I think you are missing the connection between the rules and the maintenance of power -- both the chamber rules and the caucus/conference rules and arguing there's a disjunction in my and Surdy's vies on power. Let's start by analyzing how power works in the chamber.

Let's use the House as an example. The three major pillars of power in the House are: (1) control of the floor, (2) control of committee assignments, and (3) fundraising/candidate recruitment.

1. Control of the floor is largely managed through the House Rules committee, the members of which are solely appointed by the Democratic and Republican leaders. This contrasts with other committees, whose members are appointed by the parties via the steering committees. From where does leadership derive this power? The chamber rules and the caucus/conference rules. (Suspensions go at the direction of the Speaker, and discharge petitions are rare enough to discount.)

2. While some committees are appointed by the Democratic/Republican leadership, most committee members are selected through the steering committees. When you read the party rules, you can see that steering committee membership is largely chosen by the Democratic and Republican leaders. Because leadership dominates the steering committees, they dominate how those folks are chosen. And, rarely, they will remove people from committees for not following their leadership.

3. What controls the head of the House and Senate fundraising entities? Those folks are appointed by operation of the party rules, which again gives most of the power to leadership. Plus in the modern era, the party leaders are the heavy fundraisers. And they play a significant role in candidate selection.

This wasn't always the case, and you can skim my [summary](https://firstbranchcenter.org/eras-of-control-of-the-house-o...) of eras of control in the House to see how it has been organized different.

James Wallner, who you cite, and I agree a lot. We both think it is important for the factions in the chambers to be able to express themselves. The current incentives for party leadership is to keep their team together and to split the opposing team. What that means is that they've crafted rules and norms designed to keep their team together and prevent defections. That's why most members don't make use of the procedural rules on the floor -- because it's not in their interest to do so. They feign helplessness. When you read the article, it first quotes me, and then him, making a point that Wallner would also agree with.

"But, Schuman said, something of a “rules revolution” has begun to brew in Congress lately, with House Republicans ousting their own speaker and defeating several procedural motions, while their Senate counterparts have freelanced on foreign aid and military nominations, bucking Mitch McConnell.

Surdy, for one, views many of these developments as welcome changes: His tweets often feature critiques of Congress’ centralized power (and how it is unquestioningly reported). He likes to note that leaders — by the rules alone — are mostly figureheads; it is only years of members following the pack, and choosing not to learn their own power, that have made the status quo so rigid."

Let me repeat it: power is centralized (at the top) and the members defer to it. The members choose not to learn their own power, IMO, because there's a collection action problem (which is described in the article). So far, only the Freedom Caucus-aligned folks have been willing to break that mold in the modern era.

One powerful committee chair (this was a while ago) said: “If I let you write the substance and you let me write the procedure, I’ll screw you every time.” The process dominates the results, and the process currently is designed to empower those at the top.