Year: 1862

been offered 10 twice BEFORE and that did nos Io0
could take IL. Icounseled with two Of my stan


nregard 10 IL for should think hour and na'' my
urged upon me that had right - : soldier
TO disobey the order, and that nao ah0A1'
expressed to the government my nnwinmsness
to take the command told them what my views Wero
with reference TO my ability exercise such command
which views were those had always unreservedy OK
pressed-that not competent 70 command sucn =
laree armv ss this had said the and over
again to the President and Secretary or war; ana aiso
that IL matters could be satisfactorily arranged with
General Mcclellan, thought he could command TN
Army OF tho Potomac better than any other general IT,
but they had studied the subject more than had. and
know moro about their obligations to General
Mcclellan than / did. There had been SOM


conversation with regard 10 the removal Of General
Mcclellan, when he bringing away his army from be-
fore Richmond The first Of these conversations with the
President and Secretary Of War occurred At that tme
and then, after General Mcclellan had got back TO WASH
ngon, and before the commencement Of the Maryland
campaign there another conversation Of the same
kind; and On both Of those occasions OK.
pressed to The President the opinion that I did
not think there was any who could do as
much with that army General Mcclellan could,
matters would be arranged to remove their obec-
tons 10 him. After had conversed with my staff officers
went 10 General Mcclellan himself and he agreed
with US that this was order which as soldier, had
TO cSey lie said he could not retain the command for
he soldier would have obey the order directing
him to give up that command in the midst Of violent
snow Storm with the army In position that knew but
little Of. had previously comm lnded but one corps,
upon the extreme right, and had been upon the extreme
right and in the advance ence that campaign had begun
probably knew less thaany other corps commander Of
The positions and relative strength Of tho several corps Of
tho army. Gen. Mcclellan remained some two or three
days TO arrange his AFFAIRS, and with as far as
WaTrcnton and then left, having given me all the in
formation he could in reference TO the army. General
Halleck came down to me on the 1lh Of November
On the 9th made out plan Of operations, In accordance
with the order Of General Haeck, which decided me not
only TO take command but also 70 state what proposed
to do with il. That psp wrote on the morning Of the
9th Of November and sent by special messenger to
Washington. can furnish the committee copy Of that
plan II they desire il. do rot have It here now.


Question the substance Of IL, r you please thai
may DO as well.


Auswer-I stated, in substance, that thought II al
vsabe to concentrate the army in the neghborhood Of
Warrenon, make aYsma movement the Kappa
h.Enock as feint, with view to divert the attention
OF the enemy and lead them believe going to
the direction Of Gordonsvle, and then to make
rapid movement Of the whole army Fredericksburg.
ON this side Of tho Rappahannock Az my reasons for
that stated that the further got into the interior



muncations and the greater would be tho difficulty
would have in keeping them open, the enemy had
upon our right flank corps that AZ almost any time
could by rapid movement, seriously embarrass
caught by the elements so far from base Of
supplies, and at the tmo in the enemys country,
where they had means Of getting information that
had not, It might, thought, prove disastrous to the
army, as we had but one line Of railway by which TO
supply it, In moving upon Fredericksburg would all
Nac,i rnuldf
after arriving at Fredericksburg we would be at
| q point nearer 10 Richmond than we would be
/ even II We should take Gordonsvills On tho
Gordonsvle line the enemy, In my opinion, would not
give decisive battle at place this side Of Rich
mond. They would defend Gordonsvio until such time
they felt they had given check ana then, with
many lines Of railroad open TO them, they would
upon Richmond or Lynchburg. And in either tho
difficulty of following them would bo very groat In
connection with this movement requested that barges
filled with provisions and forage should be noated TO
Aqua creek where they could be easily landed that
teras be collected for the reconstruction the wharves
there and that all the wagons Washington that could
possibly be spared should be filed with hard bread and
small commissary siores and with large number Of
beef cattle started down Fredericksburg the road
by way Dumries and that the wagon train and herd
Of cattle should be preceded by pontoon train broad
enough to span the Rappahannock twice. stated that
| IL
would be oil the timc between army ID the Potomac,
or, in other words. army would be all the time be.
the enemy and that train, but at the time


said that cavalry escort could be furnished from
Washington, would ssni some Of my cavalry
to guard train. On the morning Of the IAN OF No
vember feeling uneasy with reference the poutoons as


had not heard Of their starring, directed my chief en-
gineer to telegraph again with reference to them.
/ cuesiion.-To whom did you telegraph


4 IT, rVo
Major spauding II sub equently appeared that that
the first they had heard OF my wish to have the
pontoon train started dawn for fredericksburg although
the authorities in Washington had my plan sent 70 them


the 9th OF November and had also been discussed by
Gen. Halleck and Gen. Negs At my headquarters she
nights Of the lIth and 18th Of November and after dis.
cnssng fully there. they sat down and sent tele-
grams to Washington which, as supposed, fully covered
the case and would the starting Of the pontoon
trains at supposed, OF course that those portions
the plan which required to be attended TO In Washing
ton would be carried out there at once could have
sent officers Of my there TO attend 70 those matters
and perhaps made m stake in not doing So General
Halec afterwards ,oa that ought not 10 baye trust
cd TO them In Washington FOR the details 10 reply h. the


telegram had ordered p be sent General Woodbury. eIs
graphcd back that the p5noons would start on Sunday
morning probably. and certainly on Monday moruing,
which would have been the 10th or 18th OF November
and would have been in tim. They did not, however,
start until the 1911, aud "a lnstuss comp-::uoed rain.


ing which delayed them much, and .as roads became
bad, that when they go 10 D,mres they doa.sd the
pcntoons "a the WAGONS, Washington or steamer
and carried them down TO Aqua creek by water sending


the wagons around by land The poaoons did got here
TIL the 22d 23i Of November On the 10Th Of November


started the column down the road 20 fredericksburg
not knowing anything abou, shs delay Of tho starting OF


he ontoons becaSe The telegram anaoupc Tho daIav
did not reach warren,on Junction until had eft 70 come
down here with The troops and THAI telegram did not
reach tl arrived hero the morning cf the fotn
when it handed me by orderly who had brought
1t down to warrcntcn Junction. After reaching herer
cav at that there crossing the Rappahannock
with the army al that time Ut commenced raining and


he river began RISE not to any great extent bit did