> As far as I know, Apple requires iCloud password and PIN entry on an Apple hardware device being paired to iCloud to access Keychain data, and tends to block Apple devices by hardware ID when they’re associated with bulk login attacks. The attacker surface for phishers is exorbitantly expensive, since they’d need to have a shipping container full of iPhones to even begin harvesting credentials, assuming that they could convince users to turn over their iCloud password (which half of my friends don’t even know).

It's not my intention to necro an old thread, but I've been away for a while and haven't seen this. For the record, I have never seen a convincing argument for why these standards couldn't be applied to other platforms, particularly now that hardware attestation is a thing. It is very convenient to Apple that the line between what hardware they trust and what hardware they don't begins and ends with their own devices, even though there are plenty of devices on the market that could be verified using similar hardware checks.

Additionally, I don't really see how access to iPhone hardware is a deterrent against phishing. It makes it harder, maybe, a little bit, but it doesn't eliminate the problem. There's nothing in this scheme that I can see that Apple has published that says that it won't allow backups to be restored to used iPhones. Maybe I've missed something in the docs I've read, but I don't see why you would need multiple iPhones for this at all. Reuse the same one multiple times.

A password and pin is not a defense against fishing, and saying that criminals won't have access to a mass-market consumer device to me seems really naive. People do get phished out of their iCloud accounts, they're not magic. Getting users to turn over their iCloud passwords is how existing iCloud phishing attacks happen today.

What we see with the above scheme is Apple deciding that completely eliminating phishing attacks isn't as important as allowing iPhone users to back up their keys. Where they arbitrarily draw the line about how much phishing risk they're willing to target, and whether the location where they draw that line seems specifically designed to create the most vendor lock-in possible -- I think that's something that's worth criticizing. And I think characterizing the place where they've drawn the line as if it's a fact of nature rather than a conscious decision to decrease security and allow phishing attacks but only when it benefits Apple to do so -- I think that's an excuse.

The reality is that Apple's current implementation is vulnerable to phishing, and Apple has decided that leaving that vulnerability open is worthwhile for users. If I have access to your iCloud credentials (which are vulnerable to phishing attacks) I can restore your login keys to an iPhone I'm holding and then use those keys to access your other accounts.

> No one has yet suggested how this level of protection can be offered to end users without lock-in

To be clear, I'm not certain I would have any objection to Apple offering a secure level of protection that guarded against phishing, even if it resulted in some lock-in. But they don't. Hardware restrictions for mass-market devices are not a defense against phishing.

I am not demanding that Apple make its products less secure, I am demanding that Apple not pretend that security is the reason it's restricting its devices at the same time that Apple exposes its users to the same phishing risks within its ecosystem.

There is no reason why Apple could not (using the same access system they've already decided is good enough for iPhone restoration) also allow users who move ecosystems to access iCloud the same way and restore to certified Android devices. There wouldn't be any loss of security there beyond what Apple has already decided it's comfortable with.