> yeah I'm old enough to be familiar with these things - is there some reason that you seem to think I'm in my early twenties?

No, i don't think that. Why you'd think that? If it was due to me writing about the ILOVEYOU virus, i wrote it because from your reply i got the impression that you thought the "Love Bug" virus (mentioned in the article) would be something different than the ILOVEYOU virus. I don't think age has anything to do with that though.

> first of all, most capability based security assumes applications have the permissions natural for them to achieve their task [...] It would have all the normal common permissions required to be an email client.

Yes, i agree with that and understand it, but...

> second of all, the access for the address book was requested by an attachment that was opened. [...] To reiterate, it is not the email client that needs to ask every time it wants access to the address book, it is any executable opened from it. [...] you have still not explained why opening an attachment would need those particular permissions.

...the issue wasn't that the ILOVEYOU virus was an attachment, it was just a VBS script that was executable like any other executable could be - it could have been an EXE file instead and it'd be able to do the same things as the VBS script.

To make it clear, an attachment would not need those particular permissions, but in the case of the ILOVEYOU virus it wasn't its status as an attachment that was the problem.

The main issue, as far as Outlook Express was concerned, was that Outlook Express didn't provide any means to help users avoid these issues (which BTW is not the same as protecting them from the issues - one case empowers the users, the other treats them as powerless). And of course Windows made the issue worse with hiding filename extensions.

As an example, nowadays Thunderbird provides pretty much the same features that Outlook Express had, including displaying of HTML content and even allowing access to the address book (instead of using some API you can use SQLite3 - but that is available in pretty much every language out there and the data is still just plain text). However you can switch off the HTML display or use a simplified one, have images not be downloaded by default to protect from remote attacks and tracking and it displays prominent warnings whenever it detects you are trying to launch an executable (this isn't ideal since, as i wrote in a previous message, many users will ignore the message, but it is still better than -say- Gmail disallowing executables completely).

> I mean I guess, since you said 'yes?'

And again to be clear, i wrote "yes" to that the email client would need those permissions (since that is what you wrote). The email client needs to be able to access the internet to function.

But the attachment is not part of the email client, it is just a file that in the case of the ILOVEYOU virus, it happened to be an executable. In a permission or capability-based system that executable would need its own set of permissions that are independent of the email client.

Which goes back to what i wrote initially: those permissions will need to somehow be acquired and the most logical way - and what, e.g., mobile phones do nowadays, since that is the most widely available form of permissions-based OSes - is to ask the user.

But as the link i gave shows, most users do not pay attention to these requests - especially if they happen frequently - and just accept whatever is presented to them because what they have in mind isn't the requests and permissions to give, but performing the task the application would be for. The Linus Tech Tips video was a recent example of this of a user blindly accepting through every request and conformation presented him in the pursuit of the goal to do the task he had in mind - he wasn't interested in whatever the system was asking, he was interested in installing Steam.

> It seems frankly weird because the only end to your argument that makes any sense would be no security whatsoever

No, that is a defeatist attitude, my argument was really that the UX of the capability system that was proposed in the linked page about capability systems was a usability nightmare because it flies in the face of how users actually behave when faced with them. They do not solve the issues, at best they just make developers feel like they're doing something good, at worst they work as a way for developers to pass the blame from themselves to the users for ignoring the warnings. Either way the user is not "saved".

There must be a better way that doesn't also remove any functionality from the system, but i don't really know what that would be. I'm certain though that a system that bombards users with confirmation dialogs aren't it since we have a ton of evidence that these do not work.