>>>Can you provide exact quotes where they are making such decisions?

Transcript here: ( https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26079957 )

Nuland: Good. I don't think Klitsch should go into the government.

Pyatt: Yeah. I guess... in terms of him not going into the government, just let him stay out and do his political homework and stuff.

Nuland: [Breaks in] I think Yats is the guy who's got the economic experience, the governing experience. He's the... what he needs is Klitsch and Tyahnybok on the outside.

Pyatt: Yeah, no, I think that's right. OK. Good.
Pyatt: ... so I think you reaching out directly to him helps with the personality management among the three and it gives you also a chance to move fast on all this stuff and put us behind it before they all sit down and he explains why he doesn't like it.

So they came to an agreement that Klitschko should be outside the government, Yatseniuk should be in the government, and then got into the details of how to manage Klitschko (and later in the conversation, bring in other diplomats to help) in order to ensure they achieve what they wanted. It may not be apparent to a non-native speaker, but this isn't a conversation where they are just speaking hypothetically.

>>>Won't Russia just tactical nuke the shit out of theoretical NATO army that is in the process of assuming attack formation near their border?

Satellite ISR has a decent read on when/where nukes are being handled for the tactical varieties, and especially for the launch platforms. I would expect them to be priority targets during the air campaign. I would also expect the planning process to have Positive ID of x% of tacnuke platforms as a critical piece of the Go/No-Go Criteria...in other words, the invasion wouldn't be launched until the likely number of tacnuke "leakers" could be reduced below a certain threshold such that it wouldn't derail the armored thrust.

>>>I don't see how it is really relevant for invasion in Afghanistan

The initial invasion was an outlier in response to a Black Swan event, so no that's not directly relevant to the Petrodollar. Staying as long as we did? Arguably enabled us to threaten Iran from multiple directions, and also put US forces straddling the lines of communication between Iran and China (via the Wakhan Corridor). Those aspects supported Petrodollar maintenance.

>>>You can read a simple and balanced analysis that also discusses flaws of petrodollar system in [0].

I think I bookmarked this ages ago and forgot to come back and read it more thoroughly. Overall I agree that the dollar is due for a reckoning, and when it comes I expect a collapse of both the Western "international order" and the US economy. Hence why I think our global strategy reflects protection of the Petro even in cases where our values suggest we should have different priorities (example: not executing regime change in Saudi Arabia). But my point still stands: we can replace a nation's government, integrate their central bank, and despite not formally annexing their territory still benefit from their country economically, because we need to keep as many banks as possible generating demand for our toilet-paper-money, which they need to buy energy to run their economy at all.

>>>But why do they need all the referendums/annexations business if they invaded just to not let spooky-scary NATO in?

Ya gotta keep up appearances, for the benefit of the masses. And it creates a paper trail to trot out in international forums such as the UN later. "See, we totally did everything the democratic way. It's all above-board. Will of the people. We've got the paperwork." "Your referendums are BS because you killed half the people living there first." "You don't have the documentation to prove that."

>>>BTW Russians themselves don't claim that they invaded only (or even mainly) because of NATO, so I don't know why you chose it as (another) hill to die on.

It figures prominently in Putin's Victory Day speech: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/68366

Last December we proposed signing a treaty on security guarantees. Russia urged the West to hold an honest dialogue in search for meaningful and compromising solutions, and to take account of each other’s interests. All in vain. NATO countries did not want to heed us, which means they had totally different plans. And we saw it.

Another punitive operation in Donbass, an invasion of our historic lands, including Crimea, was openly in the making. Kiev declared that it could attain nuclear weapons. The NATO bloc launched an active military build-up on the territories adjacent to us.

Thus, an absolutely unacceptable threat to us was steadily being created right on our borders. There was every indication that a clash with neo-Nazis and Banderites backed by the United States and their minions was unavoidable.

Let me repeat, we saw the military infrastructure being built up, hundreds of foreign advisors starting work, and regular supplies of cutting-edge weaponry being delivered from NATO countries. The threat grew every day.

>>>So what stopped spooky-scary NATO from accepting Ukraine after it first applied in 2008?

Strong opposition from France and Germany. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/09/04...

>>>how much more time did sneaky US need to finally "bribe" all the other members to accept Ukraine as-is after the previous war?

Looks like it took until 2021. Germany's new foreign minister is pro-Ukraine and seems at least open to the idea: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/is-the-ne...

But I SUSPECT the French were still opposed until this latest invasion. I don't have a clear picture on what Macron or his government thinks right now, other than being pissed off at the Biden Administration for fucking over France for the Australian nuclear submarine contract.