Year: 1861

courts, but that is the incidental effect
and not the intention of the law, if it
may be construed in accordance with
its title, our State constitution and the
decisions of the Supreme Court Of the


United States applicable to the subject.


The case of Prigg vs. Pennsylvania,


decided by the Supreme Court of the


United States in January 1912, has


been often cited to show the unconsti-
nationality of these three sections of
our law of 1855. Inasmuch as the
volume containing it is not ordinarily
accessible, it may be well to give brief
history of the case, of the question be-
fore the court, and of the decision


made, with glance at the opinions ex-


pressed, which were liz no sense i'm


portant to the judgment rendered.


Edward Prigg was indicted in York


county, Pennsylvania, " for leaving,


with force and violence, taken and


carried. away from that county, to the


State OF Maryland, certain negro


woman, named Margaret Morgan, with


a design and intention of selling and


disposing of and keeping her as slave
or servant for life, contrary to statute


of Pennsylvania passed on the 26th of


March, 1896" and convicted on a spec
ial verdict by the Court of Oyer and


Terminer. On writ of error to the


Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the
Judgment was affirmed, and the case


was then brought on second writ of
error to the Supreme Court of the


United States. The Pennsylvania act
of 1926, entitled " An act to give effect
to the provisions of the constitution of
the United States relative to fugitives


from labor, for the protection of free


people of color, and to prevent kidnap-


ping" is set forth in the special verdict,


and provides penalties for any person


taking and carrying away from any


part Of the State, to another State, any


negro or mulatto, with the intent that


such negro or mulatto shall be sold as


slave or servant for life, and also a


mode for the rendition of fugitive slaves


somewhat similar to the Federal law of


1898, and well calculated to be effective


for that purpose. The special verdict





the slave for life of Margaret Ashmore,


who resided in the State of Maryland,


and that the defendant Prigg was duly


appointed the agent and attorney of


the owner of the slave, and in that ca


pacity took the negro woman, without


any process of law authorizing him so


to do, from the county of York to the
State of Maryland, and delivered her


to her mistress. The law of Pennsyl-


vania evidently contemplated that all


persons should be subject to the penal


ties for Kidnapping who did not at first
procure an order for the return of the
} fugitive in accordance with the law for
that purpose.


Upon this state of facts the court


reversed the judgment of guilty ex-


pressly upon the ground that, "In vir-


tue of the constitution, the owner OF


the slave is clothed with the authority
by himself or agent, in every State OF
the Union, to seize and recapture his


slave wherever he can do it without
breach of the peace or illegal violence. u
1t was only necessary to the decision
made that the PENNSYLVANIA statute
should be declared void in so far as it
provided for the punishment of those
who, as owners or agents, took and
carried away slaves from that Common
wealth to another, without the warrant
J of proper magistrate. In so far as
the Court went in deciding that the
, clause of the constitution relating to
the rendition of persons held to service
or labor gave to the masters of escap'


ing slaves the right of recapture in all
the States, and thus might "properly
be said to execute ITSELF" the decision
; is evidence of law, and is to be received
as such in all courts and places, equally
: with other authoritative rulings of the
highest judicial tribunals. But, in SC
: far as the court assumed to deliver
; opinions unnecessary to determine the
! question of the guilt or innocence o.
: Edward Prigg, the conclusions OF the
court are of no binding force upon that
f or other courts. Yet, inasmuch as the


States of Maryland and Pennsylvania
, had specially authorized their ables
: counsel to appear at the bar of the
5 court, and inasmuch as other questions
, were, apparently by consent, argued
, before the Judges, it is conceded tha
r the opinions placed on record have
: more than usual weight, and are euti
D tied to be respectfully considered. Th,
: obiter dicta of this case are no more tt
5 be regarded than those of many others
|, aptly characterized, in some instances
e as " the idle gable of Judge"


r Incidently a majority of the judges
S declared that the power to legislate fo
) the rendition of fugitive slaves belong
y exclusively to Congress, and hence tha
f all State laws enacted for that purpos,
n were absolutely void and of no effect
o From this opinion three of the Judge
; dissented, and the very able opinion
s of Chief Justice fancy and justice
!. Thompson are sufficient to raise SOM
g doubt as to the ultimate decision of tn
# question. 1t was also declared by
J. majority of the Judges in substance
=. that the fugitive slave law of 1898 wa
e only constitutional in so far as it author
it lied proceedings before a. Circuit o
J. District Judge of the United States
= and that the magistrates of counties
o cities and townships had no authorit
it to carry IL into effect. although REQUIRE,