This little piece reminds me of Thomas Hobbes' "Of Liberty and Necessity" (1646, publ. 1654).[1] Hobbes would have very probably rejected the recursive application of "want to" onto itself as nonsense, but uses a very similar structured chain of reasoning as the author when it comes to "necessary causes":

"... But here I must take notice of certain words of his Lordship's in this place, as making against his own tenet. Where all the causes, saith he, being joined together, and subordinate one to another, do make but one total cause, if any one cause, much more the first, in the whole series or subordination of causes, be necessary, it determines the rest, and without doubt maketh the effect necessary. For that which I call the necessary cause of any effect, is the joining together of all causes subordinate to the first, into one total cause. If any of these, saith he, especially the first, produce its effect necessarily, then all the rest are determined. Now it is manifest, that the first cause is a necessary cause of all the effects that are next and immediate to it, and therefore by his Lordship's own reason all effects are necessary." (p. 261)

This "joining together of all causes subordinate to the first, into one total cause" is not far away of applying the tactics of a regular expression.

Instead of a chain of "wants", Hobbes speaks of "alternate succession of contrary appetites" and only the last one is what we call "will". In this view, the author's example of the drug adict would have been irrelevant for the problem. An adiction merely describes a (psychological) habit. However, the analysis of "will" is always about a specific, individual event and everything that leads to it, which can often include diverse intentions:

"... I conceive that in all deliberations, that is to say, in all alternate succession of contrary appetites, the last is that which we call the will, and is immediately next before the doing of the action, or next before the doing of it become impossible. All other appetites to do, and to quit, that come upon a man during his deliberations, are called intentions and inclinations, but not wills, there being but one will, which also in this case may be called the last will, though the intentions change often." (p. 273)

In Hobbes view a "voluntary action" is an action where somebody was deliberating. Only in this sense the person has a choice. And if the person is "free" to do something, this means that the process of deliberating is still ongoing:

"... I conceive that those actions, which a man is said to do upon deliberation, are said to be voluntary, and done apon choice and election, so that voluntary action, and action proceeding from election is the same thing ; and that of a voluntary agent, it is all one to say, he is free, and to say, he hath not made an end of deliberating." (p. 273)

Therefore the freedom of the will is in accordance with determinism ("necessary causes" in Hobbes' terminology), which is itself unavoidable:

"... I conceive that nothing taketh beginning from itself, but from the action of some other immediate agent without itself. And that therefore, when first a man hath an appetite or will to something, to which immediately before he had no appetite nor will, the cause of his will, is not the will itself, but something else not in his own disposing. So that whereas it is out of controversy, that of voluntary actions the will is the necessary cause, and by this which is said, the will is also caused by other things whereof it disposeth not, it followeth, that voluntary actions have all of them necessary causes, and therefore are necessitated." (p. 274)

Hobbes' argumentation in "Of Liberty and Necessity" has far more interesting details and touches a lot more related topics than I could have presented here. For those who want to delve deeper into the philosophical discussion on the freedom of the will, I highly recommend the text as a basic read.

[1] See: https://archive.org/details/englishworkstho28hobbgoog/ [pdf] (pp. 229-278)