>using an enormous amount of resources to do so

I don't think it's enormous, I think it's probably a trivial amount relative to PRC productive capabilities / acquisition effectiveness. Benefit is PRC can potentially kick US out of East Asia, outside hedgemans don't abdicate unless their presence is demonstrated to be untenable. Rationale = PRC dragging US art5 tier partners in the region into broader war and showing everyone the US incapable of fulfilling security commitments in the PRC backyard even if the US wanted to. Incapable is key, only way to deter others in region from hedging with US secuirty if TW off the table is to demonstrate US simply cannot. Incidental benefits are also huge. PRC competes with SK/JP/TW on many fronts, especially in region, breaking their knees if they are actively involved in TW scenario = PRC has an opportunity to fill holes. Samsung phones can be replaced by Huawei around the world. JP infra investments can turn into PRC contracts. Killing 90% of high end semi that overwhelming benefits west = PRC close semi gap. Least of which = resolving ongoing maritime disputes. No occupation needed, they're islands, they can be turned into Cuba from the PRC mainland. There's only top2 mil and everyone else, JP doesn't have enough offense to really matter, realistically no one in the theatre is projected to except PRC. Meanwhile PRC is multiple times bigger = they have more targets/more resilient, and more labour/construction overcapacity to recover. Doesn't mean this is what PRC wants, but they're positioning MIC in a manner that they can / won't say no to escalation.

>park our aircraft carriers a little further away

Carriers are already parked much further away due to intermediate range PRC missiles, around 2IC in conflict. Spamming cruise missiles is about breaking the strategy of other US branches who has to operate in 1IC (airforce agile basing / marine mlrs / army missiles). Carriers were already being squeezed far enough that carrier aviation approaches irrelevance, ranges where they can't sortie to meaningfully deliver stand off weapons even with tanking. There's no other bases in the region that PRC can't reach, i.e. carrier aviation/escorts still need replenishment every few days, USN replenishment fleet anywhere in the region goes boom if they stay docked for more than 30m. Even further, other regions, we're really talking about Hawaii/3IC and beyond, and at that point the ability for USN to generate fires/sorties becomes negligible due to logistic constraints. For reference 5 carriers + regional air basing, operating unobstructed took 3 weeks to break Iraq, scale to PRC size, that’s 5 years of impossibly high tempo operation, assuming PRC can’t hit back at all.

>take off in Kansas

Everyone already knows what US long range strike options are, can extrapolate from B21 procurement what it will be. PRC answer to that is more missiles - conventional prompt global strike, which has entered their military strategy writing a few years ago, i.e. any carrier, sub, bomber that docks anywhere in the world, including CONUS goes boom in 60m. Also oil refineries, LNG plants, semi fabs, server farms, B21 plants etc etc.

"The US has long range strike options" argument misses the point. It's not about what the US always had/has/will have - ability to hit targets anywhere in the world - it's about how dynamic changes when US adversaries have what US has, when PRC can do to CONUS what US could always do to PRC mainland. And at what scale, JP still tried to fugu ballon CONUS during WW2 =/= PRC likely built an arsenal to hit every piece of strategic CONUS infra.

>control the skies

Controlling skies is a proxy for delivering effective fires. PRC betting advanced rocketry can skip the air control/supremacy layer with long range missiles designed to penetrate anywhere on earth via performance and volume. The thing with aviations/airframes is they can't be "classified" anymore, anything US is observable via space, because bombers still need wheels spin in the wild for testing. Versus PRC focusing on missiles, which can be manufactured/stored/launched from hardened facilities (look up PRC third front where they moved MIC into mountains), which IMO long term is much more resilient than bombers assembled/maintained in huge structures.

The reasoning here is that the US had 70 years to develop global logistics for carrier/bomber basing, because that was only technically feasible expeditionary hardware of the time. PRC couldn’t replicate that if she tried to (too much depends on uncertain geopolitics / alliances / access). But why bother if they can just skip all that and go straight for missiles that can hit broadside of a barn on the opposite side of earth. Arguably it would be cheaper/better, a lot of US force composition is arguably trapped in legacy inertia, i.e. Navy is not going to not carrier/sub, the air force is not going to not fighter/bomber - too much identity tied into platforms and money tied into procurement, and obligations tied into security commitments/alliances where US has to flex/visibly show presence with expensive hardware. Not to mention internal US defense drama killed earlier US efforts at prompt global strike, because why potentially cannibalize duties / undermine branch fiefdom. Meanwhile PRC/PLA modernization still new, not much sunk cost, is free to focus on rockets to break all those platforms at less cost. They don't need to FONAP, sail expensive platforms, fly bombers halfway around the world. That's a premium US maintaining hegemony has to pay for. Controlling skies in modern warfare = at the end of day is about delivering munitions to cripple war making capabilities. PLA started writing about PromptGlobalStrike in 2020 Science of Military Strategy, and acknowledged by the 2022 DoD report on PRC military. IMO we're looking at 2030 timeline where they get them in quantities western analysis would be forced to acknowledge implications. Incidentally at same time PRC also building up nuke program.