OK, I spent ~an hour reading parts I [1], II [2], and III (TFA). My perception going in was that comment moderation is very hard, and essentially impossible at scale, and that Facebook/Meta cannot credibly be accused of literally causing genocide. Here is how my opinion shifted some after reading this series:

The articles present a lot of evidence to support the notion that Facebook was well aware of clear-cut incitement to violence years before its escalation into large-scale genocide in late 2016. It isn't spelled out explicitly, but I think there are two things that make Facebook's initial apparent non-response easier to understand as incompetence rather than evil:

* In the aftermath of the Arab spring, technology and social networks enjoyed a honeymoon in public perception that is hard to remember over a decade later. People, including (especially?) people in tech, could genuinely believe that making it easier for people to talk to each other was basically good, full stop. I'd suggest that this honeymoon only really ended after the 2016 US presidential election, which caused a lot of soul searching about information and echo chambers, and got even worse after the Cambridge Analytica scandal [3, this is a graph image from NBC news]

* As part I of the article notes, "[t]he information landscape in Myanmar is so unstable that accounts of any given incident conflict, often in major ways". This dynamic seems to appear in a lot of places where well-off westerners interact with much poorer and more chaotic countries (Rwanda is a clear parallel). Part I points out that the "Burmese government" itself seems to make statements both fanning anger against the Rohingya and then trying to walk them back when it boils over into disorder

So I think it was possible to be a basically well-intentioned (naive) Facebook employee in the leadup to 2016 and hear of strange, almost genocidal sounding posts in another language in a place you don't understand and still not think "this is a break-glass moment and I need to escalate and make a new path inside my corporation for this to be taken seriously". In hindsight, this was wrong, but I think we're forgetting that what happened next didn't seem possible, because we still thought of the internet as an exceptional new dawn in mass communication. A lot is necessary for people to process something as a novel, serious emergency.

However, it's hard to maintain this judgment over the ensuing years, as senior figures at Facebook are repeatedly presented with evidence that people are deliberately distributing misinformation (e.g., making fake accounts, and other clear-cut evidence that doesn't require a fact checker and research) and mostly wave it away unless it's big enough to provoke media and investor consternation. By the end of the 2010s, I think Facebook was well past the "this sort of thing wasn't something we could imagine" stage of a crisis, and into a less defensible position along the lines of "this is reality, it cannot really be moderated, but we can pretend to moderate".

One last point re: moderation, I have no idea how Meta hires its Burmese content moderators, but it must be tricky, since as far as I can tell most people in Burma are anti-Rohingya. I would like to be wrong about this, but what should be factually trustworthy sources like the Brookings institution write things like:

> Most of the Myanmar population, especially the Buddhist majority, feels that the Rohingya don’t belong in their country ... [t]he straightforward solution would be to help the Rohingya return to their homes in Myanmar and live in peace and freedom. Sadly, this solution looks impossible in the near term because of the nationalist sentiment of the Buddhist majority

[1] https://erinkissane.com/meta-in-myanmar-part-i-the-setup

[2] https://erinkissane.com/meta-in-myanmar-part-ii-the-crisis

[3] https://media-cldnry.s-nbcnews.com/image/upload/t_fit-560w,f...

[4] https://www.brookings.edu/articles/on-the-ground-in-myanmar-...