Year: 1864

The Hard Road Backward: What Ar


mistice Means.


We all of us want our national troubles set
tied up in the best and quickest way possible.
There is no difference oil feeling on this point
But some people appear to be taking it for
granted that the short way to have a settle
ment is TO stop and turn around and go back.
They make a great mistake. That is the very
way that we never shall get it in the lifetime
OF any OF u.s. 1t is long and a hard road to
travel. ~ 4-,' -" +" ~ -


Let us suppose ourselves trying it for little.
We begin with an "armistice." This is SOW
ereign remedy, in the minds of some for all
our troubles. But it is not SO clear how we
shall manage 1t. Is the blockade to be given
up9 II so, the rebels will receive at least a
good lift from us towards independence. Is
1t still to be continued? Then we shall have
war ON the sea, and how is this to agree with
peace on the shore? Are our armies to be
maintained where they are during the months
perhaps years Of attempted negotiation? Or
shall they be withdrawn back to the borders
of the loyal States? This is what the rebels
have always insisted on before they would
3 hear of peace. 1t is, of conrse, to surrender
everything Yet to this complexion it must
come at last il a settlement is to be had other
wise than by the virtual arbitrament of war.
D, For the alternatives are: First to adjust this
q controversy ultimately according to the pos
sibilities of force. In this case we had better
keep in condition to use what force we have:
indeed, we had best continue using it without
allowing it to be weakened by interruption
and by the relaxing OF its hold. Or: Second,
to withdraw from the attempt at coercion,
and get the most satisfactory terms that can
be fixed upon by mutual agreement. This is
substantially committing the matter to the
choice of the South. 1t amounts at the very
outset to recognition of their virtual inde-
: pendence. 1t Is to put the matter on an en-
tirely different footing from that to which the
war has brought 1t. And there can then be
really no reason why the attitude of war should
not be given up, and why all its past gains, so
far as they limit or threaten Southern inde-
pendence, should not be abandoned.


some people, perhaps, may carelessly think
that we can at any rate just pause for a little
to see what our enemies will consent to, and
can still hold over them as motive to SUBJ
mission the arm of force. Such course may
sometimes be pursued. Incidental and iutri-
cate questions, suitable for diplomatic adjust
ment, may be at issue between two nations,
and while the negotiation proceeds, the aspect
of the pending war may enter In to it as an
important element. But wholly different
state of things exist here. The very question
whether there existthe too parties, is the one,





ed. There Is no incidental matter of any parr
ticular consequence to come up. There is one
single question and really no more- 1t is a
plain one. There is no need Of stopping to
See It, 1t is a vital one too; as those are not
that come up between distinct nations. The
thing to be settled is whether we shall allow
the South to maintain itself as a separate pa-
ton or not. We can tell as well about that
before an armistice as during it. And it will
fOtr Hat
at all can be made in negotiation, however
conducted, until this thing Is either practical
ly or explicitly agreed upon. 1t is in fact the
very first thing by which the negotiators, who
ever they are, will be confronted. And it is
as plain as anything can be that it is ques-
tion which mere cessation of hostities will
not help to settle, unless it be by ooneeding
Q Southern independence, sAn armistice con
be of no use at ALL unLetS IL is before virtual
ly determined In our minds to giue up the
contest. That ought to be clearly laid hold
of by everybody. M "a. saeeer


See now what sort of a path begins to
open before US. We have troops at New
bern and Hilton Head. They must come
back. There is an army about Richmond,- =
it is most 'unfraternal' thing. Sherman is
before Atlanta. the South cannot be free
from s'constraint" till he is gone. We have
got New Orleans and opened out the Missis-
~ Island No, 10 and above Memnhis st
V;cksbnro and above Port Hndsen and
port Jackson, but ali this trenches on the
dignity of "soyereign states.n and must be
surrendered. We hold the keys of Florida
an1 the Gull, and the great Fortress that con-
trolls the waters from half the Atlantic slope
.-these are on Southern soil aud must not be
kept Pulaski also, and the Islands off
CharlestoWn, and the Mobile bay, with Farra-
gut in it, must be given up. Everything Is to
be abandoned; all that our brave men have
won on the land and on the sea all but
their imperishable fame. Even that we shall
do what we can to despoil them of; and we
shall give up all our share init,


let we are only at tne beginning OF our
dlticultles, When we have undone all the
successes OF the war-and tney are Immense
and decisive If we have the patience and the
manliness to follow them up:-when we have
undone 1t all, we shall not have made settle
ment We shall only have lost all that enabled
us to approach one There is no settlement
to be had So To abandon all the gains Of
war will not make boundaries. To march
hack over Chattanooga and Murfreesboro will
not carry loyal East Tennessee and Western
Virginia and Kentucky above the Ohio. Tc
creep out from Nashville and Memphis anC
Vicksburg and New Orleans and all the great
towns our armies entered to the sound O.
yictory-to steal up in shame along the grea
valley down which they swept ip triumph
this will not stop the 1oW of the mighty wa
ters that make that land to be one and insep
arabic. Ii is the oonnguration OF the cont
nent that renders division between the Nortl
and South Impossible on any terms short 0
national suicide. This will not be changed b
our return from every battle field and fortreS
and frem ali the NOW rescued soil. Infam
will not make rs national frontiers. The lon
and narroTr tsrrito-v Ieft ,,s could not then ii