Year: 1862

Question. What was the extent of the cas-
ualties on our side resulting from all the fight
ing?


Answer. It will not fall far from 10000
men killed, wounded and missing.


Question. What is the present condition
of our troops here?


Answer. As far as my knowledge and in
formation goes it is good.


Question. Do you or not consider your
troops demoralized or the efficiency of our ar
my impaired, except so far as it has been from
the loss of so many men?


Answer. l do not. l would add here, that
although at the time l ordered the column
of attack to be formed on the morning after
the battle, thought the enemy's works could
be carried and adhered to that opinion during
that day. l afterwards became convinced that
that could not have been done owing to the
great strength of the enemy, the time given
them for reinforcing, and the belief also of our
officers that it could not be done. l accord
| ingly teegraphed to the President of the Uni
ted States that l withdrew our army because
l felt that the enemys position could not be
carried.


The following is from Gen. Summers testi-
mony:


/ consider the crossing of the river, under
the circumstances, very creditable thing. and
| also consider the retreat, under the circum-
stances, as very creditable. There was not
| gun or anything else lost. The entire army
returned without accident.
| would like to add here, because it was al
most the only occasion when the General COM
manding and myself have differed in regard to
any point-that was, l did not wish to relin-
quish Fredericksburg. l thought we could
! have held it with single division by posting
our batteries right. 1t would not have been
| giving up an expedition, but simply a change
of tactics. That is the way in which viewed
it. That We would just be drawing back
| little, in order to try it again. was there
fore strongly in favor Of holding Fredericks-
burg; Others were not. Perhaps l was the
only officer of rank who was of that opinion.
thought it would present better and diff
ferent appearance If we continued to hold the
town. We could have commanded it any time
with our artillery, and we can do so now. L
do not think there was any danger Or difficult
ty in holding it. But l may have been mis-
taken.


Question. Do you know any reason why
the pontoon bridges did not arrive earlier?


Answer. l do not.


Question. You know nothing on that sub
iect?


Answer. do not. ! expected as matter
of course to find them here when came, or
very soon afterwards


Question. If you had found them here as
you expected, what would, in your opinion,
have been the result?


Answer. | should have taken the crest in
the rear of the town on that night or the fol-
lowing day. Not considering Fredericksburg
as being of any consequence, except as being
on the road to Richmond, i should have pass
ed through the town and taken possession of
the crest.


Question. Are there any fords above here
which might have been crossed?


Answer. There are several fords on this
~ -
them would be practicable perhaps.


Question. mean, were there any practical
BILE fords at the time you did cross, and if so,
where were they?


Answer There is rough cavalry ford
down by the upper bridge at Falmouth, where
horsemen sometimes go over, but that ford de-
pends upon the tide, which rises above the
town. The tide was in when ] arrived here,
which was in the afternoon. The tide was
then receding, and citizen told me that it
would not be possible to get anything over the
ford until after dark. That ford is represent
ed to me as being deep ford. A few men
can skip from rock to rock, few men at a
time, but there are occasionally deep holes
from six to eight feet deep; such ford would
never be considered practicable for marching
troops over.


Question. What reasons do you assign for
not crossing either above or below where the
enemy lave fortified?


Answer. The reason was this: We did not
attempt to turn their left flank, because there
is slack of water, navigation being taken out
of the river some two miles above here, and
brous within tho beein at tho nnner end of
the town.


Gen. Franklln's statement did not disagree
materially from those given above; all the
Generals thought the river should be cressed,
and the arrangements were well made and
well executed. He attributed the disaster to
the failure Of the pontoon bridges, but did not
know who was in fault, Both he and Sumner
denied the decentralization of the army


Gen. Hooker thought if the enemy had
known at the time of the re-crossing of the
river, their artillery could have done little mis-
chief to our forces on account OF the darkness
of the night


Gen. Woodbury., who had charge of the En-
gineer brigade, received orders Nov 18th to
call upon Chief Quartermaster Bueher to
transport pontoons, &c. He says:


On the 10th, fearing that the land train
would not arrive in time, had thirty pontoon
wagons shipped to Belle Plain. These were
delayed by rough weather, and did not arrive
until the 22d. These wagons were loaded on
the 22d, and pontoon train was taken TO
headquarters on the morning OF the oath, by
means of teams which had come down with
the army.


Gen. Halleck's orders to me of the 18th
made it apparent that the army was preparing
to march to Fredericksburg As to the time
when the movement would be made never
received any information; fearing, however,
that the movement would be precipitate,
went to Gen. Hallecks Office and urged him to
delay the movement some five days, In order
that the necessary preparations might be made
to ensure its success. To this he replied that
he would do nothing to delay for an instant
the advance of the army upon Richmond |
rejoined that my suggestion was not intended
to cause delay, but rather TO prevent it.


The substance Of Gen. Halleck's testimony,
as far as published. is that there was not any
agreement or understanding between him and
Gen. Burnside that the pontoons and army
stores, or either of them, should be furnished
to him by the authorities at Washington with
out his looking after them himself Nothing
definite was decided upon as to the time it
would take. Gen. Burnside was of the opin-
ion when he (Halleck) left him, that he would
cross portion of his force at the fords above
the junction Of the rivers and the residue at
| Falmouth.


! Question. Since Gen. Burnside has been in
! command of the army of the Potomac have all
its movements been made according to his
! judgment and directions so far as you know
Answer. Yes, sir, entirely
Question-tby Mr.. Wright.) l understood