> It’s worth noting that Iran was a democracy until the 1953, when the US and UK supported a coup to install a corrupt dictator

This simply wasn't the case. I discuss this in a post below, but by the time Mossadegh was removed he had used a fraudulent plebiscite (claimed a 99.94% victory) to dissolve the parliament he had been feuding with and rule entirely by fiat. The Shah also wasn't installed by the U.S., he had been in power since Russia and the U.K. removed his father during WWII.

Here's an interesting letter written by the naval attache to Iran about the internal situation[1], written three months before the Shah's removal. It highlights the complexity of the situation - Mossadegh trying to use the Shah's political powers against parliament, the British interested in curtailing the power of the Shah in favor of the office of the prime minister with the hope that a pro-British prime minister will arise, U.S. opposition to this because they feel the Shah is the only thing thing holding the country together politically. And excerpt:

> Ardeshir is aware that Mossadegh is planning to try to force the Shah to sign a Firman to close the Majlis and is fearful that by some means he might come close to success in this. However, in the meantime, intense campaigning revealing Mossadegh’s plan is now being planned and will be evident in a day or two in the newspapers and in the Majlis. If Mossadegh ever attempts to close the Majlis without a Firman from the Shah, Ardeshir feels that this would be Mossadegh’s greatest mistake and with the present strength of the opposition would be almost, literally, fatal to him.

> He also mentioned that in the voting for “Speaker” of the Majlis the opposition papers are encouraging the present internal quarrelling within the National Front. At present a bitter struggle is being carried on between Shayegan, Moazami and Razavi to be the National Front candidate for Speaker; this could weaken the National Front considerably.

> Ardeshir stated that it is evident to most Iranian observers that the British aim in Iran is as follows: To officially agree that Mossadegh should go, but not to actively, covertly, work to this end, feeling that the strength of the opposition itself will work this out and that there remains a possibility that by a weak change in government the British might be able to control the next government. The number one aim of the British, however, is to weaken the Shah’s powers to intervene in time of crises to the point that at some time in the future when a pro-British Prime Minister appears the most can be made of it. He feels that in spite of the weak character of the Shah such a curtailment of powers would be disastrous to the country and would place the country at the mercy of whatever adventurers might temporarily be in position of political power, and that the country is not yet ready for this. In addition, the only symbol which holds the diverse elements of Iran together is the Shah himself.

The actual history of the period is fascinating. It's a shame that it keeps getting reduced to a sound bit that has little connection to reality.

[1] https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Ira...