You're right. I don't think I understand your point because I don't think you know what your point is.

Are you trying to advance the theory that management had no hand in the terrible decision-making around TMI, including the numerous shortcuts that Cringely noted (nb: you are hardly using an engineering approach when you resort to ad hominem criticism of Cringely as a "journalist" without responding to any of the legitimate problems he noted). Or are you trying to advance the theory that no engineering mistakes were made at TMI?

And are you trying to advance the theory here that somehow, magically, management will not continue to make NASA-like management mistakes in current and future nuclear facilities?

Because if so, that's precisely Feynman's point, which you seem to be ignoring.

And c'mon, you're merely moving goal-posts around when you focus on the severity of Chernobyl vs TMI. That isn't speaking at all to how technology was misused in both instances by people making exactly the kinds of errors Feynman emphasizes.

> A Chernobyl-style incident will never happen with a LWR reactor [emphasis added]. That much is known, and the experts - nuclear engineers - are unanimous on this point [emphasis added].

Really? Never? Unanimous? That sounds like a really interesting engineering judgment. Could you kindly link to the unanimous consensus statement from nuclear engineers that support that strong but odd statement?

Because that sounds an awful lot like NASA management who claimed that the chances of loss of a space shuttle were so remote as to be negligible.

And your statement is even more curious when we read review papers like the one[1] from nuclear engineer Bah Sehgal[2] of the National Academy of Engineering, who concludes:

"The presently-installed LWR plants in Western countries have been addressing their safety performance from the day they were installed and operating...Clearly, not all the severe accident issues have been resolved for the presently-installed plants [emphasis added].

"The presently-installed LWR plants made improvements in components, systems, operator training, man-machine interface, safety culture, etc., thereby significantly reducing the probability of a severe accident occurring. They also instituted severe accident management backfits, systems and procedures, which are providing assurance of the elimination of an uncontrolled and large release of radioactivity even in case a severe accident occurs. Still, the presently-installed plants can not provide assurance of coolability of a melt pool/debris bed, which could be formed during a bounding severe accident. In that situation, the LWR owner can not assure the public that the accident has been terminated and that there is no further danger of the release of radioactivity. [emphasis added]"

Sorry. It is you with your pronouncements of never who is absolutely not getting Feynman's point whatsoever. In particular, he decried management and others with their own wishful pronouncements of never, which stood in stark contrast with the concerns of engineers who were well aware that there were quantifiable and real risks associated with their technology.

[1] http://www.kns.org/jknsfile/v38/JK0380697.pdf

[2] https://www.nae.edu/69277.aspx