>RU

RU has already established (and now increasingly streamlined due to actually building for war) defense industrial base + PPP and autarkic resource advantages + will be forced maintain beyond 2% to rearm. Canada maybe richer but they're also squandering 6.5B buying a few coast guard patrol ships, which is arguably more incompetent than RU who at least have deficient hardware in numbers to prosecute war, and also more closely reflects current broken state of EU/NATO defense which has dwarfed RU for decades but couldn't sustain a few weeks of war that RU can. That said, RU rearming not enough to threaten NATO again, as if revealed RU capabilities were, but enough to keep NATO occupied.

RU help to PRC is significant cheap resources, no one expected RU to help in any other way except maybe provide overflight rights (big for lobbing missiles over NORAD) and playing nuclear brinksmanship against SKR/JP. Just like US is going to be largely on her own in terms of force commitment for PRC war, without large power support outside of potential basing, because realistically there are no other "large" powers to rival US/PRC in TW scenario. Except maybe JP, but questionable if their defense bump fundable, or level of commitment in actual TW scenario.

>Europeans need to scale up

Yes, but "need to" being operating word, post Trump + basic historic EU/NATO coordination issues means they're pivotting towards indigenous programs like 4.5/5/6g fighters (JP/SKR as well) - stuff that will take decades. Major capital platform like surface combatants also going to be decade+ timeline due to politics. All the big ticket / long term expensive things they plan to either do indigenously or wean off US. Meanwhile issues with hollowed out defense base and lack of common market / per country acquisitions = it's not going to be a smooth or well coordinated process for long time. EU has potential to rearm but I have serious doubts they will / are systemically capable for doing it quick. EU+UK economy is smaller than PRC by PPP but more important is defense base and industrial efficiency simply not there. I would bet that actual urgency to rearm will decrease now that RU is diminished, I don't see west EU stopping free riding anytime soon especially with structural changes like expensive energy that's already deindustrializing like in DE. Smaller/poorer east EU near frontlines likely, but little savings there.

Which ties to more "muscular EU" freeing up US resources for IndoPac, which IMO is more rhetoric than sensible analysis. Beside hardware relevant EU defense not relevant for IndoPac, the primary issue of US resourcing is dominantly domestic US interservice politics, where despite all voices screaming for PRC pivot, relatively useless army is still getting largest branch funding and pouring stupid resources into CENTCOM - ~8X USEUCOM, down from ~12X after AFG withdrawl, that's where US is freeing up meaningful resources. Apart from funding UKR war now, EU defense post GWOT was relatively insignificant committment, there wasn't much juice to squeeze. Compare to PRC gains, quick napkin math suggests PRC is _saving_ 3x USEUCOM budget buying cheaper RU oil last year, add in long term cheaper gas, less competitive EU exports, years delay in TW arms shipment and structurally PRC is coming out ahead, at least short/medium term.