I'm not sure what evidence could convince someone so dead set against the legitimacy of conjecture. I'm one (along with Aristotle and others) who credits inference to the best explanation as a valid form of reasoning. You seem more interested in hurling "conspiracy theory" ad hominem attacks than taking a few minutes to learn some history and consider whether what I'm speculating is merely "remotely plausible" or rather "quite likely." If you lack the time or imagination to do some research, accept the following "actual evidence."

Here is a GAO National Security report to Congress on the topic. I strongly encourage you to read the entire document yourself here https://www.gao.gov/assets/nsiad-00-138.pdf

But first, I'll call your attention to the rank of the people involved in this report. It's not some backbencher vanity project. I hope you'll agree that these aren't "conspiracy theorists". If you bother to read it, of course. I hope you will and admit that your beliefs about this "conspiracy theory" need upgrading.

I'll quote liberally from the GAO report below but this is just one example of many documents available (if you merely look) that should meet a reasonable standard of evidence. For instance you could read the lucid book BioHazard by a former deputy director of the Soviet bioweapons program. He talks about biodefense and vaccine programs (among other things) in the context of the bioweapons arms race, and the billions of dollars allocated by the US to "biodefense". If you think all that money is going to crop management I've got a bridge to sell you.
https://www.nlm.nih.gov/nichsr/esmallpox/biohazard_alibek.pd...

Here you go. If you come back to insist that none of this means that the labs are developing bioweapons "per se" I refer you back to the report's urgent observations that it is very difficult to distinguish legitimate biodefense programs from bioweapons programs (as I have been arguing). If you still can't accept that the US "biodefense program" is the rebranded "bioweapons program", I can't help you with that cognitive bias.

-----------

"April 28, 2000
The Honorable Floyd Spence
Chairman
The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
The Honorable Pat Roberts
Chairman, Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats and Capabilities
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

Although it signed the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, 1 the
former Soviet Union covertly developed the world’s largest offensive
biological weapons program, which relied on a network of military and
nonmilitary scientific institutes, according to a January 2000 Department of
Defense report to Congress. 2 Many of these nonmilitary institutes were
overseen by Biopreparat—an ostensibly civilian pharmaceutical enterprise
that exploited the inherent dual-use nature of biotechnology to mask Soviet
development of biological weapons using specially engineered strains of
dangerous pathogens, including anthrax, plague, and smallpox. Russia
renounced the Soviet program in 1992 and subsequently cut funding for
Biopreparat institutes; nonetheless, the United States remains concerned
about the extent of Russia’s compliance with the Convention. Reasons for
concern include Biopreparat’s retention of its Cold War leadership and
existing ties to former Soviet nonmilitary biological weapons institutes in
Russia, although Biopreparat no longer funds them. Although Russia has
generally allowed the United States access to its nonmilitary institutes that
receive U.S. nonproliferation assistance, Russia has consistently rebuffed U.S. efforts to inspect its military institutes currently managed by the
Ministry of Defense.
Notwithstanding these concerns, in 1994 the United States began funding
collaborative research projects with former Soviet biological weapons
scientists 3 because it feared that these scientists might be driven by
financial pressures to sell their skills to countries of proliferation concern
or to terrorist groups. 4 The executive branch initially funded this effort at
modest levels and used it to redirect scientists to peaceful activities;
however, it is now expanding the program’s size and scope. Because of this
shift, you asked us to review U.S. efforts to address the threat of biological
weapons proliferation from the former Soviet Union. Accordingly, we
examined
• the potential threats that the former Soviet biological weapons institutes
could pose to the United States,
• current and future U.S. efforts to address these threats, and
• risks associated with the expanded U.S. effort and executive branch
plans to mitigate them."

It goes on:

"The former Soviet Union’s biological weapons institutes continue to
threaten U.S. national security because they have key assets that are both
dangerous and vulnerable to misuse, according to State and Defense
Department officials. These assets include as many as 15,000 underpaid
scientists and researchers, specialized facilities and equipment (albeit
often in a deteriorated condition), and large collections of dangerous
biological pathogens. These assets could harm the United States if hostile
countries or groups were to hire the institutes or biological weapons
scientists to conduct weapons-related work. Also of concern is the
potential sale of dangerous pathogens to terrorist groups or countries of
proliferation concern. State and Defense officials told us that since 1997,
Iran and other countries have intensified their efforts to acquire biological
weapons expertise and materials from former Soviet biological weapons
institutes. In addition, deteriorated physical safety and security conditions
could leave dangerous pathogens vulnerable to theft or distribution into the
local environment. Finally, much of the former Soviet biological weapons
program’s infrastructure, such as buildings and equipment, still exists
primarily in Russia. While most of these components have legitimate
biotechnological applications, they also harbor the potential for renewed
production of offensive biological agents.
The U.S. strategy for addressing these proliferation threats at the source
has been to fund collaborative research activities with the institutes to

(1) reduce their incentives to work with hostile states and groups and

(2) increase their openness to the West.

While the executive branch initially
implemented this strategy with a modest level of funding, it is now seeking
a tenfold increase in funding in response to intensified proliferation
attempts by Iran and other countries of proliferation concern. The
increased funding will support an expanded array of collaborative
activities, including biodefense research 5 against biological agents,
security upgrades to select facilities, and dismantlement of unneeded
facilities.

• For fiscal years 1994 through 1999, the United States allocated about
$20 million, primarily from the Departments of State, Defense, and
Energy, to fund collaborative research projects to help redirect former
biological weapons scientists to peaceful research activities. Key program benefits during this period included providing grants to fund
more than 2,200 former Soviet biological weapons personnel—including
more than 745 senior biological weapons scientists—and gaining some
access to more than 30 of about 50 nonmilitary institutes. State and
Defense officials told us that the U.S. programs have denied
proliferators such as Iran access to biological weapons expertise and
scientists at over 15 former Soviet biological weapons institutes.

• For fiscal years 2000 through 2004, the executive branch plans to spend
about $220 million to expand its efforts to engage former Soviet
biological weapons institutes. About half of these funds will be used to
continue efforts to redirect scientists toward peaceful civilian research.

• In an emerging area of emphasis, Defense and State plan to spend about
$36 million to fund collaborative research with Russian institutes on
dangerous pathogens. This research is intended to improve the U.S.
defenses against biological weapons threats. The Department of
Defense also plans to spend (1) $40 million to upgrade security and
safety systems at select facilities in Russia and (2) $39 million to
consolidate and dismantle biological weapons facilities in Russia as it
has done in Kazakhstan—if Russia agrees."

There's much more. Read the full report.