Considering the security UI layers control device access, I don't think AOSP or Android in general (with its many vendor customisations) is the most trustable.

Knowing a PUK-code for a SIM card you own (and you can insert/hotswap) is all you need(ed) to unlock practically any Android phone until recently. Granted, this got reported and then fixed, it doesn't matter how good the TCB is if the front door is wide open.

I'd say that actual trust is hard to come by because you cannot trust what you see, since what you see is merely what is 'presented'. If a device says something like "the only Root CA I trust to sign my stage 1 boot loader is X", I still don't know if it is lying or not. I also can't do something like replace a SoC BROM since it's fused RO or simply a ROM (and not EPROM or Flash), or because the sources for that are owned by the SoC manufacturer, which isn't AOSP or Google, and I cannot inspect, build and run them. Hell, we can make this worse: even if I could flash it, who's to say that the memory I flashed is also the memory that is read when the SoC comes out of reset? What if there is a separate area on the die that has a different ROM that nobody told us about.

So trust isn't going to be purely based on "because this is the design we present you", but has to be based on non-technical factors and independent research. The former is mainly based on soft factors, and the latter is hard to come by and often just based on individual devices, not even an entire SKU release.

Architecturally, it seems to me that Apple with their own SoCs, bootrom, RTKit, iBoot etc. has a stronger platform trust case because they actually own the stack all the way with nobody else having a say about it. Especially with the spreading around of individually signed and verified hardware ROMs that don't even run on the same chips in the same device, a compromise would be very limited in scope. The only other hardware/software combination that would come close is the aforementioned Pixel devices since Google has almost all of the stack there as well.

On the x86 side it's a mess that will never be resolved, nearly every technology that was supposed to make it more trustworthy has been used to reduce trust and install persistent access outside the view of the OS. AGESA, IME, TXT, SGX, even the SMM implementations before any of those came along had problems that essentially circumvent any trust that was built up by other means. Even the hardcoded certificate signature hashes in the CPUs are coming in range if easy brute forcing (SHA1 mostly) which means that entire decades of systems can now think they are running trusted software from the reset vector all the way to the OS, just because a signature hash was using a crappy algo that was never intended to be used that way.

Windows is probably only ever going to be boot-trustable (but not OS-trustable) on ARM, just like macOS root-of-trust is pointless on anything before the T2 chip (and M1 later on). For Linux, it's about as trustworthy as you want to make it, but putting in the work is a PITA, so unless a distro or derivative (Qubes, ChromeOS etc.) does it for you, most users leave it as-is (untrusted).