The intelligence agency whose massive scope and pervasive operational shortcomings were recently exposed by one low-level operative had a slip-up in applying a well-publicized tactic to an obviously high value target.

A few comments:

• This "low-level operative" was a system administrator who used social engineering to obtain other people's authentication credentials and gain access to material to which he wasn't authorized. He wasn't the janitor or some clueless field agent.

• Did Snowden expose operational shortcomings? Absolutely. A lot of the programs that have been publicly revealed through his leaks have been running for over a decade without ever seeing the light of day, though. That tells me these "pervasive operational shortcomings" aren't very pervasive. (If they were, the NSA would be absolute shit at their mission.)

• I don't think Andrea is a "high value target," or at least high value enough to risk compromising whatever method they might use to bug her keyboard. I don't say this to belittle her or her work in any way — she seems to be a skilled programmer/hacker/infosec person. And that's exactly why this whole "the NSA is bugging her keyboard" theory doesn't make any sense.

Let's assume for the sake of argument that the NSA had planned to bug her keyboard, and that keyboard is now sitting in an NSA (or contractor) facility in/near Alexandria, Virginia, waiting for some modification to be made before shipping it back out. But, oops, they screwed up and forgot to fake the USPS tracking information. They know she knows because she tweeted about it. She's also tweeted that she can never trust the keyboard if/when it shows up. Why would they ship her a bugged keyboard at this point? If/when the keyboard shows up, she's probably going to take it apart and share anything interesting she finds with the world. There will be hard evidence.

Even if they hadn't bungled the tracking information in our hypothetical argument, they're risking exposure of the exact methods they use to bug a machine for not much potential gain. (Remember, Andrea's a skilled hacker/programmer. There's a very good chance she'll figure out what's going on and tell the world if she has any inkling that her laptop's been tampered with.)

• The keyboard she ordered fits a ThinkPad T60/T61/T400/T500 (and the equivalent "R" models, plus a few others). Internally, the keyboard and TrackPoint speak PS/2. While they could log keystrokes to an on-board chip and transmit keystrokes via radio, there aren't any especially interesting things the NSA can do to her laptop via a modified keyboard. They certainly won't be rooting it that way.

• I said that I don't think Andrea is a "high value target," despite her work on Tor, because everything about Tor is open. Anyone can download the code and see exactly how it works. The protocol is well-known. There's no curtain to peek behind and gain strategic information about Tor's workings.

So while I don't reject the argument that the NSA is trying to bug her laptop as impossible, I think it's exceedingly improbable. My money's still on "seller screwed up the tracking number."

I also like the part where the NSA is guarded by the Catch-22 "it wasn't them, because if it was, you'd never know", such that that there's no scenario in which you could be convinced that the NSA did anything.

The flip side of this argument, which everyone here seems to be clutching onto and running with, is that if the NSA is capable of it, they're doing it at every available opportunity, even when it doesn't make any sense to.