I can't make him out to be a buzzword slinger. I've listened to quite a bit of his show (although admittedly very little from the past year or so) and he definitely demonstrates good knowledge. Listening to him talk, my impression is that he brings the security mindset[1] to the table, rare among snake-oil peddlers or charlatans.

I think one of the main problems is that people in a field are generally critical of people who translate that field to a wide audience. You see that play itself out over and over. And that's what Steve does with his show, he tries to explain security to, more or less, laymen. And he only has an audio medium, which adds some difficulty. So, yes, he simplifies some things and this no doubt troubles a lot of security gurus.

Of course he's made mistakes on the show. I can recall a few, but most of them were caught and corrected later. He doesn't script it, so I'm sure you can find many examples of poor word choices or incorrect acronyms over the 300+ shows he's done.

I do think he's over-played the practical usefulness of some security products that he advertises on the show. I have experience with none of them (to my knowledge), but some of them just sound, to the trained ear, minimally useful. But, sadly, that's audio content advertising for you.

From the link, we have statements like:

> For whatever reason, Gibson tries to explain the Metasploit project as a "malware exploitation framework"

OK, that's a bad description. But he was describing Metasploit in passing using a description of Metasploit as it pertained to the subject at hand. And, if you read the actual transcript that they linked to, it was being used for malware exploitation. Seems like a silly nit-pick.

> You can't simply raise the spectre of global spying and hidden rootkits planted by Microsoft without either proving or disproving the allegation

No. If you see something alarming, you totally can. He didn't panic either.

> Steve said SSL connections are not susceptible to man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attacks? This is absolutely false.

Please. SSL/TLS has had vulnerabilities that allowed MITM attacks. They're ad-hoc and eventually get fixed. You can't just expect to MITM a random SSL connection. SSL is designed to be MITM-resistent, and saying "SSL prevents MITM attacks" is not in any way a bad description, especially when you're communicating to laymen.

> Further, having a switch does not absolutely prevent sniffing traffic. The popular Dsniff tool lets you do this.

Yep, he got that wrong.

> Close Steve, CSMA stands for Carrier Sense Multiple Access.

Yep, he got that acronym wrong. But I decided to check the next show[2]...

> [Steve] Also, I mangled an acronym, and I hate when I do that, especially acronyms that I know so well. I talked about CSMA, and I called it Collision Sense Multiple Access instead of Carrier Sense Multiple Access. And it has a CD on the end which stands for Collision Detection. [...] So the real acronym for Ethernet is CSMA/CD, which is Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Detection

So he switched a word in an acronym, then corrected it next episode. But they complained anyway. I couldn't have scripted it any better to what I said above.

Those examples were skimmed from the first three links. The authors came across like they had a vendetta to nit-pick everything they could. They've blown their own credibility already as far as needless nit-picking, missing the forest for the trees, and not checking to see when he corrects his own mistakes (aka, doing their homework).

I'd hardly summarize all that as a "fringe charlatan". He may be a bit fringe-ish, but I don't see how he's a charlatan.

[1] https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/03/the_security_...

[2] https://www.grc.com/sn/sn-017.txt