Year: 1869

Naval Constructi0n for Friendly Powers
1t will be seen by our Washington despatch


to-day that our government is likely to come


into very serious discussions with Spain and
Peru on the question of the monitors sold to


the latter Power The question originates in an
error on the part of the late administration,
which encumbered the sale of those ships with
conditions that no Power can enforce by peace
full means and which the inexorable march OF
events may render it impossible to comply
with. 1t is authoritatively stated that in the
contract there is stipulation that the vessels
shall not be used against the Spanish Power in
Cuba. We suppose the object in making the
condition was to further the interests of peace.
1t could not have been to cover our duties as
a friendly and neutral nation, for these 60 no
further, in the case of two belligerents with
both of whom we are at peace, than acting
with equal justice to both. Thus, if we sell
ships to one party we are bound to do the
same to the other if demanded Anything
more than this forms an exceptional case, and
such we suppose the case of the two Peruvian
monitors to be. Negotiations for peace be-
tween these two belligerents are now going
on under the auspices of our government, and
it no doubt was desirable that we should
lend onressii7es to no act that would mar these
labors.


But it occurs to us to inquire what may be
the position of the administration at Washing
ton IA a possible and, in view of recent events,
O nhoh Tho SuaDioh m ont
is now building in our private dockyards
thirty steam gunboats for war purposes. Does
the government purpose to impose any con-
dition on the departure of these from our
ports? Suppose the Peruvian Minister were
to ask Mr.. Fish to require from Spain the
same guarantee that has been demanded
of Peru in relation to the monitors,
could Mr.. Fish require 1t, and, if
required, could it be made effectual ?
If the gunboats are sent to Cuba they will re-
lieve from active employment dozen Spanish
ships Of war. The peace negotiations may
fall through and hostilties be renewed between
Peru and Spain. Could the dozen Spanish
ships relieved from duty in Cuban waters by
the arrival of the thirty American built gun
boats be prevented by us from capturing the
Peruvian monitors? We cite these peculiari-
ties in the reported position of our govern
ment because they may very easily lead to
great complications. We already have on
hand one awkward case in the steamer Quaker
City, seized at the request Of the Spanish Min
lister and claimed by the Minister of Great
Britain as property of British subject.


These suggestions show the danger which a
timorous diplomacy may lead us into. There
is possibility in trying to stand erect of lean
ing little backward, and we trust that Mr..
Fish is in no danger of being led into this
error. The only safe ground for our govern
ment to stand upon Is the admitted rule of in
ternational law that commerce in arms, ships
and munitions of war, even to belligerents,
may rightfully be held if we allow the same
privileges to both belligerents. We afe now
selling ships, arms and munitions abundantly
to Spain, and in view of this fact the condi-
ton imposed on the sale of the monitors to
Peru is an unjust one and should be with
drawn. We advise Secretary Fish, in order to
save himself from future complications, to ad-
wise both Spain and Peru that our government
withdraws this condition. If he does not do
so it becomes then the duty of the Peruvian
Minister to call for detention of the Spanish
gunboats. Let justice be done.