There is no plausible reason to believe I wasn't arguing in good faith, although I guess "you appear to not be arguing in good faith" is the sort of thing that people post on here, so you posted it anyway.

As for whether I have any idea what you're talking about, I don't think that there is in fact a thing that you are talking about, so it would make no sense for me to know what it was. I think you're contradicting yourself in the same unselfconscious way as the neural network output (which, by the way, probably is not from GPT-2 any more).

The standard definition of "moral relativism" is the belief that there is no absolute standard of morality, not the belief that the law is not an absolute standard of morality. There are merely descriptive, meta-ethical, and normative variants, but nobody has advanced any of them in this thread. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_relativism

However, your idiosyncratic definition of "moral relativism" as "questioning whether illegal actions are always wrong" is, I suppose, satisfied!

The belief in an absolute standard of morality usually entails that the law can come into conflict with it; the only way to avoid that is for the law to be the unique and only standard of morality. This entails, for example, that the act of making or repealing laws has no moral weight, except if you violate the proper parliamentary procedure in the process; even if the law you enact, for example, licenses you to confiscate the possessions of your political enemies and give them to your supporters. It also entails that, for example, if the law orders you to torture your mother to death when you reach 25 years old, it is moral for you to do it and immoral for you to refuse. I have never encountered anyone arguing seriously for such a standard.

However, it would be possible for a sufficiently extreme moral relativist (in the standard sense, not your idiosyncratic definition) to argue that such a morality was valid or acceptable even if they did not themselves happen to hold it.

In short, the only way to not be a "moral relativist" by your idiosyncratic definition is to be the most extremist sort of moral relativist by the standard definition.

Any other person who engages in the smallest amount of moral reasoning will immediately see that in the world there are many sorts of laws: good laws, bad laws, laws that sink to the vilest depths of depravity; and, even if they believe that there is a moral obligation to obey the law, even a bad law, they will easily see that in many cases disobedience to the law is the least wrong thing a person can do.

Many other people believe that there is a moral obligation to obey some laws, but not others. For example, I believe that there is a law with heavy penalties that prohibits you from insulting the King of Thailand, whether or not you are in Thailand, and there are several similar laws in different countries that prohibit insulting one or another nobleman or religious leader, alive or dead. Very few people believe that there is a moral obligation to obey all of these laws, but wars have been fought over them; the Peace of Westphalia established an uneasy Schelling point that has held to some extent for some centuries.

As another example, currently both the ROC and PRC claim sovereignty over Taiwan, and their laws impose conflicting obligations in many cases; for example, the ROC's laws require 4 months of military service in the ROC military of all men at the age of 18, while serving in the armed forces of the ROC is illegal under the PRC's laws. Very few people believe that there is a moral obligation for Taiwanese men to obey both of these conflicting laws, which is impossible.

Other people believe that there is no fundamental moral obligation to obey any law, because governments are not the sort of thing to which moral obligations can exist, although of course they may consider it instrumentally useful to obey laws at times in pursuit of other ethical goals, such as preventing violence. Some of these people are moral relativists, but others believe in absolute standards of ethics, such as God, the welfare of all people, or the categorical imperative.

As for people whose ethics are governed to some extent by their peers, I have a word for those people, which I'll include here since you've already launched into name-calling.

I call them "unethical", or in more detail, "devoid of a moral compass".