elastic enough TO become, In the event OF war,
power and force equal TO the occasion. Let me
illustrate my meaning. The navy OF the United states
may not at the present moment be very strong In
ships or In men, but once let the war cry be raised
and you would increase your force at sea ten-ay,
twenty fold in month. In the same way France
may not be very strong-although she is quite
much so as we are-in her navy, but she has an
Immense reservea reserve so strong that she could
by stroke OF the pen treble the number OF her
seamen IN fortnight. You IN the states are free.
Tue people govern. II the people are determined TO
make W ar tney Will provide the means and the men
and the ships 10 carry on that war; Not SO with US
The people-and indeed, all classes, save men who
have either plenty of money or long pedigrees-have
govern tnat they lost all interest IN the public
Hence IL is that don't believe II war with





500 extra sailors take service under our nag. 1t
always happens that we have far more difficulty to
get men Tor our ships during war han during peace
That is OF late years. And now thar our mercantile
navy Is increased all over the world, and that our
sup owners can AFFORD TO outbd the government IN
the mater OF sailors wages, foreign war would
decrease, and not increase, the number OF men al
our disposal. 80 -
Then again. II we went to war with the United
States the old difficulty about Ireland would crop out
People In general am talking OF Engshmen-are
Dy no means aware how strong the Irish element is
Dur Would
or on yours Would 1t willingly take service in our
navy, or would it seek for employment with yours
in my humole opinion Ii would cause our service to
10 weaker by at east fourth than II now Is.


That our navy, as at present constituted Is equal
TO the de ence OF England, Ireland and scotland,
don't for a moment DENY. But Great Britain is by
no means the most dIncult part OF the British pos
sessions 70 defend We must not forget that war
with tne states would not be like the war we had
hfteeu years ago with Russia. The Gar nad no
ships ne could send to attack our cooniesi ne re-
qured all he could muster for the defence of MS own
coast And even then, in war, so TO speak, at our
very doors, what did we dor What were we able to
dor Literally nothing. Inc history OF tue meet
that went 10 The baltc under Sir Charles Napier
not history Of which We can be proud.


Let us suppose war ~ be declared between the
Unned States and England We should require
every snip We have IN commission at home TO pre-
vent your cruisers from ockading our ports. what
W u.d become Of our commerce all over the world
We could not neglect our mercantile navy. We
must have vessels ia almost every sea, else the re-
suit would be the loss OF many trading ships that
nothing snort OF national rum would inevitably nol-
low. In America you have 80 many resources In





CARDS food-that no very great calamity would re-
suit II you ceased 70 sail single merchant snip Tor
coupe OF wears. But II Is not SO win u.s. we
1--we and have being upon what comes from
abroad. single naval disaster to our feet which
would enaole your navy to blockade for one week
two or three OF our CHIEF ports would starve the
whole nation into submission " whatever terms you
chose to dictate.


And what injury could our feet innict In the mean.
time upon your commerce or your portsS Literally
n0thlng-nOthing whatever our ron-clads are
Ine ships but they are not calculated TO cross the





sean bu, except In the hnest Of fine weather, they
cannot saifin such way as TO arrive at any gwen
point wsh anything like certainty II they crossed
thsAuantic Under san one ost OF three would reach
any rendezvous at the time appointed. If they did
b. uuder steam they would be useless because with
Out cOal) when they reached your shores.


one great might say the chief-reason for the
inenciency OF our navy Is this-We have too many
ironclads. For some years past our naval author
ties seem to have forgotten that we might-and that
IN the event or war we should-want feet oi
year we have turned our attention TO nothing In
naval architecture except that which IL defensive
We have a splendid squadron OF enormous iron-clads
which, n mustered Ia line Of battle, evenaf they
could meet IN our own waters-shlp for ship gun fol
gun aud man for man-vessels Of their owr
eabre, would no doubt do well. But we don't wan
razors 10 cut nrewood. OF what use would be
score OF costly ironclads-vesses that can haru.
sill and are very slow indeed under steam-to pro
tect our commerce IN various parts OF the world
what we want would be a large neet Of fast wooder
cOrycte5 ships that can go equally well under steam
or canvas. Aud these we not only do not possess
but we seem 10 have lost the faculty OF building
them. In WORD, AZ a means OF deience Oh our IN
teress on the high seas our navy y decidedly
wanting.


what about our navy as an Offensive forcef Could
we cross the Atlantic and blockade your portsf In
the first place we should be at the disadvantage o
lighting out OF our own waters; In the second w
should have your large vessels 10 contend with; II
the third we should want that which our iron-clads
large ana massive they are must be helpless with
Out, namely. coal. There is not one OF our iron
clads that can carry than twelve days, supply
ol luee and most OF them can carry but sever
or eght. Of what use would ships'be that can oDlJ
Ieeu lhelr fTnaces Tor such snort time In ofen
elve war ~ such a distance from all supplies
bread ana meat may be picked up even In on
eneinys country, but certainly not COAL. Could W,
send coal from England to tile squadron block
aiding New YORK or New oreansf kather.dnicult
Your navy would, aweek after war Is proclallned
steamers, each armed with q couple or 40 OF ver,
large guns and able to make headway az the rate q
dozen OF niteemkh9ts so an hour, We should hav