>It's not strange in the slightest.

It very much is strange.

>Apple deserves criticism until they fix this.

There's nothing to fix, or rather they already "fixed" it by offering an E2EE iCloud backup option to go along with local backups. As I said I think backups should simply be fully under owner control, but as it stands there is absolutely no need to backup without full key control should people wish. And even before that there was no need to use iCloud Backup. I never have. But that has tradeoffs, and it's perfectly reasonable people may choose to make different ones.

>They're going around claiming "end-to-end"

Correctly. By your twisted definition, there is no such thing as E2EE for any transport in existence because the ends might then do something you don't approve of with the data they own. HTTPS? Not E2EE. SSH? Not E2EE. WireGuard? Not E2EE. Which is completely ludicrous and a total perversion of the specific, important role E2EE plays.

>They already built end-to-end encryption for sensitive data types that is still recoverable from backups even if you lose all your devices and forget your iCloud account password

No, if you use their full E2EE options, any of them, and you lose all your devices, your password, and recovery key (including any backups you've chosen to make on your own), you are hosed for any of the data that is E2EE protected. Like, by definition? Because otherwise it wouldn't be E2EE! The fallback when ADP is not turned on and someone is using iCloud Backups is that Apple does have the keys, that's the point.

There is literally no way around this, it's just definitional. If Apple has, somewhere in the stack, the keys then it can be compelled (or choose) to share them or share access to the data, but they can also help the owner recover if all else is lost. If the owner has exclusive access to all keys then the owner has exclusive responsibility. You can certainly have the opinion that Apple should make that latter the default of only choice. I certainly have the opinion they should offer more choice period. But that's still all orthogonal to the transport mechanism. You can have ultra locked down encrypted devices, and then go to a plain vanilla HTTP website or use telnet for administration and any MITM can see what you're doing. There could be a rootkit on your system that's grabbing everything right out of memory. That doesn't mean random MITMs can see what you're doing either if the transport is E2EE. All of these are important components of the overall security picture, but they're all different ones.

>is reported by Reuters to be a secret compromise agreement with the FBI

Read your own articles you link. That's a 2020 piece on Apple dropping old plans for owner key control of all private iCloud data. But specifically following the outcry there two years later Apple introduced "advanced data protection" that does precisely what that article is complaining they didn't earlier [0]. It got lots of coverage at the time. They explicitly cover how data is stored afterwards [1]. So people can turn that on. The Reuters piece is obsolete.

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0: https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2022/12/apple-advances-user-s...

1: https://support.apple.com/en-us/102651