> No, I am talking about boost phase ANTI ballistic missile systems. During the boost phase ICBMs are especially vulnerable because they are still slow, but you need your interceptors close to the launch site because you have to detect the ICBM launches, launch your interceptors, and catch up with the ICBMs. If you have an effective ABM system, you gain a better first strike capability because you can weaken or ideally neutralize a retaliatory strike, i.e. the opposing ICBMs are no longer or at least a weaker deterrent.

My first comment still handles this, mobile, and submarine platforms exist in part to counter this. I will quote my second comment:

> "First strike is not really important in my understanding. I thought the current doctrine was there was no way to first strike enough assets to prevent massive retaliation. There is no victory with nuclear war only mutual destruction, first strike or not."

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30570482

> But look what we got now. Even if my reasoning is incorrect and we ended up with this mess for other reasons, I think it is at least plausible scenario and we could have ended up in the current situation this way. But there would have been options, Norway is a NATO member but has all kind of additional rules like no ICBMs and foreign troops on their soil.

Putin demanded that Ukraine be unable to join NATO, not the smaller demand of not having ICBMs while in NATO. I would be surprised if If that was not on the table from NATO and/or Ukraine's side. If you have any evidence this was turned down I would be surprised and interested.

> You could pave a way for Russia to also join NATO. You could at least discuss concerns and try to find some middle ground. You could try to reduce concerns. It's not binary, you can work on reasonable perceived threats without being compelled to address absolutely outlandish concerns.

Russia joining NATO has been discussed over the years with the idea coming from both sides. I do not know the specifics of why it has not worked yet, but long term I am sure that is still on the table.

> No, there would have been no actual threat if Cuba would have gotten those missiles purely as a deterrent. The threat would be only in the heads of the Americans because they don't know and can not be sure that the missiles are purely a deterrent. If I point a realistically looking toy gun at you, there is no actual threat. But you don't know or at least are not sure that it is not a real gun, so you will act according to the perceived threat. And now that I am rethinking this I actually tend towards making a stronger claim than last time, you always act according to the perceived threat. Why? Because the perceived threat is everything you have, you don't have access to the actual threat.

This seems like a definition difference causing a problem. Threat is often short hand for 'ability to do harm' in national security context. So if Cuba has the missiles they have the ability to do harm and therefor are a threat. The national security threat is the ability and nothing else. In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, "The ability to destroy a nation, kill millions of it civilians, without risking equal retaliation, and where that ability would not have existed otherwise." form:
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30570482

I have been using 'ability' in pervious comments for this reason for example in:
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30578979