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It's important for me to stress that I make a clear distinction between the way I comment on HN where I usually take a more flexible position and present a less dogmatic view than I would in a paper or technical report (or when partaking in a formal debate) where structure, accuracy, presentation and demeanor of the written word or what's said are important. Here, gravitas also matters.

Again, that brings me back to the other point you raised about about Book-I of The Republic and why I said what I did. First, the subject matter—that of justice—is important and it needs highlighting. Second, very few on HN are interested in the fine minutiae (points of argument) in the Socrates/Thrasymachus debate) let alone why a person who conducts a modern analysis of Book-I would likely come to different conclusions to those of Plato's contemporaries (clearly philosophical thought has developed and matured over the intervening two millennia, so too the way we analyze and document philosophical concepts).

In a strict reading of Book-I I'd essentially agree with you but there's just too much to discuss to detail it here, although I'd mention that Socrates (Plato) doesn't give a proper definition of justice and admits to being not able to do so. To my mind, Socrates takes a similar position with Justice that's somewhat akin to the well-known quote about porn "I can't describe it but I know it when I see it". Your point about Callicles and justice is well taken, between his and other writings by Plato and others we are nevertheless able to gleen a much more nuanced view of what Ancient Greeks thought about Justice.

My view is we should focus the public's attention on the noble aspects of what Plato was trying to achieve in Book-I and not the points that are only of interest to philosophers and logicians. And I reckon that's damn easy—almost everyone can understand that Justice isn't Thrasymachus' notion of every man for himself and that Justice serve a much bigger more noble purpose. (Similarly, other philosophical concepts must be understood to before they're useful. The public has no difficulty in understanding the concept the greatest good for the greatest number but it couldn't give a damn about the minutiae of utilitarian theory. So let's use it.)

I'd contend the sentiment, import and values expressed by Plato in Book-I are essentially timeless; with some concessions to differences in societal/cultural norms and such, a modern reader's understanding and take on Plato's intention wouldn't be that different to that held by Ancient Athenians. This is what actually matters, and it's why I emphasize it over the minutiae.

I'd back that assertion by virtue of the enormous influence and sway that Greek philosophy still has on Western thought. That this is still true is really quite remarkable given the intervening two millennia. More to point, the reason why The Republic has endured for around 2400 years and that it's still a key document in the philosophical corpus is because across those millennia many have considered what Plato says is important enough to ensure its preservation.

That doesn't necessarily mean everybody agrees with Plato, nor that everything he says is accurate and or logical by modern standards. Nor do we consider or accept the political framework in which the work was written was above reproach, in Ancient Athens slavery was a given, nowadays—at least for most of us—it's an abomination.

On the matter of disagreement, I'd refer you to Karl Popper's work The Open Society and its Enemies—Volume I Plato wherein he indicts Plato on multiple accounts. The Book's title alone tells us of Popper's distaste for Plato's political philosophy.

But put all that aside for a moment, The Republic, especially Book-I, is a sheer delight to read. The way Plato manipulates and plays with the text is both engaging and entertaining, and the translatior of my copy, Benjamin Jowett, is a very skillful and accomplished writer. Unfortunately, I can't speak for literal accuracy of the translation. (I consider not having studied Ancient Greek a major deficit in my education.)

Re: "…a slight misquote from Shakespeare's Hamlet…"

It wasn't my intension to quote the Bard verbatim, you'll note I did not attribute it and that was intentional. The reason is that whilst there's little doubt that the origin of what I quoted rests with the Bard there are other versions similar to mine where the wording has been changed deliberately. Scientists and techies deemed it necessary to remove references to "Horatio" and thus to Hamlet to make the quote more general (more applicable to science). This site is a messy unedited jumble of quotes but the gist of its message is clear:
https://quoteinvestigator.com/2018/12/25/universe/

Quo vadis? I can't answer that as I do not know. I'll say this however: despite my defense of philosophy, I'm of the opinion that the dicipline is becoming less relevant to society than is has been in past decades. There's little doubt that its influence and standing in society 50 or more years ago was much higher than it is today. The large decline in the study of humanities studies is evidence for that.

I'm strongly of the opinion that specialization is largely responsible for philosophy's deline in the eyes of the public and that's very bad news. These days, philosophy has grown into monumentally large discipline with hundreds of specialized subbranches and professional philosophers are required to investigate them in keeping with the longstanding traditions and practices of academia.

To get ahead in their profession, academics have to accept and adapt to the publish-or-perish demands of academia and that means having to specialize. Philosophy academics are now so deeply enmeshed in esoteric aspects of the discipline that they cannot adequately describe to a lay public what their work entails. This disconnect has not only led to philosophy becoming less relevant to ordinary people but also it's not in keeping with taking a more generalist approach to the discipline and emphasizing aspects that have practical relevance to real-world issues.

In short, the public has come to believe philosophy has lost touch with reality. Whether or not that's correct is essentially immaterial, what actually matters is the public's current perception of philosophy, and it's not favorable. That's a tragedy, and personally I find it not only sad but also damned annoying.

Why do I consider these issues important and why am I laboring the points with such intensity? Well, I'd posit that whilst evidence—factual data—is important and plays a significant role it's nevertheless strongly mitigated by one's political and ethical beliefs. Unfortunately, they play a disproportionate role in the public's negative perception of philosophy, also it affects the way philosophers go about their work (both judgment and the degree to which one can be impartial are impacted (that comment needs expanding to do it full justice but I can't do so here)).

Moreover, I'd contend those of a philosophical bent are often not completely immune—myself included, we've all biases. Add to that the fact we don't always arrive at conclusions by conscious deliberation, subconscious thought also plays a role. Again, these are just some more of the underlying reasons for why philosophy as a discipline plays a less influential role in world affairs nowadays than it once did. Given the state of world affairs at present the opposite ought to be true.

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† It's a shame I couldn't post the stuff on mathematics as I reckon it added weight to my points. There's no great insight here but I did mention the notion of the infallibility of proof in mathematics and how Gödel undermined that worldview not to mention putting the kibosh on Hilbert's idea of mathematicians coming up with a finite set of axioms and proof thereof that would make mathematics 'complete'. The relevance here is that Gödel's theorems had a large impact on the philosophy of mathematics, They're even important in the context of Wigner's oft-quoted "Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences", one has to ask to what degree or extent does the mathematical analog represent the natural world.