Year: 1865

Among the unsuccessful attempts OF


the Army of the Potomac to reach anC


capture Richmond, none, perhaps, was


more disheartening and disastrous thar


that of the spring of 1863 The troops


we're never more confident of success


than when they left their winter camps


about Stafford and Falmouth In the grand
advance against the enemy at Fredericks-


burg. They had enjoyed a long season o1
rest, during which they had been abund-
antly Supplied with rations, clothing
equlpments,-al that could make an army


healthy, comfortable and efficient. Great
care had been paid to drill and discipline,
and the morale of the troops had been
fully restored They now went forth full
of hope and spirit, confident that victory
would perch upon their banners. Each
soldier carried eight days rations and 80
rounds of ammunition. Each was pro-
] vlded with an extra pair of shoes and a
full supply of new clothing and blankets.
| A pr0tracted campaign, replete with long
marches and severe battles, was anticipate
ed and provided for. But one result was
expected, viz: the overthrow and retreat
of the rebel army, and the investment
and capture of the Confederate Capital.
1t was bright and CHEEKY morning in
April when the vast army left it's canton
/ ments, and its various columns began to
1 HCHN lA6A1 way ON6Ea b10 plQ6-CiaQ nils
! toward the Rappahannock During the
night of the 29th two corps, the 11th and
/ 18th, reached the right bank of the Rap
| idan at Germania, and the other Corps.
excepting Sedwick S, had already crossed
at different points farther down. Thus
the first stage of the great movement was
successfully accomplished, and the main
body of the army had gained an advan


tageous position on the enemy's flank,
and was prepared to strike decisive
blow. But instead of taking the often
sive, as was expected, the defensive was
now assumed. Instead of attacking the
enemy, breaking his communications and
| hurling him back toward Richmond, our
proud and hopeful army took up its po-
sltion, intrenched, and awaited the COM
! ing of the rebel host. How Richmond
was. ever to be reached by this defensive
mode of warfare it is difficult to under
stand. @


| To the unfortunate llth Corps has been
| attached a great portion of the blame for
the failure of the campaign. The rank
aud file of that Corps were charged with
gross coWardice, and this, it was alleged.
| brought about the disaster of the I'd of
! May and the final retreat of the whole
army. SO far as the main portion of the
/ troops of that Corps is concerned this is
an unjust calumny. There is nothing
meaner than that spirit which ISLANDERS
another In order to divert attention from
ones own guilt And of the degrees of
that meaDness, that is the lowest which
would attach the charge of cowardice to
brave men who bore many honorable
scars and whose fallen comrades were
streWn on half a score of battle-felds, in
order to cover up official negligence and
incapacity.


At this time the 11th Corpse number
ed about ten thousand electives, being
| the smallest in the army After crossing
at Germania it moved eastward along the
! plank road toward Charlottesville and
was placed In position about two and a
| half miles from that point, its lines ex
| tending nearly parallel with the plank
road, that is, east and west, and facing
| southwark. The Corps was thus detach-
| ed about two miles from all other portions
of the army, and its fanks were left hang
! ing in the air. All around it was the
thick and tangled wilderness, affording an
excellent mask to all the movements of
! the enemy In its rear, about three miles
distant, was the Rappahannock, to which
stream, also, our line of battle was nearly
parallel.


A glance at the map will show to the
merest tyrO In military affairs the weak
ness of this arrangement. 1t will be seen
at once that our line instead of extending
parallel to the plank road should have
been formed at right angles to this road,
and its direction thus have been changed
from east and west to north and south
Instead of there being a vacancy of near
! ly two miles between our left and the
J right of the 18th Corps, our flank should
| have joined with that Corps. Instead of
our right flank being left in air, thus
tempting the enemy to come and turn 1t
and gain the highway to our bridges, our
only means of retreat, that flank should
have rested on the river, or, at least, have
extended in that direction, thus covering
the approaches to the ford.


But an unfortunate fatality seems to
| have controlled everything that was done
on this unhappy day. After the lines


were formed according to this pernicious


arrangement, the troops were permitted


to stack their arms and lounge idly in the


sun, when they should have been improv-
ing every moment in fortifying their po-
sition. The keen eye of Jackson detect


ed our Incidence and weakness and he


was not slow to take the advantage offer


ed him. With about thirty thousand


men he stealthily moved to our right, de-
ceiving our unwary Generals into the be-


lief that he was falling back toward Cor


louisville. A force was sent in pursuit.


which skirmished with his rear guard


and sent back the enthusiastic report thai


the rebel army was retreating. A brig


ade or two from the 11th Corps was sem


out to reconnoitre, thus weakening still


more the small force with which we were


expected to hold what was termed the
; position of the field. Toward evening i


began to appear that hostile skirmisher,


were advancing upon our right flank anC
rear. Repeated reports to this effect were
sent to the Division and Corps command
! ers, but no apparent heed was given tt


them Regimental commanders lmplor
: ed the privilege of changing their front
, as the enemy was evidently approaching
their rear and would soon fire into the
backs of their men. But they were sneer
ingly dismissed with the remark that wher


they were needed to give information they
would be called for. Quietly, stealthily
as the tiger approaches its unsuspectinl


prey, Jackson pressed his lines through
the dense Jungle down upon the flank anf
rear of the 1st Division. His troops were
formed in successive columns, well IL
hand. supporting each other, and he was


prepared as with clenched fist and tense


ly drawn muscle, to strike one of those


smashing, annihilating blows for which
! he was characteristic. When all was


ready it is said, l know not how truly
: that he kneeled by tree and feryently
praved for the success Of his enterprise
, He then ordered his columns to spring
forward at once to the attack Instantly
; the crashing volleys of musketry roareC
tbrough the deeD forest like the hoarsG