I'm aware of that, hence my comment about the many other issues that have to be considered in decoupling information from hardware.

1. First, most whistleblowing comes from B&W documents so color isn't an issue. If it is the case then there are alternative solutions which I'll not persue here in any detail (the post would be very long).

2. Printing then rescanning can decouple the camera to some extent as physical distortions are introduced by (a) the geometry of the inkjet nozzles or laser subsystem, (b) more geometric distortion is added by changes in paper size as its fused/dried, (c) additional distortion is added by the optics of the rescanning system, same goes for any further printing and so on. Also, each stage alters the gamma and adds other non linearities to the transfer.

3. Reducing the scanning resolution will add additional distortions, blurring is to be encouraged but not to the point of illegibility. (Doing a low resolution copy on a FAX machine with time/date/headers/footers turned off could help.)

4. This may sufficiently decouple the camera but it won't decouple the copying/scanning/rescanning equipment. Best do this on machines that are located well away from the source so they're not easily traceable or associated with you or your work.

5. Copying documents across multiple different photocopiers will help as they all add optical and other geometric distortions and transfer—gamma-type—errors. Deliberately lightening and darkening the image at each stage will further increase distortions. The combined distortions will make it very difficult (but not impossible) to reverse engineer the path back to the source. Have you ever wondered why the quality of the printed type in copies of evidence, FOIs, official documents etc. often looks so daggy and blurred as to be almost illegible?

6. The idea is to add as much distortion and blurring in the chain of copies as is possible and yet still keep the final copy legible/identifiable. It's a fine balance.

7. That still does not guarantee anonymity. Sensitive documents are often 'doctored' so that each recipient receives a subtlety different copy, spacing between words may change so may the page layout, also small seemingly insignificant and barely obvious 'marks' on the page will differ between copies thus identifying each recipient. None of the camera techniques above will overcome this problem.

8. One technique is to retype the document so that it is almost identical in both looks and content but with lots of subtle changes in both layout and wording—but NOT to the extent of changing the document's meaning. Same goes for modifying images (a complex matter). As a last resort this could give you a degree of plausible deniability in cases where marked documents are issued. If you do this it would be very advisable to spirit away actual copies of the originals in a truly safe location—you may really need them one day (after you're accused of, say, forgery). I'd suggest you only go down this path if you are very competent and the stakes are very high.

9. None of what I've said should be taken lightly. No matter how hard you try to decouple yourself totally from the source (or from any involvement) it is nigh on impossible to hide from formidable and sophisticated forensics if applied relentlessly.

10. Moreover, whistleblowers, more often than not, end up being reveilled by fellow workers and usually without a job or decent reemployment prospects. Unfortunately, our culture hasn't embraced whistleblowers and whistleblowing as it should. It's a very risky business. Take the case of whistleblower Daniel Ellsberg and the Pentagon Papers; his effort wasn't rewarded as we ought to expect and he nearly ended up being locked up.

Moreover, at one point Ellsberg wistfully noted that reaction by the American public to his efforts wasn't very favorable. When it comes to whistleblowing it seems not much has improved in the last five decades.

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Edit: FYI, there are many excellent videos on Daniel Ellsberg and whistleblowing on YouTube.