One of the more interesting things that I believe this period will contribute to the field of economics is the question of investment vs spending.

That savings become investment because the bank can only make money when the money it holds works for it, is a principle that we all learn in Econ, however after the Mortgage crisis and the response to it, there has been a twist. For very large banks, and for most US citizens they only have very large banks to interact with, they stopped investing in the outer layers of the economy. Banks stopped lending to a large swath of people in part because as a large portion their deposits could be consolidated into very large pools which were used in more abstract investment schemes. Even today if you read Bank of America's annual report you will note that their investments benefit a much smaller percentage of the population than they have in the past[1]. There are merchant banks that are investing in local infrastructure but retail banks, historically a big component in that area, still suffering from the malaise of the breakdown between banking and trading which still has a cloud over them.

I don't think the book is written yet on the entirety of the challenges set up by the consolidation of capital, it certainly will provide fodder for a number of Phds in the discipline :-) But the events of the last 15 years have shown us that when you consolidate large amounts of capital into the hands of a few, their choices on investing it disenfranchise a number of previously valid capital markets. You will note that it is tied in with Piketty's observations and others about dis-contiguous capital pools. When the .01% start disenfranchising the the .99% it might feel to us in the 99% like the Gods fighting amongst themselves on Olympus, but it seems to have really material effects at a micro and macro economic level.

I am convinced, although I don't feel that my belief is widely held, is that direct transfer payments in BI (or UBI) schemes "work" because they force capital diffusion. And it is the market forces that seek to consolidate that capital that pull the capital through the economy. I originally held the opinion that such diffusion, which has to come at the cost of taxing those capital pools in the first place, would remove the incentives for those people to collect it (the old 'communist trap' you learn about, if you're not going to get to keep it, why work for it). The change though is the force multiplier effect of modern technology which has increased productivity for those who employ it far far above that of previous workers. That and a growing inefficiency of the existing transfer payments system have suggested we may have reached that point where the combined increase in efficiency of abolishing welfare and a modest tax on very large capital consolidations could provide an outsized economic benefit. The danger (or the trick of it if you will) is to manage the capital burden so that it remains a positive benefit. You essentially want a 'leaky bucket' algorithm for capital diffusion. Which is why I expect that until the next shoe "drops" which is the complete relaxation on the energy component[2], such systems will never be sufficient, in and of themselves, to be a 'living stipend'.

[1] I realize that much of Bank of America is trying to unwind some disastrous CountryWide mortgages.

[2] That would occur if we were to crack the fusion problem such that energy production was no longer limited by external factors.