Year: 1862

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL FRANKLIN.
Major General Franklin and examined
BY the Chairman


Question have the resolution OF the Senate
under which this Committee acting. Will you
go and slate in your what you deem il neces
sary to state.


Answer do not rcccllect the precise time but II was
just before moved from warrentcn, General Haeck
General Ncigs down there and had conference
with General Burnside. The result Of that confe-
renee, as understand it, that General Burn
side TO this army from warrenton
aud that vicinity to Fredericksburg aud not
the river here important part of thai
mcnt understand from General Burnside thst when
the advance OF his army arrived front OF Fredercs-
burg pen,oon traip enough build bridges
meet him there. ] know the Of the army did
arrive at Fredericksburg the proper tme but there
was no ponoon train to meet II there, and in conse-
qucnce Of that the army could not cross at the
line we expected 10 cross We were therefore, delayed
several days consequence Of the delay arrival Of
the pontoon train. After arriving here accumulated
provisions Tor twelve days. Then General Burnside
called council in which Il the unanimous opinion,


think, OF all the generals present that IL this river
could be crossed IL ought to be crossed, no
matter what might happen afterwards The point
Of crossing not then definitely determined upon but
thought at the time TO several miles fur


her down. Afterwards General Burnside called as TO-
gether again, and informed that he had determined TO
cross at tue two points at which finally did
] had no objection to that, but thought they
good as the point further down knew nothing
at ALL in fact, about the defcnces the other side IL
was not my business to know anything about them.
think the arrangements Cor the crossing all well
made at the time doubted our power to cross aud
do not believe we could have crossed had the enemy
chosen 70 prevent IT, And know from what have since
nd vvia vopio fbovr
prevented crossing at those two points they had
chosen. However as the committee know that cross.


ing successfully made under 81 fog and


my wing was concerned We get into position safely win
the loss OF very few men. Still in such posi-
the guns they had bearing upon US think that in the
course Of an hour our mon would have been scattered
that Il would have been impossible TO rally them For
unaecountabe they did not open their bat
teries. On the morning Of the 18Th instant made an
attack according to the order Of General Burnside /
and and prudent TO rus n ioash, the Whole strength
Of my command as far az cold and at the same time
keep my communication with the river open The reason
that we failed was tina, we had not troops enough 10
carry the points where The attack was made Under
the orders that were given, after we wcro press.
he held as far advance as IL possible 10 hold ID
and brought ~ all the troops in reserve TO hold that
ordered ordered to ccross S the rver and ni from wnas has
knew Of want Of success on the right
and centre as represented by their coinmanders
confess that believe the order 10 rccross was very
proper We sed the night Of the 10th without
the loss OF man, and with no troubleet all.


Question by ir. Gooch.-Bad the pontoons been here
the time Of the arrival of the army what would nave
probably been the resul2


Answer The probable result wouln have been that
the army much Of General Burnside supposes was
necessary, would have Immediately crossed the river,
driving away the enemy here perhaps FIVE hundred
thousand men, and they would have occupied the
very heights which have since been obliged TO attack
and that crossing would have bsen permanent and
csssful.


Qucetion.--Do you know whom rests the responsi.
bility Of the delay in fhe arrival Of .ne pontoonsp
snsYer.--l do not, officially.