Year: 1869

II President Grant accepts the amendment
to the tenure of Office law as friendly ana
substantial concession from the Senate, ne


must be incomparably ignorant of what con-
stitutes an insulting mockery. Not an inch OF
the power assumed by the Senate with res
pect to official changes is relinquished by the
amendment 1t merely modifes the original
law SO far as to permit temporary substitute
for an officer whom the President proposes to
remove, and to dispense the President from
the necessity of assigning specific reasons for
the removal. But the final decision remains
with the Senate. 1t is at the absolute discre-
ton of that body to say whether an incum-
bent shall be permanently displaced, or
whether he shall be continued in office In the
very teeth of the Presidents distinctly ex-
pressed wish to oust him. The effect is just
as though the Senate should make new ap-
pointment and force it upon the unwilling
acceptance of the nominal head of the execu-
tive department. This thing might be re-
peated in the case of every important subor-
dinate position, and the moral operation OF
this possibility can only be to transfer execu-
tive supremacy to the Senate, and to reduce
the independent executive authority of the
President to the point of virtual abolition.


1t is not to be denied that if there are grave
reasons why the Senate, an irresponsible body
managed by party caucus, should not exer-
cisA This ahsnlnfA control over tho executive
branch of the government there are reasons
almost, perhaps quite, as cogent, why tenure
of Office should not rest wholly upon the
arbitrary will and unexplained decision of
President who contemplates reelection for
power of removal with a paramount view to
this object is one that has seldom, perhaps
never, been resisted. General Grant, depend
upon it, is not among the exceptions, if there
be any. And yet the President oughtto have
the right of unconditional removal on account
of official corruption or ineficiency. Respon-
sibility on his part for the administration of
the executive department presumes at least
this extent of power as to the tenure of his
subordinates. No such power is left him by
the tenure of Office law in its original form, or
as the Senate proposes to amend it. And in
the latter shape the law would bestill more OBJ
jectionsble, from the fact that it authorizes the
President to make conditional removals from
entirely party or personal considerations, at
the possible sacrifice of official purity and ef-
fciency. If such motives are reinforced by like
motives on the part of the executive majority
in the Senate, the new appointment will be
confirmed and the old incumbent, however
incorruptible, competent and skillful, must
make way for the mere creature of personal
favoritism or political calculation. So must
this law work, if the proposed amendment be
adopted by the other house and signed by the
President. Gen. Grant cannot accept it
without humiliation. His reasons for propos-
ing removal, though not specially expressed,
would be canvassed in the imperious spirit of
conscious ascendency by the Radical caucus
of the Senate, and no officer could be remov-
ed, and no successor could be appointed, ex-
cept under their supreme decision. Hence if
he should still think of using the executive
patronage to promote his reelection to the
presidency, he could only do SO by entering
into degrading partnership with the Radical
caucus, laying at their feet all that is essential
to the dignity of his Office and walking humbly
in the shadow of their sovereign dictation.
He would have to submit, in short, to be their
automaton in the present administration, as
the price of their cooperation in dispensing
offices so as to put him in the way to perform
q similar part during another presidential
term. Win he sell himself in SO sorrya guise
to the Radical oligarchs of the Senate? A
short time must tell