> whose entire personality is making Hackintosh and VM apps for iOS

Congrats and thanks as I'm fairly sure I must've used your work at some point.

> Just a friendly reminder that attacks on the author's credentials have no baring on the weight of the arguments.

I didn't check nor care about the author nor their credentials because my comment was purely on the piece itself and what it sounded like to me and not an ad-hominem to the author. It did after all contain the usual scary terms such as "Microsoft", UEFI, Secure Boot as well as dismisses an entire concept just because of some flaws that can be rectified incrementally.

> It sounds like you have zero experience in security :)

I never claimed to be a security expert, but maybe my layman's approach allows me to overlook the pedantry and avoid dismissing something entirely just because it doesn't perfectly conform to some ideals? (I think the TPM's threat model will be up to the integrator to determine, as it depends on other things such as discrete vs firmware TPM, UEFI/Option ROMs and their security flaws, etc).

> No it doesn't.

I used "HSM" to mean "dedicated hardware device that does security-related things", rather than a 1-to-1 equivalent of a commercial HSM. But to the best of my knowledge a TPM can also act as a (low-throughput) actual HSM if you so desire, allowing operations with a secret key without ever disclosing it?

> The argument is TPM versus the existing security you have on Windows. (Passwords, FDE, etc)

My argument is that the TPM enables frictionless FDE for the masses without any change in user experience and without even relying on a password (which would often be weak and thus useless in practice).

Tell me how this is the same level of security as no FDE or FDE with weak password. Even if it can be broken using various methods (some of which you've described), surely you see that it still significantly increases the barrier to entry and cost of a successful attack?

> They can with a $80 FPGA. (Unless your datacenter uses Intel TXT and tboot and other prerequisites that were talked about in the article)

Those machines use fTPM which isn't vulnerable to this attack, but regardless, $80 is still more expensive than the $1 a Linux live-CD/USB costs, not to mention the requirement for lengthy physical access and ability to solder/connect wires onto the mainboard.

I'm not arguing that TPM is unbreakable or will resist sophisticated, prepared, targeted attackers. But it raises the bar by at least $80 (and in practice by a lot more on modern machines with fTPM), with zero additional effort from the user (thus it can even be used where conventional passworded FDE is impractical, such as unattended servers). It's literally free security, and yet you chose to shit on it just because it's not perfect (even though the flaws would get patched up over time, as with any product).

I think it would be good if this level of security could become the baseline (even if it's not perfect) and would rather not have FUD getting in the way. You are of course welcome to use something stronger depending on your requirements, but this becoming the baseline is still an improvement over no FDE at all (still seems to be the norm on PCs).

> If you use BitLocker, they are always in kernel memory

Yes I understand, it would still means you'd need to either be root already or have a privilege escalation exploit to extract them.

I'm not necessarily talking about FDE keys here though (for FDE keys, if you can execute code just read the filesystem directly, no need to even care about the FDE).

TPM allows a machine to prove (with reasonable levels of security, requiring at least $80 to break) to another one that it's in a given state, and be able to obtain ephemeral credentials based on that claim, this avoiding needing to persist those anywhere.

> That's not what "remote attestation" means :)

See above.

> If you like that, just disable your password and you'll get the same result

Well no, because then any guy with a Linux live CD can get the data (or someone at the recycler if the drives are swapped and discarded without being sanitized), where as now they'd at least need to shell out 80 bucks plus a soldering iron and lengthy & suspicious-looking physical access to the machine.