Year: 1869

clearly the point at issue. Hence all con-
trasting of the avarice Of the gambler with
the pure aud holy feelings of benevolence to
his family that actuate the man who has his
life assured, is impertinent to the discussion.
The feelings of the gambler to his family
may be the same as those of the policy
holders, but neither have any reference to
the question under discussion. Between the
policy holder and the assurance company it
is purely business traisaction- in
which justice requires that full and fair
equivalent should be given for all that is re-
ceived; and here is where the right or
wrong of it is to be decided. DR.. B. has
shown that on the part Of company of six
hundred thousand it is safe business trans
action, but, in order to see its true nature,
let US view it from the position occupied by
the Individual member, and see whether his
conduct will tally with the principles Of
strict justice. We repeat, it is not ques-
tion of motives, but one Of dollars and cents
"a simple inquiry &hetass or not quid
pro quo has been given and received in the
transaction. If it has not, we do not see
how life assurance can be vindicated from
the charge that it and gambling rest on the
same fundamental principle. Our General



Assembly in speaking of lotteries (see
Baird's Digest, p. SO5,) lays down the doc
trine that call attempts of whatever kind to
acquire gain without giving an equivalent,
involve the gambling principle, and partici-
pate in the guilt which attaches to that
vice." DR.. B. says that the offence of gamb-
ling consists Sin stalking of the acquisi-
tion, or loss of property upon chance,
without sufficient valuable consideration"
We understand him as here agreeing with
the Assembly, unless perchance the words
Sufficient valuable consideration" are se-
lected to meet foreseen difficulty in the use
of more explicit terms. But is this consid-
GRAFTON given?


The whole gist of this discussion, in DR..
Baird's articles, is contained in few short
sentences which we quote: "The premi-
ums paid are indeed the consideration which
legally binds the society to payment of the
amount of the policy. But back of the
pecuniary parts of the transactions, there
was the mutual guarantee, given by each to
all, of provision for the family of each de-
cedent, in succession. The value of that
guarantee, and the adequacy of the means
provided by the system for its tulflment is
readily recognized, when we limit our view
to the half dozen individuals instanced
above In that case we suppose, no one
would dream Of impeaching the moral pro-
priety of the proceeding. And the princi-
pie remains precisely the same, if instead of
six we associate six hundred thousand. The
pledges of assurance rdssually given, which
are the real considerations governing all the
parties, being mutual are equivalent and
equal, and therefore respectively adequate. "
We cannot now examine atlength herather
remarkable reasoning here employed But
we must say that just at this juncture of the
questionable turning point Of the whole
discussion, we find general arguments, and
vague and indefinite, not to say equivocal
terms. We readily admit that the principles
involved are the same whether the society
consist of six or six hundred thousand men,
bers. But how does Dr. B. undertake to
show that the guarantee on the part of the
individual member is an equivalent for the
benefits received? Simply by the assertion
that it is "readily recognized when we limit
our view to half dozen individuals" and by
the supposition that, in that case, ''no one
would dream of impeaching tho moral pro-
priety of the proceeding"