Before I start my reponse proper, I should point out that I know most other browsers, and most add-ons for them that perform the task of storing credentials, do much the same thing and are therefor no less insecure. This is why I recommend everyone avoid most credential storing products and turn off their browser's built-in facility (whichever browser they use).

> I appreciate how this appears to a novice

As you are in the process of defending storing passwords in plain form (or at least in a manner that allows them to be accessed in plain form so easily), without any warning that this is happening, I am of the opinion that you have no right to be so condescending as to publicly call someone else a novice.

> but we've literally spent years evaluating it

Some creationists have spent decades evaluating their position too. That does not make my any more inclined to agree with their assessment of the way the universe works, nor does it make me feel inclined to recommend that position to others.

> and have quite a bit of data to inform our position.

Please provide said data so that we can evaluate it, otherwise what you are saying here is simply "I'm right because I know that I'm right".

> what you're proposing is that that we make users less safe than they are today by providing them a false sense of security and encouraging dangerous behavior. That's just not how we approach security on Chrome.

That is EXACTLY how you are approaching security in Chrome it would seem.

If the criticism of the way Chrome currently does these things is wrong for this reason then Chrome's behaviour is wrong for the same reason. Users will assume that the passwords are stored securely, or will be blissfully unaware that they even need to be, and will think they are safe when they are not. This argument may not make the alternate suggestion being made correct, you certainly believe that it is not, but your argument doesn't make Chrome's current position any less incorrect either.

While here we all know that locking out workstations provides much better security (as mentioned in your earlier post) than a master password on the browser's credentials store would, the general public do not tend to have much concept of that in my experience (while it very much should be, it is not something most people give any thought to unless explicitly prompted). Letting them take their ignorance of the matter one step further is lulling them further into a false sense of security.

You are not wrong in stating that users should lock their workstations when leaving them, and should have them set to auto-lock after a time in case they forget. Likewise we are not wrong in stating that any key store should be locked after use, and automatically locked after a period of inactivity (requireing the master password to be requested again).

Essentially you are silently opting in (on the user's behalf) to exchanging security for convenience. This brings us full circle, back to the word "novice".

With regard to my earlier acknowledgement that other vendors do the same thing, while I'm taking cheap shots like the "novice" thing above: "other people are doing it" is no more a valid excuse for irresponsable behaviour here than it was in the school playgound when we were five.

We (by "we" I'm including developers, DBAs, technical managers, security experts, and other members of the technical "community") should be trying to teach users to take better care of their credentials and their information security more generally, making it inconvenient for them not to if neccessary rather than making it easy for them to continue to be blissfully ignorant of the situation.