> This is proof by assertion

That wasn't a proof, that was my thesis statement.

> If you are also referring to Strong AI, then I can prove you wrong with not just one but two examples of compelling arguments against the possibility of Strong AI. Roger Penrose argues computers are unable to have intelligence because they are algorithmically deterministic systems. According to Penrose, rational processes of the mind are not completely algorithmic and therefore can not be duplicated by any sufficiently complex computer.

That's not evidence, that's the assertion of one person who also has not provided any proof. There is no evidence that "rational processes of the mind" are not algorithmic. In fact, Solomonoff induction demonstrates that the scientific process actually is algorithmically describable.

> It does not remotely follow from the Bekenstein bound that it is even humanly possible to perfectly describe a human

Unless you are asserting that humans somehow go beyond the natural laws that govern the universe, which is what I mentioned as the only way to escape this conclusion, then this is not correct.

> Further, the Bekenstein bound "implies that non-finite models such as Turing machines are not realizable as finite devices."[1]

Not relevant. Firstly, as I said a human would actually be a finite state automaton. Secondly, not all Turing machines are physically realizable, but many are, and humans would necessarily be one of that latter class (the class expressible as finite state automata).

> A description is just that. A description of a book is not the book itself,

But if all you are interested in is the information the book contains, then yes, the description of the book is the book itself. Consciousness and intelligence are arguably information systems, which we observe by our ability to receive and respond intelligently to information.

If you're suggesting that consciousness or intelligence is something else that goes beyond information, then you are asserting something supernatural again, something beyond physics, and the burden is on you to justify this.

> More proof by assertion. You are asserting and not supporting your assertions, thus your argument is fallacious.

No, that's a conclusion that follows directly from preceding arguments, it's not an assertion.

> We simply aren't capable and never will be capable of perfectly describing a human down to the quantum level.

We don't need to do this. I'm not sure why you think this is remotely relevant. The only relevant question is whether whatever part of the human mind makes us intelligent can be replicated algorithmically. There is literally no physical evidence at this time that suggests that this would not be possible. All of known physics is computable.

Penrose claims, without evidence, that the mind utilizes quantum mechanics and also claims, without evidence, that this use of quantum mechanics is necessary for consciousness. However, in the end, quantum mechanics is just manipulating information, and classical computing can simulate quantum information processing by incurring only a polynomial slowdown, so this isn't really a barrier anyway.

> More proof by assertion. Assertions are not proof, nor are they valid argument.

You keep misusing the terms "proof" and "assertion". That statement was neither.