I can't agree, but maybe this is semantics :)

For something to be personal data, it must be information that relates to an identifiable natural person. There are two criteria here: (1) it must relate to a natural person, and (2) that person must be identifiable.

Your “loop over IP all addresses”example does not involve personal data because the information doesn't relate to anyone – it is just a list of numbers. Even if it were to relate to individuals, no court would order an ISP to disclose information about corresponding subscribers for such generated IP addresses. Then, the identifiability argument in Breyer cannot work.

In contrast, an IP address that is part of an IP packet received by a server clearly relates to the person sending the packet, if there is such a person. And, with the help of third parties, the person on the other end of the connection is reasonably likely to be identifiable. This does not depend on the website operator having any additional information such as cookie identifiers, other than the date. To avoid confusion, let me quote the relevant part from Breyer:

> 49. Having regard to all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first question is that [Art 4(1) of the GDPR] must be interpreted as meaning that a dynamic IP address registered […] when a person accesses a website […] constitutes personal data within the meaning of that provision, in relation to that [website] provider, where the latter has the legal means which enable it to identify the data subject with additional data which the internet service provider has about that person.

The only additional data involved here is that held by the ISP, not by the website. That the judgement scopes its conclusion to website providers must be understood not as a limiting factor (as in: IPs can be personal data only for website providers), but as a contrast to the uncontested observation that IPs clearly are personal data for ISPs.

An IP address that relates to an identifiable person is personal data by itself. Thus, its mere disclosure to a third party without a legal basis is a breach of the GDPR. The article you linked highlights the “absolute vs relative” identifiability discussion, but this reasoning holds even under the “relative” standpoint because Google too is a website operator who has the same reasonably likely means for identification as the original website operator, if not substantially better means due to its trove of other data it can correlate with the IP address.

In this LG München case, the court determined that sharing this data with Google was illegal, regardless of whether there is any additional data. It is, in a sense, a very formal argument, that doesn't consider it necessary to dive into specific fact patterns (that's the abstract vs concrete means part quoted in my previous comment). The court did consider the impact of Google's tracking abilities in calculating damages, though.

To summarize my disagreement with your comment: (1) I assert that an IP address by itself can be personal data for a website operator (such as the defendant or Google), per the Breyer argument. (2) The LG München judgement in this Google Fonts case is not concerned about additional data when considering the legality of processing. (3) Additional knowledge held by the website operator is irrelevant for both this case and the Breyer judgement. Since a negative is difficult to prove but a positive can be shown by a single example, could you please point out the paragraphs in the Google Fonts case[1] or the ECJ's Breyer judgement[2] where I'm mistaken for disagreements 2 or 3?

[1] https://rewis.io/urteile/urteil/lhm-20-01-2022-3-o-1749320/

[2] https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=18...