You're speaking about issues with corporate control in Go like it's some sort of theoretical thing. It's not. It's been here for ~5 years.

Those "high quality library of cryptographic functions" you mentioned?

Well, thanks to one Google employee, it is impossible in those "high quality" cryptographic functions to, say, disable in any way specific algorithms...except by modifying Go's source and recompiling it.

This is (and I wish I were making this up) because said employee has decreed that TLS/1.3 and all the algorithms in it are the best thing since sliced bread (guess who was on the committee working on the TLS 1.3 spec!) and it couldn't possibly be insecure.
Because, you know, history is not rife with examples of cryptographic functions (and perhaps more frequently, their implementations) being discovered to be vulnerable (in some cases, purposefully so thanks to NSA subterfuge.)

Further, they stated that even if it were discovered to be insecure? Well, Google will just either fix it or disable the insecure part, and release an update, and if you can't apply that update in a timely fashion, you have "bigger problems":

> Finally, about (removed) third point: if a security issue were to be found, we would publish a small security patch for all supported releases, like any other security vulnerability. A deployment that can't apply those timely has a bigger problem and won't be saved by TLS cipher suite configurability.

Because when you wake up in the morning to a TLS/1.3 vulnerability reported in The Reg and go "oh shit", it's clearly not faster to push a configuration file change or change a bit of your own code to immediately disable the affected algorithm...than it is to wait for the mitigation to make its way through Golang's release process, get picked up by the distro you use and wind its way through that release process...all the while you're vulerable, and have been for weeks or months because Google bribes people to keep their mouths shut via the bug bounty program and/or 'responsible disclosure' policies.

Because production environments always have the ability to push out new versions of a core package.

Because it's never easier to push out a configuration or code change, both technically and administratively (ie change control.)

Because it's not often easier to validate and if necessary roll back a configuration or code change versus a package change.

Because clearly every organization that uses Golang as part of its infrastructure has the technical know-how and infrastructure to grab Go source code, modify it to disable a crypto algorithm, compile it, and package/distribute it.

Because there's never a delay between when a vulnerability is discovered by blackhats, discovered by whitehats, reported to the project, mitigation makes it to release, the distro's package maintainer gets around to creating/modifying/applying the patch to whatever version they're actually still distributing, testing that / getting it signed off on, and pushed to update channels.

So, there you have it. One ivory-tower asshole who has probably rarely worked on an infrastructure team, who does not seem aware of, much less care, about the potential consequences caused by his decision...for people who are not part of the same organization that maintains the programming language.

I'm sure that if you work at Google and a problem with TLS/1.3 or Golang's implementation of it are discovered and reported to Google, you can count on that fix being made and deployed across Google's infrastructure almost instantaneously.

The rest of us, it seems, can get fucked and be vulnerable for days or longer.