Year: 1861

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Scott, who at once concurred with Major
Anderson in his opinion On reflection,
however, he took full time, consulted with
officers both of the army and navy, and at
the end of four days communicated reluct-
antly, but decidedly, the same conclusion
as before. He also stated at the same
time that no such sufficient force was then
at the control of the fort or could be
raised and brought to the ground within
time when the provisions in the fort
would be exhausted. In a purely militia
ry point Of view, this reduced the duty of
the Administration in the case to the mere
matter Of getting the garrison safely out
of the fort. 1t was believed, however,
that to so abandon that position, under
the circumstances would be utterly ruin
Gus; that the necessity under which it
was to be done, would not be fully under
stood that by many it would be consid-
cred as a part of a voluntary policy; that
at home it would discourage the friends of
the Union, embolden it's adversaries, and
60 far to ensure to the latter recognition
abroad that in fact, it would be our
National destruction cousummated This
could not be allowed. Starvation was
not vet upon the garrison, and ere it could
be reached, fort Pickens mlguIu be rein
forced This last would be clear indi-
cation of policy, and would the better en-
able the country to accept the evacuation
of fort Sumter as military necessity,
and an order was at once directed to be
sent for the landing Of troops from the
steamship Brooklyn, at fort Pickcns. This
order conld not 60 by land, but must take
the longer and slower route by sea The
first return news from the order was re-
ceived Just one week before the fall of
Sumter. The news itself was that the
off er commanding the Sabine, to which
vessel the troops had been transferred
from the Brooklyn, acting upon some qua
81 armstice of the late Administration,
and of the existence of which the present
Administration. up to the time the order
was dispatched, had only vague and un-
certain rumor to fix attention and refuse
to land the troops, or reinforce fort Pick
ems before crisis would be needed at
fort Sumter, was impossible-rendered SO
by near exhaustion of provisions in the
latter named fort In precaution against
such conjuncture, the Government had
a few days before it commenced an expe.
dition as we'll adapted as it might be to
relieve fort Sumter, which expedition was
intended to be ultimately used or not, ac.
cording to circumstances. The strongest
anticipated case for using it was now pre-
sented, and it was resolved to send it for
ward as had been intended. In this con-
tineency it was also resolved to notify the
Gov. OF South Carolina that he might ex-
pect an attempt would be made to provi.
sion the fort, and if the attempt should
not be resisted, there would be no attempt
to throw in men, arms or ammunition, with.
out further notice, or in case of an attack
upon the fort. This notice was accord


ingly given, whereupon the fort was at


tackled, and bombarded to its fall, without
awaiting the arrival of the provisioning
expedition.


1t is thus seen that the assault upor
and reduction of Fort Sumter was In ne
sense matter Of self defence on the part
of the assailants. They well knew that
the garrison in the fort could by no posi-


bility commit aggression upon them
= They knew that they were expressly no
titled that the giving of bread to the few
brave and hungry men of the garrison, wa
all that. on that occasion, would be at
tempted, unless they themselves, by resist
ing SO much, should provoke more. The.
knew that this government desired to keel
! the garrison in the fort, and not to assai
them, but merely to maintain visible pos
session, and thus to preserve the Uuiol
from actual and Immediate dissolution
trusting as herein before stated to time
/ discussion and the ballot box for fina
, adjustment; and they assailed and reduces
the fort for precisely the reverse object
to drive out the visible authority of tn