> That wasn't a proof, that was my thesis statement.

Your thesis asserted a false statement.

> That's not evidence, that's the assertion of one person who also has not provided any proof. There is no evidence that "rational processes of the mind" are not algorithmic. In fact, Solomonoff induction demonstrates that the scientific process actually is algorithmically describable.

It was evidence of at least two compelling arguments against the possibility of Strong AI, regardless of whether they are correct or not, they merely served to prove your "thesis statement" is false.

> Unless you are asserting that humans somehow go beyond the natural laws that govern the universe, which is what I mentioned as the only way to escape this conclusion, then this is not correct.

You've just claimed it is humanly possible to perfectly describe a human, while I'm pretty sure it's not possible for a human to perfectly do anything.

> Not relevant. Firstly, as I said a human would actually be a finite state automaton. Secondly, not all Turing machines are physically realizable, but many are, and humans would necessarily be one of that latter class (the class expressible as finite state automata).

You made it relevant by introducing the Bekenstein bound along with Turing machines in your argument. If the Bekenstein bound is correct then Turing machines are not realizable as finite devices. You can't have it both ways without contradiction.

> But if all you are interested in is the information the book contains, then yes, the description of the book is the book itself.

Unfortunately, we cannot redefine "description" whenever we like to suit your needs. The description of a book is not the information it contains, instead it not only
describes the content but also the physical properties of the book, such as location, dimensions, weight, color, smell, etc.

> Consciousness and intelligence are arguably information systems, which we observe by our ability to receive and respond intelligently to information.

Whatever floats your boat.

> If you're suggesting that consciousness or intelligence is something else that goes beyond information, then you are asserting something supernatural again, something beyond physics, and the burden is on you to justify this.

Like nearly all academic philosophy of mind sources, I reserve the term "Strong AI" specifically to mean software and hardware combinations that experience sentience or consciousness. This is specifically what I have argued against, the possibility that this could ever occur, no matter how much time, no matter how many attempts.

> No, that's a conclusion that follows directly from preceding arguments, it's not an assertion.

Here's your fallacious proof:

1. All finite volumes contain finite information, per the Bekenstein bound.
2. Therefore a human being can be fully described by finite information.
3. Therefore a human being can be fully simulated by a Turing machine

While 1 is true, 2 does not follow from 1. Simply because of the Belenstein bound, it in no way shape or form follows that anything of macro scale can be (actually the standard is "perfectly," not "fully") perfectly described, let alone a human being made of trillions of molecular, atomic and subatomic particles. Nor does 3 follow from either or both 1 &2. 3 is introduced out of the blue as a non-sequitur that does not follow from the previous statements, and reasserting such after valid objection is committing an infinite ignorance fallacy.

>> We simply aren't capable and never will be capable of perfectly describing a human down to the quantum level.

> We don't need to do this. I'm not sure why you think this is remotely relevant.

Then your description can neither be full nor perfect.

> The only relevant question is whether whatever part of the human mind makes us intelligent can be replicated algorithmically.

The human brain has many parts, but we are not able to distinguish between any "parts" of "the human mind." Mind is both a faculty of brain and a phenomenon that arises from brain. Mind is neither a faculty nor a phenomenon of algorithms.

> There is literally no physical evidence at this time that suggests that this would not be possible. All of known physics is computable.

Again, infinite ignorance fallacy. It is evidential that algorithms are not brains.

> Penrose claims, without evidence, that the mind utilizes quantum mechanics and also claims, without evidence, that this use of quantum mechanics is necessary for consciousness. However, in the end, quantum mechanics is just manipulating information, and classical computing can simulate quantum information processing by incurring only a polynomial slowdown, so this isn't really a barrier anyway.

I merely used the arguments from Searle and Penrose as examples of compelling argument against the possibility of Strong AI to prove that your "thesis" was false. Further, the elements of Penrose's argument that I chose did not mention quantum mechanics. You have built a deeply confused straw man argument with sweeping generalizations and distinctly unsound reasoning.

> You keep misusing the terms "proof" and "assertion". That statement was neither.

"Proof by assertion" is an informal fallacy. I was identifying the fallacy that you committed over and over. You can claim whatever you like, but unless you support your claim, it is proof by assertion.