The US federal government have been spending 90% of their cyber security budgets on offense and only 10% on defense[1].

Practically speaking, what more could legislation and budget increases require of the US federal government to increase spending on defensive measures? Some ideas (without judgement on the pros and cons):

* Educate: produce more hardening guides and product-specific educational material more often for more products.

* Invest: run free or heavily subsidized training courses and conferences, provide sought-after internships, fund more academic research, fund open source project security improvements.

* Develop: produce new standards, produce new open source software products (previous examples: SELinux, Ghidra, etc) and encourage their uptake.

* Detect and advise (software developers): reverse engineer, fuzz, debug and find vulnerabilities in software products and advise developers immediately of any security issues discovered.

* Detect and advise (network end users): scan all US Internet Address ranges for not so much vulnerabilities, but bad practices or misconfigured and/or weakly configured services. For example, scan for and detect domains with an e-mail service that doesn't support DMARC, then send advisory notices to the operator educating them on the benefits of implementing better security for the service. For example, scan for and detect home security cameras that are exposed to the Internet with default passwords, then send advisory notices to the owner suggesting they secure their home security cameras.

* Increase domestic surveillance: tap international and domestic exchanges and/or require "metadata" to be recorded in bulk to allow an instruction detection system to be created across the entire country, allowing better visibility and traceability of incidents back to their origin, and the ability to advise private companies of incidents at the earliest possibility.

* Increase international surveillance and offensive measures: more aggressively hunt down, monitor and disrupt international cyber crime groups.

I would argue most of the above with the exception of investment and some limited development and detection/advisory are unlikely to have much impact due to:

* Historical issues of Dual_EC_DRBG[2], NIST elliptic curve rigidity[3] and other involvements with standards organisations and groups have all but burnt any bridges that used to exist. Standards organisations and implementers are highly dismissive of contributions from the NSA and NIST as neither organisation are trusted.

* Increased centralisation of Internet infrastructure into Amazon EC2, Microsoft Azure/Office 365/Teams, Google Cloud/Google Docs/Gmail/etc, etc allows attackers to easily launch an attack within the same data centre as the target. Vendors such as Amazon, Google and Microsoft are now solely in control of the ICT operations of massive segments of the US economy and end users just have to trust these vendors with much reduced ability to control and audit security of the service provided. As a result of increasing centralisation, there is little investment occurring in "on-premises" solutions including e-mail gateways, VoIP systems, document storage system, etc.

* Increased reliance on transport over Secure HTTP results in raw network traffic revealing less and less information on possible intrusion attempts (all traffic starts to just become TLS connections from A to B and it is much harder to ascertain from an outsider perspective whether that traffic is suspicious or not).

[1] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-defense-idUSKBN...

[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dual_EC_DRBG

[3] https://safecurves.cr.yp.to/rigid.html