I didn’t realize that in order to comment I needed to address all of your points. Your take on the journalist (point 3) is the only one objectionable enough to warrant comment. But in the spirit of mutual respect, here you go: 1) Should the Washington Post apologize for calling Signal “unsecure, commercially available messaging platform.” Well, first, I think we can agree it’s a commercially available messaging platform. We might even agree that it is one of the most secure commercially available messaging platforms on Earth. But, as you can gather from other comments in this thread, “secure” is not a black and white thing. The padlock on my shed is secure against my kids. It is not secure against my neighbor who owns bolt cutters. Whether or not something is secure depends on the threat profile. What is the threat profile in this case? Furthermore, if some critical aspect of a system (such as the underlying cryptography) is secure that doesn’t necessarily mean the system as a whole is secure. For example, what if it is possible for an unintended party to be part of a secure conversation? Well, that by definition would not be secure. What if it is possible to screenshot classified information from a Signal conversations? That might be a security flaw. We could go on about challenges Signal faces, like their software runs on hardware they cannot control, on an OS they cannot control, compiled by a compiler they cannot control, distributed through app stores they cannot control. Or we could talk about how secure systems are only secure if used in a secure manner. We might agree that Signal is as secure as it possibly can be, given those limitations. But whether or not Signal is “secure” is not the question we should be asking. We should be asking whether it is “secure enough” for the context under discussion. The answer is no. The conversation leaked to a journalist. That is not secure. We might rightly say that Signal is apparently unsecure. I don’t expect journalists to understand crypto systems. I do expect them to recognize a security breach when it stares them in the face, and it makes sense to me that they might consider that unsecure. So, no, no apology necessary. 2) You are making a lot of assumptions here. Do you know that all 19 participants were using Signal on a govt issued device with NSA installed OS? How do you know that? All 19? If this were the proper system for communicating classified information, wouldn’t they have claimed as much? They can’t make that claim, so they are claiming it wasn’t classified information. And they are doubling down after the nature of the information has been revealed. Ask the pilots if it’s classified. And your contention that it was surely audited by the NSA line by line? Well, that has two problems: a) that would require Signal to be unsecure, and b) maybe only 18 NSA employees showed up to work that day, because they missed the journalist. The lack of any potential for NSA oversight is part of the problem. If the NSA were listening in, they could have moved the conversation to a SCIF as soon as the Fox News guy started texting F-18 launch times. 3) See my original comment. 4) By deep state, I guess you are referring to people who are actually qualified for their jobs, who understand that attack plans (including weapon systems, launch times, bomb detonation times) are classified information that if compromised could lead to mission failure and loss of life. No, these people aren’t furious that Signal prevents them from leaking information. They are furious that their unqualified superiors used Signal and did leak information. And to your question, sure I will keep using Signal. It is secure enough for my needs. But if I ever need to keep anyone updated about pending military strikes, I’ll go to a SCIF.