I have a couple of stories that I want to share. One of which has taught me a lesson about being too trusting.

I am both:

1) A venture partner (Toba Capital) where I manage existing investments, do diligence on potential new ones, and make decisions regarding how capital is allocated; and:

2) A founder / CEO (Codenvy), a development cloud with a browser IDE front-end, often times called a cloud IDE.

This article resonates with me as I can see the perspective from both sides of the coin. As a rule, in venture capital, myself and my firm does not sign an NDA. The basic rationale is that it's virtually impossible to resolve all of the potential conflicts that are associated with the NDA from both firms. So, we go with the basic principle is that we need to trust the people we are talking with and vice versa. Our reputations and history of deals / interactions are the best guide and we openly tell people up front that if there is information that is secret for themselves, they should withhold it until they have a chance to do background checks on us. In some cases, there are startups that are so secretive that we cannot infer anything at all, and we just have to politely decline and move forward.

A couple of interesting scenarios playing for me recently. I sit on the board of Sauce Labs, a cloud test company. But my venture firm recently inherited a stake in Smart Bear, a QA vendor where there are edges of competition. While neither vendor sees the other as competitive, the optics of the situation to an outsider could suggest otherwise. So in this case, we have opted to create a chinese firewall inside of Toba where I do not listen in on core data provided by Smart Bear, even though their CEO said this wasn't an issue.

Another scenario that came up recently was a referral to explore a pre-funded startup idea around making database querying easier for non-SQL expects. The referral was a warm one to the founder. We asked for the usual background information to make a surface area assessment. The input given was a very limited sales presentation with a couple screen shots and a few accompany statements from the founder that they presented to a VC and that the VC recited their entire pitch to them. And then that person stated they would only work with people who had their same vision. When probing for more thorough information, the founder became a bit squirrely, which is probably due to some sort of discomfort around sharing stuff. But there wasn't an NDA requested, and we could only conclude that maybe their claims of awesomeness were slightly exaggerated.

Now for the story around trusting too much. With my Codenvy CEO hat on in January we had recently closed our Series A for $9M in January. It was a great feeling as it took us over 6 months of raising to close it. And let me tell you, just because you a valley VC doesn't make it any easier to close your own firm's financing. Post funding we were looking at strategies for how we could grow faster. We came across a likely competitor that had 2 people part of the business and based in Europe that had raised a small amount of seed funding (<$300K). It was obvious to us that there was some great talent in the team and their focus on the market was complementary to our own. We felt that it would cause both companies to grow much faster if we could merge and join forces. They were interested and we all met together to discuss what a game plan might look like. Of course, in that conversation, we shared specifics around how we were envisioning the next 12 months to look like. We made an offer and they opted to pass. No big deal. But where we learned our lesson was that about 5 months later, this summer they released a number of features that were -- somewhat -- reflections of the vision we had shared with them, all the way down to them calling the features the same marketing brands we had ear marked. At the time, we felt foolish and anger around their ethics of the situation, and it was particularly irritating to our own engineers that they were beat in the market. There were many discussions around this, and it raises the question of how you discuss potential plans around an acquisition / investment, if you are afraid they may steal the ideas.

In the end, it's all good as we have learned some stuff:
1) The acquisition would have certainly failed. How could we have worked with people who have thin ethics?
2) We have subsequently released everything they heard from us, and our approach to everything is a) more mature, b) more scalable, c) better received. We learned that while they could take the surface area ideas, they haven't been able to exploit them to their true meaning the way they were intending.
3) Our engineers found a new form of competitive motivation that didn't exist before these - trusted - individuals decided to pawn some of their ideas. The entire culture, motivation and mindset within our (rather large) engineering office has developed into a killer instinct. And as a leader I find this trait as crucial to long term success. I am unsure if this killer instinct would have developed as quickly without this incident.

So, the issues in the article are real, and they show up when you least expect them. I think, going forward, I am just going to keep thinking about being truthful, keep my ethics high, and work with people who are the same. I'll sleep easy at night as a result.