Year: 1864

1t is we'll understood that the assaults
upon the rebel defenses of Petersburg were
attended with serious losses,-though 10
some quarters they have been exaggerated
and that the result was in Il slight degree
only advantageous to our arms. The reas-
on for the attempt was the fact that the
possession of the rebel works would give
Gen. Grant the control of the city and its
approaches, and render the escape of the
rebel forces impracdcable. The possibility
of such "A result justifes the risk of the
undertaking. Itis now pretty well settled,
however, that hencefOrward the army will
lay siege TO Petersburg, Interrupt effectu-
ally ali communication of the railways
passing through that city, and take ad-
vantage of every opportunity TO harass the
rebels by breaking the DanVille and Lynch
burg roads, and wait for the time when
the enemy will be compelled to seek relief
from the pressure by taking the initiative.
This time cannot be long delayed. The
position OF Richmond ia not unlike that Of
Vicksburg from the I6Ih OF May To the Ash
of July, 1868. Gen. Grants army prevent
ed ali communication between the city and
the country east of the Mississippi river
while the river itself, commanded by our
gun0oats, separated the city from the ter
ritOry on the west. To be sure, Richmond
can CLEAN the state OF Virginia on the LETT
of the James river, but the rsvages of war
have left little for the subsistence of the
army; while the control of the railways
named will compel the abandonment OF the
rebel capital. When this will happen can
not now be toreseen; that it will happen
is reasonably certain.


noe AND HoMISY TIE BEST RATIoss.


1t is au admitted fact, well demonstrated
by the appearance OF the rebel prisoners
in camp and hospital, that the sanitary
condition of the rebel army is equal, it not
superior to that of our own, and the stten.
tion OF practical and scientific men is di-
rected earnestly to inquiries into the cause
OF this extraordinary and unexpected fact.
In 1862 the rebels were far inferior to our
men in recuperative powers, especially
when subjected to severe or capital sur
gical operations; but it is now observed
that their condition mas greatly improved,
while our soldiers have lost rather than
gained IN power of endurance. Strange
as it may seem, there are eminent medical
men who attribute the Improvement of the
rebel army to the sim piicity and diminished
quantity OF Tations; being at present limited
TO sixteen ounces of corn meal aud four
ounces of bacon per day. This diet is
very nutricious, and when men are engaged
in active out uOOr pursuits, it must be very
healthy. Vegetables are furnished, but not
regularly or upon any system. Occasiou-
ally the soldiers obtain small quantities of
sugar, molasses, coffee and rice Corn
meal is not often used by our soldiers, and
il is never issued as a part of their ratious.
Neither bacon nor pork is much used.
The TODD of our soldiers is -four bread
(hard or soft), fresh beef, (tbe cattle gen.
orally being driven along with the army,
and killed while heated by exercise, and
eaten before the animal heat is expelled)
coffee is added and vegetables occasionally.
We have boasted of the superiority of our
army rations over those OF the rebels, but
it is by no means certain that the necessi.
ties of our enemies may not have led them
to aaystem which will work revolution
in the commissariat department OF the
army OF the United States and of the armies
of other nations when engaged in active
service.


WHAT has LEE DONE WITH HIS ARMYT


There are various conjectares as to the
position and purposes of Lees army, the
most reasonable OF which is large part of
his force has left Richmond aud joined
Johnston. 1t is possible to hold Richmond
and Petersburg with moderate force, say
fifty thousand men. The remainder of the
rebel army may be employed against Sher-
man with a reasonable expectstio on the
part of the rebels of driving him to the
passes of the mountains, IutIcting cousid-
erable loss and breaking his cOmmunica-
tions with Chattanooga. They may even
hope to destroy the army OF the southwest
and then to concentrate formidable force
tor the relief OF Richmond. Ii is quite
apparent that this is our danger in military
matters. If, however, as we may well
hope, the joint expedition against Sher-
man should prove failure or be long de-
layed, the consequences to the rebels would
be disastrous. Their ability TO raise the
siege of Richmond would depend upon sue
cess, speedily and decisive in Georgia.


THE SITUATION IN GEORGIA.


The gradual advance of Sherman and
the occupation of Marietta by our forces
an indication that the rebels have abandon
the right bank of he.ChattahOOchie,-de-
moustrate the impossioility of either party
forcing decisive battle upon the other
Hence it is possible that the concentration
of large force for the defense of Atlanta
would merely check Sherman withontin-
Yolving him 10 defeat or disaster. he has
now before him the hazardous undertaking
OF crossing the ChattahoochiesriTer in the
presence of the enemy. Ii this shall be
accomplished, Johnston must abandon At
lauta without great delay, for the town Is
so situated with reference to the river that


supplies can be cut off entirely. We are then
to anticipate the most obstinate resistance
to this enterprise. II Johnston's army has
been reinforced, its power will be manifest
ed in a vigorous defense OF the river line,
and as Sherman's dispatches show that be


was moving towards the river upon two


roads, the contest will not be delayed. II
no increase OF rebel strength Is exhibited