1. How heavily have you actually looked into this issue? The first time I was forced to do my homework on this subject was for a school project (5 years ago, IIRC) and I was blown away by two things that ran completely against the "informed" opinion I had developed by passively consuming media. First, the professionalism, restraint, and abundance of goodwill gestures I saw coming out of Monsanto (see: their press releases, their research papers, and their stance on terminator genes). Second, the extent to which Monsanto's political adversaries were willing to lie and intentionally mislead in order to pursue their objectives (see: Percy Schmeiser, the Seralini paper, Greenpeace's Terminator Gene media sprint). My preconceptions going into the project were astonishingly far from the truth -- they were the exact opposite of it. If your intent is to be fair, that means considering both sides of the story and trying to determine where the truth lies. Be honest with yourself: have you actually done this for the Monsanto/GMO debate? Or have you let your political view align itself to that of the news articles that occasionally percolate through your feeds (as I had done)?

2. I don't recall disingenuously talking about nuclear power from only the technical side. You are correct to note that the discussion should revolve around whether or not we have the technology to account for human error. You are incorrect to assume that the discussion in the corresponding academic, industrial, and regulatory circles does not revolve around this matter. "Technology has failed to take certain kinds of failures and human errors into account, therefore technology can never be expected take enough failures and human errors into account to be made safe" is a very defeatist attitude of the precise variety that TFA was complaining about. It's the lazy conclusion that dystopian SF authors default to in order to sound profound and relevant without wading waist-deep through boring technical analysis (which is what you need to do to actually be profound and relevant).

> Much of what happened in Fukushima can be chalked up to the human factor.

Straw man. Just like software engineers don't dismiss UX problems by saying "there's nothing to be done about stupid users," nuclear engineers don't dismiss catastrophes (hypothetical or actual) by saying "there's nothing to be done about stupid regulators." Instead, they find a way to fix the human problem by using the technology at their disposal. That's their job and they're quite good at it.

Unfortunately, there is ~50years of lag between industrial best practices and the point at which we can evaluate the safety record of said best practices. The first academic nuclear reactor was constructed 70 years ago. The first commercial nuclear reactor was constructed 60 years ago. Fukushima was built 50 years ago. 45 years ago, the mode of failure that did it in was discovered and corrected in new designs. Still, it's quite correct to note that the safety practices of nuclear engineers 50 years ago were not robust to mismanagement (which would have retrofitted or retired the reactor). But that has little bearing on the question of whether or not the safety practices of nuclear engineers today are robust to poor regulation, and that's the question that is relevant to our policy regarding new reactors. I'm convinced that today's safety practices are robust to poor oversight. Robust enough to make them an extremely compelling alternative, in any case.

3. How is that relevant to commercial GMO development?