Thanks for sharing, always happy when my projects inspire alternatives addressing different parts of the design space. Here are a few quick comments based on skimming the documentation, let me know if I misinterpreted anything.

- signing support

This has always been a non-goal for age. It makes the UX significantly more complex, but it's good if different tools have different goals.

I can't quite make out from https://www.kryptor.co.uk/specification if it does proper signcryption, sign-then-encrypt (vulnerable to signature stripping and re-signing), or encrypt-then-sign (vulnerable to decrypt-reencrypt-forward, like OpenPGP). If the latter two, it's a missed opportunity to offer more security than age+minisign can offer and I encourage the author to look into it!

- sender authentication

I wrote about this. tl;dr age has authentication, but I am not sure what a non-sharp UX around it would be, so I don't advertise it. https://words.filippo.io/dispatches/age-authentication/

- post-quantum security

As https://www.kryptor.co.uk/security-limitations#post-quantum-... acknowledges, "the asymmetric algorithms in Kryptor aren't post-quantum secure". There is support for adding a pre-shared symmetric key, although I did not find the pre-shared key in the usage section, but I would argue that is not asymmetric encryption.

In this sense, I would actually argue that Kryptor is just as post-quantum secure as age: age's symmetric encryption (the passphrase mode) is post-quantum (see https://words.filippo.io/dispatches/post-quantum-age/). We don't support adding a pre-shared symmetric key to asymmetric encryption, but if you have a secure channel to establish a pre-shared key, you should just use passphrase mode.

age does have a third-party fully post-quantum asymmetric encryption plugin (https://github.com/keisentraut/age-plugin-sntrup761x25519) and I plan to make an ML-KEM one once the standard is out.

- key commitment

This is a pretty wonky topic. age as a whole is key committing (you can't make a file that decrypts with two age identities as different plaintexts, some academic researchers tried!). Our file key encryption is not (https://github.com/FiloSottile/age/commit/2194f6962c8bb3bca8...) which means that if you host an online service that accepts an age file and decrypts it with a passphrase and returns an error if it's incorrect, an attacker can do a bruteforce two passphrases at a time instead of one at a time. Given the online oracle is already unusual as a setting, I am not interested in adding complexity to solve this one.

- private key encryption

age supports that! https://github.com/FiloSottile/age?tab=readme-ov-file#passph...

It's not the default because most threat models don't need it: if you have FDE, who's an attacker that can read files from your disk but not replace the age binary in $PATH?

- indistinguishability from random

Not an age goal, actually we very intentionally put "age-encryption.org/v1" in the header so you can run file(1), and specify the type of the recipients to help plugins disambiguate files. The default recipient type doesn't leak any other metadata (i.e. you can't link age files encrypted to the same recipient).

- size padding

This is a good idea and slated for age v2.