Not only is this article light on content but I think it's actively disingenuous.

First off, the title is editorializing users' reaction to the feature. Apparently even the 99% of Windows users who have never heard of Windows Recall (a preview feature not even available yet and not even compatible with most people's existing PC hardware) are "groaning" over it. But I'm sure if I sit here and argue that people will like the feature it would be a lame argument, and I might even agree with you.

Still, the other problem with the article is that it brings up factually challenging issues with the feature:

> First, even if User A never opts in to Recall, they have no control over the setting on the machines of Users B through Z.

This isn't a problem unique to an AI feature. If you send intimate photos or passwords to someone else in the pre-AI world that was still a big security problem. Windows Recall does not meaningfully expand the risk of those actions.

> That level of detailed archival material will undoubtedly be subject to subpoena by lawyers and governments.

If a government or a subpoena gains access to your system, the presence of an AI categorization system is not going to make any meaningful difference to their ability to extract data stored on it. Those types of actors have their own analysis tools that probably won't even bother with Recall as they are almost certainly more sophisticated. Not only that, you can say the same things about standard backups: anyone taking a standard not-AI-enabled backup like Time Machine or Windows Backup would have the exact same problem of having previously deleted data available for search and seizure. The typical person's cloud data exposure is arguably much worse than Recall since it's physically stored on someone else's server, a company who may comply with subpoenas where you might choose not to, which Recall snapshots only exist on your local machine.

But, okay, let's say you're still not on board with my arguments. I think the last argument I have to make is the biggest problem of this article, which is that it's operating under the base assumption that Microsoft hasn't thought of any of this.

> Threat actors who manage to get their spyware installed on a device will no longer have to scour it for the most sensitive data stored there. Instead they will mine Recall just as they do browser databases storing passwords now.

The article is just assuming that Microsoft has done nothing to secure this especially since the last time they pulled the feature.

But Microsoft has a very detailed page that gets into how this all works:

https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/privacy-and-cont...

This article points out:

1. Processing and data storage is local

2. The user has control full control over all the settings and they're secured (cannot be changed without authenticating with Windows Hello)

3. There is a huge list of exceptions where content is excluded from snapshots (e.g., incognito browsing, passwords, etc).

4. Saving, deleting, and all features related to the

> No internet or cloud connections are required or used to save and analyze snapshots. Snapshots and associated data are stored locally on the device. Recall does not share snapshots or associated data with Microsoft or third parties, nor is it shared between different Windows users on the same device. Windows will ask for your permission before saving snapshots. You are always in control, and you can delete snapshots, pause or turn them off at any time. Any future options for the user to share data will require fully informed explicit action by the user.

But this article is just interested in producing drama and calling a new feature that actually has unique functionality and zero dependence on cloud "enshittification." Okay, if you say so!