Year: 1863

GEMS MCCLELLAN AND HOOKER.


The New York radical papers have late
ly selected from the vast body of testimo-
ny taken by the joint committee of Con-
gress on the Conduct of the War, and
published, the testimony of Gen. HOOKER,
as possessing "good deal of public in
terest and historical value.'' The answer
to the first question replied to by the last
mentioned general the Times italicizes,
though it is not SO printed in the report.
This selection for publication was doubt.
less made under the same spirit which in
duced the editor to call the particular at
tentiOn Of the reader to this first answer,
a spirit which doubtless gives, in its rank
ling, good deal of uneasiness; spirit
which no good man will envy.


The first question and answer are as fol-
lows:


Question. To what do you attribute the fail
ure of the peninsular campaign?


Answer. do not hesitate to say that it is to



part OF our commander.


This question was put by the committee
to several of the witnesses, although it was
omitted in the examination of General No
CLELLAN, the leader of the national army
in that campaign. Tie committee, it may
be supposed, did not wish to hear his pro-
fessional opinion on that subject. But they
did happen to put the same question to
some of the witnesses who did not concur
with General HOOKER, and their testimony
does not, in the opinion of the radicals,
possess the same "public interest and his.
torical value" General HENRY j. HUM
was examined: he was chief in command
of the artillery in the army of the Potomac,
and testified before the committee. This
general was with the army Ct the Potomac
since its organization he organized its re-
serve artillery, and many of the batteries
that belong to the divisions. General
HOOKER has the reputation of being great
fighting general, and a great swearing gen.
eral, too, but these qualities do not give his
testimony any more value than that of men
less notorious in these respects The ques-
ton was put to General HUNT:


To what circumstances do you ascribe the
failure of the peninsular campaign? A. 1 was
not consulted in regard to the plan of the cam
hIltcn N foro / 7
its failure, in the first place. to the failure of a
flank movement, which, in ny judgment,
would have rendered the works at Yorktown
untenable by the enemy, and have shut up
the Confederates in the peninsula. was of
that opinion then and have not changed that
opinion since l do not know that such a
movement was ever contemplated 1t was a
matter upon which was never consulted. My
impression was, however. and has since been
confirmed, that an attack was to have been
made somewhere near that point; in which
case thought it was our game that Yorktown
should be occupied in strength by the enemy,
SO that we might, if possible, shut him up in
the peninsula, by operating across from West
Point, and shutting Off his retreat to Rich
mond. | believe if that had been done the
main force of the enemy would have been con-
fined At Yorktown, and We would have met
with no serious opposition in proceeding to
Richmond.


Q. Did you ever hear of any definite plan OF
that campaign, that was to be followed?


A. | never heard OF any plan OF campaign
discussed by those having that matter in
charge; but gathered, us Others have done.
from different sources, my idea of what the
plan was. and | fully expected that the move
ment have ilidica Ell would be carried out


=. W Hat obstacle was there to prevent the
flank movement being made with the force we
had there.


a. As understood it, McDowel's corps,
which Was tie laSt 70 be embarked, was to
move across 10 West Point Or near that place,
a portion OF it touching perhaps at Gloucester,
so aS To throw itself between the enemy's works
at Yorktown and Richmond. OF course the
withholding of that corps prevented the plan
if that was the plan, from being executed as
intended.


@. Were we not, without General Mellow.
ellis corps, vastly superior to the enemy when
our army landed on the Peninsula?


A. do not know. Ipresume that we were
superior to them, but how much cannot say
But the difference was this, as l had looked
upon it; had it been understood, before the
campaign was commenced, that McDOwels
corps was to be retained here, then other ar
rangements could have been made; but die
not hear OF it until after the campain had com
menced and we had been committed to Ger
tain course of action in front OF Yorktown
that is, the night we arrived in front of thu
WOTkS at IOIhtoWH ailCi Ct'hhoha'ihs5 "ii III
afternoon and making reconnoissances there
that night heard of the withdrawal of Gen
eral McDowell's force. | can say, although
was not in a position to be consulted, that Oil
believe that such Il movement would have ren
dered our force SO overwhelming as to destrO
whatever force the enemy might have throw
down on the peninsula. That was the frs
cause of failure.


O. Had you attempted the flank movemen
YOU speak of. would it not have caused the en-
emy to have retreated immediately upon Klch


a Nv opinion is that there would have bee
n race for Richmond; that in the attempt t.
save themselves, they would in the very begin
nng have made the evacuation which the,
made only on the 4th of May, and that evacua
ton would have been accompanied with all tn
haste of retreats and by sending few gur
boats up the York river past their works, W