I get what you are trying to say, but it isn't true. This is the long version that explains why and goes through the implications at each step showing the hypothesis, predictions they make, and why your views don't make sense. You should read this if you don't think my other post makes sense, but if it just clicks you don't need to read this.

H0: Free will predicts in advance of a decision problem that when a decision problem is resolved you cannot always predict the result.

H1: A lack of free will predicts of a decision problem that when a decision problem is resolved you can always have predicted the result in advance of the result, because there was only one possible resolution.

Complete Refutation of H1: The existence of halting problems. A self-reference in a decision problem refutes H1, because the self-reference

Additional strong evidence against H1: All the most successful epistemological frameworks suppose a superposition over positions which on attaining information about the next position resolves, not to a position, but to a new superposition. For example science does this. It believes we don't know for certain the theories, but we conjecture guesses and use observations to test them.

Implication of failure of H1 and the failure to refute H0: There exists a self-reference, a sort of self-concept, which prevents the resolution of a prediction prior to the resolution. Self-reference exists as a thing which must be computed.

Okay. So now we pick back up in the mathematics that deals with self-reference in game theory. In it we find equilibrium concepts which are defined with respect to self-reference and proven relative to self-reference considerations. These proofs show that the solution structure contingent on self-reference is non-deterministic.

Implication: Not only does self-reference exist, but the consequences of self-reference is the use of self-reference to refute self-referential prediction or to support self-referential prediction on the basis of utility of doing so or not doing so.

So now we know a self-reference must exist, we also know it predicts a refutation in some cases of the ability to predict it. We can also see that if the self-reference didn't exist, it would imply that there was no structure which wasn't computationally irreducible like self-reference structures are.

H3: We will see everything is predictable from the information contexts available, because agents don't exist. Example predictions: that all physics will be determinable like the position of a planet is determinable.

H4: We will that some things are not predictable, because of the existence of illusions that prevent resolution and which contain a self-reference consideration.

What we actually observe is H4. We observe H4 in at least one case, so we can't infer from H3 that we can reject H4, because H4 already rejects the safety of H3.

Let me give an example: Some deer in Africa don't see orange. Tigers, to us, are orange. To the deer they are green. The tiger color is decided by a self-reference consideration with the deer perceptual system. The deer is not going to be able to predict the future state of all tiger like we could predict the planets, because the deer is caught in a superposition with respect to a tiger's presence. When it observes a tiger, this looks the same as observing a bush. Therefore, even if it sees a bush, it can't predict that it can always model the consequence of a bush. Therefore, if we see a planet, it is incorrect to assume we can always predict the consequences of seeing a planet.

So now you can understand, if my other comment didn't click, why appeals to illusion are actually evidence for self-reference, not evidence against it. So feel free to read that comment again to see if it now clicks.