This is assuming brief embargo (blockade) and inevitable hot war after will last longer than PRC domestic production + strategic reserves + war rationing which is projected to stretch out over a year. 4M barrels a day plenty for war economy and maintaining industrial base for total war, indefinitely. PRC is not Japan who whithers on island resources alone. Which is really the scenario that anyway blockade will escalate to, total war. There seems to be this strange assumption that PRC would just sit there and eat embargo and passively erode away when they will run blockades by reflagging vessels under state and escalate/counter in other means including drawing US into first island chain defense commitments by attacking US forces stationed in JP/SKR.

>What “wonks” are these

Naval War College Review, something along the lines of "tactically tempting but strategically flawed". There's host of other recent literature that basically concludes that it's not viable at strategic level. Or that USN is large but not nearly large enough to maintain an active blockade for long without abandoning other important commitments. Amount of shipping going through Malacca is massive.

>Who precisely

Every US ally in first island chain is a few cruise missiles to ports/energy infra from regressing into developing country. They're all islands for functional islands _much_ worse food or energy security than PRC, which incidentally is what makes blockading PRC strategically flawed, because it can't be done without crippling US partners. Consider actual scale of force deployed in theatre (overwhelming in PRC favour and growing) and in actual war, US and allies aren't so much as surrounding PRC as being trapped within PRC's growing A2AD bubble. Surrounding PRC works fine for peacetime containment, but during wartime it forces US to go near PRC shores where USN is most vunerable due to security commitments. As for vaunted US naval power, it's limited to what US can deploy and sustain in theatre vs whole of PLA arsenal that's designed to dismantle US sustainment systematically.

>PRC going to attack them exactly

Cyber attacks on critical infra - there's a reason Biden communicated to RU/PRC despite all recent military sheningans and literal war against UKR that attacks on US critical infra = same as physical war. It doesn't matter how offensively capable US power projection is if US is defensively existentially vunerable on the homefront. Which flies over head most Murica strong and can blockade PRC relatively cost free proponents, sure, US can punch hard but like everyone else in networked infra era, US (likey) can't take a punch, but more historically importantly US isn't so out of reach by geography and technology anymore that it cannot be punched anymore. US want to blockade 10M barrels of imports a day? What if PRC takes out 10 million barrels of refinery infra. The scenario is not US can just starve PRC imports, but US and PRC will go balls out in escalation spiral to cripple each other's homefronts to the point of being unable to sustain modern life.

Or look at where PRC conventional hypersonic development and bulk of R&D/aquisition effort is trending. PLA is not rushing to catch up on 11 carrier groups or strategic bombers, they're focusing on precision strike conventional icbms that is able to hite every strategic node/asset in CONUS. Really around the world, i.e. Pinegap in AU. Every major strategic US platform like CVNs, SSBNs, B21s, have to sit still for maintenance sooner than later. Like entire USN runs on like 8 fast combat support ships for high tempo operation that rotates in theatre keep up replenishment. The MO behind PLA systems destruction warfare is to negate US military advantages and cripple US ability to operate at all. Of course PRC is similarly vunerable as well, but at the end of the day US loses much more being unable to defend global commitments because she can't support her blue water fleet than PRC who barely has any blue water obligations in the first place.