Year: 1868

select portions Of the debate upon the


Tenure-of- -oflice bill, which will prove


very interesting to our readers at tins


time .N1 nri.


Mr.. Edrnunds, Of Vermont, a member


Of the committee having the bill in


charge, said:


1t did seem TO the committee, after a


great deal of consultation and rehection,


that it was right and just that the Chief


Executive Of the nation in selecting these


named Secretaries, who, by law and by


the practice of the country, and officers


analogous TO whom by the practice OF all


other countries, are the confidential ad-


visers of the Executive respecting the


administration OF all his departments,


should be persons who were personally


agreeable 10 him, ia whom he could


place entire confidence and reliance; and
that, whenever it should seem to him
that the state Of relations between him
and any of them had become so as to
render this relation of confidence and
trust and personal esteem inharmonious,
he should in such case be allowed
to dispense with the services OF that
eficer in vacation and have some other
person act in his stead. We thought that
so much discretion, 40 much confidence,
so much respect ought to be properly
attributed to the Chief Magistrate Of the
nation. 1t may happen that at some par
ticular time-some people may suppose
that it has happened now-the Chief
Magistrate, for the time being, ought not
to be invested with such powers; but the
committee have recommended the adop.
ton of this rule respecting the tenure of
officers as permanent and systematic,
and as theybelieve,a an appropriate regula-
ton of the government for all admins
tratious, for all time; and 1t did appear
to them (whether the reason may COM
mend itself TO the Senate or not) that it
was just to the Executive, and on the
whole best for the interest of the nation,
that he should be allowed during recess
of the Senate to change his confidential
advisers if it should appear to him to be
fit, subject to that general responsibility
which every officer must be held to the
public and to the Senate when they meet
again. That was the reason of the
committee.


Mr.. Williams, who prepared the origi-
nal bill, said: .i


prepared the original bill in this case,
which contains in different words the ex.
ception contained in the amendment re-
ported by the committee. / do not re-
gard the exception as of any great prac-
tical consequences, because / suppose if
the President and any head of a depart
ment should disagree so as to make their
relations unpleasant, and the President
should signify desire that that head of
department should retire from the Cabi-
net, that would follow without any posi-
tive act Of removal on the part of the
President. ] do not think that in many
cases which have occurred the President
has peremptorily removed any member
of the Cabinet; but understand the
usual practice is, if the President de-
sires to dispense with any head of de-
partment, and to substitute another for
him, to signify. in some way desire that
there should be vacancy in the office,
when it becomes vacant by resignation,
is filled by the President, according to
his own wishes and views.


The heads of the departments are a
part of the executive power of the coun-
Try. According to the theory of the
Constitution, the executive power is
vested in the President of the United
States, and these heads of departments
are subordinate officers of the President,
Immediately under his supervision. They
are persons under his immediate direc-
ton, except so far as their specific du-
ties may be provided by law. But the
President consults with these heads of |
departments as to all measures of his ad |
ministration. They are regarded as his |
confidential advisers; and, certainly, the !
law which creates that relation between |
the President and the heads of depart
ments contemplates that there shall be
a state of harmony between all of them;
that there shall not be state of war in
the Executive Department Of the Gov
ernment; that it shall not be divided
against itself; but that the subordinates
or the heads of the different departments
shall be in harmony or. practical agree
ment with the President by whom they
are appointed.


The chief reason that Influenced me to
make the exception was that | thought
something was due to the President of
the United Ststes--to that office. This
bill undertakes to reverse what has here
tofore been the admitted practice of the
Government; and it seemed to me that
it was due to the exalted Office Of the
President of the United States, the Chief
Magistrate of the nation, that he should
be left to choose his own Cabinet, and
that he should be held responsible, as he
will be, to the country for whatever acts
that Cabinet may perform.


Mr.. Fessenden said:


1t seems to me very obvious that with
reference to the transaction of business
which wsA peculiarly executive, the con-
hdential advisers that we put about the
President should always be men who,
for the greater bart, are satisfactory to
him. II is exceedingly i'm
portant that there should be a cordiality
Of feeling, and an agreement upon i'm
portant matters of State policy and
State conduct between the President and
those who are his confidential advisers.
The President naturally would not want
a man in his councils who was un-
friendly to him, upon whose discretion be
could not rely in the first place, and
upon whose faith in keeping the secrets
OF the Executive Government be could
not rely in the second place; and If he
was unfriendly, the President might
naturally both fear of consulting him and
taking his advice.


Aman who is the head Of department
naturally wants the control Of that de-
partment BE wants the control Of his
subordinates, that they should be subject
10 him, and thar be should have the
power 70 remove them from Office in case
thsy ars insubordinats, and are such as
he can not comfortably get along with,
aud 10 remove them on the instant, at
the moment, ifit be necessary. In my