Year: 1863

in case our army should be repulsed and
eventually defeated, thus losing all the
advantages gained at Gettysburg, and
placing Lee completely in mastery of the
situation. The country, they thought,
depended, at this .juncture, on the erist-
ence of the Army of the Potomac The
. reports of the demOralizatiOn of the enemy
were known to be exaggerated; and the
| desperateness of his condition, if defeated,
would tend to make the battle desperate
beyond comparison.


Gen Meade acted as Il prudent man
would have done. The question was,
should he order blind attack when igno-
rant of all essential matters, having there
| fore no clear view that success was prob
able against splendidly-posted, desperate
and powerful enemy, when his five corps
commanders advised against it, and when
to be defeated was to lose all the benefit
Of the p st victories, and to place the North
and Washington again at the command of
Lee and his army? Had he seen his own
way reasonably clear to victory, he should
have discarded advice and Overruled his
subordinates. But no General-in-C Chief
would have right to imperil so much
when his mind was not clear that he would
| win.


The next day after the council was spent
| in making examinations of the enemy's
position. They all resulted in showing him
in great force, and very strongly posted.
But having acquired this fuller, though
not complete knowledge, General Meade,
stronger by delay, determined on an at
tack the day after. That night Gen. Lee
escaped, to the surprise of ala surprise
which has had its counterpart more than
once during this war. Such was the sur
prise OF Lee himself when Burnside escaped
at Fredericksburg, and Hooker at Chan
cellorville; of Halleck when Beauregard
got away at Corinth.


On one important fact the public are
greatly misintormed. 1t is generally sup
posed that Gen. Lees army was crossing
during the day which succeeded the coun
Gil of war, so that only part of it lay op-
posed to Meade for some hours. Such is
not the case. Not man in Lees army
left his lines till after dark. Had Meade
attacked that day, he would have found
Lees whole army in force, ready to re-
ceIve hin.


Disappointment at the result no one
can blame. Indeed, the chief actors, the
corps commanders and the General-in-
Chief were most disappointed of all. But
dissatisfaction and censure, such as some
journals express and hint, seem positively
unjust. 1t is very improbable that an at
tack upon Lee, in that position, with his
numerous artillery crowning the heights
and commanding the defies and roads,
could have been successful. But to have
authorized such an attack by General
subjected to the responsibilities which be-
longed to Gen. Meade, after the victory
at Gettysburg, it should have been plain
and clear that the chances were in favor
of success.


General Meade is, in many respects,
differently situated from those heretofore
in command of the Army OF the Potomac
He has had no newspaper claquers in the
camp or out Of it. His present post fell
to his lot through the wish of his brother
soldiers. To no one was his designation
to the important position he holds great
er surprise than to himself. Only sense
of duty determined him to accept it He
seeks no personal exaltation now When
ever it is for tie interest of the cause that
another should take his place, that mo-
ment, those who know him are perfectly
assured, he will be prepared cheerfully to
vacate his position. 1t is his cherished
opinion that personal considerations should
be entirely discarded in this momentous
contest. All he pretends to is the char
acter of an honest soldier, sincerely try
ing to do his duty to the best of his abili-
ty. Such man should receive from all
good citizens earnest regard and support
We have had few such in prominent sta
tiOns They are the men needed The
few we have seen, required but little
time and patient judgment to justify
their selection. Such men were Lyon,
Grant, Rosecrans, Banks. The salvation
of the country depends on the earnest
support by the Administration and the
people of this class Of men.


We say this because. We find some are
ready to blame and deoet general Meade,
Notwithstanding his wonderful Success. II,
on the early morning of Sune 2S, when he'
was notified that he must lead an army,
he had said to the country, Twill you be
satisfied if, within week, Lee and his ar
my slink away defeated from the State
they have invaded, and within a month
shall have to retreat beyond the Kappa
hammock, their prestige gone, one-third of
them hors du combat, obliged not only to
give up the invasion of the free North,
but to abandon the coveted crops of the
valley of the Shenandoah itself before
they were gathered I'M? what would have
been the response? All this he has done.
But because beside this, which seemed
impossible being done, he has not per-
ftrmed actual impossibility not pre-
vented Lees retreat and captured all his
forces, there is disposition to murmur if
not to decry. aa