> In my opinion Russia is running out of men willing to fight

First of all, let me assume you didn't poll Russians yourself. Consuming media's opinion is fine, provided we take it critically — this helps us distinguish between the facts out of which an opinion was formed later, and an opinion with the facts selected later to support it.

Second: I've been to the military, including active engagements, and in my experience, the troops start to fight because the other option is court-marshal, and they continue to fight because the other option is dying. These two are good motivators to put up the best fight possible in the circumstances. Questions like "is this war justified" or "are we the baddies" usually aren't given much importance on the battlefield; one is busy surviving another day.

> One reason to apply right now according to some is precisely because Russia is stuck in Ukraine.

That's a fair point, and it may get the loss ratio from 30:1 to about 10:1 or so.

Again, tactically it just made the task three times as easy. Strategically, I don't think it turns an unachievable goal into an achievable one.

OTOH, Russia is already eating sanctions, so the cost of the first front has already been paid; the second front may come at a lower cost.

> War in Ukraine seems to be about some sort of obsession in Russia about Ukraine, not about NATO.

OTOH, the war in Georgia wasn't about any obsession Russians have with Georgia. Because there isn't any to speak of. But both can be explained by being about NATO.

> They now seem to be equaling EU with NATO

Here's the thing: NATO is a military alliance weaponized against Russia, so Russia doesn't want to see Ukraine as a part of it. If EU is an economic alliance, Russia wouldn't have any objection to Ukraine in it. But if EU is an economic alliance weaponized against Russia, Russia (again) doesn't want to see Ukraine as a part of it. I think in the last couple of months, as we can see a weaponization of economy, finance, and even McDonalds against Russia (and weaponization of Russian energy against EU), the EU seems more and more weaponized.

> nevertheless it allows flexible interpretation

That's exactly the problem with it. In a case of need, this can be taken to mean anything. Ditto the "you are not alone" comment. Article 5, on the other hand, is very clear.

> Germany has promised even troops

Again, this is vague enough and may mean anything, between one company and the whole Bundeswehr.

> the Continuation War (where Finland allied with Germany) is seen as alliance of necessity

Not many nations are willing to admit mistakes and take guilt. This is not good for nationalism and patriotism. E.g. turks are in a second century to deny Armenian holocaust. Russians "conveniently forget" that in 1939-1941 they have been an ally of Nazis; so much so they count the war (which goes by a different name there) from 1941. Germans are a notable counter-example, but this doesn't come as their choice, does it?

In the hindsight, looking around your neighborhood, Sweden stayed neutral, Norway lost its independence for some years (but got it back), and Finland aligned with Germany. Hence "alliance of necessity" seems to be more of a retroactive explanation that allows everyone to save their face. If by "independence" they mean "independence from the Soviets", then it remains to be explained why the Soviets didn't take that independence at the end of that war. To me, it sounds more plausible that the Soviets were just not interested in governing the Finns.

One final note: the Soviets (and Russians) kept mostly silent for the last 70 years about Finnish alliance with Nazis, because it was more convenient for everyone to forget about that and move on. The Soviet/Russian victory narrative speaks about Germany and Japan, but never Finland. Now, I wouldn't be surprised if Lavrov pulls the Nazi card and waves it in Finland's face.