Thanks again for taking the time to write such a detailed response. I'm responding only to the first comment here, though I have read the others and I don't think they would alter what I write here. I will get to the other two asap. For this comment, I will limit myself to attempting to undermine the claim that causality can, in principle, make a thought be right or wrong (that is, about reality or not). I won't attempt to defend 'likeness' here: that will need a second response.

You refer to how a causal chain can convey information. More specifically, you refer to this information using the terms true and false, or using terms that are derived from truth/falsehood and make no sense without them. For example, you say that "Bob's causal chain [conveyed] more complete factual information". I would say that this is another way of saying information that is either true, or closer to the truth, than Bill's, and I don't think this is controversial, but please state if you disagree. As another example, you say Bill "[received] false information and [took] it to be credible"; and that this led to Bob's true statement. You also refer to a "false" statement in reaction to "unwelcome information" as something that is within the chain of causality. You then list several other mechanisms by which "false thoughts" can arise, listing these as "causal chains of information". (Henceforth I will use "CHOCs" to refer to chains of causality.)

My question is what is it that would make the CHOCs true or false? Everything that I said above about a brain state not being per se true or false applies to the examples of CHOCs you have listed here. More generally, it also applies to any CHOC that could be considered information. The print on a textbook, the brainstate of the textbooks' authors, the Word document that exists as a series of magnetic states on the authors' hard drives, the vibrating vocal chords that moved the authors' ears 20 years ago when they were at college, the tired brain of the typesetter who messed up the labeling in textbook B: every question that could be asked of Bill's and Bob's brainstates could also be asked these things. Specifically, what is it that makes them true or false?

Obviously, you could give the same reply that you do for B&B's brainstates, and say that the causes' own causes make them true or false. But you'll easily perceive that this just pushes the problem back another stage, and leads to an infinite regression. If the textbook's truth is caused by the truth in the author's mind, what causes the latter? We go onto infinity.

So it seems you have no justification for calling a CHOC 'true' or 'false', or believing that it conveys information that can be described in these terms. (To be clear, I think the possibility of T/F, and the possibility of conveying information, stand or fall together -- I don't think this is controversial but let me know if you disagree.) If a cause explains T/F, it must itself have its truth or falsehood explained by its own cause. You thus either face infinite regress, or need to provide some other explanation that applies to a non-mental CHOC but not to a brainstate.

(Btw, I'm not denying that a CHOC can be _associated with_ information transfer in any sense at all. That would lead me to deny that information about reality can come in through the senses, which I think we both agree would be wrong. Nor am I denying that the info associated with a CHOC can be true or false. But it is the mind that makes said association. The info conveyed by the ink on the textbook's page is only understood to be true, and is only understood as information, when in the mind. The text on the page causes the mind's thoughts in a certain sense, just as licking the page causes an inky sensation in the tongue. But the text can't _be_ information independently of the mind, and therefore can't carry T/F independently of the mind, and therefore can't explain the mind's thoughts' being T/F. I don't want my objections about causality to seem to imply that knowledge is innate, in some Platonist or rationalist sense.)

I will defend "likeness to reality" as the answer in the next exciting installment :-)