Year: 1863

movements hinged, and in respect to which
General Mcclellan has been most fiercely
assailed. And first, in regald to the most
important point of all, the general plan of
operations adopted by General Mcclellan
when, on the 1st Of November, 1861, he
succeeded General Scott as general-in-chiet
of all the forces. Was this the ineffective
plan of nibbling around the edges of the re-
belliOn, and leaving to it the advantages Of
easy intercommunicatiOn, which the ad-
ministration has so persistently pursued ?
or did he aim, by striking into the interior,
to prevent the possibility of a rapid con-
centration of the rebel forces? Here is his
testimony relative to his original plan of
the war on assuming the chief command:


O. will now call your attention to the next
point in the general question: the long period
OF inaction of the army from the time you took
command down to the first of March, when the
movement of the army commenced?


A. / think l have already stated in answer
to some previous question. the general cOndi-
ton of the troops in Washington and the de-
fences of the city. That when took command
the defences were incomplete and the army
was not in a satisfactory condition, not organ
lied and not efficient l devoted my attention
to the correction of these two points. viz: the





ton Of the army. do not think that the ar
my was in u tit condition for offensive opera
tiOns until the beginning of the year 1861
On the first OF November was appointed COM
mander-in-chief of the army, in place of Gen.
eral Scott. l at once turned my attention to
the movement of troops in the West in connec
ton with the proposed movements of the Army
of the Potomac. then thought that the con-
dition of things in the West was such that we
could assume the offensive without difficulty
early in December. I sent General Halleck to
take command in Missouri, and General Buell.
in Kentucky. The general idea was this; first
to gain complete possession of Missouri, and
then. as rapidly as possible, to move a column
on Knoxville and Chattanooga, in order to gain
possession of the Memphis and Charleston rail
road, and to aid the loyal men of Eastern Ten
nessee, Western North Carolina and South Car
olina, and Northern Georgia. Gen. Hallecl1
and Gen. Buell. reported to Inc, Immediately
after assuming their commands, that the con-
ditiOn of things was not satisfactory: that an
immense amount of preparation had still to be
made, not only for the organization of troops
but to supply the necessary material. did my
best to supply the existing defects, frequently
urging upon General Buell. the necessity OF
prompt movement upon Knoxville. always re-
garding that as of greater importance than the
possession of Nashville the possession of which
l looked upon as the second operation to be





1 looked upon it us essential that we should
gain possession of the Memphis and Charleston
railroad, in Order to cut the railroad cOmmuni-
cation between the valley of the Mississippi and
the Atlantic slope before making direct move
ment upon Richmond.


Now was this wise plan OF operations,
or was it not? Was it better, or WAS it
not better, to cut the rebellion in two in
the middle, and prevent the divided seq
ments supporting each other either by re-
Inducements or provisions? AT the time
this plan was formed, the whole mountain
region of the Alleghanies, stretching like
backbone through the cOnfederacy, had a
large element OF loyalty in its population.
That region was not adapted to the south
ern staples; it had few slaves it had its
internal quarrels and heart-burnings with
the more populous slave regions in the same
states; and it was at that early day posi-
BILE, by attOrding protection to the loyal in
habitants, to have interposed broad belt
of loyal territory between the rebels OF the
Mississippi valley and those of the Atlantic
slope. But whether this part Of the plan
had been successful Or not, the contem-
plated cutting of the railroads would have
severed the rebellion in the middle and in
sured its speedy extinction. The great
merits OF this plan are incontrovertible;
but who is answerable for its non -execu-
ton? 1t is painful to attribute the blame
to the high quarter where history will for
ever fix it, but truth is ineXorable. The
President OF the United States made in mid
winter, 1862, peremptory order in his
own name for Simultaneous movement of
all the armies on the ensuing 22d of Feb
ruary. The effect of this was, of course,
to disconcert all plans for SO timing
the greater movements in the east and
west that they should lend each other
mutual support, and make success in the
one the tOrerunner OF certain triumph
in the other. The President had been led
blythe Tribune newspaper Ga high mill
tary authOrityD to regard the capture Of
Richmond as the paramount thing to be
Immediately done; and so eager was he
TO eat his loaf hot that he would neither
tarry for the grinding, nor the kneading,
nor the baking. Had Gen. Mcclellan
been permitted to time his movements in
accordance with his own plan, his great
and menacing army on the Potomac, would
by its mere presence, have detained a vast
rebel force east of the Alleghanies, while
the western army succeeded in cutting the
railroads, and the advance on Richmond
would have been the final stroke of the
war, ending it by one crushing blow.


Another question Of cardinal Importance
is, whether the reasons for advancing to
Richmond by the Chesapeake, instead of
in direct line by way of Manassas, were
sound, and such as ought to have prevail
ed? These reasons have, in fact, SO much
force that the sole objection ever made to
the water route was that it did not enable
General McClellan's army to cover Wash
ington during the advance. His testimo-
ny, which we here quote, will set the mer-