> Um, what? The Bretton Woods agreement was part of "the fiat currency situation we now find ourselves in" (just an earlier stage of it where the government was still trying to pretend to some sort of "linkage" with gold,

If USD was not linked to gold, why was a multi-country agreement needed to change the value of the US dollar to gold?

* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smithsonian_Agreement

> To call the monetary regime in place in the 1920s "the gold standard" is a serious misnomer. The Federal Reserve was created and authorized to print money (Federal Reserve Notes, not backed by gold or anything else) in 1913.

The Federal Reserve was limited to how much money it could "print" by the 1920s, which is why the article explicitly used that time period to make its point:

> It's not clear cut when exactly the U.S. was on or off the gold standard. We suspended it in July 1914 when the onset of World War I precipitated a domestic financial crisis. We then re-established the full gold standard in December 1914 after an aggressive policy response stabilized the financial system. This continued until we entered the war, and subsequently partially embargoed gold exports starting in September 1917. The gold standard was still in effect domestically -- meaning people could trade dollars for specie -- but not internationally. These restrictions on gold exports continued until June 1919, at which point we returned to the full gold standard. I have started from this last date, because there is no question that we were operating under the gold standard at this point. For more, read this superb Federal Reserve paper on the history of the gold standard from World War I through the Great Depression.

* https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/08/why-the...

* https://archive.ph/FWKcL

This limitation was one of the contributing factors of turning a market crash and economic downturn into deflation and the Great Depression. See James and Bernanke (1991):

> However, Temin (1989) argues that, once these destabilizing policy measures had been taken, little could be done to avert deflation and depression, given the commitment of central banks to maintenance of the gold standard. Once the deflationary process had begun, central banks engaged in competitive deflation and a scramble for gold, hoping by raising cover ratios to protect their currencies against speculative attack. Attempts by any individual central bank to reflate were met by immediate gold outflows, which forced the central bank to raise its discount rate and deflate once again. According to Temin, even the United States, with its large gold reserves, faced this con- straint. Thus Temin disagrees with the suggestion of Friedman and Schwartz (1963) that the Federal Reserve's failure to protect the U.S. money supply was due to misunderstanding of the problem or a lack of leadership; instead, he claims, given the commitment to the gold standard (and, presumably, the absence of effective central bank cooperation), the Fed had little choice but to let the banks fail and the money supply fall.

* http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11482

The economies of most countries started to recover once they left the gold standard as they could pump money into their systems to generate economic activity.

If there's not enough money in one's economy you can't do business. There are historical periods where economies literally ran out of money:

* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Bullion_Famine