> The US is talking the talk but won't walk the walk. There remains virtually no political will to fight other peoples battles. This is why politicians from both major parties have argued for leaving NATO. Americans are tired of endless wars and the prospect of another is unbearable.

I'm not sure this issue over Taiwan, certainly at the State level, is viewed as other people's battles. I think this issue is viewed squarely as what it is, which is global supremacy. And to your point about both parties arguing for leaving NATO, that tends to occur on both the far right and far left, but you see in practice massive support (99-1 kind of votes in the Senate which are unheard of) to support Ukraine even at the risk of escalation and in spite of the energy issues. Gas in the Great Lakes region was pushing over $5.00/gallon and not a single thing changed w.r.t US support for Ukraine. Europe is far more likely to bow out than the US here. But insomuch as both parties may have people who are arguing to leave NATO (which, no surprise is primarily due to Russian disinformation campaigns), virtually nobody is arguing to leave Taiwan to China. You can see continued US + ally action that runs contrary here. I don't believe that there is any evidence to suggest that at least the political leadership and State apparatus of the United States has anything in mind but maintaining dominance.

> Moreover, a protracted war with China will bring the sort of economic discomfort to the american populace not experienced since world war 2. American's don't have the will for it.

I agree that this is a risk, but the US is in a far better position here than China. While Americans may have a hard time obtaining iPhones, Chinese would have a hard time importing food or energy, especially as the US completely cuts off all shipping into the mainland. You're also guessing that this would be a protracted war, when that may not be the case. I'll dig it up if you are interested but the RAND Corporation did a pretty good study about the likely trajectory of the war and surmised that both sides would be incentivized to make the war as brutal and destructive for the other side as possible to get them to capitulate early, but that runs the risk of redoubling efforts to win the war versus capitulation. That is to say, it's possible (perhaps likely) that in the outbreak of a war we eventually wind up in a protracted conflict, but we may also wind up in a position where one side completely dominates the other and the war is short and intense. The scary thing here would be a long and intense war which I believe is most likely unless the US wins decisively and early.

> Russia's war strategy is very different from the west. Where the west see's troop and equipment loses as a negative, Russia views them as a mixed bag. Sure, it sucks to loose hardware but armed peasants will fight harder with the clarity of what loosing means. It's the pattern that won them world war 2 and brought them success in Chechnya.

I agree that Russia views this very differently than the west and it's why so many were surprised by Russia launching the invasion. They'd say things like "but why don't they just stop and sell things and coexist peacefully?" which is to misunderstand what the aim of Russia is here. However, that being said Russia's strategy, as you argue, of just losing troops until they win only works to the extent that they don't lose too much military equipment. This isn't the Red Army. You can also see this in the lack of Russia actually fully engaging in the war in terms of conscription, calling it a "special military operation", etc. Putin rightly fears that public opinion would turn against him and the war should Moscow and St. Petersburg and other more ethnically White Russian areas start to feel the effects in terms of a draft or something like that. So the point there is that Russia does have a limit on what it is willing to lose. Putin is in a tough spot as well here and so far has been unable or unwilling to commit fully to the war.

> Now more strategically think about it this way: Russia has no worries about loosing territory in the current conflict with Ukraine. Even if tomorrow they, say, provoke a Nato member by invading it... Nato will respond only to push Russian forces from their territory. Nato will not use nukes fist. And Nato lacks the political will to invade Russia or impose regime change. Since that's the case, Russia can really do whatever they want. Russia's warning to the west remains. Touch our land and we'll nuke you. And given no credible counter to this threat, Western powers will remain very wary of provoking a 'miss-calculation' that could lead to the use of nuclear weapons.

I completely agree that NATO has no intention or desire to invade Russia, but Russia runs a huge risk here as well of having its bluff called. Russia can do whatever it wants to Ukraine, and Ukraine can strike Russia (as we can see with attacks in Belgorod) without nuclear retaliation. But if Russia were to attempt an invasion of a NATO country, I think Russia military assets within Russia are on-limits in a similar fashion. It's easy to see where the lines are drawn because the US is/was basically towing missiles and equipment to Ukraine and Russia neglected to strike those assets. Both sides intend to keep the war contained to Ukraine for the time being because both sides think they can win. If Russia was serious about the nuclear threats (most of which the bluffs have been called) they would have used a weapon already at the outset of the war and seized the Baltics before NATO had a chance to make sure all members were ready to go. Given Russia's apparently reluctance to truly create a nuclear disaster and they're unwillingness to engage in NATO air assets feeding intel to Ukrainian missiles, you have to wonder what's going on.

> The same rational exists in Taiwan. So, if China invades Taiwan, Western forces might have a few exchanges with them, but do you really see American boots-on-the-ground fighting and killing hundreds-of-thousands or millions of Chinese troops? When would American troops arrive even? After China starts the war? Because that's what it will take to 'win' for Taiwan. Okay, maybe you think American would do that. That's just defense. Can you imagine American troops landing in China for the purpose of threat neutralization? It'll never happen. Since the west won't violate China's borders China is also secure.

Of course you know I disagree that the same rational exists here as Ukraine isn't an existential issue as Taiwan is.

But no I don't see the US undertaking an invasion of China or anything like that because it is both impractical and unnecessary. Troops on the ground to defend Taiwan or help retake the island? Yea, absolutely, unless China engaged in a fast, decisive victory which pushed the US out of the Pacific completely and permanently. Though I think China runs some risks there because Australia and Japan at a minimum will build nuclear weapons out of fear due to the void left by US exit of the region pending the fallout from such a move. But those ships, planes, air bases, troops, etc. aren't in the Pacific just for fun. The US does intend to maintain what I'll call Taiwanese neutrality here and there's absolutely no doubt in my mind we'd be in a shooting war with China over it because the alternative is the US loses everything. Wars happen because both sides believe they can win. That's why we'll be in a war here soon unless something changes in China.