This was my main point "Bitcoin, and other crypto in general even more with higher concentration of early owners, will always be precarious because of this concentration. Whoever has control of the early issued coins, holds a leverage that is dangerous and has extortion properties."

> You are already accusing a theoretical cryptography expert of being "biased" against you?

What are you talking about? Cryptographers would be biased to their field, like yourself, about their system being incapable of being broken. It isn't just about breaking algorithms...

However some are even talking we have to start worrying about advancements by 2030-2040

[When a Quantum Computer Is Able to Break Our Encryption, It Won't Be a Secret](https://www.rand.org/blog/2023/09/when-a-quantum-computer-is...)

"One of the most important quantum computing algorithms, known as Shor's algorithm, would allow a large-scale quantum computer to quickly break essentially all of the encryption systems that are currently used to secure internet traffic against interception"

[The NIST has a "Post-Quantum Cryptography" Project](https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Post-Quantum-Cryptography)

[Waiting for quantum computing](https://techbeacon.com/security/waiting-quantum-computing-wh...)

"Large universal quantum computers could break several popular public-key cryptography (PKC) systems, such as RSA and Diffie-Hellman, but that will not end encryption and privacy as we know it."

"The most widely used PKC systems, including RSA, Diffie-Hellman, and ECDSA, rely on the intractability of integer factorization and discrete log problems. These problems are hard for classical computers to solve, but easy for quantum computers."

"This means that as soon as a large-scale universal quantum computer is built, you will not be able to rely on the security of any scheme based on these problems."

"To quantify the security of cryptosystems, "bits of security" are used. You can think of this as a function of the number of steps needed to crack a system by the most efficient attack. A system with 112 bits of security would take 2112 steps to crack, which would take the best computers available today billions of years. Algorithms approved by NIST provide at least 112 bits of security."

"AES-128 and RSA-2048 both provide adequate security against classical attacks, but not against quantum attacks. Doubling the AES key length to 256 results in an acceptable 128 bits of security, while increasing the RSA key by more than a factor of 7.5 has little effect against quantum attacks."

"When large-scale universal quantum computers are built, you will still be able to securely use symmetric encryption algorithms, but not the systems like RSA and Diffie-Hellman. These PKC systems are widely used today to create digital signatures or to securely transmit symmetric encryption keys."

"Fortunately, there are several families of quantum-resistant PKC systems: Lattice-based, code-based, hash-based, isogeny-based, and multivariate systems. NIST's Report on Post-Quantum Cryptography describes each of these families."

Encryption will still exist with more compute and new systems but it will evolve. That doesn't mean keys of the past will that aren't updated.

> Additionally every cryptography expert know the system is only as good as the keys not being found,

I like how you cut out that sentence to disregard the context...

The rest is "and that can come from other means not just breaking the algorithm or brute force... it can be how the key was created and what tool was used."

> Actual experts do not say this. Why do you keep repeating this with zero evidence?

Again let's get the full quote not the biased selective clip you made for you context "With time all encryption will be broken, we may be gone by then but maybe something comes along that changes the game. History is filled with leaps that were not expected. The early keys will get weaker and weaker over time, that is fact."

If you have a problem with that statement you have a problem.

I gave examples you brushed off. You can agree to disagree but historically most crypto either is broken or has trapdoors for export even, so you don't need to break the algorithms, you might just need info on the tools. Try using any non approved encryption algorithm for communicating with defense/military, you'll get a visit from the FBI.

> More than anything, I'm fascinated when someone makes an outrageous claim, someone gives them evidence that it is completely false, they give zero evidence that backs it up, yet they dig in, repeat their claim, distract from it and try everything to not just admit they don't actually know what they're saying.

I am fascinated as well when someone entirely disregards the point of the post and tries to tell others they know everything. I even said it might take longer than lifetimes or the universe even to break the algorithms, yet you still can't get past that point. Quite fascinating indeed.

> No, I'm responding to things you said and you keep trying to distract from them instead of admitting there is no evidence for what you said.

No I already alluded to the time situation, it doesn't matter much in the main point of my comment.

The concentration of currency in digital currencies is a problem and makes people that own that leveragable or too powerful.

The longer it takes to find/break the keys the more the value will be worth potentially...

Yes that is my entire point. You just laser focused in on cryptographic algorithms and not all the things around it. The first sentence of my first comment was a bit salacious but a lead in to the dangers of concentration in currency, and the power people have, or want to take, of the early owners.

Yes I do believe cryptographers know that not all tools and keys will stand the test of time, especially keys made in 2008... just as cyber security people know even with the best security there is always dependency holes, social engineering, and tools that can be trojan horses.

The point was, of my comment, not shifting goal posts, the concentration in digital currency is a problem and is an even bigger problem with large swaths of it in keys out there floating around, either found physically or other means.

You seem a bit combative, you are starting in with the selective context clipping so let's just agree to disagree on the rest. You have been successful in completely derailing the main point... if that was your goal, Good job!