> 1. Could be, although I doubt they would pay considering the war and sanctions

There are plenty of frozen Russian assets available in the West for seizure after a court order. These have not been touched so far, although there have been repeated suggestions of using them to pay for the damage in Ukraine.

> 2. I thought they were forced to sell to China at a heavy discount because it was their only option ?

Hadn't heard of that, but you are making my point for me: lots of incentive to try and spike the price! (A motive for an action doesn't mean it will actually succeed)

> 3. That could be an argument against anything and any side, so I do not buy it

How so? And it's not an argument "against" anything. Russia was using (their) energy supply to try and blackmail Europe. Europe switched to other sources. Threatening those other sources is a logical next step.

> 4. I doubt that Germany would not buy Russian gas.

You can doubt it all you want. Russian gas is over in Germany. I am from Germany.

> 5. Nothing big happened because of luck. Let me remind you that the EU gas reserves were pretty low, and only managed to be not depleted because of the mildness of the 2022 winter.

Oh yes, the mild winter definitely helped. Though reserves were actually very high, the gas storage facilities were topped up to the rim and the government had scrambled like mad to secure alternative supplies.

This is the data, it covers April 2022 to the start of 2024.

https://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/DE/Gasversorgung/aktuelle_g...

What I heard is that Germany essentially bought up all gas available on the open market. Now this is not really a sustainable strategy, and particularly not a replicable one (only one country can do it at a time). Which is why the winter 2022-2023 saw a nuclear renaissance in pretty much every country apart from Germany. They all saw that our "Energiewende" was built on a dirty little secret, that secret being cheap Russian gas. With the emperor now naked, that dream was over.

> 6. They do not have the jurisdiction to prosecute, but why would they not disclose their findings, at a period where western media takes the extra mile to throw shade on Russia ?

They handed their findings over the Germany after discovering enough to know that they did not have jurisdiction.

"Ljungqvist said the main task had been to establish whether Sweden or Swedish citizens were involved in the attack, which he said had taken place in international waters.

“The answer to that question is ‘no’ and there is nothing in this case that poses any risk to Sweden’s security now that we have seen how things stand,” he said."

So while the non-release of the details also bothers me, it seems to be fairly standard operating procedure: hand the data over to the Germans, let them decide.

> 7. I am not convinced, the fact that it has happened before could as easily be used as an argument for a false flag operation.

No. While almost anything can be used once you go into the convolutions false-flag operations, such arguments are not nearly as easy as the simple one. Occam's razor applies.

In addition, the primary suspect in a false flag operation would be Ukraine, and one thing the investigation did uncover, and a piece of information that was revealed, is that the operation required resources that Ukraine simply does not have. And Russia does.