I don't appreciate your dismissive, condescending and confrontational tone but I'll respond to some of your points.

> The notion that Iran's economic actions on 'oil pricing' is any material threat to anything is totally unfounded, as they don't have the economic power to do such a thing.

The 1979 oil crisis [1] is evidence to the contrary, but as I said, that influence has declined with the rise of American and Russian gas, especially the agile dynamism of American fracking. I also explicitly mentioned that it is a threat to minor producers and aide to opponents of the US (Think about those under sanction.) It would certainly effect Saudi Arabia's bottom line to some extent. The exact degree of any of these effects is something hotly debated in IR.

> Iran's 'problem with oil' is not their ability to supply, it's that they are literally attacking Saudi Arabia both directly and indirectly (via Houthis) and trying to overthrow House of Saud, Bahrain, and eventually the other Gulf states. They're constantly threatening commerce (mostly Oil) in the Gulf.

No, the problem is much older than the Houthi rebellion and I did explicitly mention them. The Houthi rebellion began only in 2004. This conflict has existed since 1979 at the absolute latest. Let's not forget that the CIA and MI6 overthrew Mohammad Mosaddegh, replacing him with their proxy the Shah, in 1953. Mossaddegh's most significant policy being the nationalization of oil. [5]

> This antagonism by the way is rooted in centuries-old Shia vs. Sunni conflict over the righteous claim to 'True Islam'.

I can't agree. I think all causes are material and based on the security and economic interests of all actors involved as is basic to modern realist international relations theory. [2] Any flavor of Islam, by these theories, is just a means to an end, just a tool.

> Protection of individuals privacy, so that their emails and SS numbers aren't accidentally made public, are basically an orthogonal issue - not even business issues are aligned.

Yes, as I said, it's not in their interests and contrary to their interests since it would cost, which answers the question that was asked.

> This talk of a nebulous 'overclass' is not helpful to your argument if you conflate their own needs especially 'money' - which most of them wold prefer to make in Iran if they could. The US has a complicated leadership class that's not easily lumped into groups.

That rests on a refuted premise, but I'll say there's nothing nebulous about the section of the capitalist class able to afford lawyers, lobbyists, and bribes to effectively influence foreign policy. [3][4]

Overall, the main thing I think you miss is that all of the Iranian state's actions are perceived by it as being in its material interest. Its goal is to maximize its security and satisfy its economic needs and it's attempting to do that, just as every other state.

Anyway, it was just off the top of my head. The situation is complex and changing. I had no intention of writing a comprehensive dissertation.

1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1979_oil_crisis

2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Offensive_realism#Main_tenets

3. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_choice#Special_interest...

4. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elite

5. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9ta...