While "the 4th largest military in the world" sounds awe inspiring, the reality was that when the Americans attacked, Iraq had a poorly trained "4th largest military in the world" that was also poorly maintained because of 10 years of economic sanctions ( https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/report/57jqa... ).

Here's what an American war veteran who fought in Iraq says:

> In Desert Storm, U.S. M1A1 Abrams tanks wiped out Saddam Hussein’s fleets of Soviet-made T-72s, and again the American Abrams-led invasion in 2003 revealed the T-72 was no match for U.S. tanks. And truly the American tanks were witheringly successful. During Desert Storm, for example, the U.S. and its coalition partners destroyed more than 3,000 Iraqi tanks. Saddam’s armored force, however, did not destroy even a single Abrams tank. ... The problem, though, is in understanding why the Abrams were so successful and the T-72s so poor. The tank is only as good as the individuals operating it, and as good as the units that employ it. I fought with Eagle Troop of the 2nd Squadron, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment at the Battle of 73 Easting, in which we destroyed scores of Soviet-era tanks and other armored vehicles, while not losing a single tank or Bradley Fighting Vehicle on our side. The reasons, as was broadly true throughout that war, were two-fold.

> First, the U.S. crewmen were highly trained as individuals. In my unit, tank drivers, loaders, gunners, and vehicle commanders had all mastered their individual jobs, then for more than a year before battle, had conducted considerable time training as platoons, then at company-level, and later we trained in squadron and eventually regimental levels. No one could have been more ready to fight than we were.

> Second, Iraq had done virtually none of those things, we later discovered. Their crewmembers had minimal training, had rarely if ever, fired their main guns in training, did very little unit-level training, and their maintenance programs – far more important in tank operations than commonly understood – was virtually non-existent. In short, the T-72 operators were poorly trained while our side was highly trained.

> In tank fights, the side that accurately fires first almost always wins. In Desert Storm, we almost always fired first, and because of our training, almost never missed. But even when the Iraqi gunners got off a shot, it was rarely on target. The results were fatal for them.

> ... Here is a little-known truth: if the Iraqis had had the same M1A1s that we had, or if we had been outfitted with the same T72s Iraq had, we still would have won, because ultimately, it is the man operating the tools of war that wins, not the tools themselves. Without question, the Abrams is superior in every way to any Soviet-era tank. But without proper training and maintenance, even an M1 can be defeated.

Source: https://www.19fortyfive.com/2023/01/ukraine-wont-get-leopard...

> ... When I fought in the tank battle of 73 Easting in 1991, our unit had conducted more than a year of intense training at the platoon, troop, and squadron level; that was augmented by another month of regimental-scale field training in Saudi Arabia before crossing the border to attack Iraqi armored units. We had every advantage, we had the most high-tech army on the planet at that time, and a virtual limitless amount of ammunition, fuel, and spare parts.

> The Iraqi enemy we were fighting had effectively no navy, no air force, and antiquated and poorly maintained Soviet equipment. They had been demoralized by the inept military leadership of Saddam Hussein, led in the field by poorly trained commanders, and whose crewmembers had abysmal gunnery skills – not to mention they had been subjected to virtual round-the-clock bombing by our allied air forces for over a month.

Source: https://www.19fortyfive.com/2023/01/ukraines-new-m1-abrams-a...